Media Framing and Social Movement Mobilization

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European Consortium for Political Research 2002Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

37European Journal of Political Research 41: 3780, 2002

Media framing and social movement mobilization:

German peace protest against INF missiles, the Gulf War, and

NATO peace enforcement in Bosnia

ALICE HOLMES COOPERDepartment of Political Science, University of Mississippi, USA

Abstract. How does media framing of issues affect social movement mobilization? This rela-tionship is examined in light of the striking variation in levels of German peace protestagainst INF missiles, the Gulf War and the NATO peace-keeping mission to Bosnia. I arguethat this variation in mobilization capacity can be explained in part by the degree of con-gruence between media framing and movement framing of the issues involved. Congruencebetween the two framings facilitates movement mobilization, whereas divergence hindersit. I compare the relative congruence between movement framing and media framing in DieTageszeitung and Der Spiegelcoverage of the three issues. I also evaluate possible alterna-tive or complementary explanations, including public opinion, normalization and elite cues,and political opportunity structure.

Introduction

Conflicting interpretations of policies lie at the heart of political debate. Likeother political actors, social movements are involved in a competition overmeaning as they try to modify public policy. They must engage in framingcontests with political authorities if they hope to mobilize substantial protest.In their framing of issues, activists try to influence public perceptions of which

issues are important, which solutions are workable, and why mobilization isworth the trouble. Framing involves, among other possible things, identifica-tion of problems and their causes, along with suggested remedies.

Framing contests play themselves out in the realm of public discourse.Public discourse consists of four sub-discourses: those found in official, chal-lenger (e.g., social movement), expert and general audience media. Generalaudience media (such as television and newspapers) incorporate, as part oftheirframing processes, varying amounts of the other three. Official discourseenjoys regular, routine access to the general media. Challenger discourses also

depend on general audience media to reach a wider audience.Scholars have long examined how media coverage of movements affects

the latters capacity to mobilize. The role of media discourse in stimulating or


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subduing protest through its coverage of issues has come under increasingscrutiny in recent years. Like officials and social movements, the media alsoengage in framing. Media framing, among other things, identifies problems

and their causes, and evaluates possible remedies. Rather than constituting aneutral arena, media framing often lends more support to certain actors anddiscourses than to others. Official and social movement discourses may findvarying levels of support from media framing, and this in turn may influencethe outcome of framing contests the battle for the hearts and minds of thebroader public. Social movements capacity to mobilize may then depend sub-stantially on media framing of the issue in question.

I look at the relationship between mobilization and media discourse usingthe empirical example of German peace movements, which at different timesmobilized with strikingly different degrees of success. West German peacemovements mobilized against INF (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces)missiles with phenomenal success in the early 1980s. Movement mobilizationagainst the Gulf War in 1991 was again reasonably successful. By contrast,the movement failed utterly to mobilize the public against German partici-pation in the NATO peace-keeping mission to Bosnia in 1995, despite wide-spread popular unease with German participation in missions beyond NATOterritory.

What explains this variation in the peace movements capacity to mobilize?I argue that this variation can in part be explained in terms of the congruencebetween media framing and movement framing of the issues involved. In anutshell, I argue that congruence between the two framings facilitates move-ment mobilization by privileging the latter in its framing contest with officials,whereas divergence hinders movement mobilization.

I begin by reviewing the literature on framing in media discourse and as amobilization tool for social movements. I then describe the ebb and flow ofGerman peace protest since 1945. After discussing my research design, I turn

to the relationship between media framing and movement framing in the threepolicy episodes. After considering alternative explanations, I conclude withfurther discussion of media framing as an important component of politicalopportunity for social movements.

Media framing and movement framing

A sizeable literature has examined how media coverage ofmovements affects

the latters capacity to mobilize, along with movement strategies to attractand shape media attention. If friendly, media attention can confer standingon movements, validating them as important players (Gamson & Wolfsfeld

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1993). Conversely, negative portrayals can marginalize movements (Gitlin1980) and restrict mobilization even among their potential sympathizers,which reduces pressure on elites to respond to their concerns (Entman &

Rojecki 1993).Media attention is indispensable in helping a movement communicate with

the broad public, which is largely beyond the reach of more specialized move-ment organs. Friendly media thus contribute to mobilization without directlytaking part (Kriesi 1996). To influence policy-makers, movements must mobi-lize the wider society. Both the extent and the content of media coverage influ-ence whether the public develops sympathy for the movement and considersentering the fray (Lipsky 1968; McCarthy et al. 1996). For all of these reasons,the media are generally one of the main targets of movements efforts, andthe need to attract media attention often shapes strategy (Zald 1996). Sincemedia are accustomed to covering established political actors, movementsmust adapt their strategies to serve the news needs of the media. For example,movements often develop flamboyant action strategies to attract media at-tention, but this leads to coverage of the dramatic action at the expense ofthe movements message (Molotch 1977; Rochon 1988). Despite these dilem-mas, movements depend on the media to generate public sympathy for theirchallenges.

But these are not the only functions that the media perform for socialmovements. Appropriately, scholars have also turned their attention to therelationship between media framing of issues and mobilization patterns.Through its coverage of issues, the mass media helps construct meaning byframing, in patterns that may well change over time. Journalists choose storylines and commentators develop arguments that support particular frames andaffect the salience and intensity of issues.The mass media thus transform infor-mation rather than merely transmitting it (Zald 1996). Media coverage helpsshape issue cultures, the set of discourses surrounding an issue (including

expert, official and challenger discourses) which span multiple competinginterpretations or packages (Gamson & Modigliani 1989).

When it comes to the mass media, there are many definitions of framing;Entman (1993: 52) refers to framing as a fractured paradigm suffering fromscattered conceptualization. In Entmans words, to frame a phenomenon isto:

select some aspects of a perceived reality and to make them more salient

in a communicating text. . . Frames, then, define problems determine

what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually mea-sured in terms of common cultural values; diagnose causes identify theforces creating the problem; make moral judgements evaluate causal

media framing and social movement mobilization 39



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agents and their effects; and suggest remedies offer and justify treat-ments for the problems and predict their likely effects (Entman 1993: 52,italics in original).

In similar fashion, Iyengar (1991) notes that framing includes attributionof responsibility for problems in two senses: causal responsibility or theproblems origin, and treatment responsibility or means to alleviate theproblem. In general, frames call attention to some aspects of reality anddeflect attention from others, Norris (1995) suggests. To establish that the endof the Cold War changed framing in American television network news, Norrisfocused on thefrequency with which certain things were covered before andafter 1990 in particular international events as a proportion of total stories;the number of stories devoted to a geographic region or country (e.g., Russia);or the relative frequency with which topics such as wars, natural disastersabroad, or international economics are covered (Norris 1995). For Pan andKosicki (1993), framing is an interactive process in which both the media andits audience engage, each operating within a shared culture on the basis ofsocially defined rules. Through this interactive process, meaning is constructedon multiple levels (Edelman 1993).1

Why should congruence between media framing and movement framing

of a given issue facilitate mobilization and lack of congruence hinder it? Manyscholars have argued that movements need viable organizational structuresand positive political opportunities, moments when the distribution of powerresources shifts in their favour (e.g., McAdam 1982). In addition, social move-ments face crucial framing tasks. Assuming that perceptions of issues aresocially constructed and therefore susceptible to movement influence, fram-ing becomes a major strategic activity of movement organizations. Framinginvolves conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion sharedunderstandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate

collective action (McAdam et al. 1996: 6, italics deleted). To mobilize thebroader public, movements must link their interpretive orientations with thoseof targeted constituencies (Snow et al. 1986). Snow and Benford (1988) iden-tify three essential framing tasks: identification of the problem and attributionof blame or causality (diagnostic framing), proposed solutions (prognosticframing) and rationales for protest action (motivational framing).

Adherence to at least the general spirit of a movements collective actionframe(s) is a prerequisite for individual participation in collective action(Klandermans & Goslinga 1996) despite factional frame disputes over the

finer points (Benford 1993). To be persuasive, movement framing must makesense to, or resonate with, its intended targets in several senses includingempirical credibility an apparent evidential basis for the movements




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framing from the vantage point of the targets of mobilization (Snow &Benford 1992).

