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Mediterraneanneo‐democracies and theopinion‐policy nexusJoel E. Brooks aa Assistant Professor of Political Science ,Illinois State University ,Published online: 03 Dec 2007.

To cite this article: Joel E. Brooks (1988) Mediterranean neo‐democraciesand the opinion‐policy nexus, West European Politics, 11:3, 126-140, DOI:10.1080/01402388808424698

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Mediterranean Neo-Democracies and theOpinion-Policy Nexus

Joel E. Brooks

This article empirically evaluates the previously unresearched relation-ship between mass public opinion and public policy in the Mediter-ranean neo-democracies. By studying almost 250 issues over thelast decade, the nature of contemporary democracy in Spain, Portugaland Greece is revealed in relation to the overall consistency betweenmajority preferences and government action. In addition, theopinion-policy nexus is explored in regard to the potential impactof alternative institutional structures, landslide majorities, differentcategories of issues (e.g., redistributive, foreign policy), and thepartisan composition of the government (i.e., socialist versus non-socialist).

Within a 19-month period in the mid-1970s, authoritarian regimes cameto an end in three Mediterranean nations: in Portugal with the revolutionof April 1974, in Greece with the fall of the colonels in July 1974, andin Spain with the November 1975 death of Franco. By 1977, democraticallyelected governments existed in all three countries. As Geoffrey Pridhamobserves:

Both the obvious similarity of their respective regime transitions fromauthoritarianism to democracy and the mere contemporaneousness ofthis process in Spain, Greece and Portugal during 1974-75 invitecomparison ... One might add ... that the common situation of thesecountries in the Mediterranean area considerably reinforces the argumentfor treating them as a compact case-study ...'

The focus of recent scholarly attention regarding the Mediterranean neo-democracies has been on the process and causes of regime transition and theemergence of competitive party systems.2 However, one of the major gaps inresearch on these nations concerns evidence dealing with a crucial componentof democracy: the relationship between mass public opinion and public policy.The purpose of this article is to address this issue by applying an unusual butrevealing perspective termed the 'opinion-policy nexus'.3 Arend Lijphartprovides the rationale for such an approach when he explains:

Democracy may be defined not only as government by the people butalso... as government/or the people - that is, government in accordancewith the people's preferences. An ideal democratic government wouldbe one whose actions were always in perfect correspondence with thepreferences of all its citizens. Such complete responsiveness in govern-ment has never existed and may never be achieved, but it can serve as

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MEDITERRANEAN NEO-DEMOCRACIES 127

an ideal to which democratic regimes should aspire. It can also beregarded as the end of a scale on which the degree of democraticresponsiveness of different regimes may be measured.4

Focusing on the majoritarian-oriented opinion-policy nexus raises importantempirical, analytical and normative questions. What is the degree of consistencybetween mass public opinion and public policy in the Mediterranean neo-democracies? How does this consistency rate compare with older WesternEuropean democracies? What variables affect this opinion-policy relation-ship? Is government responsiveness to mass opinion necessarily desirable? Thelast of these questions (focusing on the normative issue) has been consideredin general terms elsewhere.5 Regardless of whether one accepts or rejectsLijphart's depiction of the 'ideal democratic government', quantifying thedegree and type of public opinion-public consistency (or inconsistency) canprovide a unique and useful addition to current knowledge of contemporarypolitics in the Mediterranean region.

Specifically, this study presents results regarding the opinion-policy nexusfor 244 cases spanning the past decade within Greece, Spain, and Portugal.In addition to evaluating the significance of different institutional structureswithin these countries on the opinion-policy relationship, potential variationsare examined in regard to the following variables: (1) extent of majorityopinion on an issue (landslide versus slim majority); (2) types of issues(redistributive versus non-redistributive, foreign/defence policy versusdomestic issues); and (3) partisan composition of the government (socialistversus non-socialist administrations).

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

Published, scientifically-designed public opinion surveys on national policy-oriented questions from January 1978 to June 1986 (the latest continuousperiod for which complete data were available for all three countries) consti-tuted the initial data base.6 Polls concerning the popularity of currentpolitical leaders or parties were automatically eliminated since they did notfocus on policy issues, per se. Retrospective opinion questions regarding expost facto approval or disapproval of previously made governmental decisionswere then excluded, since they may not be an accurate reflection of opinionon the issue concerned before the announcement of the government's policy.This was to reduce prospects of measuring a 'phoney consensus* (especiallywhen the majority of the public approves the policy only after it is announced).

