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Massification without equalisation: thepolitics of higher education, graduateemployment and social mobility inHong KongSiu-yau Leea

a Department of Asian and Policy Studies, The Hong Kong Instituteof Education, Tai Po, Hong KongPublished online: 30 Jun 2015.

To cite this article: Siu-yau Lee (2015): Massification without equalisation: the politics of highereducation, graduate employment and social mobility in Hong Kong, Journal of Education and Work,DOI: 10.1080/13639080.2015.1049024

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Massification without equalisation: the politics of highereducation, graduate employment and social mobility inHong Kong

Siu-yau Lee*

Department of Asian and Policy Studies, The Hong Kong Institute of Education,Tai Po, Hong Kong

(Received 1 December 2014; final version received 1 March 2015)

This article explains why the massification of higher education in HongKong has, contrary to the predictions of received wisdom, failed toenhance the upward social mobility of the youth in the city. Buildingupon recent literature in political science, it argues that massificationcan take different forms, which in turn determine the effects of massi-fication on various social groups. Through exploring three criticalphases in the city’s higher education reform, this article demonstrateshow higher education policies have been heavily shaped by the interestsof the city’s elites, who, on the one hand, see the expansion of highereducation as a solution to such social and economic problems as unem-ployment and regional integration but, on the other, remain reluctant toincrease public spending on the education sector. As a result, highereducation has expanded almost exclusively in the private sector. Due topoor planning and implementation, graduates from self-financed pro-grammes are severely disadvantaged in terms of employability, resultingin wage compression and unemployment. The findings of this studyshed light on the regressive nature of higher education.

Keywords: massification; social mobility; Hong Kong; privatisation;politics of education

Introduction

In the past few decades, higher education has been transformed in manycountries, rejecting elitist for massified systems, with universities – oftenfully or partially funded by the government – competing for global reputa-tion and talent. Hong Kong is no exception. Since the 1990s, its highereducation sector has experienced rapid massification. According to officialdata, only 2579 students (2.2% of the relevant age groups) were enrolled asfirst-year students in local university degree programmes in 1980. By 2013,

*Email: siuylee@ied.edu.hk

© 2015 Taylor & Francis

Journal of Education and Work, 2015http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13639080.2015.1049024

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however, the figure had reached 17,089 (21.3% of the relevant age groups)(University Grants Committee, UGC 2014). In comparative terms, althoughthe gross tertiary enrolment rate of Hong Kong is still falling well belowthe average of wealthy countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the gap between them closed considerably inthe 2000s (Figure 1).

Contrary to the conventional assumption that higher education is a cata-lyst for upward social mobility, the rapid massification of higher educationin Hong Kong has not yet resulted in a more egalitarian society. In fact,recent evidence suggests that the receipt of higher education is heavilycorrelated to family background and that educational inequality has wors-ened. For example, the enrolment rate of young people from among the top10% of the richest families in the country (48.2%) for university degreeswas 3.7 times that of those living in poverty (13%) in 2011. The same ratiowas only 1.2 in 1991 (Chou 2013).

The question of why the massification of higher education in HongKong has failed to enhance upward social mobility in the city is relevant toAsian countries that are reforming their higher education sectors in a similarmanner, such as Singapore and South Korea. However, previous literaturehas provided little insight into the issue. Although a large body of the litera-ture asserts that higher education is crucial for disadvantaged individuals toparticipate in a knowledge economy and to achieve economic success(Manski 1992; Müller and Shavit 1998; Day and Newburger 2002;

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Figure 1. Gross tertiary enrolment rate in Hong Kong, 2003–2012 (%).Note: Gross tertiary enrolment rate is the total rate of enrolment in tertiary educa-tion regardless of age. It is expressed as a percentage of the total population in thefive-year age group that follows departure from secondary school.Source: World Bank (2015).