Empirical credibility of a movements frames thus stems from approximate

congruence between movement frames and the perceptions held by potentialparticipants. The publics perceptions stem in significant measure from mediacoverage, according to a wide-ranging body of scholarship.2 According toNiklas Luhmann (1996, cited in Kahrs 1999), what society accepts as reality isperceived through the mass media. People depend primarily on the media forinformation about the political world, and news frames affect causal beliefsheld by citizens (Iyengar 1987). Media coverage has an important agenda-setting effect; an issues prominence in the news contributes significantly to itsprominence in the public mind (Kenski 1996). This is particularly true withrespect to foreign policy issues, of which individuals have little first-hand infor-mation and little direct personal experience that could serve to filter mediacoverage (McCarthy et al. 1996; Brown & Vincent 1995). Of course, people donot simply absorb media messages with utter passivity. Instead, media dis-course occurs parallel to the processing of information by individuals andsocial networks (Erbring et al. 1980; Kern & Just 1995; Gamson & Modigliani1989). People evaluate the frames offered by movements, counter-movementsand public officials in terms of whatever cognitive or experiential tools are

available. Especially in the foreign policy arena, however, these tools are pri-marily news coverage and previously held values. Thus, at least modest mediaeffects on public opinion hold true, especially for distinctive, consistent mediamessages presented over relatively long periods of time (Bartels 1993). Insum, media coverage helps shape individual perceptions and discussions insocial networks (Gamson 1992), the micromobilization contexts for actualmobilization.3

Thus, particularly with respect to foreign policy issues, I argue, social move-ment mobilization is facilitated (but not single-handedly determined) by con-

gruence between movement framing and media framing. Congruence betweenmedia and movement framing is a function of the relative frequency withwhich media accounts of the issues in question reflect or echo the movementsframing. High congruence enhances the apparent empirical credibility, andthus the resonance, of movement frames. Media framing of issues is a primesource of the cognitive tools for people to evaluate movements diagnosticframing in particular. Does congruence between movement framing andmedia framing have, as I argue, a significant impact on movement mobiliza-tion? Empirically, I explore this relationship by comparing levels of congru-

ence between movement and media framing on the one hand with levels ofmobilization in three cases of German peace protest on the other. Alternativeexplanations will then be briefly considered.




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Peace movement mobilization in postwar Germany

Peace movements have a venerable history in postwar Germany (Cooper

1996). In the 1950s, waves of protest accompanied both West German rear-mament and the stationing of American nuclear weapons in Germany. Duringthe 1960s, the Easter March movement demonstrated on behalf of test-bantreaties, nuclear nonproliferation and a new Ostpolitik (conciliatory policytoward Eastern Europe). In the 1980s, the largest protests ever seen in WestGermany greeted the NATO decision to station new medium-range missilesin Germany and across Europe. In 1991, protest against the Gulf War attractedover 200,000 people to each of several major demonstrations.

Peace movements thus contributed to public debate in conjunction withvarious critical foreign policy debates. Given this history of activism, it is allthe more surprising that virtually no protest greeted the German decision tocommit troops to the NATO peace-keeping mission in Bosnia. In 1995,Germany crossed an historic divide with its decision to contribute troops tothe NATO effort. During the Cold War, West Germany abstained from mili-tary activity outside of NATO territory and, during the first half of the 1990s,



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the out-of-area issue (military activity beyond NATO borders) was a majorcontroversy in foreign policy debate. Participation in the NATO mission toBosnia represented the biggest break with the past in this respect, since for

the first time Germany sent troops to an Eastern European region occupiedby the Wehrmacht (army) during World War II. As sensitive as much of theGerman polity has been to any sign of militarism since World War II, it is strik-ing that peace groups proved unable to mount significant protest against thisnew direction in foreign policy.

Figures 1 and 2 show the incidence of protest events and the numbers ofparticipants in these events from 19801995. According to the Prodat project,action forms which count as peace protest events include petitions, court suits,mass demonstrations, sit-ins, etc.4 During the early 1980s missile debate, peaceprotest was very frequent. The years 19811984, furthermore, saw more than1,860,000 people involved in peace protests each year. The year 1991, whenthe Gulf War took place, was also characterized by a multitude of peaceprotests with some 632,000 people taking part. In contrast, peace protests after

Figure 2. Participation levels in peace protest events, 19801995.Sources: 198093, Rucht et al., Dokumentation und Analyse von Protestereignissen in derBundesrepublik Deutschland (Prodat), Wissenschafszentrum Berlin; 199495, authors owndata collected from Frankfurter Rundschau and Sueddeutsche Zeitung.


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1992 were relatively infrequent and had relatively few participants.5 The threecases of the missile debate, the Gulf War, and Bosnia represent cases of high,medium and low mobilization, respectively not in any absolute sense, but

relative to each other.

Research design

Media choices

To investigate the relationship between media framing and mobilization in thethree cases of peace protest mentioned above, I coded coverage of the threeissues in der Spiegeland die Tageszeitung. Since time and money restrictionsprecluded systematic coding of a larger number of media sources, I chose thesetwo print media because they are widely read by the most likely potential par-ticipants for new social movements in general and peace movements in par-ticular. As is widely known, Germans who are university-educated, belong tothe postwar generational cohorts, reside in urban areas and place themselveson the center-left or left of the political spectrum participate disproportion-ately in new social movements like the peace movement (Barnes et al. 1979;

Kriesi 1991).6

Peace activists were, of course, strikingly heterogeneous, aswas the enormous offering of books, specialty journals, etc. However, asGamson notes, general audience media are the central forum for public dis-course (Gamson 1995). As general media sources go, der Spiegel and dieTageszeitung were important, and reasonably representative, sources of polit-ical information for peace groups most likely constituencies. der Spiegelis oneof Germanys most widely read print media,while die Tageszeitung is anchoredin the left-alternative milieu which is home to much of Germanys hardest-core protest potential.

Of Germanys weekly newspapers and news magazines, der Spiegelis oneof the two most prestigious. It is considered one of Germanys Leitmedien,that is, those media that are particularly influential in terms of their impact onsociety and the way other media respond to their coverage (Boothroyd 1998).Or, as Karl Kahrs puts it,no other publication has come close to matching thepolitical impact ofder Spiegelon the history of the Federal Republic (Kahrs1999). In terms of numbers, der Spiegelhas long enjoyed a high readership.As of 1979, the beginning of the time span featured in this article, der Spiegelhad an estimated 4.5 million readers per issue, about 10 per cent of the adult

population in then-West Germany. In 1997, just after the time span featuredin this article, der Spiegelhad a circulation of 1,307,300 (Stamm 1997) with aprobable readership again of at least 4.5 million.7 Furthermore, sheer numbers




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are not the whole story. Der Spiegel is especially effective at reaching thepolitically-interested attentive public. Forty-three per cent of university gradu-ates read der Spiegelregularly or frequently, and 60 per cent read der Spiegel

for political commentary in particular. No other national publication reachedboth the national elite and a more mass-educated readership as effectivelyand consistently as der Spiegel (Herf 1991: 71). It is widely read across thepolitical spectrum, but disproportionately on the center and left (Herf 1991).Everybody reads der Spiegel, including (as highly educated citizens on theleft) the most likely adherents of new social movements.

Although its readership is much smaller than that ofder Spiegel, the demo-graphic profile ofTageszeitung readers is even closer to that of the most likelyadherents of new social movements in Germany. Founded in April 1979, dieTageszeitung (commonly called Taz) is ideologically close to and especiallytargets adherents of the ecological Green Party and the left-leaning SocialDemocrats (Kahrs 1999). Die Taz had a circulation of 38,000 in 1982 and areadership several times as high (Flieger 1992). By 1995 it had a readership-per-copy of 411,000 and a widest readership of 873,000 (Taz 1995). Two-thirdsof the Tazs readership is 2049 years old, 60 per cent is well-educated (Abituror university study), 45 per cent are 2049 years old and well-educated andone-half lives in cities of over 500,000 people (Taz 1996).

