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The Tenuous Future of the Merida Initiative by William McNamara
A m e r i c a n U n i v e r s i t y P o l i t i c s P o l i c y a n d L a w S c h o l a r s P r o g r a m
DOOMED TO FAIL
ABSTRACT
The Merida Initiative is a joint cooperation between the governments of the
United States and Mexico to combat rising drug violence at the U.S.-Mexico Border.
Launched in 2007, the U.S. State Department has since spent 2 Billion Dollars on Merida
and its partner programs, with little to show for it. Violent crime rates continue to rise in
Mexico, and no substantive effect has been observed on drug abuse in the United States.
By all measurable statistics, the Merida Initiative would seem to be a failure. But drug
policy experts at the University of San Diego and at the Woodrow Wilson Institute
suggest that those measures won’t change in the short term until we fix the long-term
problems inherent in Mexico’s justice system.
Mexicans face a very serious lack of faith in their justice system, and so very little
is facilitated at the state and local levels to combat the powerful drug cartels. Corrupt
officials also inhibit the ability of the Merida Initiative to have a substantial effect on
communities most at risk. Because of these deeper problems, the Merida Initiative is in
many ways doomed to fail. But it can be salvaged. President Obama has moved much of
Merida’s funding out of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement and into
the Economic Support Fund, which focuses more on community building and justice
reform. While this has not produced results in the short terms that would satisfy critics in
Congress, it is a strategy that could solve many of Mexico’s problems in the long run.
The best strategy that the State Department can take moving forward would be to
integrate enforcement and support strategies to neutralize both the drug cartels and the
capacity that they have to operate in Mexican power vacuums.
INTRODUCTION
In 1971, Richard Nixon gave a famous press conference in which he declared that
drug abuse was “public enemy number one” in the United States1. In the 45 years since
then, the United States has conducted the broadest most expensive anti-drug campaign in
the history of the world, with recent price tags surpassing 1 trillion dollars2. The
campaign began focused on domestic supply and demand, but in the last decade has
shifted to a focus on international drug suppliers, particularly the Mexican Drug Cartels
operating on the U.S.-Mexico border.
In the last few decades, Mexico has become a major drug producing and transit
country (Figure 1). This presents any number of global security concerns particularly for
the nearby countries most directly affected. Mexico is the main foreign supplier of drugs
to the United States. It transits most of the marijuana and cocaine entering the United
States, as well as a significant percentage of the methamphetamines and heroin3. In
2008, the National Drug Intelligence Center reported that Mexican drug trafficking
organizations are the "greatest organized crime threat" to the United States today, due to
the increased distribution and transportation networks Mexican cartels have put in place
to meet US need.4
1 Richard Nixon: "Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and 2 Branson, Richard. "War on Drugs a Trillion-dollar Failure." CNN. Cable News Network, n.d. Web. 25 Apr. 2016. 3 Cook, Colleen W., ed. "Mexico's Drug Cartels". CRS Report for Congress. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE. 2007. p. 2. Retrieved 2016-03-12. 4 ibid.
Any domestic drug control initiative in the United States must have an
international focus on the production and trafficking of drugs at the U.S.-Mexico border.
However early attempts to suppress the drug trade were met with increasing violence
from paramilitary drug cartels, most notably the Sinaloa Drug Cartel. Targeting the
organizational capacity of these drug cartels is a strategic necessity to reduce drug abuse
in the United States.
“The Influence of Mexican DTOs over domestic drug trafficking is unrivaled…Mexican DTOs control drug distribution in the most U.S. cities, and they are gaining strength in markets they do not yet control.” –U.S. National Drug Intelligence Center
After the inauguration of Mexican President Felipe Calderón in 2006, and his
subsequent pledge to battle corruption and drug trafficking, drug violence surged in areas
dominated by the most prominent drug organizations. The death toll rose as these groups
fought each other and the Mexican government for coveted control of lucrative drug
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Figure 1: Drug Seizures at Southwest Border
Methamphetamines Heroin
routes. According to recent studies, income inequality, political instability and crime have
all contributed to the increases in violence, but the major factor is the drug trade. This
violence resulted in more than 60,000 deaths in Mexico during the Felipe Calderón
Administration (December 2006-November 2012). Another 35,000 organized crime-
related deaths have occurred since the start of the Enrique Peña Nieto Administration.5
In October 2007, the United States and Mexico launched the Merida Initiative, a
$1.4 billion State Department program for US assistance in Mexico and Central
America's drug war for FY 2008-FY 2010.6 This marked a shift in US foreign drug
policy, as until this time Colombia had been the main recipient of US aid, not Mexico.
5 This figure is an estimate; full-year estimates of organized-crime related killings in 2015 are not yet available. Kimberley Heinle, Cory Molzahn, and David A. Shirk, Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2014, Trans-Border Institute (TBI), April 2015. Eduardo Guerrero Gutierrez, Nexos, February 1, 2015. 6 Cook, Colleen W., and Claire Ribando Seelke. 2008. "Merida Initiative: Proposed U.S. Anti-crime and Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and Central America." Congressional Research Services. RS22837. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/103694.pdf
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Source: INEGI Authors' calculations based on INEGI homocide data and CONAPO's 2010 population estimates for all years.
