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Lafayettes Success in Aiding the Facilitation of American

Independence

As one of the prominent generals of the Revolutionary War, Marquis de

Lafayette was crucial to the success of the American victory at the Siege of

Yorktown, signaling about the independence and earning him the nickname,

Conqueror of Cornwallis. Born in Auvergne, France of an aristocratic lineage

and military background, the Marquis pledged himself to the American cause

at a young age of 19, and proved himself to become one of Washingtons

most trusted generals and adopted son. Lafayettes success in

contributing [in the form of support, money, troops] to an American victory

over the British is displayed by his concern for his men, his zeal and undying

devotion for the American cause which drove him to secure aid from France,

and his consolidating a favorable position in Virginia during 1781. All of these

actions set up the precursory stage for Cornwalliss defeat at Yorktown.

The eight documents presented here in this analysis reflect these

qualities and actions that he exemplified and took: a plea for assistance from

Lafayette to the French Cabinet to explain conditions Americans are facing; a

letter from the Marquis to Washington in which he writes that he will march to

Richmond or Fredericksburg; a letter from Lafayette to Washington in which

the Marquis states the necessity of his remaining in Virginia to keep tabs on

Cornwallis, who has stationed at York; a letter from the Marquis to Washington

in which Lafayette promises to do all he can to stop Cornwallis from leaving

York and attempt to march downwards; a correspondence from the Marquis

(but written by J. McHenry) to Washington in which the Marquis states that he

has called for Comte de Grasse to send French naval forces to York; a


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correspondence between Vergennes and Lafayette in which it is stated that

the French King has decided to advance money and troops to America; a

letter from Washington to the Marquis explaining that the decision to have

him stationed in Virginia could be crucial for the turning point of the war; and

a Continental army officers account of the Marquis role in convincing Comte

de Grasse in staying at Virginia.

These primary documents show Lafayettes actions taken during the

last year of the American Revolution, and how his exerted efforts successfully

assisted the Patriots in their fight for independence by providing needed

supplies, troops, and other necessary support.

Letter from Lafayette to French Minister of the State, taken to Versailles by Col.

Laurens dated January 30th, 1781

This appeal from the Marquis to the members of the French Cabinet reports

of Lafayettes push for French assistance in the form of Naval backup, as well as

money and resources to equip the American troops to bring them into active

operation1; he sends the Colonel Laurens to report of the affairs in America

directly to garner the attention of the court. This is a measure of the Marquis

personal investment into contributing to the success of the American Revolution

by efforts to secure aid from the French government.

The Marquis writes of the naval inferiority of the Americans, and states that

it is not possible to make war in America2 as this lack of nautical reinforcement

hinders the efforts to attack the British soldiers effectively. He goes on to cite

several instances in which a naval backup would have allowed the Marquis and

American generals superiority in battles. Lafayette also invokes an emotional

1 Marquis de Lafayette, Letter to the French Cabinet, January 30, 17812 Ibid.


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response in the Frenchs strong dislike for the British by writing that Tories have

dared to say that France only wanted to stir up the fire without extinguishing it,3

implying that the British soldiers were viewing the French troops as inferior and

inefficient, and were only helping America under the guise of trying to exacerbate

the war. As such, Lafayette proposes that the French Cabinet send over

detachments from France and a naval fleet from the West Indies in time for the

upcoming Virginia Campaign, implicating that it would be a necessary move

politically and militarily to reinforce their pledge to assist the Americans and show

Great Britain that they were committed to this cause, while simultaneously

facilitating aid for the Patriots, satisfying the needs of both French bureaucrats

and Revolutionaries. In addition, the Marquis appeals for a transfer of funds and

resources, articulating that they could be employ[ed] against the common

enemy,4 demonstrating his contribution to the war effort. Again, Lafayette is

urging for French action against their hated enemy, and reminding them, while

obvious, but repetitiously, that the Americans have the same mutual adversary.

The Marquis zeal is evident in this document as he writes that from his personal

situation, he feels it his duty to present to the French Cabinet a true

understanding of the American soldiers and of the part which they will play in the

approaching campaign.5 This document was translated from the original French

language, and the possibility exists that there were errors in the transcription

process. Also, it is not evident in this letter if the Marquis call for assistance was

accommodated.

