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THE 14TH INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW ARBITRATION MOOT COMPETITION
2013
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE
TEAM NO. 20
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CLAIMANT
Team
Ho Pey Yann Mubin Shah Ramazan
Shiah Zi Han Yu Kanghao
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
I
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................... I
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................... III
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES........................................................................................ V
QUESTIONS PRESENTED......................................................................................VII
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................... 1
PLEADINGS................................................................................................................. 3 I. THE RESPONDENT WAS JUSTIFIED TO DISCHARGE THE CARGO TO BEATLES.................................................................................................................. 3 II. THE RESPONDENT WAS JUSTIFIED TO DISCHARGE THE GOODS AT THE PORT OF ROTTERDAM. ............................................................................... 6
A. The contractual obligation to discharge the goods at the port of Liverpool, Merseyside can be altered by Clause 29(a) of the charterparty............................ 6 B. The respondent exercised his liberty under clause 29(a) in a fair and reasonable manner ................................................................................................ 8
III. THE RESPONDENT DISCHARGED HIS DUTY TO LOAD, HANDLE, STOW, CARRY, KEEP, CARE FOR AND DISCHARGE THE CARGO PROPERLY AND CAREFULLY. ........................................................................... 9
A. The Hague-Visby Rules are applicable to this contract of carriage. ............. 9 B. The claimant has not proven that the damage and losses suffered in relation to the cargo occurred while the cargo was in the care of the respondent........... 10
1.The Claimant cannot raise a prima facie presumption that the damage to the cargo occurred while the Cargo was in the care of the Respondent because the Bills of Lading issued were claused “quality...unknown”. .... 11
2.The Respondent is not liable for damage and losses suffered because the Claimant has not proved he has suffered actual loss. ................................ 12
C. If the claimant can raise a prima facie presumption that the damage to the cargo occurred while the cargo was in the care of the respondent, the respondent is entitled to exempt his liability under art. iv rule 2(c) and/or 2(f) and/or 2(q) because the damage was caused by piracy.......................................................... 13
1.The damage to the cargo was caused by the piracy.................................................................................................................... 13 2.Piracy is an exempted peril under the Hague-Visby Rules................................................................................................................... 15
D. The vessel was in a seaworthy condition to carry out the voyage................ 17 IV. IF, WHICH IS DENIED, THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS FOUND TO BE LIABLE TO THE CLAIMANT FOR DAMAGES AND LOSSES FOR DISCHARGING THE CARGO TO BEATLES, THE CORRECT MEASURE OF DAMAGES IS THE MARKET VALUE OF NON-GMQ PFAD AT THE PORT OF ROTTERDAM. ................................................................................................. 19
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
II
A. The correct measure of damages is the market value of non-GMQ PFAD at the port of Rotterdam........................................................................................... 19 B. If, which is denied, the cargo should have been delivered in the port of Liverpool, Merseyside the claimant is only entitled to the market value of non-GMQ PFAD at the port of Rotterdam plus freight costs from the port of Rotterdam to the port of Liverpool, Merseyside. ................................................. 20
V. THE RESPONDENT IS NOT LIABLE FOR COSTS OF THE DUTCH PROCEEDINGS CLAIMED AS COSTS IN THE CURRENT ARBITRATION UNDER SECTIONS 61 AND 63 OF THE ARBITRATION ACT 1996............... 21 VI. THE RESPONDENT IS NOT LIABLE FOR COMPOUND INTERESTS PURSUANT TO SECTION 49 OF THE ARBITRATION ACT 1996 AND COSTS WITH SUCH COMPOUND INTERESTS. ............................................................ 22 VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF................................................................................. 23
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
III
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Claimant Aardvark Limited
Respondent Twilight Carriers Inc
Beatles Beatles Oil & Fats Ltd
PFAD Palm Fatty Acid Distillate
Cargo 4,000 Metric Tonnes of PFAD
Vessel M.T. Twilight Trader
Master Master of the M.T. Twillight Trader
Chief Officer Chief Officer of the M.T. Twillight Trader
Bills of Lading Bill of Lading No. PG 1-4, dated 25 October 2008
Charterparty Vegoil Voy 1/27/50 Tanker Voyage Charter Party form
M.T. Metric Tonnes
GMQ General Merchantable Quality
Hague-Visby Rules International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Bills of Lading, as amended by the Visby Protocol, 1968
IMO Circular on Piracy Prevention
Guidance to Shipowners and Ship Operators, Shipmasters and Crews on Preventing and Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, IMO Doc. MSC/Circ. 623/Rev. 3 (May 29, 2002)
Aspinall Lewis International Report
Aspinall Lewis International, MT Twillight Trader: Inspection of the Cargo of Palm Oil After Hijacking at Somalia November 2008 – Febuary 2009, dated 19 March 2009
Thomas, Cropper, Benedict Report
Thomas, Cropper, Benedict fax to Charterers Inc, dated 18 March 2009
Surveys Inc. Report Survyes Inc. report for Insurance Co PLC, dated 9 June 2009
Dutch Surveyoyrs B.V. Dutch Surveyors B.V. Report, reference no.
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
IV
Report 14782.079/WS/EB
ICC Annual Report on Piracy 2007
ICCInternationalMaritimeBureau,“PiracyandArmed Robbery Against Ships,” Annual Report, January 2007, at http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/ ICC-IMB-PRC-2007.pdf (June 8, 2009).