Figure 2: Homocide Rate in Mexico (1995-2013)
According to the US Department of State, Colombia received $600 million for FY 2006,
while Mexico received approximately $40 million.7
Those numbers would drastically change as a result of the Merida Initiative. In the
first couple of years, close to $1 Billion was appropriated by Congress to foreign aid
accounts8. In recent years, while President Obama has been scaling back Merida funds,
foreign aid to Mexico has far exceeded other countries its size9.
As the US enters its tenth year of Merida Initiative implementation, it is important
to assess whether or not it has been a successful policy. The intention of the United States
and Mexico was to reduce the drug trafficking problem, cartel influence, and associated
violence and corruption, while restoring order to much of Mexico through
implementation of the initiative. This paper will address the viability of the Merida
Initiative as an effective policy for reducing continued drug-related violence and
homicide in Mexico.
7 Grayson, George W. 2010. Mexico: Narco-violence and a failed state? New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers. 8 "The Merida Initiative Fact Sheet." 2009. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. Retrieved from http://www.state. gov/p/ini/ris/fs/122397.html 9 ibid.
POLICY HISTORY
As with any well-funded government program, there exists a substantial amount
of research on the Mérida Initiative. To effectively answer my research question, we must
understand what the goals of the initiative were, then investigate whether or not they have
been achieved. We will be looking at the evaluative framework that Merida sets up for
itself as well as scholarly articles identifying key societal measures that would indicate
success for the Merida Initiative.
The Merida Initiative was intensely debated in Congress; lawmakers were hesitant
to pass an aid proposal in light of the Mexican history of government corruption.
Proponents of the initiative stressed that equipment and training, rather than direct cash
transfers, would be offered to Mexico in an effort to curtail potential corruption.10 The
goal of the proposal was to maximize the effectiveness of already existing programs to
curb drug, human, and weapons trafficking through four different types of funding:
counternarcotics/counterterrorism/border security; public security/ law enforcement;
institution building; and rule of law and program support. At its inception, the main
objectives of the Merida Initiative were to:
1) Break the power and impunity of criminal organizations; 2) Strengthen border, air and maritime controls; 3) Improve the capacity of justice systems in the region; and 4) Curtail gang activity and diminish local drug demand.11
10 ibid. 11 Seelke, Clare R. 2010. "Merida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues." Library of Congress, Congressional Research Services R40135.
These components did not receive equal funding. In fact, at the launch of the
program the first pillar received vastly more funding than any of the others, as anti-cartel
efforts were considered more important than any society-building (Figure 3a). The
comparative allocation of the funds has been the strategic prerogative of the executive
since the beginning of the initiative. And depending on the President the strategy has
changed. Whereas President Bush heavily favored counter-narcotics and border security,
President Obama has been moving closer toward community and institution building.
Figure 3: Merida Funding Request by Program Components
(U.S. $ in Millions) Type of Funding FY2008
(Mexico) FY2008 (Central America)
FY2009 (Mexico)
FY2009 (Central America)
Counternarcotics, Counterterrorism, and Border Security
306.3 16.6 238.3 40.0
Public Security and Law Enforcement
56.1 25.7 158.5 32.0
Institution Building and Rule of law
100.6 7.7 30.7 23.0
Program Support 37.0 N/A 22.5 5.0 Total 500.0 50.0 450.0 100.0 Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2009.
The process of procuring funding from Congress for the first year of the program
was ultimately easier than service delivery itself. Since the initiative stipulated no cash
transfers or money disbursement to the recipient countries, it fell to the State Department
and other government agencies to facilitate service delivery through new and existing
programs in Mexico. The State Department funds relief to Mexico through 7 different
accounts (Figure 3a). The two most important accounts are International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) and the Economic Support Fund (ESF). Through
INCLE, the State Department subsidizes equipment for law enforcement and private
defense contractors to combat the trafficking of narcotics into the United States12. The
Economic Support Fund is more directed at institution building, funding education,
welfare, and systems of employment throughout Mexico as alternatives to violence13.
Figure 3a: U.S. Assistance to Mexico by Account, FY2011-FY2017 (U.S. $ Millions)
Account FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16(R) FY16(P) FY17(R) INCLE 117.0 248.5 195.1 148.1 110.0 80.0 100.0 80.0 ESF 18.0 33.3 32.1 46.8 46.1 39.0 39.0 49.0 FMF 8.0 7.0 6.6 6.6 4.7 7.0 7.0 3.0 IMET 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 NADR 5.7 5.4 3.8 3.8 2.9 0.0 N/A N/A GHCS 3.5 1.0 0.0. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 DA 25.0 33.4 26.2 0.0 0.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 TOTAL 178.2 329.6 265 206.8 165.2 140.0 147.5 133.5 Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY 2010-FY2016. Notes: R = Requested; P = Projected; GHCS = Global Health and Child Survival; DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; IMET = International Military Education and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism and Related Programs.
In 2010, the Government Accountability Office launched a review of the Merida
Initiative to ensure funds were being dispersed as they should be. The report concluded
12 "Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State. Web. 26 Apr. 2016. 13 “Economic Support Fund”. Relief Programs. State Department. Web. 26 Apr. 2016.
that 46% of Merida funds had been obligated and around 9% had been expended14. The
U.S. Government delivered the major equipment outlined in the initiative, including 5
bell helicopters, X-Ray inspection devices, law-enforcement canines, and training for
more than 4,000 police officers to the Mexican Government.
But while those were the positive evaluations, the review similarly found that the
Merida Initiative’s staff was far too small to administer programs an ensure efficient
implementation, and according to the GAO this was a very big problem. Since the release
of the GAO Report, the Merida Initiative has been better about staffing and delivery.
