Melody_Size Is Not The Only Problem.pdf

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NtI BI1B1 -lLE COPY,The Infantry Rifle Squad: Size

"L i Not the Only ProblemA Monographby

Major Paul E. MelodyInfantryDTIC --r LECTEAUG2 11990 D

School of Advanced Military StudiesUnited States Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, Kansas,First Term AY 89!90

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'ILTTLE (Inlie rculty Classiifiction)The Infantry Rifle Squad: Size is Not the Only Problem (U)

1j. PERSONAL AUTHQR(S)Major Paul E. MelodyIli, VtPE OF R~EPORT 13b. TIME COVERED 14fTOI~EPORT (Yta4r.Month,DL~y) 11S, PAGE COUNTmonograph I FROM TO 9 /584 SUPPI.ENTARY NOTATION

Ii. OSATI CODES" Is - SUBJEC TERMS j(,entM ouewo-ee -it "y~nd identi 9 Rioc- numnbor)FIELD :GROUP SU8.4ROUP 7 in f antry 4quaad?. squad AXLqa~nizatio*s si8- Rmi'b4arVBSSTRACT (Confnue on revtrs* !f mcc*uay and dnitwity' bylbock numbe'r-)The concern over the infantry squad's effectiveness has focused on itssize. A review of the historical data suggests that the squad'sorganization is the critical facet in the effectiveness of an infantrysquad. As a result, the author suggests the current squad can be mademore effective if its organization is ,.'changed to reflect the lessonsof three wars and decades of peacetime testing. Specifically, the squadshould not be organized around fire teams, nor around more than onelight machinegun and grenade launcher. Concurrently, the squad shouldbe used as either a base of fire or maneuver element; the squad shouldiot be expected to fire and maneuver simultaneously. /, .;< *,

120. 0ISTftIBUTION/AVAILASILITY OF ABSTRLACT I21. ABSTRACT SECUR'TY CLASSIFICATIONQINCLPSS$WIEUAJNLUMIT[D 0j SAME AS RPT. Q DTIC USERS I unclassified12?,AME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) Uc. OFFICE SYMBOLMajor Paul E. Melody , 913 684-213S .[ ATZL-SWV" OForm 1473, JUN 86 f,,veimeUd'tom are obsolete, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE


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SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVALMajor Paul E. Melody

Title of Monograph: The Infantry Rifle Squad: Size is Notthe Only Problem

Appr ed by:

Monograph Director"Lieutn nt colonel Jimmid F. Holt, MA, MMAS

Director, School ofColonel W liia-m . Ja , IMA, MMAS Advanced MilitaryWHStud iesFEff(44. Director, Graduate

P1'ipJ. Brookes, Ph.D. Degree Program

Accepted this '2' day of .... A . 1990


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ABSTRACT

THE US INFANTRY SQUAD: THE REAL PROBLEM IS MORE THAN ITSSIZE by Major Paul E. Melody, USA, 58 pages.

The concern over the infantry squad's effectiveness in therecent past has focused almost exclusively on its size.Critics argue that the current US Army infantry squads,both l ight and mechanized, are too small to accomplishtheir mission (particularly the mechanized squad). While itmay be true that the squads' current nine man strength cannot sustain as much attrition as the former eleven mansquad, size is not the key issue in the squad's effective-ness.Historical analysis of the infantry squad since World WarII would suggest that the US Army's current squad's primaryshortcoming lies in its organization rather than its size.As such, it is possible to make the current squads more ef-fective without increasing its size. This fact is sig-nificant since present personnel limitations at the Depart-ment of the Army level preclude increasing the squad'ssize.Based on data from both combat experience and peacetimetesting, the author suggests that eliminating one of thesquad's two M249 Squad Automatic Weapons, and M203 GrenadeLaunchers, would improve the nine man squad's overall ef-fectiveness.

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Table of Contents Page

I. Introduction .......................................... 1

II. Historical Background ................................ 2Post World War II .................................... 4The Korean War ....................................... 9Post-Korean W ar ..................................... 11

The Vietnam Era ..................................... 31Historical Conclusions .............................. 37

Ill. The Current Squad Organizations .................... 39The Mechanized Squad ............................... 39The Light Infantry Squad............................

IV . Conclusion and Recommendations ....................... 44

End Notes ........................................... 47

Bibliography ......................................... 55


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I. INTRODUCTIONSince the US Army-adopted the nine man infantry squad

for both its mechanized and l ight infantry battalions inthe 1980s, critics have argued that the infantry squad isincapable of performing its mission. Much of this criticismhas focused on the mechanized infantry squad. Infantry com-manders of all ranks have stated that the mechanizedsquad's dismount element is too small. Its six man size cannot absorb likely combat attrition and remain combat effec-tive. One observer, MG (ret.) Richard A. Scholtes has evenproposed removing the turret from two of the mechanizedplatoon's four M2 Infantry Fighting Vehicles in order toincrease the number of riflemen.'

Due to the fact that l ight infantry does not have toprovide for mounted and dismounted combat as doesmechanized infantry, the nine man l ight infantry squad -although two smaller than the previous eleven man squad -has not received as much attention or criticism . However.infantry commanders are concerned over the ability of thesmaller l ight infantry squad to absorb casualties and re-main combat effective. AP ...Iht infantry commander ex-pressed it, the loss of even one soldier in the squad putsan ever increasing physical burden on those that remain.2Starting out with two fewer soldiers than before only makesthe infantry squad's task that much more difficult. It ap-pears that within the American infantry community, the

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concern over the infantry squad's reduced size has focusedon numbers more than any other factor.3

Although numbers are important, size alone is not theonly factor to consider when discussing the infantrysquad's effectiveness. In fact, an analysis of both combatlessons learned and peacetime testing since World War T-suggests the US Army's current infantry squad's fundamentalshortcoming is its organization. Given this evidence, thenine man l ight infantry squad, and the mechanizedinfantry's six man dismount element, should both be reorga-nized to maximize current weapons technology, and tacti-cally required to perform single function missions to re-flect combat reality.II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Since the American Civil War, infantry in the defensehas gained a sA'ength not previously witnessed in infantrycombat. Initially this came about because of the increasedaccuracy, range. and rate of fire of the rifled musket. By1914, the machine gun had replaced the rifle as thedominate infantry weapon. However, these early machine gunswere very heavy and consequently not easily moved. As a re -sult, a stationary, protected defender was more effectivethan an exposed, moving attacker. The consequences werehuge casualties suffered by attacking infantry in the earlyyears of World War I (WWI).*

By 1918, however, the situation had changed. After

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nearly three years of trial and error in attempting tobreak the deadlock of the Western Front, the Germansachieved a tactical breakthrough in March 1918. The bulk oftheir success came from changing their existing infantryorganization and tactics to maximize th e effect of theirnew light machine gun (LMG) and automatic rifle.'

The LMG changed infantry organization and offens:vetactics. Rather than massed rifle fire, the LMG's firepaved th e way for th e infantry's final assault. SmaiJgroups of infantrymen organized around and fighting in re-lation to the section's LMG could now successfully attack.This new tactical concept, and the accompanying organiza-tion, was the essence of the German's tactical success in1918. The squad was no longer merely an administrative unitused to distribute rations, or conveniently change platoonformations. With the addition of a LMG. the squad had be-come a tactical element.*

As a resul t of their WWI tactical experience all West-ern armies in World War II (WWII) organized their infantrysquads and platoons around either a LMG or automaticweapon.' The German Army initially fielded the highly ef-fective MG 34 LMG (and later the superb XG 42) as a squadmachine gun. Similarly, the British Army developed the re-liable Bren LM G as a section weapon. These LMGs gave theGerman and British infantry an effective sustained firecapability to support infantry combat, particularly the

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attack. 'The American Army, however, could not field a reliable

squad LMG.0 As a substitute, the American infantry usedthe Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) to support its infantrysquad. Throughout WWII, th e American infantry came to de-pend on th e added firepower of th e BAR. In fact . by 1944.the Army authorized a one hundred percent increase in theinfantry company's BARs. 1 0 In spite of the fact that th eAmerican Army did not field a genuine squad LMG, t did ac-cept the premise that th e infantry squad's effect ivenessdepended, in part, on the firepower provided by a reliablesquad l ight machine gun.

POST WORLD WAR II ERAIn 1946. American combat infantry leaders gathered at

the Infantry School. at Fort Benning Georgia, to assess thelessons learned in WWII concerning American infantry. Tac-tics, doctrine, weapons, leadership, clothing. personnelpolicies, organization, and training were all discussed andevaluated at this special Infantry Conference. The conclu-sions and recommendations reached at the Conference formedthe basis for future US Army infantry organizations.weapons, and doctrine well into the 1950s. More sig-nificantly though, the observations the Conference membersmade concerning the infantry squad have been corroboratedby subsequent combat experience in two wars, and decades of


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peacetime testing.Generally, the Conference attendees felt that WWII

combat had proven the correctness of US infantry tacticaldoctrine and organization. A few areas, however, were rec-ognized as deficient and in need of immediate correction.These deficiencies primarily concerned the infantry squadand platoon, as well as the infantry's small arms.

