Martinez 2014_Narrative Immersion_new Theory

M. Angeles Martnez

Storyworld Possible Selves andthe Phenomenon of NarrativeImmersion: Testing a NewTheoretical Construct^

Something mystifying about narrative engagement, be it with novels, plays, videogames, or films, is that it does not work in tbe same way for any two readers, audiencemembers, or players. Each of us undergoes tbe narrative experience as a personallyrelevant enterprise that differs from individual to individual. Why do some readersfind certain narratives extraordinarily relevant, wbile otbers feel indifferent abouttbem? Wby do readers find great pleasure in a narrative tbat years before tbey dis-carded unfinished? Or, conversely, why do people sometimes wonder at the featuresof a past self wbo could find pleasure and self-transformative potential in a narrativethat tbeir present self cannot feel carried away by at all? Tbese are some of the ques-tions that my article sets out to answer.

Recent contributions by the cognitive sciences to narrative theory, sucb as possi-ble worlds tbeory, deictic shift theory, and neuro-psycbological research into empathieresponses, have paved the way for fresh approaches to tbe long-pursued issue of read-er involvement in tbe narrative experience. Tbis paper will discuss bow, by combin-ing tbese cognitive milestones witb blending tbeory (Fauconnier and Turner), it maybe possible to move one step forward in our understanding of tbe dynamics wherebyindividual narrative experiencers project tbemselves into storyworlds, a move neces-sary for literary appreciation and artistically motivated self-transformation.

Immersion is an intuitively accurate description for what is required in narra-tive appreciation. Tbe most extensively used metapbors expressing tbis pbenomenonmatcb narrative engagement with being "transported" or "carried away"the READ-

M. Angeles Martinez is an Assistant Professor of English Linguistics at the Complutense University ofMadrid, Spain. Her research is in the field of literary linguistics and cognitive stylistics. She has pub-lished several articles and chapters on the connection between language and cognition in narrative un-derstanding.

NARRATIVE, Vol 22, No. 1 (January 2014)Copyright 2014 by The Ohio State University

Storyworld Possible Selves and Narrative Immersion 111

ING IS A JOURNEY metaphor; with being "gripped" or "engaged"the READING ISCONTROL metaphor; and with "reward" and "value satisfaction"the READING ISINVESTMENT metaphor (Gerrig; Stockwell). Tbe use of tbese embodied metapbors,however, is just an indicator of the difficulty in explaining what narrative involvementamounts to. Some controversial issues actually seem to challenge existing theoreti-cal paradigms, and all of them include vague references to crossings of ontologicalboundaries separating factuality from fictionality.

First I will review some of these controversies. Then I will briefly revise tbe no-tions of conceptual blending and of character construction. I will also review thepsychological notion of tbe self-concept, with its constituent self-scbemas (Markus)and possible selves (Markus and Nurius), and introduce the notion of storyworldpossible self Tbe study will discuss tbe possibility of establishing analogical matchesbetween readers' self-scbemas and focalizers' cbaracter constructs witbin a blendingparadigm yielding storyworld possible selves, or mental projections of readers insidetbe fictional world. As theoretical constructs, storyworld possible selves may be usedbotb in the disambiguation of discourse reference and in tbe understanding of atten-tion priming, empatbic attacbment, and emotional involvement in narratives.

Narratives are bere understood in tbe broad experiential sense advocated in cog-nitive narratology, according to wbich narrativity is seen as "the result of cognitiveactivity ratber than as a quality of verbal texts" (Olson 15). Tbis view includes multi-modal and transgeneric instances like films, drama, songs, or video games, and doesnot restrict tbe narrative experience to readers alone, extending it to viewers, listen-ers, or players. Altbough the discussion will use tbe notion of focalizers in written fic-tional narratives, storyworld possible selves should not be restricted to readers only,but to narrative experiencers at large.

Theory Gaps and Reader Immersion

The feelings of immersion that readers experience can easily be captured by meta-phorical language, as sbown above, but cannot as easily be pinned down by tbeoreticalparadigms. Some of tbe prickliest issues bave to do witb a) tbe ontological structureof narrative discourse and its levels of representation; b) psychological and neuro-psychological descriptions of blurrings of tbe self in interactive simulation environ-ments; c) tbe mtonymie nature of narrative immersion, as it is not tbe whole entitythat is transported, but just a part of it; and d) ambiguous reference tokens in narrativediscourse, like doubly-deictic you. Let us consider each of these in more detail.

DISCOURSE STRUCTURE, LEVELS OF EXISTENCE, AND METALEPSES

The analysis of narrative discourse as an instance of a communicative situation(Chatman 31; Onega and Garcia Landa 10; Rimmon-Kenan 86; Fludernik, Introduc-tion 26) frequently includes several levels of representation, each with its correspond-

112 M. Angeles Martnez

ing addressor and addressee, and separated by ontological boundaries that preventdiscourse participants at one level of existencereal-world authors and readers, im-plied authors and implied readers, narrative-situation narrators and narratees, fic-tional world charactersfrom interacting with participants at other levels. The rigidontological boundaries between the real and the fictional world imposed on narra-tive understanding by this paradigm have recently been questioned by research intonarrative metalepsis (Ryan, Avatars 204-30; Pier 303-304; Fludernik, Introduction100-101). Ryan defines ontological metalepsis in these terms: "In a narrative work,ontological levels will become entangled when an existent belongs to two or morelevels at the same time, or when an existent migrates from one level to the next, caus-ing two separate environments to blend" {Avatars 207).

In Pier's words, "metalepses fold narrative levels back onto the present situationof the narrating act, uprooting the boundary between the world of the telling and thatof the told or even, in extreme cases, effacing the line of demarcation between fictionand reality" (303), an extreme example of which can be found in video games whereinthe real-world player is invited to play the role of a fictional-world character, who be-comes the player's avatar (Ryan, Avatars 224-25).

