Metaphysics of Energy

8/13/2019 Metaphysics of Energy

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3ti(ata. ^m ^ark


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Cornell University LibraryQH 341.M2S

3 1924 024 753 646


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Cornell UniversityLibrary

The original of this book is inthe Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions inthe United States on the use of the text.

http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924024753646


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centuries of progress, its final attitude has been torelegate this problem to the scientist, who indeedspeaks profusely about force and energy, but alwaysfinds it convenient to restrict these terms to certainconceptions of his own, formulated to suit his limit-ed diagnosis of natural phenomena. Modern andcontemporary philosophy has little to say definitelyabout it. In short, the final result of Western think-ing has been to leave the problem where it was, inthe mist of oboriginal ignorance, relieved only, by alearned agnosticism that is not unoften painfullyconscious of its strangely grotesque constructionsof nature.

It will perhaps be thought ridiculous in somequarters, for a professed student of Advaitism toattempt the solution of such a concrete problem; forthat philosophy is known to deny all facts of ex-perience, and to revel merely in high-sounding butempty words about an Absolute that is to all appear-ances a meaningless fiction. Can such a philosophysolve one of the most concrete of our problems, whensome of the best intellects among men, with a mostintimate touch with reality and actual facts, havefailed ? The doubt is plausible,at least sincere.But all I can say at present in answer to it is toHefer to the following pages and the solution con-tained therein.


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8My difficulties have been great; for I am not a

student of science, and a criticism of scientificconceptions about force and energy is absolutelyessential, at this stage of our culture, to the propercomprehension of the problem and its attemptedsolution. Much as I would have liked to set forththe problem and its solution in plain and popularform, I have been obliged, by the necessity ofcatching the ear of Western culture, to enter intodiscussions and criticisms that may not be readilyintelligible to the average reader who has' had littleor no initiation in matters philosophical. Besides,Western science and philosophy represent perhapsthe best formulated and most organized body ofpossible objections to different Advaitic positions, ifwe can credit Advaitism with any; and the solutionof no problem can hope to carry weight in moderntimes, unless these objections have been boldly facedand answered. Here I must apologize for thenecessarily profuse quotations from Western authors?and any possible inaccuracies that might have creptin, in my representation of the scientific side. Butthis cannot detract from the value of the answersthemselves, which are not aimed so much againstactual objections as against possible ones.

In the end, I must acknowledge my debt to thefounder of this Institute, Mr. Pratap Seth, whose


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4love for Advaitism combined with logical acutenesshas always been a guiding star in my deliberations,and has helped me to face boldly every doubt anddifficulty that has come to me and that I have beenable to formulate to myself in the language ofcommunication.

Amalnee, ), , , ,' ^ [ G. R. MALKANI.1st January 1920. I


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CONTENTS.Page.Peeface

IntroductionCHAPTEE I.

Energy in Physical Sciences.A.

1. The standpoint of Mechanics ... 202. Its method contrasted with its ambitions 203. Meaning of matter and energy in Mechanics 224. Its conclusion ... ... 23

B.5. The standpoint of Physics ... 246. The inherent uncertainty about all theories 257. Examination of some theories of Physics 268. The theory of one substance ... 279. The tenability of ascribing specific

characteristics to energy ... 28C.

10. The problems of homogeneous energyalone relevant to science ... 32

11. Energy diffuse and available ... 3312. Potential energy ... ... S3

(a) Energy must be in continuouB effort 34(&) The question considered from the

molecular point of view .. 35


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11.

Page.(c) No ground for potentiality anywhere 36(d) The inherent meaninglessness ... 37

13. The conservation of energy ... 37(a) Conservation and the law of im-

possibility of perpetual motion... 39(6) Conservation implies homogeneityand independence of energy ... 40(c) Such independence cannot be

merely conceptual and abstract 41{d) The theory of conservation though

based on that of work is reallyincompatible with it ... 41

(e) The consequent dilemma ... 42(/) Energy, as science conceives it, is a

self-contradictory notion ... 42{g) The law of conservation cannot

measure all the energy of theuniverse ... ... 43

(A) How Prof: Mach would prove con-servation ... ... 44

14. Dissipation of energy ... ... 46(a) The meaning of the law ... 47(&) Conservation of energy is not

opposed to its dissipation ... 48(t?) The metaphysical issue involved

in the law of dissipation ... 48(d) Levels of energy ... ... 50{e) Example from heat . so


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iil.