Based on their collective WWII combat experience, theConference members reached specific conclusions regardingan effective infantry squad. These conclusions would ulti-mately resul t in a specific recommendation to the InfantrySchool to change the WWII infantry squad's organization andtactical employment. In particular, four factors heavilyinfluenced their conclusions: the difficulty of squad com-mand and control, the lingering effects of combat attritionon squad size. the need for a squad l ight machine gun, and.as a resul t of all these, the limitations of squad tactics.

The Conference members discussed at length the dif-ficulties of squad command and control. They agreed thatcombat had clearly indicated that an average squad leadercould not control the WWII twelve man squad - even with anassistant squad leader and internal team organi=ation.Based on their ow n observations, the majority of combatleaders felt that the maximum number of men in the squ&dshould be nine." 1

The second factor that influenced the Conference


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members in regards to the infantry squad concerned attri-tion. The conferees noted that in combat infantry squadsroutinely operated at 20% less their authorized strength.Any future infantry squad that was small enough for thesquad leader to control had to be large enough to accountfor the effects of battlefield attrition. Again, the mem-bers agreed that a nine man squad seemed to be most appro-priate. The nine man squad - a squad leader and eight men -would be large enough to absorb combat attrition, yet besmall enough fo r a man to command and control, 1

The third critical factor concerning the infantrysquad was firepower. As with the other three points, theConference members based this conclusion on their combatexperience. They agreed that WWII had demonstrated that theinfantry squad needed an organic light machine gun. ratherthan an automatic rifle. The conferees felt that only asquad LUG could provide the squad with the requisite firesuppression to accomplish its mission in attack or defense.Furthermore. the members felt that the US standard rifle,the Ml "Garand*. although reliable, was too heavy and toolimited in firepower, particularly during the assault.Likewise, the BAR was also too heavy and too limited infirepower."

Like the majority of US infantrymen, the members wereparticularly impressed by the performance of the GermanArmy's squad LMG. the MG42, and the SG44 *assault* rifle.

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The MQ42 had a quick barrel change capability which allowedit to provide sustained-fire support. Additionally, thiMG42 weighed only twenty four pounds, compared to the USLMG, the M1919A6, which weighed thirty three pounds and hadno quick barrel change capability. The assault rifle, asthe name implies, gave the German infantryman additionalfirepower during the assault. The German SG44 had the capa-bility to fire in both semiautomatic and full auto))4.ticmodes. Additionally, it had the added benefit of & twentyround magazine. This prevented the constant reloading aswith the US Army's eight round Ml rifle. As a result ofthese weapons' performance against US troops, the Confer-ence members felt an American version would be id6al forthe infantry squad of the !uture.1'

The fourth factor, which concerned squad tactics, re-sulted from the preceding three. Again, the Conference mem-bers felt that combat experience had demonstrated an at-tacking infantry squad could either act As a base o fireelement or as a maneuver element. The squad could not doboth simultaneously. The US Army's WWII doctrine that asquad could estab!lish a separate fire and maneuver elementwas proven infeasible. First, it proved to be beyond thecapability of the average squad leader to command and con-trol. Second, to do both fire and maneuver required a largesquad: one part had to act as the base of fire and theother to act as the maneuver element. The large size

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precluded effective command and control. Moreover, due toattrition, the squad's combat strength was rarely suffi-cient to provide for both.

As a result of these observations, the Conference at-tendees recommended that the US Army adopt a smaller nineman infantry squad with two NCOs (a squad leader and an as-sistant squad leader). The recommended squad was organizedaround an organic squad LMG (based on the M042 design) andfive riflemen. Tactically the squad would either act as abase of fire or a maneuver element. Since the squad was notexpected to fire and maneuver, the WWII subordinate squadteams - Able, Baker, Charlie - were no longer necessary andshould be abandoned. Based on their WWII observations, theConference members felt the nine man squad, when organizedaround a LMG, was large enough to sustain casualties yetwas small enough for the squad leader to command and con-trol effectively.10

The Army's leadership accepted all of theConference's recommendations. All were implemented by 1947-with the exception of the recommended weapons.1 The Armywas unable to field a replacement for the Ml rifle and theBAR until the late 1950s." As a result, the infantrysquad in 1947 was equipped with weapons generally recog-nized as inadequate. Most importantly, the squad lacked thequintesrential LMG.10

In summary, the 1946 Infantry Conference at Fort


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Benning significantly changed the. American Army's infantryorganization and tactics. Many of these changes remainedin effect until the 1950s. .'n regards to the infantrysquad's organization, the 1948 Infantry Conference identi-fied four essential factors which would prove timeless."First, in terms of command and control, a squad leader hasdifficulty in controlling an element larger than nine men,even when assisted by another NCO. Second, because of at-trition, the infantry squad in combat will operate rou-tinely at less than its authorized strength. Consequently,a squad must be small enough fo r the squad leader to con-trol, yet lave enough to absorb casualties. The 1946 Con-ferees felt a nine man squad was the optimum size to me4this need. Third, despite peacetime expectations, the na-turL cf infantry combat precludes the effective use of sub-ordinate teams. As a result , a squad can be expected to ei-ther fire or maneuver, but it can not do both. Fourth, toeffectively fire or maneuver, the squad needs the suppres-sive firepower of an organic LMG. Rifle fire alone is inad-equate. "

THE 1(OREAN WAPDespite tactical failures against both the North Ko-

rean and Chinese Communist armies, the US Army did not feelit had learned any new lessons from combat in Korea.Rather, the primary lesson appeared to be that far too many

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infantrymen failed to apply existing doctrine.Consequently, the US Army made only one change in squad or-ganization as a result of the fighting in Korea.

The organizational change that effected the infantrysquad during the Korean War predictably eme about as a re-sult of the squad's lack of firepower. Specifically, be-cause the BAR lacked the firepower of a I.MG, the Army au-thorized an increase in the number of BARs in the infantrysquads. The additional BAR was intended to give the infan-try squad the approximate suppressive fire of an effective,organic squad LMG. 2 0

Combat in Korea seemed to confirm the observations-made about the infantry squad at the Infantry Conference in1946. The post-WWII nine man infantry squad, organizedaround the BAR, performed well in combat in Korea. As SLANMarshall observed:

. ... the BAR, even more than the machine gun Cthe M1919WA6, provides the base around which the actionof other infantry weapons builds up and the force [thosquad and platoon] expresses itself unitedly.... 'The BAR[on account of its l ight weight in comparison to theM19l1AG.) is the pivotal weapon in this eddying of thetactical situation'.2

In ragards to command and control and attrition, thenine man squad also corroborated the 1946 InfantryConference's conclusions about the infantry squad's sizeand tactical employment. Nine men appeared to be the rightsize. It. was neither too large to control nor too small to

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absorb casualties. In short, the Korean combat experienceseemed to vindicate the'Conference recommendations concern-ing the infantry squad size, organization, and tactical em -ployment.22

POST-KOREAN WAR, PRE-VIETNAM ERAFollowing the Korean War, the US Army attempted to

come to grips with the specter of potential tacticalnuclear combat. As a result, change was in the air. "Old*ideas (i.e. pre-Nagasaki/Hiroshima/Atomic era) were chal-ienged. 23 From 1953 until 1956, the US Army conducted nofewer than four major studies and tests to determine th e"best' inwantry squad organization. As will be seen, de-spite the lack of proof that the Army needed to change thenine man squad, the Army adopted an eleven man squad orga-nizod with two *fire teams*. With this change in infantrysquads, tha JS Army in essence disregarded the 1946 Infan-try Conference's *.bservations concerning the #sssntial na-ture of the infantry squad's organLzation.

Si~nificant 'y, each oi the stxuies tended to supportthe 1946 Infantry ConferencL's conclusions con,'erning theinfantry squad's essential organization. Speci.ically, eachtest noted that squad command and control requirements lim-ited the squad's optimutu size to less then te o men. Addi-tionally, ear'h test pointed out t.iat combat attrition man-dated a squad larger thaa five or six men. Moreover, each


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test recounted the need for the squad to have sufficientfirepower to act as base of fire or to support the squad'sassault. This firepower requirement recognized the need for"a suitable squad automatic weapon (until the US could field"a suitable LMG, this would mean at least one BAR). Finally,each test noted the difficulty - almost the impossibilizy -of squad fire and maneuver. Considering these points, theArmy's decision to adopt the eleven man squad seems irra-tional. As such, it is necessary to examine the genesis ofthe decision to adopt an eleven man, two fire team basedsquad.

