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APPROVED FOR RELEASE3 0 JUN 1992

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Richard Helms ..Deputy Director (Plans)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY .WASHINGTON 25.0. C.

27 FEB 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Problem of Transportationin Modern Warfare", by Lieutenant-General of •'Technical Troops I. Kbvalev, Colonel-Gelieral ofTechnical Troops P. Bakarev, and ColonelK. Pavlovich

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article whichappeared'in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya war) published by theMinistry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level ofArmy Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, thi6 materialshould be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office.Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization ofany part of thia document . in any other form should. be addressed-to the originsixii . elf.3.C6 -!' • • -

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President forNational Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research,Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,• belbartment of the Army

The DireCtor of Naval Intelligence,Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, IntelligenceU. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of IntelligenceAtomic Energy Commission

'National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and. Astronautics.Intelligence Committee

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence'

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY -SUBJECT.

DATE OF INFO :

APPRAISAL OFCONTENT

SOURCE

USSR

MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Problem of Transporta-tiO71B-MOUiiii-Warfare", by Lieutenant-General of Technical Troops I, Kovalev,Colonel-General of Technical Troops P. Balza-env,and Colonel K. Pavlovich

October 1960

Documentary

A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled"The Problem of Transportation in Modern Warfare", writtenby Lieutenant-General of Technical Troops I. Kovalev,Colonel-General of Technical Troops P. Bakarev, and ColonelK. Pavlovich.

This article appeared in the 1960 Third Issue of aspecial version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) whichis classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and is issuedirregularly. It is.distributed,,withisOhejliniittofDefense down to the4evel4f-41WComiander:7.04*119Third Issue was sent fOi.tipiisettirigiiii-17-baoiirvi960.

• :Headquarters Comment: The artiOA cited on . ps...ge.. s.s _wa ;. 1.3(04)

• disseminated as • . • .1•• ,

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The Problem of Transportation in Modern Warfare

by

Lieutenant-General of Technical Troops I. Kovalev,Colonel-General of Technical Troops P. Bakarev, andColonel K. Pavlovich

•The appearance of nuclear/missile weapons has caused .basic changes in the means and methods of conducting armedcombat.

On the basis of the well-known tenet of Engels that"tactics and strategy depend, first of all, on the levelof production and means of communication attained at agiven moment" (F. Engels, Anti-Duehring, State PoliticalPublishing House, 1952, page 156), it is necessary toexamine in the light of new conditions, one of the problemsof utmost importance to our country, namely, the problem oftransportation in modern warfare, the strategic role ofwhich has grown immeasurably.

V.I. Lenin indicated that without well-prepared andorganized transportation, and without.railroads,_modern.

• warfare is an empty phrase. • -. .

•

These tenets of Marxist-Leninist teaching retain theirfull strength and meaning. Modern warfare will demandthemaximum effort of the economic, military, 'and psyChologicalforces of the country. From its very first moment87the : Iefforts of all types-of-transportation must be concentratedon supporting combat operations of the missile troops, •PV0 troops, and the first strategic echelon of our ArmedForces. At the same time tremendous efforts must bedirected at ensuring shipments.lor.mobilization.of.thearmed forces and their strategic concentration.

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In connection with this, it is impossible to agreewith the opinion of Colonel-General A. Gastilovich whichwas expressed in his article. 1 He apparently maintainsthat allegedly mobilization and strategic deployment ofa multimillion-man army is impossible and unnecessaryunder present conditions because nothing from the interiorof the country will reach the front in time, and may noteven reach it at all. In his opinion, the outcome ofwar will be decided by missile troops and border districtarmies, in such strength and with such armament as theyhad when war fell upon them.

The views of Colonel-General Comrade Gastilovich areapparently based on the assertion that allegedly undermodern conditions only "blitzkrieg" war is possible.

