Marvel Comics - From Stan Lee to Mickey

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“X-Men is what Marvel was about: being different and misunderstood and yet still striving

to do good despite the world looking at you with doubt and suspicion.”

-- Bob Harras (Marvel editor in chief, 1995-2000)

Marvel Comics, the company of Stan Lee and Spider-Man, has created comic books with quirky characters

and gripping storylines for more than 70 years. Disney, home of several idealistic fairytale characters,

acquired Marvel at the end of 2009. This was certainly not the first time that a company had taken

an interest in Marvel’s creativity and resilience, but Disney’s primary focus on entertainment, instead of

publishing, makes this partnership unique. How did Marvel come to attract Disney Corporation, and what

is at stake for Marvel and its devoted fans? A chronicle of Marvel’s long, strange history may lend some

insight into the company’s future.

The 1940s and 1950s: The Golden Age of Comics and Upheaval

In the Golden Age of the comic book industry, a comic

book cost ten cents and readership was high. Publisher Martin

Goodman recognized the market potential for comic books and

founded Timely Comics in 1939, which eventually became Marvel

Comics. An issue of “Captain Marvel Adventures” sold a record

14 million copies in 1944, even with relatively little advertising.

During World War II, Marvel comics had a patriotic slant, and

superheroes often fought Nazis and other national enemies (see

Figure 1). After the war, the popularity of superheroes faded

and Marvel began to publish a variety of other genres, including

romance, western, horror, and funny animal comics. The company

was renamed Atlas Comics in 1951 and revived the concept of thesuperhero, this time to fight the Communists. In 1954, the peak

of the Golden Age, the comic book industry sold an estimated

one billion comics.1

In 1954, psychiatrist Fredric Wertham published Seduction

of the Innocents, which decried the pervasive violence and adult

Marvel Comics: From Stan Lee to Mickey

Research Associate Nilima Achwal developed this case under the supervision of Professor Scott A. Moore. ©2010, The William Davidson Institute.

case

1-429-053March 15, 2010

Unauthorized reproduction and distribution is an infringement of copyright. Please contact us for permissions: [email protected] or 734-763-5020

Figure 1

Source: Copyright Marvel Comics, 1942



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Marvel Comics: From Stan Lee to Mickey 1-429-053

themes across comic book genres. This sparked an upheaval against the comic book industry. Newsstand

operators and comics distributors were threatened with violence and boycotts, and the Comics Code

Authority was established in 1955 to monitor offensive content in comic books. In 1957, Marvel’s distributor

discontinued its business after an unrelated lawsuit, and Marvel was forced to sign a contract with rival DC’s

distributor, National Periodicals. At the beginning of 1957, Marvel was still the nation’s largest publisher,

releasing 75 comics a month.2 However, the new contract forced the company to limit its releases to 8-12

comics per month and fire many artists and writers.3 Marvel’s monthly sales plummeted from 6 million copiesto about 2 million copies between 1956 and 1958, while DC continued selling almost 7 million copies

monthly (see Figure 2).4 The Golden Age of comics was over, in particular for Marvel.

Figure 2

Comic Sales in Millions for Marvel and DC

Source: “Marvel and DC Sales Figures.” EntertheStory.com. 25 Feb 2010. http://enterthestory.com/comic_sales.html

1960-1970: The Silver Age of Comics

In 1960, Marvel started its turnaround and started increasing sales once more. In 1961, Stan Lee and

Jack Kirby invented the Fantastic Four, a milestone for Marvel. The next summer, they invented Spider-Man.

Marvel took a few decisions that separated it from rival DC Comics: Characters had human flaws and were

rejected by society, settings were real cities, and stories were written to keep fans for longer. DC’s method

tended to cycle through a set of fans every three years. Over time, fans came to prefer Marvel’s complex

characters to DC Comics’ godlike superheroes. For the first time, Marvel introduced comics with continuity

between issues.5 Marvel sales began to pick up, finally surpassing DC sales in 1966.

