Pragmatics I:2.217 -237International Pragmatics Association

METALINGUISTIC NEGATION AND PRAGMATIC AMBIGUITY:Some comments on a proposal by Laurence Hornl

Ad Foolen

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The goal of this paper

In th is paper I w i l l d iscuss the not ions o f 'meta l ingu is t ic

negation' and 'pragmatic ambiguity' as they are used by Horn(1985) and Horn (1989, ch. 6) in h is analys is o f the funct ion o fnegation in natural languages.

I wi l l try to show that both notions need some clari f icat ionand, in sect ion 5 , I w i l l suggest an a l ternat ive to Horn 'sclassical Gricean framework.

1 .2 Negat ion

Negat, ion in natural language is not a unitary phenomenon. Anegation operator can occur in dif ferent sentence types (The suni sn ' t sh in i ng t oday ; Don ' t go ! ; A ren ' t gou p leased? ) ; i t can t akedi f ferent par ts o f the sentence in i ts scope ( the whore sentence,a consti tuent or a word); i t can be aff ixal (unhappy) or not(not happA). Horn's voluminous L9B9 book is an extensivetreatment of al l these complexit ies. The discussion in hischapter 6 , which we shal l focus on here, is , however , res t r ic tedto the assertoric sentence type and to non-aff ixal sentence orconst i tuent negat ion. Thus, Peter isn ' t happA and Nof , Peter [shappA, but PauZ fal l within the range of the present discussion,whereas Peter is unhappy and Isn't Peter happy? do not.

Although I wi l l confine my conments to the types of negationd iscussed in chapter 6 , i t i s my op in ion that theoret ica l - c la imsdeveloped for the sentences under discussion should be at leastcompat ib le wi th o ther c la ims that per ta in to negat ion in genera l ,or , more par t icu lar ly , w i th c la ims apply ing to negat ion as i toccurs in ot,her sentence types or in (morphologi_ca1) word-n o o a f i n n

lA f irst version of this paper Iras presented at the Internatio-na1 Pragmat ics Conference in Barce lona, 9-L3 Ju ly t99O. I w ishto thank Rob van der Sandt (Ni jmegen) and Eve Sweetser(Berkeley) for their discussion and an anonynous referee ofPapers in Pragmat, ics for useful conuenLs on the pre-f inalvers ion. I am a lso grate fu l to Caro l Pfa f f (Ber l in ) and Al lanKachelmeier (wor ld t rave l ler ) for cor rect ing my Engl ish.

278 Ad Footen

1.3 A natural history of metal inguist ic negation

Centra l in Horn 's theory is the idea that the negat ionpart icle does not always fulf i l l the same function in languageuse. He acknowledges that the same idea, in one or another forn,has been pu t f o rwa rd by Duc roL (1972 ) and by Gr i ce (1967 ) , c f .H o r n ( L 9 8 9 : 3 7 7 ) :

"As Gr ice (1967 ) has po in ted out , e i ther t ru th or asser tab i -l i ty can be af fec ted by negat ion; i t i s up to the adresseeto factor in the relevant contextual clues so as todetermine jus t what the speaker in tended to ob ject to ordeny in the use of the negative form at a given point in theconve rsa t i on " .

The spec i f ic form that th is idea took in Horn 's workoriginated in 1979, 3s Horn notes on the f irst page of his L9B5a r t i c l e (p .121 ) : "The seeds f o r t he ma jo r t hes i s ge rm ina ted a tthe July 1979 Colloquium on the Possj.bi l i t ies and Limitat ions ofPragrnat ics a t Urb ino, I ta ly" . As the Barce lona conference is afol low-up to Urbino (with Viareggio 1985 and Antwerp L987 inbetween) , i t may be appropr ia te to use the Barce lona p la t form toexamine whaL has grown out of the seeds sor{,n in Urbino.

The seedlings of Horn's new idea on negation f irst appearedin h is 1985 ar t ic le . Subsequent l i te ra ture re fer r ing to thatart icle showed the notion of metal inguist ic negation as rathereas i ly accepted ( for example Brugman 1986, Sweetser 1990) , whi lethe notion of pragmatic anbigulty el ici ted cri t ical reactions(Seuren 1988, Bur ton-Rober ts 1989, anong others , see my sect ion4) . In 1989 the seedl ings were t ransplanted wholesa le in to whatwas in e f fec t a forest on negat ion, Horn 's magnum opus, 'A

natura l h is tory o f negat ion ' . Chapter 6 o f that book, ent i t led'meta l j -ngu is t ic negat ion ' , is jus t a " rev ised and expandedvers ion of Horn 1985" (1989:362) , and in i t h is ear l ie r fundamen-ta l idea is "essent ia l ly reproduced" (1989:433) wi thout change.AlLhough at the moment of writ ing the present paper (sumner 1990)no reactions to the 1989 versi-on have yet appeared, the sametype of reactions that I referred to above (Brugman etc. ) shouldapply to the 1-!Bt version.

2. DESCRIPTIVE AND IIETALINGUISTIC NEGATON: TTrrO NATURAL CLASSES?

2.1 Descript ive and metal inguist ic negation

Accord ing to Horn, negat ion, as i t is used in sentence orconst i tuent negat ion j -n asser tor ic sentences, can fu l f i l l one oftwo d i f ferent funct ions: e i ther the negat ion is descr ip t ive or i tis meta l ingu is t ic . But in exact ly which cases do vye have adescr ip t ive use and in which cases a meta l ingu is t ic one? Weshould pay some at tent ion to th is quest ion, &s Horn is notopt imal ly c lear on th is po in t .

In descr ip t ive use, negat ion is pr imar i ly 'wor ld-or iented ' ,

or ' re ferent ia l ly or i -ented ' ; that is , the speaker in tends to

Metalinguistic negation and pragmatic ambiguity 219

descr ibe a negat ive s ta te o f a f fa j . rs . Th is is typ ica l ly the casein i n i t i a l - , non - reac t . i ve , u t t e rances as i n ( f ) :

( 1 ) The sun i sn ' t sh in i ng t oday .

rn metar ingu is t ic use, on the other hand, w€ have "aformal ly negat ive u t terance which is used to ob ject to a prev iousutterance on any grounds whatever, including the way i t waspronounced" (Horn r9B9:374) . A typ ica l example o f th is use is then e g a t i o n i n ( 2 B ) :

( 2 ) A . He ca l l ed t he p61 i ce .B . H e d i d n ' r c a l l r h e [ p 6 1 i s ] ; h e c a l l e d t h e [ p o l i s ] .

The f i rs t , negat ive, con junct o f the exampre ut terance (2 B)re jec t s t he (w rong ) p ronunc ia t i on o f t he wo rd ' po l i ce ' as i toccurs in A 's u t terance. Negat ion is here pr imar i ly 'd j .scourse-or iented ' : the negat ive u t terance per ta ins to the ongoing d is-course and could be paraphrased as: 'you should not pronouncethat word in that eray ' . rndeed, the negat ion in the meta l ingu i -s t j .c u tLerance has noth ing to do wi th any rea l wor ld s ta te o fa f fa i rs , o f , depending on one 's theory , w i th anyth ing in thecogni t ive domain.

rn a woy, descr ip t ive negat ion a lso has a contextua l ord iscourse aspect , insofar as the use of a negat ive sentencealways presupposes more or less strongly the contextual relevanceof the pos i t ive counterpar t . say ing the sun isn ' t sh in ing todaysuggests that r or the addressee had the expectat ion or wish, ord id not exc lude the poss ib i l i ty , that the sun would sh ine today.Al though Horn (1989) t r :eats th is aspect o f descr ip t ive negat ionin chapter ] , under the heading 'markedness ' , i t i s not re turnedto in chapter 6 . Let us thus assume, in l ine wi th Horn, thatu t terances wi th a descr ip t ive negat ion are pr imar i ry worrd-or iented and that the d iscourse-or ienta t lon o f such ut terances isa secondary aspect .

