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Wesleyan niversity
Can Our Understanding of Old Texts be Objective?Author(s): C. Behan McCullaghSource: History and Theory, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Oct., 1991), pp. 302-323Published by: Wileyfor Wesleyan University
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2/23
CAN
OUR UNDERSTANDING
OF
OLD
TEXTS
BE
OBJECTIVE?
C.
BEHAN
MCCULLAGH
I. INTRODUCTION
Some
people
today
would
deny
the
possibility
of
achieving
an
objective
under-
standing
of a
contemporary
ext,
and
thenargue
hat there
s even less
chance
of achieving
such an
understanding
f a
text from
the
past.
Such
wholesale
skepticism
needs to
be
rejected,
I
shall
argue,
as
quite
often
objective
under-
standing
of
historical
exts is
possible. By
an
objective
understanding
f a
text
I
mean both
one which
is rationally
ustifiable
and
one
whichwould
generally
be acceptedas correct.
Sometimes
here
s
no rational
way
of
choosing
between
two or
morealternative
nterpretations,
ut
this
is by no means
always
he
case.
First let
me explain
my use
of a
few keyterms.
We understand
text when
we can say
what
it means. I
have no
comprehensive
heory
of meaning
o
de-
fend
here, but will generally
assumethat
the
meaning of
sentences
ncludes
their llocutionary
orce
together
withthe
conditions
which
makethem trueor
correct.
There
are often several
different
ways
of expressing
one's
understanding
f
the meaning
of a sentenceor
text.
Any statement
by
a
person
of
his or
her
understanding
f its meaning
is what
I
call his
or her
interpretation
of
its
meaning.
If
there
are several
ways of
understanding
he
meaning
of a text,
then
each of
those
ways
of
understanding
t is
an
interpretation
f
its
meaning
as
well. So an
interpretation
f a text
can be
eitherone
of several
different
ways
of
understanding
text, and/or
one of several
differentways
of
expressing
ne's
understanding
f
a
text. Generally,
however,
when
I
refer
to
an
interpretation
of a text
I
refer
to
a
statement
of its meaning.
It is my
belief
that
there
are conventionally
accepted
criteria
by which an
interpretation
f a textcan be
justified
as correct.
Those
who
are
skeptical
about
the
objectivity
f
understanding
ometimes
gnore
he existence
f these
criteria,
focussingupon
the subjective
determinants
f an interpretation
lone. But a
glance
at any debate
over the
correct nterpretation
f
a
text
soon
revealsboth
the
presence
and the importance
of these criteria.
Examples
of them
will
be
given
below.
If
an
interpretation
atisfies
the relevant
criteria,
t
is
not only
justified
but
also
correct.
I
prefer
o
use the
word true
ust
of statements
which
correspond
o
some
reality. nterpretations
f
the
meaning
of
a
text
are
generally
not
true
in
this sense.
They
do
not
necessarily
correspond
o
any
particular
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CAN OUR UNDERSTANDING OF OLD TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE? 303
reality. To call an interpretation f a text correct s to say that it would be
acceptedas the meaningof the text by the majorityof educated peakers
of
the
language n which it is written, were they to know the literaryand historical
contexts relevantto its subject matter and the intentionsof its author. No
individualmight have such an understanding f the text, because ndividuals
are occasionally mistaken about
the
conventional meaning
of words and
phrases,and may be ignorantof the contextof the text and of the intention
of
its author.Nor is the author's ntendedmeaning he correctmeaning,as authors
sometimes
ail
to say
what
they
intend.
Before considering he possibility
of
objective understanding
f old
texts,
let me addressJacquesDerrida'sattack upon the possibility
of
an objective
understanding f any text, old or new. Following Saussure,Derrida nsists
that the meaningof
words is to be found in their role in a
language,
n their
implications, ssociations,and contrasts. He goes beyondSaussure
n
allowing
that the
meanings
which
words have for
any
readerare also
to
be
found in
whatever iteraryand logical significance hey may
have
for
that reader. So
Derrida
inds a profusion
of
meanings
or the texts he
analyzes,
a
profusion
which he
says
is without
limits. For
him,
a text is henceforthno
longer
a
finished orpus
of
writing, omecontent
enclosed
n
a book or its
margins,
but a
differential etwork,a fabricof tracesreferring ndlessly o somethingother
than
itself,
to other differential
races.
Thus the text overrunsall the
limits
assigned
o it so
far. 2
He
dismisses he suggestion hat the meaningof a text corresponds o the
author's ntention
by pointing
out that texts exist
independent
f their
authors,
anddo not
dependupon
a
knowledge
f
theirauthor o be meaningful.Similarly
he denies hattheymustbe understoodby reference o the context
n
which hey
were
written,
or
they
can
normallybe
understoodwithout
any reference
o
that
context.3Theonly thingwhichhe admitsas determininghemeaningof a text
is thelanguage
n
whichit is written,togetherwiththe literaturen whichthat
languageappears.
Derrida's
heory
of
meaning
s of some
value,
but it is far from
adequate.
He
rightly
describes he
meaning
of
words as
a
function
of
their relation
o
other
words
associated
with
them
in
one way
or
another, hough
he
shouldalso have
recognized
he
importance
f theirassociation
with
other
hings,
suchas
objects
in
the
world,experiences eoplehave, and changespeoplewantto bringabout.
The fact that manytexts can be understoodwithoutknowledgeof the circum-
stancesof
their
composition
does not mean that the words
they
use
have no
association
with
the world.
Many
wordsare
commonly
and
regularly
ssociated
1. See the essay Differance
in
Jacques
Derrida, Margins of Philosophy,
transl.
Alan Bass
(Brighton, Eng.,
1982).
2.
Jacques
Derrida,
Living On,
in Deconstruction and
Criticism,
ed.
Harold
Bloom et
al.
(London,
1979), 84.
3. Jacques Derrida, Semiology and Grammatology: Interview with Julia Kristeva, in Posi-
tions,
transl.
Alan
Bass (London, 1972).
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304 C. BEHAN MCCULLAGH
with things in the world, things to which they refer or bring about. However,
even
if
Derrida's heorywere augmented o include
associations uch as these,
it still would not be adequate.For surelya theory
of meaningshould explain
how we know the meaningof texts. Derrida's heoryfails to explainhow we use
language
o
communicateas clearlyand precisely
as we do. It simply gnores
the conventions
by
whichwe
decidewhich,among
he variouspossiblemeanings
wordscan have, we shouldunderstand hem to
have in the case of a given text
or utterance.
It is difficult o formulate hese conventionsprecisely.Generally peaking,
the correct
nterpretation
f
a
text is that which (1) does not violate any of the
semantic
and
syntactic
rulesof the
language
n which t is
written; 2)
resolves
any obscuritiesof referenceand ambiguitiesof meaning arising from these
rules;(3) provides
a coherent
body
of
information; 4) performs he first hree
functions o a muchgreaterdegree han any other
nterpretationwhich he text
warrants; nd perhaps 5) convincingly xplains
away any failures o perform
the first
hree
functions
(that is, any
inconsistencies etween he
interpretation
and the rules of the
language,any remaining
obscuritiesand
ambiguities,
and
any
inconsistencieswithin he information t
provides).
f
an interpreter annot
meet these requirements
rom
a study
of
the
text alone, then he or she may
examine he context n whichthe text wasproduced.This willoften locate the
text
in
a widerframe of discourseand
in
an historicalcontext
which
will clear
up uncertainties
f
reference
and
meaning.