3 Ibid.4 Ibid.5 Marquis de Lafayette, Letter to the French Cabinet, January 30, 1781


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Letter from the Marquis de Lafayette to General Washington, Baltimore

dated April 18th, 1781

In this letter addressed to Washington, Lafayette provides status

updates recounts how in Baltimore, he was able to coax the merchants of the

city into lending the French general a sum of 2000 livres. This letter also


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states the Marquis commencement of his Virginia Campaign, the start of the

arduous road to what will be a significant predecessor to the Yorktown

Campaign.

This letter demonstrates the Marquis unselfish consideration for the

comfort of his troops by incurring the responsibility of borrowing a large sum

of money when the consequences were plainly that he will have to dispose of

[his] estate6 to pay back the amount. This was a crucial part of the Virginia

Campaign as his troops could not have performed the services required of

them without proper garments. The task of providing shirts, shoes, and other

garments that Congress could not obtain for the soldiers, who were

experiencing discomfort due to the unfamiliar Southern weather and long

march fell upon Lafayette, who took it willingly; this exhibits Lafayettes

supplementing the Continental Army with much needed equipment, greatly

assisting the Americans. Lafayette was to pay back the loan in two years time.

Reflected in his own words, Lafayette is shown as a man of compassion and as

an accommodating leader. However, this was a letter to the General

Washington, a man who Lafayette revered and respected greatly; it is possible

that the Frenchman felt the need to impress his adoptive father beyond the

call of duty. In this correspondence, the Marquis also informs General

Washington of his plans to reach one of the two Virginian cities as rapidly,

which was enabled by Lafayette providing his troops with new equipment, as

possible to try to contain the opposing Generals advancements. Lafayette

writes of the importance of celerity7 to follow [orders] as soon as possible8

6 Marquis de Lafayette, Letter to George Washington, April 18, 17817 Ibid.8 Ibid.


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to hasten his troops advancement to Fredericksburg or Richmond in order to

derange the calculations of the enemy.9 Lafayettes success in a timely

march to Virginia is evidenced by the reaction of General Phillips of the British

army, who was, a few days later, so surprised by the fast march ordered by

the Marquis, flew into a violent passion10. While this letter recapitulates the

commencement of the Virginia Campaign, one of the foundations leading up

to the winning battle at Yorktown, the plan to actually turn Virginia into the

warfront was not decided on until much later in August.

9 Ibid.10Marquis de Lafayette, Journal Entry Upon Entry into Richmond, May 4, 1781


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Letter from Marquis de Lafayette to General Washington, dated

August 11, 1781

In this communication with Washington, Lafayette explains to the

General that it would be for the better if he were to remain in Virginia. At this

point, it is understood that Washington was considering turning the South into

the warfront, and not New York; as such, the Marquis command of troops in

the South to contain Cornwallis was a move to consolidate and strengthen the

Patriot forces in conjunction with the forces of the Baron von Stueben and

General Wayne.

This letter reflects Lafayettes critical role of restraining the movement

of the British army in the few months before the end of the Revolution, and

informs Washington of Cornwallis exact location as he knew best, the

entrenching at York and Gloucester. The Marquis writes that Lord Cornwallis

does not seem to be leaving Yorktown for the time being, and that doing so

would furnish the Marquis with agreeable opportunities in the command of

the Virginian army,11 evidencing Lafayettes willingness to stay in Virginia

and report on Cornwallis; this shows his positive impact in aiding the

11 Marquis de Lafayette, Letter to George Washington, August 11, 1781


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American cause for independence with reconnaissance, and a Continental

Army presence. Lafayettes position in Virginia was significant in the decision

made a few days later by Washington to have the Continental Army march

south in addition to the information that Comte de Grasse would be sailing for

the Virginian coast from the French West Indies to provide naval support.

While the main ideas presented in this correspondence are clear, the details

of the tactics to be used are not disclosed due to the fear of letters being

intercepted; Lafayette writes that he would be happy [for] a more minute

detail, which, I am sensible, cannot be entrusted to letters.12 Thus, this

provides only a vague outline of the events to come and narrows the

understanding of Washingtons plans as seen from what the Marquis writes,

as even he does not have the specifications for what his role is to be in the

capturing of Cornwallis. This document does not show the exact actions taken

by Lafayette to gather intelligence on the enemy, nor does it shed light on

how the Marquis was containing the movement of the British army.

