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MartyrsofDevelopment:TaiwaneseAgrarianDevelopmentandtheRepublicofVietnam,1959–1975

JamesLin,UniversityofWashingtonLin,James.2019.“MartyrsofDevelopment:TaiwaneseAgrarianDevelopmentandtheRepublicofVietnam,1959–1975.”Cross-Currents:EastAsianHistoryandCultureReview(e-journal)33:53–83.https://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-33/lin.Abstract

In 1959, the Republic of China (ROC) government on Taiwan enacted its firstinternational agrarian development mission to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Themission began modestly to assist primarily with crop improvement and farmers’associations.ButbythefalloftheRVNin1975,Taiwanesedevelopmentconstitutedaglobal project of the authoritarian Guomindang (GMD) regime to redefine Taiwan’splace in theworld.Thisarticleexplores the sixteen-year spanofmissions toVietnam,drawingonreportsbyTaiwaneseagriculturalteamleaders,oralhistoryinterviewswithTaiwanese technicians, Taiwanese and Vietnamese policy documents, and visual andpropaganda materials published by the GMD and overseas Chinese. Agrariandevelopment became a platform through which the ROC represented Taiwanesesuccess at agricultural science and ruralmodernity. Taiwanese technicians showcasedhigh-yielding crop varieties, large and luscious green vegetables, and rationalizedagricultural implements.Simultaneously,Taiwanese teamsalsoemphasized their ruralroots, through an expertise in forming farmers’ associations that appealed to RVNleadership seeking to battle communist insurgency. These representations of successandsacrificeallowedtheGMDregimetoportraytheROCasleadingaglobalvanguardof developing nations, all toward the goal of securing its legitimacy at home as adevelopmentalistregime.

Keywords:Taiwan,Guomindang,Vietnam,agrariandevelopment,ruraldevelopment,agriculturalscience,farmers’associations,ColdWar

IntroductionOn November 13, 1963, Taiwanese rice technician Zhang Dusheng (張篤生, ChangTusun) was in a jeep returning to Saigon after visiting a rice experiment stationapproximately 70 kilometers (43.5 miles) outside the city, when his convoy was

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ambushed by Vietnamese communist forces and he was killed by gunfire.1In thesubsequent months, Zhang was made into a martyr, not of war but, rather, ofdevelopment.ChengHsinDailyNews(Zhengxinxinwenbao徵信新聞報,laterrenamedChina Times [Zhongguo shibao中國時報]), a pro-government and pro-Guomindang(Nationalist Party, or GMD) newspaper in Taiwan,wrote that Zhangwas “one of themany technical experts who are away from their homes to help foreign nations, asunder-developedasormoreunder-developedthanours,indevelopingtheirresources.They have enabled many [foreign nations] to understand more correctly of [sic] theindustriousspiritandthescientificknowledgeofourcountrymen.Theircontribution[s]inforeigncountriesareasgreatasintheirowncountry.”2

In the dozens of newspaper articles, interviews, and speeches that followed,Zhang’s martyrdom forged a new narrative of Taiwan’s engagement with the world.Following its defeat at the hands of the Chinese Communist Party, the ruling GMDregimeframedtheRepublicofChina’s(ROC)internationalaffairsaroundanexistentialbattlewithcommunismandthePeople’sRepublicofChina(PRC)regime.As Ishowinthis article, agrariandevelopmentmissions toVietnamstarting in1959expanded thisnarrative beyond retaking mainland China from the Chinese Communists to includedevelopment.TheROCwasdemonstratingitstechnology,perseverance,andmodernitytotheGlobalSouth.IntheruralvillagesofVietnam,dozensofTaiwaneseteamsworkedside by side with Vietnamese farmers to showcase greener, lusher vegetables, moreefficient and practical farm implements, and stronger Taiwanese rural organizations.TheferventanticommunismoftheColdWarwaspresent,butitwascomplementedbya new narrative of development rooted in the discourse of modernity and strengththrougheconomicself-sufficiency.Bythe1970sand1980s,withthethawingoftheColdWarinEastAsia,economicgrowthandsuccessincreasinglybecameanimportantpointof legitimacyandstatepowerfortheGMDtotheextentthattheyeventuallyeclipsedtheColdWaranticommunismaspredominanttopicsofstatediscourse.

Development—the practice of improving well-being and livelihoods, usuallythrough“modern”methodsofagriculturalscience,capitalism,orruralorganizations—was,initsinitialinternationalimplementationin1959,imaginedbyTaiwaneseplannersas a limited, “technical” endeavor. “Technical” was often a misleading descriptor,

1MinistryofForeignAffairsTelegram,November14,1963;“駐越農技團工作及協助華僑籌建紗

廠及張篤生遇難等”[TheworkoftheagriculturaltechnicalteaminVietnam,assistingoverseasChineseinpreparationtoconstructatextilefactory,thekillingofZhangDusheng,etc.];ArchiveNumber[館藏號]020-011004-0101;page38;MinistryofForeignAffairsCollection,AcademiaSinicaModernHistoryInstituteArchives(hereafterMFACASMHIA).2“CondolencetoTusunChang,”ChengHsinDailyNews,Taipei,November17,1963.TranslateddocumentlocatedinFolder842,BảndịchcácbàibáoTaiwanliênquanđếncáichếtcủaôngTu-Sun-Chang,thànhviênpháiđoànkĩthuậtcanhnôngTrungHoaDânQuốcđếnViệtNamnăm1963[TranslationofTaiwanarticlesrelatedtothedeathofTusunChang[ZhangDusheng],memberoftheROCagriculturaltechnicalteamtoVietnam1963],NhaCanhNông[DirectorateofAgriculture],VietnamNationalArchivesII(hereafterVNA).

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however, as anthropologist James Ferguson (1990) has argued in his study ofdevelopment inLesotho,andbythe1970sTaiwanesedevelopmentmissionswerenotjustabout technicalassistance.Since its takeoverofTaiwan in1945, theGMDregimehasbeen involved inanongoingdevelopmentprojectofdiscipliningandrestructuringthe island’s rural society through farmers’ associations, public health, financializedcapital, land reform, andmodern technoscience. Taiwanese overseas development intheVietnamcontextattemptedtobringtoTaiwanthelessonsofdevelopment,suchastheutilityoffarmers’associationsasinstrumentsofextendingstatecontrolandmakingrural society legible. As this article demonstrates, over the decades, developmentevolved into an important platform that enabled the state to build a new globallyderived identity centered on modernity, and subsequently wield through knowledgedisseminationandpropagandatoconsolidateitsauthority.

International developmentmarked a new frontier for Taiwan’s interactions withtheworld. The1959Vietnammissionwas the first such effort that placed Taiwanesetechniciansandexpertsinruralareasoutsidetheisland.Thisinitialmissionwasmodestin scope—just over a dozen technicians, specializing in plant breeding, fisheries, andfarmers’associations,whowerethentaskedwithaidingVietnamesestate-ledeffortsincrop improvement and ruralwelfare. From theROCperspective, anticommunismandGMD leaderanddictatorChiangKai-shek’squest to formColdWaralliancesprovidedgeopoliticalincentivesforofferingassistance.Bythemid-1960s,technicalassistancetothe Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and other noncommunist Asian regimes became asignificant complement to military assistance.3Chiang incorrectly believed that NorthVietnamwascompletelycontrolledbythePRCregime.HeviewedactionsinVietnamaspartofagreaterinternationalanticommuniststrategythatcouldnotbelimitedtotheborders of any one country, and development offered an additional means to stopChineseCommunist advances.4Development becamean increasingly vital tool in ROCinternational diplomacy. In turn, development grew more influential in shaping theTaiwanesestateandnationalidentity.

The Vietnam missions were especially significant as the first internationaldevelopmentmissionsundertakenbyTaiwan.Overthecourseofthe1960sand1970s,Taiwaneseagrarianmissionsexpandedfromonetotwodozen,coveringeverycornerofthe developing world—Asia, Africa, the South Pacific, and Latin America. The Africanmissionsduringthatperiodwereaformofdevelopmentdiplomacyandacornerstoneof ROC foreign policy, especially because the ROC was under threat from PRC-alliedcommunist blocmeasures to remove the ROC from theUnitedNations. ROC officialstradedagriculturaldevelopmentassistanceforvotesfromnewlydecolonized,UN-votingmember-states from theAfrican continent (J. Lin 2015; Liu 2006;Wang 2004). There,

3TheROChadseveralgroupsofmilitaryofficialsandadvisorstotheRVNfollowinga1960meetingbetweenChiangKai-shekandNgôĐìnhDiệm.Formoredetails,seeLinHT(2015,288–291).4ThiswasasentimentrelayedviatheU.S.EmbassyinTaipei,andnotadirectquotationofChiang.Telegram,“PresidentAppreciationforActionsofNon-CommunistAsianPeoplesinVietnam,”7/27/65,#13,“China,”CountryFile,NSF,Box238,LyndonB.JohnsonLibrary.

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theydeployedmanyofthe lessons learned intheVietnammissions, includingevokingthediscourseof ThirdWorld solidarity and commonalitybetweenTaiwanandAfrican(or Vietnamese) peoples, as well as the importance of non-Western methods ofachievingpostcolonialstrengthandindependence.

From1959untiltheendoftheSecondIndochinaWar(VietnamWar)in1975,theonce-limited Vietnam teams represented a new means of legitimacy for the ROCregime. Through development missions, ROC planners demonstrated that they weredeveloped enough to help foreign nations achieve the same growth and rural livingstandardsofTaiwan.Athome,thisevidenceoftechnicalmasteryreinforcedanewfacetofROCauthoritarianismandstatepower—thecelebrationofthemodern,economicallyindependentnationthatstakeditsclaiminternationallyasmuchasdomestically,andonequalgroundswiththeWest.NolongerwastheROCadevelopingnation,butanationwhoseadvancedagrariandevelopmentbroughtdemandfor itsexpertiseglobally,andputitattheglobalvanguard.