2.2 Initiative and reactive negative utterances

In sect ion 2 .7 I in t roduced the d is t inc t ion bet l reendescr ip t j .ve and meta l ingu is t ic use of negat ion by g iv ing sometyp icar examples (1 and 2) . But exampres wi l l not suf f ice bythemselves. ldhat we in fac t need 1s a c lear cr i ter ion that makesi t poss ib le to dec ide for each example wheLher i t far ls in t ,o thedescr ip t ive or meta l lngu is t ic c lass. Horn unfor tunate ly doesnot o f fer such a c lear -cut operat iona l c r i ter ion.

Examples (1) and (2) inv i te the hypot ,hes is that such acr i ter ion cou ld be found in an ident i f ica t ion o f the descr ip t ive-meta l - ingu i -s t ic d is t . inc t ion wi th a d is t inc t ion between in i t ia t iveand react ive u t terances. More prec ise ly , the hypcthes is would bethat descr ip t ive negat ion is a lways assoc ia ted wi th in i t ia t iveutterances - those not prompted by preceding discourse - andmeta l ingu is t ic negat ion wi th react ive negat ive u t terances.Al though Horn does noL expr ic i t ly d iscuss such a poss ib lepara l - Ier ism, we can in fac t in fer f rom a passage where he does

220 Ad Foolen

discuss Kar t tunen and Peters (1979) that he would not subscr ibet .o i t . In the i r ar t ic le , Kar t tunen and Peters def ine what theyca l l ' cont rad ic t ion negat ion ' , as a spec ia l funct j -on, cont rad ic-t ing what the addressee had jus t sa id , impl ied, or impl ic i t lyaccepLed. Horn (1989:4231 reacts to th is by s ta t ing that "mostord inary (descr ip t ive) negat ions can be character ized as serv ingthe same 'spec ia l funct ion ' " (namely t .he funct ion o f cont rad ic-t ing someth lng the addressee jus t has sa id) . Th is is to s&y,descr ip t ive negat i -on is somet imes react ive. I assume that Hornhas denia ls in mind here, in which an asser t ion by speaker A isf o l l owed by a reac t i ve coun te r -asse r t i on by B , as i n ( 3 ) :

( 3 ) A . Pe te r l i ves i n Ams te rdam.B . Pe te r doesn ' t l i ve i n Ams te rdam.

B's u t terance can be taken as "a formal ly negaLive ut terancewhich is used to ob ject to a prev ious ut terance" (c f . thedef in i t ion o f meta l ingu is t ic negat ion quoted above, betweenexample i- and 2), and thus as an example covered under the( in tens ional ) def in i ton o f meta l j -ngu is t ic negat ion. I assume,however , on the bas is o f Horn 's comments on Kar t tunen and Peters ,that he would cons ider the negat ion in (3) as a case ofdesc r i p t i ve nega t i on , desp i t e i t s r eac t i ve cha rac te r . B rs u t t e r -ance is pr imar i ly 'wor1d-or lented ' : B makes a c la in about therea l s ta te o f a f fa i rs in the wor ld , 3s A has done before. B 'ss ta tement . appears exact ly oppos i te to A 's c la lm, which cer ta in lyg ives a cont rast ive and re ject ing d iscourse-ef fec t , but that ,e f fec t is a 's ide-ef fec t ' . B cou ld a lso have reacted wi th apos i t i ve coun te r -asse r t j - on as i n ( 3 ' ) :

( 3 ' ) A . P e t e r l i v e s i n A m s t e r d a m .B. (To my knowledge) Pet .er l ives in R6t terdam!

The negat ive react ion in (3) has the same descr ip t ive s ta tus asthe pos i t i ve reac t i on i n ( 3 ' ) has . I assume tha t an ana l ys i s o fexample (3) a long th is l ine is in accord wi th the descr ip t ive-meta l ingu is t . ic d is t inc t ion as Horn would l ike to have i t under-s t o o d .

That descript ive negation can be reactj-ve invites thequest ion whether meta l ingu isL ic negat ion can be in i t ia t ive. Andhere the answer must be 'no ' . In h is d iscuss ion of Kar t tunen andPeters , Horn remarks that the spec ia l funct ion o f cont rad ic t ingsomet ,h ing the addressee has jus t sa id " is a necessary condi t ionfor a negat ive to be funct . ion ing met .a l ingu is t ica l ly " (p . 423) . Anegat ive meta l ingu is t ic u t terance presupposes that the pos i t ivecounterpart of that sent,ence has been uttered, usually by ad i f ferent speaker immediate ly before the present negat lve u t ter -ance .

I n t h i s ' exp l i ca t i on ' o f Ho rn ' s d i s t i nc t i on h re can conc lude ,then, that in i t ia l negat ive u t terances are a lways descr ip t ive andthat meta l ingu is t ic negat ive u t terances are a lways react ive. Butreact ive negat ive u t terances can be e i ther meta l ingu is t ic ordescr ip t ive. So the quest ion remains: When exact ly is a react ivenegat ive u t terance descr ip t ive and when meta l ingu is t ic? Horn 's

Metalinguistic negation and pragntatic antbiguiry 221,

in tens ional def in i t ion o f meta l ingu is t ic negat ion does not reaI1yso lve the prob lem. For as we have seen, the def in i t ion is toovague, in that i t too eas j -1y a l lows cases of descr ip t ive counter -asser t ions to fa l I inappropr ia te ly under the def in i t ion.

2.3 Metal inguist ic negation and echoing

Van der Sandt ( to appear) pos i ts that there is an 'echo-

operator ' present in every react ive u t terance wi th reversedpolar i ty . Th is would ho ld both for negat ive react ions as in (3)as f o r pos i t i ve ones as i n ( 4 ) :

( 4 ) A . I t d o e s n ' t m a t t e r .B . I t d o e s m a t t e r .

The funct ion o f the echo-operator is to r impor t ' the (pos i t ive)content o f the prev ious ut terance in to the present u t terance. Incase the echoing ut terance has a negat ive po lar i ty , the impor tedin format ive content is brought under the scope of the negat ion.In Van der Sandt 's v iew, the impor ted content is a ' fu1 l

in format ive content ' , which means that i t is not on ly thepropos i t iona l content o f the prev i -ous ut terance that is impor ted,but a lso the presuppos i t ions, conversat iona l impl icatures, andother non- t ru th- funct iona l in ferences assoc ia ted wi th the propo-s i t i ona l con ten t .

The quest ion is , whether the idea of echoing can be usefu lin exp l icat ing Horn 's d is t inc t ion between descr ip t ive and meta-l ingu is t ic negat ion. Could we say that descr ip t ive negat ionoccurs in non-echoing ut terances and meta l ingu is t ic negat ion inechoing ones? As l ras the case wi th Kar t tunen and Peters 'd is t . inc t ion between in i t ia t ive and react ive u tLerances, Van derSandt 's d is t inc t j -on can noL be used wi thout change as a properreconst ruct ion o f what Horn is a iming at . Example (3) makes thedi f ference again . Van der Sandt would ca l l (3) a case of echoing,whereas Horn would j-nterpret i t . as a case of descript ive and notof meta l ingu is t ic negat ion.