The first inkling of a US Army infantry squad orga-nized around subordinate *fire teams* occurred during theKorean War.A4 This came in response to a Department of theArmy request for SL A Marshall, the noted WWII historian, toobserve American infantry operations in the Korean War. SLAMarshall's report, gommentAry on Infantry OPerations andWeapons Usage In Korea: Winter 1950 1951, concluded thatthe Army's infantry squad was not as well organized at theMarine Corps' larger, three fire team based squad. As aconsequence, Marshall felt the Army squad should be reorga-nized so it too could fire and maneuver. One can only sus-pect that Marshall either did not agree with. or appreci-ate, the 1946 Infantry Conference's recommendation that theArmy's infantry squads be required (or expected) to conductfire or maneuver. In any event, Marshall felt obl!ged to

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suggest the Army change its squad organization and infantrydoctr ine.20

Under Marshall's proposal, the squad would consist oftwo small fire teams with each team having one junior NCO.one BAR, and three riflemen. The squad leader would onlylead two element leaders rather than eight soldiers,namely, the two fire team leaders. The fire team leaders,in turn, would lead four people, but only in a 'follow me -do as I do method.26

In M arshall's mind, the fire team concept allowed fortwo tactical improvements. First , it allowed for more re-sponsive fire and maneuver within the platoon. Instead ofonly the platoon leader deciding when to initiate fire andmaneuver, the squad leader would be able to initiate it ifhe thought it necessary.

Second, Marshall felt the fire team organizationwould insure more riflemen fired their rifles. This latterpoint was a personal fixation of Marshall 's who believedthat in WWII only a small percentage of riflemen ever firedtheir weapons. Part of his recommendation to correct thisperceived WWII deficiency was to increase the number ofleaders in the squad. As a result, any measure that couldincrease the amount of rifle fire, to include changing thesquad's organization and tactical doctrine, was ac-ceptable."

Marshall did not provide documented support for his


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recommendation to change the infantry squad's organization.In fact, Marshall 's own-report supported the validity ofthe 1946 Infantry Conference's squad organization and tac-tical employment. First , Marshall made the observation[quoted earlier, in the section concerning the Korean War'that the BAR became the squad's unifying agent in Korea.Furthermore, Marshall noted that the squad leader in Koreaseemed much more effective than had squad leaders in WWII.As a consequence, Marshall emphasized the point that thefighting in Korea produced very effective squad combat - acondition he did not observe during WWII. Marshall feltthat besides the strong NCOs, the terrain in Korea helpedbring this about. Marshall did not explain specifically whythe terrain helped to bring this about, other than the factthat it narrowed a company's frontage. Somehow from theseobservations, Marshall concluded that a squad could be mademore effective if it were organized around, *two wings,each working under its ow n leader* .2

Apparently it never occurred to Marshall that thereason the NCOs seemed more effective in the Korean Warthan they had appeared during WWII might have been due tothe organizational and tactical changes the Army had madein the infantry squad since WWII. None of M arshall 's ob-servations suggested the Army's nine man squad, organizedand led to execute fire or maneuver, was unsatisfactory.Based on his own praise of the squad's performance, one is

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hard pressed to see why the Army needed to change its squadorganizat ion. In short , nothing in M arshall 's repor t dis-

proved the observations the 1946 Infantry Conference madeabout th e infantry squad's size, organizat ion, or tac-tics. 2

Addit ionally, when scrutinized, it is hard to see th edifference between M arshal l's proposed fire teams and min-iature squads. An argument certainly could be made thatconsidering their size, they were more susceptible to at-trition, and therefore less useful, than the larger nineman squad. Seen in this light, his proposed squad ideaseems to have been a return to th e old rifle *sect ion ' or-ganization - an intermediate level between the platoonleader and the squad. M arshal l's fondness for such an orga-nization might have been due to his early acquaintance withth e sect ion organization during his WWI service. (The Armyabandoned the section following WWI in order to allow theplatoon leader to more closely control the rifle squads.)"'

Given Marshall's fixation upon increasing the squad'srifle fire, it seems he failed to appreciate the historicalimpact that an effective LMG had made on infantry combat,particularly at th e squad level. Simply put, three or fourriflemen could not equal the efficiency and effectivenessof a LMG's firepower. Futhermore, one can only assumeMarshall did not understand the essence of the GermanArmy's infantry tactical success in both world wars.


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The other fact that helped influence the Army toabandon the nine man squad was MG JC Fry's battle drillconcept. MG Fry, while the commander of th e Second InfantryDivision in Korea in 1952, during relatively static combatcondit ions (characteristic of th e Korean War at the time),instituted his own version of battle drill. Fry had previ-ously used battle drill with apparent success in Italy,when he was a WWII regimental commander.'"

Fry's version of battle drill employed an infantrysquad organized with two teams. One team acted as a base offire while the other maneuvered. Fry claimed that battledrill made th e squad and the platoon more effective. Thiswas because it prevented so-called *pin downers'- soldierswho could not move when under enemy fire. 3 2 Battle drillwas a topic discussed in detail during the 1946 InfantryConference. The Conference members nearly unanimously con-cluded that it was not a good idea since it stereotypedone's tactics. As a result , the conferees recommended theUS Army not adopt the concept."

By the middle of 1953, however, the concept of battledrill received a lo t of publicity in an unofficial publica-tion, Combat Forces Journal.34 It gained in popularityfollowing th e Korean War when Fry published a book en-titled. Assault Battle brill.' 1 As one can see. th e battledrill concept complemented M arshall 's recommendation to re-organize th e infantry squad with fire teams and return

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squad fire and maneuver to the Army's doctrine. Together,Marshall and Fry seem t6 have influenced the Army's even-tual adoption of the eleven man fire team based squad.

Despite the support battle drill gave to the conceptof a fire team organized 'squad', nothing in the tests con-ducted after the Korean W ar conclusively proved the valid-ity of such an organization. In fact, the Army conductedfour tests to examine the 'best* squad organization. In1953 the XVIII Airborne Corps conducted the first squadtest, Operation FALCON, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Atthe direction of the Chief of Army Field Forces. andserved by representativez of the United States Ar1y .n.an-try choo ("SAS), the test was designed to determine thefeasibility of three issues: the ability of one leader tocontrol ten men (i.e. an eleven man squad). the simulta-,neous employment of two BARs, and squad fire and ma-neuver.14

The XVIII Airborne Corps report concluded that a!:three propositions were feasible. However. the report con-tained two significant caveats to its conclusion. First .the ability of a squad to conduct fire and maneuver de-pended upon maintaining sufficient squad strength. Withoutenough men the squad could not provide both a base of fireand a maneuver element. Unfor.-unately. the conclusion didnot say what number was minimally required to support fireand maneuver. The report merely stated that if the squad


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suffered casualties, the squad could not execute both fireand maneuver. Second, in' order to maintain infantry squadswith the minimal numbers of personnel necessary to supportsquad fire and maneuver, the entire division had to make adeliberate and concerted replacement effort , apparently atthe expense of maintaining other type units. 37

The USAIS' representatives disagreed with the test'sconclusions. Having observed the test, USAIS representa-tives stated that the test did not prove that an NCO couldcontrol a ten man squad, nor conduct squad fire and maneu-ver. As a result , the USAIS Commandant recommended that theArmy retain the nine man squad rather than adopting theeleven man fire team organized squad. In short, OperationFALCON did nothing to disprove the 1946 InfantryConference's observations and conclusions regarding thesquad's essential organization."

