RENZ MASCARDO

Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds

FACTS: Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in December 1941. He sought to accomplish said registration of the land but was denied on the ground of being an alien, he cannot acquire land under this jurisdiction. Three great department have always maintain that lands of public domain are classified to agricultural,mineral and timber and that of agricultural lands that includes residential lots. It is also cited in this case that alien were granted the right to acquire private lands merely by way of reciprocity.

ISSUE: Whether or not an alien can buy a residential lot for purposes of temporary residence

RULING: Yes, The Supreme Court are satisfied that aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of the lands residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary they may be granted temporary rights such as lease contract provided it is not forbidden by law.

Halili vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS; Simeon de Guzman, an American Citizen died sometime in 1968 leaving real properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow and son both of whom are also an American citizen. Helen wife of the deceased executed a deed of quit claim transferring and conveying to David Rey, her son, all her rights, titles and interest.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer of lands in the hands of both alien is valid

RULING: YES In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of the public domain except only by way of legal succession. But what is the effect of the sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a qualified Filipino citizen. Jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfer it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is cure.

MULLER VS MULLER

FACTS:Elena and Helmut,a German national were married in Germany and resided there ina house owned by Helmut’s parents but later permanently resided in thePhilippines.Helmut had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for thepurchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo and in the construction of the house. The Antipolo property wasregistered in the name of Elena.After they separated, Helmut filed a motion for separation of properties for reimbursement of the property inAntipolo.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF THE FUNDS USED FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE ANTIPOLO PROPERTY

RULING: No, save for exception provided in cases of herediatary succesion. Helmut's disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express proviision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of fraud. Helmut cannot seek reimbursement in the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite constitutional prohibition.

Republic of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals and Republic Real Estate

FACTS: Republic Act No. 1899, which was approved on June 22, 1957 authorized the reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities and municipalities. Pasay City Council passed Ordinance No. 121 for the reclamation of 300 hectares of foreshore lands in Pasay City and authorized the Republic Real Estate Corporation to reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City under certain terms and conditions. Republic of the Philippines filed an opposition through Office of the Solicitor General contending that the subject land is outside the commerce of man and its terms and conditions is violative of RA 1899.

ISSUE: What is foreshore land as defined under RA 1899

RULING: Foreshore refers to the lands that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of tide. A strip of land margining the body of water: the part of seashore between the low water line usually at the seaward margin of low tide terrace and upper limit at high tide usually by breach scarp or berm

Francisco Chavez vs. Public Estate Authority

FACTS; The government through the Commission of Public Highways signed a contract with the Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines to reclaim certain foreshore areas in Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases 1 and 2 of Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. On 1977, President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating Public Estate Authority tasked to reclaim lands including foreshore and submerged areas and to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands.

ISSUE: Whether or not PEA has exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of the reclaimed lands

RULING; It was held that PEA has authority to sell and lease lands which was already declared as alienable and disposable which in the subject land in this case is already declared by law. The SC also reiterated that the disposition shall in accordance with CA No. 141 Public Land Act. Under CA 141 reclaimed lands transferred to a branch of government the disposition of the land.

Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Mindanao Medical Center vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS: Mindanao Medical Center claimed that the land where the hospital is built is the land awarded by the Former President Ramon Magsaysay. Pres. Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclamation No. 85 withdrawing the subject land from sale and settlement and reserving the same for military purposes under the administration of the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army. Private respondent claimed that the subject land was already filed for registration as attested by deed of sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private rights supersedes the law declaring that the land is devoted for public purpose

RULING: Yes, admittedly the land applied for may be considered disposed of the government upon the issuance of the Sales Award but this has singular effect of withdrawing the land from the public domain that is distributed and dispose by the Director of Lands under the Public Land Act. The sales entered into by the government and the private respondent preceded the proclamation made by the former president withdrawing the same for military purpose.

Republic of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals and Santos

FACTS: The lot subject matter of this land registration is situated near the shore of Laguna De Bay in Barrio Pinagbayanan Pila Laguna. It was purchased by Benedicto Del Rio from Angel Pili. The Deed of Sale evidencing said purchase is duly recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Sta. Cruz Laguna. Santos Del Rio filed his application for registration of said parcel of land which was approved by the Director of Lands

ISSUE: What is lake under Law of Water

RULING: Lake is a natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depths. Laguna de Bay is lake. The alteration of high tides and low tides which is an ordinary occurence could hardly account for the rise in the water level of the Laguna De Bay as observed four or five months a year during the rainy season.

MERMER RECTO

Cruz v Secretary 347 SCRA 128Separate Opinion of Justice Puno and Justice Kapunan

Facts: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain – somehow against the regalian doctrine.

Justice Kapunan, voting to dismiss the petition, stated that the Regalian Theory does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial, adverting to the landmark case of Cariño vs Insular Government, where the United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared: "It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land."

The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.

Justice Puno, describing the IPRA as a novel piece of legislation, stated that Cariño firmly established a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State and was based on the strong mandate extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902 that "No law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." IPRA recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs as a distinct sector in the Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral

domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under the customary law which traces its origin and title.

Alba vs De la Cruz17 Phil 49

FACTS: The petitioners herein are the he only heirs of Doña Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey. The four petitioners, as co-owners, sought to have registered a parcel of agricultural land in Bulacan. After hearing, the court entered a decree directing that described in the petition be registered in the names of the 4 petitioners.

Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration (CLR) asking for a revision of the decision upon the ground that he is the absolute owner of the 2 parcels of land described in said motion He alleges that the decree of was obtained maliciously and fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said lands. For him, petitioners deliberately omitted to include in their registration his name as one of the occupants of the land so as to be given notice of registration. He further alleged that he inherited the 2 lots from his father who had a state grant for the same

The Land Court upon this motion reopened the case, and rendered its decision modifying the former decree by excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz.

From this decision and judgment the petitioners appealed. The trial court held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include the name of the appellee in their petition, as an occupant of these two parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and that this constituted fraud within the meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration Act.