Coding

For each of the three cases (missile debate, Gulf War, Bosnia), I developedcodes to capture the framing packages put forward by government officialsand by peace groups respectively.8 I used representative texts from each sideas the basis for the codes that is, documents written by peace groups (suchas calls to demonstrations (Aufrufe) and pamphlets) and by government offi-cials (such as speeches and White Books on defence policy along with, in the

Bosnia case, essays by non-government pro-intervention figures on the left).In developing the codes, I adhered to the actual words of the two sides or para-phrased them as faithfully as possible.

Drawing on these documents, I identified the issue sub-components thatconstituted the major points of disagreement for each policy debate. The over-riding issues were, respectively: Should Germany accept INF missiles? ShouldGermany support the United States-led coalition in the Gulf War? ShouldGermany join the NATO peace-keeping missions to Bosnia? For the INFmissile debate, issue sub-components included assessments of the Soviet

Union, assessments of the United States, the military balance between Eastand West, sources of threat to Germany, effects of the INF missiles if stationedand responsibility for the failure of superpower arms-control negotiations




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concerning INF. For the Gulf War debate, the issue sub-components includedassessments of Iraq, American policy and intentions in the war, causes of theGulf War, effects of the war and appropriate responses to the war. For Bosnia,

they included the nature of the conflict, American policy and intentions inBosnia, appropriate policy toward Bosnia, the nature of the NATO mission toBosnia and Germanys proper role in international affairs.

Drawing on the government and peace group documents further, I devel-oped codes reflecting the two sides positions on these issue sub-components.I modeled my coding schemes loosely on those found in William GamsonsTalking Politics (Gamson 1992). Gamsons coding schemes are based on thepremise that framing packages involve not only references to values orsymbols, but also to a multitude of specific idea elements that make concretereference to the issue at hand and that collectively constitute the framingpackage (Gamson & Modigliani 1989: 11). This is best illustrated with refer-ence to the codes themselves. Each code received a three-digit referencenumber. The first digit referred to one of the issue sub-components referredto above (e.g., assessments of the Soviet Union), and the second two digitscaptured a specific idea element relevant to the issue sub-component (e.g.,The Soviets are pursuing an arms build-up). For the INF issue there were atotal of 141 codes reflecting the government and peace groups framing in my

coding scheme, for the Gulf War there were a total of 129 codes and for theBosnia case there were a total of 114 codes.To give the reader a taste of the actual codes used to capture government

and peace movement framing with respect to the INF missile debate andassessments of the Soviet Union (one of the issue sub-components), forexample, I developed codes capturing specific idea elements as follows. Rep-resenting thegovernments framing, the codes included:

Warsaw Pact armed forces have an offensive structure.

The Soviets are pursuing an arms buildup.The Soviet Union has a war-fighting strategy against the West, includingnuclear war.

The Soviets intend to occupy Western territory in case of war.The Soviets repress freedom in Warsaw Pact countries.The Soviets intervene militarily in Third World countries.The Soviets support repressive (communist) regimes or insurgencies

abroad in non-Warsaw Pact countries.The Soviets have damaged the dtente process.

Other indications that the Soviets are aggressive or expansionary.

Representing thepeace movements framing, the codes included:




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The Soviets are a defensive power.The Soviet Union wants to prevent war at almost all costs, has great fear

of war.

Maintaining their hold on the Eastern European satellites is already aneconomic strain for the Soviet Union.

Soviet behavior represents a response to Western arms measures, is theresult of feeling threatened by Western force.

Afghanistan is traditionally part of the Russian/Soviet sphere ofinfluence.

The Soviets are worried about spread of Islamic fundamentalism to theirown Central Asian republics.

Other indications that the Soviets are not aggressive or expansionary.

Having developed codes which captured the governments and the peacemovements framing on each issue, I turned to coding the media framing,namely the relevant articles in der Spiegeland die Tageszeitung. I coded allnews accounts and political commentary related to the INF missile issue, theGulf War, and Bosnia in every third issue ofder Spiegelfor the INF missiledebate (19801983) and Bosnia (19911995); and in every second issue for theGulf War (August 1990-February 1991) due to the shorter duration of the con-

flict. (This resulted in 118 articles on the INF issue, 41 articles on the Gulf War,and 74 articles on the Bosnia issue.) I coded all news accounts and politicalcommentary in approximately every fourth issue ofdie Tageszeitung for thethree debates and corresponding time periods.9 (This resulted in 178 articleson the INF issue, 209 articles on the Gulf War, and 283 articles on the Bosniaissue.) I thus coded coverage for the entire length of a given conflict, definedby certain temporal boundaries.10

I divided each article into a series of blocks representing three column-inches of text, rounded to the nearest paragraph. I searched each block of text

for passages (utterances of whatever length, from one to several sentences)which corresponded to any of the codes discussed above and recorded thethree-digit number associated with the appropriate code. The relevantcodeable unit was any utterance in a given block of text from a Spiegel orTageszeitung article that echoed or reflected any of the codes discussed above(i.e., that echoed or reflected any idea elements contained in the govern-ments or peace movements framing package). No code was used more thanonce within any given three-inch block, but many blocks contained severalcodeable utterances. Some blocks of text contained no codeable utterances.

Others contained utterances that were too vague or ambiguous to be codedproperly, in which case they were left uncoded. A second coder coded arandom sample of 120 articles; intercoder reliability was 79 per cent.




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In order again to give the reader a taste of the coding process, I refer toan article in der Spiegelon the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the reaction ofthe United States and the impact on dtente. All references in the article to

the Soviet invasion were coded with the reference number correspondingto the code The Soviets intervene militarily in non-Warsaw Pact countries(e.g., Afghanistan). A statement in the article that the American governmentconsidered the Soviet Union an expansionist power was coded as Other indi-cations that the Soviets are aggressive or expansionary. The possibility thatthe Soviets invaded Afghanistan because they feared an American invasion ofIran (in response to the hostage crisis) was coded as Soviet behavior repre-sents a response to Western arms measures, is the result of feeling threatenedby Western force.

To capture the entire content to which readers of the articles (includingpotential peace movement participants) were exposed, I coded all codeableutterances regardless of whether the author agreed with them or, alternatively,contradicted or qualified them in subsequent text. For the INF missile debate,this resulted in a total of 964 codable utterances in die Tageszeitung and 994in der Spiegelfor the entire set of articles coded; for the Gulf War a total of603 codeable utterances in die Tageszeitung and 334 in der Spiegel; and for theBosnia debate a total of 909 codeable utterances in die Tageszeitung and 602

in der Spiegelfor all articles coded.

Results

After completing the coding discussed above, I tallied the data producedin order to determine levels of congruence between Taz/Spiegel framing onthe one hand, and movement or government framing of the INF, Gulf Warand Bosnia debates on the other. I view congruence between Taz/Spiegelandmovement/government framing as a function of the relative frequency with

which Taz and Spiegelaccounts of the issues reflect or echo the movementsor governments framing (i.e., the relative frequency with which Taz/Spiegelutterances contain idea elements belonging to government or peace move-ment framing packages, expressed as a percentage of the total codeableTaz/Spiegelutterances).

Thus, for each of the three (INF, Gulf War and Bosnia) debates, I countedthe codeable utterances in die Tageszeitung and der Spiegelthat supported thegovernments or peace movements framing package, both in terms ofthe overall count for each framing package and in terms of the issue sub-

components. I then converted these raw numbers into the percentages (interms of the total number of codeable utterances) presented in Figures 38.Figure 3, for example, presents the percentages reflecting the various levels of




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congruence between the Taz framing of the INF issue and the governmentsand peace movements packages. As the overall category at the far right ofFigure 3 indicates, 21 per cent (or 207) of the total 964 codeable Taz utter-

ances reflected government framing of the INF issue, while 79 per cent (or757) of the codeable Taz utterances reflected the peace movements framing.With respect to the Soviet Union (the left-most set of columns in Figure 3),approximately 12 per cent (or 112) of the 994 codeable utterances supportedthe governments framing of the Soviet Union, while about 3 per cent (or 24)reflected the peace movements framing. The Tageszeitung framing of theSoviet Union was thus more congruent with the governments framing of theSoviets than the peace movements framing of the Soviets by a ratio of roughlyfour to one. With respect to the United States, however, the tables were morethan turned. Approximately 36 per cent (or 347) of the Tageszeitungs totalcodeable utterances were congruent with the peace movements framing ofthe United States, while only around 1 per cent (or 13) of the total codeableutterances echoed the governments framing of the United States. Thus thecongruence of the Tageszeitung framing of the United States with the peacemovements framing of the United States outweighed the congruence of Tazframing of the United States with the governments framing of the UnitedStates by a ratio of roughly 36 to 1. I repeated this process to arrive at the

coding results for both Taz and Spiegel framing (displayed in Figures 38),both in terms of the overall count for each framing package for each debateand in terms of the issue sub-components for each of the three (INF, Gulf Warand Bosnia) debates.