In 1955, the Third Infantry Division conducted Exer-cise FOLLOW ME. The exercise tested the feasibility of asmaller seven man squad as a means to ease the difficultyof squad command and control. The test squad consisted of asquad leader, an assistant squad leader, one BAR, and fourriflemen."1

Exercise FOLLOW ME produced two observations. First.the seven man squad, with only one BAR, lacked the fire-power necessary to affect a successful squad attack or de-fense. Moreover, the assistant squad leader could not help


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control the squad due to th e fact that he had to fire hisindividual rifle to augment the squad's deficient firepower. Second, having only seven men, the squad lacked thepersonnel to absorb casualties and remain effective. As aresult , the report recommended that the Army should adopt aten man squad organized with two BARs. It did not recommendthe use of fire teams. In short, Exercise FOLLOW ME con-firmed the 1946 Conference's conclusions regarding the in-fantry squad's organization. 4 0

Later in 1955 the Third Infantry Division conductedyet another test, Exercise SAGEBRUSH. Although charged toevaluate the Army's nine man squad, the Third Infantry Di-vision Commander's exercise report merely stated that thenine man squad was too small to execute squad fire and ma-neuver - a fact that was already known. His only recommen-dation suggested the Army rettrn to the WWII twelve mansquad so that the infantry squad would be large enough toform three fire teams. In sum, Exercise SAGEBRUSH failed tosupport the fire team based squad proposed by Marshall orrefute the 1946 Conference's conclusions regarding theinfantry squad's size, organization, or tactical employ-men t.*

Finally, in 1956 the US Army conducted a more "scien-tific"*4 evaluation of the infantry squad. Under the aus-pices of the Continental Army Command's Combat OperationsResearch Group, the Psychological Research Associates pre-


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capability, control , attrition effects, andmaneuverabil i ty. In terms of fire capability, ASIRS con-cluded that a squad's volume and accuracy of fire peakedwhen fifty percent of the members were equipped with BARs.When so equipped, however, the squad could not perform itsclose combat functions after the assault (such as clearingtrenches or houses). In essence, increasing the squad'sfirepower (by increasing the numbers of fire support weap-ons) at the expense of riflemen eventual ly made th e squadineffective. As a result. ASIRS testers concluded that asquad's BARs should not exceed thirty percent of itssquad's actual strength. Given the BAR's inability to pro-vide sustained fire (a function of its twenty roundmagazine), this mandated a minimum of two BARs: one to con-tinue firing while the other reloaded. In short, it was es-sential to keep the number of fire support systems to theabsolute minimum necessary - more was not better't

In terms of squad control, ASIRS results could notfix an absolute optimum leader to led ratio. The ratio var-ied with the terrain, enemy situation, mission (the attackwas more difficult than the defense), and the quality ofthe NCO concerned (i.e. his experience, training). Givenall of this, however. ASIRS testers felt the *best' leaderto led ratio was probably I to 5. But, it was possible toexceed this ratio and effectively have one man lead sevenmen. especially in more open terrain in broad daylight.*'

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In terms of attrit-on, ASI".S qljantified the ratherobvious conclusi.- that'squads of seven men and less couldnot survive as long as larger squads. Unfortunately, it wasunable to provide any new data on the effects of attrition.As a result, it was felt that a *basic brick" squad of fivemen, while the easiest to control, at least in terms ofleader to led, was also the least desirable in combat.

With regard to squad maneuverability, the ASIRS re-port catalogues simply that the diiferences between thevarious quad8 reflected the varying number of BARs as-sign - to each squad. Squad size did not seem to affect thesj ad's inherent ability to maneuver. For example, four andsix ma- squads with BARs were nc more maneuverable than aneight man squad with only one or two BARs. Although, if theeight man squad had three BARs, it was appreciably less ma-"neuverable than the squads with two or fewer BARs. Regard-ing the squad's firepower, ASIRS data showed it was betterto keep the fire support alement as small as possible. Inshort, more fire support systems was not necessarily bet-ter. `

In their more general conclusions, ASIRS controllerscommented on the squad's structure, definition, and tacti-cal employment. The ASIRS report supported the US Army'saccepted definition of a squad, used since the 1946 Infan-try Conference, as the smallest element led by a singleman. As such, any squad structure which employed subordi-

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nate leaders and organizations - such as th e eleven mansquad with two fire teams, proposed by SL A Marshall - was,cstrictly speaking, an orgnization of two squads.

Consequently, ASIRS testers concluded and str-ssedthat the Army's nine man squad, with an assistant to helpcontrol the qaad, was effective. The testers also notedthat the proposed eleven man "squad" with two fire teams(two miniature squads) was also effective. Aside from theobvious differences in structure, the primary distinctionbetween the fire team based eleven man 'squad* and the nineman siuad concerned its tactical employment. Simply put,the nine man squad could not execute fire and maneuver, butthe eleven man fire team based squad could. This made sensewhei. one recognizes that the fire team *squad' actuallyused each fire team as a small squad - one maneuvered whileone provided a base of fire. 4 *

As a result of the distinction between the two squadorganizations, ASIRS testers stated that the Army's leader-_hip had to determine whether the squad actually needed toexecute fire and maneuver. In choosing this path, ASIRStesters suggested the Army was also choosing to disregardthe conclusions the 1946 Infantry Conference made regardingthe infanitry squad's organization and tactical role. Ifthey disregarded the 1946 Conference conclusions, theArmy's leadership could decide that a squad leader couldcontrol a larger *squad' - provided, of course, that the

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squad contained subordinate fire teams. Without maintainingthe fire team structure, and the need for squad fire andmaneuver, the eleven man squad was not superior to the nineman squad.5 0

Shortly after the ASIRS was completed, the Armyadopted the eleven man fire team based squad. As such. itwould seem the ASIRS had little effect on the Army'sleadership's decision to drop the nine man squad. Concur-rently, the USAIS most enthusiastically adopted MG Fry'sversion of battle drill as official tactical doctrine. Con-sequently, the emphasis on the need ior a squad organicLMG, as well as the other points outlined in the 1946 Con-ference regarding the infantry squad, were cast aside by apreference for a fire team based squad and battle drill."

In 1961, the Army once again evaluated its infantrysquads and platoons with the Optimum Composition of theRifle Squad and Platoon (OCRSP) test. The Army's Combat De-velopment Experimentation Command (CDEC) designed the QCRSPtest to determine the best squad and platoon organizationfor capitalizing on the Army's new family of infantry weap-ons: the M14 rifle, the M60 light machine gun, and the M79grenade launcher. Specifically, CDEC expected the OCRSPtest to determine the best size, structure and organizationof the Army's future infantry squad and platoon. As withthe ASIRS in 1956, the OCRSP provided the Army many usefulobservations about infantry squad organizations, weapons,

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and tactics. Moreover, OCRSP results corroborated many ofASIRS's observations. Addi t ional ly , significant port ions ofth e OCRSP results supported th e 1946 Infantry Conference'sconclusions regarding th e infantry squad's organization andsize. Although only using a small portion of th e entiretest's results, th e testers recommended th e Army retain th eeleven man fire team based squad. But they did so with somecarefully stated caveats. 5 2

The OCRSP was more comphrensive than any earlier testregarding the infantry's basic organizations. It examinedboth the infantry squad and platoon in detail. The test ex-amined three general types of platoon organizations byvarying types and numbers of squad organizations. Some pla-toons had three squads while others had four. Some platoonshad nine man squads while others had eleven. Additionally,some platoons were organized with a separate weapons squadwhich contained all of the platoon's LM~s.33

The squad organizations tested were of two types,They were either fire team based, or based around one squadleader with an assistant squad leader (the Korean War typesquad). Squads also varied in the mix of weapons used.Some squads had one or two M6O LMGs; others had only riflesand grenade launchers.6 4

Tactically, OCRSP used a wide variety of scenarios togauge the effectiveness of the differing organizations.Live opponents tended to make the test a bit more realis-

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tic. Although different squad organizations were based ondifferent mission assumptions, they were required to per-form the same missions in the OCRSP. When the eleven manfire team squad was adopted in 1956, it was expected to em-ploy fire and maneuver. Thus in comparison, the smallernonfire team based squads appeared less effective - atleast until the fire team based squads suffered casual-ties.0

To evaluate the differences in tacical effectiveness,OCRSP testers focused primarily on successful mission ac-complishment, but they also quantified four specific areas:command and control, firepower, attrition (particularlyleader vulnerability), and maneuver. Groups of evaluatorsand observers noted particular failures in each of theseareas fo r each tested organization. As a result, with theexception of the tested squad's firepower scores (whichwere rated by electronic devises), the evaluations were allsubjective in nature. The conclusions and observations thetesters made regarding the test squads can be neatly cat-egorized in four areas: weapons, size, structure, and com-mand and control.e0

In terms of a squad's weapons mix, OCRSP observersnoted that those squads with an organic LMG were superiorin generating greater firepower than those without one.With an organic LMG. the squad was able to effectively sup-press an enemy target much better than a squad using a mix

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of automatic rifles (the M14 rifle on fully automatic) andrifles. Additionally, the report noted, not surprisingly,that with two organic machine guns, the squad's firepowerincreased in comparison to a squad with either no LMGs oronly one LMG (note: only squads with fire teams had twoLMGs) .