Issue: WON modification of the decree as to exclude said land will prosper.

Held: No. Although the appellee, occupying the two small parcels of land in question under the circumstances as have set forth, was not served with notice, he was made a party defendant by publication; and the entering of a decree must be held to be conclusive against all persons, including the appellee, whether his (appellee's) name is mentioned in the application, notice, or citation.

The decree was not obtained by fraud on the part of the applicants, inasmuch as they honestly believed that the appellee was occupying these two small parcels of land as their tenant. One of the petitioner went upon the premises with the surveyor when the original plan was made.

The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible. Upon the presentation in court if an application for the registration of the title to lands, the theory under the Torrens system is that all occupants, adjoining owners,

adverse claimants, and other interested persons are notified of the proceedings, and have a right to appear in opposition to such application. In other words, the proceeding is against the world.

Alonso vs Cebu Country Club375 SCRA 390

FACTS:On September 25, 1992, Francisco commenced against Cebu Country Club in the RTC in Cebu City an action for the declaration of nullity and non-existence of deed/title, the cancellation of certificates of title, and the recovery of property. On November 5, 1992, Cebu Country Club filed its answer with counterclaim.On May 7, 1993, the RTC decided in favor of Cebu Country Club.

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which ultimately affirmed the RTC on March 31, 1997. Thus, Francisco filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on October 2, 1997.Nothing daunted, Francisco appealed to this Court (G.R. No. 130876).

On January 31, 2002, this Court decided this case denying the petition for review and dismissing the complaint and counter claim of both parties. The decision of the Court of Appeals and that of the trial court were set aside. The Congress ultimately enacted a law to validate the TCTs and reconstituted titles covering the Banilad Friar Lands Estate in Cebu City. This was Republic Act No. 9443, effective on July 27, 2007.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 9443 gave the petitioners a legal interest to assail the RTC’s orders; and

HELD:

The law expressly declares as valid all existing Transfer Certificates of Title and Reconstituted Certificates of Title duly issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu Province and/or Cebu City covering any portion of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate," and recognizes the registered owners as absolute owners. To benefit from R.A. No. 9443, therefore, a person must hold as a condition precedent a duly issued Transfer Certificate of Title or a Reconstituted Certificate of Title.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.The Court declares that Cebu Country Club, Inc. is the exclusive owner of Lot No.727-D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, as confirmed by Republic Act No. 9443.

Republic vs Bantigue Point Dev't Corp GR 162322 March 4, 2013

FACTS:

On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land with a total assessed value of ₱14,920 for the entire property, located at San Juan Cadastre, Batangas.

The RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the case to the MTC of San Juan, because the assessed value of the property was allegedly less than ₱100,000.

Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default and commenced with the reception of evidence.Among the documents presented by respondent in support of its application are Tax Declarations, a Deed of Absolute Sale in its favor,and a Certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Batangas City that the lot in question is within the alienable and disposable zone. Thereafter, it awarded the land to respondent Corporation. Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic, the CA ruled that since the former had actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal. The CA further found that respondent Corporation had sufficiently established the latter’s registrable title over the subject property after having proven open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by itself and its predecessors-in-interest even before the outbreak of World War II.

Dissatisfied with the CA’s ruling, petitioner Republic filed this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipal Trial Court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application for original registration of land title.

HELD:

The RTC’s failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing within five days from the filing of the application for registration, as provided in the Property Registration Decree, did not affect the court’s its jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period was merely directory, and failure to issue the Order within that period did not deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case. To rule that compliance with the five-day period is mandatory would make jurisdiction over the subject matter dependent upon the trial court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be contingent upon the action or inaction of the court.

Thus, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases in two instances: first, where there is no controversy or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the value of which does not exceed ₱100,000. The instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The Court ordered that the case be REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan, Batangas, for reception of evidence to

prove that the property sought to be registered is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

Republic vs Alagad169 SCRA 455

FACTS:On or about October 11, 1951, defendants filed an application for registration of their title over a parcel of land situated at Laguna, which was amended after the land was divided into two parcels.

The Republic opposed the application on the stereo-typed ground that applicants and their predecessors have not been in possession of the land openly, continuously, publicly and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 and the land has not ceased to be a part of the public domain.

In the case at bar, if the parcel registered in the names of the private respondents were foreshore land, the land registration court could not have validly awarded title thereto. It would have been without the authority to do so. The fact that the Bureau of Lands had failed to appeal from the decree of registration could not have validated the court's decision, rendered without jurisdiction.

According to the trial court, the aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, and hence, available disposition and registration. As we have pointed out, the Government holds otherwise, and that as foreshore laud, it is not registerable.

ISSUE:Whether or not the properties in question are, indeed, foreshore lands. The question, so it follows, is one of fact: Is the parcel foreshore or is it part and parcel of the public domain?

HELD:The case, then, has to be decided alongside these principles and regretfully, the Court cannot make a ruling, in the first place, because it is not a trier of facts, and in the second, it is in possession of no evidence to assist it in arriving at a conclusive disposition. THE COURT remanded the case to the court a quo to determine whether or not the property subject of controversy is foreshore. Consequently, the Court reversed decision of both the Court of Appeals and the trial court and reinstate the Republic's complaint.

Amunategui vs Director126 SCRA 69

FACTS: These are two petitions questioning the decision of CA which declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject to titling in favor of private persons.

Roque Borre and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for registration with the CFI Capiz. The heirs of Jose Amunategui filed an opposition to the said application.

The Director of Forestry also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the public domain.

Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of lot was confirmed and registered in his name.

Applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold his rights to Angel Alpasan who also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his name.

CFI rendered its decision adjudicating the portion of the lot to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land in proportion to Angel Alpasan and Melquiades Borre's share.

Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry filed their respective appeals with the CA.

CA reversed the decision of the trial court and sustained the position of the Director of Forestry.

