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MB MC Externalities and Property Rights

MBMC Externalities and Property Rights. MBMC Copyright c 2004 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 11: Externalities and Property

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Externalities and Property Rights

Externalities and Property Rights

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 2

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Copyright c 2004 by The McGraw-HillCompanies, Inc.  All rights reserved.

External Costs and Benefits

External Cost (negative externality)A cost of an activity that falls on people

other than those who pursue the activity

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 3

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External Costs and Benefits

External Benefit (positive externality)A benefit of an activity received by people

other than those who pursue the activity

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 4

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External Costs and Benefits

Externalities reduce economic efficiency.

Solutions of externalities may be efficient.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 5

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External Costs and Benefits

When efficient solutions to externalities are not possible, government intervention or other collective action may be used.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 6

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External Costs and Benefits

How Externalities Affect Resource AllocationDoes the honeybee keeper face the right

incentives? (Part I)Bees pollinate the apple orchards.The honeybee keeper may not consider the

external benefit to the apple growers when considering the optimal number of hives.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 7

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External Costs and Benefits

How Externalities Affect Resource AllocationDoes the honeybee keeper face the right

incentives? (Part I)If the external benefit is not considered, the bee

keeper’s optimal number of hives will be less than the socially optimal number of hives.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 8

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External Costs and Benefits

How Externalities Affect Resource AllocationDoes the honeybee keeper face the right

incentives? (Part II)If the hives are located near a school and

nursing home, additional hives will cause more people to get stung by the bees.

For the students and nursing home residents, the bee hives create an external cost.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 9

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External Costs and Benefits

How Externalities Affect Resource AllocationDoes the honeybee keeper face the right

incentives? (Part II)If the external costs are not considered, the

optimal number of hives for the beekeeper will be greater than the socially optimal number of hives.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 10

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External Costs and Benefits

How Externalities Affect Resource AllocationWhen an activity does not create an

externality, the optimal level of the activity for the individual will equal the socially optimal level of the activity.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 11

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External Costs and Benefits

How Externalities Affect Resource AllocationWhen an activity generates a negative

externality, the level of the activity will be greater than the socially optimal level.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 12

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External Costs and Benefits

How Externalities Affect Resource AllocationWhen an activity generates a positive

externality, the level of the activity will be less than the socially optimal level.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 13

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How External Costs Affect Resource Allocation

Pri

ce (

$/to

n)

Quantity (tons/year)

Pri

ce (

$/to

n)

DD

Private MC

12,000

1,300Private MCwith pollution

12,000

1,300

Privateequilibrium

Quantity (tons/year)

2,000

8,000Social

optimum

2,300XC = Pollution cost = $1,000/ton

Social MC =Private MC + XC

Production without external cost Production with external cost

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 14

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A Good Whose Production Generates a Positive Externality for Consumers

Pri

ce

Quantity

Private Demand

MC

Qpvt

MBPVT

• Without external benefits QPVT is the social optimum

Social demand = Private Demand + XB

XB

MBSOC

MBPVT + XB

QSOC

• With external benefits the private D < social D and the private optimum is less than the social optimum

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 15

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External Costs and Benefits

The Coase TheoremWhen a market leaves cash on table there

is usually a response to capture the unrealized value.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 16

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External Costs and Benefits

ExampleWill Abercrombie dump toxins in the river

(Part I)

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 17

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External Costs and Benefits

ExampleThe Market

Abercrombie’s company produces a toxic waste.

If the waste is dumped into the river, Fitch cannot fish the river.

Should Abercrombie install a filter?o Assume there is no communication between

Abercrombie and Fitch

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 18

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Costs and Benefits of Eliminating Toxic Waste (Part 1)

$100/day $130/day

$100/day $50/day

With filter Without filter

Gains toAbercrombie

Gains toFitch

The Market•Without filter: Total Gains = $130 + $50 = $180•With filter: Total Gains = $100 + $100 = $200•MC of the filter = $30 & MB of the filter = $50•Loss in economic surplus = $20

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 19

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$100/day $130/day

$100/day $50/day

With filter Without filter

Gains toAbercrombie

Gains toFitch

Assume•Fitch and Abercrombie can communicate at no cost•Fitch offers Abercrombie $40 to use the filter•Economic surplus increases by $20

Costs and Benefits of Eliminating Toxic Waste (Part 1)

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 20

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External Costs and Benefits

The Coase TheoremIf at no cost people can negotiate the

purchase and sale of the right to perform activities that cause externalities, they can always arrive at efficient solutions to problems caused by externalities.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 21

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External Costs and Benefits

QuestionWhy should Fitch pay Abercrombie to filter

out toxins that would not be there in the first place if not for Abercrombie’s factory?