Page.15. A statement of the issues... ... 51

D.16. Newton's attitude ... ... 5117. The solution of Boscovich , ... 5218. Lord Kelvin's Kinematic theory ... 5319. Failure of these mechanical philosophers 55

CHAPTBJl II.Energy in Bergson's System.

A.1. Bergson's Problem ... ... 572. The view that traces mutability to some

other point in space ... ... 583. What Bergson thinks of an infinite

universe ... ... 594. The theoretical conceivability of the

hypothesis that stability and insta-bility succeed each other ... 61

5. Bergson's standpoint ... ... 62B.

6. Eolation of matter with space ... 63(a) Bergson's erroneous idea about space 64(J) In what sense can matter have

duration? ... ... 65{c) Bergson obsessed by the crude

notions of science ... 677. Their relation to mind ... ... 69


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iv.

Page.(a) Misconception about the nature

of consciousness... ... 70(6) Can the mind represent to itself

its own extinction ? ... 72(c) Confusion of qualitative sameness

with qualitative difference ... 73(d) Can cosmology be a reversed

psychology? ... ... 74C.

8. Vital Force, the source of all mutability... 759. Its pretensions unmasked ... 76

10. The unification of matter and energy inthe vital force ... ... 79

11. False and misleading images ... 8212. Further absurdities about Bergson's con-

ception of energy ... ... 8413. The finitude of the vital impulse in-

compatible with its immaterial nature 8614. More glimpses about the vital force:

(a) Possibility of life and the pointof inversion ... ... 90

(6) Can life be absent anywhere? ... 92(c) Where we should expect fullness

of life, Bergson sees a vaguevitality, a dream existence ... 93

(d) What is vital force in and by itself? 94


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Page.15. The identification of life with cons-

ciousness ... ... 9616. Conclusion ... ... 100

CHAPTER III.Problems of Motion.

1. Why we consider motion ... 1012. Meaning of continuity ... ... 1013. Can continuity be objective ? ... 1044. The sense in which Bergson regards it

as subjective ... ... 1065. The stand-point of common-sense ... 1106. Analysis of the phenomenon of the up-

lifting arm ... ... Ill7. Our paradox, and how it can be solved ... 1138. Whence then the idea of motion ? ... 1159. The correlation of motion and rest ... 118

CHAPTER lY.Problems of Motion (Continued).

1. Absolute motion ... ... 120{a) Lotze on its possibility ... 120(&) Such motion is already relative ... 122(c) The sense in which we understand

the relativity of motion ... 123{d) Meaning of a change of place ... 125(e) Consciousness is the only truth of

the correlation ,.. 126


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vi.

Page.2. Degrees of Mobility:(a) The measure of time and space ... 128{b) On the hypothesis of time as cons-

cious duration ... ... 129(c) Zeno's paradox in the light of this

problem ... ... 131(d) The proposed qualitative interpre-tation of mobility cannot solvetlie paradox ... ... 1B5

3. The beginning and amount of motion ... 1374. Persistence of motion ... ... 141

(a) This is not a separate problem : itis only the problem of the occur-rence and the reality of motionrepeated in another form ... 145

(b) Persistence is intelligible in the na-ture of the consciousness alone... 148

fcj Significance of the law as formu-lated by science . . ... 1495. Lotze's idea of motion on the view of

phenomenal space ... ... 151(a) A qualitative mark necessary for

any arrangement of phenomenain space, and the possibility ofthe appearance of motion ... 152

(b) This mark only possible for aconsciousness united to an or-ganism ... .,. 154


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vn.Page.