Scholars have largely overlooked the importance of agrarian development forunderstandingmodernTaiwanesehistory,andhaveoverlookedtheimpactofTaiwaninglobal development history. In the English-language literature, political scientist JohnGarver haswritten about ROC assistance to Vietnam, albeit briefly and onlywithin adiplomaticcontext(Garver1997).IntheChinese-languageliterature,historianLinHsiao-tinghaswrittenon theROC-RVNdiplomatic relationship, focusingmostlyonmilitaryassistance(LinHT2018).Mostconsequentially,historianSimonTonerhaswrittenabouthowRVNofficialsunderPresidentNguyễnVănThiệulookedtoTaiwanandSouthKoreaaspotentialdevelopmentmodels (Toner2017).Tonermakesthe importantclaimthatVietnamese officials found relevance in their Asian neighbors instead of the UnitedStatesor theWestbecause“TaiwanandSouthKoreaofferedanalternativemodelofgovernancethatappealedtothe[governmentofVietnam]:depoliticizedmasses, loyaltotheauthoritarianstateandmobilizedforeconomicdevelopment”(Toner2017,782).Like Taiwan, South Korea and Japan also engaged in international development,especiallyinSoutheastAsiawherefordecadestheyrenderedagricultural,medical,andinfrastructural development (Mizuno, Moore, and DiMoia 2018). For RVN leaders,Taiwanrepresenteda“romance”or“imagining”ofwhatan idealizedRVNcouldbe:adeveloped,authoritarianstate.

IntegratingarchivalsourcesfromTaiwan,Vietnam,andtheUnitedStates—aswellasanoralhistoryinterviewwitharetiredTaiwanesetechniciandeployedtoVietnam—thisarticletraceshowTaiwaneseexpertsattemptedtotransplantelementsoftheirownmodernityabroad. Itthenshowshowthedevelopmentproject inVietnambecameanimaginaryfortheTaiwanese.Thepurposeofdevelopmentwasasmuchperformativeasmodernizing, and that performance was in furtherance of ROC objectives to portrayitselfasamodern, technologicallyadvanced,humanitarian,andprosperous society tothe Global South and especially to those at home. Thus, this article follows how theGMDregimepresenteditsoverseasdevelopmenttoafracturedTaiwaneseaudiencetofurther its regime legitimizationandconsolidation,andhow itportrayeddevelopment

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to aVietnameseand global audience as evidenceof its commitment to“FreeWorld”friendshipandanticommunistinternationalism.

WhyTaiwan?VietnamandtheRuralProblemIn 1955, Ngô Đình Diệm took power as president of the newly declared Republic ofVietnaminacoupthatdeposedBảoĐại,theheadoftheStateofVietnam.DiệmwasaferventanticommunistandnationalistopposedtobothFrenchcolonialpresenceintheStateofVietnam,aswellasHồChíMinh’sDemocraticRepublicofVietnamregimethatoccupiedVietnamnorthofthe17thparallel.Bythen,U.S.aidhadbeenincreasingafterFrenchlossestocommunistinsurgencyinIndochina,andVietnamwasseenasacrucialterritorythatrequiredU.S.guidanceandtutelage(Miller2013,72).SeveralprominentAmerican development experts were appointed to serve in Vietnam, including WolfLadejinsky, the land reformexpertattached to theU.S.DepartmentofAgriculture.Ashistorian EdwardMiller has observed, experts like Ladejinsky and others in charge oftechnicalaidandruraldevelopmentpolicyinVietnamallhadpriorexperienceinotherAsian countries (Miller 2013, 79). This was certainly the case for William H. Fippin,DirectorofAgricultureforU.S.OperationsMissiontoVietnam(USOM/Vietnam).

BeforeheservedasDirectorofAgricultureforUSOM/Vietnam,Fippinwasoneoftwo American commissioners from 1952 to 1957 for the Sino-American JointCommission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) in Taiwan. Consisting of fivecommissioners—three Taiwanese and two American—the JCRR was tasked withformulating agricultural policy for theentire island. Fippinwas a farmers-organizationspecialist who had overseen several of the farmers’-association reforms in the earlyyearsof JCRR tenure.5As a result of his five yearswith the JCRR, Fippinnotonlywasintimately familiar with the operations and expertise of the JCRR in farmers’associations, but also believed that Taiwan was a particularly successful case ofagriculturaldevelopment.

In1957,theInternationalCooperationAdministration(oneofthepredecessorstotheU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment)reassignedFippintoVietnam,anareaofincreasing security concern. Shortly after his arrival, Fippin wrote to his formercolleague,JCRRCommissionerShenZonghan沈宗瀚, that“theagriculturalprogramisthe largest and in their eyesmost important (except of course themilitary)” for theVietnamese, especially in the context of seeking American aid to fight the growingcommunistthreat6 5JiangMenglintoW.I.Myers,May23,1951;ArchivalCollectionNumber[入藏登錄號]034000000351A;Folder“Myers,W.I.,”in“ShenZonghanLetterDrafts”[沈宗瀚文件稿];CouncilofAgriculture[農委會],ExecutiveYuanCollection[行政院],AcademiaHistoricaArchives[國史館](hereafterEYCAHA).6LetterfromWilliamH.FippintoShenZonghan,August31,1957;ArchiveNumber034000000337A,“沈宗翰文件稿（4箱)”[ShenZonghandocumentdrafts(“Fippin,W.F.”)];CouncilofAgriculture,EYCAHA.

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OnApril 4, 1959, in amemorandum to theDeputyMinister of ForeignAffairs, aTaiwanese Foreign Affairs official in Vietnam wrote that “in discussion with USOMAgriculturalDirectorFippinandVietnamAgriculturalandForestryMinisterLêVănĐồng,theU.S.haspreparedUS$300,000,toinvitetwentyorthirtyforeignagriculturalexpertstoprovideassistance.”7TheinitialdecisiontoinviteTaiwaneseexpertswasmadelargelyat the behest of Fippin, stemming from his experience as JCRR commissioner. TheTaiwaneseofficial inVietnamcontinued,“BecauseofFippinhavingbeeninTaiwanformanyyears,andhavingworkedwellwithmanypeoplewithinouragriculturalcircles,hehas strongly advocated to invite [experts] from our side. The RVN Agricultural andForestryMinister,however,isinterestedinhiringFrenchexperts.”8TheRVNpreferenceforFrenchexpertswasunsurprisinggiventhelongcolonialrelationshipbetweenFranceandIndochina.ThedecisiontochooseTaiwaneseexpertswasunusualbecauseitbrokewithcolonialpreferences forFrenchexperts,marking thepowerofAmericanadvisorsunderDiệm.ItwasnotVietnam’sfirstexposuretoTaiwanesedevelopment,however.

Vietnamese officials in Bảo Đại’s State of Vietnam (1945–1954), which precededNgô Đình Diệm’s Republic of Vietnam government, had been observing thedevelopmentsoftheJCRRinChinaandTaiwanasearlyas1949.InadocumentfromtheStateofVietnamMinistryofPublicWorksandTransportation(BộCôngChánhvàGiaoThông), possibly a translation of English JCRR documents by Vietnamese officials, theJCRRwasdescribedasfocusedon“bringingearningstotheruralpopulation”and“alsorecognizingthevalueof longtermresearchandeducation.”9Thedocumentcontinuedtoexplain that the JCRRwasnotaprogramdesigned to funnel largeamountsofU.S.currency “because experience has shown in Asia, it was difficult, at least in thebeginning, to expend large sums quickly and in a reasonable (wise) manner. On thecontrary,itisalively,dynamicprogramthatbeginsbyfindingwhatisnecessaryforanordinary farming family (une famille ordinaire d’agriculteurs).”10 Although it is notentirelyclearwherethistranslationoriginated,itwasmostlikelyreadbyofficialsoftheMinistryofPublicWorksandTransportation.Incontrasttodevelopmentprogramsthatareseenashighlycapital-intensive,apictureof theJCRRemergesasaprogrammoreattunedtotheneedsoftheruralpeasant.

Nonetheless,thedecisiontoinviteTaiwanesedevelopmentexpertsin1959shouldbe attributed mostly to the presence of William Fippin. Fippin’s position as head of

7LettertoDeputyMinisterofForeignAffairs(次長),April4,1959,“駐越農技團,”[AgriculturaltechnicalteaminVietnam];ArchivalCollectionNumber[入藏登錄號]020000030452A;MinistryofForeignAffairsCollection,AcademiaHistoricaArchives(hereafterMFACAHA).8LetterfromWilliamH.FippintoShenZonghan,August31,1957.9ProgrammedelaCommissionMixtePourlaReconstructionRuraleenChine[ProgramoftheJointCommissionforRuralReconstructioninChina],1949,Folder02,TàiliệuvềchươngtrìnhtáithiếtnôngthônTrungQuốcnăm1948–1949[DocumentsoftheruralreconstructionplaninChina1948–1949],BộCôngChánhvàGiaoThông[MinistryofPublicWorksandTransportation],VNA.10ProgrammedelaCommissionMixtePourlaReconstructionRuraleenChine[ProgramoftheJointCommissionforRuralReconstructioninChina],1949,Folder02,VNA.

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USOM/VietnamAgricultureandasformerheadoftheJCRRgavehimadirectlinktotheTaiwanese, but there were also intellectual reasons behind the choice beyond merecoincidenceandconvenience.

RVN leadersbelieved its ruralproblemstobesocialandeconomic innature.ThecountrysidewaswheretheNationalLiberationFront(called“ViệtCộng,”orVietnameseCommunists, by anticommunists in the South) operated and drew support. Both theRVN and the United States thus targeted rural areas, leading to “pacification”counterinsurgencycampaignsbeginningin1954(andevenearlierunderFrenchcolonialruleandtheStateofVietnam),andtheStrategicHamletProgramof1962designedtobring counterinsurgency military tactics to the countryside (Stewart 2011, 49; Miller2013,233;Carter2008,123).

However, the two allies differed in their approaches for programs to countercommunist insurgency. Fippin and other U.S. officials realized that Diệm’s demandswere centered on amassing as many U.S. dollars with as few strings attached aspossible. Fippin sought to discourage this by emphasizing low-cost, high-impactsolutionsthatcouldberealisticallyachievedwithAmericanassistance.Translated intopolicy,thisemphasismeantfocusingonprojectsthatcouldbeeasilyimplementedandwouldnotrequiresignificantcapitalorlaborresources.“Water,”Fippinwrote,wasthe“biggest, and most difficult problem, but one that we can do relatively little about.Problem is too large. Have seen an old French estimate that control of theMekongwould run to the magnitude of several billion U.S. dollars.Will be a long, long timebeforeanythingmuchisdoneinthatdirectionsoallwecandoisadabhereandadabthere.” 11 Water was indeed a major topic of discussion among twentieth-centurydevelopmentexperts,andtheMekongRiverdeltainparticularwasatargetoftheU.S.Bureau of Reclamation as well as Japanese overseas development (Sneddon 2015;Moore 2014). Fippin, however, was more concerned with factors he believed theTaiwanesecouldhelpresolve.