To reach an opt imal cooperat ive reconst ruct ion o f Horn 'stheory , I make a l ibera l use of Van der SandL 's not ion o f theecho-operator . F i rs t , I do not assume that i t p lays a ro le 1nevery po lar i ty - revers ing react ive u t terance. Thus, in ord inarycounter -asser t lons as in (3) , I assume no echoing to be presenti n B ' s u t t e rance . The re i s on l y ( pa r t i a l ) s im i l a r i t y be tween B ' sasser t ion and the prev ious asser t ion o f A. Secondly , I would l iketo s t ress that in the operat ion o f echoing as I take i t here,what is pr imar i . ly echoed is (par t o f ) Lhe form of the prev iousutterance. This form has of course a meaning and this meaning hasa contextua l in terpreta t ion (and thus, for example, conversat io-na1 impl icatures) and f ina l ly a t ru th-va lue. These meanings andin terpreta t ion aspects are, together wi th the echoed form, impor-ted in to the cur rent u t terance and thus, in the case of negat iveut terances, brought wi th in the scope of negat ion. But form-copy ing is , in my j -n terpreta t ior - r o f the echoing operat ion,pr imary.

What I propose noh, , is to say that we have a meta l ingu is t ic

222 Ad Foolen

negation in those cases where negation has such an echoed forn(wi th i ts meaning and j -n terpreta t ion) wi th in i ts scope. Th isin terpreta t ion does jus t ice to the term 'meta l ingu is t ic ' , becausethe scope of the negat ive operator is now a l ingu is t ic ob ject ,namely a copy of the utterance that was produced by the previousspeaker .

Although I have the feel ing that using the concept ofechoing is he lp fu l in c lar i fy ing what Horn 's d is t inc t ion isa iming 3t , i t s t i l I does not rea l ly g ive us an operat iona lcr i ter ion. We s inp ly c la j -m, as a resu l t o f a cer ta in in terpreta-t ion o f Hornrs d is t inc t ion, that there is no echoing present inc o u n t e r - a s s e r t i o n s a s i n ( 3 ) .

Let us consider now a broader range of exaurples that Hornc lass l f ies as cases of meta l ingu is t ic negat ion to see whetherthey f i t the p ic ture we have bu i l t up so far .

2.4 the extension of metal inguist ic negation

2.4.L Focus ing and correct ion

I f the negat ive operator focuses on par to ther words, i f we have const i tuent negat ion,use o f nega t i on as me ta l i ngu i s t i c , as i n ( 5 ) :

o f an u t terance, inHorn considers the

(5 ) A . Pe te r l i ves i n An rs te rdam.B . Pe te r doesn ' t l i ve i n 'Ams te rdam,

Such a reactive utterance is more often than not fol lowed by anu t t e r a n c e w i t h a c o r r e c t i v e f u n c t i o n , c f . ( 5 ' ) :

( 5 ' ) A. Pe te r l i ves i n Ams te rdam.B . Pe te r doesn ' t l i ve i n 'Ams te rdam; he l i ves i n R6 t te rdau r .

AI I the examples that Horn d iscusses are in fac t fo l lowed by sucha correct ive u t terance. I assume, however , that examples as (5)in which a cor rect ive cont inuat ion is not present but poss ib le ,would be cons idered, analogous to (5 ' ) as meta l ingu is t ic .

Horn points out that in case the correctj-ve contj .nuation isin t roduced by an adversat ive con junct ion l ike the Engl ish but ,the corrective utterance must be reduced down to a conjunct thatcons i s t s o f t he s imp le f ocus . Thus , ( 5 " ) wou ld be accep tab le ,b u t ( 5 " ' ) w o u l d n ' t :

( 5 " )( 5 " ' )

Pe te r doesn ' t l i ve i n 'Ams te rdam, bu t i n R6 t te rdam.Pe te r doesn ' t l i ve i n 'Ams te rdam, bu t he l i ves i nR6 t te rdam.

The presence of such a reduced adversative clause in the secondcon junc t , as i n ( 5 " ) , i s cons ide red by Ho rn as a d i agnos t i c f o rthe presence of negat ion o f the meta l ingu is t ic type in the f i rs tconjunct. The fact LhaL but in this kind of metal inguist iccontext has to be translated by a special form in some languages(German sondern, Spanish sino) is considered by Horn as anaddi t iona l argument for i ts d iagnost ic va lue. The ob l igatory

Metalinguistic negation and pragmatic ambiguity 223

syntact ic reduct ion o f the second conjunct in Engl ish and thespec ia l form that the adversat ive con junct ion in th is contexttakes in some languages are seen as a ref lect ion of the special,meta l ingu is t ic , funct ion o f the u t terance.

Two fur ther po in ts can be added here. The f i rs t is i l lus t ra-t ed by examp le (6 ) .

(6) They had run, not , walked, to the s ta t ion.

In th is u t terance, the re ject ion does not precede but ra therfo l lows the cor rect ion. Yet Horn c lass i f ies th ls example asmeta l ingu is t ic . He observes that in such a context no but can beinserted before not tnalked. This example shows that i t is not theorder of reject ion and correction per se that makes the negativea meta l ingu is t ic one. I t is ra ther the funct lon o f each of theconjuncts , re jec t ing and correct ing, that is detern inat ive.

The second addi t j -ona1 po in t is i l lus t ra ted by example (7) .

( 7 ) A . Pe te r l i ves i n Ams te rdam.B . Pe te r d6esn ' t l i ve i n Ams te rdam. He l i ves i n R6 t te rdam.

In (7 ) , B u t ters two sentences that cou ld be in terpreted asshowing the same re ject ion-correct ion pat tern, typ ica l for meta-l i ngu i s t i c nega t i on , t ha t we a l r eady encoun te red ea r l i e r i n ( 5 ' ) .But th is would be a mis- in terpreta t ion, a t least i f we are on ther i gh t t r ack i n r econs t ruc t i ng Ho rn ' s d i s t i nc t i on . B ' s f i r s tu t terance in (7) iS, in my v iew, anothur s>(ample o f counter -asse r t i on , comparab le t o examp le (3 ) . B ' s second u t t e rance i n (7 )should then be interpreted as a more preci-se counter-assert ion oras an explanation for the fact that a counter-assert ion h,as madein the f i rs t sentence (Peter doesn ' t L iue in Amsterdam, because Iknoa that he L iues in Rot terdam).

One could ask what is the comnunicative dif ference between(7 B ) and (5 ' B ) . I n tu i t i ve l y , t he i n fo rma t i ve e f f ec t i s t he samein both cases. I f we cons ider , however , descr ip t ive and neta l in-guist ic negation as two dif ferent modes of language use, w€ areforced to assume that the more or less identical informativee f f e c t o f ( 7 B ) a n d ( 5 ' B ) i s r e a c h e d i n d i f f e r e n t w a y s . I n ( 7 ) ,speaker B chooses Lhe descript ive route to reach his communica-t i ve goa l , i n ( 5 ' ) speake r B chooses t he me ta l i - ngu i s t i c r ou te . I twould be interesting to investigate in real language use whetherfactors can be ident i f ied which in f luence the choice o f route.

2 .4 .2 Pos i t ive po lar i ty i tems

Charac te r i s t i c o f pos i t i veadverb iaLs pret ty or ra ther ,t h e s c o p e o f n e g a t i o n , c f . ( B ) :

p o l a r i t y i t e m s ( P P I ' s ) , l i k e t h eis that they cannot occur wi th in

* (B ) The j ob i sn ' t p re t t y / r a the r ha rd .