International Arbitration Act
International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth)
Commercial Arbitration Act
Commercial Arbitration Act 1990 (Qld)
Navigation Act Navigation Act 1912 (Cth)
LMAA London Maritime Arbitrators Association
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
V
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
International Conventions
Hague-Visby Rules .............................................................................................. passim
Domestic Legislation
Factors Act 1889 ........................................................................................................... 3 Sale of Goods Act 1979 ................................................................................................ 3
Cases
Albacora S.R.L v Westcott & Laurance Line Ltd. [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 53 .............. 13 Anglo-Danubian Transport Co. Ltd. v Ministry of Food (1949) 83 Lloyd’s Rep 137 . 6 Barber v Meyerstein (1870) LR 4 HL 317.................................................................... 3 Barclays Bank Ltd v Commissioners of Custom and Excise [1963] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 81 4 Bradt v Liverpool, Brazil and Riverplate Steam Navigation Co. [1924] 1 KB 575 ... 11 Compania Naviera Vacongada v Churchill & Sim [1906] 1 KB 237......................... 11 East West Corpn v DKBS AF 1912 A/S and another Utaniko Ltd v P & O Nedlloyd
BV [2003] QB 1509 ................................................................................................... 5 Finlay v The Liverpool and Great Western Steamship Co Ltd (1870) 23 L.T. 251...... 4 G. H. Renton & Co v Palmyra Tarding Corporation [1956] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 379......... 9 Glyn Mills & Co. v East and West India Dock Co. (1882) 7 App. Cas. 591 ................ 5 Kopitoff v Wilson (1876) 1 QBD 377.......................................................................... 18 Leduc v Ward (1888) 20 QBD 475 ............................................................................... 6 Lickbarrow v Mason (1794) 5 TR 683.......................................................................... 3 Maxine Footwear Co Ltd v Canadian Government Merchant Marine Ltd [1959] AC
589 ..................................................................................................................... 17, 18 Mitchell Cotts & Co (Middle East) v Hairco Ltd (1944) 77 Lloyd’s Rep 106 ............. 3 National Petroleum Company v “Athelviscount” (Owners) [1934] 48 Lloyd’s Rep
164 ........................................................................................................................... 11 P Samuel & Co v Dumas [1923] 1 KB 592 ................................................................ 15 Pandorf & Co. v Hamilton, Fraser, & Co. [1886] 17 Q.B.D. 670 ............................. 15 Paterson Steamships v Canadian Co-operative Wheat Producers [1934] A.C. 538.. 16 Pendle & Rivett Ltd. V Ellerman Lines Ltd [1927] 29 Lloyd’s Rep. 133 ................... 14 Phillips & Co. v. Clan Line Steamers (Smithfield Ltd) (1943) 78 Lloyd’s. Rep. 58 .. 14 Pickering v Barclay (1648) Styles 132 ....................................................................... 16 Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1961] 1
Lloyd’s Rep 385 ........................................................................................................ 6 Rice v Baxendale (1861) 7 H & N 96 ......................................................................... 19 Sanders Bros v Maclean & Co (1883) 11 QBD 327..................................................... 3 The Bunga Seroja [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 512 ............................................................. 15 The Florida [2006] EWHC 1137 .................................................................................. 7 The Good Friend [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 586 .............................................................. 17 The Hellenic Dolphin [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 336........................................................ 11
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
VI
The Lady Gwendolen [1965] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 335 ........................................................ 16 The Product Star (No. 2) [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 397 .................................................... 8 The Sormovskiy 3068 [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 266.......................................................... 4 The Texaco Melbourne [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 471 ..................................................... 19 The Washington Trader [1972] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 463 ...................................................... 7 Wilson & Sons v Owners of cargo per the Xantho (1887) 12 App. Cas. 503 ............. 15
Arbitral Awards
New York seller v Californian buyer, Final Award, ICC Case No. 6268, 18 May 1990................................................................................................................................. 22
Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited, Southern Pacific Properties Limited v The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, 20 May 1992 22
Books and Book Chapters
Cooke, Young and Kimball et. al., Voyage Charters, 3rd ed. (London: Informa, 2007)................................................................................................................................. 15
Guenter Treitel & F.M.B. Reynolds, Carver on Bills of Lading, 2nd ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005)......................................................................................... 15
John Gotanda, Supplemental Damages in Private International Law, (Kluwer Law International, 1998) ................................................................................................. 21
Others
Guidance to Shipowners and Ship Operators, Shipmasters and Crews on Preventing and Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, IMO Doc. MSC/Circ. 623/Rev. 3 (May 29, 2002) ................................................................... 17
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
VII
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the Respondent was entitled to discharge the Cargo without the
production of the original bills of lading.
2. Whether the Respondent was entitled to discharge the cargo without the
production of the Bills of Lading.
3. Whether the Respondent was justified to discharge the Cargo in the port at
Rotterdam under Clause 29 of the Charterparty.
4. Whether the Respondent was in breach of its obligation to properly and/or
carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for and discharge the Cargo.
5. Whether the Claimants is entitled to damages for the direct losses resulting
from the Respondent’s breach of contract.
6. Whether the Claimant took reasonable steps to mitigate its losses.
7. Whether the Claimant is entitled to claim costs for the collateral proceedings
in the Dutch Court.
8. Whether the Claimant is entitled to interests on a compound basis.
9. Whether the Claimant is entitled to claim costs with compound interests on
costs.
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
1
STATEMENT OF FACTS
10. This dispute arises out of four Bills of Lading issued by the Respondent,
Twilight Carriers, on 25 October 2008 in respect of four thousand metric
tonnes of Palm Fatty Acid Distillate (PFAD) carried on board the MT
TWILIGHT TRADER. The Bills of Lading were delivered and endorsed to the
Claimants, the buyers of the PFAD, in January 2009, upon payment of the
purchase price to the sellers of the PFAD, Beatles Oils & Fats Ltd. Beatles
charterered the vessel from the Respondent, the owners of the Vessel, under a
Charterparty dated 12 September 2008.
11. The Bills of Lading stipulated Liverpool, Merseyside as the port of discharge,
and were duly signed by Hawk Shipping Services as Agent for the Master.