Surveys on the same specific issue (e.g., support for or opposition to thedeath penalty in Spain) within the same calendar year were averaged andtreated as one survey result. This prevented more than one case of opinion-policy consistency (or inconsistency) for any one issue per year. At the sametime, issues that appeared over a longer time span (e.g., support for oropposition to American bases in Greece) were considered as separate casesfor each year they were polled - reflecting the continued importance of thatissue in the eyes of the polling organisations and the unresolved nature of theissue being considered.

An additional factor is sampling error. Since samples of the size used have

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128 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS

a three per cent margin of error 95 per cent of the time, all polls indicatingthree per cent or less difference between majority and minority opinion wereexcluded from the cases analysed.

As a consequence of the winnowing process outlined above, 244 issues(cases) remained: 96 for Greece, 78 for Spain and 70 for Portugal. For eachcase, the reported majority opinion on an issue was recorded as eitherfavouring or opposing the policy suggested in the survey question. The nextstep was to characterise public policy on these specific issues.

In this article, the term 'public policy' refers to governmental actions (orinactions) regarding selected issues as indicated by legislative and/or executivedecisions. This includes budgetary spending and taxation, passage of domesticlegislation, executive orders, patterns of administrative implementation,agreements with foreign governments, and voting records in international orsupranational organisations. Excluded from consideration are so-called 'policyoutcomes' (e.g., higher unemployment) which may or may not be a directconsequence of a particular governmental action. Also excluded are simplestatements of intent not supported by some follow-up governmental actionto implement the stated position. The rationale for this exclusion is based onthe motto: 'Watch what we do, not what we say'.

To facilitate assessment of policy, information was obtained from a varietyof pertinent sources.7 In order to reduce the possibility of error or uninten-tional bias in determining policy, assistance was sought from a panel of threeexperts - one for each of the Mediterranean countries involved. To ensurethat their policy judgments were made independent of knowledge regardinghow such evaluations would affect the ultimate findings of this study, thecountry specialists had no prior access to the public opinion data. The author'sinitial assessments of public policy on the issues under consideration were sentto each of the appropriate 'expert judges'. After consultation, agreement wasreached regarding the predominant thrust of policy for all relevant cases. Atthis stage, the author compared the reported majority opinion on each issuewith the final determination of public policy on that same issue. This yieldedthe findings in the tables that follow regarding consistency (inconsistency)between mass public opinion and public policy.

An additional element considered in this process was the time-lag factor.How long a period after the expression of public opinion in a survey shouldone allow before making a determination as to policy consistency or in-congruence? While there is no obviously right or wrong answer to this question,a 12-month time-lag factor was utilised.8

In order to test for the potential relevance of the type of issue on the opinion-policy nexus in Greece, Spain, and Portugal, it was necessary to designate eachcase according to a dichotomous distinction: 'redistributive' versus 'non-redistributive'. This procedure was based upon a variation of Lowi's typologyof public policies.9 For this purpose, all issues involving a potentially pro-gressive (i.e., more equitable) reallocation of economic or political advantageor power in society were categorised as 'redistributive' in nature (e.g., proposednationalisation programmes).

The other distinction utilised regarding type of issue was the domestic-foreign policy dichotomy. In this study, defence issues (e.g., levels of military

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expenditures) were coupled with foreign policy cases when assessing govern-ment responsiveness to majority sentiment.

DEGREE OF CONSISTENCY

Table 1 quantifies the overall opinion-policy relationship for each of theMediterranean neo-democracies. On average, 62 per cent of all (244) casesexamined indicated incongruence between mass public opinion and publicpolicy. For the minority of instances (38 per cent) manifesting congruencebetween opinion and policy, the following caveat is appropriate. A findingof consistency in these cases does not necessarily establish a causal relationshipbetween mass preferences and resulting government action (and thereforepresumed democratic 'linkage')-10

TABLE 1

OVERALL OPINION-POLICY RELATIONSHIP

Country

Spain

Portugal

Greece

All Med. Neo-Democracies

Consistency%

3841

34

38

N

3029

33

92

Inconsistency%

62

59

66

62

N

48

41

63

152

Total%

100

100

100

100

N

78

70

96

244

Note: Differences between findings for Spain, Portugal, and Greece are not statisticallysignificant using chi-square test at .05 level.