The report spoke differently of the strategy of the Merida Initiative. It cited a lack
of strategic documents to ensure accountability and success. Performance measures were
not built into the program documents or implementation plan. Timelines to gauge success
were missing, and little training was available to what little staff they had. The GAO
recommended that outcome performance measures and indicators be established to assess
the success of the initiative and deliver a more efficient policy strategy. After initial
arguments by the Department of State regarding the GAO’s heavy use of “expended
funds” as the primary measure of performance, it agreed with the recommendations put
forth by the GAO.15
Beyond issues of policy implementation, there remained the question of the
Merida Initiative's effectiveness as a drug control policy. The Merida Initiative was at its
14 "Merida Initiative the United States Has Provided Counternarcotics and Anti-crime Support But Needs Better Performance Measures." 2010. Government Accountability Office. GAO-10-837. Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl0837.pdf 15 ibid.
conception heavily based on Plan Columbia, and was described as the answer to the
rising international drug problem that seemed to have been eliminated in Columbia.
Unfortunately, the GAO also released a report in 2008 claiming that Plan Columbia
wasn’t as much a success as everyone thought, though it was definitely successful as a
security program in Columbia. The goal of Plan Colombia was to reduce drug cultivation,
processing and distribution by fifty percent between FY 2000 and FY 2006. By 2006,
heroine production had been reduced by 15 percent, but coca cultivation had increased by
fifteen percent and distribution had increased by four percent.16 The funding emphasis of
Plan Colombia was on military aid with $4.9 billion allocated to military assistance and
only $1.3 billion for justice, social and economic programs that included alternative
development programs for displaced drug workers.17 The GAO ultimately recommended
a more integrated approach for the plan's programs to facilitate a more seamless transition
to Colombian control.
Additionally, as in the case of the Merida report, it recommended tangible
performance measures of the program to ensure satisfactory outcomes and self-sustaining
alternative development programs. The GAO emphasized a report issued by the US
Embassy in Bogota, which warned that any program gains would be temporary until a
stable government not prone to manipulation could be established. The Obama
Administration took this warning to heart, and proposed a shift in Merida strategy.
Since 2012 we’ve been seeing a rollback in Merida funding. This is less a result
of any policy failures, and more a paradigm shift to a strategy that does not require as
16 ibid. 17 ibid.
many resources. The Obama Administration has been moving more into the Economic
Support Fund, and subtracting heavily from International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (Figure 4). The shift has been well received by legislators who want to cut
out what they see as wasteful spending and has also garnered the support of drug policy
experts.
Congress provided $139 million in Mérida Initiative accounts in the FY2016
Consolidated Appropriations bill (P.L. 114-113) and is now considering the Obama
Administration’s FY2017 budget request of $129 million for the Mérida Initiative.
Congress may analyze how progress under the Mérida Initiative is being measured; how
U.S. funds have been used to advance Mexico’s police and judicial reform efforts; and
the degree to which U.S. programs in Mexico complement other U.S. counterdrug and
border security efforts.
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Figure 4b: U.S. Assistance to Mexico, FY2011-FY2015
(U.S. $ Millions)
Non-Merida
ESF
INCLE
The Merida Initiative has followed a trajectory similar to that of Plan Colombia
during its short duration, as its initial funding was focused on military aid. But it will be
necessary to set up a stable justice structure to ensure peace in the long term. This is why
the institution building is just as important as the counter-narcotics and why this
methodology will incorporate aspects of both in its framework. Looking at both key
indicators and broader societal measures of success, we will contribute a more holistic
analysis of Merida’s success than can be offered in the 2008 GAO Report.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The ideology underlying the Merida Initiative has been questioned. While on
paper, the Merida Initiative appeared quite clear in its intentions, according to Diana
Villiers Negroponte, the allocation of Merida Initiative funds suggested that the principal
interest of the United States was in counter-narcotics and counterterrorism.18 Villiers
Negroponte questions the way in which the Merida Initiative addressed the more
contemporary issues of organized crime and cartels prevalent in Mexico.
Villiers Negroponte did, however, applaud the Merida Initiative drafters'
recognition of the need for the use of more advanced technology in judicial and police
situations and the need for a grassroots approach to program implementation, because a
top-down approach can be alienating, not unlike the gang mentality to which many
people are accustomed.19
But this may be a part of the problem, John Bailey of the Center for U.S.-Mexican
Studies considers the Mérida Initiative to be failing as a result of greater corruption in
local governments20. “Mexico’s federal system is undergoing a rapid decentralization,
which has strengthened the 32 state governors and complicated policy coordination
18 Villiers Negroponte, Diana. 2009. "The Merida Initiative and Central America: The Challenges of Containing Public Insecurity and Criminal Violence." Foreign Policy at Brookings: 3. Retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/05_merida_ initiative 19 ibid. 20 ibid.
generally.”21 Certainly Mérida would be doomed to fail right out of the gate if it’s two
partners can’t effectively coordinate its implementation.
