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Market Illusions and Modi Mania

Sukumar Muralidharan

29 March 2014

Notions about Indias 2014 general elections being determined in the stock market

may be exaggerated, but not by much. In fact, there is an unmistakable

correspondence between successive upward notches in the stock market in recent

times and every step towards political pre-eminence by one of Indias most polarising

political figures, Gujarat chief minister Narendra Modi. The only point worth arguing

over is whether this correspondence is a matter of design or merely the outcome of

investor sentiment what Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has in a tired rhetorical

trope borrowed from the economist John Maynard Keynes long described as

animal spirits.

The Bombay Stock Exchanges Sensitive Share Price Index (Sensex) showed an

upswing in April last year, which seemingly coincided with Modis grand coming out,

when he broke out of his confinement in the local milieu of Gujarat as a person who

still had much to answer for about the 2002 riots that gutted the state under his

watch. There was one more upswing in July, soon after Modi was named head of the

central election panel of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Then came the

September exuberance. And we have not yet come to the euphoria of 2014, induced

by the opinion polls which have already crowned him with the victors laurels.

Even Modis most ardent follower, to be sure, would hesitate to put down these

movements entirely to his aura. Since the rally of the stock market in April 2013,

there was a near catastrophic fall in May, precipitated in the main by an

announcement from the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) that it would rethink the easy

money policy of pumping dollars into the economy, enabling Wall Street to play the

worlds markets. This was followed by a partial rally in July in the Indian markets and

an end to the indecision in September, when the Fed affirmed its intent to continue

bond purchases and ensure a world awash in dollars would not have to search for a

rapid cure to its addiction.

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That these policy decisions from diverse corners of the globe coincided with stages

in Modis ascent should be put down to happenstance. No responsible commentator

should read any deeper meaning there. Since the media frenzy began mounting

though, there have been a series of opinion poll findings through January and

February, which take Modi love always a subjective sense into an objective

finding that the party he leads would probably win a fairly decisive majority in the

general election. These findings all deeply questionable for various reasons -- were

just the tonic that the markets required to set course towards new heights.

If investor confidence was really driving the markets, there was a curiosity about this

phase of exuberance that media commentator Swaminathan Aiyar drew attention to.

The impetus for the upward market movement was coming almost entirely from

foreign institutional investors (FIIs) whose frenetic buying outpaced the keenness of

the domestic share holders to sell. That disproportion in money power seemingly

created a bias towards an upward rush of prices in the stock market, but fell short of

being an index of political confidence in the promised new regime. It was a situation

in which those who can vote (in the coming election) are quitting the market, while

those who cannot vote ... are getting in. This could be described in various ways,

but it was not as Aiyar noted, exactly suggestive of voter euphoria.

To take another key price indicator which (after a fashion) represents a reverse

barometer of the national mood: the price of gold after rising to dizzy heights during

the second five year tenure of the Manmohan Singh government, has since the early

months of 2013, shown some degree of moderation. Gold is the safe haven that

investors and small savers seek when times are turbulent. Yet the moderation in

gold prices could not really be read as an index of confidence since administrative

measures had intervened. The import duty on gold was raised from two to four

percent in March 2012, then again to six percent in January 2013 and eight percent

in June that year. Those were policy moves that gained little popularity with Indias

burgeoning and increasingly voluble middle-class, which in its mood of rising

resentment, could easily represent them as part of a continuum of measures taken

by Manmohan Singhs United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government to thwart the

legitimate aspirations of Indias productive strata.

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Gold has a unique position in the Indian consciousness. Early in 1991, the Reserve

Bank of India (RBI) gathered up a large part of its gold reserves and dispatched the

precious hoard to the vaults of a London bank, ostensibly to ensure that international

creditors did not call in the nations external debt. The global oil crisis of 1990 had

pushed Indias payments situation to near breaking point, announcing to a political

leadership rather innocent of the ways of global finance, that the borrowing binge of

the 1980s would exact a heavy price.