Some t imes , howeve r , PP I ' s do occu r w i t h i n t he scope o f anegat ion, namely when the negat ive u t terance is a po lar i - ty -reversed react ion to a pos i t ive u t terance conta in ing a PPI :

224 Ad Foolen

(9 ) A . The j ob i s p re t t y ha rd .B . The j ob i sn ' t p re t t y ha rd .

In some of the l i te ra ture on PPI 's , for exanple Seuren(1976 ) , B ' s u t t e rance i n (9 ) wou ld be cons ide red a case o f'echoing ' . Th is observat ion can be accounted for i f hre assumethat in th is case we have again not normal descr ip t ive negat ion,but ra ther a meta l ingu is t ic negat i -on. Pnet ty is a l lowed undernegat ion because A 's u t terance is echoed and brought wholesa le inthe scope of the meta l ingu is t ic negat ion.

Note that i f a PPI is invo lved, B cannot choose between adescr ip t ive and a neta l ingu is t i -c route. The presence of a PPI inthe A sentence preempts the choice o f descr i -p t ive, po lar i ty -reversed, counter -asser t ion. Moreover , t .he PPI seems to make acorrect ing second conjunct sound s t range:

( 1 0 ) A . T h e j o b i s p r e t t y h a r d .? ? B . T h e j o b i s n ' t p r e t t y h 6 r d , b u L e a s y .

Accord ing to my in tu i t ion,b e L t e r :

an explaining second conjunct j-s

( 1 1 ) A. The j ob i s p re t t y ha rd .B . T h e j o b i s n ' t p r e t t y h a r d ; i t ' s e a s y .

Apparent. ly, i t is not only counter-assert ion that can be fol-Iowedby exp lanatory cont j -nuat ions (c f . example 7) ; meta l ingu is t icnega t i ons as i n ( 11 ) a l so have t h i s poss ib i l i t y .

L ike the presence of the spec ia l bat in the re ject ion-correction cases the presence of a PPI under negati-on iscons idered by Horn as a d iagnost ic for meta l ingu is t ic negat ion(c f . h i s sec t i on 6 .4 .2 ) . No te t ha t t hese d iagnos t i cs a re un id i r -ec t i ona l , i ; € . t he i r p resence i s a su f f i c i en t . bu t no t necessa rycondi t ion for meta l ingu is t ic negat ion. What is necessary andessent ia l is that the negat ion per ta ins to someth ing that isechoed. There are many more examples to glve in which suchechoing is present, for example such famous ones as The ktng ofFnance is not baLd - there ts no k ing pf France. Before we br ingsuch ' log ica l ' examples in to the d iscuss ion, w€ f i rs t have to goin t .o the quest ion o f how, in Horn ' s v j -ew, descr ip t ive andmeta l ingu is t ic negat i -on are re la ted to t ru th- funct iona l negat ionas i t is def ined in log ica l semant ics .

3. NEGATION AND TRUTH-FUNCTIONALITY

3.1 Metal inguist ic negation and truth-functional i ty

The main impetus for Gr ice 's theory o f log ic and conversa-t ion was to show that logic j-s an appropriate means for theanalys is o f natura l language. Indeed, Gr ice demonst ra ted how log iccould be rescued, despi te the seemingly many non- log ica l aspectsthat the natura l language counterpar ts o f the log ica l par t ic les( n , w , - i , d ) s e e m e d t o h a v e .

Metalinguistic negation and pragmatic ambiguity 225

Although Horn takes great pleasure in the detai ls andcur ios i t ies o f natura l language, he shares a t the same t imeGr i -ce 's in terest in saveguard ing the ro le o f log ic for theanalys is o f natura l language. In that sense, Horn 's work can becharacter ized as c lass ica l ly Gr icean.

In Horn's view, natural language negation has the samefunct ion as log ica l negat , ion when negat ion is used descr ip t ive ly .Descr ip t ive negat ion is t ru th- funct iona l , i .€ . i t has the func-t ion o f revers ing the t ru th-vafue of the pos i t ive counterpar t .The sun isn ' t sh in ing is in terpreted as the c la im that The sunls sh in ing is not t , rue. Th is log ica l funct ion o f descr ip t ivenegat ion is not a par t o f the meaning of descr ip t ive negat ion,i t is the whole and only meanj-ng. Logical and descript ivenegaL ion a re , i n t h i s v i ew , f u l l y i den t i ca l .

Meta l ingu is t ic negat ion, oD the other hand, would representthe non- log ica l use of negat ion in natura l language. In th is use,t ru th- funct iona l i ty p lays no ro le a t a l l . The d iscourse- funct i -onof re ject ion is a l l there is , and i t is the whole and on lyfunct ion o f meta l ingu is t ic negat ion. Whether negat ion is t ru th-funct iona l or not thus runs s t r ic t ly para1 le1 to the descr ip t ive-meta l ingu is t ic d is t inc t ion.

I would l ike to ra ise the quest ion here o f whether Lh iss t r ic t para l le l - ism is rea l ly defens ib le . More spec i f ica l ly , Idoubt that we have to deny truth-functional i ty any role in thearea of meta l ingu isL ic negat ion.

In my v iew, which is in fac t not d i f ferent f rom the ord inaryc lass ica l v iew, a t ru th- funct iona l in terpreta t ion o f an ut terancemust be al lowed in those cases where i t makes sense to askwhether the utterance is true or not and where that truth-valuecan be ca lcu la ted mechanica l ly on the bas is o f the t ru th-va lue-bear ing par ts o f the u t terance as a whole. Thus negat ion istruth-functional when i t makes sense to ask whether the negativeutterance is true or false and where the answer to that quest, ioncan be found by determining t.he truth-value of the posit ivecounterpart, which is at the same t ime part of the negativesentence. The truth-rzalue of the senLence as a whole is thenreckoned by reversa l , because that is the 'meaning ' o f thenegat ive operator .

In Horn 's v iew, i t makes no sense to ask whether anut terance that conta ins a meta l ingu is t ic negat ion is t rue orfa lse. Never the less, I f ind i t in tu i t ive ly acceptab le to askwhether The job isn ' t pre t ty hard is t rue or fa lse. A l though theutterance may have as i ts primary function the reject ion of theposit ive counterpart as stated by the previous speaker, theground for re ject ion is the presumed fa ls i ty o f l that pos i t ivecounterpart. Together with the echoing of the forn of theprevious utterance there is a proposit ional content that is'cop ied ' and brought wi th in the scope of the meta l ingu is t icnegation. I have nc problem holding that the echoing andre ject ing aspect is par t o f the funct ion ing of meta l ing l r is t icnegation, at the same t ime holding that there j-s an aspect oftruth-functional i ty involved. The dif ference betvreen descri-pt iveand meta l ingr . r is t ic negat ion would b€, then, that descr ip t ivenega t i on has a d i r ec t 'wo r l d -o r i en ta t i on ' , t he ques t i on o f t r u th

226 Ad Foolen

and fa ls i ty be ing d i rect ly re levant , whereas in the case ofmeta l ingu is t ic negat ion echoing is pr imary. The echoing impor ts aproposit ional content and only secondly the question of truth andfa ls i - ty becomes re levant . The meta l ingu is t ic u t terance inher i tsthe truth value of the previ-ous posit ive utterance and reversesi t , which leads to the f ina l t ru th-va lue of the meLal ingu is t icut terance as a who1e.

