MAYNOOTHPHILOSOPHICALPAPERSISSUE4(2007)

AnAnthologyofCurrentResearchfrom theDepartmentofPhilosophy,NUIMaynooth

IssueEditor: CyrilMcDonnell

GeneralEditor: ThomasA.F.Kelly

DEDICATION

The Staff and Students of the Department of Philosophy

wish to express heartfelt sadness at the death

on 21 st February 2008 of

Professor Thomas Augustine Francis Kelly,

Head of the Department of Philosophy at NUI Maynooth.

All of us wish to extend our sincerest sympathies to his wife Marian,

his mother Mary, and his extended family and friends.

This issue of Maynooth Philosophical Papers is dedicated to

the memory of Thomas, the founder of this Anthology, a colleague,

a friend, and a genuine advocate of all things

philosophical and worthwhile.

He will be sadly missed.

May he rest in peace. Grsta Dha ar a anam.

ISBN 9780901519375

2007TheDepartmentofPhilosophy,NationalUniversity of IrelandMaynooth,andtheIndividualAuthors

CONTENTS

Page

ForewordbyProfessorThomasA.F.Kelly i

EditorsIntroduction ii

FACULTY

MichaelDunne: ABeingtowardsDeath theVadomori 1

IanLeask: FirstImpressionsReconsidered:SomeNoteson theLvinasianCritiqueofHusserl 17

Harry McCauley: Red,RiotousandWrong:IstheSecondaryQuality Analogyan UnpalatableDoctrine? 23

CyrilMcDonnell: UnderstandingandAssessingHeideggersTopicinPhenomenologyinLightofHisAppropriationof DiltheysHermeneuticMannerofThinking 31

TRANSLATION

EdithStein: MartinHeideggersExistentialPhilosophyTranslation byMetteLebech 55

DOCTORALCANDIDATES

JohnHaydnGurmin: EdithSteinandTaniaSinger:AComparisonof PhenomenologicalandNeurologicalApproachestotheProblemofEmpathy 99

DeniseRyan: JeandeLaRochellesFormulationoftheDistinctionbetweenBeingandEssence 123

i

FOREWORD

Iamdelighted,asProfessorofPhilosophy, tobeabletowritea forewordtothecurrenteditionofMaynoothPhilosophicalPapers,whichhasbeeneditedbyDrCyril McDonnell. I would like to express my heartfelt thanks and warmestcongratulationstoallthecontributors,bothfacultyanddoctoralcandidates.Todothisisaverycongenialdutyforme,sinceMaynoothPhilosophicalPapersisoneofthewaysinwhichourDepartmentrenewsandextendsitsalreadyvitalresearchculture,andstimulatestheworkofouryounger,emergingscholars,aswellasthatofourwellestablishedstaffmembers.

ThepresentassemblyofessaysshowsthatPhilosophyisaliveandwellinNUIMaynooth.ThefinecontributionsofourdoctoralcandidatesalsoshowthatPhilosophy is being passed on to a new and very worthy generation ofphilosophers. The diversity of the essays which form the present collection iswitness to the plurivocity of the discipline as it is practised here.Each of themshowsadepthofpenetrationandmasteryoftheirdisciplineofwhichtheirauthorscan be very proud. I amdelighted to see thatDrMetteLebechs translation ofEdith Steins work, never before translated into English, entitled MartinHeideggersExistentialPhilosophy,appearsforthefirsttimeinthisissue.InmyviewthisrepresentsasignificantcontributionbothtoSteinandHeideggerstudies,andtothehistoryofexistentialandphenomenologicalphilosophy.

IwouldfinallyalsoliketooffermycongratulationsandthankstoDrCyrilMcDonnell,forhisfinecontribution,forhisexcellenteditorshipandforhishardwork.

ProfessorThomasA.F.Kelly,GeneralEditor,MaynoothPhilosophicalPapers,Head,DepartmentofPhilosophy,NUIMaynooth.

29thNovember,2007.

ii

EDITORS INTRODUCTION

This is Issue No.4 (2007) of Maynooth Philosophical Papers, comprising ongoingwork from both Faculty and postgraduate students in theDepartment ofPhilosophy at National University Ireland, Maynooth. Maynooth PhilosophicalPaperswasanideainitiatedandpromotedbyDrThomasKelly,who,Iamhappytowrite, has been recently appointed Professor of Philosophy andHead of theDepartmentofPhilosophyatN.U.I.Maynooth.StudentsandstaffextendwarmestcongratulationstoProfessorKelly,andwewishhimalltheverybest inhisnewpositionandendeavours.

Earlier intheyear,Tomaskedme ifIwouldbe interestedineditingthisissue of Maynooth Philosophical Papers 2007, around the theme ofContemporaryPhilosophy,whichIwasdelightedtodoandgratefullyaccepted.Thankyouverymuch,Tom,forthatinvitation.IamalsogenuinelyappreciativeoftheresponsestothecallforpapersthatIreceivedfromstaffandpostgraduatestudentsforthisedition.

Submissions to Maynooth Philosophical Papers are reviewedanonymously and internationally. A very important and special thank you,therefore, isextendedtoeachof therefereeswhogavegenerouslyof their time,evaluations, suggestions and comments,which the contributors appreciated andbenefitedinkind.

Topics addressed in this issue straddle some of the main currents incontemporary philosophy, such as, for instance: existentialism, hermeneutics,phenomenology, and analytic philosophy, in addition to topics in medievalphilosophy which are of perennial relevance to contemporary philosophicaldebate.Also presented here for the first time is an English translation of EdithSteinsessayMartinHeideggersExistentialPhilosophybyDrMetteLebechofthe Department of Philosophy at Maynooth. Steins original essay MartinHeideggersExistentialphilosophiewasfirstpublishedinGermanasanappendixinEdithStein,EndlichesundEwigesSein.VersucheinesAufstiegszumSinndesSeins (1950), but it was not part of the first edition of her collected works byHerderin1986,andso,nottranslatedbyKurtF.ReinhardtforFiniteandEternalBeing(Washington:ICSPublications,1986).Itdoesappear,however,intheneweditionofSteinsGesamtausgabe,bd.11/12 (Freiburg:Herder,2006),pp.445500 and Mettes translation will feature in the reissue of Finite and EternalBeing (ICSP,forthcoming). Weare, therefore,deeplydelightedand indebtedtoMette(andtoFrSullivanspermissionofICSP)forinclusionofhertranslationinthis edition of Maynooth Philosophical Papers 2007. Interestingly, themestoucheduponbySteininheressayarealsotoucheduponbyseveraloftheauthorsof thearticles thatarepresentedandcollectedhere.ThusSteinsessay isaveryfittinginclusioninthisissue.

Finally,itremainsformetooffermysincerethankstoeachoftheauthorsfortheircontributions.Thoughthewholeisgreaterthanthesumoftheparts,thepartsareneeded.Thanks,therefore,tooneandall.

_______________________________

DrCyrilMcDonnellSeriesEditor

1

ABeingtowardsDeath the Vadomori1

MichaelDunne

Introduction

The artistic output ofDamienHirst, especially his most recentwork, the jewelencrustedSkullmakessurethatNietzschesunbiddenguestremainssomewhatwithinWestern consciousness, despite the best efforts of modernity to exorcisetheprospectofmortality.Thethemeofdeathisofcoursewellinsertedwithinthephilosophical tradition. Platowrites in the Phaedo: The one aim of thosewhopracticephilosophyinthepropermanneristopracticefordyinganddeath,2 andforSchopenhauerdeathistheinspirationforphilosophy.3Muchoftheeffortsofthe philosophers in the face of death has been to overcome the emotionsassociated with it, especially fear, terror, disgust. One thinks of the efforts ofEpicurustofreehisfellowmanfromthefearsofdeathandofthepunishmentsoftheafterlifethroughacalmacceptanceofultimatedissolutionatdeath.TheStoicinsistencethatweshouldremember thatwearemortal, themementomoriasanethical rejoinder to the hedonism of carpe diem, reemerges in renaissance andearly modern times. From the history of philosophy of the nineteenth andtwentiethcenturies twophilosophicalmovementswereparticularly influential inassociating the acceptance of finitude with authentic human existence, namelyexistentialismandphenomenology.TheHeideggereanSeinzumTode alluded toin the title of this article in some ways represents a secularisation of theKierkegaardean conception of death as the decisive moment in life, the diesnatalis of theChristian. For both the reality of death as an immanent personalpossibility forces one to become authentic, no longer to be merely content toenjoy the ride but to accept that it has a terminus.Where thought diverges isover the possibility of turning beingtowardsdeath into beingtowardstranscendence.Deathforsomebecomestheclearestindicationoftheabsurdityofhuman existence, of the anguish of our dual consciousness (Camus) of ourdesirefordurationandourcertaintyoftermination.Itcanbetransmutedthroughjouissance and the excesses of postmodernism. Or, of course, for most of thewesterntradition, itbecomestheturningpoint (,separationand judgment)whichopensuptothebeyond().

ThefusionbetweentheGreekandRomanphilosophicaltraditionandthatofJudaeoChristianitygaverisetoaseriesof sustainedreflectionsonthenatureof the human condition.Christian soteriology, however,means that theAncienttragic sense of life is overcome in a hopefilled vision of ultimate redemption,indeedtotheextentasseenintheEriugeniandoctrineofthereturnofeverythingtoGod and so nothingwill be lost.ManyChristian authors saw themselves ascontinuingthephilosophicaltraditionandcompletingitinthesenseofprovidingaseriesofdefinitiveanswerstothequestionswhichtroubledtheancients.

ITheTwelfthCenturyBackground

It might seem an extraordinary thing to state but it seems that Death wasinvented in the twelfth century, i.e., that particular Western idea, linked to

2

judgment and the afterlife, andwhich persists intomodern times as a dominanttheme in Western culture.4 It seems that Death as an abstract entity, oranthropomorphic representation, is absent from the High Middle Ages. He (?)beginstotakeformfromthetwelfthcenturyonwardsandbecomesthecentreofarichartisticandliteraryproduction.Whythetwelfthcentury?Thesuggestionbysome is that the emergence of awealthy and comfortable middle class, rich inmaterialpossessions,meansan increasedorheightenedawarenessofhowmuchthere is to be lost through death. There is also a reaction to this increasedhedonismandmaterialismonthepartofthemonkswhosechosenwayofliferunscounter to this new consumer society. There is the development of thecontemptus mundi literature with its pitiless depiction of the misery andsordidnessofhumanlifeofthefinaljudgmentandthesufferingsofthedamned.Life isdepictedasanexistentialdramawherethe individual ispresentedwithafundamental choice between salvation or damnation. There is an acutephenomenological description of the stark choices which faces every freeindividualontheroadof lifeandwheretheultimateturningpointisthemomentofdeath,amomentwhichissoimportantandyetunknown.Theimpetusforthesemonasticwriters isasituationwhereifthereistoomuchloveof lifethatpeopleneedtoberemindedofdeath,thatEtinArcadiaego.Thesolutionisconversion,penitence and that distance from the world so beloved of Neoplatonism. On amorenegativeside,theobsessionwiththemacabrealreadymentionedbyPlatointhe Republic5 where Leontius has a compulsion to look at corpses, emerges invernacular literature,sermonsandartisticdepictions.Onecouldalsomentionthefactthatthedeadthemselvesareoftenonshowtoremindthelivingofwhattheywill become, a spectacle which still fascinates today in the crypts of someCapuchinmonasteriesinItaly.