An alternative explanation (referred to as the 'counterfeit consensus' schoolof thought) views mass public opinion as non-autonomous in nature. Opinionis depicted as being largely a creation of the ruling élites." First, it is arguedthat governmental élites can mould mass attitudes through the 'phoneyconsensus' device of rallying patriotic fervour in times of crisis to createartificially high support for government policy (the 'rally-around-the-flag'syndrome). Note, however, that an effort is made to exclude most cases ofthis type (involving ex post facto approval of policy) from consideration inthis study (see methodology section). Second, it is contended that opinion maybe perceived as reflecting the dominant values of the ruling business élitebecause of its influence over the modes of opinion formation and the social-isation (legitimation) process.12 As a consequence, there would be pre-ordained consistency between opinion and policy. Such a consensus wouldbe 'counterfeit' in that it would not derive from genuinely independent massopinion but would be the result of a manipulative process.13 Therefore, if thisargument is even partially correct, the percentage of cases suggesting con-gruence between opinion and government action in the Mediterranean politiesmay actually exaggerate the real degree of majoritarian democracy that exists.In essence, the true consistency rate may be even lower than the 38 per centindicated in Table 1. On the other hand, the ability of the ruling élites tomanipulate mass opinion (creating an artificial consensus) most of the time

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130 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS

is open to doubt given the lack of high correspondence between masspreferences and policy in a majority of cases studied.

RELEVANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES

Comparative studies of the policy performance of Western democracies oftenassert the importance of differing institutional arrangements regarding thedistribution and exercise of governmental power.14 Comparing the countriesin question, Pridham notes:

On the question of institutional structures, not only do the three newMediterranean democracies include many features very recognisableelsewhere in Western Europe, but in some respects the former haveattempted to transplant institutional mechanisms from the latter - ifone recalls the influence on Karamanlis of the French Gaullist consti-tution as a model for the Greek presidency, or more specifically theprovision in the Spanish constitution for a constructive vote of no-confidence, as a direct borrowing from the West German Basic Law.The Portuguese institutional structure (before its reform in 1982) wassomewhat deviant from the norm of parliamentary states, notably inthe policy-making role granted the military which reflected the revol-utionary outcome of 1974 ...l5

Do such variations in institutional structures among the Mediterranean neo-democracies matter vis-à-vis the opinion-policy nexus? In light of the resultsin Table 1, the answer appears to be 'no'. The small differences between thefindings for Spain, Portugal and Greece are not statistically significant.16

From a comparative perspective, the percentages in Table 1 are very similarto results obtained by the author in previous studies of Britain (a parliamen-tary, unitary state), France (a hybrid presidential, unitary nation), Canada(a parliamentary, federal country), and the United States (a presidential,separation-of-powers, federal system).17 While a detailed analysis of cross-national patterns regarding the opinion-policy relationship is beyond thepurview of this article, it should be noted that for none of the seven Westerndemocratic nations mentioned above has opinion-policy consistency reachedthe 50 per cent level. In fact, the consistency rates range from 34 per cent forGreece to 44 per cent for Britain - averaging 40 per cent for the sevencountries. Given the similarity of results, obvious institutional differencesamong the European and North American political systems referred to (e.g.,federal as opposed to unitary, parliamentary as opposed to presidentialstructures) are apparently less important than the common factors among thesenations affecting the opinion-policy nexus (discussed in the following sectionsof this article).

IMPACT OF LANDSLIDE MAJORITIES

Despite the results reported above, it is conceivable that an overwhelmingdegree of majority opinion (a landslide majority) regarding an issue might carrygreater weight than a slim majority or plurality. Thus, one can consider thehypothesis: consistency between mass public opinion and public policy is

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MEDITERRANEAN NEO-DEMOCRACIES 131

higher for landslide majority than for slim majority (or plurality) cases. Forthe purpose of this analysis, all cases involving at least 60 per cent majorityopinion on an issue were designated as 'landslide' in nature.

No clear pattern emerges from the results presented in Table 2. There arestatistically insignificant differences between landslide and slim majority casesfor the Mediterranean neo-democracies as a whole and for Greece in particular.For Portugal, inconsistency is actually higher in landslide cases (i.e., theopposite of what was anticipated). For Spain, the reverse is true. Landslidecases yield slightly higher consistency rates (as hypothesised). Thus, the Spanishpolitical system appears moderately more sensitive than either Portugal's orGreece's system to overwhelming expressions of mass opinion. Alternatively,greater consistency may be a result of the 'counterfeit consensus' process(discussed in the previous section) being more highly developed in Spain. AsNancy Bermeo has argued (in reference to the Spanish transition towardsdemocracy): 'Spain never entered a stage of social revolution because theSpanish transition was controlled "from above" by defenders rather thanopponents of capitalism'.18 In addition, the small number of total landslidecases (only 24) mitigates against any firm conclusion regarding Spain.