Official spokespersons in moments of subsequent candour, would admit that the

drama of hocking the countrys gold was confected with specific intent to prime the

public mood for a radical change of policy course. It was, well before Naomi Klein,

the Canadian political theorist and campaigner coined the term, the shock doctrine

in action. The drama had the intended effect. Manmohan Singh, sworn in as Finance

Minister in P.V. Narasimha Raos cabinet in July 1991, began the change of course

with little political dissent or credible challenge in terms of practical options. Some of

the middle-class insecurity spawned in the year of living dangerously was evident in

gold prices going up by close to 25 per cent in the year that followed. But the fever

for gold subsided rather fast. Over the next four years that Manmohan Singh reigned

over the Finance Ministry, the price of the metal increased cumulatively, by a mere

15 percent.

Manmohan Singh as Prime Minister exerted a very different manner of influence

over Indias gold psychology. Between the time he left the finance ministry and the

time he took office as head of the UPA coalition, the price of gold increased by just

about 15 percent. When the UPA coalition observed the one-year anniversary of its

assumption of office, the price of gold stood roughly 5 percent higher. In the next

year, it went up by an astounding 65 per cent. Since then, reckoning in terms of

successive anniversaries of the UPA, there have been just two years of relative

moderation. Today the gold price in the Indian market is roughly five times what it

was when Manmohan Singh assumed prime ministership. If gold fever is a negative

barometer of public confidence in the management of the economy, the vote clearly

has been a resounding negative for the UPA, especially in its second term.

For all the emotional ties that bind the Indian middle-class to the barbarous relic, the

stratospheric heights the metal has achieved in recent times suggest a spillover into

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a state of neurosis. There may be an element of rational calculation in the

investment decisions made in gold. But in 2012, the economy driven by all its

animal spirits seemed on the brink of an abyss that seemed deeper and much

darker than the worst that 1991 threatened, and official spokespersons had to

consciously disavow the positive rhetoric, repeatedly describing gold as an

unproductive asset in public statements, and rapidly escalating duties on its import.

The causes of this rethink were fairly clear. As the Economic Survey issued by the

Finance Ministry just ahead of the Union Budget in 2013 put it, imports of gold had

grown by 11.2 percent in volume terms and 39 percent in value terms the previous

year. In its contribution to Indias imports, gold ranked next only to petroleum and its

derivatives, vital energy inputs for Indias new economy. Gold in fact, contributed to

30 per cent of Indias deficit on trade account that year. And it was plausibly argued

that the feverish buying of gold was forcing the Indian rupee to new lows as global

traders sought to maintain a rough parity with the price the Indian consumer was

willing to pay.

In the official view, the higher duties imposed on gold imports beginning 2012 were

an absolute necessity to stabilise the economy. Corporate India though, had a

different perception. In its annual report for FY 2012-13, Titan Industries Ltd which

has a reputation for making precision watches but earns over 90 percent of its

revenue from jewellery reported that the year had turned out to be very special

because the rise in the price of gold started tapering off quarter after quarter during

the year, and finally crashing in April (2013) to April (2012) levels.

Titan is a part of the Tata group, one of Indias most storied business empires. It

seemingly had ample grounds for worrying that its own position had eroded as the

gold jewellery market turned adverse. This was partly because regional players

which should have remained confined to their narrow domains, started exhibiting

much larger ambitions. Companies were starting to get listed, much larger stores

were being opened across the country and substantial investments were being made

in marketing. And then most disappointingly of course, the policy regime had turned

unfavourable with the duties on gold import being raised. This sober stocktaking was

followed by a positive signal to Titan shareholders of better things to come. There

was reasonable prospect, the company announced, of a reprise of the decade-old

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story of India Shining, when the feel good factor was seemingly the principal

driver of the economy. India Shining as a story, Titan declared, provided the

tailwind for its jewellery division for much of the previous decade and that

momentum was still very much there even if less pronounced. In fact, the company

was prepared to assure its shareholders that there would be some acceleration in

this story, post 2014 elections.

India Shining is in the lore of the marketing profession, remembered as a case of a

nation being branded for sale in global markets as a worthwhile place to invest. Its

origins as a marketing trope are not yet properly recorded, in part because the media

which ardently promoted the mythology is not quite keen to recall how it went

overboard with a propaganda device founded on quicksand. The mythology really

begins in the last months of Atal Behari Vajpayees tenure as prime minister in 2003,

though few then thought that the reign of the affable and avuncular head of the BJP-

led government was in imminent danger of ending. The Indian economy had just

come off a very bad year with a monsoon failure in 2002 perhaps the worst in close

to two decades devastating livelihoods across large swathes of the country.