InTwelfthCentury literature,onecouldmention the importanceof textssuch as the De contemptu mundi and that best seller the De miseria humaneconditionisof Innocent III.There is thebeginningof that long traditionof textsaround the theme of the artes moriendi, of preparing for a good death (andfamiliartomanyIrishpeopleuptorecently,especiallyasrelatedtothepracticeoftheNineFirstFridays).6AnimportantpoeminFrenchistheVersdelaMortofHlinantofFroidmontandcomposedbetween1194and1197andwhich isseenasbeingoneofthesourcesofthatlatermedievaltraditionoftheDanceofDeath.7

Hlinantdevelopshisworkaroundthree themes:deathisnearathandtheneedtodistance oneself from worldly goods mans destiny in the next life. As theopeninglinesputit:

Morz,toisuelentcremirlisage:Orqueurtchascunsasondamage:Quinipuetavenirsirue.Porceaichangi moncorageEtailaissetgieuetrage:

(ODeath,thosewhoarewisehavealwaysfearedyouNow,however,everyonerushestotheirdestructionAndiftheydonotmeetyouatthepass,yougalloptowardsthem.Forthisreason,IchangedmywaysAndleftbehindpleasureandmadness)

Unlikelaterauthors,Hlinantdoesnotindulgeinthemacabreheappealstothemind and the emotions of his reader/ hearer and not to fear or disgust.8 This,

3

rather, is something which comes to the fore with the experience of the BlackDeathinthefourteenthcentury.Hlinant isalsoimportantsinceheisoneofthecandidates suggested for the authorship of the poemwhich is our concern here,theVadomori.

IITheVadomori

WhiledoingsomeresearchonthemanuscriptsoftheLecturaontheSentencesofRichardFitzRalphintheVaticanLibrary,IcameacrosssomeversesattheendofthemanuscriptOttoboni679which isofEnglishoriginandwaswrittentowardstheendof the fourteenthcentury.Theversescameat theendof themanuscriptand together with some other lines of poetry or sayings which seemed to bejottingsbythescribeinordertofilluptheparchmentwhichwasleftblankwhenhehadfinishedcopyinghistext.Eachline(atleastinthefirstpartofthepoem)beginsandendswiththestatementVadomori(Iamgoingtodie)andhencethe generic name for this type of poemwhich, while having its origins in thetwelfth century, continued as a literary type up to the sixteenth century. Theinterestforthemedievalistliesinthefactthatthepoempresentsalistofvariouscharacterswhocomeforward,statewhotheyare,whattheirfunctioninlifewas,andthat theyaregoingtodie.Thuswehaveadepictionof thevarioustypes inmedieval society and how they were viewed by a contemporary writer. Eachpersonageisassignedaverseinwhichtheylamenttheirowndeathassomethingwhichisinevitableandbeforewhichtheyareimpotent,nomatterhowimportantthey were in life. The repetition of the phrase vado mori is suggestive of asombre litany, with funereal rhythms, characterised by melancholy andresignation.

The Vado mori genre was very popular, existing in many versions andsurviving in over 50 manuscripts scattered throughout Europe.9 The survivingversionsalldifferintermsofthenumberofversesandthepersonalitieswhicharelisted, reflecting contemporary changes in taste, politics, and social status andindeedhowmuchspaceascribewishedtofill!Allwouldseemtoderivefromacommonsourcewithversesbeingaddedtothepoemandchangedordeletedoverthecourseoftime.Itisratherironicthatwehaveherearealdeathoftheauthorinthepostmodernsense.Witheach stageof recommitting the text toparchment,the scribe feels empowered to adapt the poem to his own needs and withoutrespectinganyauthorshiporownershipofthetext. Eachwritingofthetextisarereading and reinterpretation without any felt need to subscribe to a masternarrative.

AsIexaminedsomemoremanuscriptswhilecarryingoutresearchintheBodleianLibraryatOxford,Idiscoveredsomeothertextsfromroughlythesametime (fourteenth century) and background (AngloFrench). This allowed me toestablish the basis for a textwhichmight have circulated at the time butwhichdoes not survive in any one manuscript. The possibility of such a text wasstrengthenedwhenIcameacrosstheeditionsofsimilartextsbyEleanorPrescottHammondandpublishedin1911.10Thetextwhichisgivenbelow,itishoped,isclosetotheoriginaltextwhichseemstodatefromthethirteenthcentury.Whatisclearfromthetextisthatitisrelativelyoptimisticand,unliketheDanceofDeath,doesnotseeDeathastriumphingrather,ultimatelyitisDeathwhomustdiesinceitisLifewhowinsintheend.PeterDronke11wasoftheopinionthatthestyleof

4

the opening verses with their unusual internal rhyming would suggest a datebefore 1200.Helmut Rosenfeld tended to go for a later date of the thirteenthcentury12 and pointed out that the origin of the expression Vado mori wasundoubtedlyFrench,jevaismourir. Indeed,aswillbeseenbelow,oneof thelinesappearsinFrench.13

In theversionsof the textwhichappear in theworksofRosenfeld14 andDon,15onlythevadomoriversesappearwithouttheintroductorylines.Botharerelatively late versions. In the version printed below the Vado mori verses arecounterbalanced by Vive Deo verses (in some manuscripts they are laid out inparallel columns).Theopening linesorexordiumbeginwith astatementof theanguishwhich arises at the thought of death for nomatterwhat time it is, thatmomentcouldbeoneslast(vv.23).Theimpartialityofdeathisacknowledged,itsfunctionaslevellerbringingdownbothrichandpoorsinceallmustdie(vv.49).Thevariouspersonsthenappearonstage,tostatewhotheyareandthentoexit. HerewehavePapa (Pope)Rex (King)Presul (Prelate)Miles (Warrior)Monachus (Monk) Legista (Lawyer) Placitor (Advocate) Praedicator(Preacher) Logician (Logicus) Medicus (Doctor) Cantor (Singer) Sapiens(Intellectual) Dives (Rich man) Cultor (Country man) Burgensis (City man)Nauta (Sailor) Pincerna (Butler) Pauper (Poor man) Elemosinarius(Benefactor).Muchhasbeenmadeofthehierarchicalnatureofmedievalsocietyand more written of its castelike structure riven with inequalities based uponbirth.OnlytheChurch, itseems,offeredthepossibilityforapoormantorisetothe very top. It is rarely pointed out, however, that the structure of medievalsocietywhilebeinggenerallystaticandconservative(likemostsocieties)didnothavemuchbywayofareligiousjustification.Infact,themessageofChristianitywas strongly egalitarian and favoured community of goods rather than privateproperty.Inthisregard,religiouscommunitiesweremeanttoopposetheseculararrangementofsociety,thelatterbeingtemporalwhereasthelifeofthemonkwasseenasananticipationofaneternalsituation.

Each reader will finds verses which amuse, strike a chord, or arememorable forone reasonoranother.Thestudentofphilosophymightpauseatthefateofthelogician:Alogician,IlearnedhowtodefeatothersDeathquicklydefeated me. The intellectual (Sapiens) finds that his knowledge is of no usewhenDeathturnshimintoafool(meredditfatuummorsseva).Theimageofthecantor isaniceonewhereDeathplayshimatune inadescendingscalesoh, fa,mi.

5

And the butler with a fondness for wine finds that death has served him uppoison! In general, however, the tone, is not bitter or overcritical. The advicegiven toeachcharacter in thesecondsection (ViveDeo) is hortative rather thancondemnatoryandisultimatelyhopeful.

IIIConclusion

In themedical school of Salerno, verseswere also used in order to help futuredoctors remember their schooling. However, the author of the verses had toconclude thatnomatterhowmuchmedical learningonehad, therewasnocurefordeath:Contravimmortis,nonestmedicameninhortis.InourtexttheMedicuscanfindnocureandinsteadvomitsupthemedicinewhichhisdoctorsprescribe.In thesecondsectionwe find that theMedicus is advisedonecannotultimatelyrelyuponmedicalscience(fallaxestarsmedicine).Thehopesofmanythenandnowhavealwaysbeenthatmedicalsciencemightultimatelyprolongourlivessoastoultimatelyexcludedeath.Clearlywehavenotreachedthatpointandevenifwehadthereisnothingtoguaranteethatwemightnotbecomesuchaproblemtoourselves that death might still be chosen by some over living. The challengeremains to integrate the realisation of our radical finitude into our lives, to nolongertakelifeforgranted.Ifphilosophyistobeareflectiononlife,thenitmustalsobeareflectionondeathandperhapsevensomesortofguideasweallmakeourwaytothatitertenebrosum.

NOTES

1 IwishtothankProf.PietroB.RossiforhishelpinsourcingsomematerialsinItalianandtoProf.JamesMcEvoywhoreadtheLatintextandmadesomehelpfulsuggestions.Thanksareduealsoto Prof. Peter Dronke who provided some very useful information as well as suggesting thearrangementoftheopeninglinesofthepoem.2Phaedo 64A..3DieWeltalsWilleundVorstellung,I,54II,c.4.4SeeCarloDon,HlinantdeFroidmont,IVersidellaMorte(Parma:PraticheEditrici,1988),p.7.See,also,theclassicworkbyPhillipeAris,Lhommedevantla mort (Paris: duSeuil,1977).5Republic,IV:440a:IonceheardsomethingthatItrust.Leontius,thesonofAglaion,wasgoingupforthePiraeusundertheoutsideoftheNorthWallwhenhe noticedcorpseslyingbythepublicexecutioner. He desired to look, but at the same time hewas disgusted andmade himself turnawayandforawhilehestruggledandcoveredhisface.Butfinally,overpoweredbythe desire,heopenedhiseyeswide,rantowardsthecorpses,andsaid:Look,youdamnedwretches,takeyourfillofthefairsight.6 SeeMaryCatherineOConnor, TheArt ofDyingWell: theDevelopment of theArsMoriendi(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1942).7 See Helmut Rosenfeld, Die mittelalterliche Totentanz, Entstehung, Entwicklung, Bedeutung(CologneGraz,1968).Anexcellentwebsiteandsourceformaterialsonthisandrelatedmattersistobefoundat [accessed9September2007].8Thisisalsoapparentfromhisdispassionatetreatmentoftheinelectuabilityofdeathfromwhathe writes in his De cognitione sui: Clamat nobis certissimamors, et hora mortis incertissima,mortem semper ad omnium pendere oculos, et ideo semper habendam ab omnibus prae oculis,semperquemeditandam,sicutscriptumestinEcclesiastico [7:36]:Memorarenovissimatuaetinaeternumnon peccabis (PL212, col 730)with thenovissimabeing death, judgment,hell orheaven.9 See Hans Walther, Initia carminum ac versuum medii aevi posterioris Latinorum, 2nd edn(Gttingen: Vandenhoech&Ruprecht, 1969).

6

10E.P.Hammond,LatinTextsoftheDanceofDeath, ModernPhilology,8(1911),399410.11 Inalettertome,dated21.12.03.12 Helmut Rosenfeld, Vadomori, Zeitschrift fr Deutsches Altertum, 124 (1995), 257264 (p.257): ZudenverbreitetstenVergnglichkeitsdichtungendesMittelaltersgehrendie latinischenVadomoriGedichten. Sie sind seit dem 13. Jahrhundert in ganz Europa anzutreffen und inzahllosen Sammelhandschriften berliefert, vielfach dabei variiert im Bestand und in derAnordnungderVerse,undsiewurdenindenVolkssprachenangeeignet.13WeshouldrememberthattheFrenchspeakingworldatthetimeincludestheNormannobilityof England, Wales, Ireland, Southern Italy and Sicily. The placitor hundredis et comitatumentionedinconnectionwiththephraseinFrenchisanadvocatewithintheAngloNormanlegalsystemoftheShires.14HelmutRosenfeld,DasAberaltaicherVadomoriGedichtvon1446undPetervonRosenheim,MittellateinischesJahrbuch,2(1965),190204theLatintextistobefoundonpp.195198,andhasaconsiderablyamplifiednumberofpersonages.15 SeeCarloDon,HlinantdeFroidmont,IVersidellaMorte(Parma:PraticheEditrici,1988),Appendice 1, pp. 102113. This version is completely different fromour text except for threeverses,Rex, Miles, Medicus andLogicuswhichareidentical.