Fippin honed in on practices at which the Taiwanese excelled: “varietalimprovement,fertilization,pestcontrolandculturalpractices.”12ThesewerefourcoreareasofimprovementfortheJCRRandthebackgroundofitsagriculturalsciencerootsinRepublican-eramainlandChina,aswellasinTaiwanunderJapanesecolonialrule(J.Lin 2015). Taiwan benefited from an extensive hydrological legacy left by Japanesecolonialism, and water infrastructure projects continued under the JCRR with U.S.funding.However,Taiwan’s innovations in lessexpensiveandmoreeasilytransferableforms of development were more prominent, and certainly noteworthy for Fippin.Finally,Fippinalsoobservedthatfor“verymuchofthesouthernareafloatingriceisallthatcanbegrown,andyieldsarepitifullylow—slightlyoveronemetrictonperhectare.One crop.” 13 Taiwanese teams were well versed in high-yield rice selection andbreeding,havingcontributedthesemi-dwarfingparentDee-geo-woo-gen(dijiaowujian

11LetterfromWilliamH.FippintoShenZonghan,August31,1957.12LetterfromWilliamH.FippintoShenZonghan,August31,1957.13LetterfromWilliamH.FippintoShenZonghan,August31,1957.

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低角烏尖) to themiracle rice, IR-8. They were also observant of soil conditions andclimatethatwouldwelcomenon-ricecrops,suchascornormustardgreens,whichwereplantedbyTaiwaneseteamsinVietnam.

Seeds:TranslatingTaiwaneseSciencetoVietnameseContexts

In December 1959, the Republic of China began its development assistancemissions to the Republic of Vietnam. The Vietnam missions initially consisted oftechnicians and scientists specializing in farmers’ associations and cooperatives, cropimprovement,andfisheries.Overthecourseoftheprogram’sroughlysixteenyears, itexpanded to more than twenty-four provinces in the RVN (see figure 1) to includeveterinarymedicine,entomology,soilscience,andirrigation.

Amajorfocusofthe1959missionwascropimprovement,withahighlyregardedplantbreederMaBaozhi(馬保之,PaulC.Ma)atitshead.14MabeganhiscareerasanagriculturalscientistinChina,graduatingin1929fromoneofthepreeminentcentersofagricultural science, University of Nanking (Jinling daxue金陵大學), followed by hisdoctorate in plant breeding at Cornell University, and then a year doing research atCambridgeUniversity.15Upon returning toChina in1934,Ma tookapositionwith theNationalAgriculturalResearchBureau(NARB,Zhongyangnongyeyanjiushiyansuo中央

農業研究實驗所),inchargeofoperatingtheNARBGuangxiExtensionStation.In1944,hewasappointedtheheadoftheAgriculturalDivisionwithintheMinistryofAgriculture

andForestry(MOAF,Nonglinbu農林部)oftheROC,andhelaterbecametheDeputy

Chief for theAgriculturalRehabilitationCommissionestablishedbytheMOAFtoworkwiththeUnitedNationsReliefandRehabilitationAdministrationinChina.Aftermovingto Taiwan with the Nationalist regime, Ma became the dean of the College ofAgricultureatthepreeminentNationalTaiwanUniversity.InchoosingMaastheleaderof the first Crop Improvement Mission to Vietnam, the ROC sent one of its mostexperiencedand respectedplantbreeders abroad.Afterhisbrief timeasheadof theCrop ImprovementMission in Vietnam, he spent over a decade employed by theUNFood and Agriculture Organization as the dean of the College of Agriculture at theUniversityofLiberia.

14“對外宣傳彩色專刊─中日經濟簡訊、先鋒計畫第三國訓練、中華民國統計提要、歷史經

濟資料簿”[Colorspecialissueforforeigndissemination—ROC-Japaneconomicbrief,OperationVanguardthirdcountrytraining,ROCstatisticsummary,historyandeconomicresourcebook],April1975;Folder“中華民國對外技術合作”[ROCForeignTechnicalCooperation],Vol.2;ArchiveNumber36-01-006-025;MinistryofEconomicAffairsCollection,AcademiaSinicaModernHistoryInstituteArchives,Taipei,Taiwan.15AnnouncementoftheGraduateSchool,OfficialPublicationofCornellUniversity,July15,1933;vol.25,page141;CornellUniversityLibrary.AnnouncementoftheGraduateSchool,OfficialPublicationofCornellUniversity,July15,1934;vol.26,page157;CornellUniversityLibrary.

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Figure1.DiagramoftheRepublicofVietnamshowingprovinceswhereTaiwanesetechnicalassistancewasrenderedduringthefirstfourteenyearsoftheassistancemissionfrom1959to1973.16

UnderMa’sguidance,theCropImprovementMissionproducedlengthyreportson

the state of Vietnamese agriculture. Ricewas a key concern, given that Vietnam, likeTaiwan,wasprimarilya rice-consumingculture. In1964,Taiwaneseexpertsestimatedthatapproximately2.5millionhectaresproduced5millionmetrictonsofriceannuallyin Vietnam.17One of the key reports, titled “Rice Seed Production in Vietnam,” was

16JinYanggao,“TwelveYearsinVietnam”[十二年在越南],June1973;JointCommissionforRuralReconstruction;CouncilofAgricultureLibrary,ExecutiveYuan.17Thisisroughly6.2millionacresand5.5milliontons.“越南農村改進部官員來華考察肥料配銷”[ObservationonTaiwanfertilizerdistributionbyVietnameseofficials],September26,1964;

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published inFebruary1960.18It surveyedandsummarizedriceproduction in theRVN,examiningeachstepfromproductiontodistrictfarmers, including inspection,storage,distribution, financial subsidies, anddisseminationof information.Thebroad scopeofthe reportmirrored 1950s JCRR reforms in Taiwan,where, in addition to focusing onplant breeding and application of new agricultural seeds and technologies, JCRRtechnicians also developed farmers’ associations that served as intermediaries forproviding agricultural credit and selling agricultural products to wholesalers and themarket. Taiwanese studies in Vietnam also took into account new ideas of appliedeconomics and agricultural extension that worked hand in hand with surveys andpolicymaking.

The report’s primary concern was plant breeding. The Crop Improvement Teamobserved that rice produced in Vietnam originated mostly from government-runprimary-seedmultiplicationfarms.Thericeproducedfromtheprimaryfarmsweresentto secondary-seed multiplication farms that then produced enough seeds to bedistributed to farmers to plant for the season. One significant problem was at theprimary level, multiplication seed was filtered only for off-types, rice varieties notintendedfordistributiononward.Asaresult,theteamwrotethat“thedesirablelevelofpuritycanhardlybethusmaintained,”implyingthatstandardsformultipliedriceweretoo lax.19Furthermore, selection for the primary-seedmultiplication farmswasmadefifteenyearspriortothereport,in1945,andnofurtherselectionwasperformedonaregionalbasisat thesecondary-seedmultiplication farm level.Thereport implied thatVietnamwas relyingonoutdated rice, and that selectingnewer varietieswould likelyimprove production. The team suggested instead that the government agenciesresponsibleforricebreedingworkcloselywiththeseedmultiplicationfarmsinordertoselectandproduceseedsthatweresuitableforthelocalregionstheysupplied.

Thisrecommendationonseedmultiplicationwasinlinewiththefundamentalsofagricultural science of the twentieth century—with its focus on production usingdisciplined, rationalized practices—that helped define the Green Revolution. In thiscase, improving thenational seedproduction systemadhered to thegoalof scientificselectionandbreeding,whichwastocreatehigher-yieldingseedsratherthanallowingthemultiplicationof lower-yieldingvarieties. Localizationwasalsoapartof selection,which involved ensuring that varieties accommodated the specific soils, climates,growing seasons, andother conditions in thewide rural areaswhere seedswould bedistributed.

DigitalCollectionNumber數位典藏號020-011002-0087;page15;MinistryofForeignAffairsCollection,AcademiaHistorica,Taiwan.18TàiliệucủapháibộkĩthuậtTrungHoadânquốcởViệtNamvềviệcsảnxuấtlúagiốngởViệtNamnăm1960[ROCtechnicalteaminVietnamreportonVietnamriceproduction],February1960;Folder1313;NhaCanhNông[DirectorateofAgriculture],VNA.19TàiliệucủapháibộkĩthuậtTrungHoadânquốcởViệtNamvềviệcsảnxuấtlúagiốngởViệtNamnăm1960,page21.

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Rationalizationalsoextendedtoculturalpractices,suchasmaintainingpreciseandconsistentdistancebetweenriceseedlingstoensureenoughroomforgrowthwithoutunderutilizing much needed land. Taiwanese farmers introduced new agriculturalimplements that could aid Vietnamese farmers in easily marking distances throughimprintinggridsinthesoil(figure2).

Figure2.ATaiwanesetechnicianteachingaVietnamesefarmerhowtouseanimplementtomarkricespacinginordertomaintainidealdistancewhiletransplantingriceseedlings.20

In the following years, the ChineseAgricultural TechnicalMission (CATM), as theROCteamstoVietnamwerecollectivelyknownearlyon,establishedariceexperimentcenter in Mỹ Tho, located in the Mekong delta, with experiment stations locatedthroughoutVietnam,includingLongXuyênandCầnThơintheMekongdelta,andPhanRanginsouthernVietnam.21The1968annualreportfromtheCATMindicatedthattheMỹThoExperimentCenterhadcollected710varietiesforcomparativetrials,including84 newly introduced foreign varieties from the International Rice Research Institute(IRRI) in Los Baños in the Philippines, and 37 varieties from Cambodia and Thailand.These were then distributed to the regional experiment stations for field trials todeterminewhichvarietieswouldperformbestforeachregion.Theseedssourcedfromneighboring Southeast Asian nations reflected the belief among Taiwanese scientists

20“嚴家淦總統數位照片─臺灣農技團在越南工作成果”[ApictorialrepresentationofhighlightsofCATM/VNactivities],April1965;DigitalCollectionNumber006-030202-00011-001;YanJiaganPapers,AcademiaHistorica.21LaterCATMwaschangedtotheChineseAgriculturalTechnicalGroup(CATG).