SIMULATION AND IMMERSION IN NEUROSCIENCE AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Recent research into empathy and emotional engagement in the fields of neuro-science (Lamm, Batson, and Decety; Ames et al.; Djikic et al.) and social psychology(Oatley; Kuiken, Miall, and Sikora; Mar, Djikic, and Oatley; Mitchell; Miall) seems tosupport the metaphor of ontological crossing. The use of functional magnetic reso-nance imaging (fMRI) shows that the brain regions preferentially engaged in self-referential thought are sensitive to whether a subject has been invited to considerthe emotion-provoking situation from a first- or third-person perspective (Lamm,Batson, and Decety; Ames et al.), with the implication that strong perspectival align-ment may result in "a blurring of the distinction between self and other" (Ames etal. 643). This blurring seems to be particularly strong in simulation environments.As Mitchell explains, "'simulation' or 'projection' accounts suggest that perceiverscan use their own mental states as proxies for other minds. . . . [W]e might imagineexperiencing the same constellation of events, predict what we ourselves would sub-sequently think and feel, and infer that another person would experience roughlythose same states" (1310). Several authors (Oatley; Mar, Djikic, and Oatley; Djikic etal. 25; Miall) further explore the implications of understanding the reading of fictionas a simulation process, and the ways in which experiencing these simulations mayimprove our social and empathie abflities, as well as contribute to self-improvement.

METONYMIC IMMERSION

But the "overlap between self and other" (Ames et al. 642) occurring during thenarrative experience cannot be absolute, as readers, viewers, or players do not wholly,but only partially, abandon their real-world deictic parameters. Some of these remain


latent and baekgrounded, anehoring us to the physieal diseourse situation in whiehthe reading or viewing is taking plaee. Ryan emphasizes the mtonymie nature of"the thrill of immersing oneself in an alternative reality" {Avatars 124-25), remind-ing us that "we ean visit other worlds in imagination, but our bodies tie us to the baseof the staek" {Avatars 200), that is, to the real world. But it is not just the corporealself that is left out of narrative projeetion and immersion, as part of experieneers'mindsthoughts, plans, reeolleetions about dinner, job, summer holidays, and soforthalso frequently remains attaehed to the deietie parameters of the diseoursesituation. No matter how eommonsense this assertion may seem, it ealls for aetualexplanations of what determines whieh aspeets of the experieneer's self get projeetedand intervene in narrative engagement, and whieh do not; in other words, of hownarrative experieneers may beeome metonymieally and metaleptieally immersed instoryworlds.

LINGUISTIC ORGANIZATION

Doubly Deictic "You." The linguistie organization of narrative diseourse pro-vides reeurrent indieations that sueh explanations are neeessary, as it displays linguis-tie evidenee suggesting the existenee of a hybrid mental referent ineluding both thereal-world experieneer and a storyworld perspeetivizer. One of these linguistie fea-tures is the impersonal seeond-person referenee to a hybrid extra- and intra-diegetieentity, referred to by Herman as doubly-deietie you (Herman, Story Logic 342-45;Fludernik, "Category" 119), as in example (1):

(1) Whatever hour you woke there was a door shunting. From room to roomthey went, hand in hand, lifting here, opening there, making surea ghostlyeouple. (Woolf, "Haunted House" 5; my emphasis)

As Herman explains, "in doubly deietie contexts... the audienee will find itself moreor less subjeet to eonflation with the fietional self addressed hy you" {Story Logic 345;emphasis original). Fludernik also refers to the hybrid referenee in doubly deietieyou as a "erossing of deietie boundaries" ("Category" 105), and appeals to readers'familiarity with the situation depieted as the reason why this type of pronominal use"seems to draw the aetual reader into the virtual seenario" ("Category" 119).

Generic "One." Something similar happens with the generie, impersonal pro-noun one (Brown and Levinson 190-206). It is eommon to find the indefinite onesimultaneously referring to an intra-diegetic narrative entity and to an extra-diegetiediseourse entity, in ways similar to doubly deietie you. In some eases, the double ref-erenee involves an omniseient narrator, as in example (2), a passage by H. G. Wells.Frequently, though, this use of one is found in foealizers' inner speeeh, as in example(3), in whieh a eombination of free indireet thought and interior monologue is usedto present Denis's mental aetivity:

(2) On the village green an inelined string, down whieh, elinging the whileto a pulley-swung handle, one eould be hurled violently against a saek at the

114 M. Angeles Martinez

other end, came in for considerable favour among the adolescent. (Wells,The Invisible Man 45; my emphasis)

(3) They were snorting out of West Bowlby now. It was the next station,thank Heaven. Denis took his chattels off the rack and piled them neatly inthe corner opposite his own. A futile proceeding. But one must have some-thing to do. (Huxley, Crome Yellow 3; my emphasis)

These cases also suggest a hybrid mental referent dragging the reader across theboundaries of the fictional world.

Implicit SENSER in Passive-Voice Mental Processes. These are not the only casesin which reference involves a hybrid narrative entity blending extra-diegetic readerand intra-diegetic narrator or focalizer. The use of the passive voice with mental tran-sitivity processesprocesses of thinking, feeling, and perceiving (Halliday; Hallidayand Matthiessen)provides an empty intra-diegetic slot that the reader may feeltempted to occupy (Martinez, "From 'Under the Rose'" 651). Consider example (4):

(4) One day one would get up at six o'clock and pedal away to Kenilworth,or Stratford-on-Avonanywhere. And within a radius of twenty mfles therewere always Norman churches and Tudor mansions to be seen in the courseof an afternoon's excursion. Somehow they never did get seen, but afl thesame it was nice to feel that the bicycle was there, and that one fine morningone really might get up at six. (Huxley 4; my emphasis)

Mental processes usually involve the focalizer as SENSER, in this case Denis in Al-dous Huxley's Crome Yellow, whose presence is further diluted by the use of the in-definite one on two occasions. In the absence of an explicit perceiving entity inside thefictional world, the reader may eventually be dragged in to occupy the slot created bythe grammar of the clause.