7

Vadomori1

C= StJohnsCollege,Cambridge,E6(109),(XV)ff.39v40vO1= StJohnsCollege,Oxford,58(XV),f.1(92v)

O2= Oxford,Bodleian423,f.354v(mutilated)

V= Vaticana,Ottoboni679,ff.206rb206vb

Editions:

B1= VadoMori,BritishLibrary,Landsdown397(editedbyEleanorPrescottHammond,1911)

B2= Lamentatio,BritishLibrary,Royal8BVI(editedbyEleanorPrescottHammond,1911)

Dummortemrecolo2 crescitmichicausadoloris,

Namcunctishoris morsveniteccecito3.

Equalege4rapit5morsmagnosatquepusillos,

Nunchosnuncillos6precipitandocapit7.

Pauperisetregiscommunislexmoriendi,

Datcausam8flendi sibenescriptalegis.

Gustatopomonullustransitsinemorte,

Heumiserasorte9 labituromnishomo!

VadomoriPapaqui iussuregnasubegi,

Morsmichiregnatulitheccine:vadomori.

Vadomorirexsum.Quidhonor?Quidgloriaregni?

Estviamorshominisregia:vadomori.

Vadomoripresul cleripopuliquelucerna,

Quifueramvalidus,langueo10:vadomori.

Vadomorimilescertaminevictor belli11,

Mortemnondidicivincere:vadomori.

8

Vadomorimonachusmundimoriturus12amori,

Vt13moriaturamordic14michi:vade15mori.

Vadomorilegistafuidefensoregenis16,

Causidicuscausasdesero17:vadomori.

Vadomoriplacitorhundredisetcomitatu,

(Torat)eforceorfaut, langueo:vadomori.18

Vadomoripopuloverbumvitepredicare

Quisolitusfueram,langueo:vadomori.19

Vadomorilogicus20aliisconcluderenoui,

Conclusitbrevitermorsmichi:vadomori.

Vadomorimedicusmedicaminenonredimendus21,

Quicquidagantmedici22respuo23:vadomori.24

Vadomoricantorfrangens25que26notasmodulando,

Ffrangit27morsmodulossolfami:vadomori28.

Vadomorisapiensmichinilsapientiaprodest29,

Meredditfatuummorsseva:vadomori30.

Vadomoridiuesadquidmichicopiarerum31?

Cummortemnequeat32pellere:vadomori.

Vadomoricultorcollegifarrisacervos33

Quosegoprovilicomputo34:vadomori.

Vadomoriburgensiseram censumcumulaui,

Omnia35morsadimitimpia:vadomori.

Vadomorinautafluctussulcans36remigando,

Morsprorampertransitnauifrago37:vadomori.

Vadomoripincerna38fuitvinummichidulce,

Propinatmichimorsfellea39:vadomori40.

VadomoripauperproChristocunctarelinquens41,

Huncsequar42evitansomnia:vadomori43.

Vadomoripietatepotensbenefactoregenis,

Hocmorsnonresecathacdote: vadomori.

Nullimorspartisconcludenssingulafine44,

OmniatransibuntpreteramareDeum.45

9

Responsiovite46

Morsgenusomneteritsequitursedvitafutura,

Celicafuturanuncsibifiniserit47.

Contenduntmutuo48sibi49morsetvitaduello50,

Istasuobelloseparatillasuo51.

Morsvitamresecat52sternitprotemporefortem,

Settandemmortem vitaprobatasecat.

Adcertameneo litisliscertatamori,

Dicisvadomori consulo53viveDeo

ViveDeopapanuncmammonasitdeapape,

Desinepapadeevivere:viveDeo.

ViveDeoperquemrexesrenullaadorna,

Rexrege,RexDeusest, rexhomo:viveDeo.

ViveDeopresulcuiusvicestasinhonore,

Fforma54gregi55datusesstabene:viveDeo.

ViveDeomilespacempatriamquetuere,

Fforcior56 infidei robore:viveDeo.

ViveDeomonachusquidvoverisipsememento57,

Christocommoriensincruce:viveDeo.

ViveDeolegistaDeilexveraprobatur,

Netelexperdatperdita:viveDeo.

ViveDeoplacitoriustassustentaquerelas58,

Muneraquececantrespue:viveDeo.

ViveDeopredicansquiviveretudocuisti,

Cunctaquepeccataspernere:viveDeo.

ViveDeologicepremissasfactibivite,

Neconclusatibi sitvia:viveDeo.

ViveDeomedicefallaxestarsmedicine,

EstmedicinaDeusoptima:viveDeo.

ViveDeocantorsitvoxbeneconsonalaudi,

Mensbeneconcordetsic59bene:viveDeo.

10

ViveDeosapiensquesursumsuntsapiendo,

Desipit60hicmundustusape:viveDeo.

ViveDeodivesopibussimuletpietate,

Pauperegetferopem,dasibi61:viveDeo.

ViveDeocultormanusutilitercolatagrum,

ReligioneDeimenspia:viveDeo.

ViveDeoseuburgensisseuciviusinurbe,

Vtsis62vivaDei mansio:viveDeo.

ViveDeonautaquia63multosobruitunda,

Fforsan64eritsubitamorstua: viveDeo.

ViveDeopincernaDei suntpocula65vina,

Ffons66viuusDeusesthuncbibe:viveDeo

ViveDeopauper tamrequammentebeata,

Niluthabens67ethabens68omnia:viveDeo.

ViveDeocarusrapiarisineiusamorem,

TotaferinDomini69viscera:viveDeo.

ViveDeobeneviviseisivivisamori,

Nonpotesante Deum viverepretereum.

THE LAMENT OF ONE WHO IS TO DIE70

WhenIthinkaboutdeath,areasonforsorrowgrowswithinme

Foratalltimesofthedaylookhowquicklydeathcomes!

Withimpartialitydeathsiezesthegreatandsmall

Hurryingtograbnowthese,nowthose.

Acommonlawofdyingappliestothekingandpauper

Suchawellwrittenlawgivescausefortears.

Oncetheapplewaseaten,noonepassesonwithoutdeath

Alaswhatamiserableendtoucheseveryman!

Pope

Iamgoingtodie,thePopewhosubduedkingswithacommand

Arenotthesethenthekingdomsthatdeathtakesfromme? Vadomori.

11

King

Iamgoingtodie,IamtheKing,whatanhonourandglorytothekingdom

Deathistheroyalroadforhumankind. Vadomori.

Bishop

Iamgoingtodie,aBishop,thelampfortheclergyandpeople

Iwhowasstrongnowamweak. Vadomori.

Knight

Iamgoingtodie,IamaKnight,inconflictthewinnerofthewar

IwasnotabletodenyvictorytoDeath. Vadomori.

Monk

Iamgoingtodie,Iamamonk,onedeadtoloveofthisworld

Sothatthislovemaydie,saytome,youwilldie.

Lawyer

Iamgoingtodie,alawyer,Iwasadefenderofthepoor

Anadvocate,Ihavelostmycase. Vadomori.

Magistrate

Iamgoingtodie,amagistrateatthecountycourt

AuthorityandforcenowfailmeandIamweak. Vadomori.

Preacher

Iamgoingtodie,Iwhopreachedthewordoflifetothepeople

Iwhowassolidnowamweak. Vadomori.

Logician

Iamgoingtodie,aLogicianIknewhowtosilenceothers

Deathhasquicklysilencedme. Vadomori.

Doctor

Iamgoingtodie,aDoctorwhoisnotsavedbymedicine

WhateverthedoctorsprepareIthrowitup. Vadomori.

Cantor

Iamgoingtodie,aCantorwhoshortenednotesandmadetunes

Deathshortensmytune,soh,fa,mi. Vadomori.

Intellectual

Iamgoingtodie,anIntellectual,myknowledgeisnogoodtome

UncouthDeathmakesafoolofme. Vadomori.

12

RichMan

Iamgoingtodie,aRichMan,whatgoodarerichestomenow?

Deathisimpossibletodefeat. Vadomori.

Farmer

Iamgoingtodie,aFarmerIgatheredtogetherheapsofwheat

NowIregardthiswithcontempt. Vadomori.

Burgess

Iamgoingtodie,aBurgessIcollectedtaxes

MercilessDeathcarriesoffeverything. Vadomori.

Sailor

Iamgoingtodie,aSailorsailingoverthewavesbyrowing

Deathholesthehull,sinkingtheship. Vadomori.

Butler

Iamgoingtodie,aButler,winewassweettome

NowDeathservesmepoison. Vadomori.

Pauper

Iamgoingtodie,aPauper,IlefteverythingbehindforChrist

Followhim,avoidingall. Vadomori.

Benefactor

Iamgoingtodie,frommercyarichBenefactoroftheneedy

ThisendowmentDeathdoesnotdivideup. Vadomori.

Withoutapart ofitsown,Death finisheseachpartin theend

EverythingwillpassawaybesideslovingGod.

THE RESPONSE OF LIFE

Death terrifiesallbutinafuturelife

Aheavenlylife,therewillbeanendtoDeath.

DeathandLifefacedeachotherinawarbetweenthem

Oneinbattletheequaloftheother.

DeathhaltedLifeandthrewittotheground

13

ButLife,havingbeentested,woundedDeath.

Theoutcomeofthestrugglewasfoundinfavouroflove.

YousayVadomori,IsaytoyouViveDeo.

Pope

LiveinGod, Pope towhomwealthisgod

Ifyouwanttolive,leavewealthbehind,ViveDeo.

King

LiveinGod,hethroughwhomyouareKing,withoutriches

IsKingtoaking,GodtheKingismantheking,ViveDeo.

Bishop

LiveinGod, Bishopinwhoseplaceyoustandinhonour

Youaregivenasanexampletoyourflock,standwell,ViveDeo.

Knight

LiveinGod,Knight,protectpeaceandyourcountry

Strongintheassuranceofyourfaith,ViveDeo.

Monk

LiveinGod,Monk,whatyouvowedremember

WithChristhangingonthecross,ViveDeo.

Lawyer

LiveinGod,Lawyer,thelawofGodisprovedthetruelaw

Donotletthesinfullawcondemnyou,ViveDeo.

Judge

LiveinGod,Judge,byfindingforthejustcauses

Spitoutthebribeswhichblind,ViveDeo.

Preacher

LiveinGod,youwhobypreachinghavetaughttolive

Bydespisingallsins,ViveDeo.

Logician

LiveinGod,Logician,makeforyourselfthepremisesoflife

Lestthewaybeconcludedforyou,ViveDeo.

Doctor

LiveinGod,Doctor,medicalskill isfallible

Godisthebestmedicine,ViveDeo.

14

Cantor

LiveinGod,Cantor,letyourvoicebeharmoniouswithpraise

Andsoyourmindwillalsobewelltuned,ViveDeo.

Intellectual

LiveinGod,Intellectual,itisthethingsabovewhichshouldbeknown

Knowthatthisworlddeceives,ViveDeo.

RichMan

LiveinGod,RichMan,bothgoodsandmercy,

Thepoormanneeds,helphim,ViveDeo.

Farmer

LiveinGod,Farmer,thehandusefullycultivatesafield

ApiousmindthereligionofGod, ViveDeo.

Burgess

LiveinGod,beyouaburgessoracitizeninthetown

SothatyouwillbethelivingdwellingofGod,ViveDeo.

Sailor

LiveinGod,Sailor,sincethewavessinkmanyships

Itmaybeyourdeathwillbesoon,ViveDeo.

Butler

LiveinGod,Butler,thewinesacksareGods

Godisthelivingspring,drinkthis,ViveDeo.

Pauper

LiveinGod,Pauper,blessedingoodsandmind

Whilehavingnothing,youhaveeverything,ViveDeo.

Benefactor

LiveinGod, DearFriend,becaughtupinhislove

ConfideeverythingtothedepthsofGod, ViveDeo.

LiveinGod,youliveinhimifyouliveinlove

YoucannotlivebeforeGodwithoutlove,ViveDeo.