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(and IRRI scientists) thatdifferent areasofVietnam sharedecological similaritieswithmuchofSoutheastAsia.WithterrainandgeographyasvariedascentralandsouthernVietnam,whichspannednotjustlatitudebutalsotopographical,precipitation,andsoilvariances, developmentplanners sawVietnamecologically andnot just as aboundednation-state.

IR-8riceproducedbytheIRRIshowedimpressiveyields,nearlydoublingthenativecheckvariety(usedasacontrol)at5,744kgperhectarecomparedwith3,049kg/ha.22IR-8,theIRRI’smostfamousproduct,wasoftencalled“miraclerice”becauseofitshighyields,andinVietnamitwassometimesTN-8,shortforThầnNông(“godofagriculture,”implyingsupernaturalpowers)(TranandKajisa2006).Bredintheearly1960sasacrossof two varieties, Indonesian Peta and Taiwanese Dee-geo-woo-gen, its globaldissemination allowed for significant improvements in yield across many South andSoutheastAsianrice-growingregions. IR-8becameadefiningcontributortotheGreenRevolutioninAsia,thoughalongwithmonocultureandrelianceonchemicalfertilizers,italsoledtodependenceonchemicalsandcommercializedagriculturewithpotentiallydisastrousecologicalconsequences(Cullather2010;Shiva2016).AssistantDirector forthe United States Agency for International Development(USAID)/Vietnam, James P.Grant, who was born and raised in Beijing as the son of Canadian missionaries andengaged in a lifelong career in development,wrote to Shen Zonghan of his visit to aTaiwanese demonstration plot near Biên Hòa where IR-8 was being planted. On hissecond visit a year later, Grant remarked on “the fine work done by your JCRRtechnicians in Vietnam” in helping to transform the formerly “crude demonstrationplot”to“amajorriceresearchcenter.”HeincludedaNewYorkTimesarticleshowcasingthe gift of IR-8 from Vietnam to the United States, a symbol of its gratitude asappreciationfortheUnitedStatesintroducingthenewcultivarinVietnam.23

IR-8, however, did not do well in all field tests. One of IR-8’s differentiatingcharacteristicswas its semi-dwarfingallele, sd1,which it inherited from its Taiwaneseparent,Dee-geo-woo-gen.Dwarfingallowed IR-8 stalksbe shortand stockyand resisttoppling,whichwouldsubmergericeunderwater,makingitimpossibletoharvestandthusreducingyields.But,IR-8inĐịnhTườngandPhongDinhsufferedfromtheoppositeproblem.There,duetohigherrainfall,waterlevelsinpaddyfieldswerehighenoughtosubmergetheshorterdwarf-typerice.TheCATMinsteadsuggestedearlierplantingsinApril andNovember toharvest in JulyandMarchand thusavoid flooding later in theseason. 24 Taiwanese efforts to distribute field tests of different varieties were inrecognition of the difficulties of national-scale development across different cultural,social,andecologicalcontexts.AshistorianDavidBiggshasargued,thespecificitiesofplaceandlocalityhadoutsizedconsequencesforAmericandevelopmentontheground

22Thisamountstoroughly5,125poundsperacrecomparedwith2,720poundsperacre.23JamesP.GranttoShenZonghan,November25,1968;ArchiveNumber034000000339A;FolderDocumentDrafts“G,”in“ShenZonghanLetterDrafts”;EYCAHA.24“駐越農技團第四年度工作報告”[AgriculturaltechnicalteaminVietnamFourthAnnualWorkReport],July1,1968;DigitalCollectionNumber020-011004-0102;MFACAHA.

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inAnGiangProvince(Biggs2009).IntheTaiwanesemissions,thedownsidesofusingIR-8 were avoided by adjusting planting seasons to account for local hydrologicalconditions.Nonetheless,theunexpectedobstaclesfacingIR-8,knownforitsmiraculousyield and remarkable range of growing regions, exemplified the issues facingdevelopmentnotjustbyTaiwaneseteamsinVietnambuteverywhereintheworld.

Taiwanese teams expanded beyond rice to include other food crops, includingonions,carrots,garlic,sweetpotatoes,watermelon,soybean,cabbage,lettuce,peanuts,sorghum, corn, and mung beans (figure 3). Varieties were sourced from countriesthroughouttheGlobalNorthandSouth,suchastheUnitedStates,Australia,andKorea.Experiment stations run by Taiwanese compared varieties,which could include up totwenty-eightvarieties,as in thecaseofonionsranging fromTexasEarlyGrano502toEarlyLockyerBrown.25

Figure3.PhotographcomparingtheAmericanvariety“DixieQueen”watermelon(left)at14kilograms(morethan30pounds)introducedbytheTaiwaneseagriculturalteamcomparedtoanativevariety(right)inĐịnhTường.26

Chemical fertilizer was another aspect of Green Revolution methods touted byTaiwanese teams simultaneously with seeds. In a 1964 report from the Taiwanesemission toVietnam to the JCRR, chemical fertilizerwas identifiedasbeingused “verylittle”because“ricefarmersarenotfamiliarwithchemicalfertilizers.”Theirconclusionwas that increased usagewas “absolutely necessary.” This conclusion is unsurprising,

25“駐越農技團第四年度工作報告,”July1,1968.26“嚴家淦總統數位照片─臺灣農技團在越南工作成果,”April1965.

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giventheGreenRevolutionparadigmofthe1960sthatreliedheavilyonchemicalsandvarietiesthatrespondedwelltochemicalfertilizer,despiteitbeingshort-sightedduetotheenvironmentalconsequences.Taiwanhadutilizedchemicalfertilizersextensivelyfordecades, dating back to the Japanese colonial era (1895–1945), and relied heavily onchemicals for its own agricultural miracle in the 1950s and 1960s. In the resultingsolution, implemented at the recommendation of the Taiwanese team in Vietnam,newly established Vietnamese fertilizer committees (one central and eighteenprovincial) sold fertilizers on credit through farmers’ associations and cooperatives,similartothesysteminTaiwan.Thereportdetailedthatlogisticalissues(tardinessandconfusion)wereproblematicbutexcusablegivenhow“new”fertilizerwas.27

Fertilizer usage similarly followed after rigorous field trials across the riceexperiment stations. Across Ba Xuyên, Cần Thơ, Huế, and Phan Rang experimentstations,threetypesofchemicalfertilizersweretestedingrowingriceatvariousratios:Nitrogen (N), Phosphorus Pentoxide (P2O5, or phosphoric acid), and potassium oxide(K2O, or potash). Responses differed dramatically, with some showing a near-twofoldincrease in yields, whereas rice grown in Huế responded negatively to fertilizercomparedwithusewithoutfertilizer.28

In the language of the 1964 report, the Taiwanese team leader described how“fertilizer distribution andutilization in Taiwan,Republic of China, haswonpraisesofcountriesinSoutheastAsia.”Thisself-affirmationservedtoencourageTaipeitoacceptateamoffourVietnamesefertilizerdistributionspecialiststoobservedemonstrationsoffertilizerdistributionandusage inTaiwan,but itnonetheless reinforcedanarrativeofTaiwan’ssuccessbeingwelcomedandrecognizedbyreceivingcountrieslikeVietnamintheGlobalSouth.29

“BroadSocialStrata”:RuralOrganizations,Gender,andAgriculturalExtensionTheROC team recommendeda seriesofmeasures centeredonagricultural extensionanddemonstration.Anearlysuggestionduringthefirstyearofthemissioninearly1960wastoestablishdemonstrationfieldsforproperplantingandcareofseedsselectedbythe state. To complement demonstration, the team suggested providing training inconjunctionwith 4-T, theVietnameseequivalent of 4-H in theUnited States. 4-TwasfundedbyU.S.agriculturaldevelopmentmissionsinVietnam(figure4).Both4-Tand4-Hwereruralorganizationsthat integratedagriculturalandpublichealthpracticesasameansofcommunityyouthactivity.TheROCrecommendedusing4-Tmembersalongwithvillageleaderstodisseminateinformationaboutseedplanting.Othersuggestionsto aid knowledge dissemination included printed materials, similar to the magazineHarvest (Fengnian豐年), introduced by the JCRR in Taiwan. Finally, the report also

27“越南農村改進部官員來華考察肥料配銷,”September26,1964,page15.28“駐越農技團第四年度工作報告,”July1,1968.29“越南農村改進部官員來華考察肥料配銷,”September26,1964,page15.

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suggested thatVietnameseofficials establish contests for thehighestper-unit areaofriceproduction,inwhichthe“winningfarmerwillreceive[an]awardandwillbeaskedto tell other farmers the ways and means by which he achieve[d] [his] goal.”30Byincentivizing demonstration through informal competition, Taiwanese experts werehoping to create new information venues for rural Vietnamese farmers to learn fromtheirown.

Figure4.ChiangChing-kuo(蔣經國,JiangJingguo),PremieroftheROCandsonofChiangKai-shek,visitsa4-T(4-H)chapterinBiênHòaprovince,Vietnam.31

MaBaozhidepartedastheheadoftheCropImprovementMissionafterayear,in

1960,andwasreplacedonamorepermanentbasisbyJinYanggao(金陽鎬,Yang-kaoKing), another prominent agronomist from the University of Nanking and protégé ofShenZonghan.InareporttotheJCRRauthoredaftertheendoftheVietnammissionin1972,Jinwrote,“Vietnam’sagriculturalenvironment,cultivationmethods,andculturalhabitsonthewholeareveryclosetothoseofTaiwan’s.Thosewhoareknowledgeableontheissueallbelievethattodevelopagricultureonemust[bixu必須]drawupontheexperiencesofTaiwan[yitaiwanweijiejing以台灣為借鏡].”32

TheVietnammissionwasnotjustfocusedontheagriculturalsciences;thegreatestneeds of Vietnam were perceived to be social in nature. With the expansion of theVietnamese communists in northern Vietnam, the RVN prioritized the needs of itsfarmers,thosemostvulnerabletocommunistorganization.Despiteattemptstoreplace

30TàiliệucủapháibộkĩthuậtTrungHoadânquốcởViệtNamvềviệcsảnxuấtlúagiốngởViệtNamnăm1960,page21.31JinYanggao,“TwelveYearsinVietnam,”June1973,page58.32JinYanggao,“TwelveYearsinVietnam,”June1973,page4.