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Guri-Rosenblit, Sebkova, and Teichler 2007; Milburn 2012), another bodyof the literature suggests that higher education actually does very little toenhance upward social mobility (Haveman and Smeeding 2006). This asser-tion is unsurprising because these accounts are primarily based on data thatwere collected from different education systems. As a result, the dataregarding government spending on higher education varied significantly.

In fact, recent comparative studies conducted by political scientists haverevealed that the effects of higher education on social mobility are highlydependent on the willingness of the state to support the sector through pub-lic spending (Ansell 2008, 2010; Rauh, Kirchner, and Kappe 2011). Withoutsufficient public support, higher education – even if it is massified – can beprohibitive to the poor because of its high fees. This implies that highereducation is highly political, as in other areas of public spending, becauseits benefits are not spread evenly across different sectors. Different countrieshave set up varied formal and informal political institutions; therefore, theirmethods of reforming higher education and the effects of such reforms onsocial mobility differ considerably from system to system. For example, thehigher education system in Germany has remained highly elitist because itsuniversities are controlled by the Länder (the sixteen states of Germany),whose internal competition and coordination have rendered higher educationreforms slow and piecemeal (Ansell 2010).

A persistent issue involves explaining the massification of higher educa-tion in semi-democratic regimes. To date, most accounts regarding the poli-tics of higher education have been conducted in democracies wherepolicymakers often compete with rival political parties for popular support.Thus, the explanations offered cannot be readily applied to most Asian coun-tries, in which the political power of ordinary people has not been institu-tionalised through regular elections. As such, the case of Hong Kong fills animportant gap in the literature. By examining the reasons motivating itshigher education reform, students of the politics of education can observe thepolitical and economic utility of higher education in the view of the elites.

Adopting an institutionalist framework, this article process traces thedevelopment of Hong Kong’s higher education system since the 1980s. Itargues that the city’s higher education policies have been shaped by theinterests of the economic and political elites, who favour the expansion ofthe higher education system but strongly oppose any sharp increase in pub-lic spending. Consequently, the massification of higher education has mainlybeen facilitated by profit-oriented private institutions that face stringentresource constraints. To maximise their profit and to secure their marketshare, some institutions compromise on the quality of education. This com-promise gradually undermined the credibility of their programmes, therebyresulting in the low employability of their graduates.

In the following sections, I first explain the nature of the massification ofhigher education and develop a theoretical framework for the subsequent

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analysis. Then, I examine the key events related to the massification ofhigher education in Hong Kong and explain how the policies formulated bythe government have reflected the interests of the elites in the business andpolitical spheres. This article concludes with a discussion on the effects ofthe reform on youth employability and upward social mobility.

Nature of higher education massification

Conventional accounts of higher education massification have almost exclu-sively been guided by a developmental perspective that views higher educa-tion as a means employed by national governments to boost the economicwell-being of their subjects (Acemoglu 1996, 1998; Lucas 1988; Moretti2004; World Bank 2012). By providing the labour market with more skilledlabour, these accounts contend, higher education massification can facilitateskill-biased technical change and increase the overall productivity of thepopulation, thereby helping it to better cope with the challenges of global-isation. This contention is based on the assumption that traditional accounts,as well as many state-sponsored studies, consider higher education massi-fication to be among the most effective measures to support upward socialmobility.

Nonetheless, comparative studies have identified significant variationsamong education systems. While some of these systems have indeedempowered the poor to acquire the necessary skills to share the benefits ofoverall economic development, other systems have strengthened structuralinequality, leading many students of higher education to realise that thesocial effects of higher education are contingent upon a wide range of fac-tors (Rauh, Kirchner, and Kappe 2011). In explaining the relationshipbetween upward social mobility and higher education, therefore, it isimportant to look beyond higher education enrolment figures and examinethe process of massification and the political and economic factors thatmotivate it.