ISSUE: Whether or not said lot is public forest land, not capable of registration in the names of the private applicants

HELD: Yes. A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

Possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. A positive act of government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

Director of Forestry vs Villareal170 SCRA 598

FACTS:The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First Instance. of Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed.

ISSUE:Whether or not mangrove swamps are agricultural lands or forest lands.

HELD:The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the legislature, which has the authority to implement the constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain.

The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the Director of Lands, to prove that the land is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere existence of such a plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in officious. The Director of Lands was not authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for private ownership.

The Court held that the private respondent has not established his right to the registration of the subject land in his name. Accordingly, the petition must be granted.

The legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now, mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for registration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED.

Republic vs CA160 SCRA 228

FACTS: Jose de la Rosa filed an application for registration of a parcel of land in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet.

The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc., Atok Big Wedge Corporation, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development.

In support of the application, applicants testified that they had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription.

Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots was sold to it and that Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner.

Atok alleged that a portion of Lots were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds. These claims were purchased from these locators by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots.

The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217.

The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered.

The applicants appealed to CA which affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.

Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership. The Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument that neither the private respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to the land because it is not alienable and registerable.

ISSUE: Whether respondent court’s decision, i.e. “the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claim,” is correct.

Held: No. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all

lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.

The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and completely mineral — once the mining claims were perfected. As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.

REY MALDO

Heirs of Sanjorjo v. Heirs of Quijano 449 SCRA 15 (2005)

Facts: On September 13, 1993, Vicente Sanjorjo, the heirs of Maximo Sanjorjo, herein petitioners, filed a complaint for cancellation of titles under tax declarations and reconveyance of possession of real property covering Lots 374, 376, 378 and 379 located in Medellin, Cebu, against the private respondents, the heirs of Manuel Quijano. That the plaintiffs are the owners of several parcels of land in Antipolo, Medellin, Cebu.The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata based on the decision of the Regional Executive Director on April 14, 1992. They maintained that the decision of the Regional Executive Director had become final and executory and, as such, barred the petitioners’ action. The petitioners opposed the motion. The trial court issued an Order dismissing the complaint on the ground of res judicata.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of res judicata.

Held: Yes. The elements of res judicata are the following: (1) the previous judgment has become final; (2) the prior judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the first judgment was made on the merits; and (4) there was substantial identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action, as between the prior and subsequent actions. A judgment on the merits is one rendered after argument and investigation, and when there is determination which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point, or by default and without trial.An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner.Article 1456 of the New Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes by operation of law a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property.

SALUDARES vs CA 420 SCRA 51 (2004)

Facts: A parcel of land, known as Lot 5793, formed part of the conjugal properties of spouses Juan Dator and Pomposa Saludares, known as the Tanza estate. Pomposa died on May 1, 1923, leaving herein petitioners as her compulsory heirs. Respondents filed an action for reconveyance against petitioners,they alleged in their complaint that: (a) they were the owners in fee simple and possessors of Lot No. 5793; (b) they bought the land from the successors-in-interest of Petra Dator, one of the heirs; (c) they were in possession of the subject land from 1966 to the present and (d) petitioner Isabel Dator obtained free patent OCT P-23617 over Lot 5793 in favor of the Heirs by means of fraud and misrepresentation. Thus, private respondents prayed for the cancellation of OCT P-23617 and the issuance of a new title in their names.

Issue: Whether The Court of Appeals erred when it did not consider that the complaint filed by the private respondents for reconveyance and cancellation of title before the trial court eleven (11) years after a torrens title over the property was issued in the name of the petitioners (had) prescribed.

Held: Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. The law thereby creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil Code with Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code, supra, the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. There is but one instance when prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance, that is, when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed.

MIGUEL INGUSAN vs. HEIRS OF AURELIANO I. REYES

Facts: Respondents and petitioner entered into a Kasulatan ng Paghahati-hati Na May Bilihan wherein they adjudicated unto themselves the land in question and then sold it to their co-heirs, as follows: (a) to petitioner, 1,171 sq. m. and (b) to respondent Estrella, 83 sq. m. This deed was notarized but not registered. On January 8, 1990, respondent Corazon, despite signing the Kasulatan, executed an affidavit of loss, stating that she could not find the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. P-6176. This was registered and annotated on the original copy of said title. Petitioner alleged that respondents' father, Aureliano, Sr., fraudulently secured a free patent in his name over the land using a fictitious affidavit dated April 10, 1970 purportedly executed by Leocadio selling to him the land in question and, as a result, OCT No. P-6176 was issued to him.

Issue: Whether OCT No. P-6176 was valid or invalid.

Held: The Court agrees with the CA that OCT No. P-6176 remains valid. The issue of the validity of title (e.g. whether or not it was issued fraudulently or in breach of trust) can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. A certificate of title cannot be attacked collaterally.

SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. ― A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.The rationale behind the Torrens System is that the public should be able to rely on a registered title. The Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized.

Republic V. Mangotara 624 SCRA 360 (2010)

Facts: The Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686 seeks the cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), with all their derivative titles, and reversion. The Complaint was dismissed by the RTC-Branch 4 in its Order dated December 13, 2005, upon Motion of Vidal and AZIMUTH, on the ground that the State does not have a cause of action for reversion. According to the RTC-Branch 4, there was no showing that the late Doña Demetria committed any wrongful act or omission in violation of any right of the Republic. Additionally, the Regalian doctrine does not apply to Civil Case No. 6686 because said doctrine does not extend to lands beyond the public domain. By the ownjudicial admission of the Republic, the two parcels of land in question are privately owned, even before the same were registered in Doña Demetria’s name.

Issue: Whether or not the case filed for cancellation and reversion be set aside.