The results are presented in the section below and in Figures 38. TheOverall category in Figures 38 constitutes the totals of all the precedingcolumns (to the left of Overall) of the respective figure. Thus, for example,in Figures 3 and 4 the Overall score for the governments framing packageis the sum of the government scores for the other five government columns,

while the Overall score for the peace movements framing package is the sumof the peace movement scores for the other five peace-movement columns.The Overall scores for the government and the peace movement combinedadd up to 100 per cent, and the other columns collectively add up to 100 percent. This system also characterizes Figures 58.

Media framing and peace movement mobilization in Germany

This section examines the empirical evidence for the argument that congru-ence between media framing and movement framing facilitates (but does nottotally determine) movement mobilization while lack of congruence hinders




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mobilization. Media framing does not generally take a position for or againsta specific policy decision, and media framing is certainly not synonymous withtaking such a position. What media framing can do, however, is lend more

weight to the governments or peace movements framing packages over timethrough, among other things, the frequency with which the media report onissues (Norris 1995) and their attribution of responsibility and remedies forthe issues at hand (Entmann 1993; Iyengar 1991).

The INF missile debate

NATO adopted the double-track decision in December 1979. The decisionmandated the stationing of new American INF weapons (Intermediate RangeNuclear Forces, or Pershing II and Cruise missiles) in Germany and elsewherein Western Europe unless arms control negotiations resulted in a satisfactoryreduction of the newly installed Soviet SS-20 medium-range missiles by late1983. West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, the instigator of the NATOdecision, hoped to restore the regional European balance in medium-rangenuclear weapons and thereby also to shore up the credibility of deterrence.Pitted against the Schmidt government, the peace movement made seriousinroads into Schmidts own party (the Social Democrats), the unions, the major



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Figure 3. Congruence with government and peace movement packages in Tageszeitung(Taz) utterances, INF missile debate.


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churches and society at large, as well as contributing to the rise of GermanysGreen Party.

As Figures 1 and 2 show, Germanys largest peace protests occurred in the

early 1980s in the context of the INF missile debate. As Figures 3 and 4 show,framing of the INF issue in both die Taz and der Spiegelwas much more con-gruent with the peace movements framing package than with that of thegovernment. The Overall category in Figures 3 and 4 provides an initial con-firmation of this congruence.

It is true that framing in both die Taz and der Spiegelof the Soviet Unionsforeign policy (labeled Soviet Union in Figures 3 and 4) echoed the govern-ments framing package far more frequently than that of the peace movement.(The government framed the Soviet Union as politically repressive and mili-tarily aggressive, while peace groups framed it as a defensive power strainingto hold on to its existing sphere of influence.) News accounts in die Taz andder Spiegelof the Soviet Unions relationship to other countries were almostalways negative. References to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan accountedfor more than 25 per cent of all coded utterances concerning Soviet foreignpolicy. References to repression of freedom in Warsaw Pact countries werealso relatively frequent. Assessments of the Soviet Unions armed forcesfocused largely on the arms buildup occurring at the time.



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Figure 4. Congruence with government and peace movement packages in der Spiegelutter-ances, INF missile debate.


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On the other hand, frames in der Spiegeland die Taz concerning all othercomponents of the missile debate were much more congruent with the peacemovements framing package than with that of the government. This was par-

ticularly true for assessments of American foreign policy and NATO (labeledUnited States in Figures 3 and 4). (Whereas the government framed theUnited States as committed to defending freedom and democracy, the peacemovement framed the United States as an aggressive military power that in-tervened in the Third World.) Taz and Spiegel frames concerning Americandefense policy focused especially on the Reagan administrations alleged striv-ing for worldwide superiority and its arms buildup, and they indicated that theUnited States considered nuclear war wageable on European territory. Withrespect to Americas relationship to other countries, Taz and Spiegelframingmade frequent mention of American military intervention in Central Americaand its support for repressive regimes there. Forty per cent of the coded ut-terances in Taz reporting concerning the United States referred to Americanactivities in Central America.

Taz and Spiegelframing was also largely congruent with peace movementframing of the sources of danger to Germany (labeled Sources of Threat inFigures 3 and 4). The government maintained that the Soviet Union/WarsawPact had aggressive intentions and that its military superiority posed the chief

threat to Germany, whereas nuclear deterrence provided security. By contrast,according to Spiegel, Taz and the peace movement much greater danger toGermany was posed by: the rising conflict between the superpowers and thedeterioration of dtente, deterrence run amok, the arms race and the sheerpresence of nuclear weapons on German soil, the destruction that nuclearweapons would wreak on Germany if used and the rising danger of war inEurope. Similarly, the governments claim that the INF missiles would chieflyserve as counter-deterrents to Soviet missiles got little support from either dieTageszeitung or der Spiegel, whereas Spiegeland particularly Taz articles lent

much more support to the peace movements claims that the INF missiles wereusable in waging war against the Soviet Union and therefore provided tempt-ing targets on German soil for preemptive Soviet strikes (labeled Effects ofINF in Figures 3 and 4).

Finally, there was the question of responsibility for the failure of the super-power negotiations to eliminate the INF and SS-20 missiles (labeled INFNegotiations in Figures 3 and 4). Spiegeland Taz attribution of the blame wasmodestly more congruent with peace movement framing than with the gov-ernments. In sum, in most of the individual components and certainly overall,Spiegeland Taz framing of the INF missile debate was much more congruentwith peace movement framing than with the governments, which is consistentwith the peace movements tremendous mobilization capacity.




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The Gulf War

The Gulf War found Germany in the throes of the unification process (Mller

1992). This left Germany unprepared for sudden demands to accept moreinternational responsibility, and Germany restricted its contribution primarilyto financial, logistical and material support (although it did send fighter jets tohelp defend Turkey from Iraqi attack). Germany quickly sent aid to Israel fol-lowing embarrassing revelations that German firms had illegally contributedto the Iraqi military buildup, including the Scud missiles directed againstIsrael. Peace protests were directed against the German governments supportfor the war and the American-led coalition against Iraq. The demonstrationssponsors ranged from left-wing parties to unions, church groups, students, andpeace and ecology groups (Cooper 1996).

Figures 1 and 2 show that protest against the Gulf War was relativelysubstantial, although not nearly as large as protest against the INF missiles,particularly in terms of numbers of participants. Nevertheless, several demon-strations took place in January 1991 that mobilized over 200,000 people each.As Figures 5 and 6 show, framing of the Gulf War was more congruent withthe peace movements framing package than with that of the government, par-ticularly in die Taz and, to a lesser extent, in der Spiegel.



0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

Iraq United States Causes Effects Responses Overall

Percentages

Government N = 160

Peace Mvt N = 443

Figure 5. Congruence with government and peace movement packages in Tageszeitung(Taz) utterances, Gulf War.


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Virtually universal agreement existed in the characterization of Iraq(labeled Iraq in Figures 5 and 6). The government, the peace movement as awhole, der Spiegeland die Tageszeitung all framed Iraq in a negative light Saddam Hussein was a dictator, Iraq had committed clear aggression againstKuwait, Iraq had used chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds, etc.During the actual fighting in January 1991, there was also a flurry of mentionsin der Spiegeland die Tageszeitung of the threat posed by Iraqi Scuds to Israel.Although this characterization of Iraq did not constitute concrete bones of

contention between the government and the peace movement, I have assignedthe relevant codings in Taz and Spiegelarticles to the Government columnof the Iraq component of Figures 5 and 6. The government and other sup-porters of the Gulf War brought Iraqi aggression and the danger to Israel intotheir discourse much more frequently than did peace groups, and they linkedtheir support for the war explicitly to this negative characterizationof Iraq.