In 1967, Spider-Man and Fantastic Four became television cartoons. In 1968, the height of the Silver

Age, Martin Ackerman of Perfect Film and Chemical Company bought Marvel. Perfect Film specialized in film

processing and mail-order drug and vitamin sales.6 Marvel was integrated into the company’s newly formed

Magazine Management Company. That year, Marvel produced more than 50 million 12-cent comics a year,

producing gross sales of about $6 million.7 Sales spiked once more at the beginning of 1969, when Marvel

bought its own distributor and no longer had to abide by rules governing number of releases a month (see

Figure 2). However, the comics industry was no longer as strong as it had once been; overall industry sales

were around 300 million copies.8

1970s and 1980s: Changes in Leadership

For the next several years, Perfect Film had problems with profitability and cash-flow. 9 As part of an

attempt to resolve these issues, the company was renamed Cadence Industries, after Sheldon Feinberg



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became Cadence’s chairman in late 1969.10 Furthermore, it sold off assets, cut debt and focused its efforts

on the mail order, drugs, and publishing industries.11

Comic books were changing — they began to incorporate themes related to prevailing social issues,

such as pollution and civil rights.12 The company tried to stay at the forefront of these changes. Marvel’s

comics pushed traditional boundaries with quirky and very human superheroes, including Spider-Man and

the Fantastic Four.13 Then, in 1971, Marvel became the first company to defy the 16-year-old code governingthe content of comic books when it published an issue of Spider-Man that dealt with drug abuse. 14 As a

result of these changes, Marvel’s audience began to shift; by 1975, half of all readers were 15 or older, while

in 1960, the over-15 market comprised less than 3% of readers.15

In addition to these external changes, Marvel’s internal staff changed in the early 1970s, and a younger

generation of writers joined the company. Two of the most prominent artists, Kirby and Lee, left their

positions. Kirby went to rival DC Comics, while Lee became publisher of Marvel.16 Marvel sales declined until

1972. In 1972, Marvel lowered its sales price below DC’s and offered a higher distributor discount, causing

DC sales to start falling in 1973 (see Figure 2).17 Marvel also started distributing its comics outside the US

for the first time.18

At the end of the 1970s, print costs increased and newsstands decreased their comics sales; only 48

million comics were sold in the comic book industry.19 In 1978, Marvel was in crisis due to a decline in

sales and a lawsuit threatening to affect distributors.20 That year, Jim Shooter became editor-in-chief

and implemented new policies that improved performance through the 1980s. First, he granted rights and

royalties to writers, offering bonuses if an issue sold more than 100,000 copies. Then, to combat declining

newsstand sales, Shooter focused on penetrating the new direct market, comic book stores. Marvel published

more comics geared toward the dedicated readers that frequented comics stores. In 1979, sales through

the direct market accounted for only 6% of gross sales and there were only about 800 comics shops in the

world. In three years, 20% of sales were through the direct market.21 Both quality and sales improved under

Shooter’s leadership in the ‘80s.

Marvel also started to rely increasingly on licensing income in the ‘80s. In the late 1970s, Marvel createdits own licensing division and assigned in-house artists to work on licensed products, such as sheets and

box tops.22 By 1978, Marvel’s licensing income, which came from consumer items, TV shows, and movies, was

larger than income from its comic book sales. One Marvel writer complained, “Marvel seems to be becoming a

toy company rather than a publisher.”23 Stan Lee reflected his company’s commitment to increasing licensing

fees by spending much of his time on the West Coast, working on Hollywood deals. 24 By 2008, Marvel had

accumulated more than 5,000 characters that could potentially become toys (see Figure 3).

Figure 3

Selection of Characters from the Marvel Universe

Spider-Man X-Men Wolverine Captain AmericaFantastic Four The Incredible Hulk Thor Silver Surfer

The Punisher Silver Surfer Ant-Man Iron Man

The Avengers Blade Namor the Sub-Mariner Nick Fury

Daredevil Ghost Rider Dr. Strange

Source: Marvel Enterprises, Inc. 2008 Annual Report (p. 3)



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The links between toy makers and companies with casts of known cartoon characters, like Marvel,

were strengthening. Licensing deals for cartoon characters were becoming increasingly important to the

toy makers. Television characters from weekly shows and cartoons were traditionally the source of most

licensing deals,25 but toy makers were also interested in characters from movies like Star Wars26 (1977) and

Superman27 (1978), demonstrating that this media could also have a major effect on toy sales. In 1978,

licensing royalties for all cartoon characters were $65.3 million (on $2.1 billion of goods). 28 Toy makers

indicated that toys with cartoon characters sold about 10-20% better than those without; 29 thus, Hasbrorelied on a strategy of focusing on toys licensed with characters from Marvel, Disney, Warner Brothers, and

