Mencius Lecture Notes

7/28/2019 Mencius Lecture Notes

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www.class.uidaho.edu/ngier/308/mennotes.htm

MENCIUS (371-289 or 391-308 BCE)

Taught by a disciple of Confucius grandson, and the events of his life paralleled

Confuciuss very closely. He claimed to have reached full contentment (an

unpreturbed heart) at age 40, the same year as Confucius (2a2).

The four "beginnings"Ren*, yi, li, andzhi. Not "original goodness" butpotentials inclined to the good (Mencius 6a1). Note: for Mencius "potential"

must mean something already on the way to actualization. The actual Chinese

character is the one for "sprout" not "seed."

Doctrine of graduated love vs. the universal love of the Mohists. Confucius, too.

For the latter at the outer reaches of any social circle ren* becomes hui

(generosity).

"Treat your elders as elders, and extend it to the elders of others; treat your

young ones as young ones, and extend it to the young ones of others; then you

can turn the whole world in the palm of your hand" (1a7). Goverance of the

state begins with governance in the family. Once kindness has been prefected

here, then it can be extended to the Four Seas. (Recall Confucius' reply when

someone asked him why he did not take up a post: he was already doing politics

by being filial.) These actions are reciprocal in that those who do not extend

kindness beyond the family risk losing it at home as well. This is the key to

understanding the large (=extended) person as opposed to the small (=restricted)

person.

TWO MAJOR INNOVATIONS

1. For Mencius ren* must reach out even to animals. See King Xuan's care of

the ox at 1a7. But a sheep is sacrificed instead. His feeling (xin) for the ox was

enough, according to Mencius, to qualify him as a king. It was presumbably

sufficient evidence of a potential in him for caring his people. As Mencius says:"This is how ren* works." Ajunzi cannot bear to see any living being suffer.

King Xuan, therefore, is not acting on the sprout of virtue that is shown in his

saving the ox. He must now act to extent his hear to his people as well. In 19th

Century England laws protecting animals from harm were then used to ban child

labor. The English were just like King Xuan and many of our own people

today: some care far more for their animals than they do for humans in need.


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www.class.uidaho.edu/ngier/308/mennotes.htm 2

Mencius concludes that the king's failure was not for the lack of virtue but a

failure to fully act on it.

2. Mencius most radical innovation: the right to revolt against dictators. See

1b8.

Development in dialectical skills (not an innovation, but present throughout this

period). Analogical reasoning and reductio ad absurdum. Dialectical exchanges

and extended give and take. No simple appeal to authority.

Apparently Mencius did this reluctantly--only to be able to defeat the views of

his opponents. "Outsiders all say," says Gongduzi his disciple, "that you are fond

of argument. I venture to ask why? "I am not fond of argument," announces

Mencius, "I simply have no alternative [in a world of Mohist dialectic and his

view not favored]" (3b9). As long as the states were in chaos people would

dispute with one another. When they were at peace under the sage kings, it wasobvious that one should follow the li.

Please note the elevation of Confucius above the sage kings. Zaiwo: "In my

view, the Master surpassed greatly Yao and Shun [great sage kings]"; and Zigong

adds that "through the rites of a state he could see its government; through its

music, the moral quality of its ruler. Looking back over a hundred generations

he was able to appraise all the kings, and no one has ever been able to show him

to be wrong in a single instance. Ever since man came into this world, there hasnever been another like the Master" (2a2, Lau trans.) Confucius would have

been surprised at this claim of infallibility.

2a2: unperturbedxin linked with courage andyi. True courage

always joined with doing what is right (yi). No courageous thief! Gaozi

is wrong about not consultingxin when one does not understand words.

The will (zhi*) is commander overqi while the qi is that which fills the

body. The Confucian will is a directedheart-mind. Mencius strongpoints: Im have insight into words. I am good a cultivating my flood-

like qi.


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The Child in the Well (2a6): Chan: "All men have the mind which cannot bear to

see the suffering of others." Lau: "No man is devoid of a heart sensitive to thesufferings of others."

Correlation between feelings (qing) and virtues (de).

Feeling of commiseration ren*

Lau: heart of compassion

heart of shame [van Norden: disdain] yi ("one's proper path," vanNorden)

Schwartz: sentiment of respect li

sentiment of right and wrongzhi

Mencius believes in the unity of the virtues just as the Greeks did. He likens the

four virtue sprouts with a person's four limbs, so one is handicapped morally


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and physically if one of the four is missing.

Another sign of the unity of virtues is Mencius' tendency of joining ren*yi (6a1),

ren*li (4b28), and li yi (4a10).

4a4: Mencian equivalent toAnalects 14.36. Do not return love for hatred, but

look into yourself and be true to yourself. "If others do not respond to your

love with love, look into your own benevolence; if others fail to respond to your

attempts to govern them with order, look into your own wisdom;l if others do

not return your courtesy, look into your own respect" (Lau).