We cannot agree with this viewpoint. The country . •and its armed forces should not be prepared only for a"blitzkrieg" war. The risk is too great, too great andtragic are the possible consequences in the event thatthe war assumes a protracted character. Indeed, the fateof the Socialist Camp will be placed on the scales of war.Prolonged war must not be rejected at the very outset. Onthe contrary, it is for just such a war that the countryand its armed forces must be prepared, allowing, at thesame time, for the possibility of a "blitzkrieg", andpreparation for the latter must be provided for and carriedout, but within the framework of preparation for.-a,protractedWar. .

The tasks connected with preparation of transportationfor war are distinguished by their tremendous labor-consum-ing character and demand great resources and attention .:';!.Toorganize these properly there must be a 'clear aild cOidae--conception of the nature of modern warfare: If we agree withthe viewpoint of Colonel-General Comrade Gasti16vich, andrule out the possibility of anything but a "blitzkrieg"which would be decided by the forces of only border districtarmies, and plan the development of the war-economy; andspecifically transportation, accordingly, then we may loseprecious time made available by the period of peacetimedevelopment, and at a moment of severe trial find ourselvesill-prepared for a protracted war.

1. Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", First Issue, 1960.

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Our opinions are based on the fact that =clear/missileweapons will not eliminate massed armies but, on thecontrary, will cause their inevitable increase, becauselosses in personnel will increase and large numbers ofreserves will be required to replace them. Besides, noamount of missiles can ensure the occupation and retentionof enemy territory; troops are needed for this, and a greatmany troops.

The decisiveness of the aims and the tremendousspatial scope of modern warfare make it necessary to transitconsiderable expanses. Armed combat carried on simultaneouslyin several isolated theaters of military operations willcall for strategic and operational maneuvering of forcesand weapons, as well as the bringing up of large quantitiesof supplies to troops in action during the course of thewar. These shipments, for the most part, will be carriedout not only on the territory of the USSR, but also on thatof the adjacent allied countries, as well as on enemyterritory.

Organizing shipments between countries is complicatedby the varying widths of railway gauge, differences inmeans of transportation, and by the absence of a unifiedcontrolling organ which has appropriate authority forcarrying out and coordinating military shipments betweencountries, conducted on land, sea, and air.

In addition to military shipments, consideration mustbe given to the large volume of shipments iithin.eachcountry to satisfy the requirements of the military economyand civilian population of the countries taking part in awar.

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Recently, with the spread of.opinion regarding.thepossibility of a ".blitzkrieg", and the simplificationspermitted in conducting command-staff exercises, manygenerals and officers have formed an incorrect idea

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• regarding the place and role of various types, of transporta-tion in war. The role of railroads is greatly belittledbecause of their supposedly great vulnerability to strikesof all types of weapons and the complexity of reconstructingthem. These ideas are quite erroneous. Their authorsfail to take . into consideration the fact that railwaytransportation remains the basic and decisive type oftransportation in the zone of interior and one of itsbasic types-within the limits of the front.

The experience of many wars shows that with a well/;organized reconstruction service, railroads possess a highdegree of viability, and any damage to them is quicklyeliminated. This pertains to the conditions of nuclear/missile war as well, during which it is possible to maintainrelatively prompt reconstruction of damaged sections ofrailroad lines by the assignment of appropriate manpower.and the extensive mechanization of work.

In relation to this question, the statements of 'twoprominent' American generals are of considerable interest.

The former commander of the 8th U.S. Army in Korea,Van Fleet, writes in his memoirs: "We knew that the basicmass of military supplies was delivered to the enemy byrail. We knew the location of all railway lines. Wehad superiority at sea and in the air...We did everythingpossible day after day, and still could not stop the .traffic of the Red trains. We attacked with dive bombers.and from low altitudes, shelled with artillery fire fromheavy sea and landbased guns, attacked with rocket weaponsand machine guns, and organized sabotage. We were witnessesof new proof ,of the dependability and flexibility of railroadsin wartime. it&

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Chief Engineer of the U.S. Army General Hall, inmentioning that' in case of war railways will pass from thecategory of a necessary means of transportation to one ofvital importance, stresses the fact that even under theimpact of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima: andNagasaki, railway installations were the most stable.