To investigate the process of massification, recent studies have first distin-guished two major types of higher education massification, namely partial pri-vatisation and mass nationalisation (Ansell 2008). The former is characterisedby high levels of coverage at a low level of state subsidisation and public cost.The higher education system in Hong Kong is an example of this type.1 Asdemonstrated in the following sections, the number of students enrolled inhigher education programmes has increased exponentially since the 1990s.However, the Hong Kong government has been reluctant to increase spendingon higher education. As a result, over 50% of tertiary students in the city haveto fund their education through their own means (Legislative Council Secre-tariat 2012). By contrast, a mass public system of higher education is charac-terised by high levels of coverage, state subsidisation and public cost. Thismodel is followed by Sweden, where higher education is almost completely

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funded publicly. Furthermore, the government has increased the overalluniversity budget in line with enrolments (Ansell 2008).2

Contrary to the conventional assumption that public spending on highereducation is progressive in nature, recent studies generally agree that itbenefits the wealthy, especially the middle class, more than the poor, mean-ing that it is regressive in nature (Johnson 2006; Ansell 2008). This isbecause traditional higher education, unlike vocational training, does notgenerally put much emphasis on equipping its students with skills that arereadily applicable to their future work. Households that have urgent finan-cial needs are thus less likely to consider university an attractive educationaloption. Furthermore, admission to higher education is primarily based onacademic merit. This criterion is highly biased towards students from themiddle and upper classes, according to many studies. As a result, spendingon higher education is disproportionately allocated to the wealthy, especiallythe middle class, who have the financial resources to support their childrenin performing well during public exams. This peculiar aspect of highereducation implies that its massification is shaped by political and economicinteractions that differ significantly from other types of social spending.

Consider the case of Britain, in which the idea of expanding its highereducation system with increased public spending was – contrary to theassumption of many – initiated not by the Labour Party but by the Con-servatives. In fact, the proposal of the latter to increase this spending wasquickly rejected by the then-Labour government in the mid-1960s. The gov-ernment favoured technical colleges over traditional universities becausethey helped substantiate its support among the working and low-middleclasses (Ansell 2008). The strong opposition to the expansion of highereducation slowed and challenged the process of massification. Consequently,even after the Conservatives won the general election in 1979, theyexpanded higher education enrolment without an equivalent increase in pub-lic spending, resulting in a significant decrease in public spending per stu-dent (Ansell 2008).

As mentioned previously, Hong Kong serves as a useful case based onwhich to extend recent studies on the politics of higher education massifica-tion to non-democratic regimes given its peculiar political system. Indeed,although Hong Kong – similar to Britain – has adopted the partial privatisa-tion model in expanding its higher education system, partisan competitionsand electoral calculations have never significantly influenced its policymak-ing process. The city has never been a truly democratic and independententity. Furthermore, its suzerains, namely, Britain (pre-1997) and Beijing(post-1997), have needed to engage in ongoing co-optation in order tomaintain their domination and the stability of the city. To this end, the busi-ness elites of the city have typically been chosen for their capacity to launcha large-scale capital outflow by withdrawing investment (Wong 2012). Spe-cial political status and rights were granted to ensure the compliance of

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these elites. By contrast, ordinary citizens have few institutionalised chan-nels through which they can influence public policymaking. Political partiesare also constrained by Beijing. They possess no statutory status and receiveno public funding from the state. Moreover, their members are not allowedto serve as the Chief Executive (CE) or principal government officials with-out surrendering their party affiliation. Consequently, the partisanship inHong Kong is weak. As of 2009, the largest party in the city was composedof only approximately 13,000 members. The other parties generally reportedless than 1000 members (Lam 2010). All of these findings suggest that theexpansion of higher education in Hong Kong cannot be explained simply interms of partisan competition.

To trace the development of higher education in Hong Kong, the follow-ing section explains how a partially privatised system has been developedto serve the conflicting interests of the political and economic elites, anddiscusses how such a system has ultimately undermined the upward socialmobility of the youth in Hong Kong.