Looney Tunes.30 Marvel even helped Hasbro develop a cast of original characters in the G.I. Joe line of toys

in 1982.31

Animated shows also created some earnings. The Marvel Productions animation studio, bought

from Looney Tunes director Fiz Freleng in 1981, created various animated series, including Spider-Man,

Transformers, and Muppet Babies. By 1983, in addition to developing film projects, this studio was producing

and developing both Saturday morning and prime-time syndicated cartoon programs, along with animated

TV commercials with and without Marvel characters.32 The cartoon business was extremely competitive

in the mid-1980s, and the cartoon producers that had the best chance of surviving, according to an

investment banker who followed the industry, were “the diversified ones that have the best relationships

with toy companies, the advertisers, the syndicators, and the networks.”33

By 1985, the direct market held half of Marvel sales, and this number rose to 70% in 1987. 34 Marvel

and DC together still dominated newsstand sales in 1987, with 85% market share there.35 As time went on,

the direct market ruled Marvel sales, as Marvel shifted attention from bringing in new readers to pleasing

dedicated readers and collectors, who profited from back issues. Issue prices rose from 69 cents in 1986 to

$1.00 in 1989, discouraging new readers.36

Marvel was a profitable company in the mid-1980s; in 1985, Marvel’s overall revenue (from comic book

sales, licensing, and production of animations) was over $100 million.37 In November 1986, New World

Pictures, a low-budget film maker and distributor, bought Marvel for $46 million.38 This sale was part of the

liquidation of Cadence Industries.

39

Harry Evans Sloan, the co-chairman of New World, commented, “WhatMarvel really is to us is an idea factory.”40 The New World goal was to use Marvel’s cast of characters as the

basis for movies, TV shows, and cartoons. Marvel was attracted to the deal; as Lee explained, “We will be

able to produce more of our own product instead of just licensing to other people.”41

1990-1997: Perelman, the Bubble Bursts, then Bankruptcy

Though New World valued Marvel, it experienced cash problems in late 1988 and was forced to sell some

assets; in January 1989, it sold Marvel’s comic books, children’s books, and licensing groups to financier Ron

Perelman’s Andrews Group for $82.5 million.42 Perelman promised Marvel extensive merchandising, movies,

and fame, but decisions made over the next decade ignited a downward spiral.

Marvel’s funding choices were a major issue. Perelman used Marvel assets to raise a large amount of

money for use in his other businesses. In mid-1991, Marvel had an initial stock offering that raised $48

million,43 and about 75% of this amount went to Revlon, another company owned by Perelman.44 By 1995,

Perelman had issued $620 million in debt that was secured by his holdings in Marvel in order to buy other

companies.45

In the first few years of the 1990s, Marvel relied on selling showy issues to collectors to drive sales in

the direct market. Foil covers, giveaways, multiple covers for one issue, and “cross-over” issues with many

intersecting, confusing storylines and characters became the norm. Marvel began to publish more titles



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because first issues sell more copies, and soon there was less continuity between issues. The rise in comics

prices coupled with the increase in titles caused the price of an entire sequence to rise from $24 per month

in 1986 to $150 per month in 1993.46

Marvel’s new tactics drove away both remaining fans and new readers. New readers could not follow

the complex storylines or afford to buy whole sequences. The company culture became profit-centered,

stifled creativity, and granted less autonomy to the artists. In 1992, seven key artists, including Lee, left

Marvel to form their own Image Comics. The remaining creative talent was dissipated across issues, and

dedicated readers later organized boycotts to decry the decline in quality. In an equally troubling sign for

Marvel, Disney soon entered the comic book market directly instead of licensing its characters to other

publishers.47

Marvel also focused on expanding into new industries, because readership had dropped from fifteen

million in the Golden Age to less than one million in the early 1990s. In 1992, Perelman financed the

purchase of Fleer Corporation, a trading card company, through Marvel bonds worth $286 million. Then

Marvel entered into a partnership with Toy Biz executives Ike Perlmutter and Avi Arad, in which Marvel

released rights to all Marvel characters in return for almost half of Toy Biz. Between 1991 and 1993, an

investment bubble caused the stock price to rise from $2 to $34.