The Bills of Lading were also clean upon their issuance, and incorporated the
Hague-Visby Rules and all terms, conditions, liberties and exceptions
contained within the Charterparty. In addition, the Bills of Lading were
claused with the words “shipped...in apparent good order and condition” and
“Weight, measure, quality, quantity, condition, contents and value unknown”.
12. Before the Vessel entered the Gulf of Aden, she commenced anti-pirate
watch. Nevertheless, the Vessel and crew was hijacked and captured by
Somali pirates and held hostage from 15 November 2008 to 15 February
2009. Surveys of the Cargo after the Vessel was released reveal that there was
no apparent evidence of organic contaminates although there was a possibilty
of arsenic contamination. As a result of the piracy, traceability of the PFAD
was lost and the Cargo was regarded as being of non-Good Merchantable
Quality and unsuitable for entry into the human food chain.
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
2
13. An exchange of messages between the Claimant and Beatles ensued
subsequent to the release of the Vessel by the pirates, and the Vessel was
directed by Beatles to proceed to Rotterdam where Beatles intended to sell the
Cargo. Beatles indemnified the Respondent in respect of any liability arising
from the delivery of the PFAD to Beatles without production of the Bills of
Lading, and the Respondent delivered the cargo to Beatles at Rotterdam.
14. The following proceedings took place before the Dutch court:
(i) Beatles petitioned to garnish the Cargo before judgment and attach
the Cargo.
(ii) Aardvark applied to arrest the Vessel. The application was granted,
but the arrest was lifted in return for Beatles providing security.
(iii) Beatles applied for and received an order for sale, the proceeds of
which are held by the Dutch court pending the outcome of the
current Arbitration.
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
3
PLEADINGS
I. THE RESPONDENT WAS JUSTIFIED TO DISCHARGE THE CARGO TO BEATLES.
15. The Respondent was justified to deliver the cargo to Beatles because the
Claimant had failed to produce the bills of lading despite being put on notice
that the Respondent intended to discharge the cargo at Rotterdam.
Subsequently, Beatles, the original shipper of the cargo, proved to the
Respondent’s reasonable satisfaction, that he was entitled to the possession of
the cargo.
16. In Lickbarrow v Mason1, the House of Lords recognised that a bill of lading,
by which goods were stated to have been “shipped by any person or persons to
be delivered to order or assigns” was “negotiable and transferable”. This
would enable the holder, by transferring the bill, to transfer the property in the
goods to the transferee.
17. The principle that the bill of lading operates as a document of title was further
developed in Barber v Meyerstein,2 where Lord Hatherley, held that the bill of
lading represented the goods and that possession of the bill of lading was
treated as equivalent to possession of the good covered by it.3 The status of
the bills of lading as a document of title is also buttressed by legislature under
the Factors Act 1889.4 Section 1(4) provides that ‘the expression “document
of title” shall include any bill of lading’ and is incorporated, by reference, in
section 61(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.5
1 (1794) 5 TR 683, 685-6 2 (1870) LR 4 HL 317 3 Ibid at 329-30. See also Mitchell Cotts & Co (Middle East) v Hairco Ltd (1944) 77 Lloyd’s Rep 106, 110 (Atkinson J); Sanders Bros v Maclean & Co (1883) 11 QBD 327, 341 (Bowen LJ) 4 52 & 53 Vict, c45 5 c 54
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
4
18. Thus, in the absence of an express term of the contract, the shipowner must
only deliver the cargo to the holder of the bills of lading when the bills of
lading is presented to him.
19. However, in the absence of the production of the original bills of lading at the
port of loading, it is necessary to imply a term that the shipowner can deliver
the cargo without production of the original bill of lading in circumstances
where it is proved to his reasonable satisfaction that the person seeking
delivery of the goods is entitled to possession and why the bills of lading
cannot be produced.6
20. However, the rule that the shipowner must deliver the cargo to the holder of
the bills of lading upon production of the bills of ladin is not immutable.
Three exceptions have been carved out. First, in Barclays Bank Ltd v
Commissioners of Custom and Excise7, Lord Diplock held that until the bills
of lading are produced, unless at any rate its absence can be satisfactorily
accounted for, the shipowner is entitled to retain possession of the goods. The
corollary of Lord Diplock’s holding is that the shipowner can deliver the
cargo in the absence of bills of lading provided the absence can be
satisfactorily accounted for.
21. Second, when it is proved that the person presenting the bills of lading is not
entitled to immediate possession of the cargo, the shipowner is not entitled to
deliver the cargo to that person.8 In that case, the bills of lading were
fraudulently endorsed to the consignee and hence title did not pass to the
6 The Sormovskiy 3068 [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 266, 272 7 [1963] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 81, 89 8 Finlay v The Liverpool and Great Western Steamship Co Ltd (1870) 23 L.T. 251
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
5
consignee. The shipowner was entitled to deliver the cargo to its rightful
owners in the absence of the production of bills of lading.
22. Lastly, a shipowner is not entitled to deliver to a holder of a bill of lading
when he has notice of competing claims or knowledge of any circumstances
raising a reasonable suspicion that the holder of the bill of lading is not
entitled to the goods, in which case he must interplead.9
23. The three exceptions show that the shipowner may be obliged to deliver cargo
otherwise than against the presentation of the original bills of lading. In The
Sormovskiy, Clarke J. held that a fourth exception – the rule stated in para. 18;
was consistent with the three exceptions to the rule in The Stettin.
24. The exception that the shipowner can deliver the cargo without production of
the original bill of lading in circumstances where it is proved to his reasonable
satisfaction that the person seeking delivery of the goods is entitled to
possession and why the bills of lading cannot be produced has been doubted.10
However, East West can be distinguished on the grounds that the Court of
Appeal was not expressly considering the issue raised in this pleading but was
concerned with the issue of whether the shipowners were entitled and bound
to deliver against an original bill of lading when a right of suit of bailment
may arise.