If an
adequate nterpretation
s still
not
available, he interpretermay then try
to reconstruct he author's
ntention
in
order to resolve
remaining
uncertainties.
Sometimeseven
recourse
o
the
author's ntentions
will
not remove
all
uncertainties, mbiguities
nd
inconsis-
tencies romone's
nterpretation
f a text. These
may
n
fact havebeen
ntended,
as
in
the case of some
diplomatic etters,
and
in
some
poems.
Or
they may
not
havebeen noticedbythe author.In cases suchas these,the readerappreciates
an
explanation
of
remaining nadequacies
n
the
interpretation
whichaccounts
for
theirpresence
here. The
interpretation
f
a text
which s
arrived
at
in
this
way,
and whichsatisfies
he five criteria isted
above,
is
generally
deemed
o
be
the
correct
nterpretation
f the text.
If
the language
of
the text
is not
very
well
known
by
the
interpreter,
nd the
text
provides
a
significantlyargepart
of
the evidence
of that
language,
hen the
criteria
are
a bit different.The
interpreter
till
wants
to find
an
interpretation
of the text which s as unambiguous ndcoherentas possible.But it must also
be
consistent
with
the rules
of
language
which
he
or she
judges
to make
best
sense
of all
the evidence
of
that
language
available.
Thus,
for
example,
if
a
scholar
wereunfamiliar
with
Plato's
Greek,
he or
she
would ook
for
interpreta-
tions
of the Platonic
dialogues
onsistent
with he besttheoriesof Plato's
general
semantics
and
syntax,
as well as
interpretations
which
are
as
unambiguous
nd
coherent
as
possible.
Derrida
mightargue
hat
any suchconventions
annotbe justifiedas yielding
a correctunderstandingf a text withoutviciouscircularity. f wewereto say
thattheseconventions re
appropriate
ecause
n
conforming
o them
we
always
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CAN OUR UNDERSTANDING
OF OLD TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE? 305
arrive at a correct understanding of texts, that would
indeed be circular, as-
suming that there is no independent check of their
correctness. But if we say
that
in
our community conformity to these conventions
is what we mean by
calling an interpretation of a text correct, then circularity has been avoided.
The claim that a correct
understanding of a text is
one which satisfies certain
conventional
criteria does not
necessarily entail any vicious circularity of rea-
soning.
Does it invite a
charge
of arbitrariness nstead? This question is more difficult
to answer. But perhaps it is enough to say that, as Saussure
has taught us, many
linguistic conventions are
arbitrary. Saussure noted
that the relations between
signifiers (words)
and
signifieds
(things), though
fairly regular, are usually arbi-
trary. It would be no great surprise, then, if the relations between texts and their
meanings
are somewhat
arbitrary
too.
They
involve,
at
a
minimum,
rules of
semantics and
syntax
which seem
largely arbitrary,
varying
as
they
do from
language to language.
Whether they are arbitrary or
not, the rules for interpre-
ting texts generally enable
quite effective communication
of precise ideas, and
that is what justifies them.
II. BASIC
AND
SECONDARY
INTERPRETATIONS
Another common reason
for denying the possibility of an objective under-
standing
of the
meaning
of a
text is the observation that
people's interpretations
generally vary
with
their culture and interests. This was a major argument
of
Hans-Georg
Gadamer. He noted how the interpretations
of great historians
such
as
Mommsen, Treitschke,
and
Sybel
differed
in
accordance
with their
society,
and went
on
to
say:
No one disputes he
fact that
controlling
he
prejudices
f our own
present
o
such
an
extent hatwedonot misunderstandhewitnesses f thepast s avalidaim,butobviously
such
controldoes not
completely
ulfill
he
task
of understanding
he
pastand
its trans-
mission.
Indeed,
t could
very
well be that
only insignificanthings
n historical cholar-
ship permit
us to
approximate
his ideal of
totally extinguishing
ndividuality,
whilethe
greatproductive
chievements
f
scholarship lwayspreserveomething
f
the
splendid
magic
of
immediately
mirroring
he
present
n the
past
and
the
past
in
the present.4
It is not
entirely
clear what insignificant things
in
historical scholarship
Gadamer allowed can be
objective.
A
close
look
at
historical
practice, however,
reveals that there is frequently complete agreement among historians about the
basic
meaning
of
a
text,
though considerable disagreement
about
it
secondary
meaning. Perhaps Gadamer meant
that historians can
get
individual facts
about
the
past right,
but
that
their
understanding
of constellations
of
facts is
much
more
subjective.
When
it
comes
to
the
interpretation
of
texts,
what is
certain
is
that the
variety
of
interpretations
of the kind Gadamer has
noted exists
4. Hans-Georg
Gadamer, Philosophical
Hermeneutics,
transl.
and
ed. David
E.
Linge
(Berkeley,
1976),
6. Compare Hans-Georg
Gadamer,
Truth
and
Method (New
York,
1975),
465-466.
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6/23
306
C.
BEHAN
MCCULLAGH
predominantly
mong
the interpretations
f the secondarymeanings
of
texts.
Understanding
f the basicmeaning
of a text
is much essfrequently
ontested,
so
there is less reason to
doubt
that
it
can
be
rationally
ustified. However,
sometimesan interpretation f the secondarymeaningof a text is so well sup-
ported
that
it is undisputed
oo, and so
one
may assume that it is
rationally
justified.
Gadamer's
wn essays on Plato's Lysis
and Phaedo
illustrate
what
has
just
been
said quitewell.
The
literalmeaning
of Plato's text is
never
n
doubt,
so
well
s his
Greekunderstood.
Any
ambiguities re
seen
to havebeendeliberately
introduced
s a play on words.5
What
s uncertain
s the point
of thesedialogues.
The
Lysis, an inquiry
nto the natureof
friendship,
eems o be
entirely
nconclu-
sive, the discussion umpingfrompointto point, with eachsuggestedanalysis
of friendship
being
shown
to be
quite
unsatisfactory.
The Phaedo
presents
arguments
bout
the
immortality
f the
soul,
but all
of
them
are
plainly
nade-
quate
so that
it
is
hard
to
see any point
to the dialogue.
Gadamerdiscusses
the force of
thesedialogues,
and suggests
what Plato might
have
intended
n
presenting
hem as he did.
To help
fix
the intent
of thesedialogues,
Gadamer
onsiders
heir
genre.