1. James Van Fleet, Railway Transport and the Winners of Wars. Washington, 1956.

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All . this attests to the high viability of railroads and,consequently, also to the fact that with appropriatepreparation and organization of a reconstruction, service,they will be one of the major strategic 'means of supportfor armed combat even in modern warfare.

For proper clarification of the role of the individualtypes of transportation in the economy of the country, nowand in the near future, let us list some figures whichcharacterize their relative proportion in relation to theoverall freight turnover of our country.

Types of Transportation . 1940 1 1958 11965

in percent

Rail 85.1 81.17 71.33Sea . 4.9 6.6 10.5River 7.4 5.3 5.1Pipeline 0.79 2.1 6.8Motor Vehicle 1.8 4.8 6.2Air _ 0.01 0.03 0.67

It is apparent from these figures that rail transportstill accounts for more than 80 percent 0,4114144ght . Andpassenger shipmentiiiiiirif .we Cduit-OiliiTtb*Vibich"co*ersdistances of over 1,6001nn, then the pitopoitiena'kenshipments will rise to 90 to 95 percent. ThiO'shouldalways be kept in mind in working out various theoreticalconceptions and in developing long-term plans for shipments,so that they are based on the actual capabilities of thetransportation means.

It is also necessary to take into consideration thefact that the railway type of transportation is the cheapest,and, after all, questions of economy. have importantsignificance not only in peacetime but in wartime as well..

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The cost of shipping one kilometer-ton of freight by railis about 3 kopeeks, as compared to 58 to 70 kopeeks bymotor vehicle, and more than 3 rubles by air transport.

For a long time to come railway transport will havea decisive role in serving the transportation needs ofthe country, in peacetime as well as wartime, especiallyin long distance shipping of freight.

During the period of the Second World War, 1941 to1945, the proportion for the various types of transporta-tion in the total volume,of military shipments (excludingmedical shipments) were:1

Types of TransportationAverageShipping

Distance (km)

_-

. .Proportion(in percent)

Railway 700 . 70.5Water (sea and river) 700 9.5Motor Vehicle . 100 19.8 •Air 700 0.2

In modern-offensive operations, when the operationalrear is of considerable depth, regardless of the developmentof other means of delivery;:rail"trinePert'WOly, up to50 perCent ' of all front shipments. 'Neither-tranijobitHaviation, field pipelines, nor motor vehicle transport canreplace railways in the near future.

We are for the comprehensive utilization of all types of transportation because no single type can independentlyfulfil all the needs of the national economy and the armedforces. Consequently, the task consists of working out theprinciples of comprehensive utilization of all types oftransportation on the basis of ..a thorough analysis. ofthe nature of modern warfare and taking into considerationthe actual potentialities of the theaters of militaryoperations. In accordance with this, we must bring abouttheir development and essential construction.

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1. Military Communications in Light of the Further Development of Military Art. Military Publishing House /date andpage missing/

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The viability of the transportation network dependsto a large extent on the degree of its preparation inpeacetime.

One of the most important measures is the developmentof a network of railroads and highways, construction ofairfields, pipelines, river and seaports, and also ofbypasses of major junctions of communications lines,tunnels, large bridges, etc. The accomplishment of thesetasks will take a prolonged period of time and large capitalinvestments, and in this connection, they must be closelycoordinated with the economic needs of the country. It isnecessary to combine correctly the economic and defenseinterests of the country, which in our opinion, is notalways done in practice in questions of the developmentof the transportation network.