Held: Rule 2, Section 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as "the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another." Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendant’s act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.Reversion is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land back to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.The right of the Republic to institute an action for reversion is rooted in the Regalian doctrine. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State

Banguilan v. CA 522 SCRA 644 (2007)

Facts: Serapio Banguilan, predecessor-in-interest of petitioners Protacio Banguilan, filed a homestead application bearing No. 108953 (E-61170) with the then Bureau of Lands. To the application, Gregorio Manalo, predecessor-in-interest of respondents Brigida Manalo-Velasco filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands. It appears that he also filed a homestead application over the subject land. It further appears that a certain Irene Baquiran filed a protest-in-intervention to the application of Serapio Banguilan, and a free patent

application also over the subject land, bearing No. 4-113. By Decision of December 10, 1979, the Director of Lands, through the Regional Director of Region 2, rejected the homestead application of respondents’ predecessor-in-interest Gregorio Manalo and the free patent application of Irene Baquiran, and gave "further due course" to the homestead application of petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest Serapio Banguilan.

Issue: Whether, petitioners’ cause of action was for cancellation/annulment of titles or for reversion.

Held: An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title is not the same as an action for reversion. The difference between them lies in the allegations as to the character of ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land. It is obvious that private respondents allege in their complaint all the facts necessary to seek the nullification of the free patents as well as the certificates of title covering Lot 1015 and Lot 1017. Clearly, they are the real parties in interest in light of their allegations that they have always been the owners and possessors of the two (2) parcels of land even prior to the issuance of the documents of title in petitioners’ favor, hence the latter could only have committed fraud in securing them.

G.R. No. 167232               July 31, 2009D.B.T. MAR-BAY CONSTRUCTION, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, vs.RICAREDO PANES, ANGELITO PANES, SALVADOR CEA, ABOGADO MAUTIN, DONARDO PACLIBAR, ZOSIMO PERALTA and HILARION MANONGDO, Respondents.D E C I S I O NNACHURA, J.:FACTS:

Respondents Ricaredo P. Panes et al.filed a Complaint7 for "Quieting of Title with Cancellation of TCT No. 200519 and all Titles derived thereat against petitioner Mar-Bay Realty, Inc. Panes alleged that he is the lawful owner and claimant of the subject property. That his immediate family members and the other respondents had been, and still are, in actual possession of the portions of the subject property, and their possession preceded the Second World War. Respondents averred that in the process of complying with the publication requirements for the Notice of Initial Hearing with the Land Registration Authority (LRA), it was discovered by the Mapping Services of the LRA that there existed an overlapping of portions of the land subject of Ricaredo’s application, with the subdivision plan of B.C. Regalado. The said portion had, by then, already been conveyed by B.C. Regalado to DBT. Respondents claimed that the title used by B.C. Regalado in the preparation of the subdivision plan did not actually cover the subject property. DBT, traversing the complaint, alleged that it is the legitimate owner and occupant of the subject property pursuant to a dacion en pago executed by B.C. Regalado in the former’s favor.ISSUE:

Did the RTC err in upholding DBT's defenses of prescription and laches as raised in the latter's Motion for Reconsideration?HELD:

No. The prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. If the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.

G.R. No. 167232               July 31, 2009D.B.T. MAR-BAY CONSTRUCTION, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, vs.RICAREDO PANES, ANGELITO PANES, SALVADOR CEA, ABOGADO MAUTIN, DONARDO PACLIBAR, ZOSIMO PERALTA and HILARION MANONGDO, Respondents.D E C I S I O NNACHURA, J.:FACTS:

Respondents Ricaredo P. Panes et al.filed a Complaint7 for "Quieting of Title with Cancellation of TCT No. 200519 and all Titles derived thereat against petitioner Mar-Bay Realty, Inc. Panes alleged that he is the lawful owner and claimant of the subject property. That his immediate family members and the other respondents had been, and still are, in actual possession of the portions of the subject property, and their possession preceded the Second World War. Respondents averred that in the process of complying with the publication requirements for the Notice of Initial Hearing with the Land Registration Authority (LRA), it was discovered by the Mapping Services of the LRA that there existed an overlapping of portions of the land subject of Ricaredo’s application, with the subdivision plan of B.C. Regalado. The said portion had, by then, already been conveyed by B.C. Regalado to DBT. Respondents claimed that the title used by B.C. Regalado in the preparation of the subdivision plan did not actually cover the subject property. DBT, traversing the complaint, alleged that it is the legitimate owner and occupant of the subject property pursuant to a dacion en pago executed by B.C. Regalado in the former’s favor.ISSUE:

Which between DBT and the respondents have a better right over the subject property?HELD:DBT. While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring title, but merely a system of registration of titles to lands, justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State's agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system would forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties. Thus, where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard those rights and order the cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such outright cancellation will be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title.

G.R. No. 169617             April 4, 2007HEIRS OF ZOILO ESPIRITU AND PRIMITIVA ESPIRITU, Petitioners, vs.SPOUSES MAXIMO LANDRITO AND PAZ LANDRITO, Represented by ZOILO LANDRITO, as their Attorney-in-Fact, Respondents.D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO, J.:FACTS:

Spouses Landrito loaned from the Spouses Espiritu. To secure the loan, the Spouses Landrito executed a real estate mortgage over a lot in Alabang in favor of the spouses Espiritu. The agreement, however, provided that the principal indebtedness earns "interest at the legal rate." After three months, when the debt became due and demandable, the Spouses Landrito were unable to pay. The loan was restructured in such a way that the unpaid interest became part of the principal, thus increasing the principal. Due to the continued inability of the Spouses Landritos to settle their obligations with the Spouses Espiritu, the loan agreement was renewed three more times. The debt remained unpaid. As a consequence, the Spouses Espiritu foreclosed the mortgaged property. During the auction sale, the property was sold to the Spouses Espiritu as the lone bidder. The Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale was annotated on the title of the mortgaged property. The Spouses Landrito failed to redeem the subject property. However, upon inquiry, they found out that on, the Spouses Espiritu had already executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and registered the mortgaged property in their name, and that the Register of Deeds of Makati had already issued Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the Spouses Espiritu. The Spouses Landrito, represented by their son Zoilo Landrito, filed an action for annulment or reconveyance of title, with damages against the Spouses.ISSUE:

Whether the action for reconveyance remained as a remedy available to a landowner even if the Spouses Landrito failed to redeem the property within the one-year redemption period provided by law.HELD:

Registration of property by one person in his or her name, whether by mistake or fraud, the real owner being another person, impresses upon the title so acquired the character of a constructive trust for the real owner, which would justify an action for reconveyance. This is based on Article 1465 of the Civil Code which states that:Art. 1465. If property acquired through mistakes or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for benefit of the person from whom the property comes.The action for reconveyance does not prescribe until after a period of ten years from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale since the action would be based on implied trust.