On a comparative basis, the consistency rate for landslide majority casesaveraged 42.5 per cent for Britain, the United States, Canada, and France.19

This was not significantly different from the rate for slim majority cases forthese four countries. In general, the evidence suggests that the extent ofmajority opinion expressed in opposition to or in support of a particular issuehas not been a decisive factor in the decision-making process of newer or moreestablished Western democracies.

TABLE 2

IMPACT OF LANDSLIDE MAJORITIES

Country

SPAINconsistencyinconsistencyPORTUGALconsistencyinconsistency

GREECEconsistencyinconsistencyALL MED. NEO-DEMOCRACIESconsistencyinconsistency

Landslide%

5050

3169

3268

3565

N

1212

920

1839

3972

Slim Majority%

3367

4951

3862

4060

N

1836

2021

1524

5380

Note: Only for Spain and Portugal are differences between landslide and slim majority casesstatistically significant.

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132 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS

REDISTRIBUTIVE ISSUES

Another way to approach the opinion-policy nexus is to differentiate betweentypes of issues. As noted earlier, one can adapt Lowi's typology of policies -distinguishing between redistributive and non-redistributive cases (the lattercategory combining what Lowi terms 'regulatory' and 'distributive'). To re-iterate, redistributive issues are defined in this study as proposals to reallocateincome, property, political rights or some other related value among broadgroups or classes. This necessarily means that there will be losers and winners.The process often will be marked by class conflict and cast in ideologicalterms.20 It can be argued that on redistributive types of issues (those whichpotentially threaten the economic élites' continued predominance), the degreeof consistency between opinion and policy ought to be even lower than thatwhich generally occurs. Since these issues challenge those forces that benefitfrom existing inequalities in economic and political power, it can be expectedthat in these cases, more than any others, attempts will be made to frustrate thepopular will.21

As a consequence of the argument above, one can derive the hypothesis:consistency between mass public opinion and public policy in the Mediterraneanneo-democracies is lower for redistributive than for non-redistributive issues.The results in Table 3 strongly confirm the hypothesis for each of the threecountries. For Spain, in only one out of 18 redistributive cases (6 per cent) ispolicy consistent with mass opinion. In Greece, the consistency rate is aminuscule 10 per cent for redistributive cases. For Portugal, 21 out of 25 casesresulted in incongruence between policy and opinion. Overall, the consistencyrate for redistributive cases is less than a quarter ofthat for non-redistributiveissues. Such findings are compatible with the argument in the previousparagraph and are consistent with the view expressed by Marsh, Lindblom andothers that the economic élites in capitalist societies exercise something

TABLE 3OPINION-POLICY RELATIONSHIP AND REDISTRIBUTIVE ISSUES

Country

SPAINconsistencyinconsistencyPORTUGALconsistencyinconsistencyGREECEconsistencyinconsistencyALL MED. NEO-DEMOCRACIESconsistencyinconsistency

Redistributive%

694

1684

1090

1189

N

117

421

327

865

Non-Redistributive%

4852

5644

4555

4951

N

2931

2520

3036

8487

Note: All differences between redistributive and non-redistributive cases are statistically significant.

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MEDITERRANEAN NEO-DEMOCRACIES 133

approaching a veto power on those issues which most crucially affect them(redistributive cases).22

From a comparative perspective, the results for the three Mediterraneanneo-democracies are of similar direction to (though of greater magnitude than)older Western democracies. In Britain, Canada, the United States, and France,the inconsistency rate for redistributive issues averaged 64 per cent.23 Thiscompares with 89 per cent for Spain, Portugal, and Greece (reported inTable 3). Therefore, economic élites in the newer democracies of the Mediter-ranean region appear to be even more powerful in their ability to thwart policiesincompatible with their interests than are élites in older democracies. The extentto which these results are a function of the development of political partysystems in these two groups of countries is examined in detail later.

FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

Another distinction that can be made between types of issues involves foreignversus domestic cases. There is a frequently espoused, though largely un-proven, assumption in public opinion and foreign policy literature that foreignpolicy is less susceptible to pressures of mass opinion.24 This is supposedlytrue due to the presumed lower salience of many foreign policy issues for themasses and greater interest group pressure vis-à-vis domestic concerns. As aconsequence, this traditional perspective would anticipate that consistencybetween mass public opinion and public policy is lower for foreign policy thanfor domestic issues.