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 22

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External Costs and Benefits

ExampleBy law Abercrombie cannot dump without

Fitch’s approval.Fitch and Abercrombie can negotiate

without cost.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 23

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Costs and Benefits of Eliminating Toxic Waste (Part 3)

$100/day $150/day

$100/day $70/day

With filter Without filter

Gains toAbercrombie

Gains toFitch

•Economic surplus = $200 w/filter & $220 w/o filter•Fitch would gain $30 with the filter but the outcome is inefficient•Abercrombie pays Fitch $40 to operate without the filter•Economic surplus = $110 + $110 = $220 & both gain $10•Allowing pollution increases economic surplus

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 24

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External Costs and Benefits

When polluters are liable:Polluter’s income is lowered.Those injured by pollution will have higher

income.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 25

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The Gain in Surplus from Shared Living Arrangements

Least costlyProblem Ann’s cost of Betty’s cost of solution to

solving problem solving problem the problem

Total cost ofseparate apartments

(2)($400/month) $600/month $200/month= $800/month

Total cost ofshared apartment

Rent savings From sharing

Benefits of Shared Living

Costs of Shared Living

Ann’s phone usage Curtailed Tolerate phone Betty toleratesphone usage: usage: $150/mo. Ann’s phone

usage: $250/mo. $150/mo.

Gain in Surplus from Shared Living

Rent savings Least costly accommodation Gain in surplus($200/month) to shared living problems $50/month

($150/month)

Will Ann and Betty Share an apartment?

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 26

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The Gain in Surplus from Shared Living Arrangements

Least costlyProblem Ann’s cost of Betty’s cost of solution to

solving problem solving problem the problem

Total cost ofseparate apartments

(2)($400/month) $600/month $200/month= $800/month

Total cost ofshared apartment

Rent savings From sharing

Benefits of Shared Living

Costs of Shared Living

Ann’s phone usage Curtailed Tolerate phone Betty toleratesphone usage: usage: $150/mo. Ann’s phone

usage: $250/mo. $150/mo.

Gain in Surplus from Shared Living

Rent savings Least costly accommodation Gain in surplus($200/month) to shared living problems $50/month

($150/month)

How much should Ann and Betty pay if theyagree to split their economic surplus equally?

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 27

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Copyright c 2004 by The McGraw-HillCompanies, Inc.  All rights reserved.

External Costs and Benefits

Legal Remedies for ExternalitiesWhen negotiation is costless:

Efficient solutions to externalities can be found.The adjustment to the externality is usually

done by the party with the lowest cost.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 28

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External Costs and Benefits

Legal Remedies for ExternalitiesWhen negotiation is not costless:

Laws may be used to correct for externalities.The burden of the law can be placed on those

who have the lowest cost.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 29

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External Costs and Benefits

Economic NaturalistWhat is the purpose of speed limits and

traffic laws?

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 30

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External Costs and Benefits

Economic NaturalistWhy do most communities have zoning

laws?

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 31

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External Costs and Benefits

Economic NaturalistWhy do many governments enact laws that

limit the discharge of environmental pollutants?

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 32

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External Costs and Benefits

Economic NaturalistWhat is the purpose of free speech laws?

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 33

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External Costs and Benefits

Economic NaturalistWhy does government subsidize the

planting of trees on hillsides?

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 34

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The Optimal Amount of Negative Externalities is Not Zero

Quantity of Pollution

MC/MB

MC (increasing opportunity cost)

Q

MB = MB

MB (diminishing marginal utility)

Optimal amount of pollution: MC = MB

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 35

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The Problem of Unpriced ResourcesWhen no one owns property, the

opportunity cost of using it is not considered.

Use of the property will increase until MB = 0.

Property Rights and the Tragedy of Commons

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 36

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Number of steerson the commons

1 126 26

2 119 19

3 116 16

4 113 13

5 111 11

Price per 2-year-old steer($)

Income per steer($/year)

A village has:• 5 residents• Each has savings = $100• Each villager can buy a bond paying 13%/yr or a steer and

sell it in a year• Investment decisions are individual and public

Will there be a socially optimal outcome?

The Relationship BetweenHerd Size and Steer Price

Individual choice• 4 steers = $52• 1 bonds = $13• Total Income = $65

Act individually to maximize income

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 37

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Marginal Income and theSocially Optimal Herd Size

1 126 26 2626

2 119 19 3812

3 116 16 4810

4 113 13 52 4

5 111 11 55 3

Act collectively tomaximize village incomeSocially optimal choice• 1 steer = $26• 4 bonds = $52• Total Income = $78

Individual choice• 4 steers = $52• 1 bonds = $13• Total Income = $65

Number of steerson the commons

Price per2-year-old steer

($)

Incomeper steer($/year)

Total cattleIncome($/year)

MarginalIncome($/year)

Act individually to maximize income

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 38

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Property Rights and the Tragedy of Commons

When no one owns the commons, the opportunity cost of using it is not considered.