On the other hand, the peace movement received more support than thegovernment from Taz and Spiegelframing of the other components of the Gulf

War debate. First, both media sources framed the motives and role of theUnited States (labeled United States in Figures 5 and 6) in negative tonesthat echoed those of peace groups the United States and its allies had con-



0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Iraq United States Causes Effects Responses Overall

Percentages

Government N =140

Peace Mvt N =194

Figure 6. Congruence with government and peace movement packages in der Spiegelutter-ances, Gulf War.


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doned Iraqs earlier war with Iran but now opposed the invasion of Kuwait;and the United States and its allies were waging the Gulf War primarily foreconomic reasons, in particular to guarantee their oil supply.

With respect to causes of the Gulf War (labeled Causes of War in Figures5 and 6), the government held Iraq responsible, whereas in the framing ofpeace groups and the two news media, the United States/West had contributedsignificantly to the causes of the war President Bush was eager for war, theAmerican military buildup in Saudi Arabia in 1990 paved the way for war,diplomacy and sanctions were not given enough time to work, etc. Further-more, the West (including Germany) had earlier delivered arms to Iraq,thereby contributing to the current problem.

A third component for which peace movement and media framing werecongruent concerned the effects of the Gulf War (labeled Effects in Figures5 and 6). Both media described the physical damage and civilian sufferingcaused by the American bombing of Iraq. Moreover, both media, and inparticular die Tageszeitung, framed the Gulf War as a source of threat toGermany specifically, the ecological danger posed by burning oil fields andpotential climate damage.

The final component for which peace movement and media framingwere congruent concerned appropriate responses to the Gulf crisis (labeled

Responses in Figures 5 and 6). While der Spiegelwas largely silent on theissue, die Tageszeitung lent support to peace groups views that war would notsolve problems in the Gulf, their calls for continuing diplomacy in the placeof force, and their calls for an export ban on war materials. In sum, in most ofthe individual components and certainly overall (labeled Overall in Figures5 and 6), Spiegeland Taz framing of the Gulf War was more congruent withpeace movement framing than with the governments. In the case of the GulfWar, however, the margin of victory in terms of media support for peacegroups framing was somewhat lower than in the case of the INF missile

debate. Nonetheless, the reasonably high congruence between media andmovement framing paralleled the peace movements moderately successfulmobilization against the Gulf War.

Bosnia and the NATO peace-keeping mission

Toward the end of the Bosnian component of the wars of secession from theformer Yugoslavia, the German Bundestag voted on two issues: whether tocontribute fighter jets and warships to a NATO mission to assist a possible UN

withdrawal from Bosnia (June 1995) and whether to join the multilateralpeace-keeping mission envisioned by the Dayton peace agreement (Decem-ber 1995). The issue of involvement in military missions to Bosnia was




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extremely controversial, and it capped a lengthy debate on the out of areaquestion the issue of whether Germany could or should participate inmilitary activity beyond NATOs core territory. During the Cold War, West

Germany restricted its military activity to defence of NATO territory, and thisself-restraint became associated with an interpretation of certain constitu-tional clauses, shared by virtually all established elites, which seemed to restrictmilitary engagement in just such terms. Even participation in blue helmetpeace-keeping like the UN mission to Somalia in 1993 provoked both enor-mous controversy and a suit taken before the German Constitutional Court,as did the Kohl governments decision in 1992 to send one German destroyerand three German jets to monitor the UN embargo against Serbia. There wasalso little popular enthusiasm for out of area military activity. In July 1994,however, the Constitutional Court ruled that German participation in multi-lateral out of area missions was indeed constitutionally permissible.

In spite of consistent opposition to out of area military activity, there wasvirtually no mobilization against the Bosnia mission, the most substantial (andthe most internationally sensitive) episode of out of area activity up to thatpoint. As Figures 1 and 2 show, mobilization protesting Western use of forcein Bosnia or German participation therein was minimal to nonexistent. AsFigures 7 and 8 show, framing of the Bosnia issue by both die Tageszeitung and



0.0%

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20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Conflict United States Policy Mission OverallGermany

Percentag

es

Pro-Intervention

Anti-InterventionN = 303

N = 606

Figure 7. Congruence with pro-intervention and anti-intervention packages in Tageszeitung(Taz) utterances, Bosnia.


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der Spiegelwas, overall (see the Overall category in Figures 7 and 8) and inmost individual components, more congruent with the pro-intervention side(the government and parts of the left) than the anti-intervention (peacegroups) side.

The congruence in framing between both media sources and the pro-intervention side was particularly strong for the component of the debatewhich got the most notice, attribution of blame for the war (labeled Conflictin Figures 7 and 8). For the pro-intervention side, as well as die Tageszeitung

and der Spiegel, the Serbs were aggressors and the Muslim were victims; UNpeace-keeping, sanctions and diplomacy had failed to stop the fighting. In con-trast, Taz and Spiegelcoverage offered considerably less framing support tothe diagnosis of peace groups that the Bosnian war was caused by national-ism and aggression on all sides, had its roots in historical instances of ethnicconflict in the region, and so on.

Die Tageszeitung and der Spiegelalso offered considerably more supportto the pro-intervention than the anti-intervention side when it came to theAmerican role in the Bosnian conflict (labeled United States in Figures 7 and

8). Both media sources described the United States and Western Europe ashesitant to intervene. In so doing, neither media source offered much framingsupport to the concrete claims of either side, but their framing was compati-



0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

United States Policy Mission Germany Overall

Percentages

Pro-InterventionN= 398Anti-Intervention

Conflict

N= 204

Figure 8. Congruence with pro-intervention and anti-intervention packages in der Spiegelutterances, Bosnia.


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ble with the pro-interventionist claims that the United States had a genuineinterest in peace in the region. The two media sources offered absolutely nosupport to the anti-intervention sides (peace groups) claims that the United

States was serving self-interested economic or power motives in the BosnianWar.

When it came to appropriate Western policy toward Bosnia (labeledPolicy in Figures 7 and 8), the pro-intervention side enjoyed greater visibil-ity than the anti-intervention side in die Tageszeitung and the two sidesenjoyed about equal visibility in der Spiegelin terms of the relative frequen-cy of mention of their respective positions. While the anti-interventionistsdenied that military intervention would serve any useful purpose and arguedthat the West should instead focus on humanitarian aid to Bosnia, the pro-interventionists argued that force was acceptable to protect human rights andto end the fighting.

In two areas Spiegel and Taz framing lent more support to the anti-intervention side,but neither of these areas attained much prominence in theirnews accounts. These included, first, the notion that the NATO mission wouldenshrine dominance of military solutions in international conflicts and wouldserve to defend imperialist economic interests, and so on (labeled Missionin Figures 7 and 8). These included, in addition, the anti-interventionists claim

that joining the NATO mission would mean breaking with Germanys postwarpolicy of restraint, would increase Germanys great-power role, would mili-tarize German foreign policy, etc. (labeled Germany in Figures 7 and 8).

In sum, in most of the individual components and certainly overall, Spiegeland Taz framing of the Bosnia issue was much more congruent with pro-intervention framing than with the peace groups anti-intervention framing,and this was consistent with peace groups incapacity to mobilize the broaderpublic.