Probability laws favoured a good monsoon the following year and indeed, rainfall in

2003 was most beneficent both in quantity and geographical spread. Within a couple

of months of the official withdrawal of the monsoon usually announced by the India

Meteorological Department at mid-September the signals were clear. The

economy would enjoy in statistical terms, a record year of growth. The statistics

though, could not quite capture the trauma that large numbers in the country were

just recovering from. Nor could they even begin to understand the terms on which

the recovery was negotiated by each of the drought hit individuals and households.

Disregarding this apparent matter of detail, two senior advisors in economic policy to

the Vajpayee government, Vijay Kelkar and Ajay Shah, just two weeks before the

Diwali festival that heralds months of supposed comfort after all the hard work of the

sowing and harvest, wrote a front-page article in the Indian Express which in

retrospect needs to be preserved as an instance of branding gone disastrously

wrong. Titled Why is this a very happy Diwali? Top answer is reforms, the article

published on 22 October 2003 argued for a decisive rejection of the cynical view

that the rain-gods were solely responsible for the new economic dynamism which

had created a feel good sentiment all around. Momentous changes were underway

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and these would not be reflected in the reflexively cautious academic or official

understanding because of lags in the statistical system. The corporate sector was

doing well and so too was manufacturing. There was clearly .. something deeper

going on: it (was) not just (about) a good monsoon. And with all the evidence

considered, the answer to the whodunit was very clear: the reforms did it. Indeed,

said Kelkar and Shah in perhaps an unintended compliment to the process that

Manmohan Singh had begun as Finance Minister twelve years before, for many

years, the reforms process was criticised as pain and no gain. The results are now

manifestly visible. Having tasted the rewards of all the labours that had gone into

the reforms, the authors exhorted an unidentified collective undoubtedly intending

the whole country, including the smallholder farmers just coming out of a drought-

induced disaster -- to come together and put our shoulders behind similar far-

reaching reforms in areas that had not gained from the enlightenment till then.

Feel good was soon the slogan on the lips of every candidate of the BJP and India

Shining became the partys claim to a renewed term in office. It was a sales pitch

that the media joined in eagerly to promote. On 13 April 2003, as the campaign for

the general election to parliament entered its final month, the Times of India (ToI)

carried an extended interview with Prime Minister Vajpayee, which was in effect, a

celebration of his tenure and an anticipation of more to come. The preface to the

interview put it with absolute clarity: Two years ago it would have been difficult to

imagine Atal Behari Vajpayee heading the next government. Today, on the eve of

election (sic), he is clearly the front-runner. Not only this, his stature has grown and

the grand old man is seen (as) the biggest political brand. Sachin Tendulkar of

politics, you might say. Hes the one setting the agenda be it on economic reforms,

contentious issues like Ayodhya or peace with neighbours.

In an editorial accompanying the interview the same day, the ToI celebrated

Vajpayees greatly adaptable and acceptable qualities as a political figure under the

headline Vanilla Vajpayee. Atal (sic) was the flavour of the month, the newspaper

observed, since he was very much like vanilla ice cream. There may be bigger,

bolder flavours, but it was ultimately, good old vanilla that would prove the winner,

because it could blend in harmoniously with any other flavour or mood. By these

criteria, Atal-ji (sic) had nurtured his image carefully, so that he appeared to be all

things to all people.

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India Shining proved a monumental dud in terms of the electoral rewards gained by

its most breathless proponents. The Congress, having approached the election with

something akin to a sense of dread, stitching up regional alliances that it was by

doctrine averse to in a desperate bid to stem the BJP tide, was initially disoriented by

the magnitude of its victory. For those steeped in ardour for the Congress dynasty,

the verdict was an unequivocal affirmation of its leader Sonia Gandhi's claim to prime

ministership. Reacting with almost visceral disdain for this proposal, the BJP fielded

its most theatrical elements to loudly rail against any prospect of the Italian-born

Sonia Gandhi assuming the post. Vajpayee went into a seclusion that soon became

permanent retirement from politics. And his successor and close political associate

Lal Krishna Advani soon stepped up with his own judgment about the election

results. There was no positive mandate inherent in the verdict, he declared. What

was evident instead was a national outcome that was an aggregate of several

conflicting regional verdicts. Advani cautioned against reading the election results as

a "mandate for any alliance, much less for any single party and certainly not for any

individual". Having won a mere seven seats more than the BJP, the Congress was

obliged to follow the path of "maximum consensus" not merely within its alliance, but

also with the opposition.