For instanCe, the Seven-Year Plan calls for laying90,000 km of rails on railroad lines. Of this amount,only 9,000 km are allotted for new railway construction,and the rest will be used for the reconstruction of existinglines and replacement of old rails. It must be stated, thatin the course of the past several years the rate of railwayexpansion has fallen behind the growth rate of the volumeof industrial output. For the past 10 years the volume ofindustrial output has grown yearly by 10 to 12 percent, butthe expansion of rail lines has been only 1 percent, andhighways even less than that. The density 04.409nyIworkof rail lines and mobile highways even.in.tWtOtein,theater of military operations, the most fa*orable* - -this respect, is illustrated by the following figures:

'_

Rail lines I Automobile tligiiiiaial-. .

(in km per 100 sq km of territory)

In the Soviet Union 2.7 10.5:In other countriesof the Socialist Camp . 9.2 42.0In the •countries 10.7 .75.0

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It is necessary to note that in compiling 'these figureson the USSR, only those territories having the most highlydeveloped networks of railways and automobile highwayswere considered.

Having a total network of main railway lines stretchingfor 123,000 km, we haul 60 percent more freight than theentire railway network of the 'USA, which stretches for340,000 km (first-class roads only). Thus, the densityof freight traffic carried by railways in the USSR is4.5 times that of the USA. During the current-Seven-YearPlan the average freight traffic density will be increasedby another 50 percent approximately. Thus, despite the •development of other means of transportation,:theoperatingpace of the railways of the USSR in the'coming -iears willnot decrease,bUt on the contrary, will increase considerably.Meanwhile, it is now planned to utilize basic .capital • .investment not for the development of new rail lines, butfor the reconstruction of existing lines.

From the military viewpoint, in a number of important areas it would be more correct to solve the problem of en-suring the shipment of the increasing flow of freight by building new railway lines, because a denser network also bas a higher degree of viability. . .

Converting the basic railway main lines toele6:44ctraction will not raisethe;viability4904004#94.network, because the *irk et,the-tallway044WWentirely on the uninterrupted performance of :the•p9Werfu1electric power plants, which in themselves will-b07:an-.important target for enemy strike's. In these:CiraMitilicesit is necessary to establish alternate sources OriiOier.(zakoltsevat) . in our power system as soon as possible.

Diesel-electric traction is more independent,:*idCon-sequently more Viable, prOvided, that stocks ofdieliel fuelare established for a prolonged period of time/becausefuel suitable for diesel 'locomotive use is-produced inonly one or two places in the country. It must also be notedthat our main , line locomotives cannot be used abroad becauseof their clearance and load characteristics and the design'of the running gearwhich is not adaptable to WestEuropean gauge.

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One of the measures for increasing the viability ofthe transportation network which is being carried out inpeacetime is the construction of bypasses of major rail-way junctions and establishment of stocks of reconstructionmaterials and structures.

In our opinion, a number of errors are committedin this matter. Bypasses of junctions takeA long timeto build, and are expected to be used only in wartime.Thus, large capital investments are immobilized. Forexample, the bypass of the Smolensk railway junction;,which has been under construction for 10 years, and whoseestimated cost is 52 million rubles, does not completelyperform the task of increasing the viability of thisrailway. It is necessary to construct wide bypasses ofjunctions, taking into account the possibility of usingthem in peacetime for transporting local freight, thus .allowing for fast recovery of the expenditures which havebeen made.

Little attention has been given to theconstruction and development of rail spursseaports, moorages for support of combinedshipments, and also to the construction ofto airports.

problems of theto river andrail-waterrailway spurs

Not everything is going well in establishing stocks .of mater10„structures.and equipment*forAhe:reconOi*tiOnof bridges, tunnels, ports, airfields anVOtheeAnatailitiOnsin the transportation network. For instance, the Ministry.of Transportation is stockpiling pro-assembled, transportable(tselnoperevozimyy) spans weighing up to 68 tons to reconstructbridges, and they can be transported only by rail andinstalled by special railway cantilever cranes.