48

1993 was the only year that Marvel salespassed $1 billion, and there was a high of 10,000 comics shops.49

In 1995, the collecting bubble burst and only the readers remained. The price of paper and ink jumped,

and Marvel had close to zero profit. At this time, Marvel used a variety of independent distributors. Marvel

decided to purchase Heroes World Distribution for its exclusive use. Consequently, comics stores could no

longer qualify for volume discounts for purchasing many different brands of comics from one distributor.

Other distributors were also adversely affected; they compensated for the loss of Marvel business by signing

exclusive contracts with other publishers or went bankrupt. Because of the lack of competition among

distributors, comics shops could not afford distributors’ costs and were forced to close.

Soon after, in 1995, Perelman bought another trading card company, Skybox International, and Italian

sticker manufacturer Panini group. He spent several more million dollars for the rights to feature NBA playersand Disney characters on trading cards and stickers, respectively. That year, Marvel borrowed a total of $700

million from banks and $1 billion from bondholders in order to finance expansion. In addition, the high-

risk bonds had interest rates as high as 12%. Perelman persuaded Perlmutter and Arad to make an initial

public offering of Toy Biz shares on the New York Stock Exchange, reaping $10 million for Marvel. However,

there had been a major league baseball players’ strike before the purchase of Skybox, and the trading card

industry collapsed. Soon after, two Disney movies performed poorly in the box office, pushing Panini, and

consequently Marvel, into a crisis. Marvel stock plummeted to $15. By the end of the year, Marvel had 35%

market share and losses totaling $48 million.50

By 1996, one in six comic book stores had closed as compared to 1993, and Marvel sales had dropped

by a fourth. Marvel fired 275 employees, including one-third of the publishing staff of the New York City

office.51 Comics prices climbed to $2 per copy.52 Marvel offered more Toy Biz shares on the New York StockExchange, yielding about $35 million for Marvel. Still, Marvel claimed only 25% of the market and suffered

losses of $464 million. By the end of 1996, Marvel’s stock price was a meager $4.50.53

Marvel filed for bankruptcy in January 1997. An investor in Marvel’s IPO would have seen a $1,000

investment dwindle to $2 by the time the company emerged from bankruptcy.54 Also in 1997, Marvel broke

its exclusive contract with Heroes World Distribution to switch to DC’s Diamond Distributors, which now

had a monopoly over comics distribution. After bankruptcy, there was a protracted legal battle over Marvel

ownership. After more than a year of court proceedings, Perlmutter and Arad of Toy Biz finally took control

of the company, leaving Perelman (and Carl Icahn, another potential suitor55) on the outside looking in.56



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1998-present: A Reinvented Marvel

In October 1998, Marvel, now merged with Toy Biz, opened on the stock market at $7 a share. The stock

price did not increase much more for five more years (see Figure 4).

Figure 4

Marvel Stock’s Weekly Closing Price

Source: Google Finance historical prices for Marvel Entertainment, http://www.google.com/finance/historical?q=NYSE:MVL

Table 1 shows the precarious position that Marvel was in from 1996 to 2001. Net sales were unstable,

operating income was small or a loss, working capital was negligible or negative, and shareholder’s equity

was unstable. At one point in 2000, the company only had $3 million in the bank.57

Table 1

Marvel Financial Figures

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008Net sales 221.6 150.8 232.1 319.6 231.7 181.2 299.0 347.6 513.5 390.5 351.8 485.8 676.2

Operating income 27.2 (49.3) (19.5) 0.6 (59.0) 1.3 80.5 167.2 224.4 171.2 112.6 274.4 368.0

Working capital 102.2 74.0 (133.4) 91.9 41.7 30.0 32.6 214.2 142.2 2.5 (58.6) (108.5) (26.3)

Assets 171.7 150.9 689.9 654.6 554.0 517.6 517.5 741.9 714.8 573.5 623.9 817.4 937.6

Equity 137.5 108.0 183.6 135.8 31.4 41.9 242.9 469.5 546.5 360.6 254.9 181.5 396.7

Sources: Marvel annual reports 2000-2007

Table 2 shows the distribution of Marvel’s sales and profits across its separate segments. The company’s

mix of sales and income changed significantly over the years.