Massification of higher education in Hong Kong

Higher education was by no means a system designed to enhance socialmobility when Hong Kong’s first university, the University of Hong Kong,was established in 1911. As then-Governor Frederick Lugard suggested, itwas a platform for the British Empire to extend its influence into China. Byproviding Western education to the Chinese elites who were likely tobecome government officials in the future, the university in Hong Kongwould serve the interests of the British Empire in the Greater China region(Mellor 1992). In other words, the university project was primarily aimed toattract Chinese elites who were likely to take up important economic andpolitical roles upon graduation. In addition to the limited financial supportfrom the colonial government, the project was also supported by donationsfrom local business elites, such as J.H. Scott and Hurmosjee Mody.Although the colonial government has gradually increased its subsidies touniversity students, it has not enabled the significant expansion of thehigher education sector. Unsurprisingly, for much of the colonial era, highereducation was not an essential educational step for would-be professionalsfrom less prestigious family backgrounds. Under the highly competitivepublic examination system, only a fortunate few in the working classescaped their poor family backgrounds and received university education.This condition held true even after the founding of the second university inthe city in 1963, that is, the Chinese University of Hong Kong. By 1965,only 2.2% of school-age youth in Hong Kong were admitted to full-timedegree programmes offered by the two universities (UGC 2014).

It was not until the late 1980s that The Hong Kong government beganto expand the higher education sector. Through establishing a new univer-

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sity and upgrading several existing polytechnics and colleges to universitystatus, the colonial government increased the number of first-year degreeplaces (Lee 2000). The Hong Kong UGC (1996) explained that this expan-sion was a response to the rising family wealth in the 1990s. This wealthaggravated the parental pressures on children to exploit educationalopportunities (UGC 1996). However, this account is insufficient because themiddle class in Hong Kong remained an insignificant political force andenjoyed few formal institutional channels through which to influence pol-icy-making although the legislature was partially democratised in the 1990s(Lui 2003). Furthermore, evidence suggests that during the 1980s, the gov-ernment was content with the supply of high-level manpower from overseasinstitutions (Cheng 2002). Therefore, a more plausible reason, as Lui (2014)suggests, is that the expansion of higher education during the 1990s mayhave been motivated by the need of the colonial government to assuage thepublic’s fear regarding the handover of power from Britain to China in1997. In line with other large-scale infrastructural projects of the time (e.g.constructing a new airport), the purposes of higher education expansionwere to assure Hong Kong citizens that the government was committed tothe long-term development of the city and to prevent a large-scale outflowof talent and capital. The expansion was mainly funded by increased publicspending, which was made available with the accumulation of revenue. Asa result, the enrolment rate of students in the first-year-first-degree places ofgovernment-funded tertiary programmes increased significantly from 7417(participation rate: 8.8%) in 1989 to 14,779 (participation rate: 18.1%) in1996 (UGC 2014). These figures were by no means comparable with thoseof other massified higher education systems. Competition for universityplaces in Hong Kong remained fierce.

A more concrete plan to massify higher education was proposed afterthe city suffered the Asian financial crisis. This crisis triggered an economicrecession of unprecedented magnitude. To ameliorate the labour marketcrunch caused by the recession, the government proposed the further expan-sion of the higher education sector in 2000 so that by 2010, 60% of thosedeparting senior secondary school would receive tertiary education (Tung2000). However, the proposal of massification was heavily shaped by theelitism of education policymakers. In a report commissioned by the Educa-tion and Manpower Bureau, UGC commented that the government muststrategically identify a small number of institutions as the focus of publicand private support to produce world-class universities that can meet thehighest international standards of research and teaching (UGC 2002). Thiscomment clearly suggests that the government had no intention of compro-mising the selectivity of existing universities for the expansion of highereducation (Mok 2009).