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French colonial administrators with Vietnamese administrators under Diệm’sgovernment,communistinsurgencywasnotstemmedbypacificationcampaigns.DiệmandotherRVNofficialsturnedtoruralandcommunitydevelopment,whichemphasizedthecommunityasadurableunitofgovernancefromwhichpositivesocialchangecouldbereplicatedfromthebottomupandthusthroughoutruralVietnam(Immerwahr2015;Stewart 2017). It was here that William Fippin’s aforementioned connection withTaiwanwasfateful.InMay1959,approximatelyonemonthafterFippin’ssuggestiontoinvite Taiwanese experts on farmers’ associations, Trần Ngọc Liên, the CommissionerGeneral for Cooperatives and Agricultural Credit, traveled to Taiwan with Fippin andseveralotherRVNofficials toobserveTaiwanese farmers’associations firsthand.Afterthe trip, Liên formally requested Taiwanese experts in farmers’ associations andcooperatives.TenTaiwaneseagriculturalexpertswererequestedtobesenttotheRVNon a six-month provisional basis, to “work especially at village levels,” he said,“encouraging, guiding, training, and assisting Vietnam’s newly formed farmers’associations to get firmly established and operating.”33Along with teams from other“FreeWorld” nations brought in through U.S. mediation, the work of the Taiwanesetechnicalmissionwould help form the basis of counter-communist insurgency effortsthatweredesignedtowintheheartsandmindsoftheVietnamesepeasants.

OnOctober27,1959,RVNVicePresidentNguyễnNgocThơsenttheobjectivesandscopeof theTaiwaneseassistancemission in farmers’associations toelevenprovincechiefs.34The October agreement increased the Taiwanese technicians to eleven, ofwhicheightwere focusedonestablishing farmers’ associationsand cooperatives; twoon fisheriesandcropcooperatives;andthe finaloneontraining.Theeightmenweresplit into three teams and responsible for vast territories of central and southernVietnam, roughly four to five provinces per team. After familiarizing themselveswithlocal conditions, the RVN regime placed the onus on local governments “to let thesespecialistconducttheiractivitieswithouthindrance”andfurthermore“havenewideasandmakeclearproblemsthatrequirespecialists’helpandinvestigation”tosenduptothe Central Farmers’ Association Committee and central government authorities.35Thoughspreadthin,theTaiwaneseadvisorswerehandedthetaskofnewideaswithin

33HuỳnhVănĐiểmtoWilliamFippin,April3,1959;“駐越農技團(I)”[AgriculturaltechnicalteaminVietnam,vol.1];ArchivalCollectionNumber020000030452A;MFACAHA.34TàiliệucủavănbộCôngChánhvàgiaothôngvềchươngtrìnhhoạtđộngcủachuyênviênĐàiLoanvềhiệphộinôngdânvàgiaiđoạnthựchànhcáccấphiệphộinôngdânliênhệđếnbộCôngChánhnăm1959[1959correspondencewiththeMinistryofPublicWorksregardingtheactivityplansofTaiwanesespecialistsinimplementingandassistingfarmers’associations],October27,1959,Folder202,BộCôngChánhvàGiaoThông[MinistryofPublicWorksandTransportation],VNA.35TàiliệucủavănbộCôngChánhvàgiaothôngvềchươngtrìnhhoạtđộngcủachuyênviênĐàiLoanvềhiệphộinôngdânvàgiaiđoạnthựchànhcáccấphiệphộinôngdânliênhệđếnbộCôngChánhnăm1959,October27,1959,Folder202.

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the local governments that would be actionable, and thus contribute to the SouthVietnameseregime’seffortstoexpandanationalruralpolicy.

Taiwanese farmers’-association experts were called upon to enact a ruraldevelopmentmodel thatemphasizedgrassroots interactionswith farmers.OnApril9,1959, theMinistry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) sent amemorandum to theMinistry ofEconomicAffairs.Inthememo,MOFAoutlinedtheworkdetails.First,“workcomesintocontactwith broad social strata, including central and local, to the lowest stratumofvillage farmers’associations.”36Next, “work scope includesmatters related to leading,extension, and training, with achieving farmer-association self-sufficiency andindependenceastheobjective.”37Theseobjectivesweresupplementedbygoalsofthefarmers’associationto“produceagriculturalproducts.”38Thefocusonthelowestlevelsof Vietnamese social strata reflected the rural emphasis of development from theTaiwanesemodelandthedesiretoengageatthevillagelevel.TheTaiwanesesuccessatorganizing and utilizing farmers’ associations to extend agricultural knowledge anddistributefertilizermatchedtheVietnameseneeds.

In defining how these projects would be carried out, Taipei chose a differentapproach from the United States. Whereas U.S. development agencies such as theInternationalCooperationAdministrationchosetosendexpertswithextensivescientifictraining for itsmissions abroad, Taiwaneseplanners predominantly sought blue-collartechnicianstoworkdirectlywithVietnamesefarmers.AsMOFA’sApril9memorandumcontinued,Taiwanese“workersdonotrequirehighereducation,butratherrequirelongterm service in farmers’ associations or related organizations aswell aswide rangingpractical experience managing farmers’ associations or related organizations.”39Thischange was pragmatic, reflecting the importance of on-the-ground experienceinteracting with “the lowest stratum” of rural society. It also saved on costs—technicians received significant hardship bonuses forworking abroad inVietnam, andmanywereeagertotakethesalarybump.EventherelativelyfewscientistswholedthetechnicalteamswererepresentedasworkingintheruralcountrysidewithVietnamesefarmers. In reports written for audiences outside Taiwan, especially Americans and“FreeWorld” allies like the RVN, Taiwanese documents presented university scienceprofessorsasworking“shouldertoshoulder”withVietnamesefarmers.40

An interview with Zhang Jiming 張基明 , a retired Taiwanese technician whoworkedinVietnamfrom1968to1969,indicatedthatthemajorityoftechnicianswererecruited fromagricultural vocational schools (nongxiao農校). Zhang graduated fromTaichungAgriculturalVocationalHighSchool(Taizhonggaonong台中高農)inagronomy

36MemofromMinistryofForeignAffairstoDeputyMinisterofEconomicAffairs,April9,1959,“駐越農技團(I)”[AgriculturaltechnicalteaminVietnam,vol.1];ArchivalCollectionNumber020000030452A;MFACAHA.37MemofromMinistryofForeignAffairstoDeputyMinisterofEconomicAffairs,April9,1959.38MemofromMinistryofForeignAffairstoDeputyMinisterofEconomicAffairs,April9,1959.39MemofromMinistryofForeignAffairstoDeputyMinisterofEconomicAffairs,April9,1959.40“嚴家淦總統數位照片─臺灣農技團在越南工作成果,”April1965.

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(zonghenongyi綜合農藝).HeunderwenttwomonthsoftrainingdesignedbytheJCRRfor technicians performing technicalwork abroad, andwas assigned to a four-personteamapproximately35kilometers(nearly22miles)northwestofSaigon.Zhangengagedinallmannerofwork,fromdemonstrationtoextension,thusshowinglocalVietnamesefarmershowtoplantrice,grains,vegetables,anduseagriculturalequipment(figure5).Ateachstage,representativesfromlocalVietnamesefarmers’associationswereinvitedto their Taiwanese team’s demonstration farm. Usually every day after dinner,Taiwanese technicians held meetings for one to two hours to teach about tenVietnamese farmers different agronomic techniques. 41 Taiwanese technicians alsotrained a number of Vietnamese farmers to serve as extension agents, who thenqualifiedtoserveasinstructorsforotherVietnamesefarmers(figure6).

Figure5(left).NationalTaiwanUniversityProfessorC.I.Lin(left)demonstratestransplantingrice“shouldertoshoulder”withVietnamesefarmers.42

Figure6(right).Aspartoftheagriculturalextensionanddemonstrationprogram,TaiwanesetechnicianstrainedselectedVietnamesefarmerstoserveasdemonstrationsupervisors.ThispictureshowsTaiwanese-trainedsupervisorsteachingsoybean-plantingmethodstootherVietnamesefarmers.43

Taiwanese extension and demonstration teams in Vietnam worked not only in

agricultural sciences and farmers’ associations, but also in “home improvement.”Demonstration centers included rural handicraft production equipment that could beutilizedwithin“homeeconomics,”agenderednotionthathome-based laborwasalsoproductive labor. In the 1960s, Taiwan rural organizations like 4-H had begun toorganizewomen toproducehandicrafts that could thenbe sold inmarkets (figure7).This endeavor was linked to 4-H in the United States, where 4-H originated, and itsgendering of boys and girls (Rosenberg 2015). State gendering of Taiwanese ruralsociety,usuallyalongwithcommunitydevelopment,persistedwellintothe1990swith 41ZhangJiming,interviewbyJamesLin,January14,2019.42“嚴家淦總統數位照片─臺灣農技團在越南工作成果,”April1965.43“嚴家淦總統數位照片─臺灣農技團在越南工作成果,”April1965.

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Taiwanesegovernmentpromotionofmarried–women’slabortofuelruralhome-basedproduction that formed the “satellite factories” of Taiwan’s later industrializedeconomic growth (Hsiung1996). InVietnam,womenplayedaprominent role in ruralareas.ZhangJimingindicatedthatbythetimeofhisarrivalinVietnam,mostmenwereinvolved in the ongoing war, and thus women often participated in extension anddemonstrationactivities(figure8).44

Figure7(left).“Homeimprovementagents”shownhereareusingastraw-ropemakingmachineataTaiwanesedemonstrationcenterinBiênHòa.45

Figure8(right).VietnamesefarmersvisitaTaiwanesedemonstrationfarm.46Althoughmostextensionanddemonstrationactivitieswereperformedinpersonat

demonstrationcentersandfarms,theywerealsocomplementedbywrittenmaterials.In Taiwan, farmers’ associations and government agents distributed magazines,pamphlets, and other materials as a core strategy in extension. For example, inconjunctionwith theU.S. InformationService, the JCRRwroteanddistributed in ruralareasofTaiwanthemagazineHarvest,whichincludedmoralitytales,comics,andothermeansofattractingawideswathofTaiwaneseruralsociety.

