MDA Journey to Mission Success Randolph Stone Director-Quality, Safety & Mission Assurance Missile Defense Agency March 3, 2008 Approved for Public Release

MDA Journey to Mission Success

Randolph StoneDirector-Quality, Safety & Mission

AssuranceMissile Defense Agency

March 3, 2008

Approved for Public Release08-MDA-3305 (29 FEB 08)

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Agenda

• Reasons for Quality

• Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System (GMD)- History- Major Problems- Impact- Systems Engineering Improvements- Cradle-to-Grave Approach- Lessons Learned- GM Successes

• Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KI)- Award Fee- Knowledge Points- MDA Assurance Provisions

• Reasons for Quality

• Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System (GMD)- History- Major Problems- Impact- Systems Engineering Improvements- Cradle-to-Grave Approach- Lessons Learned- GM Successes

• Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KI)- Award Fee- Knowledge Points- MDA Assurance Provisions

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Reasons for Quality

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Great Prophet 2

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Taepo-Dong-1

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Ground-Based Midcourse Defense

Ground-Based Interceptor Emplacement

Sea-Based X Band Radar

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GM History

• Program Description- National Missile Defense (NMD) Program began in 1996 under BMDO program

- Realigned as the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System (GMD) under MDA in 2002– A key component of the nation’s multi-layered Ballistic Missile Defense System

– The GMD includes sensors, command systems, fire control systems, and Ground Based Interceptors (GBI)

- In spiral development – 3 phases simultaneously– Design and Development, Operational, Support

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GM Major Problems

• Directed to produce and field while still in the development & test phase - Rapid deployment – enormous pressure on PD to meet program schedule

- Led to high-risk decisions regarding schedule, product quality, and program cost

• Acquisition reform – removed Mil Stds, relied on industry “best practices”- Traceability and sub-contractor flow-down- High percentage of issues developed with sub-contractors– Unauthorized changes, poor communication, lack of prime oversight

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“Why Not Fly?”

GM Major Problems

• EKV team focused on technical aspects of design instead of producability of end item- No production control, constant engineering changes

- Schedule slips, nonconformances and quality escapes

• Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) - No formal qualification in design and development for COTS flight computer

- Computer reset – Root Cause unknown for over a year

- COTS became logistically expensive; would have been easier to build

“Why Not Fly?”

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Impacts

• GM experienced a string of failures between 2000 and 2005- “Interceptor production slowed as the year progressed primarily because technical problems were discovered…these problems were traced back to poor oversight of subcontractors, too few qualification tests, and other quality assurance issues.” GAO Report, March 2006

GMD Test Failures

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IFT-13c

Example

Countdown automatically aborted due to a built-in-test anomaly that detected excessive drops of Electronic Control Unit (ECU) messages.

Cause: Roundoff error propagation caused a timing mismatch. When the SIGI and FC clocks crossover, timing jitter occurs and occasionally data is sent to the ECU when it is busy, resulting in no responses. To avoid a recurrence, need to raise the tolerance level for missed messages -- changing one line of computer software code.

IFT-13c – December 2004

Launch Abort

ed

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Approved for Public Release08-MDA-3305 (29 FEB 08)These Tests Were Wake-Up Calls

IFT-14

Example

One of the last steps in the launch sequence is to open the silo doors and retract the horizontal stabilizers that hold the missile in place. Sensors indicated that one of the three lateral support group mechanisms had not retracted, causing the missile to abort launch

Cause: Corrosion and dissimilar metals (galvanic corrosion) caused the failure. One mechanism failed to latch due to wrong crush blocks

IFT-14 – February 2005

Launch Abort

ed

These Tests Were Wake-Up Calls

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MDA Systems Engineering Improvements

• MDA began to take a hard look at its quality practices- Uncovered test and development problems through audits of EKV and OBV– Example: “Functional performance test not consistently conducted during environmental testing”

- Commissioned 2005 Independent Review Team (IRT) study– Dr. William Graham, Dr. Bill Ballhaus, MG (R) Bill Nance

– Confirmed not enough Ground Testing, Deficiency in performance verification and systems engineering

– Recommended: — Strengthen systems engineering — Hold contractors accountableComplete Halt to Flight TestsThese Tests Were Wake-Up CallsComplete Halt to Flight Tests

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• MDA began to use a back-to-basics systems engineering approach- Mission Readiness Task Force (MRTF)

– Improved readiness through systematic proven processes— System Verification, Critical Design Reviews, System Function Reviews

– Improved test rigor & gained confidence in testing procedures

- Restructured Contracts & Award Fee Processes– “Paid for Failures”

- Program Management began supporting Quality– Strategic Improvements: Infusing quality in contract, empowering Mission Assurance Organization

– Tactical Improvements: Test Like You Fly, Dedicated Ground Test Missiles, End-to-End Testing

MDA Systems Engineering Improvements

These Tests Were Wake-Up Calls“Why Should It Fly?”