In the immediate aftermath of the election results, it rapidly became accepted

wisdom that the BJP-led alliance had been turned out because of a mass upsurge of

those at the receiving end of its economic policies. The feel good mythology was

turned on its head. By that logic, it seemed appropriate for the Congress to reverse

course. Investors in the market soon stepped up with an explicit warning that

honouring the political mandate could mean economic suicide.

The arithmetic of the parliament that emerged made the Congress dependent to a

great degree on the sustenance of the parties of the left, which had turned in their

best performance in a long time. And spokespersons of the left were quick to affirm

that they would be keenly interested in ensuring a course of policy congenial to their

interests. On 14 May 2004, foreign institutional investors (FIIs) that had taken strong

positions in the stock exchanges, pulled out in droves, driving down the Sensex by

330 points, or six percent. Under a front-page headline that read Red Alert: Markets

See Red as Sonias Red Ally Flashes Red Card at Sell-off, the ToI reported next

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day, that the drop in the Sensex was the sharpest in over four years and had wiped

57.3 billion off the aggregate value of the market.

The didactic purpose of the mass evacuation from the market had seemingly not

been served. When the markets reopened after the weekend break, the FIIs drove

down the index by 842 points or 17 percent in a mere twenty-two minutes. After

emergency measures to staunch the haemorrhage, the Sensex closed the day 565

points lower. The erosion of value was estimated by the ToI the next day at 133

billion. Under a headline that described an ostensible quit India movement by the

FIIs a phrase deeply evocative of a moment in Indias anti-colonial struggle the

ToI reported that Manmohan Singh, still described as Finance Minister designate,

had called up the incumbent in that position, Jaswant Singh, to ensure that effective

measures were taken to stop the stock rot.

It was that very day that Sonia Gandhi gave up her putative claim to the prime

ministers post, nominating Manmohan Singh instead to lead the complex political

coalition that had emerged in the 2004 general elections. And Manmohan Singh was

instantly seen as a rather amenable figure from the perspective of the markets. On

20 May, the ToI reported with some satisfaction on its business pages , that the

markets were on a recovery trip and had gained 129 points.

Manmohan Singh retained his cautious and unadventurous attitude towards policies

that might potentially step outside the bounds of strict fiscal rectitude. Because of his

status as an unassuming bureaucrat who had been propelled into a position of great

authority in an act of benediction, Manmohan Singh was never really his own man.

Within the Congress party, it was the accepted wisdom that despite the lustre

displayed in patches, most parts of the country remained in a slough of despond. A

semblance of social and economic equity had to be restored if the democratic polity

was to be sustained. The Congress party, with Manmohan Singh reluctantly playing

along, saw the answer in revisiting the populist commitments of the 1970s and early-

1980s. This meant providing a stimulus to the rural economy in an effort to directly

address poverty.

The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) was passed in 2005,

assuring every willing individual at least a hundred days of manual unskilled work, in

the 200 poorest districts of the country. The fiscal year 2006-07 was the first full year

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of implementation of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Plan (soon named

after Mahatma Gandhi and now known as the MGNREGP). The programme was in

2008-09 extended to the entire country at the urging of Rahul Gandhi, the Congress

party prince looking for a platform to prop up his destined role.

Till the early years of the UPAs second term, which began after a fairly convincing

electoral triumph in 2009, there was no hint that the fiscal commitments made in

extending the right to work were a serious strain. In August 2010, Finance Minister

Pranab Mukherjee spoke with absolute confidence about further extending the

charter of rights and entitlements for every Indian citizen. The right to education

would be the first step, for which a possible outlay of 2.31 billion over three years

would be set aside. Following this, the next two priorities would be to operationalise

the rights to food and health. This level of ambition, Mukherjee said, would have

been beyond imagination in the 1980s when the government, despite best intentions,

found itself stymied in all efforts to directly address poverty. What had made the

unthinkable a distinct possibility was the turning of a page in the 1990s, which

generated the second wind in Indias growth story.