Facework in Focalizers' Inner Speech. Facework is understood as a sum of in-teraction strategies aimed at the cooperative management of face. The study of faceand facework (Goffman) over the past decade has focused on their interactional na-ture (Arundale; Haugh), on their connection to the development of discourse aims(LPRG), and on the essential role they play in participants' identity construction(Spencer-Oatey 648). Inner speech is the term broadly used to refer to the narra-tive presentation of a character's consciousness (Cohn; Herman, Story Logic; Palmer,Fictional Minds; Fludernik, Introduction; Palmer, "Mind"; Herman, Emergence). Thepresence of interactional facework in focalizers' inner speech in verbal narratives ismassive, in the form of both connectedness and separateness strategies. Among theformer are ellipses, as in example (5), the use of in-group terminology, question tags,intensifiers, code-switching, repetitions, or agreement tokens (Brown and Levinson103-29). Among the latter are hedges, indirectness, giving reasons, impersonaliza-tion, and understatements (Brown and Levinson 129-209), as in example (6):

(5) She'd seen it afl. Been there, done that, bought the T-shirt [my emphasis].But this one made her shudder.


Interesting. (Lindsay 18-19; emphasis original except where noted)(6). . . yet be was admirable witb her busband; yet his manners certainly

wanted improving; yet sbe liked bis laughthinking this, as she came down-stairs, sbe noticed tbat sbe could now see the moon itself tbrougb tbe stair-case window. (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 174; my emphasis)

Interactional facework presupposes two discourse entities at tbe same ontologicallevel. Strictly speaking, it could not be claimed tbat the facework found in focalizers'inner speech is addressed at readers, as inner speech is, by default, addressed at one-self However, readers no doubt "overbear" (Garcia Landa) focalizers' inner speech,and could ultimately feel inclined to metaleptically share tbe addressee role witb thefocalizing consciousness.

Wbat tbese apparent cul-de-sacs suggest is that ontological boundaries do ex-ist, but that there are ways to move across tbem; tbat, in tbe case of the real and thefictional world, these cross-boundary moves do not, obviously, involve the "whole"reader, not even tbe wbole of tbe reader's mind, as a substantial part of it remainslatently anchored to tbe contextual situation in whicb tbe reading takes place; thatsome part of tbe reader's mind does make a move across ontological boundaries; thattbis part of tbe mind has to be in an appropriate format tbat allows cross-boundaryprojection and existence within tbe ontology of the storyworld; and tbat tbe cross-boundary reader's move needs a theoretical frame in which to occur, so that existingcontradictions may be resolved.

Conceptual Blending

As can be observed in tbe previous section, many of the metapbors used to try tocapture tbe nature of narrative immersion also seem to involve tbe concept of blend.Ryan explains tbat two separate environments seem to blend wben existents migratefrom one level to anotber in metaleptic transgression {Avatars 207), and Pier refersto an effacement of the line of demarcation between fiction and reality during meta-lepsis, too (303).

Neuroscientists mention "a blurring of the distinction between self and other"(Ames et al. 643) and an "overlap between self and otber" (Ames et al. 642) resultingfrom intense perspectival alignment, and social psychologists explain tbat simula-tion experiences require experiencers' minds to function "as proxies for other minds"(Mitchell 1310). Gognitive narratologists go even further and refer to a conflationof tbe audience with tbe fictional self addressed by you (Herman, Story Logic 345),pointing out tbat the hybrid reference in doubly deictic yow "seems to draw tbe actualreader into tbe virtual scenario" (Fludernik, "Gategory" 119).

Gonceptual blending tbeory (Goulson and Oakley; Fauconnier and Turner) maytbus prove a useful paradigm to approach narrative immersion from the standpointof its idiosyncratic, individual reader-specific nature. In Fauconnier and Turner'smodel, two or more mental spaces are conceptually connected through matching


relations of a metaphorical nature. Matching features across two spaces are furtherprojected into a new, emergent mental space, called tbe emergent structure, or blend.Tbe blend tbus contains features from the two input spaces, but tbe blending processalso yields furtber features tbat did not previously exist in any of the input spaces,but wbich have resulted from the conceptual operation itself. Tbese may now be pro-jected back into the input spaces and enricb or modify tbem. Conceptual blendingthus ideally accounts for some of tbe most bidden creative aspects of cognition, andmay serve to explain tbe personal, interactive, and creative experience that narrativeengagement is believed to be.

A conceptual integration operation requires two isomorpbic mental spacesacross which analogical matches may be established. Since this research is concernedwitb tbe aspects of the narrative experiencer's self that are projected into tbe story-world, it seems logical that experiencers' self-scbemas, or mental representations oftbemselves, sbould be one of the input spaces involved in tbe blend. As tbe blur-ring of the experiencer's self is recurrently connected to tbe fictional world entity-narrator or focalizerproviding perspectival viewpoint, the other mental spaceshould involve the mental representation of one of these entities. For tbe sake ofconciseness, my investigation will focus on tbe cbaracter construct for tbe focalizer.However, in tbe case of verbal narratives, furtber researcb sbould explore analogicalmatches between readers' and narrators' mental constructsas tbese are perspectiv-izers within the narrating situationand even between readers and cbaracters othertban focalizers inside the fictional world.