4a17 and 7a26: The use of discretion (quan): men and women should not touch

each other, according to li; but if your sister-in-law is drowning, then you must

lend your hand. If the whole world were going under, then you would use the

Dao in the same way. Is it true that one can use the Dao in the same prudential,

means-to-ends way as using your hand in rescue? The analogy should be thatone would use force if all chaos reigned, but would use the way of virtue under

normal circumstances.

What do think of the following correlations of the four virtues with the family:

"The core ofren* is serving one's parents. The core ofyi is obeying one's elder

brother. The core ofzhi is knowing these two and not abandoning them. The

core ifli is to regulate and adorn these two. The core of music is to delight in

these two" (4a27). Notice how important music is for development of thevirtues. An note also the "dance of virtue" that follows in the same passage.

The character for music and joy is the same and Mencius celebrates the joy he

feels in virtue and how it conduces to the happy life. The following chart

reveals some significant differences between simple pleasure, joy, and

happiness, the latter defined as Aristotle's eudimonia, literally "having a good

spirit."


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6a6:"No one can develop his [ones] original endowment to the full extent." Not

even the sage?

ARGUMENT BY ANALOGY

Philosophical analogies approximate the form of mathematical proportions and

therefore might appear to be tight deductive systems. For example, A is to B as C

is to D has the same form as 1/2 = 2/4, but the "numerators" and "denominators"

of philosophical analogies are never mathematically identical. This ultimatelymakes mathematical proportions and philosophical analogies quite different. It

makes them inductive arguments, an argument that does not lead to necessary

truths. Only deductive arguments give us truths that are true in all cases and

without exceptions, e.g., the truths of logic, math, and geometry.

In assessing the value of philosophical analogies, we must ask two questions:

Are the things compared similar? and are the things similar in the particular

respect in question? If these two questions can be answered in the affirmative,


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then a convincing argument from analogy probably exists.

In his bookPractical Logic, Monroe C. Beardsley contends that there is no such

thing as an argument from analogy. "Analogies illustrate, and they lead to

hypotheses, but thinking in terms of analogy becomes fallacious when the

analogy is used as a reason for a principle" (p. 107). Beardsley does, however,

give a good example of an analogy which is "strong" and which can be used torepresent one thing as another. This is the analogy of a map: "The dots on the

map are not very much like actual cities, and the lines on the map are not all like

mountains or wet like rivers.... But the structure of the map, if it is a good one,

corresponds to the structure of the country it represents. That is, the shapes of

the states are like the shapes on the map; ...and the relative distances between

actual cities are like the relative distances between the dots on the map" (p. 106).

It is clear that such analogies can be very helpful in clarifying the form and

structure of some arguments, even to the point of discrediting a specificargument.

Parallels vs. Analogies

A parallel argument: all elements are equal or similar in all essential

particulars;

Or at least identical syntactical elements in corresponding positions.

Analogies have neither of these features.

Mathematical ratios are perfect parallel deductive arguments.


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Chap. 6 Mencius

Discussions about human nature (xing):

1. Neither good nor evil: Gaozi.

2. Its good or evil, depending on who rules (or environment?).

3. Intrinsic goodness (Shun) and intrinsic badness (Shuns father).

4. It is good, or more accurately, humans have the potential for goodness:

Mencius.

5. Its evil or more precisely: humans tend to evil: Xunzi (Hsn-tzu).

For Gaozi ren* simply means love as a natural affection that stems from a basic

sexual desire, which along with hunger, are Gaozis two beginnings. Therefore,

that which issheng* (inborn)desire for sex and foodisxinghuman


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nature. Such desires obviously can lead to either good or bad.

Who is Gaozi anyway? A Daoist, as some say? Much more likely, as Schwartz

says, he is a Confucian (2a2 speaks of him almost as a colleague) who simply

disagrees with Mencius about human nature. He is, for example, closer to

Mencius than the Confucian Xunzi is. He also attained an undisturbed heart at an

earlier age than did Mencius (2a2).

6a1 wood xing

____ is to ___

cups and bowls morality (ren*yi)

The wood is destroyed in making cups and bowls, but Mencius thinks that it is

absurd to think thatxingis destroyed in making humans moral.

D. C. Lau puts the reductio ad absurdum in an interesting way. The analogy of

doing violence to the wood is moral evil, so the implication of Gaozis analogy is

that it is evil to make humans moral.

Further implication: Violence is done to the wood whether we make good bowls

or bad ones. So violence is done to human nature whether the person becomes

immoral or moral!

Giers version of 6a1:

wood good cups xing

____ __________ _____

natural grain with the grain natural good

This reading fits Confucian virtue ethics must better. It gives a picture of crafting

a noble soul from raw material that already has a potential for virtue-beauty in it.It also gives an argument for the goodness/beauty of this potential. This firmly

supports to a Confucian aesthetics of virtue.