* * *

15

1NotaistosversusprooptimismorsCConclusiomortisproomnigenerehominumdicensVadomoriO22recoloB2:meditorB13Dummortem eccecito:om.CO1V O2cito:citorB14Thetermaequelege(withimpartiality)istobefoundinHorace,OdesIII,1whichalsodealswiththesubjectofdeath.5rapit:capitB26 Nunchosaccepitnuncillos,Virgil Aeneid VI,313316,referringtoCharon.7capit:rapitB28causam:eamB29sorteCO1VmorteO210 langueoCO1:langueV11:certaminevictorbelliC: bellicertaminevictorO1V12moriturus codd.recte mortuus?13Vt:O1:EtC14dicO1V:hicCO215vadeO1V:vadoCO216egenisCO1VegenusO217desero B2O2:defero CO1V18 lineisleftasalacunainVtmriaetfortitudonuncdeficientlangueovadomoriinmarg.B2perhapsthisisalegaltermorcommonexpression,giventhatFrenchwasthelanguageusedinthelawcourts.19Vadomoriplacitor Quisolitusfueramlangueovadomori om.O1O220 logicusCO1VO2placestheversesonmedicushereandthelogicusfollows.21redimendusCO1VrevolandusO222medici:mediO123respuo:reppuoB224B1breaksatthis25 frangensB2O1:fuagensCV:26queom. B227 frangitO: FfuagitCV28Ffrangitmorsmodulandosolfami:Inlacrimasmutocantica:B2Vadomoricantor...vadomori om.B1O1O229michinilsapientiaprodestCO1VdoctornunccessodocereO230MeredditfatuummorsseuavadomoriCO1VQuifacunduseramnonorovadomoriO231AtthispointalargetearbeginsinO2,leavingonly someofthetexttotherightoftheline.32nequeat B1O1V:nequiatO2nequeantB233acervosCO1V:acervosO234computo:deputoB235omniaV:diuinaCdimuaO136sulcans:fulcansB237Morsprorampertransit nauifrago:MorsproramperimitnaufragaB2 avariantinthemarginofB2reads:VadomorinautafluctusquifulcomarinosNaufragoraufereturanchoravadomoriSeeE.P.Hammond,LatinTextsoftheDanceofDeath,ModernPhilology,8(1911),399410(p.8).38Pincerna(butler)39 fuitmichi...fellea:fuipotummichifellis,HoraproponandivltimaB2 fellea:folleaV40Vadomoriburgensis...Propinatmichimorsfelleavadomoriom.B1CO241proChristocunctareliquensO1V:quempauperChristusamauitCChristuspauperamauitO2.InO2themanuscripthasbeenmutilatedandwhatremainsofthelinesisasfollows:ndtunisifimusmutarenequimusmundototusadheresasolusheresimosepeliturtadaturhomosicadnichilatur

16

dumstareputaturetmichicausadolorisveniteccecito.42sequar:sequorC43B1endshere44Vadomoripietate...singulafineChas:TemaleQuisubitorapuitissemori45 Text endshere inCand there then follows a letterwhich ends on 40v:Explicit vna epistolavniusItaliciadalterum46ResponsioviteVom.O147MorseritB2om.B1CO1O2V. TheeditorofB2arranged the text so that the vadomoricoupletisfollowedimmediatelybythevivedeocouplet.48mutuo:varioB249sibiO1:igiturV50 A reference to theEaster sequenceVictimaePaschali Laudes:Mors et vita duello conflixeremirandoDuxVitaemortuus,Regnatvivus.51 Istasuobello separatillasuo:illasuobelloseparatistapiosuoB252resecat: rececatV53consulo O1: consule V54 fforma:formaO1551Pet5:3Formafacti gregiexanimo56Fforcior:ForciorO157 ViveDeomonachus quid voveris ipsememento:Vive deomonache: quodque anueris ipsemementoB2.58ViveDeoplacitor iustassustentaquerelas:Vivedeorethor?iustassustollequerelasB259sic:sitB260decipitV61sibi:tuaB262sisO1:sitV63quia:queB264Fforsan:forsanO165poculaO1:poclaV66 ffonsV:fonsO167habens:heusB268habens:heusB269donumB270ThisrenderingintoEnglishisneitherfairnorfaithfulbutismerelyintendedtogiveanideaofthecontentoftheLatinoriginal.

17

FirstImpressionsReconsidered:SomeNotesonthe

LvinasianCritiqueofHusserl

IanLeask

ABSTRACT

This article investigates an intriguing ambivalence in Lvinass reading(s) of Husserlsphenomenologyofinternaltimeconsciousness.ThearticlefocusesonthespecifictreatmentoftheHusserlian protoimpression, suggesting that one (underappreciated) aspect of Lvinassapproachmayservetoundermine,orevenunsay,itsbetterknowncounterpart.

Introduction

Given that Lvinas would eventually declare the deformalization of temporalrepresentation tobe theessential themeof his research,1 it ishardly surprisingthattheHusserliananalysisoftimeconsciousnessshouldhavereceivedconsistentcritical scrutiny throughout Lvinass oeuvre. To be sure, there is a moreprominentfocusupon(andexplicitoppositionto)Heideggerianfinitudebutsuchfocus itself seems to presuppose a regular critique of Husserl, particularly hisstressonpresenceandrepresentation,inordertoindicateamoregeneralfaultlinein so much of the established phenomenological approach to temporality andtemporalization.

In the notes that follow, I shall outline something of the nature ofLvinass critique in part, by showing something of the phenomenologicalalternative that he tries to offer. However, by focussing upon Lvinass own,differingtreatment(s)oftheHusserliananalysisofprotoimpression,Ishallalsoinvestigate the possibility of a radically different assessment of Husserliantemporal analysisan assessmentwhichmaywell beg fundamental questionsabout the aforementioned Lvinasian alternative. My main concern, I shouldstress, ismorewithLvinass critical understanding thanwith the finedetailofthe object of that understanding: what follows, therefore, is intended as anengagementwithLvinassengagementwithHusserl,ratherthananengagementwithHusserl perse.

ILvinasonHusserlonTemporality

Understandably, Lvinass principal contentions regarding temporality andtemporalizationhavebeenmainlyunderstoodintermsofhistrenchantoppositionto Heidegger: as the title of Lvinass first magnum opus already indicates,finitudeshould never be taken as theultimatehorizonwhichHeideggerhimselftook it to be and, as has become sowell known,Lvinaswill contend that theimmediate overflow of the Others face suggests a kind of structuralmeasurelessness that is, at thevery least, comparablewith theCartesian ideaofinfinity(wherebyanyideathattheknowingmindmightformisalwaysexceededby the ideatum of such an idea). Furthermore, beyond the specific question of

18

infinity,Lvinaswoulddevotesomuchofhislaterwork,inparticular,toacertaindeconstructionof theHeideggerianekstases,depictingthemasa(literally)selfcentred making present or homogenisation of temporal excess: for Lvinas,Heidegger consistently fails to respect the sheer alterity of time (principally byfailing to address the question of generation, or generations, which it entails).Overall, forLvinas,theHeideggeriantreatmentoftemporalityis leftstuntedbyitsfixationupon Daseinsfinitude.2

But what, specifically, of Husserl? Lvinass general comments (on thetendency,withinphenomenology, towardsa will topresence)maybedirectedmainly towardsHeidegger nonetheless, it seems that the critique ofHeideggerpresupposes,asakindofarmature, thecritiqueofHusserl.Morespecifically, itseems that the ontological imperialismwhichLvinas condemns inHeideggercanalreadybefound,allegedly,inHusserlianphenomenology.Thus,forLvinas,Heideggers(antiethical)concernwithBeingseems,atleastinpart,tobethefullmanifestation of certain Husserlian propensities: authentic, carefull Dasein,concernedwith theSelfConstancy of anticipatory resoluteness, is (so it seems)merelythedramatic,existential,intensification(andcertainlynotthecontrary)ofthe monadic egopole that Husserl understands as intentional consciousness.WhichiswhyLvinasregularlyconjoinstheconcernwithBeingandtheconcernwithcognition:whetherontologicalorepistemological, somuchof thepreviousphenomenologicaltraditionhasfailedtodojusticetoalterity.

Husserlian intentionality, we are told, is almost archetypal in itsprivilegingoftheknowinggaze.Thus:

[Husserlian]Intelligibility,characterizedbyclarity(claret), isatotaladequationofthethinkerwithwhatisthought,intheprecisesenseofamasteryexercisedbythethinkeruponwhat is thought inwhich the objects resistance as an exterior beingvanishes. Thismastery is total and [] is accomplished as a giving of meaning(sens): the object of representation is reducible to noemata. The intelligible ispreciselywhatisentirelyreducibletonoemata[].Clarityisthedisappearanceofwhatcouldshock(heurter).3

Noesis always seeks to overcome alterity (including sensation) consciousnessof always seeks to become the foundation of what shows itself and sophenomenological horizon comes to play a role equivalent to the concept inclassical idealism.4 With Husserl, it seems that reflection and thematizationalwayswanttowinout.

Above all, though, it is the Husserlian concern with representation (or,more specifically: representation) that betrays a kind of inner truth ofphenomenology andwhich returns us to the specific issue(s) of temporality(and temporalization). For just asHeideggerian ekstases are foundwanting, sotheirHusserlianfoundationisexposed,supposedly,asavolitionaldrivealwaysto render temporal disparity present within a simultaneousness, or conjunctionbroughtaboutby mygrasp.Bydiscovering(orrediscovering)presenceas theworkofconsciousness,Lvinassuggests,theHusserlianegoreducesfatefully the time of consciousness to the consciousness of time.5 The primordialintrigueoftime6 isdismissed,oratleastsubordinated,bytheimpositionofarepresentational frame: past and future become merely retained or anticipatedpresents7 intentionalconsciousnessmaintainscontrolintermsofthepresentHusserlianrepresentationassertsitsownstatusbypositingapurepresentwithouteventangentialtieswithtime.8

19

ForLvinas,then,Husserlianrepresentationseeksnevertobepreceded.Itanticipates all surprises. It is not marked by the past but utilizes it as arepresented and objective element.9 It denies its own enduring, its temporalsuccession,byconvertingexteriorityintoitsnoemata,therebyreducingalteritytothework ofmeaningbestowing thought. (Such is thework,Lvinas declares,oftheHusserlianpoch.10)Alltold,theHusserliananalysisassumesthattimehas exhausted itself (spuisait) in its way of making itself known or ofconformingtothedemands(exigences)ofitsmanifestation.11Hence:

The constitution of time in Husserl is also a constitution of time in terms of analready effective consciousness of presence in its disappearance and in itsretention, its immanence, and its anticipation disappearance and immanencethat already imply what is to be established, without any indication being givenabout theprivilegedempirical situation towhich thosemodes ofdisappearance inthepastandimminenceinthefuturewouldbeattached.12

TheHusserlian thinking of time is, it seems, essentially as onewith itsHeideggeriansuccessor.Inboth,thealterityof time is forced intoaProcrusteancontainment future and past are never acknowledged on their own terms.Against both, Lvinaswants to highlight an alterity irreducible to any noeticonoematic correlation a lapse of time that does not return, a diachronyrefractory to all synchronization.13 By thinking otherwise, Lvinas claims, hemight undo representation and unveil a temporalizationwhich is not mine andwhich exceeds my now: a future which can never be anticipated, and a pastwhichwasneverpresent.

IILvinasonHusserlonProtoImpression

WefindsomeofLvinassmostconcentratedattentiontoHusserliantemporality attention which seems, initially, to unveil the founding structure of theHeideggerianekstasesintheanalysisheprovides,in OtherwisethanBeing,ofthe absolute primal streaming, the realm of the protoimpression (or primalimpression), which Husserl takes to be the basis of conscious life itself.14

Needless to say, this apparent selftemporalizing of the actsof consciousness isregardedwithdeepsuspicion:althoughsuchaprimal realmmight seembeyondobjectification, beyond intentionality, and beyond (or beneath) selfcoincidence,itstruestatus,Lvinasmaintains,ismoretodowithguaranteeingtheprestigeofautarchicconsciousness.