25. On 20th March 2009, the Respondent received an email by the Claimant that
the Claimant was put on notice that the Respondent intended to discharge the
cargo at the Port of Rotterdam.11 However, the Claimant did not present the
9 Glyn Mills & Co. v East and West India Dock Co. (1882) 7 App. Cas. 591 10 East West Corpn v DKBS AF 1912 A/S and another Utaniko Ltd v P & O Nedlloyd BV [2003] QB 1509, 1539 11 See email correspondence from Claimant to Respondent at pg 36
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
6
bills of lading at the port to receive the cargo. In the absence of the production
of bills of lading, the Respondent was entitled to deliver the cargo to Beatles
because while the email sent put him on notice of the possibility of competing
claims, Beatles was the original shipper of all the cargo onboard the Vessel.
26. Meanwhile, the Claimant, who knew that the Respondent intended to
discharge the cargo, did not show up at the port with the bills of lading.
Hence, the Respondent was reasonably satisfied that Beatles was entitled to
possession of the cargo and was justified in delivering the cargo to Beatles.
II. THE RESPONDENT WAS JUSTIFIED TO DISCHARGE THE GOODS AT THE PORT OF ROTTERDAM.
A. THE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO DISCHARGE THE GOODS AT THE
PORT OF LIVERPOOL, MERSEYSIDE CAN BE ALTERED BY CLAUSE 29(A)
OF THE CHARTERPARTY.
27. The Respondent was justified to deliver the cargo at the Port of Rotterdam
because the hijacking of the Vessel triggered the right to rely on Clause 29(a)
of the Charterparty to make delivery at a substitute port requested by Beatles.
28. In Leduc v Ward12, the English Court of Appeal held that the bill of lading
would be conclusive evidence as to the terms of the contract of carriage once
it has been endorsed to a third party. In the absence of any special provision in
a charterparty, the effect of the nomination of a loading or discharging port by
the charterer is that the charterparty must thereafter be treated as if the
nominated port had originally been written into the charterparty and that the
charterer has neither the right nor the obligation to change that nomination.13
12 (1888) 20 QBD 475 13 Anglo-Danubian Transport Co. Ltd. v Ministry of Food (1949) 83 Lloyd’s Rep 137; Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 385
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
7
29. However, Clause 29(a) of the Charterparty allows a shipowner to discharge
the cargo at a substitute port. The shipowner can invoke the liberty to
discharge the cargo at a substitute port if he encounters practical difficulties in
the performance of the contract of carriage.
30. In The Washington Trader14, the United States District Court held that Clause
29(a) “confers upon the master of the vessel certain discretionary powers
when circumstances unexpected and beyond the control of the owner threaten
the security of the vessel or cargo, including the right to proceed or return, or
to stop at any safe port, or to discharge the cargo at any safe place or port.”
31. This construction was accepted by the English High Court in The Florida.15
The High Court held that “the trigger for application of the clause is merely
something which ‘in the judgment of the owner or the Master’ is likely to give
rise to a range of risks some of which could have the effect of frustrating the
charter”.
32. The scope of such practical difficulties only include situations where the ship
or the cargo encounters unexpected hazards, detentions, delays or threats of
seizure of destruction or when it is unsafe, imprudent or unlawful for the ship
to proceed on its voyage or to discharge the cargo at the port of discharge.
33. The Respondent has the right to make delivery at a substitute port in situations
where the ship or the cargo encounters unexpected hazards, detentions, delays
or threats of seizure of destruction. On 15 November 2008, Somali pirates
14 [1972] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 463 15 [2006] EWHC 1137
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
8
hijacked the Vessel while it was on route to the Port of Liverpool, Merseyside.
The ship and her crew were held hostage for approximately four months.16
34. The hijacking of the ship was an unexpected circumstance which was beyond
the control of the Respondent and threatened the security of the ship and the
cargo. Clause 29(a) was thus triggered and the Respondent was entitled to
have the Vessel call and discharge her cargo at the Port of Rotterdam.
B. THE RESPONDENT EXERCISED HIS LIBERTY UNDER CLAUSE 29(A) IN A
FAIR AND REASONABLE MANNER
35. The Respondent in discharging the Cargo to Beatles exercised his liberty
under Clause 29(a) in a fair and reasonable manner.
36. The liberty to discharge the cargo at a substitute port confers the shipowner
the discretion to determine if his vessel would encounter unexpected hazards,
detentions, delays or threats of seizure of destruction in her performance of
the contract of carriage. The discretion must be exercised honestly and in
good faith such that the outcome is fair as between both parties. It must not be
exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably.
37. In The Product Star (No. 2), the English Court of Appeal decided that
contractual discretion under a charterparty had to be exercised honestly and in
good faith.17 Leggatt L.J. held that the owners were not entitled to exercise
their contractual discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner,
without having regard to the provision in question. Instead, shipowners should
properly consideration the matter before him after making necessary inquiries.
16 See Aspinall Lewis International Report at para. 1.2.2 17 [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 397, 404
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
9
38. This principle has been applied in cases involving the discretion to discharge
cargo “so near as she may safely get”. In G. H. Renton & Co v Palmyra
Tarding Corporation, Lord Somervale held that the discretion must be
exercised in light of the reasonable interests of both parties.18
39. After the Vessel was released, Beatle requested the Vessel to unload her
Cargo at the Port of Rotterdam instead of the Port of Liverpool, Merseyside. It
was fair and reasonable for the Respondent to accede to Beatle’s request to
discharge at the Port of Rotterdam instead of the Port of Liverpool,
Merseyside because Beatles, as the shippers of all the cargo onboard the
Twilight Trader, were in the best position to decide where it would be prudent
to discharge the cargo in light of the hijacking.