The results in Table 4 do not support the traditional view of the opinion-policy nexus described above. For Greece, consistency rates are 57 per centfor foreign policy cases against only 17 per cent for domestic issues. For Spain,opinion and policy are congruent in approximately half of all foreign policycases compared with about a quarter of domestic cases. In Portugal, thedifferences are not as great, although they are in the same direction as noted

TABLE 4DOMESTIC VERSUS FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

Country

SPAINconsistencyinconsistencyPORTUGALconsistencyinconsistencyGREECEconsistencyinconsistencyALL MED. NEO-DEMOCRACIESconsistencyinconsistency

Foreign Policy%

5149

4852

5743

5347

N

1918

1617

2418

5953

Domestic Cases%

2773

3565

1783

2575

N

1130

1324

945

3399

Note: All differences between foreign policy and domestic cases are statistically significant.

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134 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS

for the other countries. This pattern of greater consistency between opinionand policy for foreign policy as opposed to domestic issues also has been foundin regard to older democracies such as France, Britain, Canada, and the UnitedStates.25

One possible explanation is that the higher consistency rate for foreignpolicy cases is a reflection of the 'counterfeit consensus' process describedearlier. It can be argued that an artificial consensus is more easily obtainedin foreign policy cases given the 'rally-around-the-flag' syndrome, the abilityof governmental élites to control information more easily regarding such issues,and the relatively lower level of public knowledge usually associated withforeign affairs. In addition, the findings in Table 4 could be explained in thelight of the discussion regarding significantly lower congruence betweenopinion and policy for redistributive cases. Since virtually all such issues arealso domestic in nature, lower consistency scores result for domestic as op-posed to foreign policy/defence cases (given the large number of redistributiveissues in the former category).

PARTISAN COMPOSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT

By the early 1980s, all Mediterranean neo-democracies had come under eithersocialist majority rule or a coalition government headed by a socialist primeminister. Did such changes in the partisan composition of the Spanish,Portuguese and Greek governments make a difference vis-à-vis the opinion-policy nexus? Two rival hypotheses will be presented.

On the one hand, it can be argued that socialist administrations could leadto greater consistency between mass public opinion and policy than 'bourgeois'governments. This would be due primarily to differences resulting fromdecisions on redistributive issues. Under conditions of socialist rule, thesupposed representatives of the working class (and the alleged opponents ofthe economic élite) have attained control of the mechanisms of government.As a consequence, action regarding redistributive cases would be moreresponsive to mass interests and preferences. This might especially be true ofthe Mediterranean neo-democracies for reasons discussed by Salvador Giner:

The region has not been tainted with what are seen as the equivocationsof the more northern kind of socialism. The semiperipheral position ofsouthern Europe in the context of European economic development, thesharpness of its class cleavages, and its long tradition of radicalism haveseemed to give it a number of advantages and opportunities towards theend of the twentieth century which had been missed by socialistselsewhere. Likewise, the much more fundamentalist electoral pro-grammes of the southern European socialists showed that they were fullyaware of the scope of their historical chances.26

Alternatively, one can present the hypothesis that there is no significantdifference between socialist versus conservative administrations in relation tothe opinion-policy nexus. This might be true because of the supposedly de-radicalised nature of socialist ideology and parties within the context of regimetransition in the Mediterranean polities. With regard to Spain:

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MEDITERRANEAN NEO-DEMOCRACIES 135

Even under the dictatorship, while the PSOE was reconstructing itsclandestine party machinery, its claims were moderate. Agrarian reform,for instance, then still a serious issue in Spain's vast Andalusian lands,was not included in its agenda. This could be attributed, of course, tothe all-important, urgent task of first restoring democracy to the country.Later, the need to tread carefully and not to antagonise the coup-pronesection of the army, as well as to achieve respectability among a peoplelong indoctrinated about the evils of socialism and communism, actedas brakes upon any undue manifestation of extremism... The reformismof the PSOE, like that of the other Mediterranean parties, is based onthe all-pervading idea of modernisation. In the Spanish case, theleitmotiv is that the socialist government's task is to embark on a seriesof reforms that an enlightened conservative or centre party ought to havecarried out long ago.27

In a similar vein, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) in Greecehas been characterised as a left-wing party in 1974 that 'moved to occupyalmost totally the central area of the spectrum'. In the 1981 and 1985 elections,PASOK 'tried to give increased assurances about its essentially moderate,"systematic" intentions to the middle class voters of the urban centers... Therewas very little mention of "socialism"'.28 While campaigning for allagi(change) throughout Greek society, the socialist government has been accusedof not following through on its pre-election promises (e.g., regarding dis-mantling of American bases and nationalisation policy).29 As Mavrogordatosobserves: '... PASOK is recognised as the new centre in Greek politics... Inclass terms, PASOK is neither a peasants' party nor a workers' party, despiteits socialist label'.30

For Portugal, one must stress the coalition nature of governments headedby the Socialist Party. In order to form coalitions with parties to its right, 'thePortuguese socialists had to abandon the Marxist, collectivist and - to a lesserextent - étatist leanings, to which an important section of their partyadhered'.31 In addition, further constraints arose as a result of a severeausterity programme demanded by the IMF at the start of the 1983 coalitionadministration.