It is accepted by wide consensus that the Indian economy in 2003-04 moved to a

new trajectory of near double-digit growth. There is also general agreement that one

of the most significant contributions to the new growth momentum came from the

rise in gross domestic savings. After being in negative territory for years together,

public sector savings turned positive in 2003-04 and increased strongly the next few

years. Also turning in a strong performance was private corporate saving. The year

2008-09 brought about a partial reversal of both these trends, since private corporate

earnings were deeply eroded by the global economic downturn, and the compulsion

of fighting the recession through a fiscal stimulus obliged the public sector to

undertake a number of fresh expenditure commitments.

A sudden blossoming of foreign investor interest was another notable change in the

Indian growth profile in this period, portrayed in the media as a signal of confidence

in the Indian economy. The real picture has been rather mixed. Far from being a real

breakthrough, the surge of money coming into the Indian markets was probably just

a temporary high, arising from a lucky number drawn in the casino of global finance.

After a decade-and-a-half of indifferent or only sporadic interest in the Indian market

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as destination for both direct and portfolio investment foreign capital began

flowing in to Indian markets in significant magnitudes from about 2003. The sudden

upward spike in fact, begins at just the time that the India Shining mythology is

beginning to gain traction.

Except for insiders, it is never easy tracking the entry and exit of speculative money

into the stock markets, though the index of share prices offers a reasonable metric. If

the Sensex were the guide to locate that specific moment when India became a hot

investment destination, the 2003 monsoon was it. By conventional understanding,

accepted in both the folk and scientific accounts, the monsoon sets in over the state

of Kerala on Indias south-western coast on the first day of June. There are years in

which it announces a delayed arrival; even years when it fails to appear for weeks

together, by which time panic is the normal response among large masses of Indias

people.

In 2003, the monsoon arrived on time and showed the early vigour that promised

quick progress and plentiful rain. In June 2003, the Sensex, after hovering in the

3000s range for close to ten years, only shooting up to the mid-4000s in brief

episodes which were quickly brought down to reality, increased by close to 10

percent. The next month it further went up by a like magnitude. And then there was

seemingly no stopping it. By December 2003, it had crossed the 5000 mark for the

first time and was bidding fair in April the next year to top 6000 at just the time that

the India Shining mood was peaking and the affable and avuncular Vajpayees

claims to a fresh mandate were being widely described as irresistible.

Vajpayees banishment into political oblivion by a most inconvenient electoral

mandate led to a few months of sobriety on the markets. The earlier panache,

though, was rediscovered with the reassuring figure of Manmohan Singh in charge.

By November 2004, the Sensex had actually topped the 6,000 mark. Conquest of

the next psychological peak of 10,000 came in January 2006.

In the midst of all this, there was little room for considering certain evident sources of

deeply vulnerability. Portfolio investments though large in volumes, remained

volatile, with large inflows typically being accompanied by large withdrawals. Thus

after registering a historic high of 2.22 per cent of GDP in 2007-08, net portfolio

investments (i.e., inflows less outflows) fell to a negative figure the following year as

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investors pulled out in the wake of the global economic meltdown. Inflows recovered

since, but to this date, have continued showing a certain eccentricity and

unpredictability that leaves Indian capital markets in a seeming state of unending

confusion.

What is classified as FDI too is a very ambiguous entity. Rigorous research to

uncover the reality behind the mythology, indicates that much of the inflow of FDI

originated in known tax havens, especially Mauritius. A large part of the inflow was

for acquisition of shares in existing companies and could not be deemed to have

added to productive capacity. And over 70 percent of the money coming in was

destined for the services sector notably real estate and construction and financial

services as against just over 20 percent in manufacturing.

As interesting as the Indian growth story since 2003-04 perhaps more so if the

connection between the two were to be drawn out has been the escalation in credit

creation. The chain of linkages here is very simple: large volumes of money coming

in from overseas would under free market logic, have pushed up the value of the

Indian currency. To stop this, which would have possibly led to a severe contraction

in all export-oriented sectors, the RBI had to continually buy up the foreign currency

coming in, pumping equivalent rupee amounts into the banking system. Flush with

this injection of liquidity, the banks in turn pumped up their lending against real

estate and consumer durables, marking out for special attention the aspirational

middle class that was suddenly finding its dreams within reach.