(c) The semblance of motion is theonly motion we know; but ithas no meaning unless thecorrelation is resolved back intoself-consciousness ... 154

(d) Solitary motion impossible : Lotzeunconsciously introduces therejected co-ordinates ... 158

(e) Can a thing be conceived ashaving an unspatial history ofinner states? ... ... 159

(f) A date cannot explain persistenceor inertia of motion: Lotze'sadmission ... ... 162

CHAPTEE V.Meaning of Efficiency.

1. Eolation of the idea of energy with thatof some activity or motion ... 161

2. A thing cannot move itself: the causeof its movement must lie ouside it ... 165

3. Nor can one thing move another ... 1664. No sense of power in outside change:

we go from one static thing to anotherwithout end ... ... 166

5. We are directly conscious of power onlyin our own activity ... ... 167

%, The distinctioQ of ageut and patient .. 16S


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vui.

Page.7. How caa movement be produ ced from

two immobilities ? Any interactionbetween the spatial and the unspatialinconceivable ... 169

8. Analysis of an act of will 1709. No sense of power from perceptionright up to the completion of the

whole set of bodily movements in-volved in the particular act ... 170

10. Was there any such sense when theprocess was just begun? ... 172

11. The sense of 'can' ... ... 17212. The meaning of this 'can' should be

sought in our spiritual nature ... 17313. Can power be limited? ... ... 17414. The evidence of our consciousness points

to the unlimitedness of our nature ... 17415. What we understand by an instrument

and its limitations ... ... 17516. Example from vision ... ... 17617. Are we not moving within hopeless

inconsistencies? ... ... 17718. The unlimited is the only meaning, andthe only truth ... ... 17719. The true sense of Power ... ... 1792p, Cojjplusiou ... ... 179


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INTRODUCTION.Scientists and philosophers agree to regard the

world as a manifestation of^ energy. But few ofthem understand what they exactly mean by energy.Most of them use this word only to cloak theircomplete ignorance as to the nature of the cosmos.The scientist thinks that he knows energy in thevarious phenomena of the universe, and that itsreality is beyond doubt or dispute ; he wisely,however, refrains from giving any spiritualisticconnotation to it; it is the ground of the worldoutside, and he is satisfied with this explanation.

Some philosophers, with a poetic temperament,go much farthai'; they conceive it to be the spiritualforce of the highest reality, God or the Absolute.The universe is a manifestation of the energy ofGod, the infinite joy of the divine',this is theircreed.

The scientist has his work easy. He appeals toour experience which shows change and motion ;these, he argues, could not be possible without realcosmic energy. Eeserving for the present a fullerconsideration of these notions, we may here onlynote some of his admissions, Re admits th*lt there


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6is no direct way to approach energy, and that allthat we are given to know about the universe is aseries of varying views in time; energy is ?i. postulateof this variation, and will be an impossible notionin a world of completely static elements. On hisown admission, therefore, he approaches energyfrom the outside, through the senses and the intellect.The senses and the intellect do not see energy; theysee definite phenomena or things. But these do notstay in their nature,they are succeeded by otherphenomena. Thus the universe is reduced in ourknowledge to a series of sense-impressions succeedingeach otJier. This is the best and the most conclusiveproof to the scientist for the reality of energy; forhow otherwise could the world change and producein us corresponding changes of impression ? f Natureis endowed with Power, essential Power

The poet-philosopher shows much greater con-fidence, though he has less evidence to hold forth.His chief strong-hold is his condemnation of formalreason as untuned to catch the higher harmonies ofthe divine nature. Sri Aurobindo Ghose holds thisview. We have already shown in a separate

t Here it will be noted tbat the scientist is led to the notion of energy,because he conceives nature to be necessarily continuous in fact andmeaning; otherwise, the only thing he is given to l?now is a series ofdiscontinuous views.