The proposal for massification was also limited by the budgetary con-straints encountered by the government. The economic recession following

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the financial crisis generated a record-high public budget deficit of 65 bil-lion Hong Kong dollars (5.2% of gross domestic product) in 2001/2002.The Basic Law, which is the constitutional document of the city, requiresthe government to maintain fiscal balance; thus, elimination of the deficitbecame the government’s priority. Cutbacks were implemented across differ-ent sectors. Consequently, instead of increasing the number of publiclyfunded degree programmes, the government encouraged private educationproviders, many of whom were subsidiaries of existing universities, to offerself-financed two-year sub-degree programmes that catered to the needs ofthe youth. This proposal was supported by the political and economic elitesbecause it seemed to accommodate two otherwise conflicting goals of thereform: on the one hand, this proposal enabled more youths to receivehigher education without significantly increasing public spending; on theother hand, this proposal preserved the selectivity of publicly funded degreeprogrammes. This idea was best articulated in the following statement madeby the UGC (2002):

The higher education sector will need to diversify its income from privateand public resources, and then focus its resources to attain the highest qualityof teaching and research. Because resources are always limited, it will benecessary to selectively identify outstanding performance where that occurs ininstitutions, teachers, learners and researchers, to ensure they receive the sup-port to achieve international excellence in the application of their expertise.

The public demand for higher education was high; therefore, privateeducation actors competed to open sub-degree programmes. As a result, thenumber of sub-degree programmes surged from 38 in 2001/2002 to 279 in2007/2008 (iPASS 2013). Figure 2 shows the enrolment rates in sub-degreeprogrammes during this period.

The expansion plan implemented by the government in 2000 paved theway for the development of a partially privatised higher education system.Although the quality and employability of graduates from self-financed pro-grammes were doubted considerably in subsequent years, the governmenthad no intention of delaying the process of massification. Instead, in orderto attract foreign resources and to diversify the economy after the globalfinancial crisis of 2008, the Hong Kong government envisioned the educa-tion sector as one of the six emerging industries that should be rapidlydeveloped (the other five industries were education services, healthcare ser-vices, testing and certification services, environmental industries, innovationand technology, and cultural and creative industries). This strategic plan wasdeveloped with the mainland Chinese market in mind. Policymakersbelieved that these six industries were comparatively advantageous overtheir mainland counterparts. As the CE commented in 2009:

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The government’s strategy for promoting the six industries is to seize theopportunities arising from our co-operation with Guangdong and align ourefforts with measures already introduced to get immediate results. (HongKong Government 2009a)

Once more, the elites of the city were important in formulating thisstrategic plan. In 2008, the CE set up a Task Force on Economic Challenges(TFEC) that consisted of 11 members (including the CE, who chaired thegroup) to solicit the view of the elites on the effects of the financial tsunamithat hit the Hong Kong economy and to identify business opportunities forconsideration by the government and by the industries concerned. Table 1lists the major affiliations of the members of this task force.

Clearly, TFEC membership was primarily confined to the leaders of themajor businesses in the city (finance and properties). Although no conclu-sive evidence suggests that all suggestions from the TFEC were taken seri-ously, as the major consultative body set up by the government after theglobal financial crisis, its membership symbolised the attitude of the govern-ment in strategic planning, which was highly pro-business and elite-focused.

In the process of reforming the higher education system of the city, theTFEC concluded that the government should continue to encourage theexpansion of the private sector and the development of world-class universi-ties (TFEC 2009). The development of a vibrant private higher educationsector that can supply full-time degree programmes was anticipated to not

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Figure 2. Enrolment in full-time self-financed sub-degree programmes, 2001–2007.Note: Sub-degree programmes include higher diploma and associate degree pro-grammes.Source: iPASS (2013).

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only alleviate the competition for university places but also attract talentand resources from other countries. Following the recommendations ofTFEC, the government designated a number of sites and invited interestedparties to set up private higher education institutions. As of 2013, the num-ber of degree-awarding higher education institutions in Hong Kong hadrisen to 18, of which 10 are operated on a self-financed basis. Meanwhile,public universities have also leveraged on their reputation and resources toattract more foreign students, many of whom come from mainland China,and to increase their degree of internalisation (Figure 3). This action furtherpushed local students who were eligible for government-funded programmesinto the self-financed sector. In the academic year of 2012/2013, 15,870 stu-dents enrolled in self-financed degree programmes. This number representeda significant rise from that determined during the early 2000s (there were268 in 2001/2002) (iPASS 2013).