Testing causation

Table 1 demonstrates that genuine variation in the independent variable exists,exhibiting a systematic trend rather than a random occurrence. In terms ofgenuine differences between levels of congruence between media and move-ment framing, Table 1 shows that INF and Bosnia are indeed polar cases andthat the Gulf War case lies in between. The chi square statistics generatedby the paired comparisons demonstrate that variations in congruence acrossissues are statistically significant. In particular, with respect to the Tages-zeitung, the tests of significance demonstrate the extent of the differences incongruence between media and movement framing in the INF-Bosnia andGulf War-Bosnia comparisons. Thus, Tageszeitung framing favours the peace




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EuropeanConsortiumforPoliticalResearch2002

Table 1. Cross-tabulations for differences between INF, Gulf War and Bosnia regarding congruence ment/peace movement framing

Taz Spiegel

PAIRWISE INF Bosnia INF COMPARISONS

Congruence with: 207 606 327 government framing

peace movement/ 757 303 667 anti-intervention

Pearson c2(1) = 388.99 Pr = 0.000 Pearson c2(1)

Gulf War Bosnia Gulf War


peace movement/ 443 303 194

anti-intervention Pearson c2(1) = 233.59 Pr = 0.000 Pearson c2(1)

INF Gulf War INF


peace movement/ 757 443 667 anti-intervention


ALL CASES INF Gulf War Bosnia INF

Congruence with: 207 160 606 327

government framing

peace movement/ 757 443 303 667 anti-intervention


g = -0.614 ASE = 0.024 g = -0.4663


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movement with respect to INF and the Gulf War, but flips to favouringgovernment framing with respect to Bosnia. The chi square statistic for theINF-Gulf comparison shows that Tageszeitung framing of these two cases is

more alike than for any other paired comparison, which is consonant with themiddle-case status of the Gulf War. The same holds true for der Spiegel, butto a lesser extent. The gamma statistic, which assumes that cases are orderedby degree of mobilization (INF > Gulf> Bosnia), indicates a strong negativerelationship between Tageszeitung congruence with government framingand the extent of mass mobilization. The same holds true for der Spiegel, butless strongly; the gamma correlation is weaker but significant and in the samedirection (ASE less than 0.05).



0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

0

Congruence between media framing and movement framing

Nu

mberofprotestparticipants(inthousands)

Spiegel

Taz

Bosnia

Gulf War

INF

20 40 60 80 100

(% agreement)

Figure 9. Relationship between protest levels and media congruence with peace movementpackages for INF, Gulf War and Bosnia.


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Finally, since levels of congruence between Taz/Spiegelframing and move-ment framing change systematically across the three cases and since the INFmissile, Gulf War, and Bosnia cases are ordered in terms of descending mobi-

lization by the peace movement, we can make the reasonable inference thata causal relationship exists between media/movement framing congruence andmovement mobilization capacity. Figure 9 summarizes this relationship.Wherecongruence between media framing and movement framing was high (the INFcase), mobilization was also high. Where congruence was low (the Bosniacase), mobilization was also low. Where congruence was somewhere in be-tween (the Gulf War case), mobilization was moderate.11

Reverse causation?

As noted above, I have pointed to a reasonably strong relationship betweenmedia framing and peace groups capacity to mobilize with respect to the INFmissiles, the Gulf War and the NATO mission to Bosnia. But what aboutthe possibility of reverse causation? Do media establish framing patterns inadvance of movement mobilization, or does mobilization tilt media framingtoward the peace groups side? This question can be most usefully addressedwith respect to the INF missiles and the Gulf War, the two cases in which mobi-

lization actually took place. I therefore compared levels of overall congruencebetween Taz/Spiegel framing and peace group framing for the INF debatebefore the first major anti-missile demonstration (October 1981) and betweeneach of the largest subsequent demonstrations (June 1982 and October 1983)with levels of congruence for the entire missile debate. I undertook similarcomparisons for the Gulf War debate, comparing levels of congruence beforeand after the first major demonstration against the Gulf War on 14 January1991. Two more large demonstrations took place in the second half of January1991. The results are presented in Tables 2 and 3.

During the INF debate, framing in both die Tageszeitung and der Spiegelshifted toward somewhat higher levels of congruence with peace groupframing after the first or second major demonstrations of the early 1980s, andthis shift may be partly attributable to influences of the peace movement onthe two news sources. On the other hand, Taz and Spiegelframing of the INFissue was already quite congruent with peace group framing even before thefirst major demonstration in October 1981. During the Gulf War, moreover,levels of congruence between Taz framing and peace group framing actuallyfell after the first major demonstration; demonstrations certainly did not tilt

media framing toward the peace movement in the case of the Gulf War. Insum, although it may have played a slight role in the INF missile debate, peace




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Table 2. Congruence between media and peace group framing of the INF debate, by timeperiods

Framing congruence Framing congruencewith peace movement, with government,INF debate INF debate

die Tageszeitung

January 1980October 1981 77% 23%

November 1981June 1982 77% 23%

July 1982October 1983 84% 16%

Entire period (January 1980 79% 21%October 1983)

der Spiegel

January 1980October 1981 65% 35%

November 1981June 1982 74% 26%

July 1982October 1983 74% 26%

Entire period (January 1980 67% 33%October 1983)

Table 3. Congruence between media and peace group framing of the Gulf War, by timeperiods

Framing congruence Framing congruencewith peace movement, with government,Gulf War Gulf War

die TageszeitungAugust 199015 January 1991 77% 23%

15 January 199128 71% 29%February 1991

Entire period (August 1990 73% 26%February 1991)

der Spiegel

August 199015 January 1991 59% 41%

15 January 199128 59% 41%

February 1991Entire period (August 1990 58% 42%

February 1991)


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movement mobilization was not the driving force behind media framing ofthese two issues in any consistent fashion.

Weighing alternative or complementary explanations

Public opinion prior to and during the INF, Gulf War and

Bosnia debates

Before concluding, several alternative explanations for the ebb and flow ofpeace movement mobilization capacity need to be considered. First, I considerpublic opinion, both prior to and during the three debates. Measuring publicopinion through surveys is fraught with methodological difficulties, includingthe susceptibility of survey responses to the framing effects of the survey ques-tions themselves (Entman 2000; Eichenberg 1989). Nonetheless, many schol-ars find survey evidence useful in spite of all its well-known and indisputableshortcomings (Everts 1993: 197). All caveats notwithstanding, one mightexpect to see a general relationship between public opinion and movementmobilization.

Let us now consider prior public opinion as an explanation for varying

levels of peace movement mobilization. That is, prior to the specific contro-versies over the INF missiles, the Gulf War or Bosnia, the public held attitudesthat increased or decreased receptivity to peace movement arguments oncethose controversies actually arose. If prior public opinion did indeed con-tribute to mobilization potential in the three cases, one would expect that itfavoured receptivity to peace movement arguments about the INF missilesmore than about the Gulf War or Bosnia, since mobilization against INF mis-siles greatly outstripped mobilization against the other two. Unfortunately, Iam aware of no data that would reveal prior German public opinion con-

cerning wars like the Gulf War. However, we can compare prior public opinionconcerning issues associated with the INF missiles on the one hand, andGerman participation in out-of-area military activity like the Bosnia missionson the other.

Thestatus quo ante of public opinion on the eve of the missile debate (late1979) constituted a mixed but not wholly inhospitable terrain in terms of thepublics a priori likelihood of being receptive to peace movement argumentsand mobilization attempts. As Table 4 shows, on the eve of the missile debate,with respect to threat of communism,military balance and nuclear balance,

the percentage of (Western) Germans holding attitudes that suggested likelyreceptivity to subsequent peace movement positions was higher than or equalto the percentage holding attitudes that suggested likely receptivity to sub-




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sequent government arguments.With respect to the other issues listed in Table

4, however, this relationship was reversed; attitudes suggesting receptivity tosubsequent government positions outweighed attitudes suggesting receptivityto subsequent peace movement positions by a large margin.

With respect to German participation in multilateral military missionsbeyond NATO territory (e.g., Bosnia), survey results reveal a potentially more,and in any event not less, hospitable terrain for peace movement mobilizationin terms of a priori public opinion. As Table 5 shows, support for Germaninvolvement in combat missions outside NATO territory was extremelylimited from 1991 to mid-1993. It is true that as much as 45 per cent of the

German population was prepared to accept German participation in unarmedpeace-keeping missions, and these people might be considered potential sup-porters of subsequent peace-keeping missions despite potential use of force



Table 4. German publics prior attitudes to INF missile-related issues, 19771979 (percent-age of public holding attitudes likely to make them receptive during the INF debate to peacemovement arguments (P), government arguments (G))

Peace Dontmovement Government know/no

Issue arguments arguments answer

Threat of communism (G = great or 40 41 18very great; P = not great or not serious)

Military balance (G = Warsaw Pact superior; 65 31 4P = NATO superior or both sides equal)

Nuclear balance (G = Warsaw Pact superior; 56 27 17P = NATO superior or both sides equal)

NATO essential to European security 5 84 11(G = agree; P = disagree)

Withdrawal of American troops from Federal 18 77 4Republic (G = against; P = in favour)

Military alliance with United States or 27 57 16neutrality? (G = alliance with UnitedStates; P = neutrality)

Federal Republic should defend itself 19 57 24against military attack by using military

force? (G = yes; P = no)Attack from East best prevented by 21 55 24

deterrence with West adequately armed?(G = agree; P = disagree)

Sources: Eichenberg 1989; Szabo 1987; Schweigler 1984; Schmidt 1985.