G.R. No. 175763               April 11, 2012HEIRS OF BIENVENIDO AND ARACELI TANYAG, namely: ARTURO TANYAG, AIDA T. JOCSON AND ZENAIDA T. VELOSO, Petitioners, vs.SALOME E. GABRIEL, NESTOR R. GABRIEL, LUZ GABRIEL-ARNEDO married to ARTURO ARNEDO, NORA GABRIEL-CALINGO married to FELIX CALINGO, PILAR M. MENDIOLA, MINERVA GABRIEL-NATIVIDAD married to EUSTAQUIO NATIVIDAD, and ERLINDA VELASQUEZ married to HERMINIO VELASQUEZ,Respondents.D E C I S I O NVILLARAMA, JR., J.:FACTS:

Subject of controversy are two adjacent parcels of land located in Taguig. The first parcel ("Lot 1") with an area of 686 square meters was originally declared in the name of Jose Gabriel under Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 1603 and 6425 issued for the years 1949 and 1966, while the second parcel ("Lot 2") consisting of 147 square meters was originally declared in the name of Agueda Dinguinbayan. Petitioners claimed that Lot 1 was owned by Benita Gabriel, sister of Jose Gabriel, as part of her inheritance as declared by her in a 1944 notarized instrument ("Affidavit of Sale") whereby she sold the said property to spouses Gabriel Sulit and Cornelia Sanga which later on was sold to herein petitioner Bienvenido. As to Lot 2, petitioners averred that it was sold by Agueda Dinguinbayan to Araceli Tanyag. Petitioners claimed to have continuously, publicly, notoriously and adversely occupied both Lots 1 and 2. On the other hand, respondents asserted that petitioners have no cause of action against them for they have not established their ownership over the subject property covered by a Torrens title in respondents’ name. ISSUE:

Whether the registered owner may still be compelled to reconvey the registered property to its true ownersHELD:

Yes. Notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner may still be compelled to reconvey the registered property to its true owners. The rationale for the rule is that reconveyance does not set aside or re-subject to review the findings of fact of the Bureau of Lands. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a better right. . Defendants never occupied the whole area of the lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 1603 (686 sq. m.) neither were they able to set foot on the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 6542 [sic] for the reason that those lots had been in actual, open continuous, adverse and notorious possession of the plaintiffs against the whole world for more than thirty years which is equivalent to title.

G.R. No. 149238             November 22, 2007

SIXTO ANTONIO, petitioner, vs.SPS. SOFRONIO SANTOS & AURORA SANTOS, SPS. LUIS LIBERATO & ANGELINA LIBERATO and SPS. MARIO CRUZ & VICTORIA CRUZ, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:FACTS:

Petitioner Sixto Antonio filed a complaint for Reconveyance, Annulment of Title and Damages against respondents spouses Santos. Antonio alleged that he is the absolute owner of two parcels of land situated in Rizal. Although the RTC, Branch 71, declared him the true and absolute owner in fee simple of the two parcels of land he applied for, it set aside its decision with respect to Lot No. 11703, to avoid duplication of issuance of titles. Antonio said that after investigation, he discovered that Lot No. 11703, was already titled in the name of respondents. He then filed the complaint for Reconveyance, Annulment of Title and Damages against respondents, averring that respondents committed fraud in their application for titling. In their answer, respondents averred that OCT No. 108 was duly issued to them by the Register of Deeds for Metro Manila. They alleged that prior to the issuance of OCT No. 108, they, as registered owners, had always been in peaceful possession of the property and at no time had Antonio possessed the property, nor did he ever make any claim against the said property. ISSUE:

Did the Court of Appeals and RTC erroneously treat petitioner’s action for reconveyance as one for titling of a parcel of land?HELD:

Petitioner contends that it is very apparent the RTC and Court of Appeals had the notion that his case a quo was not an action for reconveyance, but rather an application for registration of land where the applicant and oppositor had to prove their respective registrable titles. This, he adds, could be gleaned from the RTC’s findings that "the claim of plaintiff on the basis of said documents cannot prevail over the adverse, public, open, peaceful and continuous possession by the defendants over the subject property," and that "it was indubitably shown that the defendants have occupied said property since time immemorial while plaintiff has never at anytime taken possession of said property."

We find petitioner’s contentions unconvincing. For an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, this Court has held that the party seeking reconveyance must prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud.10 The RTC, in making the abovementioned findings, was not treating petitioner’s action for reconveyance as one for titling of property. But it was weighing whether petitioner has, by clear and convincing evidence, proven his title to the property. Moreover, the RTC, in its decision, discussed the merits of petitioner’s ground for his action for reconveyance, i.e. whether or not respondents committed fraud in titling the subject property in their names. The RTC held that as shown by public records in the custody of the RTC, Pasig City and the Land Registration Authority, petitioner’s claim that the property was fraudulently titled in the names of respondents is baseless.

G.R. No. 2869            March 25, 1907MATEO CARIÑO, petitioner-appellant, vs.THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.Coudert Brothers for appellant.Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.ARELLANO, C.J.:

Facts: An Igorot applied for the registration of a certain land. He and his ancestors had held the land as owners for more than 50 years, which he inherited under Igorot customs. There was no document of title issued for the land when he applied for registration. The government contends that the land in question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against the Crown.

Issue: WON the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine.

Held: No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land. There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:

“It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.”