In terms of a squad's size and structure, OCRSPtesters noted that a larger squad (particularly the elevenman fire team squad) could sustain more casualties, andcontinue its mission, better than could smaller squads(particularly the eight man squad). However, the reportalso noted that when the eleven man squad suffered casual-ties, the fire team structure fell apart. Specifically, theOCRSP testers concluded that to maintain a fire team struc-ture, the squad had to have a Minimtm of ten men and threeNCOs. Moreover, having fewer than ten men prevented thesquad from conducting fire and maneuver. (This observationwould prove prophetic of the fire teom based squad's per-formance in the Vietnam War.)O*

Furthermore, in regards to weapons mix, the OCRSP fi-nal report noted that when each fire team had an LMG (i.e.two LMGs per squad), its overall effectiveness rapidly de-creased as soon as it lost riflemen. This came about prima-rily due to the need to replace the two LMGs' gunners andassistant gunners with riflemen. Eventually, as the squadsustained losses, it lost AVAILABLE riflemen and conse-

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"quently lost its close combat capability.,. This wasattributed to the squad leader's preference to continue toman the squad's tw o LMGs in order to reta..n the squad'sfirepower capability.50

This strange phenomena was first quantified in ASIRSin 1956. Specifically, as the percentage of fire supportweapons increased beyond thirty percent of the squad'ssize, the squad lost its close combat capability. Such wasnot the case, however, when the squad had only one LMG. aswith those squads organized around a squad leader and anassistant.40

The OCRSP conclusion noted the best squad organiza-tion, without fire teams, was one organized around a singleLMG, a squad leader, an assistant squad leader, and six orseven riflemen. The test's observers felt this squad'sshortcomings, in comparison to the fire team squad, wercthat it lacked leaders (i.e. it lacked two team leaders)and firepower (i.e. it had only one LMG). However, the ob-servers noted that this squad could be controlled and movedJust as effectively as the fire team based squad. 61

It should be noted, however, that one can discernthat the observers had a pro-fire team bias." As such,the following points should be kept in mind when consider-ing the relort's evaluation of the squad without fireteams. First, when one remembers the debilitating effectsof an additional LMG on the squad's close combat capability

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(mentioned earlier), this loss of firepower might be a rea-sonable tradeoff. Second, the shortage of one NCO, one oftwo team leaders, is only a concern if the squad is ex-pected to execute fire and maneuver. If the squad was notto fire and maneuver (as was the case following WWII) , theadditional team leader would be unnecessary, or at best, aluxury.63

In their conclusions, the OCRSP testers recommendedthe Army adopt an eleven man fire team based squad with twoLMGs, even though it recognized the fact that the fire teamstructure would probably not endure th e effects of combatattrition for very long. As a caveat of thc inherent weak-ness in the fire team's combat durability, the OCRSPstated, ' Too much emphasis, therefore, should not be giventhe fire team concept.* Given this comment, the fact thatthe testers recommended a fire team based squad can only beattributed to a strong belief in the potential a fire teamstructure gave to squad fire and maneuver. Despite thetesters ' recommendation, it is important to realize thatthe OCRSP results demonstrated that once a squad sufferedcasualties, the best organization was nearly identical tothe nine man squad recommended in the 1946 Infantry Confer-ence.04

In summary, one can see many sim ilarities between theOCRSP report and the 1946 Infantry Conference concerningth e infantry squad. Specifically, both recognized the dif-

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ficulties of squad command and control. As a result, bothstated the best squad otganization (short subordinate fireteams) was one consisting of a squad leader, an assistantsquad leader, a LMG, and five or six riflemen. To accountfor attrition, both reports concluded the squad needed tobe larger than seven or eight men.0e

The primary differences between th e OCRSP and th e In-fantry Conference conclusions revolved around the issue oftactics. The Infantry Conference members felt that combatproved th e infeasibility of squad fire and maneuver. Themembers of the OCRSP, reflecting the Army's doctrine in1961, felt a squad could execute fire and maneuver. Assuch, the only squad organization to support this view wasone with subordinate fire teams - in essence an organiza-tion with miniature squads. Despite this fact, the OCRSPstrongly noted the tenuous life span of the team organiza-tion in test *combat', an observaton that undermined itspractical use. (It should be noted that until th e VietnamWar, the Army had not officially used th e fire team basedsquad in combat. When th e Army did use th e fire team orga-nization in combat in Vietnam, combat results corroboratedthe OCRSP observation.) The basic question would seem tobeg: Why did the Army in 1961 support a squad organizationthat was obviously perishable, probably unnecessary, andcertainly unproven in combat? Despite these issues, theArmy retained the fire team based squad and squad fire and

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maneuver tactics. The US Army's leadership continued todisregard - perhaps unknowingly - the 1946 InfantryConference's observations and conclusions regarding the in-fantry squad's organization and tactical employment. 6 "

THE VIETNAM ERA, 1965-1975Concurrent with the Vietnam War, specifically from 1966

to 1972, the Army' Combat Developments Experimentation Com-mand conducted The Infantry Rifle Unit Study (IRUS). Thetesters sought to give the Army the means to make decisionsconcerning how the Army should organize, train, and equipits infantry squads and platoons through the late 1970s.It was the most thorough and comprehensive evaluation ofinfantry small arms, infantry-company level organization,and direct fire infantry combat to date. The IRUS also per-mitted examination of every aspect of small unit infantrytactics and doctrine, by analyzing combat experience fromVietnam, Korea and WWII. Additionally, IRUS testers em -ployed highly sensitive electronic devices to measure theeffects of firepower during various tactical scenarios.Moreover, computer simulations analyzed the results of thevarious tactical scenarios conducted in the test. As such.IRUS observations are invaluable in evaluating the mostcritical aspects of the infantry squad's organization.0 7

The IRUS provided quantified observations about the ef-fectiveness of machine guns, assault rifles, and dual pur-


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pose grenade launchers in a variety of tacticalsituations." 8 Like earlier tests, IRUS testers analyzedthe squad in terms of command and control, attrition, fire-power, and maneuver. 61

Perhaps most striking was the fact that IRUS testerssought to determine once and for all the requirements fcr aBasic Infantry Element - a BIE. The IRUS testers recog-nized that the terms 'fire team* and *squad' already hadspecific associations and connotations about their respec-tive organization, size, and employment requirements. Assuch, until some objectivity could be reached, the Armywould never really be able to know what size, structure orweapons mix the infantry's basic building block should con-tain. IRUS's framers thought the term BIE would insure thetest remained objective. Specifically, IRUS Phase I aimedto determine the parameters for the Army's future BIE.1 0

Due to the detail included in IRUS' conclusions, eachsubcategory will be addressed separately. The first con-cerns the BIE's size, and its command and control. The IRUSconclusion stated it was impossible to determine a *best*size BIE using only the factor of contiol. As in the 1956ASIRS, IRUS testers concluded there were too many variablesthat affected a BIE's command and control. It appeared fromtests and combat that most men could easily control fiveothers. However, a single man could also control up to tenmen under certain conditions. It depended on the si tuation

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- the terrain, mission, leader's experience etc.. Thetest's analysts noted that a breakpoint seemed to occur atsix men: It was harder to control seven or more men than itwas to control five or less. In the end, IRUS's conclu-sions reaffirmed command and control alone could not de-l imit the BIE's size. Like the 1946 Infantry Conference'sconclusions, the IRUS conclusions recognized that one manhad difficulty in controlling more than eight men."'

In their search for the BIE's optimum size, the IRUStesters investigated the actual rates of attrition for in-fantry squads in wars from WWII to Vietnam. The testersconcluded that squad's were generally attrited by an aver-age of around twenty to thirty percent. Additionally, IRUSnoted that squads routinely operated at twenty percent oftheir authorized strength. This proved consistent even insuch a modern war as Vietnam. Additionally. IRUS observersnoted that once the BIE'S strength fell below five men ittended to become combat ineffective. Considering these !ac-tors, as well as the issue of size in regards to commandand control. IRUS's test officer recommended the BIE con-tain six men. (Although an analysis of the data reveals thenine man BIE actually performed better than the slx manBIE.) The testers recommended the six man BIE as a resultof their subjective "military' judgement since the testdata did not overwhelmingly support their recommendation.7a

Concerning attrition, IRUS noted one other important


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point: the serious effects combat attrition had on thefeasibility of the fire team based squad. Units in Vietnam,the first elements to use the fire team squad in combat,routinely dropped the fire team organization once thesquad's strength fell below nine men. As a result of thelingering effects of operating at twenty percent less theirauthorized strength (i.e. eight of eleven men), most of theunits analyzed in Vietnam rarely operated with fire teams.Units in combat stated that a scuad of less than eight ornine men was too small to employ fire teams in squad fireand maneuver. This point was also noted in the 1961 OCRSPtest.13

In terms of the BIE's weapons mix and firepower effec-tiveness, the IRUS provides some very interesting observa-tions. Based on live fire tests, the best combination ofweapons was a single l ight machine gun and a grenadelauncher." The LMG proved to be the most effective and ef-ficient weapon to suppress both point and area targets ineither attack or defense when compared to the results pro-duced by eithep massed rifle fire or the grenadelauncher.1" Moreover, the IRUS noted the LMO's effective-ness actually imprioved as its range from the target in-creased. As a result , in the attack the LMG was the mosteffective weapon in covering the movement of another el-ement. Addit ionally. th e IAUS noted that th e grenadelauncher was most effective when employed as an area sup-