ForLvinas,itisnotjustthattheprimalimpressionis[]notimpressedwithoutconsciousness15apointwhichmightsuggestadistinctionbetweentheintrinsicnatureofprimalimpressionandthesecondaryroleofconsciousness.Itis also, andmore significantly, that the intrinsic nature of primal impression isitself confirmation of the hegemony of presence as Lvinaswould have ithere, it is the absolute source and beginning of all temporal modification, thespontaneouscentrewhichisindifferent toprotentionandretention.

As such, primal streaming becomes, fatefully, the prototype oftheoretical objectification16 it is as if the primacy of presence is alreadyconfirmed by this notion of origin and creation. (Protoimpression precedes allelse even its own possibility. Its presence is pure.) The primal impression

20

mightseem,initially,tobebeyondintentionalitybutitisalwaysfittedbackin the normal order17 and is never on the hither side of the same or of theorigin.18Accordingly,thenonintentionalityoftheprimalretentionisnotalossofconsciousness19fornothingcanbeproducedinaclandestineway(ltreclandestinement), (n)othing enters incognito into the Same,20 nothing canbreak the thread of consciousness.21 The (negative) significance of Husserlsanalysis of internal time consciousness could hardly be greater, therefore: forLvinas, theHusserlian interpretation of protoimpression is (nothing less than)themostremarkablepointofaphilosophyinwhichintentionalityconstitutestheuniverse.22

ButjusthowvalidisLvinasscontention,inOtherwisethanBeing,aboutthis remarkable point in Husserlian thought? Is it the case that originaryimpressionconfirmsandsanctifiesthedomainoftheSameandhencethatitexcludes the diachronic? Is the Husserlian analysis nothing more than thesuppressionoftemporalalterity?Istheprimalimpressiontobeunderstoodsolelyintermsofautonomy?Inattemptingtoanswerthesequestions,oneofthemostinstructive texts we can consult is another penetrating, although very different,reading of The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness one whichLvinashimselfgivesus.For,inhis1965essayIntentionalityandSensation,23

Lvinas reads Husserlian absolute streaming in a way that may not quitecontradicthismorestandardapproach, butwhichcertainly throws intoquestionsomeofthecentralcontentionsjustexamined.24

The1965workisdesignedasageneral(althoughintensive)surveyofthesignificance of intentionalitys corporeal basis and, not surprisingly, giventhis context, the issue of the protoimpression is at the centre of Lvinasstreatment.However,here,unlikeinOtherwisethanBeing,hewantstostressthatthe Phenomenology of Internal TimeConsciousness, overall, is in no sense thededuction or construction of time starting out from an atemporal gaze (dunregardintemporal)embracingtheprotoimpressionanditspalemodifications.25

On the contrary, Husserl finds the protoimpression pure of all ideality,nonidealityparexcellence26tobemorelikeakindof immanentdisjunctionwithinconsciousness.(Ashealsoputsthis:Anaccentuated, living,absolutelynew instant the protoimpression already deviates from that needlepoint(pointedaiguille)whereitmatures(mrit)absolutely present.27)

The protoimpression is, fundamentally, noncoincidence, presentingitself only in terms of its owndepartureor deviation from thepresent. Its verystructure is divergence so that the protoimpression in itself is alwaysalready beyond itself, always already the event of dephasing. The protoimpression is not in sequence it is more a transgression of continuity, afundamental lapse. Meanwhile (if this is not too inappropriate a term), theprotentionandretentionwhichattachtoanyprotoimpressionalinstantareneveradequate to, and are overflowed by, sensational flux: adequation, presence andrecuperation are defeated, so to speak.28 There is a kind of constitutive gap,Lvinas finds, between sensationevent and protoimpression: the former bothprecedes and succeeds the latter this, in turn, seems to found the diachronystronger(plusforte)thanstructuralsynchronism29 thatLvinas findsatthecoreofHusserlianembodiment.

Furthermore, and perhaps most significantly of all, Lvinass reading ofgenesis and origin here seems (again, contra the reading in Otherwise thanBeing) to undermine rather than bolster the autonomy of the subject: absolute

21

primal streaming can certainly be seen as source, beginning, or creation, asgenesis spontanea yet, far from this confirming the primacy of presence andtheoretical objectification, what arises in this origin only serves to confirmalterity, the unpresentable. There is, Lvinas insists, unforeseeable noveltyarisingwithinthisoriginanyfulfilmentisbeyondallconjecture,allexpectation,all germination, and all continuity, and consequently is wholly passivity (toutepassivit),receptivityofanotherpenetratingthesame.30 (This, inturn,showsthe essence of all thought as the reserve of a fullness that escapes (duneplenitudequichappe).31)Alterity isat thecoreof theselfs temporalization:deep within immanence, within apparently indistinct sedimentation and thickalluvium,32wefindnothinglessthantranscendence(understoodhereliterally,asapassingover,anoverstepping,asagoingbeyonditselfwithinitself,asthezero point of representation [] [that] is beyond this zero33). The answer toLvinasscentralquestionintheessayIntentionalityandSensationIstherediachronywithin intentionality?34is, therefore,anunambiguousYes:ashewillconclude, it isthisdivergencefromthatisnothinglessthan(t)hemysteryofintentionality.35

IIIConclusion

The issues raised by this disparity in Lvinass approaches to the Husserlianprotoimpression have huge significance. For one thingand, admittedly, thismayseemabanaltruismweareremindedoftheimmenseandfecundrichnessof Husserls analysis. But, beyond this fairly obvious point, we are alsoconfronted with the possibility unveiled by Lvinas himself that Husserlmay well counter the Lvinasian critique of his phenomenology, by thinkingotherwise in a way that not only differs from but also profoundly challengesLvinas.AsLvinasshowsus,Husserluncoversastructuralalteritywithin theself,aknottedintriguethatisnottheproductoroutcomeoreffectoftheOther.Husserl, that is tosay,raisesthepossibility thatprior toencounterwiththeOther,assuchwealreadyencounteralteritywithinourowntemporalization.Thus,beforeanydelineationof theLvinasianOther,Husserlmayhavealreadyuncovered an irreducible otherness that resists synchronization within noeticonoematic correlation but, in this case, the irreducible selfotherness of ourabsolute subjectivity. It seems that Husserl (read through Lvinass moregenerous 1965 appraisal) may show us that the consciousness of time neitheroverwhelms nor suppresses the timeofconsciousness rather,he shows that theconsciousnessoftimeisalwaysalreadythetimeofconsciousnessandso,isalwaysalreadylapse,dispersion,iteration,alterity.36

NOTES

1EmmanuelLvinas,TheOther,Utopia,andJustice,in IsitRighteousToBe?InterviewswithEmmanuelLvinas,ed.byJillRobbins(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,2002),pp.200210(p.209)Lautre,utopieetjustice,inAutrement,(102,Nov.1988),pp.5060(p.59).HereafterOUJ,withthetranslationspaginationprecedingtheoriginals.

22

2 I have treated some of these issues elsewhere. See Ian Leask, Finitude: The Final Frontier?HeideggerandLvinasonDeath,in At theHeartofEducation.SchoolChaplaincy&PastoralCare, ed. by James Norman (Dublin: Veritas, 2004), pp. 239250, and Contra FundamentalOntology: the Centrality of the HeideggerCritique in Lvinass Phenomenology, MaynoothPhilosophicalPapers,2,(Maynooth,2004),pp.5158.3 Emmanuel Lvinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: DuquesneUniversityPress,1969),pp.12324Totalitetinfini.Essaisurlextriorit(Phaenomenologica8)(LaHaye:MartinusNijhoff,1961),pp.9697.Henceforth,abbreviatedasTI,withtheEnglishtranslationspaginationprecedingtheoriginals.4TI,p.445:15.5 SeeEmmanuel Levinas, Diachrony and Representation, in Entre Nous. On ThinkingoftheOther,trans.byMichaelB.SmithandBarbaraHarshay(London:Athlone,1998),pp.159177(p.163)DiachronieetRepresentation,inRevuedelUniversitdOttowa,55,4,(1985),8598(p.88).6 Ibid.,p.164:8889.7EmmanuelLvinas,FromtheOnetotheOther:TranscendenceandTime,inEntreNous,pp.133154(p.138)Delunlautre.Transcendanceettemps,ArchivodeFilosofia,5113(1983),2138 (p. 25). Hereafter abbreviated as FOTO, with the translations pagination preceding theoriginals.8TI,p.125:989 Ibid.10 Ibid.11FOTO,p.138:2512OUJ,p.209:5913EmmanuelLvinas,OtherwisethanBeingorBeyondEssence,trans.byAlphonsoLingis(TheHague: Nijhoff, 1981), p. 9 Autrement qutre ou audel de lessence (The Hague: Nijhoff,1974), p.17. Hereafter abbreviated as OB, with the translations pagination preceding theoriginals.14SeeHusserl,ThePhenomenologyofInternalTimeConsciousness,ed.MartinHeidegger,trans.J.S.Churchill(IndianaUP,1964), passim.15OB,p.33:4116 Ibid.17OB,p.33:4218 Ibid.19OB,p.34:4320OB,p.33:4221OB,p.34:4322OB,p.33:4223 EmmanuelLvinas, Intentionality andSensation, inE.Lvinas,DiscoveringExistencewithHusserl, trans. by R. Cohen & M. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1998), pp.135150Intentionalitetsensation,inRevueInternationaledePhilosophie,7172,fasc.12,(1965),pp.3454.HereafterabbreviatedasIS,withthetranslationspaginationprecedingtheoriginals.24 IShasreceivedsurprisinglylittlescholarlyattention.Foranexceptiontothegeneralrule,seeRudolfBernet,LvinassCritiqueofHusserl, inTheCambridgeCompaniontoLvinas,ed.bySimonCritchley&RobertBernasconi(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),pp.8299,esp.pp.9193.25 IS,p.142:4426 IS,p.144:4627 IS,p.142:4328SeeIS,p.144:4647.29 IS,p.148:5230 IS,p.144:464731 IS,p.145:4732 IS,p.149:5333 IS,p.148:5134 IS,p.143:4535 IS,p.145:4736 IshouldliketoexpressmythankstoDrJamesMcGuirkforhishelpfulcommentsonanearlierdraftofthispaper.

23

Red,RiotousandWrong: IstheSecondaryQuality

AnalogyanUnpalatableDoctrine?