The foregoing argumentation might be interpreted as anef for t to go fur ther than Horn, i .€ . to saveguard log ic for theanalysis of natural language to a nuch greater extent than hecons idered poss ib le or theoret ica l ly prof i tab le . Indeed, thest r ic t para l le l ism between the descr ip t ive-meta l ingu is t icd is t inc t ion and the t ru th- funct i -ona1 - non- t ru th- funct iona ld i s t i nc t i on has , because o f i t s s imp l i c i t y , a t heo re t i ca l a t t r ac -t iveness. Never the less, I am prepared to g ive i t up. In sect ion5, I w i l - l a rgue that the theoret i -ca l loss is not as large as i tmight seem, for in i ts s tead I w i l l o f fer a d i f ferent v iew on therelat ion between logic and language.

In the next section, w€ wil l look at some further examplesof metal inguist ic negation that Horn considers as support for thec la imed para l le l j -sm between meta l ingu is t ic negat ion and non-t ru th- funct iona l i ty .

3.2 Conversational implicature and truth-functional i ty

Consider the fol lowing examples that Horn discusses extensi-v e l y :

( 12 ) A . Some men a re chauv in i s t s .B. S6me men aren ' t chauv in is ts - a l l a re chauv in is ts .

( H o r n I 9 B 9 t 3 7 O )(13) A. They had a baby and got marr ied.

B. They d idn ' t have a baby and get marr ied, they gotmarr ied and had a baby. (Horn I9B9:373)

According to Horn, the negation in these examples cannot bea descript ive and thus truth-functional negation, because thenthey would be paradoxical in content, which they intuit ively arenot . In a descr ip t ive reading of negat ion, the f i rs t sentence in( I2) would log ica l ly imply that not a l l men are chauv in is ts ,whereas the second sentence expl ici t ly states that aII men arechauv in is ts . In (13) the propos i t j -ona l content o f the sentencebefore the comma is identical to the proposit ional content of thesentence af ter the comma. a t least in the c lass ica l Gr icean v iew.This content cannot at the same t ime be negated and confirmedwi thout paradox.

The way out for Horn is a metal inguist ic reading of thenegat ive e lement . Then t ru th- funct iona l i ty no longer p lays a ro lei n t he f i r s t con junc t o f B ' s r ep l y i n ( I 2 ) and (13 ) , so t ha t not ru th- funct . iona l conf l ic t w i th the second conjunct occurs .

In both examples the f i rs t con junct meta l ingu is t ica l lyre jects the prev ious ut terance, not on the ground of fa ls i ty o fthe proposit ional content, as hras the case in our earl ier PPI andre ject ion-correct ion examples, but on the ground of a conversa-

Metalinguistic negation and pragmatic ambiguiry 227

tional implicature the previous utterance gave r ise to and whichis cons idered wrong by speaker B. More prec ise ly , in (L2) i t is ascafar quant i ty impl icature (not aLL) that B cons iders as wrongand in (13) i t is a manner impl icature (and then) , t r iggered bythe o rde r o f con junc t s i n A ' s u t t e rance , t ha t i s r e j ec ted .

The fact that i t i s a conversat iona l impl icature that i -s theta rge t o f r e j ec t i on i n ( 12 ) and (13 ) i s f o r Ho rn an ex t raargument for denying that metal inguist ic negation has a truth-funct iona l ro le in these cases. ConversaLional impl icature issomething pragnatic, whereas truth-functional- operat,ors can onlytake semant ic mater ia l , namely propos i t iona l contents , &s the i rargument.

Recent theoret ica l v i -ews, however , par t icu lar ly those wi th inthe framework of Relevance theory, have cast doubt on theassumpt ion that the t ru th-condi t iona l eva luat ion o f a sentenceshould be s t r ic t ly l inked to i ts semant ic content . Sperber andWi l son (1986 t I76 - I93 ) have d i f f e ren t i a ted be tween sen tence con -tent and t ru th-condi t iona l cont .ent . The la t ter is the resu l t o f apragmat ic in terpreta t ion o f the former . The pragmat ic componenttakes a ra ther abst ract sentence content as input , adds'exp l i ca tu res? , and g i ves a p ropos i t i ona l f o rm , 'wha t i s sa id ' ,as ou tpu t .

Cars ton (1988) and R6canat i (1989) have developed Sperberand ld i lson 's l ine o f th ink ing fur ther , argu ing thaL manner andquant i ty impl icatures should be cons idered as 'exp l icatures ' ,forming par t . o f what is sa id and thus fa l l ing wi th in the scope oft ru th- funct iona l operators .

I f we adopt th is l ine o f th ink ing, as I am inc l ined to do,there is no pr inc ip led reason for deny ing t ru th- funct iona lin terpreta t ion for these cases of meta l ingu is t ic negat ion.Echoing copies, together wi th the form of the prev i .ous ut terance,i . ts t ru th-condi t iona l content . In example (L2) the t ru th-condi -t iona l - content would , in th is v iew, read as 'some but not a I I menare chauv in is ts ' . A negat ive operator can apply to th is' exp l i ca ted ' con ten t , f ocus ing on t he ' no t a1 I ' - pa r t , w i t hou tcont rad ic t ing the immediate ly fo l lowing s ta tement that a l l menare chauv in is ts . I f the re jected prev ious ut terance was indeedfa lse, then the meta l ingu is t ic u t terance can mechanica l ly beg i ven t he va lue ' t r ue ' . I t i s t hen t r ue t ha t s6me men a ren ' tchauv in i s t s and , ana logous l y , i t i s t r ue f o r ( 13 ) t ha t t heyd idn ' t have a baby and get marr j -ed. Again , meta l ingu is t ic use andt ru th- funct iona l in terpreta t ion are not mutua l ly exc lus ive.

3.3 Prototypical metal inguist ic negation

One might be tempted, or the bas is o f the foregoingsect ions, to make the argument even s t ronger , c fa imlng that everyoccurrence of meta l ingu is t ic negat i -on has at the same t ime at ru th- funct iona l in terpreta t ion. Th is would be to say thatdescr ip t ive and meta l ingu is t ic negat ion are not d i f ferent inrespect to t ru th- funct iona l i ty . A l though I would agree thatt ru th- funct iona l i ty is not the essent ia l po in t , o f d i f ferencebetween the two types of negat ion, I would not go as far as, forexamp le , Ca rs ton (1985 ) o r Van de r Sand t ( t o appea r ) , who i ndeed

228 Ad Foolen

c la im that the t ru th- funct iona l aspect is a lways present whennegat ion is used in natura l language. The prob lemat ic cases forme are the fo l lowing:

(14) The k ing of France is n6L ba ld - there is no k ing of France.(Horn 1,989 :362)

( 1 5 ) a . I a m n o t a ' c o l o r e d l a d y ' - I a m a b l a c k w o m a n !(Ho rn I 9B9 :373 )

b . H e d i d n ' t c a l l t h e [ p 6 1 i s ] , h e c a l l e d t h e [ p o l i s ] .(Ho rn I 9B9 :371 . )

I n a me ta l i ngu i s t i c r ead ing o f ( 14 ) and (1 l a and b ) , t hef i rs t con junct in each case re jects a prev ious ut t .erance, but thegrounds for the reject ion are dif ferent from the ground offa ls i ty that we encountered in the prev i -ous sect ions. In (14) theground for re ject ion is the non- fu l l f i l tment o f a presuppos i t ion.In (15 a) the ground is the word choice and in (15 b) i t is thepronunc ia t ion o f the word po l ice. Truth or fa ls i ty do not beconere levant in these cases because i t is the act o f say ing X ( in 14)or the lray X is said ( in 15) that t ,he current speaker isopposing. Whereas i t does make sense to paraphrase the implica-t u r e c a s e s b y a ' i t i s n o t t r u e ' p h r a s e , t h e e x a m p l e s t h a t w e a r ed iscuss ing here can be bet ter paraphrased in l rays l ike thefo l lowing: ' I t makes no sense to s ta te that the k ing of France isba ld ' ; ' I t i s no t app rop r i a te t , o ca l l me a co lo red l ady ' ; ' The

word po l ice should not be pronounced that way ' . One could ca l lth is use of meta l ingu is t ic negat ion proto typ ica l in the sensethat the grounds for re ject j -on are in these cases L inguis t icones, namely the say ing of X or the way X is sa id .