Thus, a variety of moderating factors have been at work on the socialistparties within the Mediterranean region. As a consequence, one should notbe surprised by Giuseppe Di Palma's conclusion that 'early rhetoric not-withstanding ... the basic policies of the socialist governments, especially inthe economic sphere, are above all remarkable for the fact of differing onlyincrementally and sectorally from those of their predecessors'.32 This wouldbe compatible with the latter hypothesis that anticipates no significantdifference between socialist versus non-socialist administrations vis-à-vis theopinion-policy nexus.

The results in Tables 5 and 6 clearly support the 'no difference' hypothesis.There are no statistically significant distinctions in consistency rates betweenopinion and policy for socialist as opposed to non-socialist governments.Regardless of the party in power, majority sentiment is thwarted in a majorityof the cases: 59 per cent of the time under non-socialist governments and

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136 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS

TABLE 5

PARTISAN COMPOSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT

Country

SPAINconsistencyinconsistency

PORTUGALconsistencyinconsistency

GREECEconsistencyinconsistency

ALL MED. NEO-DEMOCRACIESconsistencyinconsistency

3664

4258

3367

3664

Socialist

N

1832

1318

2245

5395

Non-Socialist

%

4357

4159

3862

4159

N

1216

1623

1118

3957

Note: Differences between socialist and non-socialist governments are not statistically significant.

TABLE 6

REDISTRIBUTIVE CASES BY PARTISAN COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT

Country

SPAINconsistencyinconsistency

PORTUGALconsistencyinconsistency

GREECEconsistencyinconsistency

ALL MED. NEO-DEMOCRACIESconsistencyinconsistency

1090

1783

1090

1288

Socialist

N

19

210

218

537

Non-Socialist

%

0100

1585

1090

1090

N

08

211

19

328

Note: Differences are not statistically significant.

64 per cent under socialist rule. This pattern is true even for redistributive issues(see Table 6) - the very cases affecting the supposed ideological raison d'êtreof socialist parties. Inconsistency between opinion and policy for redistributivecases averaged 88 per cent under socialist administrations and 90 per cent fornon-socialist governments - an indistinguishable record. These findings arenot consistent with previous research on the opinion-policy nexus. For bothBritain and France, congruence between opinion and policy for redistributive

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MEDITERRANEAN NEO-DEMOCRACIES 137

issues was significantly higher under British Labour and French Socialist partyrule than during 'bourgeois' governments.33 The results of this study confirmGiner's observation regarding socialist parties in the Mediterranean neo-democracies:

Under liberal democracy, moderation is nearly always the price of power.The socialist parties and movements of southern Europe have won theirvictories and achieved the tolerance of their once intransigent foes bydint of deradicalisation. One possible inference from the shift tomoderation ... is that southern European socialism has ceased to be'principled'. At its mildest, it has become identified only with thefreedoms of liberalism and with a vague sense of social justice.34

CONCLUSION

Because the findings discussed in this study are based on a short time-frame(1978-86) encompassing a transitional period in the history of Spain,Portugal, and Greece, the conclusions regarding the opinion-policy nexusshould be viewed as tentative. Nevertheless, the results suggest the followinggeneralisations:

1. in all of the Mediterranean neo-democracies public opinion andpolicy are inconsistent in a majority of instances;

2. variations in institutional structures do not appear to make adifference in the overall opinion-policy relationship;

3. landslide majorities (with the possible exception of Spain) are nomore likely to be heeded than slim majorities;

4. inconsistency between opinion and policy rises to overwhelming levels(approximately nine out of ten cases) when redistributive issues areconcerned;

5. the partisan composition of the government makes no statisticallysignificant difference in regard to overall consistency rates or inrelation to the degree of policy-opinion congruence for redistributiveissues.