G.R. No. 158121             December 12, 2007HEIRS OF VALERIANO S. CONCHA, SR. NAMELY: TERESITA CONCHA-PARAN, VALERIANO P. CONCHA, JR., RAMON P. CONCHA, EDUARDO P. CONCHA, REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL GUARDIAN, REYNALDO P. CONCHA, ALBERTO P. CONCHA, BERNARDO P. CONCHA and GLORIA, petitioners, vs.SPOUSES GREGORIO J. LUMOCSO1 and BIENVENIDA GUYA, CRISTITA J. LUMOCSO VDA. DE DAAN, AND SPOUSES JACINTO J. LUMOCSO and BALBINA T. LUMOCSO,2 respondents.D E C I S I O NPUNO, C.J.:FACTS:Petitioners, heirs of spouses Dorotea and Valeriano Concha, Sr., claim to be the rightful owners of the subject lot. Respondent spouses Lumucso are the patent holders and registered owners of the subject lots. Concha, filed a complaint for Reconveyance and/or Annulment of Title with Damages against the spouses Lumucso. On separate occasions, respondents moved for the dismissal of the respective cases against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matters of the complaints. Petitioners opposed, contending that the instant cases involve actions the subject matters of which are incapable of pecuniary estimation which fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTCs. ISSUE:

Which court has jurisdiction over the subject matterHELD:

Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to remove cloud on one's title, the applicable law to determine which court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.-- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots are situated in Cogon, Dipolog City and their assessed values are less than P20,000.00

G.R. No. L-8936             October 2, 1915

CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.

Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.D.R. Williams for appellee.

 

JOHNSON, J.:

Facts:

A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The said wall and the strip of land where it stands is registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years after the decree of registration is released in favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of the latter included the stone wall and the strip of land where it stands.

Issue:

Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement which has been registered under the name of two persons?

Held:

For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no remedy. However, it can be construed that where two certificates purports to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold title and will prevail.The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the “mirador de su casa,” to avoid the possibility of losing his land.

The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the Torrens system.

G.R. No. L-8936             October 2, 1915

CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.

Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.D.R. Williams for appellee.

 

JOHNSON, J.:

Facts:

A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The said wall and the strip of land where it stands is registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years after the decree of registration is released in favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of the latter included the stone wall and the strip of land where it stands.

Issue:

Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement which has been registered under the name of two persons?

Held:

For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no remedy. However, it can be construed that where two certificates purports to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold title and will prevail.The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the “mirador de su casa,” to avoid the possibility of losing his land.

The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the Torrens system.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8936             October 2, 1915

CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.

Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.D.R. Williams for appellee.

 

JOHNSON, J.:

          From the record the following facts appear:

First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila.

Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.

Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.

Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.

Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.

Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.

          Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

          The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to

avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)

          While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.

          For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons.

          The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.

          The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p. 237).

          Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.

          It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in that way.

          We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.

          In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the application of Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application. Through their failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up their own omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".

          As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that

judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him.

          We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.

          We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be protected under the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said sections.

          May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).

          When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)

          Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.

          While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land

released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.

          In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land had theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system. When land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence.

          The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.

          It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.

          In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of the

predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.

          Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

 

 

 

Separate Opinions

 

TRENT, J., dissenting:

          I dissent.

          In cases of double or overlapping registration, I am inclined to agree with the reasoning and authority on which it is held in the majority opinion (first) that the original holder of the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the original holder of the later certificate, where there has been no transfer of title by either party to an innocent purchaser; both, as is shown in the majority opinion, being at fault in permitting the double registration to take place; (second) that an innocent purchaser claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the original holder of the later certificate, and also as against innocent purchasers from the holder of the later certificate; the innocent purchaser being in no wise at fault in connection with the issuance of the later certificate.

          But I am of opinion that neither the authorities cited, nor the reasoning of the majority opinion sustains the proposition that the original holder of the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against an innocent purchaser from the holder of the later certificate.

          As to the text-book authorities cited in the majority opinion, it is sufficient to say that the rules laid down by both Hogg and Niblack are mere general rules, admittedly subject to exception, and of course of no binding force or authority where the reasoning upon which these rules are based is applicable to the facts developed in a particular case.

          In its last analysis the general rule laid down in the majority opinion rests upon the proposition set forth in the last page of the opinion wherein it is said that "it would seem to be a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected." The rule, as applied to the matter in hand, may be stated as follows: It would seem to be a just and equitable rule when two persons have acquired separate and independent registered titles to the same land, under the Land Registration Act, to hold that the one who first acquired registered title and who has complied with all the requirements of the law in that regard should be protected, in the absence of any express statutory provision to the contrary.

          Thus stated I have no quarrel with the doctrine as a statement of the general rule to be applied in cases of double or overlapping registration under the Land Registration Act; for it is true as stated in the majority opinion that in the adjudication and registration of titles by the Courts of Land Registration "mistakes are bound to occur, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable;" and that in the absence of statutory provisions covering such cases, "it is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties, under such circumstances, so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration all of the conditions, and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them."

          But like most such general rules, it has its exceptions and should not be applied in a case wherein the reasons on which it is based do not exist, or in cases wherein still more forceful reasons demand the application of a contrary rule.

          The general rule relied upon in the majority opinion is a mere application of a well settled equity rule that: "Where conflicting equities are otherwise equal in merit, that which first occurred will be given the preference." But it is universally laid down by all the courts which have had occasion to apply this equity rule that "it should be the last test resorted to," and that "it never prevails when any other equitable ground for preference exists." (See 19 Cent. Dig., tit. Equity, par. 181; and may cases cited in 16 Cyc., 139, note 57.) It follows that the general rules, that in cases of double or overlapping registration the earlier certificate should be protected, ought not to prevail so as to deprive an innocent purchaser under the later certificate of his title of the earlier certificate contributed to the issuance of the later certificate. Hence the holder of the

earlier certificate of title should not be heard to invoke the"just and equitable rule" as laid down in the majority opinion, in order to have his own title protected and the title of an innocent purchaser of a later certificate cancelled or annulled, in any case wherein it appears that the holder of the later certificate was wholly without fault, while the holder of the issuance of the later certificate, in that he might have prevented its issuance by merely entering his appearance in court in response to lawful summons personally served upon him in the course of the proceedings for the issuance of the second certificate, and pleading his superior rights under the earlier certificate, instead of keeping silent and by his silence permitting a default judgment to be entered against him adjudicating title in favor of the second applicant.