With the rapid expansion of full-time, self-financed degree programmes,a safe conclusion is that higher education in Hong Kong has evolved into apartially privatised system in which the tuition fees paid by students are cru-cial in sustaining operations. In fact, a common theme across the threephases of higher education massification in Hong Kong is the reluctance ofthe government to increase its spending. This theme is by no means a merecoincidence. Although the point when the Hong Kong government decidedto pursue a low-tax balanced-budget regime is unclear, such a policy has

Table 1. Members of the TFEC and their backgrounds.

Name Background

Donald Tsang(Chairman)

CE of the Hong Kong Government

John C. Tsang (DeputyChairman)

Financial Secretary of the Hong Kong Government

Victor K.K. Fung Group Chairman of the Li & Fung group of companiesLawrence J. Lau Vice-Chancellor of the Chinese University of Hong

KongK.C. Leong Chairman of Roctec Futures Trading Company LimitedMargaret Ko Leung Vice-Chairman and Chief Executive of Hang Seng Bank

LimitedAyesha Macpherson Partner of KPMGStephen Roach Chairman of Morgan Stanley AsiaShih Wing-ching Chairman of Centaline (Holdings) Company Limited (a

leading property agency)Patrick Wang Chairman and Chief Executive, Officer of Johnson

Electric Holdings LimitedMathias Woo Executive Director of Zuni Icosahedron (a non-profit,

charity arts organisation)

Source: Hong Kong Government (2009b).

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been maintained with great consistency since the colonial era, and has beenseen by the business elites – who have dominated the policymaking process– as the cornerstone of economic success. The need to avoid deficits and tomaintain a low tax rate explains the wariness of the government to increase

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Figure 4. Public expenditure per tertiary student, 2003–2012.Note: Public expenditure (current and capital) includes government spending oneducational institutions (both public and private), education administration andsubsidies for private entities (students/households and other private entities).Source: The author’s calculation based on World Bank data (World Bank 2015).

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recurrent public spending. Figure 4 depicts the public expenditure (currentand capital) per tertiary student from 2003 to 2012, which clearly suggeststhat as the massification of higher education continued, the amount of publicspending per student has, with the exception of 2009, gradually decreased.

In summary, the process of higher education massification in Hong Konghas been heavily shaped by the interests of the political and economic elites.The main reason for the rapid transformation of the higher education systemfrom an elitist one to a partially privatised mass system is the dynamicopportunity structure that was presented to the elites of the city. The ongo-ing processes of globalisation and regional integration, coupled with anincreasing demand for educational services, particularly during economicdownturns, has presented the elites of the city with mixed opportunities andthreats. On the one hand, higher education is a potentially profitable ‘indus-try’ that can attract not only local resources but also foreign investment andtalents (Lui 2014). On the other hand, universities must excel in teachingand research to achieve this goal. This excellence requires a significantincrease in investment. To accommodate these competing goals, the modelof partial privatisation is adopted for the expansion of the higher educationsector. This model enables the city to capitalise on the demand for highereducation without significantly increasing public spending. Of course, it isimpossible to tell if the interests of the disadvantaged have been consideredseriously by the elites in the policymaking process. Nonetheless, the massi-fication of education has improved little in terms of social mobility, as sug-gested in the next section. If at all, it has enhanced the social standing ofthe disadvantaged slightly.

Effects of massification through partial privatisation

Although enrolment in higher education has recently increased sharply, littleevidence suggests that the upward social mobility of the population hasimproved. To date, enrolment in publicly funded degree programmes haspeaked at approximately 18% of the relevant age groups. Furthermore, asmentioned in the introduction, these programmes have increasingly beendominated by youth from wealthy family backgrounds (Chou 2013). Thepoor are more likely than the wealthy to enrol in the self-financed degreeprogrammes offered during the process of massification. Table 2 reports thedetailed findings of Chou’s study regarding the growing inequalities inhigher education.