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pression weapon in the attack, but of comparatively littlevalue in the defense. Finally, IRUS quantified that the

rifle proved to be an effective point suppression weapon atclose ranges. Moreover, massed rifle fire could not provideas effective fire suppression as the combination of LMG andGrenade Launcher. The quantified results of the LMG's ef-fectiveness supported the 1946 Infantry Conference's recom-mendation fo r a squad LMG. 7 6

Of all of the observations concerning the weapons num-bers and mix, the one that seems most unusual - some wouldsay counter-intuitive - concerns the best number of LMGsper BIE. Based primarily on earlier studies and the effec-tiveness of the single LMG's fire in the BIE. the testersconcluded that two LMGs per BIE would not be as effectivein suppressing a target as only one LMG per BIE,"

This result can be attributed to several facts. First ,two UGs per BIE are much harder for the BIE leader to con-trol because his attention is not devoted to a singleweapon. This doublinS of weapons systems makes the weaponscollectively less effective. Second, two LMGa consume twiceas much ammunition as one. When the guns are not effec-tively supervised, much of the ammunition is not effec-tively directed. Collectively. these two facts mean thegun's potential firepower is never realized. In short, hav-ing more L14Gs per BIE does not axiomatically mean more ef-fective firepower. Overall. the IRUS testers concluded that


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a BIE should have one LMG and a grenade launcher (tocomplement the LMG). Together, these two weapons would pro-vide the most effective firepower to allow the BIE's rifle-men to assault an enemy's position or to keep an attackingenemy at bay. As can be seen, this point merely added tothe 1946 Infantry Conference's conclusions regarding theinfantry squad's basic firepower need.10

As a result of analyzing command and control, combatattrition, and weapons mix, the IRUS testers felt theycould finally define the parameters for an effective BIE.First , the testers observed that a BIE was the smallest el-ement commanded by a single man. Moreover, they noted thatto be effective the BIE should have the followingcharacteristics: First, the BIE-should have no fewer thanfive men. Although to account for the lingering effects ofattrition, the IRUS testers stipulated the BIE should actu-ally contain no fewer than gix men since attrition tendedto make the BIE combat ineffective when it fel l below fivemen. Second, to provide the B:E with the most effectivefirepower, the BIE should contain a single LMG and a gre--nade launcher."'

The final aspect of the IRUS concerns comments aboutthe taztical use of the BIE. IRUS testers concluded thatthe BIE should not both fire and maneuver. Rather, thetesters stated the BIE should either fire or maneuver aspart of a larger unit. Its fire or maneuver should be con-

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trolled by an element above the BIF, namely The NextEchelon Above The BIE, or NEATBIE. 8 0 As can be seen, theIRUS arrived at essentially the same conclusion about th eBIE as the 1946 Infantry Conference had about the infantrysquad.

HISTORICAL CONCLUSIONSWhen one considers the observations made after WWII,

Korea, and Vietnam, as well as the results of nearly twodecades of peacetime testing, certain conclusions consis-tently appear in regards to the infantry's basic buildingblock - the squad. First, a squad needs to have one organicLMG. The LMG gives th e squad its most effective firepower.In the attack, it secures the infantry's assault. As such,all other squad weapons should add to or complement theLMG's fire. Two or more LMGs in the squad do not provide aseffective fire as does one. This is because two or moreLMGs exceed the typical squad leader's command and controlability. Furthermore, two LMGs tend to degrade the squad'sclose combat capability. This is especially true when theyconstitute over thirty percent of the squad's size. As thesquad suffers casualties, the LMGs are consistently mannedat the expense of the squad's remAining riflemen. 01

Second, the squad should probably contain no more thannine or ten men, and an assistant squad leader. This nunberis not too large for a squad leader to control. It is also

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large enough to remain effective even with the historically'outine effects of combat attrition. The assistant squadleader can facilitate command and control and provide somedepth allowing for leader attrition as well.

Third, th e 3quad should not use fire and maneuver - itshould either fire or maneuver. As proven routinely inWWII, Korea, and Vietnam, squad fire and maneuver is toodifficult for the squad leader to control himself. The onlysuccessful examples of squad fire and maneuver employed asquad which contained two subordinate fire teams, whichacted like miniature squads. This organization, since theleader controls subordinate elements rather than indi-viduals, is actually a rifle section.

Since the American Army has shown an institutionalbias for the fire team based squad in the years followingthe Korean War, a few historical points concerning itsutility are in order. First, as was just mentioned, a

"squad' consisting of fire teams is arguably not really asquad at all, at least not in the sense that it is thesmallest unit led by one man with no subordinate elementleaders.02 Two, although the US Army has sent squads intocombat organized initially with fire teams, combat attri-tion forced the squad to reorganize without them. Spe-cifically, once the squad's strength fell to eight men, thesquad was too small to effectively employ fire teams, espe-cially when one of the team leaders became a casualty. At a

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minimum, to sustain the fire team structure, even if thefire team leaders did not become casualties, the authorizedsquad strength would have to be twelve or thirteen men.Only in this way could the routinely appearing effects ofcombat attrition be accounted for.03

Given all this, the 1946 Infantry Conference seems tohave neatly captured the essential - and timeless - aspectsof a minimally effective infantry squad. Combat in Korea,followed by decades of peace time testing, and combat inVietnam, have corroborated and elaborated on theConference's initial findings. At no time does any of thehistorical evidence refute the Conference's conclusions re-garding the squad'.s command and control, the effects ofcombat attrition on the squad's size, the squad's need fora LMG, and the limitations of a squad's tactical employ-ment. As a result, any current or future infantry squadshould be judged in light of these characteristics.

III. THR INFANTRY'S CURRENT SQUAD ORGANIZATIONS-THE MECHANIZED SQUAD

Currently, the mechanized infantry squad consists ofnine men and the M-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV). Threemen comprise the vehicle crew with six men in the dismountSrifle* team.04 The squad's nine man size resulted the dif-ficulties of the IFVs development than from any desire tomake the post-Vietnam eleven man squad smaller. The Army

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did not simply choose to readopt the Korea War nine mansquad. Its nine man size squad is a by-product of thevehicle's evolutionary development, which will not be re-counted here as it exceeds the scope of this study. Sufficeto say, design problems produced a vehicle that could onycarry a six man dismount element rather than the hoped foreleven man squad. The reduced six man dismount element ab-sorbed certain key weapons of the previous eleven man, fireteam based squad." Apparently, the Army's designers ac-cepted a tactical procedure for dealing with combat lossesresulting from peacetime, force design 'attrition. Spe-cifically, in the old eleven man squad, as the squad suf-fered casualties, the squad leader kept the squad's 'key"weapons manned (i.e. automatic rifles and grenade launch-ers).'4 In similar fashion, force designers reduced thenumber of riflemen in the mechanized team as the vehiclelost space. As a result, the dismount team contains two au-tomatic riflemen, now armed with the M249 Squad AutomaticWeapon (SAW), two men armed with the M203 grenade launcher,and two men armed with the M16 assault rifle. In short, themechanized infantry squad's rifle team - the squad's in-fantry element - begins its operational life as though itwere merely the remains of an eleven man, two fireteamsquad. In doing this, the force designers ignored the his-torical lessons concerning the squad's essential organiza-tion. More importantly, they have made the squad less ef-

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fective.This process of reduced dismount strength and retention

of the former eleven man squad's key weapons has certainlygiven the dismount team a great deal of firepower poten-tial. It has, however, also significantly degraded thesquad's close combat capability. As demonstrated in testssince the end of the Korean War, specifically: ASIRS(1956), OCRSP (1961), and IRUS (the late 1960s, early1970s), a squad's effectiveness is reduced once a certainpercentage of its strength is filled with fire support sys-tems such as LM3s and grenade launchers. In short, morefire support systems in the squad does not inherently meanbetter fire support. Granted this appearscounter-intuitive (that more weapons would not provide morefirepower), but it has yet to be refuted.

The maintenance of the older eleven man squad's weaponshas also effected the squad's close combat tasks. Closecombat tasks (clearing trench lines, buildings, and bun-kers) , as well as individual soldier tasks (such as manningobservation and listening posts, building obstacles etc.).need riflemen armed with a light weight assault rifle, notgrenade launchers and LMGs (like the M249, Squad AutomaticWeapon - SAW). As light as the SAW may be, it is still tooheavy to allow the gunner to perform the tasks Just men-tioned.01 Given the paucity of riflemen in the mechanizedinfantry squads, any change in weapons or organization that

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could increase the infantry company's close combat strengthwithout decreasing its effectiveness would appear to be astep in the right direction.

