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Mental model theoryversus the inferencerule approach inrelational reasoningJean-Baptiste Van der HenstPublished online: 01 Oct 2010.

To cite this article: Jean-Baptiste Van der Henst (2002) Mental modeltheory versus the inference rule approach in relational reasoning, Thinking& Reasoning, 8:3, 193-203, DOI: 10.1080/13546780244000024

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© 2002 Psychology Press Ltd

THINKING AND REASONING, 2002, 8 (3), 193–203

Mental model theory versus the inference ruleapproach in relational reasoning

Jean-Baptiste Van der HenstK.U. Leuven, Belgium and Institut Nicod, Paris, France

Researchers currently working on relational reasoning typically argue that mentalmodel theory (MMT) is a better account than the inference rule approach (IRA).They predict and observe that determinate (or one-model) problems are easier thanindeterminate (or two-model) problems, whereas according to them, IRA shouldlead to the opposite prediction. However, the predictions attributed to IRA arebased on a mistaken argument. The IRA is generally presented in such a way thatinference rules only deal with determinate relations and not with indeterminateones. However, (a) there is no reason to presuppose that a rule-based procedurecould not deal with indeterminate relations, and (b) applying a rule-basedprocedure to indeterminate relations should result in greater difficulty. Hence,none of the recent articles devoted to relational reasoning currently presents aconclusive case for discarding IRA by using the well-known determinate vsindeterminate problems comparison.

MENTAL MODEL THEORY ANDRELATIONAL REASONING

Human reasoning involves many inferences that depend on relations. Here is atypical example of a relational reasoning problem:

Problem 1.1. A is to the right of B2. C is to the left of B3. D is in front of C4. E is in front of AWhat is the relation between D and E?

Address correspondence to Jean-Baptiste Van der Henst, Laboratory of ExperimentalPsychology, University of Leuven, 102 Tiensestraat, 3000 Leuven, Belgium. Email:jvanderhenst@hotmail.com

I am grateful to Luca Bonatti, Ira Noveck, Jeremy Pacht, Guy Politzer, Walter Schaeken,Walter Schroyens, and Dan Sperber, for their instructive comments on a previous version ofthe paper and to the members of the reasoning group in Leuven for their support: WimDeNeys, Kristien Dieussaert, Leon Horsten, Nikki Verschueren, and Géry d’Ydewalle. I amalso grateful to Richard Griggs, Maxwell Roberts, and two anonymous reviewers for theircritical reading of earlier drafts of the article.

http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/pp/13546783.htm l DOI:10.1080/13546780244000024

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In 1989, Ruth Byrne and Philip Johnson-Laird published a well-known paperconcerning relational reasoning and more specifically spatial reasoning. In thispaper, the authors (1) apply Mental Model Theory (MMT) to spatial reasoningand (2) provide a test between MMT and its long-standing adversary, theInference Rule Approach (IRA). A significant number of articles on relationalreasoning have been published during the last decade and most, if not all, are inclose continuity with Byrne and Johnson-Laird’s study and likewise tend toreject the IRA. The purpose of the current paper is to present a criticism of theargument advanced for rejecting the IRA and to reassess the main result on whichthis argument relies. The paper is not intended as a criticism of MMT and itsdescription of relational reasoning, but rather as claim that the dismissal of theIRA is based on a mistaken argument.

According to Byrne and Johnson-Laird (1989), human reasoning relies on theconstruction and manipulation of mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) and can be characterised as a three-step procedure. First,individuals construct a model of the state of affairs described in the premises,second they come up with a putative conclusion compatible with this model, andthird they try to falsify this conclusion by constructing alternative models of thepremises. MMT makes a very clear prediction in regard to problem difficulty:the larger the number of models compatible with a problem, the greater itsdifficulty.

For instance, Problem 1 given earlier is compatible with one model:

C B AD E

From this model, the reasoner can draw the initial conclusion “D is to the left ofE”. No other model is compatible with the premises. This problem is thereforelabelled a “one-model” problem.

Consider now the “multiple-model” Problem 2 whose first premise isirrelevant:

Problem 2:1. B is to the right of A2. C is to the left of B3. D is in front of C4. E is in front of BWhat is the relation between D and E?