HarryMcCauley

I

In recent analytical moral theory a debate has been raging for some time nowabout themerits and demerits of realism aboutmorality. Twomain schools ofmoralrealistshaveemergedonoppositesidesof theAtlantic. IntheUSvariousnaturalist realists prominent amongst them, the socalled Cornell realistshavecanvassedvariousversionsoftheviewthatmoralpropertiesarerealandareeitherreducibleto,orareconstitutedoutofnaturalproperties.1 IntheUKmoralrealismhastakenasomewhatdifferentdirection.MoreunderthethrallofMooreand the open question argument than the Americans, the British realists havetended to reject thenaturalistpathand have tried to findsomeway inwhich todefend a conception of moral properties in which such properties are seen asobjectiveandmindindependent,withouttherebybeingreduced,toorconstitutedoutofnaturalproperties.2

HangingoverandhauntingthisBritishprojectis,ofcourse,thespectreofMooreannonnaturalproperties,andBritishrealistsfindthemselvesconstantlyconfronted with one or other version of a constraint succinctly expressed byPanayotButchvarovasfollows:Theallegedrealityofethicalpropertiesmustbeunderstoodinastraightforward,familiarandunsurprising fashion.What it is forsomethingtoberealorexistisperhapsthedeepestphilosophicalproblem,butonedoes realism in ethics no service by resting it on highly dubious and unclearsolutionstothatproblem.3

One way in which a number of British realists have attempted to meetButchvarovs constraint has been to canvass for an analogy between moralproperties and secondary qualities like colours. The overall argument runssomewhatasfollows:surelysecondaryqualities,likecolours,arestraightforward,familiarandunsurprisingpropertiesof thingsandsurely itwouldalsobeagreedthat suchqualitiesare real,mindindependent featuresof theworld, i.e. featureswhoseexistencedoesnotdependontheirbeingactuallyperceived.Atthesametime it would be agreed that there is, nevertheless, an extent to which suchqualitiesalsodependinsomewayonthepresenceofperceiverswithappropriateperceptual systems.As a key supporter of the analogy, JohnMcDowell, put it:(colours)[]arenotbrutelytherenotthereindependentlyofoursensibility though [] this does not prevent us from supposing that they are thereindependentlyofanyparticular[]experienceofthem.4Secondaryqualities, itis maintained, exhibit an intriguing combination of objective and subjectivedimensionswhichenableusatoneand the same time, toconcede that theyareundoubtedly part of the furniture of the world, while also conceding that thepresenceofobservers likeus,withperceptualfaculties likeours,isnecessaryforsomeaspectsofthatfurnituretobelitup.5

Reflecting on this intriguing combination of subjectivity and objectivity,philosophers like McDowell, Wiggins and McNaughton have argued that we

24

might locate moral properties epistemologically and ontologically by analogywith secondary qualities.Whenwe say that persons or their actions are just orunjust,fairorunfair,courageousorcowardlyor,moregenerally,rightorwrong,goodorevilweare,ontheonehand,claimingthatwhatwearesayingistruei.e. that things really are aswe say they arewhile, on the other,wewouldreadilyconcedethattermslikegoodandbad,rightandwrong,justandunjustetc.only have application in an order of things in which persons with moralsensibilities like ours are present.McNaughton puts this combination of claimsneatlyasfollows:[justas]ourmodeofperceptiondoesnotcreatecolours,butmakesusabletoseethemsoalsomoralpropertiesarenottobethoughtofascreated by [us] [] but as real properties which can only be experienced bybeingswhoshareawholenetworkofresponseswithus.6

One final aspect of the secondary quality analogy (hereafter the SQA)merits a brief mention. By locating a key pole of morality in a widerangingconception of human responsiveness, the supporters of the SQA also hope tocaptureoneofthemostwidelysharedpositionsincontemporaryanalyticalmoraltheory:internalismi.e.theviewthatmoralconsiderationsareintrinsicallyactionguiding.Realistswhoconstruemoralconsiderationsas beliefs havewellknownand widely discussed problems squaring their beliefbased realisms withinternalism,and,giventhewidespreadsupportforinternalism,suchproblemsareoften seen as bad news for those realists. However, supporters of the SQA, bybasingmoralitypartly inaconceptionof human responsivenesswhichstraddlesthe cognitive and emotive sides of our being, seem well placed to meet theconstraints of internalism. If our moral responses engage with howwe feel, aswellaswhatwebelieve,thenroomforinternalismseemsclearlyavailable.

The SQA, or sensibility account of moral properties thus holds manyattractions for realists and it has been widely discussed over the past threedecades.However,ithasnotgoneunchallenged.Ithasbeenchallengedbyrealistslike JonathanDancy,whomaintain that it does not deliver a sufficiently robustrealism,andbyantirealistslikeSimonBlackburn,whohasclaimedthattherearesomanydisanalogies betweenmoral properties and secondary qualities that theviewlacksplausibility.7 Undertheweightoftheopposition,overtsupportfortheSQAhaswanedinrecentyears,thoughthereremainthosewhostillseepromiseintheinterestingcombinationoffeatureswhichitofferstorealists.8

II

Inarecentpaperontheanalogy,ElijahMillgramhasofferedanovelcriticismoftheSQA, claiming that support for it carrieswith it potentially unpalatable andembarrassing implications.Millgrams claim is that theSQAcarrieswith it theimplicationthatmoralfamiliaritywouldbreed,ifnotmoralcontempt,then,atthevery least, a growing moral indifference to evil. Millgram argues that thisconclusion follows fromacombinationof theSQAwith itskey thought thatour detection of, and response to moral properties are rooted in our moralsensibilitiesandanallegedsimpleand indisputable factabouthumanbeingsand their sensibilities i.e. that the more we are exposed to this or thatphenomenon, the less and less acute our responses and reactions to thephenomenon in question become leading to a point at which we may wellbecomeindifferentto,orboredbythephenomenoninquestion.

25

FollowingWiggins,9Millgramtakesfunnyasaplausiblecandidateforasecondaryqualityandarguesthatwhilewemayrespondonthefirst,secondandperhaps even on a few subsequent occasions, to the same joke by finding itriotouslyfunny,surelybythehundredthtellingthehumourofthejokewillhavefadedandwewillnolongerfinditfunnyatall,willnolongerreacttoitaswedidat the outset. We may even bring ourselves to say the joke isnt funnyanymore.10 Moreover, we see nothing wrong with our responses on suchoccasionsandwereadilyacceptthatthejokeinquestionhasaswemayputitpasseditssellbydateasfarasitsfunninessisconcerned.

AppliedtomoralcasesthisreadingoftheSQAanditsimplicationsseemsratherdisturbing.TouseMillgramsownexample:ourresponsestothefirstandsecondholocaustsmaycarrywiththemanappropriatesenseofhorrorandmoraloutrage, but what of the hundredth holocaust? Just as in the case of the joke,doesnt the SQA suggest that we would greet that hundredth holocaust with aworldweary indifference, and perhaps without any sense of horror or moraloutrageatall?Moreover,andstillmoredisturbing,doesnttheSQAsuggestthatin the holocaust case, as in the joke case, our new, jaded response is awhollyappropriate one it seems right to say that this latest holocaust is not reallywrongorevilatall, that isnottheresponse itprovokes.Thus, justas the initialfunninessofthejokehasfadedandallbutdisappearedwithtimeandfamiliarity,soalsothewrongnessoreviloftheholocaustshavefadedandallbutdisappearedwithtimeandfamiliarity.Justastheonceriotousisnolongerevenfunny,soalsotheoncemorallyhorrificisnolongerevenmorallyeyebrowraising.

ItseemscentraltoMillgramscriticismoftheSQAthathetakesitthatthewhole story aboutmoral valueswhichsupportersof theSQAcan tell isa storyentirely in terms of the actual reactionswhichmoral phenomena actually elicitfromusonagivenoccasion.ItistruethathebrieflyadvertstoMcDowellstalkof such responses beingalsomerited11,buthegoeson toconstruethisclaimofMcDowells in terms of the agents responses to his/her moral sensibility andclaimsthataniterationoftheinitialattackontheSQAwoulddealwithanysuchhigherordermovetodefendit.12Millgramskeypoint isthattheSQAimpliesnot just thatwewill in fact respond to similarmoral evils etcwith diminishingoutrage, but that such a response is to be deemed wholly appropriate aconclusionwhichhethinksissurelyunpalatable.Heconcludesasfollows:

Itiswidelythoughttobeafeatureofourmoralconceptsthatrepeatedapplicationofsuchaconceptinlikecircumstancesiscorrectinallinstances,ifcorrectinany[].It is a feature of our moral sensibilities that their repeated exercise in likecircumstances gives rise to reactions that are not constant but systematicallychanging.Itfollowseitherthatasecondaryqualityaccountofvalueisnotasuitableaccountofmoralorethicalvalue,orthatitisaradicallyrevisionistone.13

NowIdonotwishtoengagehereinawiderangingdefenceoftheSQAitisliabletoawiderangeofdifficultiesandproblems14butmerelytoarguethat, as generally presented, it has available to it resourceswhich can protect itfrom the kind of attack mounted by Millgram. I will confine myself here tomaking fourpointsoneverygeneralpointabouthowtounderstandtheSQAandthreemorespecificpointsaboutthosedimensionsofthetheoreticalsettingoftheSQAwhichprovidetheneededprotectionagainstMillgramsattack.

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III

(i)HowtoUnderstandtheSQA

Twice in the course of his brief paperMillgram suggests that supporters of theSQAtakeitthatmoralvalueseitherare,oraretobeunderstoodassecondaryqualities.15ThissuggestionofanequationofvalueswithsecondaryqualitiesblursakeypointbeingmadebythesupportersoftheSQA.Whattheyarguefor isananalogybetweenvaluesandsecondaryqualitiesananalogyintendedtothrowsome lightontheepistemologicalandontological statusofmoralproperties.TosaythatAandBareanalogous isnottosaythat theycanbeequatedwitheachother, but that there are interesting similarities to be noted in how we are tounderstandthemandplacetheminourschemeofthings.Inallsuchclaimsthereisarecognitionthattherearealsodifferencestobenotedoftendifferencesofsome significance. John McDowell e.g. is quick to point to such significantdifferencesinhisaccountoftheSQAandtohighlightthepointthattheanalogyisintended as just that: an analogy.16 Thus, in discussing the SQA it is of vitalimportancetorecognisethatitssupportersseesecondaryqualitiesonlyasofferingusausefulepistemicandontologicalmodel amodelwhich suitablyadaptedcanthenbeappliedtovaluesandcanthrowsome lightontheepistemicandontological dimensions of our thoughts about values. The SQA is not to beunderstoodasofferingusanexactparallelwhichwillholdupallalongthe line.AsRichardNormanrecentlyputit,thevalueofthesecondaryqualityanalogyisthatitenablesustoholdontotheideaof objectivityalongsideanacceptanceofacertainkindofanthropomorphism.17Millgram, inhisaccountof theSQA,doesnotpaysufficientattentiontothisgeneralpointabouthowtotaketheanalogyandthiscolourshispresentationofitandhisdiscussionof itsimplications.

(ii)TheSQAandtheLanguageofReactions

In addition to this misleading general setting of his discussion, Millgram alsoseemsinclinedtounderstandtheSQAaccountofourdetectionof,andresponsetomoralsituationsinanoverlymechanicalmanner.Thewordhemostoftenusesinhisdiscussionof it isreactions,andindoingsoheconveystheimpressionthatsupportersoftheSQAareinclinedtoseeourmoralresponsesassimplyinvolvingthemoralagentinreactingtocertainfeaturesoftheworldinthewayinwhichitmight be reasonable to suggest that colour perception involves such relativelysimple reactions. Now it is, of course, true that supporters of the SQA dooccasionally talk in such a manner, but by and large their claims are made intermsofourpossessingacomplex formofmoral sensibilitywhichenablesandfacilitatesustorespondappropriatelytothedemandswhichwefindbeingmadeon us in this or that moral situation. These moral responses are not simplyreactions in the way we might think of colour perceptions as involving suchreactions,ratherdotheyhavetheirplaceinamorewiderangingandsophisticatedaccountofwhatitisforamoralagenttorespondtoamoraldemand.