Use of the commons will increase until MB = 0.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 39

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Property Rights and the Tragedy of Commons

One person’s use of the commons imposes an external cost on the others by making the property less valuable.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 40

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Property Rights and the Tragedy of Commons

The Effect of Private OwnershipExample

How much will the right to control the village commons sell for?

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 41

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Property Rights and the Tragedy of Commons

The Effect of Private OwnershipAssume

Villagers can borrow and lend at 13%.The villagers decide to auction off the rights to

the commons.One steer is the optimal number

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 42

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Property Rights and the Tragedy of Commons

The Effect of Private OwnershipAssume

Income from one steer = $26.Pay $100 for the commons

o The $26 profit covers the cost of the loan to buy the steer at the opportunity cost of $100 or $13

Economic surplus of the village will be:o (4 x $13) + $26 = $78 oro (4 x $13) + $13 rent + $13 highest bidder = $78

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 43

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Property Rights and the Tragedy of Commons

The Effect of Private OwnershipObservations

When the land is auctioned, the highest bidder will have an incentive to consider the opportunity cost of grazing additional steers.

Common property is not used efficiently.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 44

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Property Rights and the Tragedy of Commons

Zoning laws and other regulations restrict the use of private property.

The laws can be used to maximize economic surplus.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 45

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Property Rights and the Tragedy of Commons

The laws can also be used to achieve an individual goal (reelection) by reducing the economic surplus.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 46

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Property Rights and the Tragedy of Commons

Private ownership may be impractical.

Economic NaturalistWhy do blackberries in public parks get

picked too soon?Why are shared milkshakes consumed too

quickly?

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 47

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Property Rights and the Tragedy of Commons

When Private Ownership is ImpracticalHarvesting timer on remote public landHarvesting whales in international watersControlling multinational environmental

pollution

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 48

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Positional Externalities

When Payoffs Depend on Relative PerformanceIn a competitive situation:

There is an incentive to take an action to increase the odds of winning.

The overall gain to the players as a group will be zero.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 49

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Positional Externalities

When Payoffs Depend on Relative PerformanceIn a competitive situation:

When the payoff depends on relative performance, incentive to invest in performance activities will be excessive from a collective point of view.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 50

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Positional Externalities

Economic NaturalistWhy do football players take anabolic

steroids?Smith and Jones are competing for a single

position and a $1 million contract.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 51

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Payoff Matrix forSteroid Consumption

Each has 50%chance of winning

Jones Wins

Smith WinsEach has a 50%

chance of winning

Don’t takesteroids

Jones

Smith

Takesteroids

Don’t takesteroids

Takesteroids

•Dominant strategy for each yields the third best outcome•This prisoner’s dilemma outcome is the attraction of rules banning performance enhancing drugs.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 52

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Positional Externalities

Positional ExternalityWhen an increase in one person’s

performance reduces the expected reward of another in situations in which reward depends on relative performance

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 53

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Positional Externalities

Economic NaturalistWhy do grocery stores stay open all night,

even in small towns?

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 54

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Positional Externalities

Economic NaturalistTwo stores considering whether or not to

stay open until 1:00 a.m.

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 55

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Payoff Matrix for Extended Shopping Hours

Second bestfor each

Best for WegmansWorst for Tops

Best for TopsWorst for Wegmans

Third best for each

Close atmidnight

Wegmans

Tops

Close at1:00 A.M.

Close atmidnight

Close at1:00 A.M.

• Customers will choose the store with the most convenient hours, assuming all other variables are the same

• Both stores will stay open• Why will they stay open 24 hours?• Could a local law solve their problem?

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 56

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Positional Externalities

Positional Arms RaceA series of mutually offsetting investments

in performance enhancement that is stimulated by a positional externality?

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 57

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Positional Externalities

Positional Arms Control AgreementsAn agreement in which contestants attempt

to limit mutually offsetting investments in performance enhancements

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 58

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Positional Externalities

Positional Arms Control AgreementsCampaign spending limitsRoster limitsArbitration agreementsMandatory starting dates for kindergarten

Chapter 11: Externalities and Property Rights Slide 59

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Positional Externalities

Social Norms as Positional Arms Control AgreementsNerd normsFashion normsNorms of tasteNorms against vanity

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