6a2 In the second argument Gaozi reaffirms his position that human nature is

neither good nor evil, just as water can be made to go east or west.

whirling water xing


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__________ ___

its going east good or bad

whirling water xing

___________ ______

its going west good or bad

6a2: Mencius answer:

water xing

____ ___

flows downwards tends to the good

"Xingis naturally good just as water naturally flows downward." Couldn't Xunzi

(the next Confucian who believes that humans tend to evil) use this same

analogy and simply say that downward flowing water symbolizes the tendency

of humans to become evil?

6a3: Gaozi believes that which issheng* (that which is inborn; Ware "life" is

misleading) is sex and a desire for food. So for Gaozi sex and desire for food ishumanxing. Ifsheng isxing, then:

whiteness whiteness xing? xing? xing?

_______ = _______ ___ ___ ___

white feather white jade dogs oxen humans

Mencius: In that case all natures are the same?Reductio ad absurdum. Further

analysis: "nature" is an "empty, formal term" and has to be filled with specificcontent, while "whiteness" already has minimum specific content, which will

define it as the same predicate for all things that are qualified by it. As Lau states

"The nature of a thing depends entirely on what the thing is, while whether a

thing is white or not depends on whether it includes the characteristic which we

define as whiteness independently." The first is inherent, innate, internal; the

other is accidental, external.Nature of whiteness is not the same as the


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essential nature of something. Aristotle: the essence of the feather is not

whiteness. Many different things can share whiteness, but only oxen

can share the ox nature.

7a21: The physiognomy of virtue means that inner virtue shows on the

outside: The four virtues are "rooted in his heart, and manifests itself in

his face, giving it a sleek appearance. It also shows in his back andextends to his limbs, rendering their message intelligible without words"

(Lau). A fusion of the inner and the outer. The Great Learning, a

later Confucian text, relates the physiognomy of virtue to the practice of

"self-watchfulness" (shen du) and making the will sincere. While the

evil person thinks that he can do anything that he likes in private, the

virtuous person knows better. "For other people see him as if they see

his very heart. This is what is meant by saying that what is true in aman's heart will be shown in his outward appearance. . . . wealth makes

a house shining and virtue makes a person shining. When one's mind is

broad and his heart generous, his body becomes big and is at ease"

(Chan, pp. 89-90).

7b25: Ames translates as follows: "Being sage, to be unfathomable, is called

'divinity' (shen)." Ames has probably mistranslated this passage, for it is clearthat the charactershen is predicative not substantive. Ifshen is predicative, then

a standard Chinese-English dictionary dictates that the sage is "wonderful,

marvelous, miraculous," notdivine. In his annotatedMencius Yang Buojun lists

five instances of the charactershen--three substantive and two predicative, and

7b25 is definitely one of the latter.

Tu Wei-ming quotes this passage from the Lau translation ("to be a sage. . . is

called 'divine'"), but qualifies it by observing that "the idea of spiritual in this

connection by no means signifies a 'spiritual being' (shen ren) which rises above

the sage." Even if Mencius actually meant to divinize the sage, this is clearly not

the original position of Confucius. It is consistent with his position to call the

sage "goodness itself," but neither theAnalects nor the other early literature

support the deification of the sage.

Ames and Hall's use the of theDoctrine of the Mean is also problematic. They

quote the famous passage: "So earnest and sincere--he is humanity! How deep


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and unfathomable--he is abyss! How vast and great--he is Heaven (tian). Who

can know him except he who really has quickness of apprehension, intelligence,

sageliness, and wisdom, and understands [the] character of Heaven?" Ames and

Hall's interpretation goes wrong for at least two reasons: (1) they ignore the

obviously figurative nature of this passage; and (2) they do not read the passage

in its own context or the context of traditional and contemporary commentary.

On the first point, Ames and Hall overlook the nature of the text's language. Justas we are not to believe that the sage is actually an abyss--he is only "deep and

unfathomable" as an abyss--we are not to think that the sage is literally Heaven.

Even so, we can learn a lesson from the prophet Isaiah. When he describes the

Messiah as "mighty God" ('el gibbor), he is not deifying him; rather, he is only

saying that the Messiah will act with the power of God. The Hebrew word 'el

(God) is sometimes used to make superlatives, such as harere'el--"towering

mountains" not divine mountains--and 'arze'el--the "towering cedars" ofLebanon. Just as the Confucian sage is great like Heaven, so too will the Messiah

be mighty like God. Ames and Hall are making the same mistake as Christian

commentators do, when they claim that the Hebrew prophets spoke of a divine

Messiah. Most Confucian philosophers have resisted the deification of

Confucius with the same fervor that the Jews have rejected the divinity of Jesus,

and we should do the same. The four paragraphs above are cited from N. F.

Gier, Spiritual Titanism,pp. 184, 186.

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Mencius Lecture Notes