As ment j -oned before, Cars ton (1985) defends a pos i t ion inwhich a l l uses of negat ion are t reated as t ru t .h- funct iona l . Horn(1989 :434 ) c r i t i zes t h i s pos i t i on i n t he f o l l ow ing way : "Ca rs tonis forced by her neomonoguism tp propos i t lona l ize every target o fmeta l ingu is t ic negat ion, f rom grammat ica l usage to phonology. . . " . Horn suggests that t reat ing presuppos i t iona l and s ty l is t icaspects o f an u t terance as propos i t iona l is a k ind of "categorym is take " (Ho rn I 989 t434 ) . I t h i nk h i s c r i t i que on'p ropos i t i ona l i z i ng ' eve ry aspec t o f an u t t e rance i s j us t i f i ed .

3 .4 Conc lus ion

In the foregoing sect ions, I have accepted Horn 's d is t inc-t ion between descr ip t ive and meta l ingu is t j -c use as a usefu l one.I have proposed that the d is t inc t ion can be c lar i f ied by ask ingwhet,her the negation pertains to an argument echoed from thep rev ious speake r ' s u tLe rance . Ho rn ' s c l a im tha t desc r i p t i venegat ion goes together wi th t ru th- funct iona l in terpreta t ion andmeta l ingu is t ic negat ion doesn ' t , was quest ioned, however . Iargued that a Lruth- funct iona l in terpreta t ion o f some but not a l lme ta l i ngu i s t i c u t t e rances i s poss ib l e .

Metatinguistic negation and pragmatic ambiguity 229

4. PMGMATIc AMBIGUITY

4.f Rmfiguists and monoguists

Horn is not the f i rs t one to note that negat ion is anoperator that seens to perform dif ferent, operations in dif ferentcontexts. One of the values of his study is the broad overvj-ew ofthe d i f ferent theoret ica l pos i t ions that observat ions on thevar iab i l i ty o f negat ion have led to . Horn makes c lear that mostanalyses of th is var iab i l i ty have been semant ic wi thout tak ingpragmat ics proper ly in to cons iderat ion. More spec i f ica l ly , heshows that most authors have def ined the prob lem of var iab i l i tyas a d i lemma between two poss ib le pos i t ions: Can we, despi te theapparent functional diversity of the negative operator inIanguage use, iso la te a meaning ( the meaning) that is constantacross these uses? Or do we have to accept t ,hat negat ion is not aunitary phenomenon, so that two or more conventj-onal ized meanj.ngsor functions have to be assumed? Horn cal1s these posit ions t.he'monogu i s t ' and t he ramb igu i s t ' pos i t i on . Ca rs ton (1985 ) andKempson (1986) are representat ives o f the f i - rs t pos i t ion, whereasSeuren (1985, 19BB) cou ld be ment ioned as a defender o f anambigu is t ana lys is . Seuren cont rasts the presuppos i t lon- re ject ingfunct ion o f negat ion (which he ca l ls ' rad ica l negat j -on ' ) w i th a l lo ther uses of negat ion ( 'min imal negat ion ' j -n h is terms) andargues that both meanings or functions must be seen asconventional ized operators in the language system.

One weapon that Horn uses repeatedly against many of theearl ier analyses of negation is of an empir j .cal nature. He showsthat they brought only part of the range of uses of negation intop lay. In par t icu lar , the cases where negat ion per ta ins to formalaspects o f the prev i -ous ut terance (pronunc ia t ion, morpholog ica lrea l izat ion or s ty le) have been le f t out o f the d iscuss ion inmost analyses. Indeed, Horn must be compl imented for h j -s broadempir ica l bas is , which surpasses every prev i -ous s tudy of nega-t ion. One might hope for fu ture s tud ies t .hat Lhey not fa l l be lowHorn ' s emp i r i ca l s t anda rd .

Bes ides the empi r ica l va lue of Horn 's work and h is extens ived iscuss ion of the l i te ra ture (a l though non-Engl ish l i te ra ture isre la t ive ly neglected) , he develops a new theoret ica l v iew whichis meant as a synthes is o f the monoguis t and the ambigu isLpos i t ion. Essent ia l in h is nevr proposal - is br ing ing in to p lay thepragrnat ic leve l o f descr ip t ion, not as a 'waste-basket ' , but as afu l ly ser ious 1evel , which in in terp lay wi th the semant ic leve1,should he lp to account for the fac ts .

Horn 's proposal can be summar ized as fo l lows. A11 uses ofnegat ion fa l1 in to two 'natura l c lasses ' , the descr ip t ive c lassand the meta l ingu is t ic c1ass. The two c lasses are c la imed tocover complet .e ly and d iscrete ly the ent i re range of poss ib leexamples. The d i f ference between the two c lasses is , however , notto be found on the semantic but on the pragmatic level. Thed i f f e rence i s ana l yzed as a case o f rp ragma t i c amb igu i t y ' , no t o fsemantic ambiguity as the ambiguists would have i t . 0n thesemant ic 1evel , Horn assumes that negat ion is un i tary . 0n thesemant ic leve1 he thus fo l lows the monoguis ts , in par t icu lar

230 Ad Foolen

those monoguists who claim that the unif ied negative operator isto be ident i f ied wi th negat ion as i t is def ined in log ic , i .e .wi th the t ru th- funct iona l operator . Th is un i f ica t ion on thesemantic level- does not imply for Horn that negation is truth-funct iona l in a l l i ts uses, BS the other 1ogica l ly or ientedmonoguj-sts assumed. 0n1y in the descript ive use of negation ist ru th- funct iona l i ty preserved. In the meta l ingu is t ic uses i t is' rep laced ' by the funct ion o f re ject ion.

Cent ra l to th is p ic ture is the theoret ica l not ion o fpragmatic ambiguity. The term 'pagmatic ambiguity' is rather new,it does not have an establ ished posit ion in pragmatic theory.Horn does not expl ici t ly define what pragmatic ambigui-ty is. Heuses the concept and leg i t imat izes h is use of i t by po in t ing outan analogy between his analysis and similar analyses of othermeaning phenomena that are avai lable in the l i terature. Hement ions Donnel lan 's (1 ,966) d is t inc t ion between the at t r ibut iveand referentj-al understanding of Srnl th' s murderer is insane,some analyses of modal verbs, and the one-sided or two-sidedunderstanding of scalar predications as analyzed in the Griceant rad i t ion

These i l lustrat ions with examples could not prevent severalauthors who reacted to Horn 's 1985 ar t ic le f rom cr i t ic iz ing thenot ion o f pragmat ic ambigu i ty or a t least Horn 's use of i t .Bes ides the re ferences to cr i t ics that Horn g ives in h is 1989book (p . 377) , the fo l lowing could be added. The quotat ions aremeant to g ive an impress ion of the type of react ions that Horn 'stext apparent ly e l ic i ted.

"Horn unfortunately does not point out what he means bypragmat ic ambigu i ty , but in t roduces th is not ion by examples"(Van de r Sand t , t o appea r , p . 37 ) .