Letter from the Marquis de Layette to General Washington,

dated August 21, 1781

In this letter, only a few days after deciding to remain in Virginia,

Lafayette clearly details the movements of Cornwallis and the British army to

General Washington. The Marquis is able to discover Cornwalliss plans of

relocating the British faction down in North Carolina. Lafayette displays

successful contribution to assisting the American Independence movement by

12 Ibid.


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providing highly important intelligence, as well as acting upon it for the favor

of the Patriots.

Lafayettes efforts to uphold a unified front in Virginia until

Washington, Rochambeau, and the other generals are able to reach Yorktown

are exemplified in this document. He carefully and meticulously keeps watch

of Cornwalliss moves while taking the course of action that protects his

troops in the best manner, again showing his consideration for his soldiers,

and has them perform cautious reconnaissance and through that discovers a

significant ploy of the British to try to march down to North Carolina; Lafayette

writes that they will render it more difficult for the enemy to attempt a

journey to Carolina13. His actions from here could have altered the outcome

of the Yorktown Campaign significantly had he found out too late of

Cornwalliss new direction in the war, losing the planned bid for a successful

close to the Revolution. Lafayettes dispatching of several hundred militia

members to forage in the vicinity of the British troops for intelligence is an

excellent example of his augmentation of the war for the Americans; had he

not acted as he did, it would have greatly defeated the efforts of the Virginia

Campaign and the planned Siege of Yorktown. While Lafayette describes his

army as a little army14, there is no denying its force as a foundation for the

Siege of Yorktown, by keeping the British armed forces in the prime and

intended location for a combined assault of French and American troops.

Though Lafayette had a key role in holding back Cornwallis, that action was

simply all he could really do in his situation as he did not have enough men to

13 Marquis de Lafayette, Letter to George Washington, August 21, 178114 Ibid.


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engage in formal battle with the British in a tactful manner. It is also noted in

this letter that some of the stationed soldiers under Lafayette were prone to

some false accounts15 that [gave] them some alarms.16 Some of the

details Lafayette relays to Washington could be a consequence of

aforementioned false accounts.

15 Marquis de Lafayette, Letter to George Washington, August 21, 178116 Ibid.


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Letter from Marquis de Lafayette to General Washington, dated

September 8, 1781

This letter, written by James McHenry, but signed off by Lafayette

summarizes the landing of French troops in Virginia, and how the infantry

have been stationed for maximum tactical advantage against the British.

Lafayette writes this letter to inform Washington that he has sent a request to

M. Comte de Grasse to send naval forces up along the York River for

additional reinforcements.

Lafayette writes that the Continental army and the French forces have

been acting out of propriety, and not the desire to advance17 simply as a

means of being cautious, though he feels certain that were Cornwallis to

attack them, he cannot but repent of it18. This signals the growing strength

of the Southern front in Virginia as they prepare for the final battle, but also

displays how high-strung the situation was at that point, as both sides were

exhibiting great alertness; a single wrong move could have agitated

unfavorable responses out of either side. The Marquis states that their

presence has rendered Cornwallis to only acts of discretion. Lafayettes

prompting of Comte de Grasse to send up a naval force reflects his sense of

purpose for the Revolution by calling upon his French countrymen to come to

17 Marquis de Lafayette, Letter to George Washington, September 8, 178118 Ibid.


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the assistance of the Americans and does so by using the required proper

delicacy19 as to make sure Comte de Grasse willingly sends reinforcement

without what could be received as an unwanted prodding. This adds to the

consolidation of a strong force in Virginia, less than a month from the Siege of

Yorktown. While this letter was signed by Lafayette, he had been with a

violent headake and feaver20 during the time it was written; as such,

Lafayette had to be reliant on the words of James McHenry to convey his

messages to General Washington. There is a possibility that Lafayette was not

able to include all the details of the situation that he wished to or that some of

the details were reported incorrectly during his bout of sickness. This letter is

unable to show if Lafayettes careful plea to the Comte de Grasse is a

successful one, as it is not yet reported whether ships were sent up the York

River.

19 Ibid.20 Ibid.

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