          The majority opinion clearly recognizes the soundness of the principles I am contending for by reasoning (with which I am inclined to agree) whereby it undertakes to demonstrate that as between the original holders of the double or overlapping registration the general rule should prevail, because both such original parties must held to have been fault and, their equities being equal, preference should be given to the earlier title.

          The majority opinion further recognizes the soundness of my contention by the reasoning whereby it undertakes to sustain the application of the general rule in favor of the original holder of the earlier certificate against purchasers from the original holder of the later certificate, by an attempt to demonstrate that such purchasers can in no event be held to be innocent purchasers; because, as it is said, negligence may and should always be imputed to such a purchaser, so that in no event can he claim to be without fault when it appears that the lands purchased by him from the holder of a duly registered certificate of title are included within the bounds of the lands described in a certificate of title of an earlier date.

          At considerable length the majority opinion (in reliance upon the general rule laid down under the various systems of land registration, other than those based on the torrens system) insists that a purchaser of land land duly registered in the Land Registration Court, is charged with notice of the contents of each and every one of the thousands and tens of thousands of certificates of registry on file in the land registry office, so that negligencemay be imputed to him if he does not ascertain that all or any part of the land purchased by him is included within the boundary lines of any one of the thousands or tens of thousands of tracts of land whose original registry bears an earlier date than the date of the original registry of the land purchased by him. It is contended that he cannot claim to be without fault should he buy such land because, as it is said, it was possible for him to discover that the land purchased by him had been made the subject of double or overlapping registration by a comparison of the description and boundary lines of the thousands of tracts and parcels of land to be found in the land registry office.

          But such ruling goes far to defeat one of the principal objects sought to be attained by the introduction and adoption of the so-called torrens system for the registration of land. The avowed intent of that system of land registration is to relieve the purchase of registered lands from the necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title of the vendor in order that he may rest secure as to the validity of the title to the lands conveyed to him. And yet it is said in the majority opinion that he is charged with notice of the contents of every other certificate of title in the office of the registrar so that his failure to acquaint himself with its contents may be imputed to him as negligence.

          If the rule announced in the majority opinion is to prevail, the new system of land registration, instead of making transfers of real estate simple, expenditious and secure, and instead of avoiding the necessity for expensive and oftimes uncertain searches of the land record and registries, in order to ascertain the true condition of the title before purchase, will, in many instances, add to the labor, expense and uncertainty of any attempt by a purchaser to satisfy himself as to the validity of the title to lands purchased by him.

          As I have said before, one of the principal objects, if not the principal object, of the torrens system of land registration upon which our Land Registration Act is avowedly modelled is to facilitate the transfer of real estate. To that end the Legislature undertakes to relieve prospective purchasers and all others dealing in registered lands from the necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title to such lands furnished by the Court of Land Registration, and I cannot, therefore, give my consent to a ruling which charges a purchaser or mortgage of registered lands with notice of the contents of every other certificate of title in the land registry, so that negligence and fault may be imputed to him should he be exposed to loss or damages as a result of the lack of such knowledge.

          Suppose a prospective purchaser of lands registered under the Land Registration Act desires to avoid the imputation of negligence in the event that, unknown to him, such lands have been made the

subject of double or overlapping registration, what course should he pursue? What measures should he adopt in order to search out the information with notice of which he is charged? There are no indexes to guide him nor is there anything in the record or the certificate of title of the land he proposes to buy which necessarily or even with reasonable probability will furnish him a clue as to the fact of the existence of such double or overlapping registration. Indeed the only course open to him, if he desires to assure himself against the possibility of double or overlapping registration, would even seem to be a careful, laborious and extensive comparison of the registered boundary lines contained in the certificate of title of the tract of land he proposes to buy with those contained in all the earlier certificates of title to be found in the land registry. Assuredly it was never the intention of the author of the new Land Registration Act to impose such a burden on a purchaser of duly registered real estate, under penalty that a lack of the knowledge which might thus be acquired may be imputed to him by this court as negligence in ruling upon the respective equities of the holders of lands which have been the subject of double or overlapping registration.

          On the other hand, I think that negligence and fault may fairly be imputed to a holder of a registered certificate of title who stood supinely by and let a default judgment be entered against him, adjudicating all or any part of his registered lands to another applicant, if it appears that he was served with notice or had actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the Court of Land Registration wherein such default judgment was entered.

          The owner of land who enjoys the benefits secured to him by its registry in the Court of Land Registration may reasonably be required to appear and defend his title when he has actual notice that proceedings are pending in that court wherein another applicant, claiming the land as his own, is seeking to secure its registry in his name. All that is necessary for him to do is to enter his appearance in those proceedings, invite the court's attention to the certificate of title registered in his name, and thus, at the cost of the applicant, avoid all the damage and inconvenience flowing from the double or overlapping registration of the land in question. There is nothing in the new system of land registration which seems to render it either expedient or necessary to relieve a holder of a registered title of the duty of appearing and defending that title, when he has actual notice that it is being attacked in a court of competent jurisdiction, and if, as a result of his neglect or failure so to do, his lands become subject to double or overlapping registration, he should not be permitted to subject an innocent purchaser, holding under the later certificate, to all the loss and damage resulting from the double or overlapping registration, while he goes scot free and holds the land under a manifest misapplication of the equitable rule that "where conflicting equities are otherwise equal in merit, that which first accrued will be given the preference." It is only where both or neither of the parties are at fault that the rule is properly applicable as between opposing claimants under an earlier and a later certificate of registry to the same land.