Character Constructs

The construal of a mental model for tbe focalizer is subject to tbe same processesintervening in cbaracter construction at large, wbicb Emmott describes in tbe fol-lowing terms: "As we read we collect information from tbe text about eacb cbarac-ter. . . . We build an 'image' of a cbaracter in our mind and with every subsequentmention of the individual we not only add to tbis MENTAL REPRESENTATION . . .but utilize if (221). Tbis information comes in varied forms, from descriptive mate-rial to otber cbaracters' comments and evaluations, and one of its main sources isthe intramental presentation of tbe character's consciousness in tbe form of innerspeech (Margolin 56).

The mental image of a cbaracter that Emmott refers to is constructed in wayssimilar to tbose in wbich mental representations of real-world individuals are built.In fact, as Herman points out, "Wben I categorize a being as a person, I ipso factoassume tbat be or she instantiates a constellation of mental and material predicatespredicates that are linked togetber in patterns specified by models of persons circulat-ing in my culture or subculture. In turn, characters in novels can be viewed as modelpersons" ("Post-Gartesian" 2).

This suggests that the mental modeling of fictional cbaracters is grounded onsocio-cultural categorization processes similar to tbose employed in tbe categoriza-


tion of actual human beings. In his research into fictional minds. Palmer also insistson their similarities with real minds, and explains that "Any challenge to this ap-proach that argues that fictional minds are semiotic constructs and therefore utterlyand unabridgeably different from real minds does not, in my view, work. They arecertainly semiotic constructs, but many of the semiotic operations that are necessaryto recover meaning from them involve those aspects of fictional minds that are simi-lar to real minds" ("Mind" 86).

These approaches to character construction suggest that character constructs,as mental spaces, should be considered isomorphic with our mental spaces for realpeople, in the sense that their constitutive features and internal structure will allowcross-space analogical matches if the appropriate matching relations hold.

The Self Concept

While character constructs are solidly accounted for in narrative theory, this is notthe case with readers' mental representations of themselves. Luckily, social psychol-ogy has a long tradition in the study of the individual's self-concept. The self-conceptis a complex mental structure of the self containing episodic, semantic, and proce-dural knowledge, built from our interaction with the physical and the social world,and consisting of two main types of interrelated modules: self-schemas and possi-ble selves. These notions have been successfully applied in the social sciences in ar-eas as varied as medical therapy and behavior (Linville; Young), political discourse(Duncan), education (Alexander), business (Jameson), advertising (Edson-Escalas;Wheeler, Petty, and Bizer), intercultural communication (Bochner), and the studyof interactional face (Spencer-Oatey), but they have not so far been applied in theareas of narratology and narrative discourse analysis. However, as mental representa-tions of the self, their potential for the analysis of narrative immersion and interactionshould not be underestimated.

SELF-SCHEMAS

The view that the self can be understood as a network of interrelated schmas istraced back to the work of Markus, who emphasizes the social component of this cog-nitive structure, stressing that the building blocks that constitute the self, and whichshe terms self-schemata, are construed on the basis of the individual's exposure to andinteraction with the social environment. This is how Markus defines self-schemata:"Self-schemata are cognitive generalizations about the self, derived from past experi-ence, that organize and guide the processing of the self-related information containedin individuals' social experience" (63).

Self-schemas, as they are commonly referred to, "integrate and summarize a per-son's thoughts, feelings, and experiences about the self in a specific behavioral do-main" (Stein 188), and function as self-perceived category memberships for oneself.


based on self- and other-evaluations, whieh inelude physical characteristics, person-ality traits, soeial and professional roles, gender, ethnieity, ideology, skills, or partieu-lar interests and hobbies. Individuals may entertain a variety of eomplex, eo-existingself-sehemas about their interaetional roles, sueh as the self as parent, friend, roman-tie partner, professional member, eolleague, boss, Sportsperson, einema-goer, eonser-vative, or animal-lover.

Logieally, not everybody has all types of schmas. People may be schematic oraschematic in a domain (Markus), depending on whether they have self-sehemas foreategory membership in that domain or not. Being sehematie in a domain involvespossessing eognitive generalizations about domain-speeifie aspeets of oneself derivedfrom past experienee, whieh influenee eurrent behavior and projeet domain-speeifieexpeetations on future imagings of the self On the eontrary, people who are asehe-matie on a partieular dimension do not invest time or mental aetivity on related at-tributes, events, or situations. These properties of self-sehemas may be easily reeog-nized as priming effeets (Smith 410), in the sense that they influenee attention andprompt faster proeessing of related information, as well as eontain proeedural seriptsfor sehema-related behavior.

Although self-sehemas may be modified, this is undergone with resistanee, asthey are pereeived as eore representations of the self However, exposure to and inter-aetion with a variety of soeial situations requiring new roles and strategies not onlyinereases and enriehes the eomplexity of the network, but may also introduee ehangesin the working self-concept, or eurrently aetivated self-sehema eontaining the subset ofsemantie, episodie, and proeedural knowledge that is eontextually aetivated and thusaeeessible at a partieular moment (Baldwin 326). In this sense, the simulation envi-ronment provided by narratives may be ideal for trying out new roles and strategieswithout the risks to the self in real-life situations.

POSSIBLE SELVES

The most malleable parts of the self-eoneept are the individual's possible selves.Markus and Nurius introduee the eoneept in these terms: "Possible selves representindividuals' ideas of what they might beeome, what they would like to beeome, andwhat they are afraid of beeoming, and thus provide a eoneeptual link between eogni-tion and motivation. . . . [T]hey funetion as ineentives for future behavior (i.e., theyare selves to be approaehed or avoided) and . . . they provide an evaluative and inter-pretive eontext for the eurrent view of self" (954).