Under modern conditions, when the enemy will attemptto cut our railway network into individual isolatedsections, in a majority of cases it Will not be possibleto transport these spans and cranes by rail to-the-bridgesunder reconstruction. •

In our opinion it would be proper to stockpile pre-fabricated bridge structures, and cranes to install them,so that in case of need they could be shipped by motorvehicle transport.

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It is advisable also to establish stocks of materialsand structures for reconstructing highway bridges andriver ports.

At present the need has arisen for closer coordinationof activities among the member countries of the WarsawPact. Many problems have accumulated which requirecoordinated solutions and collaboration. Specificallyawaiting a solution are problems of great importance suchas:

-establishing a park of special rolling stOck whichwould allow for automatic transfer (while in motion) fromthe Soviet gauge of 1524 mm to the West European gaugeof 1435 mm and back again without changing trucks;

-setting up extensions of rail lines with Soviet gauge'deep into the territory of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakiaand Rumania and of West European gauge deep into ourterritory;

-establishing common bases. for reconstruction Materialsand structures and consolidating them;

-reinforcing railway and highway bridges to meet theload specifications of our rolling stock and units ofindependently driven equipment. •

:

All these problems have a direct bearing on ensuringthe viability and the uninterrupted performance of the

. transportation network during a period of war.

To solve them we must first of all enlist the servicesof the already existing"Orgadization , lor the : Cooperation ofRailroads of the Socialist Countries (OrganizatsiyaSotrudnichestva Zheleznykh Dorog-OSZhD) but include in itappropriate military specialists.

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In addition to engineer-construction measures, theviability of communications lines is ensured by thepresence of reconstruction organizations, capable ofmoving quickly to work installations and having at theirdisposal the necessary equipment cadres of specialiststrained in working under conditions of radioactivecontamination of the terrain.

Within the boundaries of the zone of the front, theviability and reconstruction of communications lines willbe ensured by railway, engineer, and road units which'aretrained to perform this work in peacetime.

Reconstruction of the rear area networks is entrustedto the organizations in charge of their operation and.which do not have the technical equipment or the trainedcadres for performing this work. .

The exception is the Ministry of Transportation, whichhas reconstruction trains and bases of reconstruction .materials. In addition, for reconstruction of majorinstallations it is provided that construction organizationsof the Ministry of Transport Construction will be calledupon. However, even these organizations are not trainedin the reconstruction of installations destroyed by nuclearweapons,

•

In case of large-scale destruction'of.majrailWay:.7.installations whose reconstruction will requiWiOiriat deal

of time, the organization of temporary transshipment areas(vremennyy Peregruzochnyy rayon VPR) should be.:Providedfor in order to transit obstructed areas by . using. other.forms of transport, primarily motor vehicle.J:Forjiervicingthe VPR, special mobile formations should'be'i4k0iIed forwartime and equipped with loading-unloading . madhinery andmotor vehicle transport. .• ,,...• .

It would be incorrect to assume that Such specialformations will be able to perform independently-the-task.of . transshipping freight in obstructed areas. Even roughestimates indicate that for setting up a VPR'on such amain line as that between Moscow and Minsk, when the railway

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junction at Vyazma has been destroyed, and through whichpass 76 pairs of trains daily, the transshipment areastretches for 250 to 300 km, and for it to service trans-shipment of supply trains alone we shall need no lessthan 10,000 motor vehicles and more than 15,000 men forthe loading-unloading operations.

In circumstances when the enemy inflicts large-scaledestruction, it will be very difficult to' effect necessarynational economic and military shipments without strictcentralization Of the comprehensive utilization 'of 'all •forms of transport.

At the present time in our country, all forms Oftransportation are controlled by various ministries anddepartments.. Some of them are subordinate to central,and some to republic and local organs of authority.Because of this, it is very complicated,even in peacetime,to organize and conduct combined shipments with theparticipation of 2 to 3 types of transport.

In time of war, such bureaucratic disunity intransportation means is intolerable because it can leadto serious consequences for the armed forces, as well asfor the economy of the country, and these consequenceswould be difficult to correct.