Taiwanese development utilized written materials in Vietnam as well. In oneinstance in 1973, a Vietnamese request for an emergency shipment of TaiwanesefertilizersandseedswasaccompaniedwithapamphletontheproperusageoffertilizerinVietnamese.Thecover,simplytitled“SeedandFertilizerUsageGuide,”alsoindicatedthattheseedsandfertilizerswere“agiftoftheRepublicofChina”withashortmessagethatwished“peaceandhappiness”to“theprosperousvillagefarmersoftheRepublicofVietnam.”47 The guide elaborated on the technical contents of fertilizer, including

44InterviewwithZhangJiming,January14,2019.45“嚴家淦總統數位照片─臺灣農技團在越南工作成果,”April1965,page20.46“嚴家淦總統數位照片─臺灣農技團在越南工作成果,”April1965,page32.47“種子及肥料使用說明書”[Seedandfertilizerusageinstructions],January27,1973.“我緊急

支援越南農作物種子及肥料”[ROCemergencyaidofagriculturalproducts,seeds,andfertilizertoVietnam];page265;DigitalCollectionNumber020-011008-0007.MFACAHA.

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chemicalcomposition,butwasalsoameanstoshowcasethehumanitarianactionsandgoodwillofTaiwaneseassistance.Boxescontainingvegetableseedswereadornedwithflags of the ROC and RVN side by side, showing the origins of the gift along withpartnershipfortheRVNpeoples(figure9).

Figure9.AVietnameserecipientofTaiwaneseaid.TheboxisadornedwiththetwoflagsoftheRepublicofChinaandRepublicofVietnam.48

Intheofficialceremonyhandingovertheroughlyfiftythousandpackagesofseeds

and fertilizer, ROCAmbassador to VietnamXu Shaochang許紹昌 gave a speech thatoutlinedROCperspectivesonthealliance.Throughoutthespeech,heemphasizedthatthe ROCwas similar to the RVN in social and cultural terms: the gift was “from onefarmingpeopletoanother.”InrelayingthehopesoftheROC,theambassador’sspeechalso evokedmodernist languageof economicprosperity aswell as valorizationof therural.Theseedsand fertilizerwere intended togive“ahelpinghand to the individualsmallfarmertostandonhisownfeetagain.”Thesepackagestoindividualfarmerswereaccompaniedbyalargeamountof“high-yieldinghybridcornseed”thatwas“designedfor the purpose of demonstrating profitable corn-growing in various provinces inVietnamtopavethewayfor large-scaleproductionofcornbothfordomesticuseandforexportinthefuture.”49Thecapitalistlanguagefocusedonthescientificmodernismofhigh-yieldinghybridsinordertoachievehighproductivityandlargeexportnumbers,

48“我政府贈越種子肥料？運送分發照片”[ROCGovernmentgiftofseedsandfertilizershippinganddistributionpictures]January27,1973;DigitalCollectionNumber020-011008-0007.MFACAHA.“我緊急支援越南農作物種子及肥料,”page261.49“我贈越肥料種子農具值一億七千萬”[ROCgiftsVietnamfertilizer,seeds,andagriculturaltoolsworth170million],May10,1973;DigitalCollectionNumber020-011008-0007.MFACAHA.“我緊急支援越南農作物種子及肥料,”page261.

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aimed at resolving both problems of basic human need and national economicprosperity.MartyrdomandIdentity:RepresentingOverseasDevelopmentatHomeIn Taiwan, the continued demand for Taiwanese development assistance abroadwascontinuallyreportedondomesticnewsoutlets.Onaregularbasisfrom1959until1975,newspaper articles deliveredupdateson theprogress and incidentsof the Taiwaneseteam inVietnam.Thoughoftenshort, theupdatescompensatedfor theirbrevitywithregularity. Major Taiwanese newspapers reported on changes in team leadership,project accomplishments, and, particularly, contract renewals. These publications,whichatthetimewererunbyorcloselyaffiliatedwiththeGMDregime,servedofficialstateinterestsbyreportingontheeffortsoftheROCabroadtohelpdevelopingnations.

Theresponsetothe1963deathofTaiwanesericetechnicianZhangDusheng,intheintroduction to thisarticle,demonstratedthe importanceofoverseasdevelopment toROC foreign-policyofficials. Zhangwasborn in1935and raised inTainan, in southernTaiwan. After graduating from Tainan No. 1 High School, he enrolled in TaiwanProvincialAgriculturalCollegeinTaichung(todayNationalChungHsingUniversity國立

中興大學) for his secondary education.Upon graduation, he underwent training as areserve officer and was assigned to grassroots political organization work. Aftercompleting his military service, he briefly taught at the Yuanlin Agricultural School(Yuanlinnongxiao員林農校)in1961beforemovingontoworkattheTaichungDistrictAgricultural Improvement Station (Taizhong nongye gailiang chang台中農業改良場)where he worked for two years in rice improvement. On October 10, 1963, he leftTaiwantojointheTaiwaneseAgriculturalTechnicalAssistanceTeamtoVietnam.

ZhangwaskilledinthelineofdutybyVietnamesecommunistforcesonNovember13,1963.Asmentionedintheintroduction,hewasreturningtoSaigon,aftervisitingariceexperimentstationoutsideSaigon,whenhe“metaVietnamesecommunistambushandwaskilled”alongwithaVietnamesetranslator.50Taiwanesetechniciansoccasionallywere caught in the middle of military operations—another incident involving threeTaiwanesetechniciansbeingsurroundedbyVietnamesecommunisttroopsoccurredinHuếin1968—butusuallythetechniciansemergedwithoutissueduetointerventionbyallied (typically American) forces or Việt Cộng recognition that Taiwanese technicianswere noncombatants.51One of my interviewees thought it likely that Zhang’s grouppanicked upon being ambushed by Vietnamese communists, who usually did notexplicitly target Taiwanese agricultural technicians for attacks, and panicking andattempting to flee instead of surrendering and being taken prisoner resulted in the 50“農復會定期 追悼張篤生”[JCRRperiodicalmourningZhangDusheng].聯合報[Uniteddailynews],November20,1963.51ShenZonghantoAustinB.Sanford,April26,1968;ArchiveNumber034000000357A;DocumentDrafts“S,”in“ShenZonghanLetterDrafts”;EYCAHA.ShenZonghantoWillieCook,April26,1968;ArchiveNumber034000000330A;DocumentDrafts“C,”in“ShenZonghanLetterDrafts”;EYCAHA.

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unfortunate deaths. One memorandum sent by the Taiwanese technical team to aVietnameseagriculturalofficial referenced“Vietcong snipers”asbeing responsible forZhang’s death. 52 Yet newspaper portrayals of the incident omitted many details,pointing instead to the patriotic nature of Zhang’s work and the work in generalconductedbytheTaiwaneseagriculturaltechnicalteams.

Newspaper editorials, especially those from GMD-affiliated publications, UnitedDailyNews(Lianhebao聯合報)andChengHsinDailyNews(Zhengxinxinwenbao徵信

新聞報),providedvenuesfortheGMDtousedevelopmentasameansofpropaganda.OneUnitedDailyNewsarticlecitedProvincialDepartmentofAgricultureandForestryDirector Zhang Huiqiu (張慧秋, H. T. Chang. After being interviewed following thedeath,ZhangHuiqiustatedthatZhangDushengwas“exactlythetypeofyouththatourcountryneeds.”Elaboratingfurther,ZhangHuiqiuexplainedthatyoungtechnicianslikeZhang Dusheng served a crucial role. Since 1953, Taiwan’s agriculture “had primarilyrelied on practical and relatively simple experimental research results,” but by 1963“had already attained such high levels, that in order to further develop, it requiresengaginginevenmorerefinedandprofoundresearch.”Thus,goingabroadtoVietnamrepresented positive opportunities for experts like Zhang Dusheng, whereas work inTaiwan was often “poorly compensated,” so that they could “on the one handaccomplish our national mission of assisting our allies, and on the other hand, afteraccumulatingsavings,returnhometoworkwithpeaceofmind.”53

ZhangHuiqiu’sgoal inemphasizingaspectsofpragmatismandadvancedresearchnot only reinforced that Taiwan possessed unique and useful expertise but alsoinformedthedomesticTaiwaneseaudienceaboutthereasonsTaiwaneseyouthneededto be abroad in Vietnam—to benefit both their own careers and their nation. ZhangDusheng’s status as benshengren 本省人, or native Taiwanese, was never explicitlymentioned in these accounts; under an official GMD policy that treated thebenshengren as Chinese, official accounts did not acknowledge such ethnic divisions.However,Zhang’sbirthplaceofTainanwasmentionedonoccasion,andcombinedwithhisbirthyear1935predatingthearrivaloftheGMD,thereadercouldeasilydeducethatZhangwasbenshengren.Manyoftheblue-collartechnicianswhoworkedinruralareasinTaiwanandthenweresentabroadtoVietnamandotherforeignlocalesinthe1960swerebenshengrenlikeZhang,asopposedtothebureaucratsandscientistsinpositionsofpowerlikeShenZonghanandMaBaozhi,whowerewaishengren外省人,“mainlandChinese”who arrived in Taiwanwith theGMD in 1949. Zhang’s commonbackground

52“NewsReleasesRegardingDeathofJCRRTechnicianbyVietcongSnipers,”OfficeMemorandumfromChineseTechnicalMissiontoVietnamonCropImprovementtoDoanMinhQuan,Chief,RiceService,December2,1963;Folder842,BảndịchcácbàibáoTaiwanliênquanđếncáichếtcủaôngTu-Sun-Chang,thànhviênpháiđoànkĩthuậtcanhnôngTrungHoaDânQuốcđếnViệtNamnăm1963[TranslationofTaiwanarticlesrelatedtothedeathofTusunChang,memberoftheROCagriculturaltechnicalteamtoVietnam1963],NhaCanhNông[DirectorateofAgriculture],VNA.53“張篤生在越殉職”[ThesacrificeofZhangDusheng],聯合報[Uniteddailynews],November16,1963.