As opposed to self-sehemas, possible selves have not been eonfirmed by soeialexperienee, but this does not in the least diminish their power. To the eontrary, byaeting as expeeted, feared, or desired ideal referenee frameworks, they strongly inter-vene in self-evaluation and self-pereeption, and aet as powerful behavior guidelinesdetermining approaeh or withdrawal strategies regarding the desired or the fearedself Experimental studies (Markus and Nurius 954; Dunkel and Kerpelman) have re-vealed repertoires of individuals' possible selves, ineluding desired possible selves like


the loved and admired self, or the self you ought to be, and dreaded possible selves,like the lonely self, the incompetent self, or the unemployed self.

Possible selves account for the dynamic nature of the self-concept and for its po-tential for growth and change. Markus and Nurius argue that research into self andidentity is doomed to failure if it focuses just on what people think they are, withoutaccounting for what they wish or fear to become, because it is the permanent adjust-ment and interaction of a person's self-schmas and possible selves that determinesperception, emotion, and motivation; yields behavioral patterns and strategies; andprovides "direction and impetus for action, change, and development" (960). The im-mediate effects of this interaction are on the working self-concept, but may eventu-ally reach the more permanent, core self-schemas. This suggests the relevance of theself-concept for an understanding of narrative engagement, not only on the groundsof the dynamic nature of its interrelated network of self-schemas and possible selves,but also because of its mental representation format, which allows for a specificationof internal features liable to be matched to relevant features in readers' mental repre-sentations of fictional characters.

Storyworld Possible Selves

DEFINING SPSS

Readers' storyworld possible selves (SPSs) can be preliminarfly defined as imag-ings of the self in storyworlds, formally conceived as blends resulting from match-ing features across a particular reader's self-concept and a focalizers character con-struct. These matches are triggered by cues in the narrative discourse which activatea subset of relevant self-schemas and possible selves in the reader's self-concept net-work. The readers storyworld possible self will be projected if, and only if, at leastone of the reader's self-schemas or possible selves is activated by narrative cues, thatis to say, if the reader is schematic in one or more of the domains in the narration.This may account for readers' partial leap from the real to the fictional world, as it isnot the complete self-concept that is involved in deictic shifts, but just one or a fewof the readers possible selves and/or self-schemas. A reader may, for instance, feelstrongly interested in an adventure story because it contains primers that activatethe adventurer possible self, leaving the mother/wife/teacher self-schemas dormant.Or maybe it is the mother self-schema that is primed by narrative cues, so that read-ers can use the storyworld as a safe simulation environment in which to experienceschema-related behaviors and strategies. Figure 1 presents a formal description ofthe blending process whereby the input spaces of the reader's self-concept and the fo-calizer's character construct are blended, using a counterfactual structure of the sortinvolved in the projection of fictional worlds as alternative possible worlds (Ryan,Possible Worlds). As noted above, people lack schmas for particular domains; somereaders, for instance, may lack a parent, environmentally active, skiing, or romanticself-schema, being, thus, unable to project matches with relevant storyworld char-


SUPERFRAME

Real beings are not fictional world entities

If I were this fictional world entity, I would...^ SPS ^

ATREADER'S SELF-CONCEPT

\4

I exist in the real world

< > PERSPECTIVIZER'S CONSTRUCT

/

Fictional entities exist in storyworlds

Figure 1. Counterfactual nature of storyworld possible selves projection.

acters and their environmental events and situations, and consequently finding thenarrative uninteresting and personally irrelevant in terms of self-transformation.The result would be a drop in empathie engagement, probably making the narrativeexperiencer drop tbe book or turn off tbe TV, tbat is, opt out of a self-irrelevant nar-rative experience.

However, as the self-concept is not totally fixed, but subject to changes derivedfrom both social experiences and self-reflection, a narrative in whicb tbe reader baspreviously failed to be immersed may, a few montbs or years later, suddenly seempersonally relevant and useful. This would mean tbat cbanges in tbe reader's self-concept, wbether in its possible selves or in its self-scbemas, have determined tbepresence of features tbat were, simply, not previously tbere, and wbich now allowcross-domain mappings witb the perspectivizing entity. Gonversely, cbanges in tbeself-concept may make us feel unmoved by a narrative tbat seemed profoundly en-gaging on a previous occasion, but with wbich tbe modified self no longer finds rel-evant matcbes.

SPSs AND DISCOURSE PARTICIPATION,SELF-TRANSFORMATION, AND EMOTIONAL INVOLVEMENT

From a linguistic point of view, SPSs may function as mental referents for thosecases in whicb both the grammar of the clause and discourse organization suggest the


need for the reader to share a grammatical slot with the perspectivizing entity insidetbe narrating situation or tbe storyworld. In tbis sense, SPSs can syntactically func-tion as mental referents for doubly deictic you and generic one, for elliptic SENSERparticipants in passive-voice mental processes involving the reader's cognitive activityinside a fictional world, and as implicit hybrid addressees of inner-speecb facework,actually allowing the overhearing reader to occupy a discourse role within the onto-logical boundaries of the fictional world.

From tbe perspective of narrative immersion, tbe explanatory power of SPSsseems equally promising. Blending operations function as networks, so that, oncea blend is established, features in the blend may be projected back into the inputspaces, altering tbeir internal structure. Tbis backwards projecting property of blendsmay explain tbe transformative power of narratives, by accounting for the fact thatminor changes produced by a narrative in the reader's possible selves may reach tbefurthermost recesses of tbe self-concept. Similarly, SPS features may be projectedback into the mental model of tbe focalizer, intervening in idiosyncratic perceptionsof characters by different readers.

The feeling of wasted reading time can also be connected to SPSs' backward fea-ture projection into the self-concept. A reader may incorporate into an adventurerpossible self scripts for emotional and physical survival tbat were not originally tbere.Tbese, in turn, now being a part of tbe working self-concept, may be moved furtherback into the network, affecting other possible selves, everyday-life self-scbemas, andeven episodic memories and past possible selves. Ascbematic readers, bowever, willbe uninterested wben aware of limited opportunities for self-transformation, and willperceive reading time as wasted time.