President Obama’s judicial reform funds may be coming too-little-too-late in
Olson’s view. Olson argues that a “lack of coordination and political infighting between
political parties, political leaders, and government agencies has crippled Mexican anti-
crime efforts.”22 He adds too that the extra funding from the Mérida Initiative only serves
to “reinforce the shortcomings of Mexico’s efforts by underfunding judicial reform while
prioritizing the ‘presence and patrol’ strategy used thus far by the military and law
enforcement agencies.”23
George Grayson discusses this corruption in a scientific frame, looking at how
mounting drug violence, cartel power, and local corruption may prove to be too great an
obstacle for U.S. anti-drug efforts.24 In order for Mexico not to become a "failed state" as
Grayson suggests is possible, Calderon must take control of Mexico back from the drug
cartels through several strategies implemented concurrently. He recommends continuing
the war on drugs while exploring other alternatives, such as legalizing certain drugs in a
tradeoff for halted drug-related violence in a type of modus vivendi. At the same time, he
calls for focus on the demand side, through increased education and treatment in the
United States and Mexico. Grayson suggests that the possibility of decriminalization of
21 ibid. 22 ibid. 23 ibid. 24 Grayson, George W. 2010. Mexico: Narco-violence and a failed state? New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers.
certain narcotics - such as marijuana- in the US could help lessen demand from Mexico
and has stated that, “the least bad policy is to legalize drugs.”25
Thomas Cole similarly argues that the killings in Mexico and movements in the
US market for drugs are correlated.26 Drug policy analyst Mark Kleiman agrees that
Mexico's position as the primary transit point for illegal drugs entering the United States
is directly linked to US demand. If demand rises, drug violence will rise as well. Kleiman
notes that the heaviest drug users are responsible for the largest portion of demand and
says that, "taking away the drug dealers' best customers will reduce their earnings."27
Effective intervention targeted at these drug users is necessary to affect the illegal drug
economy. The prevention of future substance abuse could also help shrink the illicit drug
market, thereby reducing the stakes for DTO profits that motivates violence.28 Another
option to consider is the legalization of certain drugs, something that has been advocated
for by the United Nation's Committee for Crime and Drugs and many political leaders.
Much of Mexico's violence is due to the use of automatic weapons, most of which
come from the United States. Heavily armed cartels wage wars against one another with
catastrophic results, not only killing each another, but more often than not murdering
innocent bystanders. To eradicate illegal weapons transfers, Villiers Negroponte asserts
that a two-pronged assault is necessary.29 Not only is it necessary to curtail "downstream"
25 "How to Stop the Drug War." 2009. Tlie Economist, March 5. 26 Cole, Thomas B. 2009. "Mexican Drug Violence Intertwined With US Demand for Illegal Drugs." JAMA : the Journal of the American Medical Association. 302 (5): 482. 27 ibid. 28 ibid. 29 Villiers Negroponte, "The Merida Initiative and Central America: The Challenges of Containing Public Insecurity and Criminal Violence."
sales to criminal organizations, but to successfully reduce weapons trafficking and
availability of arms to Mexican criminal organizations, "upstream" sales in the United
States must be further regulated through the implementation of stricter rules dealing with
gun shows, gun dealers and illicit private sales. Villiers Negroponte calls for an effective
assault weapons ban, which will, "first seek to ban the import of lethal weapons,
including assault weapons, and second to end the grandfathering of weapons in excess
of .50 caliber."30 The United States must recognize that its gun policies and lackluster
enforcement directly relate to the increased violence and instability in Mexico and must
strive to curb this alarming trend. The first step that the United States should take is
addressing the 2004 Assault Weapons Ban reversal. The administration should work to
reinstate the ban and heighten oversight and regulation of gun shows and illegal traders.
All of these scholars contribute something important to the discussion. These
issues cannot be looked at in a vacuum; a responsible and strategic policy framework
promotes reform as much as it targets the cartels. This holistic approach informs how I
will evaluate Merida myself and the recommendations that I will make for future Merida
strategies.
30 ibid.
ANALYSIS
At this point we will look at the effect that the Merida Initiative has had on violent
crime in Mexico and drug abuse in the United States, as well as a few of the societal
measures identified by the aforementioned scholars. In evaluating the success of the
Merida Initiative, we will observe the extent to which its programs have had a direct
negative effect on drug abuse and violence on both sides of the border. In the absence of
such effect, we will discuss possible reasons and strategies moving forward.
The Justice in Mexico Project at the University of San Diego published a very
useful report in 2015 that provides a significant amount of data on the Mexican Drug War
collected from governments and non-profits. I used this report as a jumping off point for
any number of other organizations which analyze the crime data surrounding the Mexican
Drug War
Homicide levels in Mexico spiked dramatically between 2007 and 2011 (Figure
5)31. This doesn’t necessarily mean that it has spiked as a result of the drug war, but is
certainly a result of an unabated atmosphere of violence in Mexico. The murder rate has
been on the decline since 2011, but since it accelerated far more quickly than it has been
decelerating, the number of homicides is not likely to reach 2007 levels until 2020,
assuming no repeat escalation of violence.
31 Heinle, K; Molzahn, C; Shirk, D. “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2014”. Justice in Mexico. University of San Diego. San Diego. 2015. Web.
A major share of these homicides is the result of organized crime killings. A
review of data generated by various independent sources shows that a large a large
proportion of these murders bear the characteristics typically associated with organized-
crime-style killings (i.e. gun battles, group executions, torture, dismemberment, high-
powered weaponry, beheadings, “narco” messages, mass graves)32. About a third, and as
many as half, of all homicides in 2014 bore such characteristics33.
The Mexican Government has not released a complete data set on organized
crime killings since 2010, but based on a trajectory of past and recent figures, it is
estimated that as many as 8,000 homicides per year can be attributed to the Drug Cartels.