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perhapsmadeinternationaldevelopmentmoresympathetictobenshengrenaudiences,tying in the political and diplomatic objectives of the waishengren GMD with thesacrificesmadebybenshengrenonbehalfofrepresentingTaiwanabroad.

Most importantly, development helped legitimize the GMD state in the eyes ofbenshengren.TheneedforTaiwaneseaidabroadandTaiwanesewillingnesstoputtheirlivesonthelinetohelpothernationsgavetheTaiwaneseasenseofnationalisticpride,demonstrating “industriousness” and “scientific knowledge,” which were deemedsuperiorTaiwanesequalities.54Economicgrowth,humanitarian largesse,andexpertisein modern science and technology were the characteristics that the GMD sought tocultivateintheirpublicimagetomaintaintheirauthoritariangriponTaiwan.

TheOverseasChinese,InternationalAnticommunism,andIdeologiesofState-Building:RepresentingTaiwaneseDevelopmentGloballyAlthough thememory of Zhang Dushengwas crafted into the image of the idealizedTaiwaneseunderthedevelopmentalistGMDathome,thetargetedaudienceswerenotlimitedtoTaiwaneseandtheruralVietnamese.TheGMDportrayeditselfastheleadersof“FreeChina”internationally—thelegitimateChineseregime.ThisimageofFreeChinaincludedthehuaqiao華僑,theoverseasChinesediaspora.ForlateQingrevolutionariessuch Sun Yat-sen, overseas Chinese hadplayed an important role, from funding earlyGMD revolutionary efforts to providing the technical expertise for nation-building(Bergère 1998; Soon 2014). During the Cold War, the overseas Chinese became aparticularlyimportantdemographicfortheGMDinordertosubstantiateitsownclaimsof legitimacy as the true guardians of “China.”Without themajority of its territoriespriortoitsretreatin1949,theGMDmadecarefulaimstogarnergrassrootssupportinmajor overseas Chinese centers, such as the West Coast of North America and thePhilippines, ashistorianChienWenKunghas argued, “toembed theNationalist stateintoChinesesocietyandconnecthuaqiaotoTaiwan”(Kung2018,5–6).

Vietnam was certainly no exception. Vietnam and greater Southeast Asia werehometoa largeChinesepopulation thathadbegunemigratingduring theseventeethcentury at the end of the Ming dynasty. Many overseas Chinese originated fromsouthernChina,particularly speakersofCantonese,Chaozhou (Teochew),andMinnan(Hokkien).AlargenumbersettledinthesouthernVietnamcityofChợLớnjustoutsideSaigon and later integrated and merged into Saigon itself. ROC official diplomacytargeted these Chinese populations as part of its global efforts to build a huaqiaoidentity under ROC patronage. Historian Mei Feng Mok argues that the ChinesecommunityinChợLớninparticulardevelopedtransnationaldiasporatieswithChineseoutside Vietnam—in Taiwan, Malaya, and Hong Kong—partially through theconnectionsfosteredbytheROCstate(Mok2016,89).TheROC, forexample,offered

54“CondolencetoTusunChang,”ChengHsinDailyNews,Taipei,November17,1963.TranslatedinFolder842,VNA.

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scholarships and reserved spots for overseas Chinese as incentives for Vietnamese-ChinesetoattenduniversitiesinTaiwan(Mok2016,92).

ChinesecommunitiesinVietnamthusbecameanotherdiscursivebattlegroundfortheGMDtowinover.Utilizingthesamephrasingandimagery,Vietnamesenewspapersserving Chinese communities in Chợ Lớn and elsewhere in Vietnam covered GMDdevelopment. One of the largest Chinese newspapers by circulation in Vietnam wasYuenTuongjihpao(Ch.Yuandongribao遠東日報,FarEasterndaily),foundedin1940byahuaqiaobusinessmanofChaozhoudescent,ZhuJixing朱繼興,anddistributedasfar as Laos and Cambodia (Mok 2016, 19). Yuen Tuong’s regular columns discussedmatters of everyday life, such as education, gender, literature, and film, along withcoverage of ROC actions in Vietnam. In the July 14, 1960 issue of Yuen Tuong, ajournalistinterviewedthen-CropImprovementMissionheadMaBaozhiandrelayedthegoalsoftheTaiwaneseteaminbeginningtechnicalassistancetoVietnam.55Thereafter,YuenTuongreportedwithregularitytheactionsoftheTaiwaneseteams,rangingfromvisitsof irrigationexpertstocontract renewals.56Intheaforementioned1973instanceofTaiwan-giftedseedsandfertilizer,YuenTuongreportedontheconsequencesofthegiftbyborrowingthesamelanguageandphrasingusedinAmbassadorXuShaochang’sspeech. In detailing the goals of the gift, Yuen Tuong noted that gifted seeds wereintended “in the future not only to supply the food needs of this nation, but also toexpanditscropexports.”57

TheROCportrayedtheTaiwanese-Vietnameseallianceinnationalist,Asian-centric,andanticommunisttermsthatappealedtotheanticoloniallegacyoftheRVNandNgôĐình Diệm. Diệm came to power on what Miller has called “an unimpeachablereputationasanationalist” that culminatedwithdeposing theFrench-backedBảoĐạiandendedFrenchcolonialinfluenceinVietnam(2013,28).Thoughfiercelyanticolonial,Diệm also gained U.S. support for his regime through his vehement anticommunism,particularlyagainstHồChíMinh’sDemocraticRepublicofVietnam.AshistorianNu-AnhTranhasargued,theRVNengagedinananticommunistinternationalismimaginingtheRVN in friendships with ColdWar allies and as amember of the “FreeWorld” (Tran2013, 92). This anticommunist internationalism included participation in the AsianPeople’sAnti-CommunistLeague,ofwhichtheROCwasafoundingmember,alongwithdelegations from South Korea, Thailand, Macau, Hong Kong, the Ryukyu Islands(Okinawa), the Philippines, and the RVN. 58 RVN anticommunists “conceived of

55“農技團長馬保之對記者談該團此行任務”[InterviewwithagriculturaltechnicalteamleadMaBaozhidiscussingrecentagriculturaltechnicalteammission],July14,1960;“駐越農技團 (I)”[AgriculturaltechnicalteaminVietnam,vol.1];ArchivalCollectionNumber020000030452A;MFACAHA.56“農技團長馬保之對記者談該團此行任務,”July14,1960.57“我贈越肥料種子農具值一億七千萬,”May10,1973.“我緊急支援越南農作物種子及肥料,”page261.58“AsianPeoples’Anti-CommunistConference,MinutesoftheOpeningSession,”June15,1954;HistoryandPublicPolicyProgramDigitalArchive,B-387-039,DocumentsRelatedtotheAsian

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anticommunistinternationalismasthenaturalresponsetocommunistimperialism”;asaresult,theRVNregimeemphasizeditsinternationalrelationships(Tran2013,92).

A1960documentfromtheRVNMinistryofPublicWorksandTransportation,mostlikely a Vietnamese translation of an ROC official report of Diệm’s visit to Taiwan,likenedthetwonationsasbeing“twopeoples[ornations,dân-tộc]thatsharethesamecultural root which communism is destroying now.”59It elaborated on the existentialthreatofcommunismtobothnations:“theexistenceoftwocountriesisalsocurrentlyindanger.”ThereportpraisedtheaccomplishmentsoftheGMD’s1911revolutionthatledtotheestablishmentoftheROCandDiệm’sfoundingoftheRVN.60Thestrugglesofthe“free”peoplesofAsiabecameapointofprideandofcommonhistory.Bothsidesperceived themselves to be linked with a recent revolutionary past, rooted in theirviolentoppositiontocommunism.

Furthermore, the ROC report favorably compared the nationalist ideologiesespousedbybothleaders,theThreePrinciplesofthePeople(sanminzhuyi三民主義)—whichoriginatedwithSunYat-senandwasadoptedbyChiangKai-shekasthepoliticalideologyoftheROC—andNgôĐìnhDiệm’sPersonalism(Nhânvị).61

Both Personalism and the Three Principles shared basic tenets. PersonalismwasDiệm’s answer to finding a path between radical communism and French colonial-definedliberalism.ItcanbetracedbacktothewritingsofFrenchCatholicphilosopherEmmanuelMounier,who critiqued liberal capitalismand individualism in thewakeoftheGreatDepressionofthe1930swhilealsorejectingMarxismanditstendencytowardoppressionof individuals(Miller2013,46;Stewart2017,95).Diệm’sbrotherNgôĐìnhNhu, who played a crucial advisory and political role in the Diệm regime, becameexposedtoPersonalismwhilestudyinginFranceasanarchivist.EventuallyPersonalism,asarguedbyhistorian JessicaChapman,became the“official statephilosophy”of theRVNunderDiệm(Chapman2013,71).Phi-VânNguyenandotherhistorianshaveshownthat the RVN constitution of 1956 reflected Personalist principles (Tan 2019; Nguyen2018).

Yet,PersonalismasarticulatedbyNgôĐìnhNhuandadoptedintheRVNcontext,wasalso, inMiller’swords, “maddeninglyopaque” (Miller2013,46). Thisopacitywasdue in part to its roles as an indigenous ideology and a platform for postcolonialconsolidation.AshistorianGeoffreyStewarthasputit,theNgôsneededan“authenticVietnamese ‘cultural formula’ to imbue the populationwith the appropriate sense ofnationalspirittowillinglyparticipateinthenation-buildingprocess”(Stewart2017,99).

Anti-CommunistLeagueConference,PapersRelatedtoTreaty-MakingandInternationalConferences;SyngmanRheeInstitute,YonseiUniversity.http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118328.59Hồsơ vềviệcTổngThốngViệtNamviếngthămĐàiLoannăm1960[SummaryofRVNpresident’svisittoTaiwan1960],Undated(1960);Folder1161,BộCôngChánhvàGiaoThông[MinistryofPublicWorksandTransportation];VNA.60HồsơvềviệcTổngThốngViệtNamviếngthămĐàiLoannăm1960,Undated(1960).61HồsơvềviệcTổngThốngViệtNamviếngthămĐàiLoannăm1960,Undated(1960).