But tbere are other ways in whicb SPSs may be connected to emotional respons-es. According to self-scbema researchers, changes in core self-scbemas and in tbeself-concept tend to be strongly resisted, and are accompanied by feelings of fear andanxiety. As Markus and Nurius explain, "When a self-conception is cballenged, tbereis likely to be a sudden and powerful flood of bad feeling" (964). Negative feelingsalso accompany the perceived approach of a self-scbema to a negative possible self,while approximating a self-scbema to a desired possible self may be accompanied bypositive emotional reactions, even if anxiety-tinged. SPSs may, in this way, serve toaccount for emotional involvement and feelings of self-transformation during narra-tive processing, so tbat emotional involvement would not be derived exclusively fromempathie concern with the focalizer, but also from dynamic processes of self-schemamodification.

Testing SPSs

My investigation will now explore tbe explanatory power of the concept of SPSs in ac-tual narrative environments. Of particular interest will be 1) tbe connection betweenemotional response and the type of self constructself-schema, desired possible self,feared possible selfinvolved in isomorpbic matches witb tbe focalizer, and 2) tbepervasiveness of SPSs and tbeir role in subsequent narrative experiences.


AN SPS TYPOLOGY AND EMOTIONAL RESPONSE

Four basic types of SPS may result from isomorphic matches between readers'and a focalizer's input spaces, depending on whether the reader's self-concept struc-ture projected in a certain part of a narrative is a 1) self-schema, 2) desired possibleself, 3) feared possible self, or 4) past possible self. These will be briefly reviewedbelow.

Self-Schema SPSs. SPSs involving readers' self-schemas contain socially con-firmed parts of the self-concept, with self-labels like parent, friend, or beach-lover.Readers schematic in a domain prompted by a narrative will probably be willinglyinvolved in self-schema matches with a focalizer, so that, while sharing this charac-ter's experiences in the simulated situation, the reader will prime opportunities forbehavioral training in the self-schema domain.

An example can be found in Bolao's 2666 (2009) and, more specifically, in thesection focalized by Amalfitano, a university professor who has ended up in the re-mote Mexican city of Santa Teresa, in the Sonora Desert, dragging with him his onlydaughter, a beautiful young woman called Rosa. In this third-person narration, occa-sionally tinged with narratorial intromission, readers access the storyworld throughAmalfitano's consciousness, as in the direct thought passage that opens the section:

(7) No s qu he venido a hacer a Santa Teresa, se dijo Amalfitano al cabo deuna semana de estar viviendo en la ciudad. No lo sabes? Realmente no losabes?, se pregunt. Verdaderamente no lo s, se dijo a si mismo, y no pudoser ms elocuente. (211)

I don't know what I've come to Santa Teresa for, Amalfitano told himselfafter a week living in the city. Don't you know? Don't you really know? hewondered. I truly don't know, he told himself, and he could not have beenmore eloquent, (my translation)

But things can get worse, and they do, when he finds that young women are regularlyand brutally killed in the surroundings, and he has to see his beloved daughter go outevery evening with a cast of dubious characters and patiently wait in the backyard un-til he sees her back. Eventually he decides that the bliss of having her near is not worththe danger she is being exposed to and sends her to Europe, himself staying behind,trapped in the misery of the Sonora desert.

In this section of Bolao's novel, readers schematic in the parent self-schemamight find useful behavioral strategies to cope with diflicult decisions, like respect-ing a child's freedom in early adulthood, in the crude awareness of the dangers thatlie in the way, or opting for painful separation if that is in the child's benefit. And aUthis without the risk of making the wrong decision, or without undergoing the actualpain of parting from a loved one. Readers aschematic in the parent schema, however,might not find opportunities for the incorporation of useful behavioral patterns intothe self-concept network, and might find this part of the book particularly unmemo-rable, unless other types of matches with Amalfitano's construct are established.


Desired Possible Selves SPSs. In faet, readers who lack a parent self-sehema maypossess a parent possible self, in whieh ease the projeeted SPS would be of a differentnature. SPSs involving readers' desired possible selves are not easy to prediet, as theyeontain aspeets of the self-eoneept that, as opposed to self-sehemas, have not beeneonfirmed by soeial experienee, like the sueeessful self, the loved self, the adventurerself, or the hero self

There are frequent examples of how SPSs may be projeeted from relevant match-es between a foealizer's eonstruet and one of readers' desired possible selves. With-in this eategory we would find the adventurer SPS prompted by, for example, JulesVerne's narratives, the sharp deteetive SPS prompted by thrillers like P. D. James's, orthe loved SPS in romantie stories. But examples are not restrieted to popular fietion.Readers eaught up in the routine of responsible adult life frequently enjoy matehingopportunities for a free possible self In faet, invitations to simulation eseapes fromheavy, stressful routine are eommon in the opening paragraphs of famous novels, likeMelville's Moby-Dick (example [8]), in whieh the foealizing eharaeter and narrator,Ishmael, seems to explieitly invite isomorphie matches between his own self-sehemaas someone for whom reality seems from time to time unbearable, and readers' freepossible selves:

(8) Call me Ishmael. Some years agonever mind how long preeiselyhav-ing little or no money in my purse, and nothing partieular to interest meonshore, I thought I would sail about a little and see the watery part of theworld. It is a way I have of driving off the spleen, and regulating the eireula-tion. Whenever I find myself growing grim about the mouth; whenever it isa damp, drizzly November in my soul; whenever I find myself involuntarilypausing before eofRn warehouses, and bringing up the rear of every funeral Imeet; and espeeially whenever my hypos get sueh an upper hand of me, thatit requires a strong moral prineiple to prevent me from deliberately steppinginto the street, and methodieally knoeking people's hats offthen, I aeeountit high time to get to sea as soon as I can. This is my substitute for pistol andball. With a philosophieal flourish Cato throws himself upon his sword; Iquietly take to the ship. There is nothing surprising in this. If they but knewit, almost all men in their degree, some time or other, eherish very nearly thesame feelings towards the oeean with me. (93)