Thus e.g. David Wiggins explicitly draws a distinction between merereactions to features of theworld and the complex and sophisticatedmanner inwhichsupportersoftheSQAunderstandthesensibilitysideoftheanalogystory.Overtime,Wigginsnotes,ourcapacitiestorespondaredevelopedandfinetunedin a way which takes the SQA account some way beyond any simple

27

feature/reaction story. Thus he notes: Finer perceptions can both intensify andrefine responses. Intenser responsescan furtherheightenand refineperceptions.And more and more refined responses can lead to further and finer and morevariegatedormoreintenseresponsesandperceptions.18

So any suggestion that the SQA is committed to some rather simplefeature/reaction account of moral knowledge or moral responsivenessoversimplifiesthecaseregularlymadeandemphasisedbytheleadingsupportersofversionsof theanalogy. Inher recentoverviewof themoral realismdebate,Margaret Little highlights this side of the SQA: just as one needs a certainsensory apparatus to see red things, one needs a certain emotional andmotivationalpalettetoseecruelorkindthings[],[butthemoral]sensibilityinquestionisnotunderstoodassomemechanisticdispositiontoreact.Itisinsteadapractice of responding that is partly constituted by judgments ofappropriateness.19

(iii)AppropriateResponsesandAppropriateAgents

Mention of appropriateness brings me to a further dimension of the SQA.SupportersoftheSQAdonotconfinetherefinementsoftheirtheory toaofferingamorecomplexaccountofthewayinwhichweshouldunderstandwhatamoralsensibilityisliketheyalsoregularlyemphasisethepointthatitisonlypersonsofacertainsortwhoshouldbetakenasparadigmsofwhatamoralagentshouldbe like,andthusasexhibitingtheappropriatesortofmoralsensibility.ForJohnMcDowell,withhisAristotelian leanings, thiscomesdowntothepointthat it isonlyvirtuouspersonswhoare,intheend,tobetakenaspossessorsofappropriatemoral sensibilitiesand thusas reliabledetectorsofmoral value. In both VirtueandReasonand Aremoral requirements hypothetical imperatives?McDowellemphasisesthesepoints.Inthelatter,stressingtheimportancetomoralperceptionof an appropriate process of character formation, he notes that in moralupbringingwhatone learns is[]toseesituations ina special lightand intheformerhesays,focusingspecificallyonthemoralactionsofavirtuousagent,thata kind person has a reliable sensitivity to a certain sort of requirement thatsituations imposeon behaviour [].The sensitivity is,wemight say, a sortofperceptualcapacity.20SimilarthoughtsarepresentinWigginsscommentsinthelatersectionsofhispaperASensibleSubjectivism?.

These thoughts may be applied to Millgrams remarks about jokes andholocausts.As far as jokesareconcerned,whilewemightagreewithMillgramthatbeinganoccasionfor laughter iscertainlyconnectedwithwhat it istobefunny,surely wewouldbaulkathissimpleequationofthetwo.21SurelyWigginsis nearer the mark when, in offering a more developed notion of our comicsensibility, he says that whenwe disputewhether x is really funny, there is awholewealthofconsiderationsandexplanationswecanadduce[].Wecandoalittlebetterthansaythatthefunnyisthatwhichmakespeoplelaugh.22Apersonwithadevelopedandsophisticatedsenseofhumouri.e.anappropriatecomicagentmaywellagreewithMillgram that repetitionsof trivial knockknockjokes may bore, fade and finally entirely lose their humour,while resisting thesuggestionthatsuch fading isalsoa featureof thecomicmomentsofaplaybyOscarWilde.AsWigginsnotes:Afeeblejestorinfantilepracticaljokedoesnotdeserve to be grouped with the class of things that a true judge would findgenuinelyfunny.23

28

Similarly, to those with sophisticated and welldeveloped moralsensibilitiesi.e.virtuouspersonsthereislittlelikelihoodthatthehundredthholocaustwill begreetedwitha hohumasMillgram suggests.24Moralagentswith adequately developed sensibilities can begenerally reliedupon to respondappropriately to the demands of the situations in which they find themselves.Theseresponsesare,ontheSQA,viewedasinformedanddevelopedresponsestofeatures of those situations features which are rooted in the moral situationsinvolvedandwhichmeritordemandacertainsortofresponsefromappropriatelymoralised agents. AsMcDowell puts it: One cannot share a virtuous personsviewofasituationinwhichitseemstohimthatvirtuerequiressomeaction,butseenoreasontoactinthatway.25Toavirtuouspersonitisnotjustthedetectionof the evil characteristics of holocausts which trigger off the demand for acondemnatoryresponse,itisalsoamatterofthetypeofpersonavirtuouspersonis.Theresponsehasitsrootsinthevirtuouspersonsmoralsensibilityandforaslong as that persons moral sensibility remains intact the response will be thesameandwillnottendtofadewithrepetition.

(iv)RepetitionsofJokesandHolocausts

Thesuggestionthatmoralsituations,likejokes,maybesubjecttosuchrepetitionbrings me tomy final comment onMillgrams criticism of the SQA. Jokesparticularlytrivialknockknockjokesmayeasilylendthemselvestothesortof repetition which Millgram suggests will lead to the evaporation of theirfunniness. However, is the same true with regard to moral situations likeholocausts?Morespecifically,wouldthosewhocanvassfortheSQAbelikelytothinkittrue?

The leadingsupportersof theSQAwouldbe inclinedtoofferanegativereplytothisquestion.Assupportersof theSQAaregenerallyparticularists theywould surely be inclined to the view that moral situations do not repeatthemselves in the way which Millgrams criticism requires. They resist thesuggestionthatmoralitycanbecodifiedandareinclinedonthataccounttorejecttheclaimMillgrammakesthattheapplicationofamoralconceptiscorrectin all situations if correct in any.26 Wiggins, e.g., explicitly queries theapplicabilityhereofsupervenienceoneoftheconceptsuponwhichMillgramhangshiscaseatthispoint.27

McDowellisperhapsthemostardentsupporteroftheparticularistsideofthe SQA story. Time and again he rejects the idea that morality is a matter ofapplying concepts in a rule governed manner, always in the same way tosituations which repeat themselves with sufficient clarity to licence suchcodifiability.True tohisAristotelian rootsheseesvirtuousagentsnotasagentswhohavelearnedhowtoapplyasetofrulesoverarangeofcases,butasagentswho,throughappropriatecharacterformation,havedevelopedasensitivitytothesalient features of moral situations which enables them to respond to suchsituations on a casebycase basis. In Virtue and reason he puts the pointdirectly: Occasion by occasion, one knows what to do, if one does, not byapplyinguniversalprinciplesbutbybeingacertainkindofperson:onewhoseessituations in a certain distinctive way.28 If asked how such a person wouldproceedindealingwithmoralquestions,McDowellisequallyforthcoming:Itisbyvirtueofhisseeingthisparticular factrather thanthatoneas thesalient fact

29

about the situation that he ismoved to act by this concern rather than thatone.The perception of saliences is the shape taken here by the appreciation ofparticularcases.29

Fromsuchaperspectiveitisthevistaoffadingresponsestoasuccessionof holocaustswhich begins to fade. For theparticularist the very idea thatevensimplemoralsituationscouldrepeat themselves inthemannerof knockknockjokes is a nonstarter not to mention the suggestion that complex moralsituations like holocausts could do so. In the absence of suchmoral repetitionsMillgrams finalpointabout thegeneralapplicabilityofmoralconceptsand theallegedficklenessofhumanresponsesalsolosesitsforce.

IVConclusion

Allinall,then,MillgramscaseagainsttheSQArequiresforitssuccessnotonlyasomewhatmisleadingpresentationoftheoverallroleoftheanalogy,butalsotheignoringofarangeoffeatureswhicharepartandparcelofthetheoreticalsettinginternaltowhichtheanalogyisgenerallysetoutanddefended.ThesupportersoftheSQAmakemuchof thecomplexityof the notionofamoral sensibility andspecificallyrejecttheideathatitimpliesasimplefeature/reactioncapacity.Theyalsomakemuchof the ideathat it is thecomplexanddevelopedsensibilitiesofmoralagentswhohavebeenappropriatelyeducatedvirtuousagentswhichareinquestionand,finally,theytendtobeparticularistsandthustorejecttheideathatmoralsituationsrepeatthemselvesandcanbecodifiedinthewayMillgramsaccountwouldrequire.WithaproperappreciationthattheSQAis intendedonlyasananalogy,andwiththeseadditionalfeaturesofitstheoreticalsettinginplace,the SQA whatever its other difficulties does not carry the unpalatableimplicationsMillgramattributestoit.

NOTES

1ThemostprominentUSmoralrealistsareNicholasSturgeon,RichardBoyd,PeterRailtonandDavidBrink.Foradiscussionoftheirworksee,e.g.,AlexanderMiller, AnIntroductiontoContemporaryMetaethics (Oxford:PolityPress,2003),chapters8and9.2 Seepart2ofMargaretLittlesRecentWorkonMoralRealism, inPhilosophicalBooks,35(1994),225233.3PanayotButchvarov,SkepticisminEthics (IndianaUniversityPress,1989),p.4.4JohnMcDowell,ValuesandSecondaryQualities,inJ.McDowell,Mind,ValueandReality(HarvardUniversityPress,1998),pp.131150(p.146).5Whenitcomesto moral realism,thesemovesenablesupportersoftheanalogytorecognisethatinanytalkofamoralrealitythenotionofrealitymustbeunderstoodascruciallyinvolvingmoralagents.AsDavidMcNaughtonputsit,theveryideaofamoralrealismwhichleftmoralagentsoutofthepicturewouldbecompletelyimplausible.SeeD.McNaughton, MoralVision(Oxford:Blackwell,1988),p.94.6McNaughton,p.95.7SeeJonathanDancy,Twoconceptionsofmoralrealism,inProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety, SupplementaryVolume60(1986),pp.16786andSimonBlackburn,Errorsandthe

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phenomenologyofvalueinhis EssaysinQuasirealism(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1993),pp.149165.8See,e.g.,JamesRachels,Introduction,inEthicalTheory:TheQuestionofObjectivity,Vol. 1,ed.byJ.Rachels(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1998),pp.118(p.15)RichardNorman,Makingsenseofmoralrealism,inPhilosophicalInvestigations,20(1997),117135andPeterSande,ThePerceptualParadigmofMoralEpistemology,inTheDanishYearbookofPhilosophy,27(1992),pp.4571.9DavidWiggins,ASensible Subjectivism?,inD.Wiggins, Need,Values,Truth(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1998),pp.185214(p.195).10ElijahMillgram,MoralValuesandSecondaryQualities, AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly,36(1999),25355(p.254).11SeeMcDowell,p.143.12Millgram,p.254.13Millgram,p.255.14ForaninfluentialandwiderangingassaultontheSQA,seeDavidSosa,PatheticEthics,inArguingaboutMetaethics,ed.by AndrewFisherandSimonKirchin(London:Routledge,2006),pp.241284.15Millgram,pp.253and254respectively.16McDowell,pp.138and143.17RichardNorman,p.131.18Wiggins,p.196.McNaughtonhassomeinterestingthingstosayonthispointinhisdiscussionofapersonsgradualappropriationofamusicalsensibilitywhichenablesaproperappreciationofjazz.See Moral Vision, p.58.19Little,pp.227228.20BothpapersappearinMcDowellscollectionMind,ValueandReality,andthequotationsarefromthatbook,pp.85and51respectively.21Millgram,p.253.22Wiggins,p.195.23 Ibid.,p.193.24Millgram,p.254.25McDowell,Mind,ValueandReality, p.90.26Millgram,p.255.27SeeWiggins,p.197.28J.McDowell,VirtueandReasoninMcDowell, Mind,ValueandReality,pp.5073(p.73).29 Ibid.,p.68.

31

UnderstandingandAssessingHeideggersTopicinPhenomenologyin

LightofHisAppropriationofDiltheysHermeneuticMannerofThinking

CyrilMcDonnell

ABSTRACT

ThispaperanalysesHeideggerscontroversialadvancementofHusserls ideaofphilosophyandphenomenological research towards the BeingQuestion and its relation to Dasein. Itconcentrates onHeideggers elision ofDilthey andHusserls different concepts of DescriptivePsychologyinhis1925SummerSemesterlecturecourse,withHusserlsconceptlosingoutinthecompetition,asbackgroundtotheformulationoftheBeingQuestioninBeingandTime(1927).It argues that Heidegger establishes his own positionwithin phenomenology on the basis of apartial appropriation of Diltheys hermeneuticalmanner of thinking, an appropriation that waslaterradicallycalledintoquestionbyLvinasonDiltheyeanhermeneuticalphilosophicalgrounds.