40. The Respondent exercised Clause 29(a) in the Bills of lading in a fair and
reasonable manner and thus was justified in delivering the cargo in the Port of
Rotterdam.
III. THE RESPONDENT DISCHARGED HIS DUTY TO LOAD, HANDLE, STOW, CARRY, KEEP, CARE FOR AND DISCHARGE THE CARGO PROPERLY AND CAREFULLY.
A. THE HAGUE-VISBY RULES ARE APPLICABLE TO THIS CONTRACT OF
CARRIAGE.
41. The Hague-Visby Rules are applicable because it has been specifically
incorporated by a paramount clause contained in the Bills of lading.19
42. Section 5(5) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 provides that the
Hague-Visby Rules shall have the force of law in the United Kingdom.
Accordingly, Article X(c) of the Hague-Visby Rules is applicable to a bill of
18 [1956] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 379 at 392-3 19 Bills of Lading No. PG1, PG2, PG3 and PG4, Clause 2
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
10
lading governed under English law. Article X(c) states that the provisions of
the Hague-Visby Rules shall be applicable to a bill of lading relating to the
carriage of goods between ports of two different states if the contract
contained in or evidenced by the bill of lading provides that these rules are to
govern the contract.
43. On the facts of this case, the paramount clause contained on the reverse of the
bills of lading provides that “when the Hague-Visby Rules are not enacted in
the country of shipment, the corresponding legislation of the country of
destination shall apply, irrespective of whether such legislation may only
regulate outbound shipments”. Accordingly, the Hague-Visby Rules will
apply because the United Kingdom is the country of destination and the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 provides that the Hague-Visby Rules shall
have the force of law.
B. THE CLAIMANT HAS NOT PROVEN THAT THE DAMAGE AND LOSSES
SUFFERED IN RELATION TO THE CARGO OCCURRED WHILE THE CARGO
WAS IN THE CARE OF THE RESPONDENT.
44. The Claimant does not have a prima facie case against the Respondent for the
losses suffered in relation to the deterioration of the nature of the Cargo from
a GMQ product to a non-GMQ product because the deterioration was a
deterioration of the internal quality of the condition. As the bills of lading
were claused with the words “quality...unknown”, the onus of proving that the
damage occurred onboard the Vessel is on the Claimant. The Claimant has
neither proved he has suffered actual loss nor that the deterioration occurred
on the Vessel. Hence, the Respondent is not liable for the losses suffered in
relation to the Cargo.
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
11
1. The Claimant cannot raise a prima facie presumption that the
damage to the cargo occurred while the Cargo was in the care of
the Respondent because the Bills of Lading issued were claused
“quality...unknown”.
45. Representations on the bills of lading as to the condition of cargo shipped are
conclusive evidence in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value and the
shipowner is estopped from denying that the cargo was shipped in good
condition.20 Hence, the cargo owner can raise a prima facie presumption that
the damage to the cargo occurred while the cargo was in the care of the
shipowner by showing that cargo which had been shipped in “good order and
condition” was damaged on arrival.21
46. However, the phrase “in apparent good order and condition” refers only to the
external and apparent condition of the cargo and thus, a representation as to
the condition of the goods is not one as to the internal condition or quality of
the cargo since the internal condition or quality of the cargo cannot be verified
by the shipowner.22
47. When the internal condition or quality of the cargo is deteriorated, the
shipowner is entitled to allege that the deterioration in the internal condition or
quality of the cargo occurred prior to loading if the deterioration would not
have been apparent to reasonable inspection at loading provided the bills of
lading issued are claused with the phrase “quality and condition unknown”.23
The onus of proving that the damage occurred onboard the vessel is shifted to
the claimant.
20 Compania Naviera Vacongada v Churchill & Sim [1906] 1 KB 237 21 Bradt v Liverpool, Brazil and Riverplate Steam Navigation Co. [1924] 1 KB 575; The Hellenic Dolphin [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 336, 339 22 Supra note 20 23 National Petroleum Company v “Athelviscount” (Owners) [1934] 48 Lloyd’s Rep 164, 170
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
12
48. The Respondent is not liable for damage and losses suffered in relation to the
cargo because the deterioration of the nature of the Cargo from a GMQ
product to a non-GMQ product is not a deterioration of the internal quality of
the cargo. Both products are physically identical and it would not have been
apparent to reasonable inspection the nature of the Cargo (i.e. whether it was
GMQ or non-GMQ) at the port of loading.
49. The onus shifts to the Claimant to prove that the Cargo was GMQ PFAD and
not non-GMQ PFAD prior to loading at the Port of Pasir Gudang, Malaysia.
On the face of the Bills of lading issued, the Cargo is described only as PFAD
and no mention is made whether the Cargo was GMQ or non-GMQ product.
The Respondent would also not have been able to verify that the Cargo loaded
was GMQ or non-GMQ because it would not have been apparent to him due
to the fact that GMQ and non-GMQ PFAD is identical.
50. The Claimant has failed to show that the Cargo was not a non-GMQ product
prior to loading and hence cannot raise a prima facie case against the
Respondent for the losses suffered in relation to the deterioration of the nature
of the Cargo.
2. The Respondent is not liable for damage and losses suffered
because the Claimant has not proved he has suffered actual loss.
51. The Claimant alleges that the Cargo suffered damage when it lost its status as
a GMQ product.
52. This claim is unfounded. Although the Cargo lost its status as a GMQ product,
the physical nature of the Cargo was not altered. In fact, when surveyed, the
FFA content, TSM content and M&I results of the cargo were all within the
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
13
specifications stipulated in PFAD contracts 1234 and 1235.24 The Respondent
is not liable for damage and losses suffered because the lost of the Cargo’s
status as a GMQ product is not actual loss.