Ishmael is probably right, sinee the opening paragraph of Moby-Dick has grabbedthe attention of generations of readers who ean metonymieally projeet themselvesinto Moby-Dick's storyworld and sail away, at least for a while. Within possible selvestheory, thus, the resulting positive emotions would not be derived exelusively fromsatisfaetory empathy with a foealizer, but also from the thrill of approaehing a desiredpossible self

Peared Possible Selves SPSs. While readers' self-sehemas and desired possibleselves seem to offer abundant opportunities for isomorphie matehes with foealizers,the projeetion of features from readers' undesired possible selves into SPSs is still

124 M. Angeles Martinez

more interesting, as it may serve to explain why we frequently feel irresistibly attract-ed by focalizers on the verge of social exclusion. Dreaded possible selves are modelsthat we try to avoid, like the lonely self, the incompetent self, or the unemployed self(Markus and Nurius). Many of these are personally feared, like the lost self or the fllself In others, however, the source of fear is of an ethical and social nature. This is thecase with many of the possible selves that, if liberated from the social disgrace andconflict they would surely entail, might not seem so terrible after all, like the bank-robber self, the incestuous self, or the murderer self.

Certain narratives present readers with the unbelievable opportunity to try out asocially fearsome possible self with total impunity. A good example can be found inPoe's "The Cask of Amontfllado." This short story offers readers the chance to safelyproject their revengeful possible selves into SPS blends with Montresor, the narrator-focalizer, and enjoy the sweet taste of vengeance in the safe simulation environmentof the damp catacombs in the Montresors' palazzo. Let us recafl the paragraph inwhich Montresor, nearing the end of his grim mission, seems to feel a tinge of pitifulremorse:

(9) A succession of loud and shrill screams, bursting suddenly from thethroat of the chained form, seemed to thrust me violently back. For a briefmoment I hesitatedI trembled. Unsheathing my rapier, I began to gropewith it about the recess; but the thought of an instant reassured me. I placedmy hand upon the solid fabric of the catacombs, and felt satisfied. (206)

The irresistible pull of this sort of safe immersive simulation seems to be particu-larly favored by readers (Gregoriu), and among this type of focalizers we can findremarkable characters lfl


past self (Markus and Nurius; Dunkel and Kerpelman). Although past selves are asidiosyncratic and unpredictable as all possible selves, certain narratives seem likely toactivate tbe past selves of a large number of readers. An example can be found in tbewell-known opening paragrapb of Peter Pan:

(10) All children, except one, grow up. They soon know that tbey will growup, and the way Wendy knew was this. One day when she was two years oldshe was playing in a garden, and sbe plucked another flower and ran withit to her mother. I suppose she must have looked ratber deligbtful, for Mrs.Darling put her band to ber heart and cried: "Oh, why can't you remain liketbis for ever!" This is all tbat passed between them on the subject, but hence-forth Wendy knew that she must grow up. You always know after you aretwo. Two is the beginning of tbe end. (Barrie 1; my empbasis)

Tbe mental referent for the two doubly-deictic you pronouns in example (10) isof a bybrid nature: one of the input spaces involves tbe construct of tbe first-person-narrator /, and tbe other is tbe reader's small-child past possible self. Past possibleselves can also be prompted by focalizers like Briony Tallis in Ian McEwan's Atone-ment, wbicb offers matcbing opportunities witb tbe pre-adolescent past self. By shar-ing these focalizers' experiences, readers may incorporate modifications in their pastselves tbat project useful transforming features into tbe self-concept. Similarly, fea-tures in readers' past selves projected into tbe relevant SPS may slip back into the fo-calizer's construct, resulting in idiosyncratic cbaracter construction processes.

THE PERVASIVENESS OF SPSS: PAST STORYWORLD POSSIBLE SELVES

A special case of past possible selves are readers' past SPSs, or past projectionsof tbe self into storyworlds. One of the properties of blends in Fauconnier and Turn-er's model is tbat, once a blend has emerged, it may intervene in furtber blendingoperations witb other input spaces. As a blend, an SPS sbould tbus be available fornew conceptual integration processes. Gonsequently, a reader's past SPS, promptedby a previous narrative experience, and now a part of tbe self-concept, may becomeone of the reader's input spaces projecting isomorpbic matcbes witb tbe focalizer ofa new narrative. Tbe main effects of past SPSs on narrative immersion seem to be oftwo kinds: emotion enbancing effects, and intertextual resonances.

Emotion enbancing effects would occur wben a strong emotion, either positiveor negative, prompted by a previous narrative experience, is recalled by narrativecues tbat re-activate a past SPS. The identification of such occurrences would prob-ably require subject interviews beyond the scope of tbis study, but its validity as abypotbesis is provided by testimonies of readers wbo anticipate great joy or profounddisgust just from genre cues tbat recall a previous pleasant or disturbing narrativeexperience. Tbis suggests tbat some SPSs may be incorporated into tbe self-concept,and may be re-activated to intervene in isomorphic matches with focalizers in newlyencountered simulation environments.