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(such as the decision to send German fighter jets to aid UN peace-keepingtroops in June 1995 or the decision to contribute German troops to theenforcement of the Dayton accords in December 1995). Nonetheless, what-ever stance one takes on the question just mentioned, from 1991 to 1993 a sub-stantial portion of the public (at least 38%) wanted to see the German militarylimited to missions within NATO territory only, which would certainly indi-cate receptivity to the anti-intervention position.

Thus, prior public opinion was moderately propitious for peace movement

attempts to mobilize against both INF missiles and German involvement inBosnia. However, peace movement mobilization against the INF missiles wasvastly more successful than against the NATO missions to Bosnia. Therefore,prior public opinion fails to provide a satisfactory alternative explanation forthe varying success of peace movement mobilization.

The evolution of public opinion during the three controversies themselvesmight also help explain the peace movements mobilization capacity. In par-ticular, the proportion of the general public sharing the peace movements fun-damental positions (i.e., opposed to INF missiles, the Gulf War and Bosnia)

would logically represent an upper limit on mobilization potential (on thisgeneral point, see Klandermans & Goslinga 1996; Reuband 1985).

The case of the INF missile debate sustains this expectation quite well. AsTable 6 illustrates, public opinion between 1979 and 1983 increasingly turnedagainst the INF decision and the possible stationing of missiles. (Admittedly,responses varied considerably depending on the wording of survey questions,but the bulk of those surveys conducted in 1983 found large-scale oppositionto stationing INF missiles (Berger et al. 1983).) Whereas in late 1979 only 35per cent opposed possibly stationing the missiles, by late 1983 as many as 74

per cent did so.This evolution of public opinion may well have increased mobi-lization potential and contributed to the actual mobilization which grew byleaps and bounds between 1981 and 1983 (see Figures 1 and 2).



Table 5. German publics attitudes toward German participation in out of area militarymissions (percentages)

Combat Unarmed Acceptablemissions peace-keeping only within Dont know/noacceptable only NATO territory answer

March 1991 17 41 39 3

June 1992 14 44 38 4

April 1993 12 21 53 14

Sources: Spiegel1991, 1992; Die Woche 1993.


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The case of Bosnia also sustains this expectation. German support for theuse of Western multilateral force rose between 1992 and 1995. Juhasz (2001)found that 58 per cent of Western Germans and 45 per cent of EasternGermans supported military enforcement of the UN-imposed no-fly zone inBosnia in March and October 1993; the remaining Germans divided theiropinions between indifference (24 per cent of Westerners and 23 per cent ofEasterners) and disapproval (18 per cent of Westerners and 32 per cent ofEasterners) on this issue. Similarly, Sobel (2000) found that 59 per cent of all

Germans approved of fight(ing) to get aid convoys through in late February1994 (39 per cent opposed). Both Juhasz and Sobel found lower levels ofsupport (around 40 per cent) for bombardment of Serb troops (Juhasz 2001)and launching air attacks (Sobel 2000) at those respective times. By late Sep-tember, 64 per cent of Germans were ready to support the NATO mission toBosnia, with 30 per cent opposing it (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1995). Theacid test came, however, with the issue ofGerman participation in such mul-tilateral endeavours. Table 7 shows the evolution of German public opinionon this most sensitive issue. At most, 40 per cent of German respondents sup-

ported German participation in UN or NATO missions through 1994. Start-ing in 1995,however, support for German participation increased dramatically,with 57 per cent supporting deploying German Tornado fighter jets to supportUN peace-keepers in June 1995 and 72 per cent supporting German partici-pation in the NATO peace-keeping mission in December 1995. This risingsupport for German participation in the Bosnia missions corresponds to thepeace movements inability to mobilize significant protest in 1995 or at anyearlier point (see Figures 1 and 2). The significant rise of public support forGerman participation in 1995 was particularly constraining; the two parlia-

mentary votes in June and December 1995 on the issues mentioned abovewould have provided the most logical focal points for protest. Thus, the evo-



Table 6. German publics attitudes toward INF missiles, 19811983 (percentages)

Opposition to Approval ofINF/missile INF/missilestationing stationing Undecided

October 1979 35 39 26

July 1981 44 29 27

AugustSeptember 1983 66 16 18

October 1983 74 25

Sources: Institut fr Demoskopie Allensbach 1981; Emnid 1983; SINUS 1983.


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lution of public opinion may well have helped constrain the peace movementsmobilization capacity concerning Bosnia.

On the other hand, the case of the Gulf War lends little support to thenotion that public opinion adequately explains mobilization capacity, as Table8 shows. The first two entries measured German support for a potential warwaged by the United States-led coalition against Iraq prior to the onset of

fighting in mid-January 1991. The first two entries are also inconsistent witheach other, which may be due to question wording (the October 1990 ques-tion measured support for using force to liberate Kuwait (Everts 1993), whilethe 16 January 1991 question measures support for military attack in the eventthat Iraq had not withdrawn from Kuwait before the expiration of the UNsultimatum). Once the fighting began, however, it is clear that Germans sup-ported the Gulf War in high numbers (c. 75 per cent), although this supportdropped somewhat in the course of the War. Despite this high level of publicsupport for the Gulf War, however, the peace movement was able to mobilize

some 600,000 participants in over 140 events (see Figures 1 and 2). The factthat the peace movement achieved moderate mobilization (in comparison tothe INF or Bosnia cases) despite high public support for the war would appearto be a paradox. Kaiser and Becher (1992) also draw attention to this; theynote the high public support for the war, but they also characterize the mobi-lization against the Gulf War as big and suggest that it would have been evenlarger except for the long-held hope that a non-military solution would befound.

In the final analysis, public opinion prior to and during the INF, Gulf War

and Bosnia debates turns out to be an imperfect predictor of the peace move-ments mobilization capacity. Prior public opinion should have prepared more



Table 7. German publics attitudes toward German participation in Western military inter-vention in Bosnia, 19931995 (percentages)

Date of interview No Yes

January 1993 (Western Germans only) 57 40

27 April 1994 56 39

13 March 1995 44 49

6 June 1995 31 57

11 December 1995 (no report) 72

Note: the figures do not add up to 100% because dont know/no answer responses weregenerally not reported.Sources: Sobel 2000; Infas 1994; Sample-Institut 1995; Forsa 1995; Emnid 1995.


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(or equally) hospitable ground for mobilization against German participationin the Bosnia mission than against INF, but mobilization was vastly moresuccessful against the latter than against the former. The evolution of publicopinion during the debates themselves seems consistent with the levels ofmobilization achieved (or not) during the INF and Bosnia debates, but isapparently inconsistent with the mobilization achieved against the Gulf War.

While public opinion undoubtedly plays a certain role in facilitating or

constraining mobilization, the above observations dovetail nicely with mycentral argument,namely that media framing strongly affects movement mobi-lization capacity. The effect of media framing sheds light, for example, on therelationship between prior public opinion and the timing of protest withrespect to the INF debate. While part of the (West) German public can beconsidered receptive a priori to peace movement positions in the missiledebate, the first major demonstration against the missiles did not take placeuntil October 1981 (a full 21 months after the NATO double-track decisionwas announced in December 1979), despite the fact that peace groups began

mobilizing in 1980. Arguably, part of the explanation for this lag lay in theneed for the peace movements arguments about the missiles, deterrence andthe international constellation to attain credibility with the populace. Thiscredibility was undoubtedly enhanced by the support it found in der Spiegeland die Tageszeitung. Similarly, although the German public was at best highlyambivalent about, if not downright opposed to, German participation in outof area military involvement through 1993, the same public came to supportGerman participation in the armed NATO peace-keeping mission to Bosniaby 1995. The peace movements chances to mobilize against participation in

the Bosnia mission were also low. These developments were quite plausiblydue in part to the lack of support for the movements positions in der Spiegeland die Tageszeitung. Furthermore, while the climate of public opinion was



Table 8. German publics attitudes toward the Gulf War, 1991 (percentages)

Date of interview Against (potential) Support (potential)Gulf War Gulf War

October 1990 24 63

16 January 1991 79 16

29 January 1991 21 75

6 February 1991 23 76

19 February 1991 37 60

Note: figures do not add up to 100% because dont know/no answer responses were notreported.Sources: Everts 1993; Infas 1991a, 1991b; Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1991a, 1991b.