C. IF THE CLAIMANT CAN RAISE A PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION THAT THE
DAMAGE TO THE CARGO OCCURRED WHILE THE CARGO WAS IN THE
CARE OF THE RESPONDENT, THE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO EXEMPT
HIS LIABILITY UNDER ART. IV RULE 2(C) AND/OR 2(F) AND/OR 2(Q)
BECAUSE THE DAMAGE WAS CAUSED BY PIRACY.
53. In the event that the Claimant can raise a prima facie presumption that the
damage to the cargo occurred while the Cargo was in the care of the
Respondent, the Respondent can rebut the presumption by proving that the
loss was caused by an excepted peril provided for in Article IV Rule 2 of the
Hague-Visby Rules. A shipowner who seeks to rely on any immunity under
Article IV of the Hague-Visby Rules must prove that the damage was caused
by an excepted peril or cause.25
54. The deterioration in the quality of the Cargo was caused by the hijacking of
the Vessel by Somali pirates off the Gulf of Aden. The Respondent is entitled
to exempt its liability because loss that is caused by piracy is an exempted
peril under the Hague-Visby Rules.
1. The damage to the cargo was caused by the piracy.
55. The damage that was sustained by the Cargo was caused by piracy. The
Respondent has discharged the burden of prove, on a balance of probabilities,
that the damage to the cargo was caused by the piracy.
24 See PFAD Contracts between the Claimant and Beatles at pg 1 & 2 25 Albacora S.R.L v Westcott & Laurance Line Ltd. [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 53, 64
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
14
56. In Pendle & Rivett Ltd. V Ellerman Lines Ltd26, the English High Court held
that the carrier has the onus of explaining the cause of loss or damage. This
principle was applied in Phillips & Co. v. Clan Line Steamers (Smithfield
Ltd)27 where Atkinson J held that “if the damage is entirely unexplained, it is
difficult to see how the onus [of rebutting prima facie liability] can be
discharged”.
57. In the Claim Submissions, the Claimant submitted and the Respondent agreed
that the Vessel was held off Somalia by Somali pirates between 15 November
2008 and 13 February 2009.28 The Aspinall Lewis International Report
revealed that during the hijacking, no heating was applied to the cargo during
the period of captivity, although instructions were given to heat the cargo
throughout the voyage.29
58. Furthermore, although there is no evidence that the tanks at any location were
opened and cargo was taken out or something was dropped into the cargo,
there is no doubt that during the hijacking, the tanks could have been open and
closed at any stage during the period of the hijacking.30 If any damage or loss
occurred arising out of the deterioration of the cargo, it would have occurred
during the hijacking by Somali pirates.
59. The Respondent has proved, on a balance of probabilities, that the damage to
the cargo was caused by the piracy.
26 [1927] 29 Lloyd’s Rep. 133 27 (1943) 78 Lloyd’s. Rep. 58 28 See Claim Submissions at para. 10 29 Aspinall Lewis International Report at para. 1.2.4 30 Ibid at para. 3.1
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
15
2. Piracy is an exempted peril under the Hague-Visby Rules
a. Article IV Rule 2(c) – Perils of the sea
60. The term “perils of the seas” occurs frequently in policies of marine insurance
but should be construed in the same way in bills of lading or charterparties31,
although care and discrimination must be shown in applying decisions about
marine insurance to the Hague-Visby Rules.32 Perils of the seas are those
perils which are peculiar to the carrying on of business on the sea. The peril
must be an unforeseen and evitable accident, not a contemplated and
inevitable result and it must be of the seas, not merely on the seas.33
61. “Perils of the seas” include the violence of the sea itself and danger which is
caused to things being on the sea by reason of the action of other elements
which act upon the sea. It is mercantile custom that piracy is considered a
peril of the sea.34 Since Somali pirates caused the damage or loss during the
hijacking, the Respondent is entitled to rely on Article IV, Rule 2(c) to exempt
itself from liability.
b. Article IV Rule 2(f) – Act of Public Enemies
62. The term “act of public enemies” applies to pirates whether operating on the
high seas or not.35 The authors of Voyage Charterparties36 suggest that the
introduction of Article IV Rule 2(f) was to include land-based pirates under
31 Wilson & Sons v Owners of cargo per the Xantho (1887) 12 App. Cas. 503, 509 32 The Bunga Seroja [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 512 33 P Samuel & Co v Dumas [1923] 1 KB 592, 618 34 Pandorf & Co. v Hamilton, Fraser, & Co. [1886] 17 Q.B.D. 670 at 676, 685 35 Guenter Treitel & F.M.B. Reynolds, Carver on Bills of Lading, 2nd ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) at 9-217 36 Cooke, Young and Kimball et. al., Voyage Charters, 3rd ed. (London: Informa, 2007)
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
16
the exceptions of Article IV Rule 2 because previously only only seagoing
pirates had been held to be a “peril of the sea”.37
63. The damage to the cargo was caused by the piracy and hence, the Responsible
is entitled to rely on Article IV, Rule 2(f) to exempt itself from liability.
c. Article IV Rule 2(q) – Any other cause arising without the
actual fault or privity of the carrier
64. Article IV Rule 2(q) exempts liability for losses that are caused by piracy if
the carrier can establish that the loss occurred without his own fault or privity
and it did not result from any fault or neglect on the part of his servants or
agents.
65. Rule 2(q) allows the shipowner to avoid liability for any damage or loss not
falling within the named exceptions provided that he can establish that the
damage or loss occurred without his own fault or privity and that it also did
not result from any fault or neglect on the part of his servants.38
66. In The Lady Gwendolen39, the Court of Appeal held that the test to be applied
in judging whether there has been actual fault must be an objective test in
accordance with the standards of a hypothetical reasonable shipowner having
the management and control of his vessel in similar circumstances.