Past SPSs may also explain the effects of intertextuality on what Hutcheon calls"knowing audiences," as intertextual references also require readers to recall previousnarrative experiences. Consider tbis excerpt from McGartby's The Road (2007):

(11) In tbe dream from wbicb be'd wakened he had wandered in a cavewhere the child led bim by tbe band. Their ligbt playing over the wet flow-stone walls. Like pilgrims in a fable swallowed up and lost among tbe in-ward parts of some granitic beast.... Until they stood in a great stone roomwhere lay a black and ancient lake. And on the far shore a creature tbatraised its dripping moutb from the rimstone pool and stared into tbe lightwitb eyes dead white and sightless as tbe eggs of spiders. It swung its headlow over the water as if to take the scent of what it could not see. Grouchingthere pale and naked and translucent, its alabaster bones cast up in sbadowon tbe rocks bebind it. Its bowels, its beating heart. Tbe brain tbat pulsed ina dull glass bell. It swung its bead from side to side and then gave out a lowmoan and turned and lurched away and loped soundlessly into tbe dark.(3-4)

Some "knowing" readers of Beowulf may feel like having deictically shifted into tbiscave before. In fact, tbe memory is embedded in the internal structure of a past SPS,the one wbo shared Beowulf's descent to tbe sea-bottom cave in pursuit of Gren-del's motber, the mighty water-monster. Readers schematic in Beowulfpast SPSs maynow experience the activation of this blend, and recall the following passage in theAnglo-Saxon epic poem:

(12) Then the son of princes advanced over the steep rocky slopes by a nar-row path, a constricted route where only one could pass at a time, an un-familiar way, precipitous crags, many a lair of water-monsters. He went infront with a few knowledgeable men to examine the ground, until suddenlyhe found mountain trees leaning out over a grey rock, a cheerless wood; be-low lay tbe water, gory and turbid.... Straigbt away she wbo for a bundredseasons bad kept watch on the flood's expanse, grim and greedy, fiercely rav-enous, discovered tbat some man from up above was exploring the dwelling-place of monsters. (101-107)

Much of tbe detail, of course, is not here, but is likely to be provided Gestalt-fashionby readers' minds, so tbat the moutb-dripping, moaning water-creature in The Roadmaybe isomorpbically matched to grief-stricken Grendel's mother in Beowulf if tbereader possesses a Beowulf past SPS. The new SPS blend may also project featuresback not only into the reader's self-concept, but also into tbe focalizer's construct, sothat the activated reader's past Beowulf SPS, containing features of the hero's death attbe end of tbe narrative poem, may project back Beowulfian features into tbe inputspace of tbe father in The Road, as sbown in Figure 2. Accordingly, at tbe end of Mc-Gartby's novel, the sorrow-ridden young son who honors his elder's body respectfullywrapped up in a blanket in tbe woods (285-86), may be metaphorically matched to


Beowulf as focalizer Beowulf reader's self-concept

b' (Blend 1)w

Reader'sBeowulf SPS

The father in The Roadas focalizer

. c (Blend 2)Reader's

TlieRoad SPS

Figure 2. Past SPSs and intertextual resonance: a conceptual integration explanation.

the grieving Geats in the moving farewell to their warlord which closes the epic poem(186-87).

Of course, the .Beowu/f past SPS would not be the only reader schema involved innarrative immersion in The Road, nor will it even exist or be activated in many read-ers' self-concept network. But, as conceptual integration emergent structures, pastSPSs may prove to be useful explanatory tools in idiosyncratic intertextual readings,and may also throw further light on underexplored aspects of emotional engagement,like the anticipatory effects of previous immersive experiences.

Conclusion

This study has tried to provide evidence for the fact that narrative involvement re-quires the projection into the fictional world of, at least, one of the self-schemas orpossible selves constituting the reader's self-concept. I have used the term storyworldpossible selves (SPSs) to refer to the blend resulting from conceptual matches acrossthe selectively projected part of the reader's self-concept and features in the focal-izer's construct. Storyworld possible selves could increase our understanding of cer-tain narrative phenomena. Syntactically, they may act as mental referents for doubly-


deictic you and generie one, inelusive of real-world reader and fietional-world foeal-izer. They may also funetion as referents for hidden SENSERS in transitivity men-tal proeesses. Pragmatieally, they may funetion as interaetional eounterparts for thelinguistie faeework found in foealizers' inner speeeh. SPSs may also provide a betterunderstanding of the mtonymie nature of deietie shifts into storyworlds, and mayhelp explain how emotional engagement oeeurs. Additionally, they may aeeount forthe faet that different readers are differently moved by the same narrative, or even thefaet that the same reader may be affeeted in different ways by a narrative at differentpoints is his or her life, also throwing light on idiosyneratie aspeets of intertextualresonanee.

Interaeting with narratives is one of humankind's most pervasive and cherishedsoeial praetiees, and narrative engagement is, undoubtedly, a highly eomplex andmultifaeeted proeess. Storyworld possible selves, as this study has tried to show, maybe useful eognitive struetures in the study of immersive phenomena, as the riehnessof experienee that they eontribute to the self-eoneept in the eontext of the safe simu-lation environment provided by the storyworld must be a eonstant souree for thereshaping of the self-evaluative meehanisms that intervene in the transformation ofthe self

Further researeh would be needed to investigate eross-domain mappings withnarrators' eonstruets, as well as SPS projeetion in multimodal narratives. SPSs mayalso prove of relevanee to AI researeh, sinee the study suggests that, for narrativeimmersion to take plaee, the artifieial mind should be provided with a self-eoneeptnetwork eonsisting of a number of self-sehemas and possible selves, so that relevantmatehes with entities in the fietional world may be established. Finally, future studieseould also address SPS projeetions aeross single, eomplete narratives, thus testing theeoneept's usefulness for the purposes of eognitive poeties.

Endnote

The research in this article was presented at the 2012 Poetics and Linguistics Association (PALA)Conference, held at the University of Malta. This essay is a revised and expanded version of mycontribution in the conference proceedings (see Martinez, "Reader-Focalizer"). The completionof this research was funded by the Spanish Ministry of Education within the Jos Castillejo 2012grant program.

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