To put this into perspective, this makes the cartels a more fatal threat than cancer for
Mexican individuals aged 15-6434.
32 ibid. 33 ibid. 34 “Mexico’s Health Stats” Healthy Planet. World Health Organization, 03 Feb. 2013. Web. 26 Apr. 2016.
The proportion of organized crime violence in the homicide rate varies depending
on the source that you use. There are three independent groups that calculate their own
measures, each with varied results (Figure 6). It can be observed however that even the
most conservative estimates show cartel killings to comprise a substantial portion of
homicides in Mexico.
Figure 6: Percentage of INEGI and SNSP Homicides Attributed to Organized Crime Style Homicide (2006-2014)
Year Milenio (% INEGI)
Milenio (% SNSP)
Reforma (% INEGI)
Reforma (% SNSP)
Lantia (% INEGI)
Reforma (% SNSP)
2006 20.3 18.0 2007 31.3 27.0 25.6 22.1 2008 40.5 43.2 36.6 39.0 2009 41.8 51.4 33.3 40.9 2010 49.1 61.2 45.0 56.0 2011 45.2 54.6 45.5 55.0 2012 47.7 57.2 38.1 45.7 2013 44.4 55.6 31.5 39.5 49.6 62.1 2014 38.7 51.1 31.0 40.9 36.3 48.0
Average 42.3 50.2 34.1 39.7 43.0 55.0
But it’s important to note that violence in Mexico is not pervasive and persistent
throughout the country. In most cases, it’s highly localized and sporadic to locations
where cartels are struggling for dominance35. Prior to the beginning of Merida, there
existed a type of Pax Mafioso in which the cartels were set in their ways and did not need
to resort to violence36. Once the United States began disrupting their drug flow, violence
and inter-fighting broke out in specific areas, moving from year to year depending on
changing cartel turfs37.
35 Heinle, K; Molzahn, C; Shirk, D. “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2014”. Justice in Mexico. University of San Diego. San Diego. 2015. Web. 36 ibid. 37 ibid.
In the last decade, violence has not only increased but dispersed throughout
Mexico38. Areas close to the U.S.-Mexico border in particular have seen ultra-heightened
violence as a result of threatened cartel routes39. The following maps were generated by
Theresa Firestine of the University of San Diego’s Trans-Border Institute:
38 ibid. 39 ibid.
While it is very evident that violence has been increasing and dispersing, it’s also
important to note that it has been receding since 2012 to low points, which is also made
clear in the murder rates above (Figure 5). This is an important reversal of the trend.
Under President Calderón (2006-2012), the number of intentional homicides annually
increased more than two and a half times from 10,452 in 2006 to 27,213 in 2011,
according to INEGI figures40. The last full year of Calderón’s term there was a slight
decline in the total number of homicides to about 4% to 26,03741. All told, throughout the
Calderón administration, 121,669 people were killed, an average of over 20,000 people
killed per year, more than 55 per day, or just over two every hour42.
When he entered office in December 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto promised a shift
in public security strategy away from the focus of the previous administration on
dismantling Mexico’s powerful drug cartels by going after their leadership structures,
toward efforts that reduce the impacts of all crime – organized and other – on the public.
At this point President Obama also shifted Merida’s funding to match Nieto’s strategy for
the Mexican Drug War. He transferred many funds from International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement into the Economic Support Fund (Figure 7).
Figure 7: FY2012-FY2017 Merida Funding for Mexico (U.S. $ in Millions)
Account FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16(R) FY16(P) FY17(R) ESF 33.3 32.1 35.0 33.6 39.0 39.0 49.0 INCLE 248.5 195.1 148.1 110.0 80.0 100.0 80.0 Total 281.8 227.2 194.2 143.6 119.0 139.0 129.0
Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2013-FY2017.
40 ibid. 41 ibid. 42 ibid.
Since this shift in approach, we’ve seen both a decrease in the homicide rate in
Mexico as well as a decrease in the portion of those homicides related to organized crime
(Figure 5). Which is amazing, especially when you consider that the Nieto administration
has been relentlessly pursuing cartel leaders, with at least 12 cartel bosses being captured
or killed during his first term43.
The biggest victory for Nieto’s government came in February 2014 with the arrest
of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, the founder and leader of the Sinaloa drug cartel44.
Though his later escape highlight once more the shortcomings of the Mexican Justice
System. It was announced earlier this year that he will be extradited to the United States,
which is a common strategy for high-level bosses in Mexico (Figure 8).
43 “'El Chapo' Guzman: How the World's Most Wanted Drug Lord Was Finally Busted." CNN. Cable News Network, 24 Feb. 2014. Web. 26 Apr. 2016. 44 ibid.
One area however in which this strategy has not been successful is
disappearances. 2014 was the year with the highest number of disappearances on
record45. This is likely a result of the cartels moving underground; during the peak of
their violence in 2012, bodies would often be shown mutilated in the streets. Now, since
they are rarely in armed conflict with each other, they have a greater tendency to hide
their victims. So this should be viewed as a failure of the existing strategy, but also a
byproduct of its successes.
To recapitulate all that’s been covered in these results, the murder rate
skyrocketed during the first half of the Merida Initiative but was localized to areas where
the cartels felt threatened and not dispersed across the whole country. When the funding
shift moved toward institution building, the murder rate decreased but at a slower rate.