,All forms of transportation which are -

of the country can be systematically andexpeientlyutilized only if the control of their exiilOitatiOi 'emanatesfrom a single center, closely connected to thelnpieme- HighCommand.

, ,. •

In our opinion, it is extremely essentiiiA6:nnite.themanagement of all types of transport in one organ, for •instance, in a specially established transportation committee.At the same time, decentralization of control must be ensured.by establishing S . to 10 directing bodies territoriallyand administratively linked with industrial-economicareas and military districts. Such a system will ensurethe viability of the controlling organs and will' permit amore effective solution of the problem of combinedutilization of all types of transportation in peace andwartime.•

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At the same time it is necessary to complete theunification within the Ministry of Transport Constructionof all construction organizations which conduct constructionof rail lines and highways, pipelines, airfields, andsea and river ports, after preparing them organizationallyand technically for wartime accomplishment of the mostcomplex work in reconstructing communications lines inthe zone of interior.

However, the forces of the construction organizationsof the Ministry of Transport Construction alone will be farfrom sufficient to reach this goal. Appropriate preparationis needed so that reconstruction work and the establishmentof VPH's are also assigned to local territorial organizationsand the populace.

In wartime, reconstruction of communications lines inthe zone of interior must become a common task of all thepeople and be organized by the State. People and equip-ment must be assigned in advance to all the most importantinstallations ( rail centers, ports, large bridges, etc.)and, in case of need, must 'go immediately to the installationand put themselves at the disposal of the chief in chargeof organizing the reconstruction work.

°Under peacetime conditions it is expedient to conducta series,of .measuresin„AccordInce with the pcllicyof.;ipe

• "- -

more effeetiife'utilizatioa'Of'theinitial period of a war.' ,

In the present situation, to outfit one fully mobilizedmotorized-rifle division, varioue , typesof . equipment mistbe brought from 29 to 32 separate depoii".tO the ItiAiiiitionpoint from distancSs'of 500 to 2500 km. In order to decreasethis volume of shipments at a time when the railways areworking under the most strain, complete depots should beset up at the mobilization points, .:from which all therequisite military equipment and materiel could be obtainedat once.

The problem of supplier and consumer routing of trainsmust be Solved in order to reduce . to a minimum the layovertime of military goods at points where trains are reconstituted.

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It is time to take practical action in creating specialfreight containers, pallets(poddon) and other means forshipping military goods which will ensure mechanization ofloading-unloading work and will sharply reduce the layovertime of trains in transshipment areas.

To decrease the time needed for full mobilizationand shipment of troops of the first strategic echelon,the traveling speed of trains should be increased to1000 km per 24-hour period (i.e. doubled) and the weightof a military train increased to at least 1500 tons(gross weight) instead of the 1200 tons used presently.The present level of technical equipment of railway transportfully allows implementation of these measures.

According to modern views, it is planned to reconstruct,in a frontal zone, 2 or 3 frontal railway routes and 1 or2 lateral ones. To carry out these tasks, the compositionof the front includes 5 or 6 railway brigades, reinforcedwith bridge regiments, battalions of railway pontoon bridges,special formations, and, when necessary, tunnel battalions.

The rate of reconstruction of railways will depend toa considerable extent on the extent and nature of theirdestruction and on the number of railway units assigned tothe reconstruction of one or another railway route.•

-- It is known that in previous wars each of the ;opposing, . .sides tried to effect complete destruction Ofrailiiiys -during a retreat. Roadbeds, tracks, all bridges and pipes,communication lines, railway water supply installations,and service and technical buildings were all blown up.Practically speaking, such complete destruction Was possibleonly in a tactical zone of defense to a depth of 20 to 40 kmfrom the main line of resistance, and then only underconditions of a slow retreat. In an operational zone 100 to200 km in depth, railways suffered a slight to averageamount of destruction.