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criticism of his articles on 'Individual and Absolute'appearing in the Arya issues of June and July 1917,that though reason is unable to grasp the Keal, anintuitive or a poetic experience of the energy ofGod in the cosmos, only dimly and indirectlyanticipates the nature of the true reality. We neednot undertake this criticism here again, though theattitude which we have adopted in this book willnaturally supply a complement to what we havealready said.

It will be well here to set down the Advaitiostand-point in a few and simple words to supply akey to the discussions that will follow; although,we must remember that our treatment must neces-sarily be inadequate and fragmentary in character,for a proper understanding of any aspect ofAdvaitism naturally leads to its other aspects andthe raising of many disputed points. We shall takehere a passing notice of three aspects of our question.(1) The possibility of a static universe, (2) ourexperience of change, and (3) the meaning of energy.

The scientists admit that the conception ofenergy would be impossible in a completely staticuniverse. Now what is meant by a completelystatic universe? Naturally, a universe in whichohsingQ in every form, either as motion indijBEerent


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8to things, or as qualitative variation of thingsthemselves, will be out of question. Is such auniverse possible? Some might argue that thepossibility and the impossibility of such a universeis not a matter for our argument or decision. Wehappen to see the universe changing; and thereforea changing universe is real and possible. It is quiteconceivable that change may disappear from theuniverse, and things might thenceforward continuein their own place and respective natures; a staticuniverse will then be equally real and possible. Atleast there is no inherent necessity why the universeshould change, orwhy it should not. It is a matterfor the universe to decide, and when it does decideit finally and definitely, the reality of a staticuniverse will he the proof of its possibility.

The argument appears quite plausible. But itis based upon a fundamental misunderstandingabout the nature of the universe. Objectively, it isequally conceivable whether the things as theyappear to us are brought about by the forces andthe energies of the scientist, or as the immediatecreations of a static and immobile substance thatrenews them every moment. The one is as mysteri-ous to us as the other; we know neither howmobility can become immobile appearances, norhow immobility can become mobile in an act of


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we have to move our organs in space to get ourimpressions. But a really static universe, necessi-tating an immediate consciousness, can only haveone time and one consciousness of all things. Is it,however, conceivable that red and blue, and allother heterogeneous qualities of things, can exist atthe same time in one consciousness? No doubt eachcolour gets its form by an unconscious comparisonwith other colours, especially the colour of thebackground; but still, unless we are loath to takeexperience as our guide, only one colour is explicitat one time; we cannot even conmve how red andblue can exist together in one consciousness.

Some might argue that the limitation of ourconsciousness must not be attributed to an all-knowing immediate consciousness. But if we areto bo guided by our experience, and have to dealwith meanings rather than words, we must at leastbe able to conceive the possibility/ of such co-existence.On the contrary, our experience distinctly points totwo successive moments in the consciousness of redand blue; nay, the moment we have qualitativelydifferent views, we have succession in consciousness,and time has received its form. If we do awaywith succession and so time, as we must in animmediate consciousness, red and blue and all otherqualities joined with them will cease to exist at all,


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11instead of appearing together. The qualities whichremain qualities only by their limitations of formin time, can never remain those qualities whenthose limitations are taken away. The red gets itsparticular quality of redness by not being blue,yellow, orange etc. How then can it co-exist withits innumerable 'nots' in one explicit consciousness?

It might still be urged that these /'nots' arenecessarily 'implied' in its explicit consciousness,and in that sense, it co-exists with them all. Butthis only proves that the particular quality gets its'specificality' from these 'implied' nots, and cannotretain it the moment these 'implied nots' themselvesbecome explicit, as they must, in an immediateconsciousness which sees all things first-hand, inevery supposed moment of time, without distinctionor partiality for a particular quality. Such aconsciousness has no reason, nor even the possibilityof dissociating reality into 'implied' and 'explicit'.Everything must exist in it in one moment ofexplicitness. How then can the different qualitiesretain their specificality, which is necessarily boundup with the above distinction and a time broken upinto successive moments? If we give back to timeits real continuiiy, and resolve moments into aunity of consciousness, there will be no possibilityfor the perception of qualities; qualities will cease


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12to have any meaning, which is the same thing as tosay, that they will cease to exist.