The
Lysis,
he concludes,
s not
a systematic
nquiry
but
a discussion,
a
form of
conversationn which wemove within the live play of riskingassertions,of
taking back
what we have said,
of
assuming
and
rejecting,
all
the while
pro-
ceeding
on our
way
to
reaching
an
understanding. 6
ince Socrates'discussion
in
the Lysis
is
with two boys, Lysis
and
Menexenos,
Gadamer uggests hat
it
is appropriate
o
find t
inconclusive,
forchildren
do
not
yet
knowwhat
friend-
ship
is
and how
complex
a relationship
n
enduring riendship
reates
between
the
friends. IThe inconclusive
arguments
have
a
point though.
When
Menex-
enos
cannot tell
whether
a lover becomes
a friend
of
the beloved
or vice
versa,
Gadamer aysthatPlato certainlywants us to sensethat in actualfriendship
it
is impossible
o distinguishhe
lover
from
the
beloved
n
this
way
and
to
say
who
is the lover
andwho the beloved. 8 his,
in Gadamer's yes,
is
characteristic
of the force
of the
discussion,
and
he
goes
on to
find
similar
ignificance
n
other
apparently
nconclusivearguments.
Gadamer
also detects implicit
significance
n
the Phaedo.
For
example:
WhenPlato
has
Socrates,
n
the
hour
of
death,
enter
into conversation
with
'Pythagorean'
epresentatives
f contemporary
cience,
hat
is
obviouslymeant
to showthatPlato sawit as his own task to unite the moralintrospection or
which
Socrates
tood
with
the scientificknowledge epresented
y
the
Pythagor-
eans. 9
Gadamer's
entral hesis
s
that
the
Phaedo's
poetic
power
to
convince
5.
For examples,
Hans-Georg
Gadamer,
Dialogueand Dialectic:
EightHermeneutical
tudies
on Plato
(New Haven,
1980),
9, 11.
6.
Logos
and Ergon in Plato's Lysis,
bid.,
5.
7. Ibid.,
6.
8.
Ibid.,
10.
9. Ibid., 32.
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CAN OUR UNDERSTANDING OF OLD
TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE?
307
is stronger than
its arguments'
logical power to prove. '0He
sums up his discus-
sion
with
these words:
Plato certainlydoes
not
want
to say that he has proved
he same mmortality f the soul
which sbasic o thereligious radition.Butwhathe doeswant o say s thatthe spreading
skepticism esulting
rom
the scientific
nlightenment
oes not at allaffect he sphere
of
our
human ife andour
understanding
f
it. The
growing
cientificnsight
nto the
causes
of coming-into-being
ndpassing-away,
nto the
courseof natural
processes,doesnot
obviate
the need
for
thinkingbeyond
the
reality
of
this world,
and it has no authority
to
contest
religious
convictions.
Thus
the pointof the demonstrations,
t
seems to
me,
is
that
they
refute doubts and
not that
they justifybelief.
For proof
of the uncertaintyof secondary
interpretations
of the Lysis and the
Phaedo one need only glance at books about them. David Bolotin has given a
detailed
account
of the
long dispute
between
Max Pohlenz and Hans
von
Arnim
about
the
significance
of
the
Lysis.
12
Pohlenz
argued
that it was meant to
show
that friendship
is related to
erotic love
in
that it
always
includes an element
of
desire;
whereas
Arnim
produced
reasons
for
thinking
Plato
regarded
true
friendship as
existing only between good people
who
are
quite
self-sufficient,
possessing the
good already and so not desiring
it. It
is
interesting
to see
how
texts can be
found
to
support
both
interpretations.
As for the Phaedo, compare the following fairly recent interpretations:
The
subject
of the discussion s the desirability
f death.'3
It willbe wellto askwhat s thefundamental urpose
f the dialogue.
It is
not,
of
course,
to
prove
that the
humansoul
is
immortal,
houghmuch of
it is
devoted
to
arguments
for thatthesis; t
is
not to pay
a
tribute
of
admiration
o a
beloved
friendand
master,
though
hattribute s
undoubtedly aid;
t is not to
expound
or
propagate
metaphysical
doctrine,
hough
the
doctrine
of
Forms
(Ideas)
bulks
arge;
t
is,
I
would
say,
to
extend
and
deepenthrough
the mouth
of
a
consciously
Platonized
Socrates,
the essential
teaching
of
Socrates
himself,
namely
hat man's
upreme
oncern
s
the
tendance f his
soul,
or
(in
more
modern anguage)
he furthering
f his
insight
nto moraland
spiritual
values and the
application
of that
insight
n
all
his conduct.'4
The
Pythagoreans,Aristotleargues,
differfrom Plato only
in
denyingany separation
between
irst
principles
which hey dentify
withnumbers ather
han
ideas -and
the
things
said to be their
imitations;
he
Pythagorean eaching
on
reincarnation,
n
the
other
hand,
presupposes
he separability
f the
psyche
from
the
body.
The
attempt
o
reinterpret
he
meaning
of
separation,
nd
in
so
doing
to reverse
he
Pythagorean
position, is,
one might say, the
fundamental ntention
of
the Phaedo.'5
With such a variety of secondary interpretationsit is tempting to suppose that
each
represents
a
subjective
viewpoint
and
that none can
be
judged
to be
superior
to
any
other.
But that is not
what the commentators
believe,
as the
quotation
10. Ibid.,
22.
11.
Ibid.,
37.
12. David Bolotin,
Plato's
Dialogue on Friendship
(Ithaca, N.Y.,
1979).
13.
R. S.
Bluck, Plato's Phaedo
(London,
1955),
1.
14. R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo (Cambridge, Eng., 1955), 3.
15.
Rome Burger,
The Phaedo:
A Platonic
Labyrinth
(New Haven,
1984),
7.
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308 C. BEHAN MCCULLAGH
from Hackforth ndicates. CertainlyGadamerdefends his
interpretations y
suggesting
hat
they
accountfor more featuresof the
dialogues
han
previous
interpretations id.
In
particularhe believes they account for the inconclu-
sivenessof the Lysis, and the obvious inadequacyof the arguments n the
Phaedo.
The distinction havejust madebetween he basic
meaningof a text and the
text's
secondarymeaningneeds
to be
explained.The secondarymeaningof a
text
dependsupon its basic meaning,but the basic
meaning
of a text
depends
on no other
meaning
t
has.
The
basic meaningdoes,
of
course, dependupon
the
meaning
of
the wordsand phrasesused
in
the text, but not upon anyother
meaning
of the text
as
a
whole.
It is not
quite
the same
as
the literal
meaning
of the text, for the latter is sometimes aken to be a functionsimplyof the
semantics
and
syntax
of the
language
used
in
the
text,
and not of the context
in
whichthe text appears.The basic meaningof a text is sometimes
a
function
of its context.
In
discussions f the meaning
of
texts,
t
is
common
o
distinguish
he
meaning
of
the
sentences,according
o the rulesof
language;
he
meaning
of the utter-
ance, taking
nto accountthe
context
n
which
the
text was
produced;
and
the
meaningof the utterer, hat is the meaningwhich he author
ntended o convey
in writing he text. How does the basic meaningof a textrelate o these alterna-
tives?