Conversely, disappearances have continued to increase to their highest rates in Mexico’s
45 Heinle, K; Molzahn, C; Shirk, D. “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2014”. Justice in Mexico. University of San Diego. San Diego. 2015. Web.
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120
140
Ext
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Figure 8: Individuals Extradited from Mexico
to the United States
history, likely as a result of DTOs moving their operations underground. The capture of
drug lords however is a risky enterprise because the Mexican Justice system seems
unable to hold them for long, resulting in more extraditions to the United States.
DISCUSSION
The Merida Initiative has been significant for both the United States and Mexico.
It delivered a much needed collaboration and acceptance between both countries, by the
acknowledgment of their mutual shortcomings and their pledge to aid one another. Both
countries realized that the futures of their societies were tied, and a significant yet
unintended consequence of the Initiative has been to improve relations between the
governments of the United States and Mexico. The first objective of the initiative was to
reduce drug violence and the second was to reduce drug trafficking into the United States
by aiding the Mexican government's fight with the drug cartels. Those two goals linked in
the possibility of a reduced demand for drugs in the united States following a decreased
supply. The unfortunate truth is that neither goal of the initiative has yet been successful.
There are multiple reasons, which include flawed implementation yielding limited
positive outcomes; the short duration and the small scope of the aid program; the limited
effects the policy has on domestic drug policy and demand reduction; and the mounting
drug-related violence prevalent in Mexico.
A Carnevale Associates study of US drug policy found that consumption from
2002 to 2008 had not changed and remains at eight percent of Americans aged twelve
and older.46 It also showed that, though consumption has remained the same, federal
spending for supply reduction rose by sixty-four percent whereas spending on demand
46 "The Continued Standstill in Reducing Illicit Drug Use." 2009. Research and Policy Analysis Group of Carnevale Associates, Retrieved from http: //www.carnevaleassociates.com/ Drug percent20Policy_Budget percent20Mismatch.pdf
reduction only rose by nine percent. These statistics are foreboding such that the united
States should seriously consider reevaluating its commitment to the Merida Initiative, or
at least it’s approach.
Various policy alternatives exist for the Merida Initiative at this juncture. This
paper will address the three most plausible options in turn, and review the effectiveness
of each policy within the established criteria. The first option is to discontinue the Merida
Initiative by allowing its federal authorization to expire. The second option is to continue
with the Obama administration's approach to the Merida Initiative, called "Beyond
Merida." This policy embodies the Merida Initiative's original goals, but integrates a
"shared responsibility" approach to drug control and a larger focus on institution building
rather than military spending. The third option is a new approach that integrates aspects
of President Obama's "Beyond Merida" approach, but focuses more on domestic drug and
weapons policy as means of lessening demand, and institution building and government
support as means of lessening the supply.
The criteria used to determine the best policy incorporates the basic economic
principles of supply and demand. The theory of supply and demand is fundamental in
explaining market economies and most societal outcomes. The problem of drug violence
in Mexico can be attributed to heightened demand that has fueled a larger supply. A
successful policy would lessen supply through decreased drug production and cross
border trafficking. For this to happen, there must be decreased demand- specifically,
within the United States. This is of course not easy to accomplish but is the goal
nonetheless that will lead to the most desired outcome. A smaller supply and demand for
drugs on both sides of the border could necessarily lead to abated violence over drug
territory.
Abandoning the Merida Initiative is an easy and pragmatic option, since the
program's implementation has caused much concern in Congress and many headaches in
the State Department. The difficulty of creating a lasting impact through Merida’s
implementation has proven a complex task for the State Department, especially when you
consider the many overlapping jurisdictions of working agencies. The GAO report is just
the beginning, since the bulk of the money allocated to the program has not yet been
spent. There also have not been concrete evaluations of program success, such as the
establishment of timelines to facilitate accountability.
Violence has escalated alarmingly in Mexico and the "spillover" of this violence
into the United States is evident. In discussing the limitations of the Merida Initiative,
Villiers Negroponte highlights the flow of illegal weapons into Mexico from the United
States and how this is not adequately addressed in the initiative.47 This shortcoming
highlights a failure of one of the criterion: lessened demand. Illegal weapons trafficking
is perhaps a direct result of heightened drug violence south of the border. Merida funds
are restricted from domestic use, so strengthening US domestic policy is essential for
foreign drug policy success.
The Merida Initiative has also failed to reduce supply. Analysis has shown that
some US policies have actually increased trafficking. Major interdiction efforts in the
United States closed Florida as an entry point for Colombian cocaine, but made Mexico
47 Villiers Negroponte, "The Merida Initiative and Central America: The Challenges of Containing Public Insecurity and Criminal Violence."