The fact that the poor are highly likely to enter self-financed sub-degreeprogrammes has significant implications for social mobility because employ-ment data suggest that the premium attached to these programmes has beendiminishing rapidly.3 In terms of monthly income from main employment,the difference between the graduates of sub-degree programmes and ofupper secondary schools narrowed to approximately 2000 Hong Kong

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dollars (roughly 256 US dollars) in 2011, whereas the gap between thegraduates of degree programmes and of upper secondary schools was15,000 Hong Kong dollars (approximately 1923 US dollars) (Figure 5).Moreover, the unemployment rate of the graduates of sub-degree pro-grammes has exceeded that of the graduates of upper secondary schoolsince 2009, as suggested in Figure 6. These findings cast considerable doubton the employability of graduates from self-financed sub-degree pro-grammes.

This result is by no means surprising. The rapid expansion of the privatesector in higher education provision was poorly planned and monitored.Although all self-financed programmes must undergo a rigorous accredita-tion process administered by the government,4 their day-to-day operationalpractices, including admission and teaching, can hardly be monitored in atop-down manner. Thus, these practices are primarily determined by marketconditions. Given limited budgets and keen competition, self-financedinstitutions have developed different strategies to maximise their profit andsecure their market share. As expected, some institutions have compromisedthe quality of education (e.g. by admitting students who do not fulfil theentry requirements) to maximise profit (Wan 2011). A particularly astonish-ing case occurred in 2012: two self-financed community colleges admitted5300 new students, which represented an increase of more than 200% incomparison with the admissions rate of the previous year (Chong 2012).Scandals like this, which are not uncommon, have weakened public

Table 2. Relationship between educational attainment and family background,1991 and 2011.

1991 2011

Household income

Underpoverty linea

(%)Top 10%richest (%)

Underpoverty line

(%)Top 10%richest (%)

Enrolled in universitydegree programmesb

8.0 9.3 13.0 48.2

Enrolled in post-secondaryprogrammesc

16.0 16.4 30.0 23.6

Neither in full-timeeducation noremployed

20.8 9.1 19.2 7.7

Source: Chou (2013).aThe poverty line is drawn at half of the median household income.bUniversity degree programmes include all local and overseas bachelor’s degree programmesand beyond.cPost-secondary programmes include all certificates, diplomas, associate degrees, and sub-degree programmes.

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5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

2001 2006 2011

HK

D

Year

Upper Secondary

Tertiary (Non-Degree)

Tertiary (Degree)

Figure 5. Median monthly income from the main employment of working popula-tion according to educational attainment (highest level attended), 2001, 2006 and2011.Notes: The figures include all persons with educational attainment (highest levelattended), as represented by different types of diploma/certificate, associateship, orequivalent courses in the 2001 Population Census. No individual figures were avail-able.Source: Census and Statistics Department (2015a).

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Perc

enta

ge

Year

Upper Secondary

Tertiary (Non-degree)

Tertiary (Degree)

Figure 6. Unemployment rate according to educational attainment, 2007–2013.Note: The unemployment rate is the proportion of unemployed persons in thelabour force in the respective groups.Source: Census and Statistics Department (2015b).

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confidence in the quality of self-financed sub-degree programmes, thusresulting in the low employability of their graduates.

Furthermore, while the premium attached to (self-financed) higher educa-tion has decreased significantly, the financial burden associated with educa-tion has increased significantly for students from poor family backgrounds.Without government subsidies, students enrolled in self-financed pro-grammes must use their own funds to continue their education. Some stu-dents end up amassing massive debts by the time they graduate. Previousstudies suggest that students who must repay tuition fees have more incen-tive to enter into dynamic private sector services than those who have nouniversity-related debts and can thus earn a higher income (Ansell andGingrich 2013). However, the preceding analysis suggests that this generalprinciple does not apply to the graduates of self-financed sub-degree pro-grammes because policymakers have maintained a clear distinction betweenpublicly funded and self-financed institutions, whether deliberately or not.Faced with heavy financial burdens and low social recognition, many self-financed, sub-degree students strive to enter publicly funded degree pro-grammes and are again bewildered by the keen competition for admission.Consequently, many graduates end up with low-paying jobs or are evenunemployed.