67. On 14 November 2008, as the Vessel entered the Gulf of Eden, she
commenced anti-pirate watch.40 This is accordance to IMO Circular on Piracy
Prevention which states that when “ships are in, or approaching areas where
37 Pickering v Barclay (1648) Styles 132 38 Paterson Steamships v Canadian Co-operative Wheat Producers [1934] A.C. 538, 549 39 [1965] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 335, 346 40 Aspinall Lewis International Report at para. 1.2.2
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
17
attacks take place, bridge watches and look-outs should be augmented”.41 The
Master of the Vessel, in commencing anti-pirate watch, has acted in
accordance with the standards of a reasonable shipowner and hence the
Respondent is entitled to rely on Article IV, Rule 2(q) to exempt itself from
liability.
D. THE VESSEL WAS IN A SEAWORTHY CONDITION TO CARRY OUT THE
VOYAGE.
68. The Respondent can rely on the Article IV Rule 2 of the Hague-Visby Rules
to exempt its liability as the Vessel was a seaworthy vessel. The duty to
exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy under the Article III rule
1 of the Hague-Visby Rules is an overriding obligation which the Respondent
has discharged.
69. In Maxine Footwear Co Ltd v Canadian Government Merchant Marine Ltd,
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that the obligations stated in
Article III Rule 1 is an overriding one, such that the carrier could not raise any
defences in Article IV, Rule 2 if he has breached it.42 Lord Somervell opined
that this principle is based on “the natural construction apart from the opening
words of Article III, Rule 2. The fact that the rule is made subject to the
provisions of Article IV Rule 1 and is not so conditioned makes the point clear
beyond argument”.
70. The carrier’s obligations under Article III, rule 1 embraces the distinct aspects
of the seaworthiness obligation recognized at common law.43 It does not add
41 Guidance to Shipowners and Ship Operators, Shipmasters and Crews on Preventing and Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, IMO Doc. MSC/Circ. 623/Rev. 3 (May 29, 2002) 42 [1959] AC 589, 602 43 The Good Friend [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 586, 592
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
18
nor extend the ordinary meaning of ‘seaworthy’ as understood by the courts.
Thus the obligation under Article III, Rule 1 is for the shipowner to ensure
that his vessel is one that is “fit to meet and undergo the perils of the sea and
other incidental risks to which of necessity she must be exposed in the course
of a voyage”.44
71. The standard required of seaworthiness is relative to the nature of the ship, the
particular voyage contracted for, the cargoes that have been contracted to be
carried as well as the state of knowledge and standards prevailing at the
material time.
72. However, under the Hague-Visby Rules, the absolute undertaking of
seaworthiness is replaced by an undertaking that the shipowner will, before
and at the beginning of the voyage, exercise due diligence to make the vessel
seaworthy. This obligation will be discharged if the carrier has demonstrated
that he exercised the level of due diligence that is expected from a reasonably
prudent shipowner to make the ship seaworthy before and at the beginning of
the voyage.45
73. The Respondent exercised due diligence to make the Twilight Trader
seaworthy by taking appropriate preventive measures such as commencing
anti-pirate watch before it proceeded into the Gulf of Aden and hence the
vessel was in a seaworthy condition to carry out the voyage.
44 Kopitoff v Wilson (1876) 1 QBD 377, 380 45 Supra note 42
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
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IV. IF, WHICH IS DENIED, THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS FOUND TO BE LIABLE TO THE CLAIMANT FOR DAMAGES AND LOSSES FOR DISCHARGING THE CARGO TO BEATLES, THE CORRECT MEASURE OF DAMAGES IS THE MARKET VALUE OF NON-GMQ PFAD AT THE PORT OF ROTTERDAM.
A. THE CORRECT MEASURE OF DAMAGES IS THE MARKET VALUE OF NON-
GMQ PFAD AT THE PORT OF ROTTERDAM.
74. The Respondent was justified to discharge the cargo at the Port of Rotterdam
and hence the damages due to the Claimant, if any, would be the value of non-
GMQ PFAD at Rotterdam on 20 March 2009 which is USD 1.4 million.
75. The established measure of damages is the market value of goods at the time
and place of supposed delivery.46 The market value of non-GMQ PFAD
should be used because the Respondent is not liable to the Claimant for the
loss of GMQ status of the cargo as a result of piracy. Further and/or in the
alternative, the loss of GMQ status does not alter the physical nature of the
Cargo and the Claimant has failed to prove damage or actual loss to the
Cargo.
76. In the presence of an available market for the Cargo, market value should be
assessed by reference to the market price of the goods.47 The market price of
non-GMQ PFAD is evidenced by the sale of the other parcel of PFAD
onboard the Vessel by Beatles at USD 350/m.t. This is further supported by
the Single Joint Expert Report which states that the price of non-GMQ PFAD
is 60-70% of the price of GMQ PFAD.48
46 Rice v Baxendale (1861) 7 H & N 96; The Texaco Melbourne [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 471, 475 47 The Texaco Melbourne, supra 48 Single Joint Expert Report at para. 3.D
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
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77. The various sources indicate an average of USD 504/m.t.49 for the value of
GMQ PFAD on or around 20 March 2009. On application of the discount due
to the non-GMQ status, the market price should be within the range of USD
303/m.t. to USD 353/m.t. and is consistent with the price of USD 350/m.t.
78. Therefore, in these premises, the quantum of damages due to the Claimant, if
any, is USD 1.4 million.