an appealing second choice. Little-known Mexican drug dealers benefited from the
product and grew to be the bosses of sophisticated and violent cartels.48 Overall, drug
demand has remained the same and drug supply has increased. Meyer suggests that the
Merida Initiative applied the same principles of military focused aid to fight drug
trafficking, similar to previous unsuccessful policies implemented in Mexico by the
Mexican government.49 This suggests that the program was doomed from the start. On
the other hand, to discontinue a program that has only really been half implemented
would seem a waste of the taxpayers’ money. As claimed in the perceived success of Plan
Colombia, the length of the program has as much to do with its success as does the
transition of the program to a nationally run self-sustaining entity.50
A second policy option is the Obama administration's strategy of following the
model of the Merida Initiative, with the inclusion of a more bilateral collaborative
approach.51 This approach is often referred to as "Beyond Merida" and is founded on the
"four pillars" first articulated by President Obama when he made his FY 2011 budget
request. Following the "Beyond Merida" strategy of keeping elements that have been
working and changing what’s been inefficiently implemented, Obama called for overhaul
48 Meyer, Maureen. 2007. "At a Crossroads: Drug Trafficking, Violence and the Mexican State." Washington Office on Latin America 13. Retrieved from http://www. wola.org/ index. php?option=com_content&:task=sectionp&id=l&:Itemid=2&:topic_ filter= Mexico&subtopic_filter= 49 ibid. 50 Villiers Negroponte, "The Merida Initiative and Central America: The Challenges of Containing Public Insecurity and Criminal Violence." 51 Olson, Eric L., and Wilson, Christopher E. 2010. "Beyond Merida: the Evolving Approach to Security Cooperation." Wilson Center, University of San Diego, TransBorder Institute, Retrieved from http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/Beyond percent20Merida.pdf
of the early policies to promote more widespread success.52 The new strategy would be
more focused on "institution building" than security expenditures – the bulk of the
Merida Initiative’s past spending.
Villiers Negroponte would agree with this plan. In her analysis of the early Merida
Initiative, Villiers Negroponte concludes that while the Merida Initiative is a step in the
right direction, it is not enough to successfully curtail drug trafficking and violence.53
Once the United States leaves Mexico, success will be hinged upon the strength of state
and local justice systems, Mexico’s implementation of tax and spending policies,
supported by long lasting programs with built in local support. The "Beyond Merida"
approach incorporates the ideas outlined by Villiers Negroponte. If successful in the long
term, the pillars of the "Beyond Merida" approach could affect the supply side of drug
trafficking. The evolved policy is ambitious in its aims and would require a long-term
commitment of resources from the United States. The policy does address weapons
trafficking originating in the United States, but has not thus far implemented any policy
successful in lessening illegal arms trading. Unfortunately, the Obama plan is glaringly
lacking in its response to the call for "shared responsibility" in addressing drug demand.
According to the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), the prevalence of illicit
drugs in the United States will not diminish in the near future, but will in fact increase
due to growing demand and increased production in Mexico. The only drug that will not
be produced in increased amounts is cocaine, due to shortages felt in Latin America
52 ibid. 53 Villiers Negroponte, "The Merida Initiative and Central America: The Challenges of Containing Public Insecurity and Criminal Violence."
rather than a decrease in demand. In fact, global demand has increased as Europe has
discovered cocaine.54 The NDIC found that, "the growing strength and organization of
criminal gangs, including their alliances with large Mexican drug trafficking
organizations (DTOs), will make disrupting illicit drug availability and distribution
increasingly difficult for law enforcement agencies."55 The Mexican government under
President Calderón has fought DTOs with some success by limiting internal corruption,
but corruption is so widespread and the power of the cartels so great that this fight will be
long. When one cartel leader is arrested, others rise to take his place, waging violent
battles against each other in cities such as Ciudad Juarez. It is estimated that, though
thousands of soldiers have been committed by President Calderón and millions of US
dollars have been given in funding, less than one percent of the billions of dollars in drug
money smuggled into the United States every year is seized.56 These disheartening
statistics suggest that the "Beyond Merida" approach has failed the criteria of reduced
demand leading to lessened supply.
Unfortunately, drug trafficking and cartel-related violence have continued to rise; this
raises the question of whether the Obama administration's policy has been successful.
Certainly the idea is good, but what is that worth if it does not yield desired results? US
officials have claimed that drug demand has gone down in the United States and this has
54 "National Drug Assessment 2010. " 2010. U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center 2010-Q031 7-001. Retrieved from http://www.justice.gov/ndic/ pubs38/38661/index.htm 55 Ibid. 56 Coleman, Michael. 2010. "People of world influence." The Washington Diplomat. 2010. Accessed Marchio, 2011. http://www.thedialogue.org/page. cfm?pageID=32&pubID-2476.
increased violence in Mexico because their money supply is getting cut off.57 However,
Carnevale found that drug demand has in fact remained exactly the same. The three
criteria- lessened drug production and transportation, violence reduction in Mexico and a
decreased demand in the United States- have not been met. It is clear that the Obama
administration's strategy has not yet been successful in the way that it has defined for
itself. Granted that the implementation of a policy of this scope takes time and that the
intentions of "Beyond Merida" are good, the policy does not account for domestic factors
influencing the drug trade and does not focus enough on the underlying economic and
historical issues present in Mexico.
Where should American foreign drug policy go from here? It is difficult to decide if
the Merida Initiative has been successful, considering that it was never fully implemented
before the final disbursement of plan funds. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, among
others in the Obama administration, has stressed the United States' "shared responsibility"
in the drug problem facing Mexico. The United States is the biggest customer of the
cartels that are being fought against, and it is the largest supplier of assault weapons to
the same Mexican drug cartels. Essentially, the drug cartels are fighting the Mexican
government with weapons purchased from the United States, to me that’s the worst of all.
The governments of Mexico and the United States are battling a highly lucrative industry
responsible for employing thousands of people and using grizzly scare tactics to
intimidate millions of others. This is our problem, we have a responsibility to fix it.