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favourable to both the Gulf War and German participation in the Bosniamission, the congruence between Taz/Spiegel framing and peace movementframing facilitated the movements reasonably successful mobilization against

the Gulf War, whereas the absence of congruence between Taz/Spiegelfram-ing and movement framing helped hinder mobilization against Bosnia. Thus,even when majority public opinion worked against it, the peace movementwas able to mobilize considerable protest against the Gulf War with the helpof media framing in two of the organs read most often by those with highprotest potential.

Normalization of German foreign policy and elite cues on the left

Yet another possible explanation for the peace movements inability to mobi-lize against German participation in the NATO mission to Bosnia (in contrastto its earlier successes) exists: that German foreign policy had undergone aprocess of normalization by 1995 which changed attitudes held by politicalparties and the general public concerning the use of military force. This argu-ment intersects with an additional possible explanation of the peace move-ments incapacity in 1995,an argument concerning elite cues. According to thisargument, potential peace protestors respond to cues emanating from left-

wing elites. Thus, the fact that left elites were solidly united against the INFmissiles and relatively united against the Gulf War facilitated mobilization ofrank-and-file potential protestors. By contrast, the deep divisions among leftelites over the Bosnia mission discouraged mobilization against it.

Since the Cold War ended, German foreign and security policy has under-gone a certain normalization (Otte & Greve 2000; Duffield 1998; Gordon1994). While some conservatives advocated that Germany become so normalas to pursue its national interests unilaterally, most of the German politicalclass equates normality with multilateralism, including the commitment to par-

ticipate in multinational military missions out of area (i.e., beyond NATOterritory). This was advocated relatively quickly by the conservative-liberalcoalition that governed until 1998. It was also reluctantly accepted as of 1995by most of the Social Democratic leadership and roughly half of the leader-ship of the Greens, but only after sharp restrictions were placed on Germandeployment (McKenzie 1996; Cooper 1997).

The issue of normalization intersected with the issue of elite cues on theleft since normalization entailed the acceptance of German involvement inmilitary missions on the left as well as the right. There is indeed an apparent

correlation between the internal consistency of elite cues on the left and thepeace movements ability to mobilize. The most prominent figures of the leftwere virtually united against the INF missiles and relatively united during the




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brief conduct of the Gulf War (although deeper splits became apparent inpost-mortem debates conducted after the Gulf War). However, in theBosnian case, the Social Democrats and the Greens were very deeply divided

over German participation in Western intervention by the time the crucial par-liamentary votes were taken in June and December of 1995. Prominent figureson the left, Joschka Fischer of the Greens most notably among them, spokeout infavourof Western use of force.

Thus, rather than constituting an automatic response to the lifting of ColdWar constraints on policy, acceptance of out of area military involvementevolved only gradually and as the result of a highly conflicted process, inparticular within the left parties and public opinion (Cooper 1997). Duffield(1998) attributes this resistance to the persistence of a postwar national secu-rity culture (similarly described by Berger 1998) characterized by deep-seatedskepticism toward the appropriateness and utility of military force. In the19901995 period, this skepticism was slowly overcome by several counter-vailing factors. Germany experienced pressures from NATO, the EU, and theUN to become more involved in peace-keeping and peace enforcement. Thesepressures brought into play two norms of German foreign policy: namelythe desire to be a reliable partner in the above-mentioned institutions and thedesire to avoid a Sonderweg, a unilateral course of action (even a peaceful

one) on the international stage (Duffield 1998; Otte & Greve 2000; Banchoff1999).The course of normalization on the political left can not be divorced from

the concrete cases in which military intervention was under debate. Judgingfrom the rhetoric concerning the NATO mission to Bosnia, the nature of thecause also played a large role for pro-interventionists on the left. For them,willingness to sanction force in Bosnia was catalyzed by the fall of Srebrenicaand other UN-protected zones, and the subsequent Serbian massacre ofBosnian Muslim civilians (Maull 2000). In addition, the lefts former anti-

Americanism was not a hindrance to support for intervention this time.Instead, they viewed the NATO missions to Bosnia as motivated by hu-manitarian concerns rather than sordid power-political considerations, whichengaged the never again Auschwitz tenet (the dictum to prevent genocide)of the lefts postwar political culture (Cooper 1997), along with its desire thatGermany remain a civilian power (Maull 2000).

It is at this point that my argument about the congruence between mediaframing and movement framing comes in, as an explanation that complementsand interacts with a focus on normalization and elite cues. Why did parts of

the left elite change their collective minds about the use of force and com-municate this to their compatriots in the citizenry at large? By 1995, the left




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elites perceptions of the Bosnian conflict and the NATO missions had beenat least partially formed by approximately four years ofmedia framing of theBalkan conflict, including that by die Tageszeitung and der Spiegelas outlined

in previous sections. The fall of Srebrenica and the other safe areas servedas the proverbial straw that broke the camels back of resistance to Germanparticipation in multilateral military missions abroad, because these eventsfol-lowed three years worth of reporting and commentary on (primarily) Serbianbarbarism in the Balkans.

And how did rank-and-file potential protesters pick up these transformedelite cues, in addition to their impressions of the Balkans conflict itself? Nat-urally, statements supporting German participation in NATO missions bykey figures on the left received ample press coverage in Der Spiegeland DieTageszeitung as well as other media. They were particularly newsworthybecause they generated intense conflict within the SPD and Greens, andbecause they broke with the lefts consensus on anti-militarism. (The Party ofDemocratic Socialism (PDS) opposed the NATO missions without muchinternal controversy and did not attract as much media attention.) Coverageof these statements in der Spiegeland die Tageszeitung is included in the arti-cles coded for this analysis and adds to the frequency of the pro-interventioncoded utterances captured in Figures 7 and 8. Although elite views did not

receive any special weight in the coding process, they were amply discussedin der Spiegeland die Tageszeitung and thus had a cumulative impact on boththe readers and the coding for this article. Moreover, potential protestors arenot simply passive recipients of elite cues which they duly translate intoactivism or lack thereof. Instead, they weigh these cues in conjunction withother sources of their perceptions of issues, including media coverage. Whereleft-elite cues were divided (e.g., with respect to Bosnia), potential protestorson the left may have given more heed to pro-interventionists like Fischerbecause these views were more consistent with the cumulative trend of media

reporting.

Political opportunity structure

A final possible alternative explanation might be that the political opportu-nity structure was better for the peace movement during the INF missiledebate than during either the Gulf War or the Bosnia debate. (Political oppor-tunities are the features of the political context that affect movements emer-gence and success.) Indeed, such a claim has a great deal of merit. A number

of components of political opportunity, and especially their overall configura-tion, enhanced the peace movements mobilization capacity against the INF




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missiles. The movement had a salient issue with which to work; its positionswere not co-opted by conventional politics or the major parties; levels ofprotest potential were high in society at large; the issue of peace squeezed

out any competitors for mobilization energies in the extra-parliamentaryarena; and government social, economic and foreign policy as a whole wasalready relatively unpopular (Cooper 1996).

By contrast, in the 1990s, political opportunities for peace movement mobi-lization against both the Gulf War and Bosnia were less favourable overall,and these reduced opportunities dampened mobilization capacity indepen-dently of framing effects. On the positive side, the issue was salient in eachcase, as demonstrated by massive press coverage. Moreover, no other over-riding issues competed in the extra-parliamentary arena with protest againsteither the Gulf War or Bosnia. Furthermore, other than the engineering ofunification itself, the Kohl governments policies were not known for wide-spread popularity in the 1990s. (If anything, the popularity of unification in1990 should have dampened protest against the Gulf War more than againstGerman involvement in Bosnia.) On the more negative side, protest withrespect to new social movement issues like environmentalism had subsidedsince the 1980s and post-material issues had lost ground to the material onesof unif

Documents

Media Framing and Social Movement Mobilization