From what
I
have
observed,
our
practice
s to decide
the
basic
meaning
of
a
text
by following
the
procedure
described
above. First we
considerthe
meaningof the sentences,drawing olely upon our
knowledgeof the language;
if
this is
unambiguous,we go no further.
If
it is ambiguous,however,we refer
to the context
in
the
hope
of
clearingup
the
ambiguity.
The
sentence There
are
bats
in
the
belfry meansonething
f
addressed
o the local
pest controller,
and another
f
spoken
to the
churchcricket
eam
looking
for
their
equipment.
If a
careful
study
of
the contextfails
to
resolve
he
ambiguity,
we then turn
our
attention
o the
speaker,
and
try
to
discover
what he
or she
probably
ntended
in
saying
what he or
she did. Thus the meaningof a text
may dependupon
the
meaning
of the
corresponding tterance,and even the
meaning
of
the
utterer,
but it
neednot do
so.
Indeed,
f
the
meaning
of a text is
unambiguous ccording
to the rules of
the
language,
t
may differ rom
the
meaning
which
the utterer
intended o
convey. Interestingly nough, precisely
he
same
procedure
s
fol-
lowed to determine
he secondarymeaningof a
text as well.
I
have
suggested hat one can sometimes ustify one's
understanding
f
the
basic
meaning
of
a text
by
reference
o
rules
of
semantics
and
syntax
alone.
In
practice,however, providinga completejustification
of an
interpretation
n
terms
of these
rules s
virtually mpossible,
as
the
rules
nvolved
defy complete
formulation.
Competent anguageusers
know how to
apply
hese
rules,
but not
how to state them.
In
practice, therefore,
we
regard
an
interpretation
f a
sentence
as
justified
f
most educatedusers
of
the
languageudge
t
to be correct.
Sometimes he
meaning
of
a
sentence,
taken on
its
own,
is
ambiguous.
To
resolve he
ambiguity
t
is conventional
o
choose
a
reading
whichbest
fits
the
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CAN
OUR UNDERSTANDING
OF OLD
TEXTS
BE OBJECTIVE?
309
context.
Derrida
asserts
hat
there
are no absolutely
determinable
ontexts
by
which
o justify
an
interpretation.6
But
once againhe overlooks
he
conventions
we use
to
determine
meaning.
We
always
choose
the meaningwhich
fits
best
withthe surroundingext, thatis a meaningwhicheitherentailsor is entailed
by
what is said
elsewhere
n the
text, or
at least
which
s
not incompatible
with
what
is said elsewhere.
This
usually
resolves
he ambiguity
quite
quickly.
If
it
does
not,
then
we commonly
draw
upon
our
knowledge
of the literary
and
historical
ontext
n which
he sentence
was uttered.
And
if this fails to
resolve
the
issue,
we turn
our
attention
to
the author
and the
circumstances
f her
composing
or
uttering
he
text to determine
what she
probably
ntended
t
to
mean.
Derrida
ries
to preclude
hese
movesby
denying
that the meaning
of
texts depends n any way upon the presenceof a contextof utteranceor the
presence
of the
author,
but
in that
he
is just
mistaken.
Often
it does
depend
upon
those things.
Certainly
we sometimes
come
upon
texts
in places far
re-
moved
from
the context
of
theirproduction,
and
that
fact sometimes
makes
t
difficult
o be sure
that we
have
understood
them correctly.
Historians
are
particularly
onscious
of this
difficulty,and
do what
they
can to overcome
t.
II. CRITERIA FOR JUDGING SECONDARY INTERPRETATIONS
As
has been
shown,
the secondary
meaning
of
texts
is much
more frequently
debated han
their
basic meaning,
but
that does
not mean
there is no
way
of
justifying
a
secondary
nterpretation.
A
secondary
nterpretation
f a text
is
often
an act
of
colligation,
n
which various
features
of the basic meaning
of
the text are
shown
to have
a certain
significance
when considered ogether.
Secondary
nterpretations
ake
a
variety
of forms. Theymay
simply
be
state-
mentsof the additionalllocutionaryorceof atext,
and
perhaps
f its secondary
field
of
reference.
A
secondary
nterpretation
might
ake
the formof a
statement
of
the author'sgeneral
ntention,
which
would
help
account
for the features
of
the
text which
could
be seen
as
helping
to fulfillit. We
have
already
seen
an
example
f
this
kindof
interpretation
n
Gadamer's
iscussion
f Plato's
general
intentions
n
writing
he
Lysis
andthePhaedo.
A
secondary
nterpretation
might
also consist
of a
general
summary
of the
content
of
the
text,
or a
summary
of
itsessential
deas
or
thesis. It could
even
be a
statement
f someoverall
tructure
of the text. Thekeycriterionusedin judgingthe adequacyof suchinterpreta-
tions
s
theirscope:
we
prefer
nterpretations
hich
colligate
he
greatest
number
of facts about
the text.
But
they
must
also be
not
very
complex,
and
coherent.
General ummaries
re
expected
o
satisfy
additional
equirements
ppropriate
to
their nature:
hey
must
be
accurate,
nformative,
and
comprehensive.
Texts
sometimes
llustrate
a
number
of
general
ruths,
as
the discussion
of
16.
Jacques
Derrida,
Margins
of
Philosophy,
310.
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310 C. BEHAN MCCULLAGH
the Lysis and the
Phaedo has
shown.
All
of these might be interesting, so
the
search
for
one
reading superior to the others could appear
pointless.
It
has a
point, however, which is to
provide
a
reading which somehow explains
all
the
major parts of the text, if possible, and thus to representthe whole text fairly.
That is
why the scope of
secondary interpretations is so important.
It is possible for a text to have
a significance
for
its
author's contemporaries
which the author did not intend. And it
is possible for a
text to have a significance
for modern
readers which neither the author
nor
the
author's contemporaries
would have known
-the Freudian interpretation of
The Turn of the Screw is
a
case
in
point.
Whose
secondary interpretation is the
correct one?
I
believe
that current conventions are
captured
by
the
following
distinctions.
I think
we
judge the most comprehensive interpretation to be the correct one, whether or
not it accords
with
the
author's
intended reading, or the reading of the author's
contemporaries.
The
historically
correct
interpretation
is
that
of the
majority
of
the author's educated
contemporaries, which might well be that intended
by
the
author. The intended
interpretation
is
simply that
intended by
the author.
1. The
dangersof anachronism
The best
secondary
interpretation of a text is usually also the historically correct
one, because modern theories often have implications which do not apply to an
old
text,
and so
frequently misrepresent
them.
Indeed, the
appropriateness
of
summarizing
texts
in
modern terms which the
author would never have used
has been
questioned. Quentin Skinner
has
shown
that this
practice, by historians
who have
not
carefully
understood the
basic
meaning
of the texts first,
can
lead
them to
misrepresent them. For example, those
who have interpreted the
political
views of the
Levellers
in
seventeenth-century Britain as a
philosophy
of
liberal
democracy, simply because the Levellers
were concerned
with
an
extension of the right to vote, have completely mistaken their views.