For this problem, a first model is compatible with the premises:

C A BD E

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and supports the conclusion “D is to the left of E”. In contrast with Problem 1, thesearch for alternative models may yield a second model consistent with thepremises:

A C BD E

However, the indeterminacy between the A and C does not matter for discoveringthe answer and both models support the same conclusion “D is to the left of E”.

According to MMT, Problem 2 should be more difficult than Problem 1because it is harder to deal with two models than with one model. In a series ofexperiments , Byrne and Johnson-Laird (1989) exhibit clear-cut results thatconfirm this prediction. In their second experiment, 70% of the conclusions werecorrect for problems of type 1 (one-model problems) and 46% for problems oftype 2 (two-model problems).

DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE MENTAL MODELTHEORY AND THE INFERENCE RULE APPROACH

The argument advocated by MMT’s proponents

The impact of Byrne and Johnson-Laird’s study not only derives from theirdescription of spatial reasoning in terms of mental models. It also rests on the factthat the obtained results are claimed to challenge the IRA. According to suchapproaches (Braine & O’Brien, 1998; Rips, 1994), individuals are equipped witha set of mental inference rules and apply these rules to the logical form of thepremises in order to derive conclusions. The difficulty of a problem depends ontwo factors: (1) the number of rules used to reach the conclusion: the larger thenumber of rules used, the greater the difficulty. (2) The difficulty weightassociated to each rule.

The IRA is generally advocated for propositional reasoning, and the debatebetween MMT and IRA is mainly focused on this type of reasoning (Bonatti,1994a,b; Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Schaeken, 1992, 1994; Noveck & Politzer,1998; O’Brien, Braine, & Yang, 1994). In the field of spatial reasoning, there arehardly any psychologists who currently defend an approach based on inferencerules. However, the proponents of MMT claim that MMT and IRA makecontrasting predictions concerning performance on spatial problems of the typeused by Byrne and Johnson-Laird (1989). In particular, they argue that the IRApredicts that problems of type 1 would be more difficult than problems of type 2,because they require an additional inferential step, whereas MMT makes thereverse prediction.

Indeed, in Problem 2 the relation between C and B, to which D and E aredirectly related, is given by the second premise. In contrast, for Problem 1 there is

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no premise that asserts the relation between A and C to which D and E are related.Reasoners must first infer the relation between A and C—by a transitivity rule—in order to infer the relation between D and E, which makes the derivation longerthan for Problem 2. In sum, they argue that the number of models for Problems 1and 2 is not proportional to the number of formal steps carried out in order toreach the conclusion. Hence, the comparison between performance on Problems1 and 2 looks crucial because it appears to provide a straightforward test betweenthe two approaches. The empirical data seem to corroborate MMT and to refuteIRA, as Problem 2 is actually harder than Problem 1.

This result is often mentioned (Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1992; Evans,Newstead, & Byrne, 1993; Johnson-Laird, 1996, 1999, 2001; Johnson-Laird &Byrne, 1991; Vandierendonck, De Vooght, Desimpelaere, & Dierckx, 2000) andhas often been replicated in several sub-domains of relational reasoning, i.e., forspatial reasoning (Boudreau & Pigeau, 2001; Carreiras & Santamaria, 1997;Roberts, 2000, Vandierendonck & De Vooght, 1996, 1998), temporal reasoning(Schaeken, Girotto & Johnson-Laird, 1998; Schaeken & Johnson-Laird, 2000;Schaeken, Johnson-Laird, & d’Ydewalle, 1996a,b; Vandierendonck & DeVooght, 1996, 1998), and abstract relational reasoning (Carreiras & Santamaria,1997). In all cases, this result is viewed as providing clear support for MMT anda clear refutation of the IRA.