It all turned sour in rather quick time. The share markets began to show signals of

incurable fickleness from about early-2008 and the money that was otherwise

seeking returns from investment in assets, began flowing into the commodity

markets, pushing up prices in a persistent inflation that lasted till at least the middle

of 2013. The engine of credit creation was pulled in by the RBI which found the risks

of inflation far more serious than dampening the free spirits of the aspirational class.

Demand for the glittering new symbols of affluence automobiles and real estate

began to falter and the large corporate entities that had made hugely debt-leveraged

investments in these sectors began disposing of assets to just stay solvent. Credit

portfolios of the banks turned problematic. Of the mountain of non-performing assets

held by the countrys banks today, a very large proportion is contributed -- according

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to top investigators -- by some of Indias most storied corporate firms. From about

late 2010, a cascade of revelations began to emerge about the unsavoury political

deals that had been made by the UPA administration to gift-wrap scarce resources

such as the communications spectrum and mining lands -- for the untrammelled

profiteering of chosen corporate cronies.

Despite the greater than anticipated majority won in 2009, public endorsement for

the UPA, at least in terms of middle-class sentiment, was soon in free fall. In April

2011, in a strategic time interval between Indias victory in the cricket world cup and

the beginning of a month-long carnival of uniquely Indian provenance called the

Indian Premier League of cricket the anti-corruption campaigner Anna Hazare led

a virtual insurrection of the middle-class, demanding a legislation to deal with official

malfeasance that would have virtually handed over dictatorial powers to an

unelected council of the virtuous. That mass referendum through the media,

disavowing all residual trust in the UPA dispensation was carried out one more time

and with more devastating effect in August that year, by a newly constituted social

coalition that gathered under Hazares benign gaze. The illusions were crumbling

and Manmohan Singh and his entire leadership team, left floundering for a credible

response that would salvage public confidence.

Political and economic managers of the UPA from then on proved increasingly

reluctant to emerge from the cocoon of comforting formulaic thinking into which they

had withdrawn. But as elections neared, the compulsion to stick with populist

commitments unveiled in the UPAs first years grew stronger. In July 2013, the UPA

pushed through a presidential ordinance making food security a basic entitlement for

every Indian citizen. Late the following month, both houses of parliament passed the

relevant law. The markets went instantly into a swoon and the rupee plunged to a

new low. Arun Shourie, the BJP ideologue who oversaw the disinvestment process

as a minister in Vajpayees cabinet whether out of anxiety at the political capital

that the Congress could harvest or out of sincere commitment to fiscal prudence

called for the food security bill to be scrapped.

The Congress response to a deep erosion of faith from its middle-class constituency,

spoke of a stoic determination to risk the alienation of this most voluble strata,

weather the adversities of a bad press, and stake its political future on the potential

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electoral rewards of staying the populist course. This has been one of the dominant

themes of the elite insurrection against the UPA: that the effort of the productive

sections which have put India on the world map go unrecognised while the political

class as the now common term of art puts it entrenches itself firmly in the seats

of power on the strength of a clientelist relationship with the poor. A highly liberalised

tax regime has been an integral part of the economic reforms package since 1991.

Tax compliance has perhaps increased but so too has the sense of entitlement. The

Indian middle-class has begun demanding proportionate attention to its specific

interests for all the tax rupees that it pays.

If an alternative discourse emerged, it remained on the fringes. From early-2012, the

UPA began to be seen as sunk in terminal paralysis, pulled in opposing and mutually

contrary directions because of the diversity of constituencies it had to serve. The

elite discourse then seemingly switched towards identifying and promoting the

political leadership that would be responsive to its needs. When Narendra Modi

travelled to Delhi in April 2013, he encountered demonstrations on the streets, but

enraptured crowds within the halls where he addressed gatherings of the elite. And

at a policy dialogue organised by a media house that had just passed into the control

of the countrys biggest industrial conglomerate Reliance Industries Ltd he was

given an hour on stage to put forward his perspectives for the future. This was

followed by a setpiece interview in which he came up with all the right answers:

pouring subtle scorn on the Planning Commission which is regarded in business

circles as a useless inheritance of the days of centralised bureaucratic planning,

talking up the benefits of foreign direct investment in various sectors, including

defence, and making a case for reform of the labour laws to enable rapid changes

and turnover of factory workers and office staff. There were few of the hard edges of

Modis early political persona on view. Just the seemingly inclusive rhetoric of

development that nobody can quite challenge without sounding like a person right

out of the dark ages.