First the
paradigmmakes it unnecessarily ifficult o
account for some of the most
characteristic
eaturesof
Leveller
deology.
For
if
we areprogrammedo
think
n
terms
of
the
republican
ecularism f the
movement,
t
is not
surprising
hat
their
agonizings
over the
Monarchy
and
their
appeals
to
religioussentiment
begin
to
look
somewhat
baffling.
And
second, the paradigmof
democracy
will
tend to lead the historical
investigation
n
rather
nappropriate irections.Some anachronistic oncept
of
the
welfare
state
has to be
found in Leveller hought, as well
as a belief
in
manhood
suffrage,
which
they
never
n
fact
held.17
To
describe
the
Levellers as
presenting
a
theory
of
liberal democracy
is thus not
only
unfair,
in
that it
fails to accommodate
many
of their
important
concerns
about the crown and
religion,
but it is also
misleading
in
that
it
implies
concerns
for a welfare state
and manhood
suffrage
which
were
not theirs
at
all. Such
17. Quentin kinner, Meaning ndUnderstandingnthe Historyof Ideas, Historyand heory
8
(1969),
27.
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CAN
OUR
UNDERSTANDING
OF
OLD TEXTS
BE OBJECTIVE?
311
mistakes
can be
avoided,
however,
if the
historian
carefully
checks
whether
the
basic
meaning
of a
text
warrants
the modern description
of
it.
Despite
the
dangers
of summarizing
old texts
in modern terms,
John
Dunn
suggests that such summaries are useful in showing the modern relevance of
these
texts.
He therefore
applauds
the practice,
while
remaining
concerned
about
their accuracy:
To present
a
complex
argument
from the
past
in
terms
of
its significance
for us
may often
seem
mendacious
and
to present it
with
the
greatest
concern
for historical
specificity
but without
exploring
its significance
is
likely to seem
trivial.18
The history
of philosophy,
like
the history
of science,
must
needs
be Whig
as
to subject-matter
. .
. [and]
.
.
.
Tory
as to
truth. 19
The
process
of
carefully
judging
the
justification
of a
modern
summary
of
an old text is well illustratedby J. W. Gough's discussion of Willmore Kendall's
thesis
that
Locke's
theory
was
not
individualist,
as has
been
commonly
thought,
but
that
it gives
an authoritarian
and collectivist
account
of political
power.20
To judge
the
adequacy
of these
descriptions,
Gough
interprets
them
and
then looks
for
evidence
relevant to
them
in
Locke's
writing.
An
individu-
alist
theory,
it
seems,
is
one which
presents
government
as severely
limited
by
the
rights
of individuals.
An
authoritarian
theory
insists upon
the govern-
ment's
authority
over
individuals,
unless
the government
is so bad
that
the
people are entitled to revolt. There are passages in Locke which support both
views,
so
how does
Gough
decide
the issue?
First,
he carefully
examines
the
crucial passages
in context
to see
whether they
do
support
the
interpretation
suggested
for them.
He
finds that
some which appear
to support
the
individualist
interpretation
do not
really
do
so,
when
studied
in
their
context.2
Second,
he
points
out
that there
is evidence
for and
against
both readings,
and that
each
can only
be defended by ignoring
as
insignificant
those
passages
which
tell
against
it.
As
Gough
puts
it:
Many
critics
have
noticed
features
of
Locke's
theory
which
seem
inconsistent
with
the
usual
individualist interpretation
of
him.
The critics
have
varied,
however,
in the
degree
of
emphasis
they have
laid
on such discrepancies,
and
have
generally
tended to
treat
the
individualism
as fundamental,
and
to
minimize
what
is
inconsistent
with this,
either
ignoring
it
in
their
final verdict
or dismissing
it as
ill-considered
and unrepresentative
of
Locke's
real
view.
Mr.
Kendall,
in
effect,
reverses
this
tendency.
It is
the
individualist
passages
which are
inconsistencies
for
him,
and he
emphasizes
instead the
points
-and
they certainly
amount
to a
considerable
array-on
the
other
side.22
Finally, Gough concludes that the truth about Locke lies somewhere between
the
two extremes.
His
theory
does
not
neatly
fit either
modern model,
though
it contains
important
elements
of
both.
18.
J. Dunn, The
Political Thought
of John Locke (Cambridge,
Eng., 1969), 208.
19.
J. Dunn, Political
Obligation n
Its HistoricalContext:
Essays
in Political Theory Cam-
bridge,
Eng., 1980),
26.
20. J. W.
Gough, John Locke's
Political Philosophy (Oxford,
1956), chap. 2.
21. Ibid., 29-30.
22. Ibid., 28.
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312
C. BEHAN
MCCULLAGH
WasLocke
then,
after all,
an
individualist?
think
we
can sayhe
was, but
he
wasnot
a thorough-going,
xtreme
ndividualist....
He standsmid-way
between
wo
extreme
positions
n
politics....
Wemay
conclude,
hen,
that Locke
wasan individualist
n
a
qualified
ense.
Hedid not
imagine
he
state
to be an
artificially
abricated
ombination
of naturally
eparate
ndividuals;
e didnot championhe individual gainst hecommu-
nity,and
barely
onsidered
hepossibility
of conflict
between
hem.
Butthe
government
he recommended
was in
effect
he parliamentary
imited
monarchy
approved
of
by his
Whig
contemporaries,
nd this
meant hat
it
would
be constitutional
nd
not absolute,
and that
it would not invade
the
liberties
of
the subject.23
Old
theories seldom
fit modern paradigms
neatly,
but
they
sometimes
have
important
ideas
and
values
in
common.
These
are
highlighted
by
modern
sum-
maries
of them. The
extreme
interpretations
of Locke were
neither accurate,
comprehensive, nor fair. They implied positions contrary to those Locke
adopted
or
they
ignored
important
parts
of
his
theory,
thus giving
a
misleading
impression
of
the whole.
That
is why they
were
finally rejected
by
Gough.
2. The
illocutionary
force
of
texts
The historically
correct
interpretation
of a text usually
coincides
with
the
au-
thor's
intended
meaning,
as
authors are usually
well
aware of how
their
texts
will be
read
by
their contemporaries.
Interestingly
enough, historians
frequently
take the identity of the two for granted. Skinner, for example, has shown
that John
Locke,
in
his
Two Treatises
of
Government,
was rejecting
and
repudiating
one
of
the
most
widespread
and
prestigious
forms
of
political
argu-
ment
at the
time,
simply by
noting
the
prevailing
conventions
of debate
about
political
obligation,
the role
of
the
ancient
English
constitution
in those,
and
Locke's
failure
to
mention
it.24
Similarly
he has
shown
that
Machiavelli
in
places
challenges
the
prevailing
assumptions
of the
mirror-for-princes
writers,
by
comparing
what
those
writers
said
with certain
passages
in The
Prince.25
Skinner
assumes that these implications of the texts were intended by their authors,
which
is
probably
true,
though
nothing
need
be known
about their
intentions
to
identify
them.