Criticism

The issue I wish to raise has to do with the argument that is developed against theIRA and with the interpretation of this “crucial” result. In Problem 2, the firstpremise generates, in the context of the other premises, an indeterminacyregarding the relation between A and C: A can be on the right of C, or on the leftof C. According to the proponents of MMT, this indeterminacy causes theconstruction of two models. Moreover, they argue that inference rule theoristsshould adopt the following analysis: As the first premise is irrelevant and theindeterminacy it conveys (in combination with Premise 2) does not matter foranswering the question, participants need not take this premise into account toinfer the conclusion. Consequently, indeterminacy should not influence thereasoning procedure if people use rules. To illustrate, Byrne and Johnson-Laird(1989, p. 567) give the following description of the rule application process forproblems with an irrelevant premise like Problem 2:

The first premise in the problem is irrelevant, and the inference rules must be usedto derive relations between D, C and B, and then those relations between D, E, andB before there is sufficient information to use a rule to infer the relation between Dand E.

This is indeed a description of how inference rules should be used to infer aconclusion as efficiently as possible. However, a description of how inferences

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rules should be used is not necessarily a description of how inferences rules areactually applied. Finding a logical proof of a conclusion does not mean thatpeople will build such a proof when they reason. This description ignores theindeterminacy and thereby forecloses the possibility that inferences are appliedto premises that support this indeterminacy. In sum, the opponents of the IRAclaim that if what individuals do is construct mental models, the indeterminacyshould influence the inferential process, but if what they do is apply inferencerules, such an indeterminacy should have no effect at all. Let us note that the keypoint here is not the irrelevance of one the premises per se but the indeterminacyconveyed by such a premise. Even if all premises are relevant and still introducean indeterminacy (see for instance Schaeken et al., 1998), the indeterminacy isseen by the proponents of MMT as having no influence on a rule-based reasoningprocess. Hence, it is not the presence of an irrelevant premise that is the main“difficulty factor”, as suggested by Rips (1994, pp. 414–415) but the presence ofindeterminacy. Schaeken et al. (1998) showed that even when all the premiseswere relevant, indeterminate problems were harder than determinate ones.1

The difficulty of the argument proposed against the IRA is that there is noreason to disbar the IRA from taking into account the indeterminacy conveyed bythe premises. The argument unduly presupposes that if the reasoner were to useformal inference rules he/she would know what information is necessary forsolving the problem (i.e., the determinate relations) and what information is not(i.e., the indeterminate relation). Obviously, ignoring or taking into account somepiece of information does not depend on the inferential device (rules or models)used but on heuristic and strategic aspects of reasoning (see Quinton & Fellows,1975; Wood, 1969). The comparison between problems 1 and 2 does not reallyprovide a test between theories hypothesising two concurrent inferentialmechanisms, but more modestly provides a test between a hypothesis I, assumingthat participants take into account the indeterminacy as they do not know whetheror not it is necessary for solving the problem, and a hypothesis DI, assuming thatparticipants disregard indeterminacy. The error in the argument consists inexpanding the IRA with one hypothesis DI and in expanding MMT with anotherhypothesis I. The comparison takes the following form:

IRA + DI versus MMT + I.

If we now make the error in the opposite direction, then we will get a comparisonfavourable, this time, to the IRA:

1Although the presence of an indeterminacy unambiguously contributes to increase difficulty,the impact of irrelevant information is not so clear: Vandierendonck et al. (1996, p.257) found thatone-model problems with an irrelevant premise were harder than one-model problems with noirrelevant premise and took more time to be solved (p. 260). But these results were not observed bySchaeken et al. (1996a) who did not find any difference between the two types of problems(pp. 226; 228).

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IRA + I versus MMT + DI.

We can make this new comparison more explicit: (1) On the one hand, onecould envisage a rule approach that takes into account indeterminacy. Forinstance, the following two rules, whose application gives an indeterminateconclusion, could be used in Problem 2:

1. Left (y, x) & Left (z, x) Left (y, z) OR Left (z, y)2. [Left (y, z) OR Left (z, y)] & Front (w, z) Left (y, w) OR Left (w, y)

and could be added to the following set of relational rules:2

3. Left (x, y) & Front (z, x) Left (z, y)4. Left (x, y) & Front (z, y) Left (x, z)5. Left (x, y) & Left (y, z) Left (x, z)6. Left (x, y) Right (y, x)

One can then apply these rules to Problems 1 and 2. Given that for these twoproblems, reasoners cannot know in advance what relations are important foranswering the question, they should consider that none of non-explicit relationsshould be overlooked. Hence, their strategy should consist in trying to discoverall relations existing between all pairs of items, which are not explicitly given inthe premises.