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SAcquisition Strategy Panel

-MAP, PMAP on Contract

-Mission Assurance Criteria

-Award Fee Requirements

Peer Reviews

-Surface correctable problems early

-Identify risk

-Ensure Best Practices

System Functional Review

Software Specification Review

-Evaluate human interfaces, controls, displays

-S/W safety issues & Audits

Preliminary Design Review

Critical Design Review

-Subsystem and functional issues

-Design Performance

-Producibility and risk areas

System Verification Review

Joint Services IM Munition WG

Design Certificate Review

Safety Hazards Assessment

Development Test for Risk Reduction

-FMECA, Sneak Analysis

Continuous Activities- Mission Assurance Reps (MARs) on-site

(Gov. & Industry sites)

- Mission Assurance Audits

- Award Fee Boards

--Independent Readiness Review Teams

--Mission Readiness Reviews

Mission Assurance Audits

-Average 6 MA audits annually

Pre-Shipment Reviews

BMDS Parts & Materials Control Board (PMCB)

-Element PMP Control Boards (PMPCB)

-Voting Member

Tests and Inspections

-FOD Prevention, NDT, Acceptance Inspection

-Mandatory Gov. Inspections (MGIs)

Failure Review Board

Material Review Board

Supplier Road Maps

Stakeholder Initiatives

Integrated Product Teams (IPT)

Test Design Reviews (TDR)

-Voting Member

Mission Operations Review

Interface Control WG

-Interface integration activities

-Ensures integration and compatibility

-Resolve technical issues

Interoperability and/or Integration Test

BMDS System Safety Working Group

System Requirements Review

Pedigree Review Flight Readiness Review

Flight Operations Review -Voting Member

Pre-Flight Readiness Review

Launch Readiness Review

Mission Readiness Review

-4 to 6 weeks Prior to launch

-Voting Member

BMDS Safety Officers (BSOs)

-6 BSOs at Colo. Spgs.

MDA Executive Level Flight Test Reviews

-Series of 4 Flight test reviews leading to launch

-Voting MemberMDA Programs

DVKV KI AL IP BC AB TH GM TCSN

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AF Award Fee Board

Contract Award Fee Review - Annually

Voting Member

SN

MDA Cradle-to-Grave Approach

TEST LIKE YOU FLY

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FTG-02

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GM Lessons Learned

• Good Quality practices from the beginning will benefit in the long run

• It is hard to change once the program has started- Hard to change culture- Costly to change design

Intercept

17/17 Successful Intercepts

These Tests Were Wake-Up CallsNO INTERCEPTOR FAILURES SINCE 2005

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KEI – Kinetic Energy Interceptor

KEI Command Center

KEI Launcher

Kinetic Energy Interceptor

These Tests Were Wake-Up CallsMDA’s New Program Built with Mission

Assurance

• Mission Assurance Philosophy Built-In- Contracts & Program Culture

• In Design and Development Phase- 1st and 2nd stage static fire tests

- KEI Fire Control and Communication• First Flight Test – FY09

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Kinetic Energy Interceptor

• Contract integrated with high-level of Mission Assurance- Program Integration with Mission Assurance Government Personnel – Matrixed People from MA Organization– KIQ: QS Direct Line

- Contractors held fully accountable for mission success

- Real-time incorporation of lessons learned– Not sitting in a database– Experience from across BMDS utilized

- Early Integration Product Team (IPT) Approach with all suppliers

• Contract Structured with Award Fees

These Tests Were Wake-Up CallsGovernment Involvement from the

Beginning

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KEI Award Fee Boards

• Unique Award Fee Criteria – Based on Knowledge Points and Mission Assurance- Schedule comes 2nd

• Find problems and identify issues early and often

• Increased scrutiny on performance- No longer “paid for failures”

• Set of steps to determine accurate award fee- Performance Monitor – Including Mission Assurance Personnel

- Award Fee Review Board – Including Mission Assurance Personnel

- Award Fee Advisory Board – Including Mission Assurance Management

- Fee Determining Official – MDA Director

Mission Assurance Actions and Metrics

These Tests Were Wake-Up CallsIncentives to “Get It Right the First

Time”

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Award Fee Criteria – Knowledge Points

• MDA Director’s Knowledge points- Preplanned event that provides objective evidence for key decision making

- Each added commitment hinges on knowledge gained about critical risks

• Completed KEI Knowledge Points- Demonstrate ONIR Accuracy for Boost Phase Fire control (April 2006)

- Successful 1st and 2nd stage static firings

• Future Knowledge Points- Booster Flight Tests (2008)

Kinetic Energy Booster

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MAP Rev A

Award Fee Criteria – MDA Assurance Provisions

MAP Requirements Sections3.1 Management

3.2 Design and Development

3.3 Software and Firmware

3.4 Technical and Mission Assurance Reviews

3.5 Reliability, Maintainability, Availability

3.6 Parts and Materials Control Program

3.7 Integrated Test and Evaluation Program

3.8 Test, Measuring, and Diagnostic Equipment and Standards

3.9 Interface Management

3.10 Configuration Management

3.11 Control of Nonconforming Items and Materials

3.12 Fabrication and Quality

3.13 Supplier Management

3.14 Safety

These Tests Were Wake-Up Calls160 Pages – Over 1800 “Shall”

Statements

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Mission Assurance Toolbox

MDA Assurance Provisions

Mission Assurance Representatives

MDA Advisories

Supplier RoadmapsSupplier Roadmaps

Mission Assurance And Safety Audits

Government / Industry

Partnerships

Lessons Learned

QSMAUnfettered

Access

QSMAUnfettered

Access

CEODays

DCMA QALetter of

Delegation

DCMA QALetter of

Delegation

IndustryStakeholderInitiatives

PedigreeReviews

MDA PedigreeReview Certification

MemorandumOf

Agreement(MOA)

MemorandumOf

Agreement(MOA)

MDA

MDA Parts, Materials

AndProcesses

Plan

MDA Parts, Materials

AndProcesses

Plan

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FTG-03a

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Questions?

Documents

MDA Journey to Mission Success Randolph Stone Director-Quality, Safety & Mission Assurance Missile Defense Agency March 3, 2008 Approved for Public Release