These
are
conventional
secondary
meanings
of the texts
justi-
fied
by
the context
of the writing together
with
the rules of
language
which
warrant
the statements
reporting
them.
There
are times,
however,
when
the
further
illocutionary
force
of
a
text
cannot
be inferred
from the
context,
and
can
only
be
known
by
discovering
the
author's
intentions.
For
example,
to decide
whether
Thomas
Hobbes
and
Pierre
Bayle
meant their
pious
utterances to be taken ironically, historians have to
judge
their
intentions,
as there
is
no
hint of
irony
in their
texts.26
23.
Ibid.,
51.
24.
Quentin
Skinner,
Some
Problems
n the
Analysis
of
Political
Thought
and
Action,
Polit-
ical
Theory
2
(1974),
286.
25.
Quentin
Skinner,
The Foundations
of
Modern
Political
Thought.
Volume
1:
The
Renais-
sance
(Cambridge,Eng., 1978),131.
26. See
Quentin
Skinner,
Meaning
nd
Understanding
n the History
of
Ideas,
33-35.
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CAN
OUR UNDERSTANDING
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TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE?
313
An
author's
ntention
can
be
stated
n
modern
words,
I think,
so long
as
the
author
would
have
consented
o an
appropriate
ranslation
f
them
as
accurately
representing
is or her
intention.
Skinner,
or
example,
has said
that:
During
theeighteenth entury, he enemiesof the rulingoligarchynEngland ought o
legitimate
heir
attacks
on
thegovernment
y insisting
hat they
were
motivated
entirely
by
reverence
or the constitution,
and thus
that
their actions
deserved
to
be commended
as patriotic
rather
han
condemned
as factious. 27
t is very
doubtful
hat
eighteenth-century
ritishpoliticians
would
have
recognized
heir
explanations
s
legitimations.
egitimation,
s Skinner
himself
has
acknowl-
edged,28
s
a Weberian erm,
and
derives
ts
modern
meaning
from
Weber's
theory
of legitimation.
Eighteenth-century
oliticians
would
have
said
they
were
justifyingtheirattackson the government,not legitimating hem. But if the
meaning
of
Weber's
erm
were
explained
o them,
then they
probably
would
agree
hat
n
justifying
heir
attacks hey
were ndeed
egitimating
hem,
making
them politically
acceptable
according
o
recognized
authorities.
Because
the
best
interpretation,
he
historically
correct
nterpretation,
nd
the
author's
nterpretation
f
a text
are usually
he same,
historians
requently
fail
to distinguish
hem. Thisis
the case
in the
commonly
accepted
reading
of
Gulliver's
Travels s
a
political
atire.
This
s
an
excellent
xample
of
a
secondary
interpretationf a text, one whichstates ts additional llocutionary orceand
its secondary
ield
of reference.
Gulliver's
Travels
an
be understood
at a
basic
level as
a story
about
the adventures
of
Gulliver.
That,
indeed,
is
how
most
people
understand
t today.
To Swift's
contemporaries,
owever,
amiliar
with
the details
of
political
ife
in
Britain,
ts
forceand
its references
ppeared
quite
different.
They
took
it to
be not
just
a story,
but
also
a satire;
t
referred
not
just
to Gulliverand
the imaginary
ands
he
visited,
but
also
to
political
figures
of his day
with
the intention
of
ridiculing
hem.
A. E.
Case
has pointed
out,
for example, hat whencontemporarieseadthat theEmperorwhomGulliver
encountered
n
his
firstvoyagewas
strong
nd
masculine,
with
anAustrian
Lip
and
arched
Nose,
his
Complexion
olive,
his
Countenance
rect,
his Body
and
Limbswell
proportioned
..
His
Dress
was
very
plainand
simple
..
His
Voice
wasshrill,
but veryclear
and
articulate,
hen
they
thought
of George
I's
thick
and ungainly
form,
his bad taste
in
dress,
and
his
guttural
and unintelligible
pronunciation
f
the
little
English
he knew. 29
The
interpretation
f
Gulliver's
Travels s
a political
satire
has
the strongest
possiblesupport.Itaccounts or a very argenumberof thedetailsof thestory.
(The
third essay
in
Case's
book
explains
he political
allegories
n detail.)
It
is
an
example
of
a
genre
amiliar
o Swift's
contemporaries,
nd so readily
denti-
fied
by
them.
And
the
interpretation
s
consistent
with what s
known
of
Swift's
intentions
n
writing.
Similarustification
an
be provided
or the interpretation
27.
Quentin
Skinner,
The
Idea
of a
Cultural
Lexicon,
Essays
in
Criticism
29
(1979),
216.
28. Quentin Skinner, Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action, 292.
29.
Arthur
E. Case,
Four
Essays
in
Gulliver's
Travels
(Gloucester,
Mass., 1958),
71.
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314
C. BEHAN
MCCULLAGH
of Cervantes'
Don Quixote
as
a
parody
of both the
aims and
means
of knightly
chivalry.
A. J.
Close,
in
defending
his
reading
of
the
story,
wrote: The
aims,
like the
acts, are
a
madly literal
mimicry
of
the stereotype
behaviour
of
the
heroesof chivalric omance, ndwouldhavebeenimmediately ecognizedas
such by contemporary
eaders.30
Sometimes
he
further force
of a text
is not to
be identified
with a
genre
such
as satire
or
parody,
but
with a
conventional
mplication
of the text in
its
particular
ontext.
For example,
when
a piano
teacher
tells
a
pupil that
she
played
a piece
beautifully,
she is
not only
describing
he
playing,
but by
doing
so
she is
praising
he
student,
and by
doing
that she is encouraging
her.
These
further
descriptions
are warranted
by
the
rules
of
language
andthe
context.
3. Summaries
f
the basic meaningof
a
text
A
very
common
form
of
higher
understanding
f the meaning
of
a text is
that
achieved
by
producing
n
adequate
ummary
f
what t says,
that
s,
of
itsbasic
meaning.
A
common
reason
for
summarizing
n author's
views
is to compare
them
with those
of others.
J. G.
A. Pocock
has
made a
special
study
of
the
writing
of
James
Harrington.
n
an essay
entitled Machiavelli,
Harrington
nd English
EighteenthCentury deologies, he produceda summary f Harrington's olit-
icalthought,quoting
him
only
for the
sakeof
illustration.
His summary
s often
quite
terse: Harrington's
ntire
theory
of
monarchy
can
be
reducedto two
propositions:
irst,that
theKing's
agents
and servants
must
be
supported
ither
upon
the land, as a
feudal
aristocracy,
or about
his person
as praetorians
or
janissaries; econd,
that whichever
of these
methods
s
adopted,
relationsbe-
tween hemilitary lass
and
theKing
will be so prone
o
tensions
hat
monarchy
can
neverbe a
stable
form
of
government. '
ocock
provided
his
summary
of Harrington'sheory in order to compare t with that of the first Earl of
Shaftesbury.
This
practice
s
repeated
hroughout
he
essay.