The expansion of higher education in Hong Kong has occurred almostexclusively in the private sector; therefore, the wage compression encoun-tered by graduates of self-financed programmes indicates that the educa-tional reform has achieved little in terms of enhancing upward socialmobility. The rapid expansion of self-financed degree programmes since thelate 2000s may have provided additional education opportunities to thegraduates of sub-degree programmes; however, similar issues of employabil-ity and wage compression can extend from sub-degree programmes to thenew self-financed degree programmes considering that publicly funded uni-versities have a budget and a mandate to excel in teaching and research.

Conclusion

This article set out to explain why the massification of higher education inHong Kong has, contrary to the predictions of traditional accounts, failed toenhance social mobility in the city. It argues that massification can take dif-ferent forms, which in turn determine its impacts on different social groups.In the case of Hong Kong, the process of massification has been heavilyshaped by the interests of the city’s elites, who see higher education massi-fication as a solution to such social and political problems as unemploymentand regional integration, but remain reluctant to increase public spending onthe sector. Consequently, the massification of higher education in HongKong has taken on a partial privatisation model in which expansion occursalmost exclusively in the private sector. As a result, publicly funded degree

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programmes have remained highly selective and are increasingly biasedtowards wealthy students. In the process, graduates from self-financed pro-grammes are severely disadvantaged in terms of employability despite theirinvestment. This scenario results in wage compression and unemployment.In short, the expanded opportunities for higher education have barelyimproved the social standing of poor students, if at all.

The findings of this study concur with those of many previous studieson the drawbacks of educational ‘industrialization’ (Brown and Carasso2013; Lui 2014). Nonetheless, the current results also differ in that theyhighlight the role of elites in the process. In fact, although partial privatisa-tion may not be an uncommon strategy of massification, the case of HongKong still provides valuable new insights adding to the existing literaturebecause the city’s political system has allowed its elites to enjoy specialpolitical status and rights. This research not only confirms the potentiallyregressive nature of higher education expansion by examining the motiva-tions behind higher education reform, but it also sheds light on the politicaland economic utility of higher education in the view of the elites. This workconnects this issue with the problems of employability and social mobilityfaced by tertiary students. Many Asian countries have expanded their highereducation sectors in a similar manner; thus, further research may generalisethe findings of this research by determining whether similar dynamics areobserved in other systems.

Another avenue worthy of pursuit is the changing popular perception ofhigher education in Hong Kong. In the 1990s, higher education was viewedby many Hong Kong citizens as a ticket to upward social mobility (Wan2011). This view justified the massification of higher education. However,as the sector continues to expand, it is necessary to examine whether thishas led to any significant change in the educational preferences of the pub-lic. Although ordinary people in Hong Kong have limited influence in thepolicymaking process, their preferences will nevertheless determine theeffectiveness of educational reform.

Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes1. Other examples include the United States, Japan and Britain.2. Other examples include Denmark, Norway and Finland.3. Employment information about graduates from self-financed degree pro-

grammes has yet to be made available.4. The statutory body that is responsible for accrediting self-financed programmes

is the Hong Kong Council for Accreditation of Academic and Vocational Quali-fications.

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Notes on contributorSiu-yau Lee is an assistant professor in the Department of Asian and Policy Stud-ies, Hong Kong Institute of Education. His research focuses primarily on institu-tions and institutional change in authoritarian regime and housing and highereducation policies in Greater China. He earned his DPhil in Politics and MSc inModern Chinese Studies (Distinction) from the University of Oxford, where he wasa Swire Scholar. His recent publications appear in Asian Survey, Modern China andSocial Indicators Research.

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