For Problem 1, the following steps would be pursued:

C1: “B is to the left of A” (Rule 6 to premise 1)C2: “C is to the left of A” (Rule 5 to premise 2 and C1)C3: “D is to the left of A” (Rule 3 to C2 and premise 3)C4: “C is to the left of E” (Rule 4 to C2 and premise 4)C5: “D is to the left of B” (Rule 3 to premises 2 and 3)C6: “B is to the left of E” (Rule 4 to C1 and premise 4)C7: “D is to the left of E” (Rule 4 to C3 and premise 4 or Rule 5 to C5 and C6)

For Problem 2, the following steps would be pursued:

C1: “A is to the left of B” (Rule 6 to premise 1)C2: “A is to the left of C OR C is to the left of A” (Rule 1 to C1 and premise 2)C3: “A is to the left of D OR D is to the left of A” (Rule 2 to C2 and premise 3)C4: “A is to the left of E” (Rule 4 to C1 and premise 4)C5: “D is to the left of B” (Rule 3 to premises 2 and 3)C6: “C is to the left of E” (Rule 4 to premises 2 and 4)C7: “D is to the left of E” (Rule 4 to C5 and premise 4)

2These rules consist of a simplification of the Hagert’s rules (1984) presented by Byrne andJohnson-Laird (1989). For instance, Rule 3 is a logical consequence of rules “a” and “e” describedin Byrne and Johnson-Laird (1989):

Rule “a”: Left (x, y) & Front (z, x) Left (front (z, x), y).Rule “e”: Left (front (z, x), y)) Left (z, y) & Left (x, y) & Front (z, x).

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Hence, both problems give rise to the same number of inferential steps. However,in Problem 2, there is more information to store than in Problem 1, because twoof the six non-explicit relations (i.e., C2 to C7) have a disjunctive form (i.e., C2and C3) and thus contain two atomic propositions instead of one (it is a commonobservation that disjunctions are harder to manipulate than categoricalassertions). For Problem 2, C2 and C3 represent twice as much to store than inProblem 1, which makes Problem 2 more difficult than Problem 1. As for MMT,the greater difficulty of indeterminate problems from the perspective of IRA canbe explained by the greater amount of relations to store. The only difference isthat for MMT, relations are analogically represented whereas for IRA they arepropositionally represented. Furthermore, one could also argue that rules 1 and 2should be considered as more complex, and thus harder to apply, as they involvemore atomic propositions than rules used for determinate problems (Rules 3 to7). This is in line with recent claims of mental logicians who argue that a giveninference rule has its own difficulty weight and can be more or less difficult thananother one (Yang, O’Brien, & Braine, 1998; see also Rips, 1994). Yet, analternative view is to consider that there is no specific rule dealing withindeterminacy. But then, when the reasoner is trying to establish, say the A–Crelation in Problem 2, he/she may apply a rule to premises containing items A andC but this will lead to an impasse; he/she can then reiterate with another rule andso on. After a while, he/she can then realise that the A–C relation cannot beknown. These additional unsuccessful reasoning steps should lead to greaterdifficulty than when all relations can be established as it is for determinateproblems.3

3An anonymous reviewer also suggested that instead of inferring all the non-explicit relations,which requires keeping track of all the premises, individuals might follow a more economicalstrategy by only inferring conclusions from the last processed information in working memory andthe new incoming premise. For Problem 1, the following steps would thus be pursued:

C1: “B is to the left of A” (Rule 6 to premise 1)C2: “C is to the left of A” (Rule 5 to premise 2 and C1)C3: “D is to the left of A” (Rule 3 to C2 and premise 3)C4: “D is to the left of E” (Rule 4 to C3 and premise 4)

Such a strategy would permit an answer to the question asked in Problem 1. However, the strategywould be less successful for Problem 2. The following steps would be first be pursued:

C1: ‘A is to the left of B’ (Rule 6 to premise 1)C2: ‘A is to the left of C OR C is to the left of A’ (Rule 1 to C1 and premise 2)C3: ‘A is to the left of D OR D is to the left of A’ (Rule 2 to C2 and premise 3)

However, at this point C3 cannot interact with premise 4. The reasoner may stop his/herreasoning here and would not find out the relation between D and E. He/she can also reiterate thepremises and restart a proof from another premise, like premise 2:

C4: ‘D is to the left of B’ (Rule 3 to premises 2 and 3)C5: ‘D is to the left of E’ (Rule 4 to C4 and premise 4).