For
example
he
used summaries
o
compare
what
he
called
the 'County'
vision
of
English
politics
with
Harrington's
iew:
If we
now summarize
he
main outlines of
the 'County'
vision
of
Englishpolitics
as
it
appears
n a
multitude
of
writings
in
the
century
hat
follows 1675, we
may
attempt
o see
what
is Harrington,
or
rather
neo-Harrington,
bout
it. 32
Historians
aim
to
produce
summaries
which
are
accurate,
nformative,
and
comprehensive.A summarys accuratef the statementsn the text instantiate
it and are not
inconsistent
with
it. Informativeness
ecreases
as
generality
n-
creases,
as a
very general
summary
ould
be instantiated
by
a
large
number
of
diverse
exts.
So
historians
prefer
a
summary
which
is
no
more
general
than
30. A.
J. Close,
Don Quixote
and 'The Intentionalist Fallacy, '
British
Journal
of
Aesthetics
12 (1972),
13.
31. J.
G. A.
Pocock, Politics,
Language
and Time:Essays
on
Political
Thought
and
History
(London,
1972),
116-117.
32.
Ibid.,
124.
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CAN
OUR UNDERSTANDING
OF OLD
TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE?
315
they require.
The level
of generality
s that
atwhichcomparisons
f interest
an
be
mademost
clearly.
A summary
hould
be comprehensive
nthatit covers
he
variousaspects
of the
basicmeaning
of the text
in
question,
so that each
signifi-
cant partof the basictext instantiatespartof the summary.Let me illustrate.
C.
B.
Macpherson's
Marxist
nterpretation
f Locke
in ThePolitical
Theory
of
Possessive
Individualism
as earned
much
respectbut
also some
criticism.
Alan Ryan
has
argued hat
it is
not accurate.
For example,
Macpherson aid
that Locke
denied
that laborers
without
property
could
be
full citizens,
as
citizenshipwas
reserved or
those
with
property.
Ryan
objects
hat some
plainly
unambiguous
statements
by Locke
.
. .
flatly contradict
this summary
of
Locke's
views.
Locke
n fact maintained
hatallrational
adults
couldbe
citizens,
and deniedcitizenshiponly to Lunaticks nd Idiots. 33Macphersonwas also
mistaken n thinking
hat Locke
restricted
property
o
goods, for
Locke
de-
scribed
property
s
that which
othershave
no
right
o take
without he person's
consent,
and
specifically
ncluded
such personal
things as
life, liberty,
and
health.
Ryanconcludes
hat
the
orce of Macpherson's
ccount
challenges
ne
to
produce
some
alternativepicture
hat fits
the text better
than this. 34
Dunn's
criticism
of
John
Plamenatz's
nterpretation
f
Locke reveals
the
importance
of
summaries
being
comprehensive
f
they are
to be acceptable.
Plamenatz,seeingLocke as a greatliberal philosopher,assumedthat Locke
based
political
obligation
upon
the consent
of
the
governed.
But,
Dunn
points
out,
this
interpretationgnores
the
theological
dimension
of Locke's
hought.
Referring
o a large
rangeof
Locke's
writings,
Dunnshows
hat
Lockegrounded
political
obligation
in
man's
duty
to God
of
self-preservation.
Since
people
cannot
subsist
without
society,God,
who
wills them to
subsist,
also wills
them
to use their reason
to discover
he rules
by
which
a
society
can be
maintained,
and to follow
them.
People
consent to
others
havingauthority
over
them,
so
that consentis a necessaryconditionof politicalobligation.But what is also
necessary,
o drive
them to obey,
is duty
to
God.35
By ignoring
he theological
dimension
of
Locke's
hought,
Plamenatz
and
othershad
produced
a
summary
which said
nothing
about
large
and
important
parts
of
Locke's
writings
on
political
obligation.
Whenan
important,
relevant
part
of
any
author's
work s
ignored
by
a
sum-
mary
description,
he summary
s
prone
to
give
a
misleading
mpression
of
the
whole.
Pocock has
explained
how the
habit
of
commentators
n
ignoring
books
IIIandIVof Hobbes'Leviathan,whichdiscussreligioushistory,hasledpeople
to
believe
that
Hobbes'
thought
was
unhistorical
o a
degree
which
it
was
not.36
ndeed
he
practice
has
even
fuelled he
belief
thatHobbes
acked
religious
33. Alan Ryan,
Locke
and the Dictatorship
of the Bourgeoisie,
Political
Studies
13 (1965),
223.
34. Ibid., 227-228.
35. J. Dunn, Political Obligation in Its Historical Context, 29-33.
36. J. G.
A. Pocock,
Politics, Language
and
Time,
149-150.
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316
C. BEHAN MCCULLAGH
convictions
and was, perhaps,
an atheist.37
ocock condemnssuch
interpreta-
tions
of Hobbes'
writing
and
of
his convictions
as
seriously
misleading.
4. The key dea
of a text:
a tertiary nterpretation
Anotherkindof
higherunderstanding f
the meaning
of a text whichhistorians
sometimes
eek involves dentifying
he key dea
of an author'swork.
A
key
idea, itseems, s one
uponwhich he other
principle deas
o someextentdepend.
Once a
work
has been
summarized,
t is then sometimes
possible
o identify ts
key idea. For this
reason,
an interpretation f the
key idea of
a text could be
regarded
as a tertiary
nterpretation f the
meaning
of the text, depending
as
it does upon a secondary
ummaryreading
of the text.
In a thoughtfuldiscussionof the fundamentaldeain Harrington's olitical
philosophy
Pocock discusses
C. B. Macpherson'sbelief
that Harrington's
system
will not
work
unless
entrepreneurial
ehaviour
n
land owners
is
pre-
sumed
o be at its basis. 38
Macpherson
rgued
hat
changes
n the
social
distribu-
tion
of
power
in
seventeenth-century
ngland
were seen
by
Harrington
o be
the result
of
changes
n
patterns
of wealth,particularly
and
ownership.
Pocock
thinks
Harrington
aw it
as
the result
of
changes
n
the
legalobligations
which
went
with
land tenure.
Feudal
obligations
o
serve an overlordgave place
to
independent enured freeholders. Pocock arguesthat Macpherson'sunder-
standing
of
the
key
idea
in
Harrington's ystem
is
wrong
because
certain
m-
portant
featuresof his system
do not
depend
upon
it.
Harrington's
otion
of
the
power
whichthe
man
who
has
property
exerts
over the man
who has
none
does
not entail
any
particular
escription
f
the economicrelations
between he
two men,
or
of
the
economic
process
n
which
the two are
engaged.
All
that is
necessary
o know is
that
the one is independent
and
the other dependent
on
him. s39
Inanotheressay,on Burke nd theAncientConstitution, Pocockexplains
how Burke's onservative olitical
heory
s an
expression
f
a
theory
about
the
nature
of
English
awdevelopedby Sir
EdwardCoke
and
SirMatthew
Hale
in
the seventeenth
entury.
This
theory
maintained
hat
English
common
aw was
based
upon
custom, interpreted
nd
applied
n
courts,
from time
immemorial,
and
that it enshrined
he
practical
wisdom of
ages
and so deserved
he utmost
respect.