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Table 2

Marvel Financial Distribution by Segment

Segment sales

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Toys 212.4 245.8 167.3 91.7 155.0 85.2 212.8 68.0 116.1 87.4

Publishing 14.7 43.0 45.2 49.5 64.5 73.3 86.0 92.4 108.5 125.7

Licensing 4.9 30.9 19.2 40.0 79.6 189.2 214.7 230.1 127.2 272.7

Segment operating income

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Toys 1.3 30.3 (13.8) (5.8) 8.9 21.7 58.1 15.5 21.1 54.7

Publishing 1.4 8.3 12.3 14.5 19.6 25.4 37.3 36.4 44.1 53.5

Licensing 4.3 19.9 4.5 5.2 69.4 139.4 152.7 143.4 77.6 196.1

Sources: Marvel annual reports 2000-2007

Marvel started an independent imprint called Marvel Knights. The artists involved in this endeavor

released their creativity; they made radical changes to traditional characters, and it was well received. They

revealed the origin of Wolverine, created a black Captain America, and banned smoking from books. The newgeneration of readers raved over Marvel’s fresh, new look.58

In July 1999 Marvel named Peter Cuneo president and CEO.59 He came to Marvel and implemented a

strategy that had many skeptics:

“I view Marvel as having the potential to be the leading entertainment company in the

world built around fantasy characters. I view all of our characters as brands, and what

we’re doing is brand management. I view our characters as celebrities — only they don’t

get old or misbehave. We’re going to place them in as many mediums and entertainment

venues as possible, and we’re building the business for the long term.”60

Cuneo believed that Marvel was not getting enough value out of the 5,000+ characters that it haddeveloped, and he planned to look for ways to change that state of affairs.

In 1998, 77% of Marvel’s revenues came from toy sales, 19% from comics, and 4% from licensing Marvel

characters.61 Marvel focused on increasing revenues from licensing, the smallest driver of revenue at the

time, by selling rights to Hollywood studios. However, Marvel received only a small percentage of revenues

from its first movies.62 In 1999, Columbia Pictures paid Marvel $10 million for rights to produce Spider-

Man, though Columbia brought in $403.7 million from this picture. X-Men: The Movie was a great success in

2000, with ticket sales of $160 million worldwide; unfortunately, Marvel made a mere $1.3 million from the

movie, since it had sold its rights to the characters during Perelman’s time.63 Though it did make money from

licensing deals for merchandise related to the movie, it kept only about 75% of the sales of merchandise

because it had to share the rest with the studio.64 (See Table 3 for a more extensive list of Marvel movies.)

Finally, Fox’s Fantastic Four had a worldwide gross of $624 million, but Marvel received only $13 millionfrom this film.65 Cuneo’s strategy for the future was to participate in the profits from the movie itself. Some

market analysts speculated that a company such as Disney, Fox, or Viacom — who all already had their own

production studios — might one day be interested in buying Marvel.66



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Table 3

Gross Domestic Revenues in Millions

Date Gross Movie

8/1/86 16.3 Howard the Duck

8/21/98 70.1 Blade7/14/00 157.3 X-Men

3/22/02 82.3 Blade II

5/3/02 403.7 Spider-Man

2/14/03 102.5 Daredevil

5/2/03 214.9 X2: X-Men United

6/20/03 132.2 Hulk

4/16/04 33.8 The Punisher

6/30/04 373.5 Spider-Man 2

12/8/04 52.4 Blade: Trinity

1/14/05 24.4 Elektra7/8/05 154.7 Fantastic Four

5/26/06 234.4 X-Men: The Last Stand

2/16/07 115.8 Ghost Rider

5/4/07 336.5 Spider-Man 3

6/15/07 131.9 Fantastic Four: Rise of the Silver Surfer

5/2/08 318.4 Iron Man

6/13/08 134.8 The Incredible Hulk

12/5/08 8.1 Punisher: War Zone

5/1/09 179.9 X-Men Origins: Wolverine

Source: “Marvel Comics movies at the Box Office,” Box Office Mojo, http://boxofficemojo.com/franchises/chart/?id=marvelcomics.htm

downloaded on March 6, 2010.

Then, Marvel rid itself of Fleer Corporation, Skybox International, and Panini for a loss of $400 million.

However, the $30-million-per-year interest on the junk bonds that had financed their purchase proved to

be a key problem for Marvel. Marvel bought back some of its own bonds and cancelled them at half price,

since they were valued at 40 or 50 cents on the dollar. In addition, Marvel did not overprint for the direct

market, only printing books that were pre-ordered, which was popular with back issue sellers. In 2001,

Marvel posted its first profit in many years, half of it from buying back its own bonds.67 That year, Marvel

overtook DC in both sales and market share (see Figure 5).