What do the conclusions of this study tell us about the status of democracyin the Mediterranean polities? What differentiates them from other Europeanliberal democracies in respect to the opinion-policy nexus? On one hand (forreasons discussed in the previous sections), the Mediterranean nations aredifferent (compared with older capitalist democracies) with regard to greaterinconsistency rates for redistributive issues and lack of impact on the opinion-policy relationship resulting from changes in the ruling political party. As aconsequence, one might argue that the transition to mature democracy isincomplete in the Mediterranean region in the light of the apparent greaterpower of economic élites and the limitations of 'party government'.35

On the other hand, based upon comparative findings cited earlier, theMediterranean neo-democracies have achieved a typical degree of overallopinion-policy consistency (occurring in slightly under four out of ten cases).Thus, Spain, Portugal and Greece do no worse than supposedly more maturedemocracies (such as Britain, France, Canada and the United States) in terms

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of their general extent of opinion responsiveness. This raises profoundquestions about 'democratic transition' if the models (or end products) of sucha transition are themselves polities in which majority preferences are thwartedon a majority of policy issues. While all three Mediterranean countries maybe at some stage of the 'habituation phase' in the transition toward 'liberaldemocracy',36 there is a different yardstick applied in this article. Based uponthe perspective of the opinion-policy nexus, transition to 'majoritariandemocracy' (as previously defined by Lijphart) is far from complete. In thisrespect, however, the Mediterranean neo-democracies are not alone.

NOTES

1. Geoffrey Pridham, 'Comparative Perspectives on the New Mediterranean Democracies: AModel of Regime Transition?', West European Politics, Vol.7, No.2 (April 1984), p. 1.

2. Regarding Greece, see Kevin Featherstone, 'The Greek Socialists in Power', West EuropeanPolitics, Vol.6, No.3 (July 1983), pp.237-50; PN. Diamandouros, 'Transition to, andConsolidation of, Democratic Politics in Greece, 1974-83: A Tentative Assessment', WestEuropean Politics, Vol. 7, No.2 (April 1984), pp. 50-71 ; Christos Lyrintzis, 'Political Partiesin Post-Junta Greece: A Case of "Bureaucratic Clientelism"?', West European Politics,Vol. 7, No. 2 (April 1984), pp. 99-118; George Th. Mavrogordatos, 'The Greek Party System:A Case of "Limited But Polarised Pluralism"?', West European Politics, Vol.7, No.4(October 1984), pp. 156-69; Seraphim Seferiades, 'Polarization and Nonproportionality: TheGreek Party System in the Postwar Era', Comparative Politics, Vol.19 (October 1986),pp. 69-94. Regarding Spain and Portugal, see Ken Gladdish, 'From Autocracy to PartyGovernment: Interpreting Regime Changes in Spain and Portugal', West European Politics,Vol. 8, No. 3 (July 1985), pp. 114-18; Antonio Bar, 'The Emerging Spanish Party System:Is There a Model?', West European Politics, Vol.7, No.4(October 1984), pp. 128-55; NancyBermeo, 'Redemocratization and Transition Elections: A Comparison of Spain and Portugal',Comparative Politics, Vol.19 (January 1987), pp.213-32; Kenneth Medhurst, 'Spain'sEvolutionary Pathway from Dictatorship to Democracy', West European Politics, Vol. 7,No.2 (April 1984), pp.30-49; Thomas Bruneau, 'Continuity and Change in PortuguesePolitics: Ten Years After the Revolution of 25 April 1974', West European Politics, Vol. 7,No.2 (April 1984), pp.72-83.

3. See Joel Brooks, 'The Opinion-Policy Nexus in France: Do Institutions and Ideology Makea Difference?', Journal of Politics, Vol.49 (May 1987), pp. 465-80.

4. Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government inTwenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 1-2.

5. See Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); CarolePateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970);David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds.), Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practiceand Theory (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1978); Norman Luttbeg (ed.),Public Opinion and Public Policy, 3rd ed. (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1981); John Sullivanet al., 'The Sources of Political Tolerance: A Multivariate Analysis', American PoliticalScience Review, Vol. 75 (March 1981), pp. 92-104.

6. Sources utilised were: George Gallup (ed.), The International Gallup Polls: Public Opinion1978 and 1979 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1980, 1981); Elizabeth H. andPhilip K. Hastings (eds.), Index to International Public Opinion: 1978-86 (Westport, CT:Greenwood Press, 1979-87); polls from affiliated Gallup organisations in Spain, Portugal,and Greece.

7. English-language sources utilised included: Europa Yearbook: A World Survey, 1978-86(London: Europa Publications, 1979-87); Facts on File: Weekly World News Digest, 1978-86(NY: Facts on File, 1979-87); Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1978-86 (London:Keesing's, 1979-87); New York Times Index, 1978-86 (NY: New York Times, 1979-87).