This theorywas applied
o the
English
constitution
n
what was called
the doctrine
of the
ancient constitution,
o defend the constitution
against
reform.That doctrinewasrespectedby many n Burke's ime,and wasusedby
him
in
1782 o
oppose
movesto reform
t. Instead
of
talking
about
a
key
dea
Pocock
here
refers
o
a
root
dea :Burke
roots
his
argument
n the idea that
the
law is
immemorialand
customary. 40
37. Ibid., 161.
38. Ibid.,
111.
39. Idem.
40. Ibid.,
229.
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CAN
OUR
UNDERSTANDING
OF OLD TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE?
317
5. Cases of underdeterminationf
a secondary
nterpretation
In describing
ach kindof secondary
meaning
of a text I have drawnattention
to criteria
which historians
espect n deciding
whethera secondary
nterpreta-
tion of a text is acceptable r not. It sometimeshappens,however, hat two or
more different econdary
nterpretations
meet these criteria
equally well,
and
thenthere
s no rationalground or
saying hatone interpretation
s morecorrect
than another.
For
example,according o Christopher
Butler,
there are several
differentmodern summary
accounts of
Emily
Brontd's
WutheringHeights
whichareequallywarranted.
He accepts
hat theyall meet
nternalcriteria
of
accuracy,
consistency,scope,
simplicity, and fruitfulness. 41
erek
Traversi,
for
instance,
sees
it
as
contrastingbasic human
emotions
with the superficial
graces of civilized ife; TerryEagleton arguesthat Catherine tradesher au-
thenticselfhood
for
social
privilege,
howingan ideological
contradiction
e-
tween
the
individualand
the family;whereas
Patsy Stoneman
ees
it
as
demon-
strating
the pressures
o conformityput upon
women
in
Victoriannuclear
families.42
utler ays
hat the ext aloneunderdetermines
ur nterpretation, 43
and
suggests
we should accept
the
diversity
of readings
n
this
case.
Similarly
Paul
B.
Armstrong as
discusseddifferent econdary
nterpretations
of EdgarAllan Poe's
The Turnof
the Screw.EdmundWilson
observed
hat as
only the governesssees the ghost of Peter Quint, the storycan be seento be
about the
fantasies
of
a
thwarted
Anglo-Saxonspinster -an
interpretation
basedupon
Freudian
heory.
For
Wayne
Booth, on the other
hand, the ghosts
are
real,
and it is
just
a
frightening host story.
Finally, Robert
Heilmannhas
read it as a struggle
f evil to possess
the humansoul. 44
Armstrong
draws
attention
o the way
a critic'sview
of
life
informshis or her
interpretation.
He
acknowledges
hat
minimum
tandards
have
to
be met for
an
interpretation
o
be
acceptable.
It must
demonstrate
nternal coherence
and
effectiveness
n
meetingunexpectedchallenges, 45e says, meaningthat the interpretation
should coherewell
with
the
basic
meaning
of
the
text,
though
even this is
not
alwaysunambiguous.46
rmstrongargues hat,
in
this case
at
least,
an
appeal
to the historyof
the
book's composition,
to Poe's intentions,
will
not resolve
the issuebecause hese
can
be variously nterpreted
s
well.47He finds
no rational
groundsfor preferring
ne
of these interpretations
o
another.
It
is
interesting
o
notice
that the
Freudian
nterpretation
f
The
Turn
of
the
Screw
nearly
succumbed
o
the
criticism
by
A.
J.
A. Waldock that
it
could
41. Christopher
Butler, On the Rivalry of
Norms for
Interpretation, New Literary
History 20
(1988-1989),
133.
42. Ibid., 129-130.
43.
Ibid., 132.
44. Paul B. Armstrong,
History
and Epistemology:
The Example
of the Turn of the Screw,
New Literary History
19
(1987-1988),
697-698.
45.
Ibid., 700.
46. Ibid., 701-702.
47.
Ibid., 707-708.
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318
C. BEHAN
MCCULLAGH
not
explain
the
governess'saccurate
description
of Peter
Quint, whose
ghost
according
o this theory
she
had never
seen. Armstrong
notes
that a
single
failure
o
fit
may thus
have devastating
epercussions
or the entire
nterpretive
configuration. 48s it turnedout, the Freudian heorywas saved, at least to
some
extent,by
John Silver,
who identified everalways
n
which
the
governess
could
have learned
of Quint'sfeatures,
including
reports
from
people
in the
village
nearby.
IV. THE PROBLEM
OF
PAST
CULTURES
I have argued
that there
are
objective
criteria
for
deciding
which
basic
and
secondary nterpretations f a text are acceptable,and which are not. In the
case
of
the
basic meaning
of a text,
these criteriaare normally
decisive.
When
it
comes
to secondary
nterpretations,
here is
more
room for equally
well
supported
alternative
eadings.
Now
I mustraise
a
problem
which
confronts
historians
nterpreting
ld
texts.
Historians
want
to know
what old
texts
meant
when
they
were irstpublished.
Historians
do not
merely
ook for
an
interpreta-
tion
of the
text which
will
fit it
well.
They
look
for
a
reading
whichwill do
that
and
which
is also
likely
to
have been
historically
correct that
is, a
reading
which hemajorityof educated eaderswouldhaveacceptedat the timethetext
was written.
But are
they
ever
justified
n
thinking
hat
their
interpretation
f
an
old
text
is historically
orrect?
Hans-Georg
Gadamer
has argued
at length
in
his book
Truthand
Method
that
it is never reasonable
o
suppose
that
we have
an
accurate
knowledge
of
whattextsreally
meant
n
the past.
Gadamer
presents
he
process
of
interpreta-
tion
as one
of
trying
o
findan
interpretation
hich
willmake he textmeaningful
to
oneself.
He likens
it to the
process
of
trying
to
understand
what another
person s saying n conversation.Onebeginswith thephysical ounds,or in the
case
of
texts,
the marks
on a
paper,
andtheseare
nterpreted
n
accordance
with
the
interpreter's
xisting
knowledge
of the
language
and
of the
subject-matter.49
If one's
initial nterpretation
f
a
text
does
not
fit
it
exactly,
if
it
is inconsistent
withsome
featuresof
the
text,
or
makes
no
sense
of
them,
then
different
nterpre-
tations
are
tried to see
whether
hey
are
more
comprehensive.
At
every
stage,
Gadamer
points
out,
the
possible
interpretations
re
drawn
from one's
own
prior
knowledge
of likely
meanings,
one's prejudices,
s
he calls them.50t is
no surprise,Gadamer oncludes, hat interpretationshange romtimeto time.
They
are inescapably
relative
to the knowledge
of
the
interpreter.
You,
for
example,
know
immediately
when
you
read
a
classic
essayby
Mommsen
he
only
time
when it could
have been
written. Even
a master
of the
historical
method s
not able to
keep
himself
entirely
ree
from the
prejudices
f his
time,
48.
Ibid.,
701.
49. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 349-352