In the currently effective regUlations and instructionsof our probable enemies, there'is , provision by way of"delaying operations" for massive obstructions alongcommunications routes.' In the field manual of the

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US Army, Obstruction and Destruction, it is planned touse nuclear weapons to create obstructions. Considerablework has been done in West Germany in preparing structuresfor destruction. According to available ,data,mine deviceshave been installed in more than 300 installations (bridges,tunnels, dams, reservoirs).

The experience of the last war showed that the fasterthe rate of offensives of troops, the less time the enemyhas to set up obstructions. Under modern conditions, withthe fast rate of offensive and the dense railway networkin the western theater of military operations, it is to beexpected that the enemy will be in a position to destroyrailways only by individual focal points, striving tosplit and break up the entire network into isolatedsections. Moreover, first to be destroyed will be alllarge bridges and tunnels. The extent of destruction torailways in this case will not be as great as in the caseof complete destruction, but the nature of destruction andconditions of reconstruction will be more complex than inthe last war.

Under the conditions of highly mobile modern warfare,when offensive operations are conducted in grealt.depth Andthe destruction of railways is accomplished at certainpoints, railway units will

railways, work along.a40front,

separated from each other, as a-rule, in Sif*ll1,04)Aniteoften in a "deep envelopment" of railway'SeCtorOiti4 -occupied by the enemy, or in "corridors" made byOini.:troops.

, .Taking into account the possible tempos of offensive

• operations, railway troops_must:reconstructthe'bnOic:.front : railway main lines at a pace of no leis than 45, to50 km per 24-hour period and strive to raise this:63.55_to 60 km per day. In the last War the railway reconitructionrate in one front operation was 5 to .0 km on one route(in individual cases up to 20 to 25 km)..

In order not to be separated from the advancing troopsby more than a distance of a day's ride by motor vehicletransport, railway troops must reconstruct any destroyedpoint or any installation in 3 to 3.5 days.. If its

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1.3(a)(4)1011111111.111110111K„reconstruction requires more time (for instance, buildinga bypass of a railway Junction or bridge, reconstructionof tunnels, etc), then it will be necessary to overcomethe obstructed area by establishing L a VPR and by wideuse of other types of transport..

The task of increasing the rate of reconstruction ofrailways to 55 to 60 km per day, and more, demands afundamental change in the technical equipment of railwaytroops, the creation of new types of reconstruction meansbased on wide use of automation, telemechanics, and theoverall mechanization of reconstruction processes.

. Railway troops must be mobile. Their.technicalequipment and reconstruction equipment must be capable Ofbeing transported not only by rail and motor vehicletransport, • but also by airplanes and helicopters. Only.bythis approach can the task , of increasing the pace of rail-way reconstruction to the required level be performed. Inaddition we must not lose sight either of certain problemsof an organizational nature. -

As is known, the composition of the troops of theSoviet Army which are deployed beyond the western nationalborders of the USSR does not include railwa) , :pnits.' In.case of war, railway .unitsjill.,,taket_it..41eaStAA:0048.2to arrive at the:t.Oht:iiiii:,stai,tWOrk;-;y4,4c414,114,1gwl-,',-:time the advancing 'Move 'fOr10047cOriiideiib13i.Consequently, in the very' first days ofla"WSr..,.a significantseparation may develop between operating railways andfthe,.advancing troops. ".•

• • •All bases for recOnstruction materials and structures

are also'located on the territory of the TISSR,.at t.distance of more than . 2000 to 3000 km from -the line' of -deployment of troops of the first line. Even if thereare sufficient stocks of these materials, it.is-impossibleto deliver them quickly to reconstruction sites.

• Such a situation cannot be considered normal. In orderto reconstruct railways in the wake of the advancing troops,railway units and materiel bases must be located as closeas possible to departure lines.