Over the next seven years, Marvel sold rights to various characters and gradually increased both comic

book sales and market share, reaching a market share of 45% in 2008 (again, see Figure 5). The comic book

business was highly profitable and maintained its position as “a research and development function for all

of Marvel,” according to Cuneo.68 Marvel broke off its licensing deal with Toy Biz and sold the rights for five

years to Hasbro for $205 million.69 This markedly reduced Marvel’s direct workings in the toy manufacturing

business.



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Figure 5

Publisher Market Share: 1997-2010

Source: “Market Share.” The Comics Chronicles. Comichron.com Note: TPB=trade paperbacks

Hollywood produced more than 20 Marvel films, with most activity starting in 2000 (see Table 3). Soon,

Marvel found it more profitable to produce its own films (as Marvel Studios) and distribute them through

Paramount Pictures. Marvel raised $525 million to build this studio. 70 The first Marvel-produced movie,

Iron Man in 2008, was a great success, earning $318 million in the domestic box office and $260 million

overseas.71 Of course, Marvel got to keep a much larger portion of these revenues than it had under any

licensing scheme.

After Marvel’s revival, a likely partnership emerged in 2009, when Walt Disney Company acquired Marvel

Entertainment for $4 billion. This partnership will not only give Disney more content that appeals to boys,

but will also help Marvel produce and market its rich characters to become successful franchises.72 Marvel’s

stock price jumped from $28 to $50 between January and September 2009.73



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Endnotes

1 Lavine, Michael L. “Comic Books and Graphic Novels for Libraries: What to Buy.” Serials Review Volume 24, No. 2. Summer 1998: p 34.

“Marvel and DC Sales Figures.” EntertheStory.com. 25 Feb. 2010.2 http://enterthestory.com/comic_sales.html.

Cooke, Jon. “Stan the Man and Roy the Boy.” A Conversation between Stan Lee and Roy Thomas. TwoMorrows Publishing 2003.3

http://www.twomorrows.com/comicbookartist/articles/02stanroy.html.

“Marvel and DC Sales Figures.” EntertheStory.com. 25 Feb. 2010.4 http://enterthestory.com/comic_sales.html

Collins, Sean. “The Amazing! Incredible! Uncanny Oral History of Marvel Comics” Maxim.com. 12 Aug. 2009.5

“Perfect Film seeking to acquire publisher.” The Wall Street Journal. 21 Jun 1968: p. 11.6

7 Raviv, Dan. Comic Wars: How Two Tycoons Battled Over the Marvel Comics Empire—And Both Lost. New York: Broadway Books, 2002.

“Updating Superman: Comic book heroes are being modernized.” The Wall Street Journal. 15 Aug. 1970: p. 1.8

“Cadence Industries says it’s rebounding from 1969 troubles.” The Wall Street Journal. 27 Jan. 1972: p. 20.9



“Updating Superman: Comic book heroes are being modernized.” The Wall Street Journal. 15 Aug. 1970: p. 1.12

Heinzel, Ron S. “Like characters, comic creator imperfect hero.” Los Angeles Times. 13 March 1975: p. E12.13

Van Gelder, Lawrence. “A comics magazine defies code ban on drug stories.” The New York Times. 4 Feb. 1971: p. 37.

14

Heinzel, Ron S. “Like characters, comic creator imperfect hero.” Los Angeles Times. 13 March 1975: p. E12.15

Collins, Sean. “The Amazing! Incredible! Uncanny Oral History of Marvel Comics” Maxim.com. 12 Aug. 2009.16


“Borrowing costs head higher in Japan; Mexican policies stir investor concern.” The Wall Street Journal. 30 July 1973: p. 6.18

Lavine, Michael L.19 “Comic Books And Graphic Novels For Libraries: What To Buy.” Serials Review Volume 24, No. 2. Summer 1998:

p 34. http://www.ugr.es/~alozano/Translations/ComicBooksinLibraries.pdf



Kleinfield, N.R. “Superheroes’ creators wrangle.” The New York Times. 13 Oct. 1979: p. 25.22

Kleinfield, N.R. “Superheroes’ creators wrangle.” The New York Times. 13 Oct. 1979: p. 25.23