LIGHT INFANTRY SQUADAs with the mechanized infantry squad, the light infan-

try squad contains nine men. This resulted from the changesin the Army of Excellence." The decision to adopt thenine man light infantry squad was not by design, but by thelimitations of current Army end strength. However, like themechanized squad, it too reflects the vestiges of theArmy's old eleven man squad. This is most easily seen inthe squad's two fire teams. Each fire team has one teamleader, and three suoordinates. One is armed with a SAW,one with a grenade launcher (presumably the team leader),and two with rifles.e"

The light infantry's squad's fire team organization isintellectually unsupportable and undermines its overalltactical effectivewiss. A review of the historical evidenceproves this poit. Firost seen in the OCRSP (1981), asquad's strength must remain above eight men after attri-tion to effectively employ a squad with a fire team struc-ture This observation was corroborated in combat by unitsin "jletnam. Obviously, the light infantry's nine man squadcan be expected to fall short of this number. The unsuit-ability of the nine man squad to operate with fire teams is

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even more pronounced when one considers the lingeringeffects of combat attrition. 00 The historical record indi-cates that the nine man squad would operate for an extendedtime at six or seven men in combat. Therefore, it would bean ineffective organization if it tried to employ fireteams. *

The fire team structure has also encouraged the infan-try squad to use squad fire and maneuver tactics. As seenin combat since WWII, squads rarely, if ever, use fire andmaneuver. Rather, squads tend to either act as a base offire element or a maneuver element for a larger element(i.e. a platoon). Even if one accepts the premise thatsquads can execute fire and maneuver, tests (the placewhere it has been attempted under controlled conditions)indicate that the concept needs full strength fire teams tooperate effectively. Teaching squads to fire and maneuverin peacetime makes little sense when one recognizes thatcombat conditions (primarily attrition, but also commandand control) .will prevent its use in combat.

Finally, unlike the mechanized squad, which can placethe squad's second LMG in the vehicle, the light infantrymust carry it along. As a result, the light infantrysquad's second LMG does not initially appear to make thesquad less effective. Once the squad is in combat, however,with its squad strength lingering at seven or eight men,the presence of two LMGs will degrade the squad's close

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combat strength and make the squad more quickly combatineffective - particularly for close combat tasks.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONSBased on the lessons of three wars and decades of test--

ing, the current infantry squad is poorly organized. It isessentially a whittled down version of the Army's oldeleven man, two fire team squad. The squad's small sizemitigates against its effectively using two SAWs and twogrenade launchers, particularly in the mechanized rifleteam. Two SAWs and two grenade launchers not only reducethe squad's fire suppression effectiveness, but they alsodissipate the squad's close combat capability, the rifle-men. A nine man organization cannot support the lightinfantry's fire team structure or squad fire and maneuver.In sum, the Army needs to remember and apply its own les-sons learned and relearned concerning the infantry squad'sorganization and tactics.

The following recommendations are presented as a way toimprove the infantry squad's effectiveness. The recommen-dations address both the mechanized and light infantr~ysquads. The recommendations do not propose a change to thesquad's existing strength. Instead the recommendationspropose a change in the squad's current organization.

The easiest way to make the mechanized squad more ef-fective is rather simple. The rifle team should be reduced

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in equipment by one SAW and one grenade launcher. The netbenefit of dropping these weapons in each fire team wouldbe twofold. First , th e rifle team's suppressive fire effec-tiveness would be improved. Second. the mechanized infantrycompany's close combat strength would be increased immedi-ately. The number of riflemen in each squad would increasefrom one to three. Collectively then, th e company would in-crease from its current nine to twenty seven riflemen. Theincrease in riflemen would give the infantry commander thehuman resources to accomplish the variety of tasks onlydismounted infantry can preform.

The solution to the l ight infantry's close combatstrength is almost identical to that presented for th emechanized squad. First, eliminate one of the squad's twoSAWs and grenade launchers. As with the mechanized infan-try, this would increase the squad's close combat poten-tial. Second. eliminate the fire team structure. Organizethe squad around a squad leader and assistant squad leader"instead. Under this structure, the assistant squad leadercould still lead an ad hoc team - if required by the tacti-cal situation. Eliminating the fire team would also sim-plify the light infantry squad's tactics. The squad wouldeither fire or maneuver in relation to its SAW. This wouldlessen the squad leader's tactical duties and be more inline with what has actually taken place at the squad levelin WWII, Korea. and Vietnam.

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These recommendations are not radical nor are they asteo backward. The experiences of three wars and severaldecades of testing corroborate these proposals. The propos-als can be better appreciated and placed in perspective ifone keeps in mind that the loss of the now traditional fireteam is not really a loss at all.

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Tactics and Techniques of Committee 'B ', (Ft. Benning Ga.:The United States Army Infantry School, 1946), T-17, T-18,T-19, T-20, T-30.12 . Ibid.13 . Ibid.14 . Ibid.15 . The Infantry Conference, Tactics and TechniquesCommittee 'A', T-1, T-2; The Infantry Conference. Tacticsand Techniques of Committee 'B ', T-17, T-18, T-19, T-20,T-30. Although somewhat incidental to this study, the Con-

ference also noted deficiencies in the WWII infantryplatoon's organization. The WWII procedure of attaching anassault element from the company's weapons platoon to therifle platoon was inadequate. Combat had revealed that theinfantry platoon needed organic LMGs and rocket launchers.Based on the testimony of numerous combat veterans, as wellas on its own internal discussions, the Conference recom-mended the infantry platoon be given an organic support el-ement, similar to that of the rifle company and battalion.As a result , the infantry platoon gained a weapons squadconsisting of a LMG and a rocket launcher. The new weaponssquad's primary mission was to support the rifle squads'assault. The weapons squad was a duplicate of the WWIIAssault Squad of the Weapons Platoon. Additionally, in WWII"the scout section was a special skill . Not al'l infantrymenwere trained in vcouting. The Conference members felt thatin th4 future all Infantrymen should be taught how toscout, fire both the BAR and the Light Machtne Gun.

16. Robert Dupree and Horace E. Homesley, Jr., His-toy o- United St~tasq Ar~mY_ _quaS, -Ano R'latogns.1,93,51967,(Ft. Benning, Ga, : Combat Developments Command,1967). 22-25.

17. TE Cosgrove. *The New Machine Gun.* Ordnance,Iy-Jui.e 1957, 1095.18 . The Infantry Conference, Tactics .an Techniqges

Comittee 'A' , T-1, T-2; The Infantry Conference. Tgact.qsand Technique- of Commuttee 'B ' T-17, T-18. T-19. T-20.T-:.O, Tte M1919Ae was the Army's WAG. It was a heavy weaponand therefore was kept in the platoon's weapons squad.19. The Infantry Conference, Tactics and Tchnicues

Committee 'A, T-1, T-2; The Infantry Conference,_Tactxcsand Techniques of Committee 'B *, T-17. T-18, T-19, T-20.T-30.

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20. J. Lawton Collins, Stress the Fundamental,*Combat Forces Journal, 1952, 11-18; Frank T. Mildren, *WhatHas Korea Taught Us?,* Infantry School Quarterly, October1953, 7-13; Lessons From Korea, The Infantry School, 1954;Dillon Snell,* The New Squad Formations,' Infantry Journal,1953, 72-74; Dean Havron, et. al., A Research Study of theInfantry Rifle Squad T E, (Ft. Mornroe, Va : HeadquartersContinental Army Command, 1956). 1-10.

21 . SLA Marshall, Commentary on Infantry Operations-nd Weapons Usage In Korea: Winter 1950-1951, (Chevy Chase,Maryland: The John Hopkins University, 1951), 53-54, 72-76.22. The Infantry Conference, Tactics and TechniquesCommittee 'A', T-1, T-2; The Infantry Conference, Tacticsand Techniques of Committee 'B ', T-17, T-18, T-19, T-20,T-30.23. Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tac-t ical Doctrine. 1946-76, (Ft. Leavenworth, ks.: GovernmentPrinting Oiiice, 1981), 12-19.24. Marshall, Commentary on Infantry Operations andWeapons Usage In Korea: Winter 1950-1951, 53-54, 72-76.25. The authorization fo r two BARs did not appear un-til 1953, after Marshall submitted his report, MarshallCommenktary on, In-fan try- Ope~rat-ions adWeapon UsaieI

jKorea: Winter _1 950-1951, 53-54, 72-76; Robert Dupree andHorace E. Homesley, Jr.... Hisory of United States ArnMSquads and .Platoons. Ig35-1967,(Ft. Bonning, Ga.: CombatDevelopments Command, 19T7), 20-22.