"The not ion o f rpragmat ic ambigu i ty ' is re la t ive ly new inl ingu is t ic theory . Horn (1985. I35) a t t r ibutes i t to Donnel -1an (1966) . A l though there is some unc lar i ty as to what i tstands for, i t implies anyvray the possible use of theexpression in question in a non-truthcondit ional way"( S e u r e n 1 9 B B : 1 9 4 ) .

Bur ton-Rober ts (1989:227-228) reacLs to a passage in Horn(1985:1,32) where Horn s ta tes thaL the d is t inc t ion between the twotypes of negation represents a case of "praguatic ambiguity, abu i l t - i n dua l i t y o f use " ( c f . a l so Ho rn I 9B9 :370 ) . To t h i spassage, Bur ton-Rober ts reacts as fo l lows:

"What is 'p ragmat ic ambi -gu i ty ' ? what is a 'bu i l - t - in

duat i ty o f use '? He [Horn] never prov j -des anyexplanatory derivation of i t [metal i-nguist ic negation] andrepeated ly cont rad j -c ts h imsel f in the mat ter o f how th isPRAGMATIC understanding of negation relates to the logicalSEMANTICS of negation. For example, at one point Horn speaksof th is marked negat ion as 'an extended meta l ingu is t ic useo f a bas i ca l l y t r u th - f unc t i ona l ope ra to r ' ( p . I 22 ) . Ho rne lsewhere cont rad ic ts th is by a l lud ing to ' th is spec ia l or

Metalinguistic negation and pragmatic ambiguity 231,

marked use of negation, irreducible to the ordinary internalt ru th- funct ionaL operator ' (p . 132)" .

F i na l l y , Jacobs ( t o appea r , p .45 ) commen ted i n t he f o l l ow ing way :

"Es mrisste irgendwelche pragmatischen Mechanismen geben, died ie a l ternat iven In terpreta t ionen mi te inander oder mi t e inergemeinsamen'zugrundel iegenden ' In terpreta t ion in Bez iehungsetzen Mechani-smen, die diese beide Operatoren in einenZusammenhr,rg bringen kdnnten, werden von Horn nicht disku-t ier t " . [Some pragmat ic mechanisms should be g i -ven thatre la te the a l ternat ive in terpreta t ions to each other or to acommon 'under ly ing ' in terpreta t ion Mechanisms thatcould re la te the two operators are not d iscussed by Horn] .

I t is my feel lng that the discussion can be brought furtheri f a re f lec t ion o f a more fundamenta l k ind is made. 0n1y byref lec t ing in a more systemat ic way on the not ion o f pragmat icambiguity can we develop a context for interpreting or cr i t j .ci-z i ng Ho rn ' s p roposa l .

4.2 Two types of pragmatic ambiguity

In my v iew, i t is poss ib le and usefu l to d is t ingu ish betweentwo types of pragmatic ambiguity. The two types wil l be discussedin the fo l lowing sect ions.

4 .2 . t Type 1: semant ic vagueness

In this type of ambiguity, a form is underspecif ied on thesemant ic leve1. Di f ferent contexts , for example d i f ferent typesof arguments to which an operator appl j-es, make the meaning noreconcrete .

Among Horn 's examples o f pragmat ic anbigu i ty , h is re ferenceto the analys is o f the modal verbs by l {er the imer (L972) andKratzer (1977 ) cou ld be p icked out as an i l lus t ra t ion o f th j -stype of praguat ic ambigu i ty , c f . Horn (1989: 375) :

"Wer the imer (L972) argues pervas ive ly that sentences conta i -ning modals are not semantical ly ambiguous, but haveeither of two uses dependlng on the system of ruleswhich is impl ic i t ly invoked for the eva luat ion o f thesentencet ' .

Smi th 's (1989t 92) shor t example analys is o f the modalscould a lso be ment ioned here:

"The t r ip le o f a le th ic , ep is temi-c and deont ic readings can,merc i fu l ly , be le f t unspec i f ied, as the d i f ferences arearr ived at on the bas is o f pragmat ic in terpreta t ion incon tex t " .

I f I unde rs tand A t l as ' ( 1989 ) ana l ys i s o f nega t i on we l1 , h i sanalys is be longs to th is type too. At las ' favor i te concept is

23? Ad Footen

' g e n e r a l i t y o f s e n s e ' , c f . A t l a s ( 1 9 8 9 : 1 3 4 ) :

"The speaker o f Engl ish knows, in the usual impl ic i t sense,that in a sentenee 'The F is not G ' the word. 'not r issense-general. This knowledge is not captured by a truth-condit ional theory of sense what the speaker knows iswhat recognizab le c i rcumstances count as jus t i fy ing theasser t ion 'The F is not G ' . There are d i f ferent poss ib legrounds for the correct emplogment of the sentence 'The Fi s n o t G ' " .

Accord ing to Horn (19892 423y, who comments on a ser ies o fpubl icat ions by At ras, he fAt las ] is "p lac ing a l_ I our negat iveeggs in to a rad ica l ly underspec i f ied basket ' , .

Note that At las ' un i f ied descr ipL ion of negat ion does notidenti fy the naturar language meaning of negation with i ts]og ica l counterpar t as most monoguis ts tend to do. secondly ,At las does not use the not ion o f pragmat ic ambigu i ty exp l ic i t ly ,but h is 'd i f ferent grounds for the cor rect employment ' cou ld beread as an alternative formulat. ion of the same idea.

4.2 .2 Type 2: Pragmat ic re- in terpreta t ion

A semant ica l ly f lu l ly spec i f ied meaning is 'overru led ' incertain pragmatic contexts by a secondary neaning. The prototy-p ica l example here is the theory o f ind i rect speech acts . can youposs me the sa l t? is a quest ion on the semant ic leve l . 0n thepragmat ic leveI there is ambigu i ty . E i ther the 'quest ion ' meaningis preserved or a re- in terpreta t ion takes p lace, oh the bas is o fcontext and Gr icean pr inc ip les, lead ing to a request in terpreta-t i o n .

Maybe the two-sided understanding of scalar predications(c f . Horn r9 \9 t 376) a lso f i ts here. The semant ica l ly g iven lowerbound one-s ided unders tanding (a f , Least ) is , in most contexts ,turned into a two-sided understanding, in which an upper bound(not more than) is added, whereas in o ther contexts the pragmat icunders tanding wi l l be ident ica l w i th Lhe semant ica l ly g ivenmeaning ( the a t Least in terpreta t ion) .

rn type 1- pragmatic ambiguity there is an abstract meaningthat becones more concrete by applying i t in dj_fferent domalns orto dif ferent types of argument,s. rn type 2 pragmatic ambiguitythe semant ic meaning can funct ion per fect ly wel l w i thout'enrj-chment, ' of that meanlng, although in sone contexts themeaning is changed into a secondary understanding byin terpreta t ion processes a long Gr j_cean pr inc ip les.

4.J eragmatic ambiguity and metal inguist ic negation

rf i t makes sense to dist inguish between two types ofpragmatic ambigulty, then the question arises under which typeHorn 's descr ip t ive-meta l ingu is t ic ambigu i ty can be categor ized.From certain passages in his text we may inf ler that he has a type2 pragmat ic ambigu i ty in mind:

Metalinguistic negation and pragmatic ambiguity 233

" . . . the descr ip t ive uses of negat ion is pr iurary ; thenonlogical metal inguist ic understanding is typical ly avai l-ab le on ly on a 'second pass ' , when the descr ip t ive readingse l f - des t ruc t s " (Ho rn 1 ,989 :444 ) .