Beller, Miles. “Hollywood is banking on the comics.” The New York Times. 9 Dec. 1979: p. D1.24

Winter, Christine. “Tempo; Toy company technique — hitch your wagon to a star.” Chicago Tribune. 28 Feb. 1979: p. B1.25

Weingarten, Paul. “If you liked the film, you’ll love the paraphernalia.” Chicago Tribune. 24 June 1977: p. A3.26

Johnson, Sharon. “The cartoon creature as salesman: Better than ever.” The New York Times. 11 Feb. 1979: p. F3.27



Winter, Christine. “Tempo; Toy company technique — hitch your wagon to a star.” Chicago Tribune. 28 Feb. 1979: p. B1.30

Davis, Bob. “Hasbro Bradley scores with its ‘terror’ toys, adroit licensing plans.” The Wall Street Journal. 13 Dec. 1984: p. 1.31

Rea, Steven X. “Caped crusaders bound for screen.” Philadelphia Inquirer. 21 Sept. 1983: p. C5.32

Landro, Laura. “Glut of cartoon shows prompts producers to search for new markets and partners.” The Wall Street Journal. 12 May33

1987: p. 35.


Towle, Lisa H. “What’s new in the comic book business.” by The New York Times. 31 Jan. 1988: p. 21.35


“Marvel Entertainment Group Inc.” Funding Universe. Downloaded 7 March 2010.37 http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-

histories/Marvel-Entertainment-Group-Inc-Company-History.html.

Keppel, Bruce. “New World Pictures to acquire Marvel.” Los Angeles Times. 21 Nov. 1986: p. J2.38

Hicks, Jonathan P. “Marvel comic book unit being sold for $82.5 million.” The New York Times. 8 Nov. 1988: p. D20.39

Keppel, Bruce. “New World Pictures to acquire Marvel.” Los Angeles Times. 21 Nov. 1986: p. J2.40

Basler, Barbara, and Daniel F. Cuff. “Publisher expects sale to aid Marvel Comics.” The New York Times. 28 Nov. 1986: p. D2.41

Hicks, Jonathan P. “Marvel comic book unit being sold for $82.5 million.” The New York Times. 8 Nov. 1988: p. D20.42



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“Marvel, comic book king, plans initial stock offering.” The Wall Street Journal. 13 June 1991: p. B8.43

Light, Larry, and Laura Zinn. “Painting a new face on Revlon.” BusinessWeek. 6 April 1992.44

Spiro, Leah Nathans. “Ron Perelman, the man who collects companies.” BusinessWeek. 11 Sept. 1995.45


Jefferson, David J. “Bam! Aargh! Little comics get trounced.” The Wall Street Journal. 22 Jan. 1990: p. B1.47

Raviv, Dan. Comic Wars: How Two Tycoons Battled Over the Marvel Comics Empire—And Both Lost. New York: Broadway Books, 2002.48



Chang, Kenneth. “Splaaaat! Comic Books No Longer Reaping Big Sales in Single Bound.” Los Angeles Times. 2 March 1996. http:// 51

articles.latimes.com/1996-03-02/business/fi-42105_1_comic-book.



Norris, Floyd. “Is it time for Ron Perelman to sell off Revlon?” The New York Times. 28 March 1999: p. WK16.54

Serwer, Andrew E. “The dustup over Marvel: Can Carl Icahn save Spider-Man?” Fortune. 13 Jan. 1997.55

“Judge approves plan for Marvel.” The New York Times. 14 July 1998: p. D7.56

Reiss, Robert. “How Marvel became a business superhero.” Forbes.com. 1 Feb. 2010. Downloaded 7 March 2010.57 http://www.

forbes.com/2010/02/01/peter-cuneo-marvel-leadership-managing-turnaround.html.

Collins, Sean. “The Amazing! Incredible! Uncanny Oral History of Marvel Comics.” Maxim.com. 12 Aug. 2009.58

“Executive changes.” The New York Times. 21 July 21 1999: p. C14.59

Shook, David. “Can Marvel’s heroes save the day?” BusinessWeek. 6 Sept. 2000.60




Smith, Anne Kates. “Marvel Entertainment: Super hero stock?” The Washington Post. 15 May 2008. Downloaded 7 March 2010.64

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Documents

Marvel Comics - From Stan Lee to Mickey