26. Marshall. Commqntary on Infantry Operations andWeapons .Usage In Korea: Winter 1950-19_; 53-54, 72-76.27. Marshall's belief in the importance of massedrifle fire can be seen in his WWII work, Men Against Fire:

ThePro~blemof .Battlef-ieldCommand.in .Fture ar.(Gloucester, Ma: Peter Smith, 1978); recently Marshall'sbasic arguments in Men.Agan. nst F -re:he Problem ofB t e-fielo Command in Future War have been reevaluated by Dr.Roger Spiller, the deputy director of the US Army's CombatStudies Insti tute, and shown to be rather speculative atbest, see Roger J. Spiller, SL A Marshall and th e Ra.t.ito ofFire, RUSI Journal, Winter 1988, 63-71.

28, Marshall, Commentary on, Infantry Operation.s andWeapons Usage In Korea: Winter 1950 195j. 53-54, 72-76.29. Ibid.

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30. Robert Dupreeoand Horace E. Homesley, Jr. His-tory of United States Army Squads and ?ltoons,1935-1967,(Ft. Benning, Ga. : Combat Developments Command.1967), 25.

31. Fry's squad battle drill is noticeably absentwithin the platoon's battle drill. Apparently, battle drillwas used as a means to tra'n infantrymen more than a tacti-cal technique, see JC Fry, "Battle Drill, Combat ForcesJournal, April, 18-22; May, 37-39.

32. Fry, 'Battle Drill."33. The enthusiasm for battle drill can be seen mostclearly in the Infantry Tnstructori 's Conference in 1956,where its use is described primarily to meet unexpected re -sistance during a deliberate attack or patrol; InfantryInstructor's Conference Report, (Ft. Benning, Ga. : Govern-ment Printing Office, 1956), 70-78.34. Fry, "Battle Drill."35. James C. Fry, Ascault BattleDrill,(Harrisburg,Pa.: The M ilitary Service Publishing Co.,

1935).36. Dean Havron, et. al., A Research Study of the In-fantry Rifle Squad TOE (ASIRS), (Ft. Monroe, Va : Headquar-ters Continental Army Command, 1956).37. DuPree, 62.38. DuPreq, 62; ASIRS, 4.39. ASIRS, 5-10.40. Ibid.41. Ibid.42. The test was scientific in the sense that it usedcontrol teams, professional testers, and was not conducted

by a tactical unit.43. ASIRS, 1.44. ASIRS, 1, 2, 9, 64.45, ASIRS, 1-15.

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46. ASIRS, 64-67.47. Ibid.48. ASIRS, 50-51.49. ASIRS, 70-74.50. Ibid.51. In'antry Instructor 's Conference Report, 1956,77; John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infantry, Part I, ArmyLineage Series, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Of-fice, 1972), 99-101.52. US Army "ombat Developments Command, Optimum Com-Sposition of the Rille Squad and Platoon (OCRSP), (Ft. Ord,Ca. : Combat Developments Command, 1961).53. OCRSP,l-13.54. OCRSP, 15-23.55. The OCRSP testers noted that none of the person-nel involved in the test knew how to lead a squad withoutsubordinate fire teams, and that this affected the nonfireteam based squads, OCRSP, 18-19.56. OCRSP, 13, 20-23, 66-68.57. OCRSP, 16, 20-23.58. OCRSP, 16-17.59. Ibid.60. OCRSP, 18; ASIRS, 64-67.61. Ibid.62. The OCRSP testers noted that none of the person-nel involved in the test knew how to lead a squad withoutsubordinate fire teams; this ignorance affected the nonfireteam based squads tactical effectiveness, OCRSP. 18-19.63. The OCRSP test assumed that the infantry squadhad to execute fire and maneuver, this was an unfair com-parison with the nine man squad, which was not designed toexecute this mission. Moreover, th e preference fo r a fireteam based squad tended to skew the evaluators expecta-tions. As a result , the nine man squad always seemed

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tactically inferior.64. OCRSP, 16-17,A9.65. OCRSP, 2-3.

66. OCRSP, 19.67. US Army Combat Developments Command, Infantry

Rifle Unit Study, IRUS-75, phase 1, part 2, Annexes C-D,part 3, Annexes E-I; phase 2, vol. I,IV,V; Executive Sum-mary ( Ft. Benning, Ga. : Combat Developments Command,1969).68. IRUS-75, the test used the Stoner 63 LMG as theprototype LMG of the 1970s. It closely resembles the Army's

current LMG the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon.69. IRUS-75, Executive Summary, phase 2, p. 1-4.70. IRUS-75, phase 1, part 2, Cl to C15.71. Ibid, E17.72. Ibid, E-V-18 to E-V-39; as with the 1961 OCRSPtest , the IRUS testers showed a strong bias toward a fireteam organized squad; they were unable to provide any jus-tification for the concept other than by *subjective'judgement..73. IRUS, phase 1, part 3, E-III-31; The IRUS sur-

veyed many Vietnam veterans and used the Infantry School'sow n studies to identify th e effects attrition had on thefire team in combat; in regards to the fire teams use seeTA Williams and Horace Homseley Jr., Small Unit Combat Ex -pe-rience_ in Vietnam. 1966-1967, (Ft. Benning, Ga. - US ArmyCombat Developments Command, 1067).

74 . IRUS, phase 1, part 3, E-III-13; the IRUS testerspolled Vietnam veterans, both NCOs and officers, about theuse of a squad LMO. Invariably, the majority of veteransused the M-60 LMG (a platoon support weapon at the time)attached to a rifle squad; IRUS-75.75 . IRUS-75, phase 1, part 3, E-III-27 to 30.76. Ibid, 7 to 14.77. Ibid. 12 to 18.78. IRUS-75, phase 1, part 2, F-15.

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79. Ibid.80. Ibid, D-6, D-I-l.81. Until such time as the M203 Grenade Launcher andits ammunition weighs no more than th e M16, it is still too

heavy to allow an infantryman to perform close combat orlabor intensive tasks.82. IRUS-75, phase 1, part 2, Cl to C15.The IRUScalled this BIE the fire team rather than a squad. Why? TheIRUS felt that US Army doctrine and tactics was betterserved by having another element (the NEATBIE) subordinateto th e platoon that could execute fire and maneuver. How-ever, the IRUS did not justify this point of view. The testofficer based this decision on what the test termed"military judgement* - or what others might called person-

nel preference.83. IRUS-75, phase 1, part2, Annex E-V, 18-39.84. Department of the Army, FM 7-7J The MechanizedInfantry Squad and Platoon (Bradley) , (Washington, D.C.:Government Printing Office, 1986) , 6.85. Robert J. O'Neil, *Eight Years Later,' Infantry,Jan-Feb 1980, 22-26; O'Neil served as the IRUS test of-ficer.86. Department of the Army, FM 7-7 The-Mechanized-I-

Sfantry Squad and-latoon, (Washington, D.C. : GovernmentPrinting Office, 1978), 22.88. 'The Army of Excellence* created more Army divi-sions, but did not increase the Army's overall endstren8th.As a result , nearly every element had to lose some person-nel. The infantry battalions did this, in part, by reducingthe squad from eleven men to nine.89. Department of the Army, FM 7-70 Light Infantry11atoon/Squad, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Of-

fice, 1986), 690. Infantry personnel losses seem to have remainedconsistent from WWII through Vietnam, namely at twenty to

thirty percent less the authorized st rength, or seventy to

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W hittenberg, John A. et. al.. A Study of th e InfantryRifle Squad TOE. U.S. Army Cont inental Command, Ft. Monroe,Va., 1956.Williams, T.A., and Horace E. Homesley Jr.. Small UnitCombat Experience Vietnam, 1966-1967. U.S. Army Combat De-

velopments Command, Ft. Benning, Ga., 1967.2. Field Manuals

Department of the Army. FM 7-7J The Mechanized InfantrySquad and Platoon (Bradley). Washington D.C., GovernmentPrinting Office, 1986.FM 7-10 Rifle Company, Infan-ty Regiment. Washington,D.C., Government Printing Office,1949.

- - - --M 23-14 Squad AutomaticWeapon (SAW) M249. Washington D.C., Government Printing Of-fice, 1985.

FM 7-70 .Light InfantryPlat oon/Squad. Washington D.C., Government Printing Office,1986.3. Published Articles

Attack Committee, United States Army Infantry School..*The Assault," In fantry. May-June 1961, 52-53.

"*Battle Drill*'. Infantry School Quarterly. Jan 1957,8-16.Boyko, Robert G.'Attack of a Fortified Position.' In-

fantrY, March-April 1980, 39-41.Bremer, James H.,*A Squad With Tw o Wings," Infantry,

April-June, 61-64."Bunker Busting,* Infantry Sphool Quarterly, 1953,25-28.Collins,J. Lawton, 'Stress the Fundamentals,* Combat

F_,orcea Journal,November 1952, 11-18.Crawford, Hunt Dorn. 'Give Us More Firpower.' fn.ant

Journal, May 1948. 37-39.Depuy, William E. Col.. '11 Men - I Mind.* Army. March

1958, 54-60.

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