          Of course all that is said in the briefs of counsel and the majority opinion as to the right of the holder of a certificate to rest secure in his registered title so that those dealing with registered lands can confidently rely upon registry certificates thereto is equally forceful by way of argument in favor of the holder of one or the other certificate in case of double or overlapping registration. The problem is to determine which of the certificate holders is entitled to the land. The decision of that question in favor of either one must necessarily have the effect of destroying the value of the registered title of the other and to that extent shaking the public confidence in the value of the whole system for the registration of lands. But, in the language of the majority opinion, "that mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize the damages, taking into consideration all the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them." lawphil.net

          It will be observed that I limit the exception to the general equitable rule, as laid down in the majority opinion, to case wherein the holder of the earlier certificate of title has actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the course of which the latter certificate of title was issued, or to cases in which he has received personal notice of the pendency of those proceedings. Unless he has actual notice of the pendency of such proceedings I readily agree with the reasoning of the majority opinion so far as it holds that negligence, culpable negligence, should not be imputed to him for failure to appear and defend his title so as to defeat his right to the benefit of the equitable rule. It is true that the order of publication in such cases having been duly complied with, all the world is charged with notice thereof, but it does not necessarily follow that, in the absence of actual notice, culpable negligence in permitting a default judgment to be entered against him may be imputed to the holder of the earlier certificate so as to defeat his right to the land under the equitable rule favoring the earlier certificate. Such a holding would have the effect (to

quote the language of the majority opinion) of requiring the holder of a certificate of title to wait indefinitely "in the portals of the court" and to sit in the "mirador de su casa" in order to avoid the possibility of losing his lands; and I agree with the writer of the majority opinion that to do so would place an unreasonable burden on the holders of such certificate, which was not contemplated by the authors of the Land Registration Act. But no unreasonable burden is placed upon the holder of a registered title by a rule which imputes culpable negligence to him when he sits supinely by and lets a judgment in default be entered against him adjudicating title to his lands in favor of another applicant, despite the fact that he has actual knowledge of the pendency of the proceedings in which such judgment is entered and despite the fact that he has been personally served with summons to appear and default his title.

          "Taking into consideration all of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties," it seems to me that there is no "equality in merit" between the conflicting equities set up by an innocent purchaser who acquires title to the land under a registered certificate, and the holder of an earlier certificate who permitted a default judgment to be entered against him, despite actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the course of which the later certificate was issued.

          I am convinced, furthermore, that aside from the superior equities of the innocent purchaser in cases such as that now under discussion, there are strong reasons of convenience and public policy which militate in favor of the recognition of his title rather than that of the holder of the earlier title.

          One ruling exposes all persons purchasing or dealing in registered lands to unknown, unspecified and uncertain dangers, to guard against which all such persons will be put to additional cost, annoyance and labor on every occasion when any transaction is had with regard to such lands; while the other ruling tends to eliminate consequences so directly adverse to the purpose and object for which the land registration law was enacted, and imposes no burden upon any holder of a certificate of registered lands other than that of defending his title on those rare, definite and specific occasions wherein he has actual notice that his title is being challenged in a Court of Land Registration, a proceeding in which the cost and expense is reduced to the minimum by the conclusive character of his certificate of title in support of his claim of ownership. Furthermore, judgment against the innocent purchaser and in favor of the holder of the earlier certificate in a case such as that under consideration must inevitably tend to increase the danger of double or overlapping registrations by encouraging holders of registered titles, negligently or fraudulently and conclusively, to permit default judgments to be entered against them adjudicating title to all or a part of their registered lands in favor of other applicants, despite actual notice of the pendency of judicial proceedings had for that purpose, and this, without adding in any appreciable degree to the security of thir titles, and merely to save them the very slight trouble or inconvenience incident to an entry of appearance in the court in which their own titles were secured, and inviting attention to the fact that their right, title and ownership in the lands in questions has already been conclusively adjudicated.

          The cases wherein there is a practical possibility of double or overlapping registration without actual notice to the holder of the earlier certificate must in the very nature of things to be so rare as to be practically negligible. Double or overlapping registration almost invariably occurs in relation to lands held by adjoining occupants or claimants. It is difficult to conceive of a case wherein double registration can take place, in the absence of fraud, without personal service of notice of the pendency of the proceedings upon the holder of the earlier certificate, the statute requiring such notice to be served upon the owner or occupant of all lands adjoining those for which application for registration is made; and the cases wherein an adjoining land owner can, even by the use of fraud, conduct proceedings for the registration of his land to a successful conclusion without actual notice to the adjoining property owners must be rare indeed.

          In the case at bar the defendant purchased the land in question from the original holder of a certificate of title issued by the Court of Land Registration, relying upon the records of the Court of Land Registration with reference thereto and with no knowledge that any part of the land thus purchased was included in an earlier certificate of title issued to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, the holder of the earlier certificate of title, negligently permitted a default judgment to be entered against him in the Court of Land Registration, adjudicating part of the lands included in his own certificate of title in favor of another applicant, from whom the defendant in this action acquired title, and this despite the fact that he was an adjoining land owner, had actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings and was personally served with summons to appear and defends his rights in the premises. It seems to me that there can be no reason for doubt as to the respective merits of the equities of the parties, and further that the judgment of the majority in favor of the plaintiff will inevitably tend to increase the number of cases wherein registered land owners in the future will

fail to appear and defend their titles when challenged in other proceedings in the Courts of Land Registration, thereby enormously increasing the possibility and probability of loss and damage to innocent third parties and dealers in registered lands generally, arising out of erroneous, double or overlapping registration of lands by the Courts of Land Registration.

Carson, J., concurs.

G.R. No. 2869            March 25, 1907MATEO CARIÑO, petitioner-appellant, vs.THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.Coudert Brothers for appellant.Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.ARELLANO, C.J.:

Facts: An Igorot applied for the registration of a certain land. He and his ancestors had held the land as owners for more than 50 years, which he inherited under Igorot customs. There was no document of title issued for the land when he applied for registration. The government contends that the land in question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against the Crown.

Issue: WON the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine.

Held: No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land. There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:“It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.”