In any case, Problem 2 would lead to more erroneous answers than Problem 1.

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On the other hand one can conceive a model-based approach that constructsonly necessary models and does not deal with indeterminacy when it is notnecessary. Problem 2 is then a one-model problem:

C BD E

and should be at least as easy as Problem 1. This time the better performance onProblem 1 in comparison to Problem 2 can be seen as corroborating IRA andrefuting MMT. But again, this argument and the use of that result would, thistime, be unfair to MMT. A more appropriate comparison would take thefollowing form:

IRA + I versus MMT + I.

However, problems 1 and 2 do not provide a test for that comparison, becauseboth approaches predict that Problem 2 would be harder than Problem 1.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, tests between MMT and the IRA in the most recent publicationson relational reasoning, which rely on a comparison between Problems 1 and 2,rest on a mistaken argument. The indeterminacy that occurs in Problem 2, is notpertinent to drawing contrasts between the two approaches. The superiority ofMMT over IRA was attributed to the MMT’s ability to explain how indeter-minacy increases difficulty. But the difficulty caused by the indeterminacy can beaccounted for by both approaches. According to MMT, indeterminacy involvesthe construction of several models. According to a rule approach, it involvesmore propositional information to store and manipulate in memory. Althoughempirical data in relational reasoning are neatly described by MMT, they do notexclude a description based on inference rules.

The fact that most psychologists reject the IRA on the basis of aninappropriate argument does not mean that their findings are not meaningful.First, they have obtained results that are compatible with MMT. Second, theyhave shown that the increase in difficulty with the number of models is notrestricted to spatial relations but applies more generally, for instance to temporaland abstract relations. Third, some studies have contributed to a betterunderstanding of the model construction process. For instance, Schaeken et al.(1996a), and Carreiras and Santamaria (1997), obtained results on reaction timein line with a parallel construction of models rather than the sequentialconstruction originally hypothesised. In sum, these studies show that MMT canaccommodate an impressive range of findings, but does not provide decisiveevidence against the IRA.

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Although psychologists should refrain from deciding between MMT andIRA on the basis of differences in performance on problems of type 1 and 2, thisdoes not imply that they should altogether abandon attempts to distinguish thetwo approaches. Another way to compare the two approaches might consist inconsidering other types of data than the difference in error rate between problemssupposed to be hard for MMT and easy for IRA, and problems supposed to beeasy for MMT and hard for IRA. For instance, Vandierendonck and De Vooght(1997) have shown that the visuo-spatial sketch pad is largely involved inreasoning with spatial and temporal relations. Their results reveal that premises’reading time increases when visuo-spatial processing is impaired by a secondarytask. However, when a secondary task interferes with linguistic-phonologicalprocesses, premises’ reading time does not increase. This suggests that the visuo-spatial sketch pad is necessary to solve relational problems and that premises arecoded in a visuo-spatial format (see also Klauer, Stegmaier, & Meiser, 1997). Inthe same vein, Goel and Dolan (2001) conducted a neuroimaging study withspatial and nonspatial relational reasoning and reported results indicating thatneural structures known to be involved in the processing of visuo-spatialinformation were activated in resolution of such problems. These new sets ofdata seem to provide a more promising support for MMT than the traditionalcomparison between problems 1 and 2.

However, a purist could always argue that the most elegant comparison shouldinvolve predictions relying on a clear description of the computational steps ofeach inferential procedure (search for alternatives vs rule application) rather thanon the mere nature of cognitive processes (analogical vs propositional). Con-sequently, relational problems remain to be found for which the two approachesunambiguously generate contrasting predictions in terms of performance results.But this might be problematical, as an increase of difficulty from the modelperspective also involves an increase of difficulty from the rule perspective.

Manuscript received 27 October 2000

Revised manuscript received 5 December 2001

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