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Personalism was this formula. In imagining the ideal Vietnamese village, the Ngôsbelieved that the conservatismand spiritualismof Personalismwereneeded to enactthesocialtiesbetweencommunityandthemodernVietnamesenation(Stewart2017,100).Throughhisexaminationof theresettlementofnorthernrefugees intosouthernVietnam, historian Jason Picard has argued that theNgôs saw in traditional northernvillagestheiridealof“acorporate,close-knitcommunity”thatneededtobereplicatedacrossruralVietnam(Picard2016,84–86).Personalismtiedintothisvision;hence,theemphasisontheruralvillage.

Like Personalism, Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles as an ideology providedjustification for a revolutionary regime without being too dogmatically onerous.Beginningin1905,SunhadelaboratedpubliclyontheThreePrinciples—minshengzhuyi民生主義, usually translated as “livelihood of the people” or less often as “welfare”;minquanzhuyi民權主義,usuallytranslatedas“democracy”;andminzuzhuyin民族主義,usually translated as “nationalism”—as an organizing concept for his revolutionaryplatform, culminating in the 1924 published eponymouswork. Sunwas a pragmatist,andtheThreePrinciplesservedasamalleablepoliticaltooltoallowSunandtheROCtogarnerpopularpoliticalsupportinananti-Manchuandanti-imperialsentimentinearlytwentieth-centuryChina.AccordingtoSunYat-senbiographerMarie-ClaireBergère,theThree Principles were “a work of propaganda, a long political tract designed to winfollowers rather than to instill conviction,anappeal toaction rather than to thought”aimedto“diffuseanumberofideasratherthantoanalyzethem”(Bergère1998,353).Continuing under Chiang Kai-shek’s ROC, the Three Principles were largely used as asymbolic platform to demonstrate the ROC’s welfarist or revolutionary roots whenconvenient. Integrated into curricula across schools and military academies, forexample, the Three Principles were meant to build loyalty to and support for theauthoritarianROCregime.

Though Personalism and the Three Principles were both often deployed forpropagandapurposes,theconsequencesofthatdeploymentoftenresultedinrealandexpansive networks, movements, and institutions—such as the Asian People’s Anti-Communist League and Moral Re-Armament—that affected perceptions and foreignpolicies. As historian Mitchell Tan has effectively argued, “the production andproliferationofanationalideologywasanimportantwayinwhichnascentAsiannation-states like the RVN sought to define themselves not just to their people but also inrelationshiptoaRegiondivided,atleastinpart,byaconflictofideas”(Tan2019,4).Thedefinition and legitimation of the GMD regime were unquestionably the highestpriorities.TheThreePrincipleswasnotonlydeployedasapoliticalor social ideology,but also as a developmentalist one aswell. Economicwelfare, providing for thewell-being of the Taiwanese and global peoples like the Vietnamese against communism,becamecrucial.

Alludingtocommonpolitical ideologiesandrevolutionaryoriginswas inherent toTaiwan’s imaginingof itsdevelopmentmissions toVietnamandtherestof theGlobalSouth.Taiwan’smissionstoAfricaandland-reformtrainingofThirdWorldbureaucrats

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also reflected how the GMD became adroit at using the language and discourse ofdecolonizingnations todemonstrate solidarityandcommonality. InVietnam, theROCseizeduponPersonalism,thefoundingoftheRVN,andthebackgroundofDiệmandhisfamilytoenabletherepresentationthatitfoundmostideal,onecenteredonTaiwan’srevolutionaryandtechnicalmodernityandsteadfastanticommunistsolidarity.

ConclusionTheVietnammissionprovedtobe,atleastintermsofcontinueddemandfromtheRVN,a success for the Taiwanese. The original six-month mission was extended to threeyears. In 1961, the JCRR attempted to reassign the leader of the farmers’ associationteam,YangYukun(楊玉昆,Y.K.Yang),toTaiwan,wherefarmers’associationsneededhisattention.ButYang’sreassignmentoutofVietnamresultedinadeeplyimpassionedpleafromTrầnNgọcLiêntotheJCRR’schairmanatthetime,JiangMenglin蔣夢麟:

TheestablishmentofnumerousStrategicHamletshasgreatlyimprovedsecurity conditions in the rural areas and will afford greateropportunities tomoreeffectively expand the servicesof our [farmers’associations].Thissituationintensifiestheurgentneedofthespecialistswhohavebecomefamiliarwithourconditions....Mr.Chairman,Imustearnestly request thatyoureconsideryour three-yearservicepolicy inthelightofthepresentsituationinVietnam.Wearedeeplyengagedinan activewar, and our resources are stretched to themaximum. Thefocus of this war is in the countryside and among the rural people.Experienced direction and leadership is of special importance at thistime.62

With the implementation of the Strategic Hamlet program that sought

“pacification”ofruralvillagesbyincreasingsupportandthusostensiblylesseningruralties with communist insurgents, the RVN sought Taiwanese expertise in ruralorganization.By1970, theUnitedStateshadcontributedUS$2,036,088 to theTaiwanmissions,payingforcapitalcostsinvolvedintechnicalassistance.63Ina1972evaluationofthecontractwiththeROC,RalphGleason,USAIDDeputyAssociateDirectorforFood

62LetterfromTrầnNgọcLiêntoJiangMenglin,December6,1962;“駐越農技團(II)”[AgriculturaltechnicalteaminVietnam,vol.2];ArchivalCollectionNumber020000030453;pages17–18;MFACAHA.63ContractEvaluation,May3,1972;Folder3832;Hồsơkiểmsoátngânkhoảnhợpđồngvớipháibộhợptáctáithiếtnôngthôn-TrungQuốcvề yểmtrợtổngquátcanhnôngchoViệtNamnăm1969–1973[DocumentspertainingtobudgetingandauditsofcontractswiththeJointCommissionforRuralReconstructionregardinggeneralsupportforagricultureinVietnamin1969–1973],CơquanpháttriểnquốctếHoaKỳ[U.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment];VNA.

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andAgricultureinVietnam,describedtheTaiwanesemissionasattainingmissiongoals“inaverypracticalmanner…forinstance,demonstrationfieldswereelaboratelysetupandoperatedbythecontractorasanintermediategoaltowardsattainmentofthefinalgoalofwidespreadextensionofimprovedvarietiesandculturalpractices.”Asaresult,“farmers benefiting from CATG assistance have experienced substantial increases inincome through increasedharvestsof cropproduceofhighvalue.”However,GleasoncastdoubtontheabilityoftheRVNtofulfillitsendoftheagreement,statingthat“finalgoalofnation-wideextensionrestsinthecapacityandcompetenceofthecooperatingcountry,” and then ended by lamenting that “more could have been accomplished ifhost country supportweremore adequate.” In amatter of a few years,Gleasonwasprovedcorrect.64Despitethe“intermediate”successoftheTaiwanesetechnicalmissioninrealizinghigherincomesandasystemofextensionanddemonstration,theseeffortswereultimatelyunable to save theRVN regime. Taiwanesemissionswere continuallyreneweduntilthedemiseoftheRVNin1975concludedTaiwanesemissionstoVietnam.

Taiwanese development missions to Vietnam began a decades-long project toportray Taiwan as leading a vanguard of the developingworld. After having achievedsuccessinagriculturalscience,farmers’associations,andruralimprovementinTaiwan,GMD planners sent Taiwanese scientists and technicians abroad to develop othernations.Taiwanesemissionsdeployedspecificpracticesofmodernhigh-yieldingseedsand chemical fertilizers to reproduce Taiwanese success. At the same time, theGMDalsoemphasizedTaiwan’sruralmodernityasaccomplishedthroughahistoryofsuccessin farmers’ associations. In representations of Taiwanese development throughnewspaper articles, propaganda, and official reports, Taiwanese planners portrayedTaiwanasaprimarilyruralsocietythatsucceededthroughachievingmodernscience(ofdeveloping high-yielding seeds), ingenuity (through agricultural machinery), and hardwork (of farmers and technicians). This imaginary of Taiwanese modernity marked alarger shiftwithin theGMDtechnocracyand theROCstate itself,which sawTaiwan’sdevelopment success deployed for diplomatic objectives as well as strengthening itsdomestic rule. Not only did the ROC demonstrate its anticommunist conviction to a“FreeWorld” ally, the RVN, but it also burnished its developmentalist credentials athomeanddivertedattentionawayfromitsrepressiveauthoritarianism.AsshownintheofficialspeechesandwritingsaboutZhangDusheng,theGMDimaginedamodernandhumanitarian ROC that sacrificed its youth to save other nations. This imaginationundergirded the emergence of a developmentalist platform that continued to defineTaiwanfordecadestocome.

64AuditingReportofJCRR,November14,1970;Folder3832,VNA.

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AbouttheAuthorJamesLinisahistorianandAssistantProfessorofInternationalStudiesattheUniversityofWashington,Seattle.Thisarticle,basedonresearchforhisforthcomingbookonthehistoryofTaiwaneseagrariandevelopmentintheGlobalSouth,wouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutSimonTonerandresearchassistantsVinhNguyenandHungNguyen,whotranslatedVietnamesedocuments.TheauthorisalsoindebtedtoNu-AnhTranandKevinLi,whohelpednavigateNationalArchivesIIinSaigon.SimonToner,AlvinBui,andthetwoanonymousCross-Currentsreviewerswereinvaluableinreadingandprovidingcritiquesandsuggestions.ThisarticlewaswrittenwithsupportfromtheAssociationforAsianStudiesChinaandInnerAsiaCouncil,whichfundedtraveltoVietnam;aLyndonB.JohnsonLibraryMoodyresearchgrantfortraveltoAustin,TX;andFulbrightTaiwan,theROCMinistryofForeignAffairsTaiwanFellowship,andtheChiangChing-KuoFoundation,whichprovidedresearchfundstotraveltoTaiwananddedicatedtimetowritethisarticle.Finally,theauthorwishestothankalloftheparticipantsofthe“GlobalIsland:TaiwanandtheWorld”workshopheldin2018attheUniversityofWashington,whoprovidedcountlessthoughtfulsuggestions.