8. This follows the practice established by Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro, 'Effects of PublicOpinion on Policy', American Political Science Review, Vol. 77 (March, 1983), pp. 175-90.

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9. See Theodore Lowi, 'American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and PoliticalTheory', World Politics, Vol.16 (July 1964), pp. 677-715; Lowi, 'Four Systems ofPolicy, Politics, and Choice', Public Administration Review, Vol. 32 (July/August 1972),pp. 298-310.

10. A number of 'linkage' models (e.g., interest group or party government) have beenproposed in the American public opinion literature which are premised upon a direct(or at least indirect) relationship between mass public opinion and resulting public policy.See V.O. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1961);John Sullivan, 'Linkage Models of the Political System', in Wilcox (ed.), Public Opinionand Political Attitudes (New York: Wiley, 1974), pp. 637-59; Robert Weissberg, PublicOpinion and Popular Government (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976); Luttbeg,op. cit.

11. See Joel Brooks, 'Democratic Frustration in the Anglo-American Polities: A Quantificationof Inconsistency between Mass Public Opinion and Public Policy', Western PoliticalQuarterly, Vol.38 (June 1985), pp.250-51.

12. See T. B. Bottomore, Elites and Society (London: Penguin, 1964); C. W. Mills, The PowerElite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses ofPolitics (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1964); Ralph Miliband, The State in CapitalistSociety (London: Basic Books, 1969); David Marsh, 'Interest Group Activity and StructuralPower: Lindblom's "Politics and Markets" ', West European Politics, Vol. 6, No. 2 (April1983), pp. 3-13.

13. See Christopher Hewitt, 'Policy-Making in Post-War Britain: A Nation-Level of Elitistand Pluralist Hypotheses', British Journal of Political Science, Vol.4 (April 1974),pp. 187-216.

14. For example, see A. Heidenheimer, et al., Comparative Public Policy: The Politics of SocialChoice in Europe and America, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1983); G.B. Powell,Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Cambridge: MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1982).

15. Pridham, op. cit., p.9.16. This was determined using chi-square test at .05 level.17. See Brooks, 'Democratic Frustration in the Anglo-American Polities', op. cit., p. 254; Brooks,

'The Opinion-Policy Nexus in France', op. cit., p.469.18. Bermeo, op. cit., p.219.19. Brooks, 'Democratic Frustration in the Anglo-American Polities', op. cit., p.256; Brooks,

'The Opinion-Policy Nexus in France', op. cit., p.472.20. For an analysis of contrasting class configurations in contemporary Spain and Portugal,

see Bermeo, op cit., pp.219-24.21. See Salvador Giner, 'Southern European Socialism in Transition', West European Politics,

Vol.7, No.2 (April 1984), pp. 138-9.22. See Marsh, op. cit., p.4.23. Brooks, 'Democratic Frustration in the Anglo-American Polities', op. cit., p. 256; Brooks,

'The Opinion-Policy Nexus in France', op. cit., p.473.24. See James Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (NY: Random House, 1961); Roy

Macridis (ed.), Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972).25. See Brooks, 'The Opinion-Policy Nexus in France', op. cit., pp. 475-76; Brooks, 'Democratic

Frustration in the Anglo-American Polities', op. cit., pp. 253-4.26. Giner, op. cit., p. 139.27. Ibid., pp. 152-53. Also see Mario Caciagli, 'Spain: Parties and the Party System in

Transition', West European Politics, Vol.7, No.2 (April 1984), pp. 84-98; Bar, op. cit.28. Seferiades, op. cit., pp.82 and 88.29. See Nickolas Limberes, 'The Greek Election of June 1985: A Socialist Entrenchment', West

European Politics, Vol.9, No. 1 (January 1986), p. 142.30. Mavrogordatos, op. cit., pp. 165-6.31. Giner, op. cit., pp. 149-50. Also see J.R. Lewis and A.M. Williams, 'Social Cleavages and

Electoral Performance: The Social Bases of Portuguese Political Parties, 1976-83', WestEuropean Politics, Vol.7, No.2 (April 1984), pp. 119-37.

32. Giuseppe Di Palma, 'Government Performance: An Issue and Three Cases in Search ofTheory', West European Politics, Vol.7, No.2 (April 1984), p. 184.

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33. See Brooks, 'Democratic Frustration in the Anglo-American Polities', op. cit., p. 257; Brooks,'The Opinion-Policy Nexus in France', op. cit., p.474.

34. Giner, op. cit., p. 155.35. See the discussion by Pridham, op. cit., pp. 12-15.36. See the discussion of Rustow's theory of democratic transition in Ibid., pp. 24-6.

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