B. IF, WHICH IS DENIED, THE CARGO SHOULD HAVE BEEN DELIVERED IN THE
PORT OF LIVERPOOL, MERSEYSIDE THE CLAIMANT IS ONLY ENTITLED TO
THE MARKET VALUE OF NON-GMQ PFAD AT THE PORT OF ROTTERDAM
PLUS FREIGHT COSTS FROM THE PORT OF ROTTERDAM TO THE PORT OF
LIVERPOOL, MERSEYSIDE.
79. The Respondent is only liable for the market value of non-GMQ PFAD at the
Port of Rotterdam plus freight costs from the Port of Rotterdam to the Port of
Liverpool, Merseyside which is USD 1.52 million due to the Claimant’s
failure to mitigate his losses when he bought GMQ PFAD in Liverpool. The
Respondents cannot be liable for the extra costs incurred by the Claimants in
obtaining a product of a higher grade.
80. The Claimant had been informed that the cargo was to be discharged at the
Port of Rotterdam by Beatles.50 This puts the Claimant on notice of the
alleged contractual breach and thus a duty to mitigate arises. The Claimant did
not take reasonable steps to mitigate his losses when he purchased GMQ
49 The average is obtained by tabulating and averaging the prices of PFAD provided in the various reports contained in the Moot Scenario (Survey by Surveys Inc at pg 49 – USD 603/m.t; PFAD prices attached to letter from Beatles to Twilight Carriers at pg 63 – USD 430/m.t; Prices provided in Single Joint Expert Report at pg 58-59 – USD 475/m.t, USD 468/m.t, USD 650/m.t, USD 440/m.t, USD 465/m.t) 50 See email correspondence from Claimant to Respondent at pg 36
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
21
PFAD in Liverpool only on the 16th of April.51 The delay in purchasing
shows that the Claimant did not take reasonable steps to mitigate by acquiring
non-GMQ PFAD from other markets instead.
81. On the facts, the Claimant should have mitigated his losses by taking delivery
of the purportedly damaged cargo or purchase replacement stock in Rotterdam
and transport it to Liverpool. Therefore, the correct measure of damages is the
price of non-GMQ PFAD at Rotterdam plus the freight costs to transship the
cargo from the Port of Rotterdam to the Port of Liverpool, Merseyside which
is USD 380/m.t.
82. Hence, the quantum of damage due to the Claimant, if any, is USD 1.52
million.
V. THE RESPONDENT IS NOT LIABLE FOR COSTS OF THE DUTCH PROCEEDINGS CLAIMED AS COSTS IN THE CURRENT ARBITRATION UNDER SECTIONS 61 AND 63 OF THE ARBITRATION ACT 1996.
83. The Tribunal should find the Respondent not liable for costs incurred by the
Claimant in the Dutch court proceedings because such costs are not “costs of
the arbitration” as stipulated under Section 61 of the Arbitration Act 1996, and
the power of the Tribunal to award costs is limited to “costs of the
arbitration”. Costs and fees incurred in a collateral proceeding are generally
not recoverable in arbitration.52
51See email correspondence from Claimant to Respondent at pg 36 ; D&F Brokers Ltd. Sales Note at pg. 46 52 John Gotanda, Supplemental Damages in Private International Law, (Kluwer Law International, 1998) at 190
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
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84. In Final Award No. 6268, the tribunal decided that legal costs of ancillary
judicial proceedings were only recoverable as costs of the arbitration in the
event that they are damages for breach of the agreement to arbitrate.53
85. In Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited, Southern Pacific
Properties Limited v The Arab Republic of Egypt, the ICSID tribunal decided
that only such costs incurred in the production of work that was utilized not
only in the collateral proceeding but in the then-current arbitration were
recoverable as costs of the arbitration.54
86. On the facts, proceedings in the Dutch courts were related solely to the
application by Beatles to garnish property and attach moveable goods and the
application by the Claimant to arrest the Vessel. Those proceedings have no
bearing on the current claims and Twilight is not liable for the costs in the
Dutch court proceedings.
VI. THE RESPONDENT IS NOT LIABLE FOR COMPOUND INTERESTS PURSUANT TO SECTION 49 OF THE ARBITRATION ACT 1996 AND COSTS WITH SUCH COMPOUND INTERESTS.
87. The Tribunal’s powers to award interest on a simple or compound basis are
encapsulated within Section 49(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996. An award of
compound interest is to be based on the justice of the case, pursuant to Section
49(3) of the Arbitration Act 1996. The Tribunal should find the Respondent
not liable for compound interests because the justice of the case does not merit
compound interests.
88. Relevant to a finding that the Respondent is not liable to the Claimant for
compound interest are the facts that the Respondent took the necessary 53 New York seller v Californian buyer, Final Award, ICC Case No. 6268, 18 May 1990 at 125 54 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited, Southern Pacific Properties Limited v The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, 20 May 1992 at 83
Team 20 – Memorandum for the Respondent
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precautions to prevent piracy by implementing the anti-pirate watch and that it
was proved to the Respondent’s satisfaction that Beatles was entitled to
possession before it delivered the cargo to Beatles.
89. Section 61(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996 stipulates that the Tribunal’s award
of “costs should follow the event” unless there are circumstances that justify
the Tribunal doing otherwise.
90. If the Tribunal finds the Respondent not liable in respect of the Claimants
claims in damages, costs should follow the event and the Tribunal should
make an award of costs in favour of the Respondent.
VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
91. For the foregoing reasons, the Respondent respectfully requests this Tribunal
to:
92. DECLARE that the Respondent was justified to discharge the cargo to
Beatles;
93. ADJUDGE that the Respondent discharged his duty to load, handle, stow,
carry, keep, care for and discharge the cargo properly and carefully;
94. and further
95. ADJUDGE that the Claimant is only liable for USD 1.4 million if the
Respondent is found to be liable to the Claimant for damages and losses
arising from the discharge of the cargo to Beatles at the Port of Rotterdam.