And in a footnote he po in ts exp l ic i t ly to a d i f ference betweenhis understanding of the pragmatic ambiguity of negation and thetype of ambiguity that is assumed in the examples he refers to(Donne l l an L966 , Wer the imer I 972 ) :

"Note, however , that the dual funct j -ons of negat ion are notent i re ly on a par wi th the ins tances of pragmat ic ambigu i tyjus t c i ted, where the d is t inc t , ion between the twounderstandings in each case is neut ra l ized at the leve l o flog ica l form" (Horn 1,989:563) .

These quotat ions s t rongly suggest that Horn in terprets h isdescr ip t ive-meta l - ingu is t ic d is t inc t ion as a type 2 pragmat icambigu i ty , i .e . the ind i rect speech act type. Th is type demands,however , the exp l icat ion o f a Gr icean der ivat ive mechanism. I thas to be shown which contextual factors init iate the mechanismand how the mechanism derives the non-logical function from thelog i .caI meaning. As Bur ton-Rober ts (1989) and Jacobs ( to appear)have po j -n ted out , Horn fa i ls to g ive such a der ivat ion (see

a b o v e , s e c t i o n 4 . 1 ) .Jacobs suggests j-n his comment that the two uses of

negat. ion be derived fron a common underlying meaning (see above),i .e . to choose a type l - descr ip t ion. Whatever Horn is a iming at ,i t i s no t a p roposa l o f Lha t t ype , c f . h i s c r i t i que o f A t l as '' rad ica l ly underspec i f ied basket ' . I never the less want to proposein the fo l lowing, pr€- f ina l , secL ion of th is paper a type ofso lu t ion that in terprets Horn 'S descr ip t ive-meta l ingu is t icd is t inc t ion as a type 1- pragmat ic ambigu i ty .

5. rs NOr LocrcAL?

' I s no t l og i ca l? ' i s t he t i - t l - e o f one o f A t l as ' a r t i c l es onnega t i on (A t l as 1981 ) . Ho rn ' s answer t o Lh i s ques t i on i s asfolows: "I conclude that the only ful l and compJ-ete answer mustbe 'somet imes" ' (Horn 1989: 443) . I doubt that th i -s answer isrea1ly an ans lver that adequateJ-y re f lec ts Horn 's v iew. At lasmeans t .he quest ion to per ta in to the semant ic leve l , and ontha t l eve l nega t i on , i n Ho rn ' s t heo ry , i s no t ' some t imes '

log i .ca l , but a lways. Horn is fu l1y in l ine wi th Gr ice in whosev iew the semant ics o f natura l language is log ica l in nature.

In recent years th is c lass ica l Gr icean v iew has been moreand more cast in to doubt . Relevance theory , for example, arguesin favor of a division between logic and language. Logicalreasoning takes contents as input that are the result ofpragmat ic j -n terpreta t ion o f abst ract semant ic const ructs , c f .Cars ton (1988 : r '16) :

234 Ad Footen

"r t seems then that we must d is t ingu ish two k inds ofsemant ics , r i -ngu is t ic and t ru th condj . t iona l , the formernaturarry f iguring only 1n a theory of utterance neaning,the latter taking as i ts domain proposit. ional forms, whetherof u t terances or unspoken thoughts" .

The same type of argument can be found in the cognit iver i ngu i s t i - c l i t e ra tu re . swee tse r ( 19901 92 -93 ) ) , f o r examp le , i ndiscusslng the anarysis of natural language cnd, takes a skepti-ca1 s tand against log ic isn:

"Given that and has some uses which do not pararrel thoseof the log ica l operator6, as wel l as some which do, doesthat mean we should analyzen in terms of and, or and. 1nterms ofn? My feering is that i t is a mistake to analyzenaturaL-language words l ike and as being identical toenti t ies of the man-made logicat terninology which soclearly derives from natural language (rather than the otherv',ay around) and so clearJ-y has needs and purposes dist inctfrom those of natura] language. ldhatever 'putt ing thingsside-by-side' may mean in natural language, i t only some-t imes means something equivalent torr. Perhaps the closestwe can get to stat ing the relat ion between ond and n is tosay that A is a mathemat ica l c rys ta l r izat ion o f one of themos t sa l i en t uses o f and " .

Continuing in this l ine of thinking, I take a type 1ambiguity as a point of departure and propose for negation anabst ract At ras- type of meaning, someth ing l ike 's ign i fy ing inade-quacy' which j-s neutral between such more concrete specif icat i-onsas descript ive inadequacy or metal inguist ic inadequacy. Thedescr ip t ive use would, in th is v iew. be one of the more concretepragmat ic in terpreta t ions o f the semant ic abst ract operator .Horn 's mela l ingu is t ic ' re jec t ion ' funct ion o f the operator wouldarso be one of the concrete in terpreta t ions, that occurs i f theargumenL of the operator is o f a l ingu is t ic character , namely theechoed form (and content) of the prevj-ous utterance. Depending onthe exact target of the metal inguist ic negation we can dist in-gu ish d i f ferent subtypes of metar ingu is t ic negat ion(propos i t iona l content , conversat iona l impl icature, presuppos i -t i o n , f o r m a l a s p e c t s ) .

Truth-condi t iona l in terpreta t ion o f u t terances takes p laceaf ter pragmat ic in terpreta t ion. I t takes on ly those ut terancesas input for which i t makes sense to ask wheLher they are true orfa lse. rn my v iew, th j -s condj - t ion is not . fu l f i l led for sonesubtypes of the meLal ingu is t ic negat l -ve u t terances that Hornd iscusses, nanely those subtypes in which the ground for re jec-t ing the prev i .ous ut terance j -s o f a spec ia l l ingu is t j -c nature(presuppos i t ion fa i lu re , form- inadequacy) .

Metalinguistic negation and pragmatic ambiguity 235

6. CONCLUSION

I rea l ize that what I proposed in sect ion ! is not morethan a suggestion of a possible framework for further research.Analogous to Sweetserrs re la t iv i -z ing phrase "whatever 'put t ing

things side-by-side' may mean in natural language" I have to usea phrase l ike 'whatever signifying inadequacy may mean in natural-I anguage ' .

My main goal was to show that Horn's proposal cannot be thelast word in the natural history of negation. I hope to have madeclear at t ,he same t ime, that his work is a landmark in thishistory by which everyone who wants to explore further groundmus t pass .

By way of concl-usion, I mention four points that I havet r ied to defend or suppor t here:1 . The three d is t inc t lons that can be made regard ing the use ofnegat ion, namely in i t ia t ive vs . react ive, descr ip t ive vs . meta-l ingu is t ic and t ru th-condi t iona l vs . non- t ru th-condi t iona l , donot run paraI1e l .2, We can dist inguish 2 types of pragrnatlc ambiguity. Thedescr ip t ive-meta l ingu is t ic d is t inc t ion is a type 1- ambigu i ty .3 . Negat ion can be un i f ied on the senant ic leve l , w j - thoutnecessari ly j-denti fying this unif ied meaning with the logicalt ru th- funct iona l negat ion operator .4 . Truth-condi t iona l semant , ics spec i f ies the re la t ionsh ip bet -ween 'what is sa id ' (a pragmat ic representat ion) and an ext ra-l ingu is t ic domain o f in terpreta t ion. Negat ive u t terances thatre ject prev ious ut terances on spec i f ic l ingu is t ic grounds (Xcannot be sa id because a presuppos i t ion is not fu l f i l led or Xshould not be said in this way) are excluded from truth-funct iona l in t .erpreta t ion.

236 Ad Footen

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