57 Olson & Wilson, "Beyond Merida: the Evolving Approach to Security Cooperation."
Unfortunately, current policies do not appear to be effective. A third policy option
that the Obama administration should consider is using the "Beyond Merida" approach as
a point of departure. A strategic approach to drug trafficking eradication must be made
through recognition of the United States' role in drug demand and its effects on supply
and drug related violence. Security and equipment assistance to Mexico in a sustained
effort is necessary to eradicate cartel influence in the short term, but as historical
outcomes like plan Columbia teach us, a broader policy focus is imperative for success in
the long-term. Programs implemented in Mexico should focus on both local and national
community building, and funding should be consistent for the duration. Plan Colombia
was successful in some ways because of the sheer quantity of funding by the US
government. Mexico needs funding so that its programs may be consistent, if nothing else.
Consistent funding for institution building, military assistance, and progressive
programming to divert drug producers to other trades would all serve to provide
alternatives to the drug cartels. And if less people work for the cartels, it will necessarily
limit the supply of drugs flowing into the United States.
A paradigm shift will be necessary to lessen violence in Mexico. The Obama
administration's approach of collaboration and shared responsibility is a welcome
departure from that of past administrations, but it has not been paying enough attention to
the drug abuse problem within the United States. The United States has five percent of
the world's population, yet it has seventeen percent of the world's drug addicts. US drug
policy should reflect these numbers. Counterdrug programs must focus on and fund drug
addiction eradication programs and anti-drug education with the zeal demonstrated by
“sexy” counter-narcotics military operations in order to effectively reduce drug demand
and drug violence in our own country. This approach would meet the criteria of lessening
demand and reducing supply in the long run; by attacking drug demand, drug supply
would be significantly affected over time, it’s economics.
Lastly, many economists and knowledgeable leaders suggest that legalizing certain
drugs would be a means of driving their prices down. Without the high price tags
attached to illicit drugs, the high-violence high-reward drug wars would most certainly
diminish in the long term. Legal markets would prevail. Simple economic theory explains
that high prices stimulate highly competitive markets, but low prices are less attractive
and lessen suppliers. Drug legalization is hotly contested and information from some
policy institutes suggest that legalizing drugs, such as marijuana, will in fact have little
effect on the violence in Mexico.58 Klimer suggests that marijuana sales make up only
part of drug trafficking profits with estimates of between $1.5 and $2 billion in annual
gross revenue.59 However, while Klimer also maintains that it is unknown whether
reductions in Mexican DTOs' revenues from exporting marijuana would lead to
corresponding decreases in violence, other analysts have suggested that large reductions
in revenues could increase violence in the short run but decrease it in the long run.60
Therefore, the legalization of certain drugs and the establishment of government price
controls could diminish the surges of violence in Mexico and would satisfy, in part, all
three of the criteria established.
58 Klimer, Beau. 2010. "Insights on the Effects of Marijuana Legalization on Prices and Consumption." Santa Monica, CA.: RAND, http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/ CT351/. 59 Ibid 60 Ibid.
CONCLUSION
The Merida Initiative has had some positive impacts: it opened dialogue between
the United States and Mexico and improved relations that had been cooling for years.
President Calderón was the first foreign president to visit the United States after President
Obama took office, marking a turning point in diplomatic relations between the countries,
and suggesting that closer collaboration would continue.
The drug-trafficking problem in Mexico is enormous. It would be impossible to
eradicate a problem like this over a decade. Massive increases in violence with little
government response have accompanied the increasing lawless freedom of drug
trafficking. This has been evident in the apparent failures of both Mexican and American
drug policies for Mexico. This paper has outlined the difficulty of foreign and domestic
drug policy for the United States and the significance of this problem for Mexico. After
assessing the three policies using the established criteria, the third policy emerges as the
best course of action for Mexico: the United States should proceed with the "Beyond
Merida" approach, while focusing on domestic US factors that influence the drug trade.
"Beyond Merida" should be used as a framework for a more progressive policy
that will incorporate a sustained, long-term commitment to aid Mexico in it’s
development, in all perspectives not just in the drug war. To truly eradicate the rampant
supply of drugs and the ever-growing drug trafficking trade, the United States and
Mexico must cooperate and the United States must commit to implementing its aid
programs fully and properly. As GAO reports on the Merida initiaitive and Plan
Columbia have shown, accountability has proven difficult for the State Department. To
truly affect both supply and demand sides of the drug problem, performance measures
and indicators are needed to keep the initiative on track.
The military-centered aid approach did not work. It has never worked. Plan
Colombia showed that the United States could eradicate cartel influence in one country,
but that the drug trade would merely shift to a new country. Historically, Mexican
presidents have fought organized crime and drug trafficking through "combating fire with
more fire" with little success.61 It’s time we adopt a new approach, and President Obama
strategy could be what we need. To truly eradicate the drug supply problem, not only
must the demand for drugs be reduced on both sides of the border, but a commitment
from the United States and Mexico to provide alternatives for Mexican citizens to work
in legal and high-paying professions, as opposed to joining the drug cartels.
President Calderon showed an admirable dedication to eliminating drug cartels
and corruption in Mexico. The United States and Mexico have a unique relationship
stemming from a shared history and similar ideological and political views. Both
countries are democracies and were founded on similar principles. If Nieto continues
Calderon’s undertaking, and the United States continues to support the new strategy
while focusing more on domestic drug and weapons policy and enforcement, it will be
possible to diminish the cartel stranglehold on Mexico and lessen its widespread violence.
61 Meyer, "At a Crossroads: Drug Trafficking, Violence and the Mexican State."
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