Introduction

MartinHeidegger(18891976)isgenerallyregardedasoneofthemostimportantthinkersofthetwentiethcentury.Heideggerisalsoregarded,inparticular,asoneof the most influential figures of the new phenomenological movement inphilosophythatwasinauguratedinGermanybyEdmundHusserl(18591938)attheturnofthetwentiethcenturyandwhichspreadrapidlythroughoutEuropeandfurther field in the first half of that century. Yet, despite this prominence,agreement has not been reached about what Heideggers topic in philosophyexactly is,1 or about the precise nature and actual extent of the influence thatHusserls phenomenological manner of thinking had uponHeideggers path ofthinking (Denkweg) about the question of the meaning of Being (die Fragenach dem Sinn von Sein), more often abbreviated by Heidegger as simply theBeingquestion (die Seinsfrage), Heideggers famously selfdeclared topic ofresearch in philosophy and phenomenological research in his unfinished essayBeingandTime(1927).2 TwoyearspriortothepublicationofBeingandTime,however, Heidegger, in his 1925 Summer Semester lecturecourse delivered atMarburg University, remarks to his students that one should look towardsWilhelmDilthey(18331911),andnottoHusserl,tofindtheoriginsofthetopicinphilosophyandphenomenologicalresearchwithwhichheisconcerned,for,inHeideggersestimation,

As superior his analyses in the particular certainly are, Husserl does not advancebeyondDilthey. However, at least as I [Heidegger] see it,my guess is that eventhoughDiltheydidnotraisethequestionof[themeaningof]beinganddidnotevenhavethemeanstodoso,thetendencytodosowasaliveinhim.3

InthisarticleIwanttotakeseriouslyHeideggers indicationtohisstudents thatwhilstHusserls phenomenological analyses are of little use to him in his owneffort to raise anew (wiederholen) the question of the meaning of Being,4

Diltheysmannerof thinkingcertainly is,even ifDiltheyhimselfdidnotdeployhisenergiesinthatdirection.TherelationofHeideggerswayofthinkingabout

32

the BeingQuestion both to Diltheys hermeneutic manner of thinking and toHusserls phenomenological manner of thinking, nevertheless, is much moreintricatethanthatas intimatedbyHeideggertohisstudents inhis1925lectures,for, in this article I will argue that Heidegger uses, at least implicitly, centralfeatures of Diltheys hermeneutic method of enquiry, in particular Diltheysinterest in the experience of language, in order to correct Husserlsunphenomenologicalmannerofreflection whilstadvancingDiltheyshermeneutictowards the question of the meaning of Being, notwithstanding Heideggershighly controversialand repeatedclaim throughouthiscareer inphilosophy thatthis issue had been left unthought (ungedacht) by Husserl in phenomenologyand phenomenological research.5 In other words, Heideggers development ofphenomenologytowardsthequestionofthemeaningofBeinganditsrelationtoDasein is better understood less in terms of a philosophical dialogue(Auseinandersetzung)betweenhimandHusserl, asbothprofessedbyHeideggerin various places and reiteratedby several critics in recent commentary on theHusserlHeidegger philosophical relationship, and more in terms of anappropriation of Diltheys hermeneutic manner of thinking, just as Heideggerhimself intimates in his 1925 lectures but without elaborating upon anappropriation of Diltheys manner of thinking, however, that was later to beradicallycalledintoquestionbyLvinason Diltheyeanhermeneuticphilosophicalgrounds,orsoshallIargueintheconcludingsectionofthisarticle.Hencethetitlewhich is also the argument of this article: Understanding and AssessingHeideggersTopicinPhenomenologyinLightofHisAppropriationofDiltheysHermeneuticMannerofThinking.

IHeideggersElisionof

DiltheyandHusserlsConceptsofDescriptivePsychology

In his 1925 lectures Heidegger suggests to his students that there is an innerkinshipbetweenDiltheysmannerofthinkinginhis1894BerlinAcademyEssayIdeastowardsaDescriptiveandAnalyticPsychologyandHusserlsdescriptivepsychologicalanalyses in the twoVolumesof hisLogical Investigations (19001901).6 There is, however, no inner kinship between Diltheys analysis ofhuman experiences andHusserls analyses. In Ideas towards aDescriptive andAnalytic Psychology, Dilthey attempts to describe and analyze humanexperiences from the point of view of their structural totality and inherenthistorical (and linguistic) depthdimension.7 Thus plays, poems and novels, aswell as State laws, social systems, art, music, economies, philosophies andreligions, all document and articulate, in Diltheys eyes, something meaningfulabout the historically evolving nature of mans selfunderstanding that is neveralways complete but always partially unfolding in and through history and lifeitself,andyet,alwaysbelongingtoagreaterwholeofunderstandingofthekindofbeingthatweourselvesare.8ThusDiltheysawhiswork(afterKant)intermsofaCritique ofHistorical Reason.9 In the Logical Investigations Husserl analysestheexperiencesofa normative logicalconsciousnessas such the lifeofanabstract (ahistorical) logical consciousness as such and seeks intuitivelyverifiabledescriptionsofessentialandinvariantapriorifeaturesoflogicalactsofreasoning.10 Husserl learned hisdescriptivemethodnot fromDilthey, but from

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FranzBrentano(18381917)whenattendingthe latters lecturesonDescriptivePsychologyatViennaUniversityfrom1884to1886.11 It istrue,then,thatbothDilthey and Husserl (and Brentano of the Vienna period) call their workdescriptivepsychology,asHeideggerinstructshisstudentsinhis1925lectures,but identity in terms is not equivalent to identity in concepts.12 Behind theterminologicalagreementthatexistsbetweenDiltheyandHusserl(andBrentano)onDescriptivePsychologytherearerealandmajorsubstantialdisagreementsinconceptsofDescriptivePsychology.Whichmethodofdescriptivepsychologythat is being appealed to and defended byHeidegger in the development of hisownthoughttowardsthequestionofthemeaningofBeing,therefore,isnotjustof nominal significance but of philosophicalconceptual significance aswell. Ineffect,Iwillarguethatwhatoccursinthe1925lecturesisanelisionbyHeideggerof Dilthey and Husserls concepts of descriptive psychology, with Husserlsconcept losing out in the competition. Before addressing this matter inHeideggersthinking,then,itwillbeusefultonotefirstlyandbrieflysomeofthesalient features of Brentanos descriptivemethod thatwere so influential in thedevelopmentofHusserlsthought,beforeexaminingDiltheysdescriptivemethodandHeideggerssubsequentfusionofbothmethodsofdescriptivepsychologyinthe elaboration of his own topic of research in philosophy and hermeneuticalphenomenologicalresearch:thequestionofthemeaningofBeing.

By the timeHusserl attendedBrentanos lectures from 1884 to 1886 inVienna,Brentanohadbegun to apply his newdescriptivepsychologicalmethodofanalysis,which hehaddevisedsome ten yearsearlier in hisunfinishedstudyPsychology fromanEmpirical Standpoint (1874),13 to the task of clarifying themeaningofconceptsemployed inthenormativedisciplinesofLogic,EthicsandAesthetics.14 This task, of course, was not the original function of descriptivepsychology.Rather, inPsychology fromanEmpiricalStandpoint, themain taskthat Brentano set for descriptive psychology was to clarify the meaning ofconcepts for the science of psychology, or,moreprecisely, themeaning of twocentral terms used in current scientific debate, namely, physical phenomenonand psychical phenomenon.15 This clarification was necessary for Brentanobecause, in his view, there existedmuch confusion among scientists over themeaning of these terms and neither agreement nor complete clarity has beenachievedregardingthedelimitationofthetwoclasses.16ThusBrentanoinformsusthathefoundnounanimityamongpsychologistsaboutthemeaningofthesebasic terms for their science.17 And even important psychologists, Brentanofurtherremarks,maybehardpressedtodefendthemselvesagainstthechargeofselfcontradictioninthewayinwhichtheyusedandunderstoodthemeaningofthese terms.18 This lackofagreement, coupledwith misuse, confusion, andselfcontradiction by some eminent scientists concerning the meaning of thephysicalandthepsychical,was,inBrentanosestimation,impedingtheevolutionofthenaturalsciencesingeneral,especiallyphysics,andthebuddingnewscienceof psychology in particular, which Brentano now considers as the crowningpinnacle of the natural sciences, that is to say, as the science of the future.19

SinceBrentano,however,couldnotsettlethedisputeaboutthemeaningoftheseterms among psychologists and physicists by appealing to any wellfoundedtheoryelaborated in natural science, nor resolve thisdifficulty bydrawinguponany debatable meaning which these terms may have enjoyed in any particularphilosophical or historical understanding of the physical and the psychical, hisonly alternative was to check the meaning of these terms against the facts of

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experience itself.20 And that meant for Brentano, now following Lockesapproach, against the experience of physical phenomena given to outerperceptualsenseexperienceandtheexperienceoftheabilityofconsciousnesstoreflect upon itself and to have itself, psychical phenomena (i.e., its ownpsychicalactexperiences),asacontentforreflectionininnerperception.21Afterthedomainofeachofthesetwobasicclassesofphenomena,presentedviaouterand inner perception respectively, had been appropriately demarcated and themeaningofthetermsphysicalphenomenonandpsychicalphenomenonclearlyagreed, the ensuing task of the natural science of psychology, so Brentanobelieved,wouldbetoexplain,usingthemethodofthenaturalsciences,howsuchpsychical phenomena or psychicalact experiences (and their immediateobjects)came intoexistenceandwentoutofexistence for that mentally activesubject.ThusBrentanodrewasharpdistinctionwithinthescienceofempiricalpsychology between what he called Descriptive Psychology and GeneticPsychology.22GeneticPsychologyisthenaturalscientificpartofthescienceofempiricalpsychology.Itsmaintaskistoexplain,throughobservation,hypothesesandexperimentation,howthephenomenaof immediateconsciousnessreallyandtruly existwhenwe are not immediately aware of them, e.g., colours (physicalphenomena)as lightwaves(orlightparticles),soundsassinewaves,etc.,thatisto say, as the theoretically constructedobjects of natural science.We could saythatthenatural scientistbeginswithphysicalphenomena(e.g.colours)onlytodemonstratethatthisisnotthewaytheyreallyandtrulyexist(forcoloursexistaslightwaves, light particles, and are effects of stimuli on the retina and in thebrain etc.).23 Descriptive Psychology, on the other hand, does not rely onnaturalscientific theories, noron outer(sense)perception,noronhypotheticalreasoning, but on inner perception and direct intuition of the phenomenathemselves (i.e. psychicalact experiences and their objectivities).24 The task ofthedescriptivepartofpsychologyistoyieldclearandunambiguousdescriptionsof the phenomena in question themselves, removing all misunderstanding andconfusion concerning them25 that is to say, the sole aim of descriptivepsychology is toclarify foruse in natural science ingeneraland for the naturalscienceofempiricalpsychology inparticular themeaningof theterms physicalphenomenonandpsychicalphenomenon.InBrentanosschemeofthings,then,thoughbothdescriptivepsychologyandgeneticpsychologyconstitutethenaturalscience of empirical psychology as he understands it, in Psychology from anEmpirical Standpoint descriptive psychology serves a preparatory function forempirical psychology its task is to clarify intuitively what genetic psychologylaterhastoexplaincausally.

Brentano, therefore, never advocated themethod of the natural sciencesfor thedescriptivepartof thescienceofempiricalpsychology.Rather,Brentanoheld firmly to the Lockean conviction that knowledge of consciousness and itscontents indescriptivepsychology is tobegleaneddirectly (nonhypothetically)fromreflectionwithinconsciousness itself.26 Furthermore,Brentanowasequallyadamant that the descriptive partof the scienceof psychology sought truthsofreason, and not truths concerning matters of fact.27 Only descriptions ofphenomena based on truths of reason and grasped at one stroke andwithoutinduction can remove any possible selfcontradiction or ambiguity about themeaningofthephenomenathemselvesinquestion,andthataretobelaterstudie