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1111111111 4.S(a)(4)4111=1111411

20M)

1.3(e.)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

000012331 UNCLASSIFIED

There is no clarity in the problems of organizingthe operation of reconstructed sectors and their technicalconcealment. Many independently operating organizationshave appeared in front railway sectors. Reconstructionof railways is conducted by railway brigades and specialreconstruction formations subordinate to the chief ofrailway troops of the front (NZhVF), and operation ofthe reconstructed railway sectors is ensured by operatingrailway regiments and operating special formations,subordinate to the chief of the military-operating director-ate of the front (nach. VEU). The organization ofmilitary shipnients is conducted by the chief of militarytransport of the front (nachalnik VOS0). They all haveequal rights and, with the exception of the chief ofVOSO, are directly subordinate to the commander of thefront. The NZhVF and VEU for special service are alsosubordinate to the Ministry of Transportation of theUSSR.

When our troops are operating on the territory ofallies, it must be taken into account that there are alsolocal governmental organs of railway, administration withwhom the work must be coordinated.

As was pointed out earlier, under modern conditionswe must strive for the comprehensive utilization of all.types of transportation located within the limits of thefront: rail, water, motor vehicle, air, and pi5eline. Yet,all these types OttrinsPortition. are subordinate'tOdifferent arms of troops and services.

The need has arisen to examine the problem . of settingup within the composition of the front a single militarytransport' service . (directorate), endowed with the nedessirypowers for organizing centralized utilization of all typesof transportation subordinate to the front and appropriateauthority to coordinate problems of military shipmentswith appropriate ministries and departments. The complementof this directorate must include experienced specialistsand representatives Of all types of transportation who arecapable of establishing and efficiently directing apowerful transport service.'

simmummilll1.3(a)(4)

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LAICLASSIFIED

1.2(a)(4)

C00012331 UNCLASSIFIED

At the beginning of the Second World War an attemptwas made to assign the responsibility for reconstructionand operation of front railways to a representative ofthe NETS (Narodnyy Komissariat Putey Soobshcheniya -Peoples' Commissariat of Transportation), who was attachedto the Military Council of a front. The experience ofmany wars has shown that front railways must be controlledby the military, especially beyond the limits of ournational boundaries. In time of-war, neither railwaymennor local agencies of authority will recognize anyoner'else's'authority, and no one else will have adequatelegal rights. .

At the present time the planning of shipments andcoordination of the tasks of all types of transportationare the responsibility of the third department of the .headquarters of the rear services of a front. Thisdepartment will be unable to resolve a single practicalproblem, and will be a superfluous echelon of command, tyingup the operations of all transportation agencies. Thisconclusion is corroborated by the experience of manypractical exercises.

To ensure comprehensive utilization of all types oftransportation, it will be necessary to make up mutuallycoordinated schedules and plans (possibly using electronic.computing machines), a unified dispatcher control tor,.shipments, good and iccurately operating cornOxiic*tionS, •

etc. All this requires highly qualified specialists whohave experience in working in transportation agencies.

To coordinate the preparation of the entire transportationnetwork for operation in wartime, and also to resolveproblems Of its utilization in the interests of operatingtroops, it is necessary to set up, within the scope of themember-countries of the Warsaw Pact, an appropriate •transportation agency which must be closely connected withthe OSZhD.

It is also expedient to distribute properly the stocksof reconstruction materiel, and to unify reconstruction

1-3(a)(4)

-19-

1.3(a)(4)

HNC! ASSIFIFn

CO 0012331 UNCLASSIFIED

1.3(0(4)

1.3(a)(4)

equipment and reconstruction units so that they willmeet modern requirements. Comprehensive utilization ofall types of transportation must also be organized inaccordance with a unified plan, regardless of thenation to which they belong.

It is perfectly obvious that appropriate preparationof means of transportation for work under conditions ofwar must be carried out in advance. Every delay in thismatter is very dangerous because the scope.of the woriis so great that it will be impossible to make up losttime in the course of a war.

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12(04)

IINCLASSIFIFF)