The perception of distance by this immediateconsciousness presents still more interesting consi-derations. If a thing always appears the same, asit must to this consciousness, and all measurementsby movement or muscular effort are ruled out, thereis no possibility of any perception of distance atall. The immediate consciousness will know nodifference between the 'nearer' and the 'farther'. Werecognize distance by a system of qualitative changesin the view of objects, resulting from their relativedisplacement in the field of our vision; and it isliterally true that distance measures a continualperversion of objects, in respect of their sizes andpresented aspects.

This lack of appreciation of distance, on thepart of the immediate consciousness, will react uponits perceptions; for, in the universe of our experience,the character of each perception is dependent uponits distance; and where distance does not enter as afactor in any sense, no specific character can beassigned to a perception ; perception will cease toexist. Objects in a picture have no distance fromeach other in one of their dimensions, namely depth.A landscape differs from a picture in this respect


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13it has a bacJcgi-ound which remains relatively static,and is thus conceived as farther away. All pictureshave meani7ig on the assumption of this real life-like landscape. Our universe is made up of objectswhich appear such and such at such and such a dis-tance. When we have taken away distance, wehave taken away such and such a view,and withit every view altogether. The immediate conscious-ness can at best coin one standard view of its ownfor every object, but even then it can satisfy itselfalone, that that view represents no distance and yetrefers to a real object outside.

A still more interesting consideration presentsitself to us here. Every object has its obverse andreverse. We see only one side of a thing at a time;and yet in this perception is necessarily involved itsother side; we cannot even conceive an object or aperception without a back or its other side. Andyet how is this all-knowing immediate conscious-ness to bring both sides together in one perception?The very nature of perception, formal in character,forbids it. Besides, if distance is abolished, with itwill have to be abolished all dimensions of spacetoo, and the world in which this consciousness willfind itself, will not eveii approximate to the flatworld of our geometry; for even geometry, with itsideal definitions, will not, perhaps because it cannot,


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14abolish the distinction of 'obverse' and 'reverse' withregard to its images. But the immediate conscious-ness is called upon to achieve even this impossibletaslc. In short, a static ivorld, getting meaning onlyin an all-knowing immediate consciousness^ can heworld in no sense.

We have already seen that qualities can havetheir specific form only in time; we cannot perceivea diversity excepting in successive moments; andthis experience of ours is the only meaning we canattach to a world. Change is the form under whichalone perception is possible. But what is it thatchanges? Is it the world outside us, or time, or ourconsciousness, or all the three put together? What-ever may be the reply to this question, we know onetbing for certain, that the meaning of the world is nolonger to be sought in an immediate consciousness,but a consciousness as we know it, bound up withan organism and working under its limitations. It isconditioned by the instrumentality of the senses,and is only able to see different forms in succeedingmoments of time. This means that our world iscomposed of forms, having spatial determination;and that, these forms to be forms at all, must occupysuccessive moments of time; they are intelligibleand possible only in a universe of change.

t Ppatifil determination liere must not be taken in tlie narrow senseof a visual perception; anythin;: that can be grasped by any of our senses,and has, as such, a form or limit, must be conceded spatial determinatioii,


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15If, then, the meaning of the world is to be

sought in our consciousness ridden by time andspace forms, and not in any all-knowing immediateconsciousness, the meaning of change can only liein our experience of succession. It is anotherquestion whether this succession is guaranteed byan objective change in the world itself, or it is purelysubjective, or again neither. Here we have only tonote that we cannot go beyond our experience ofsuccession in determining the meaning of change.

We now come to our third point,the meaningof energy. We grant for the present that there isreal change outside, a succession of forms,oneview, a second view, a third view and so on. Butwhat makes them successive ? If each form were aunit, complete by itself, it will be independent ofall other forms, and its own sufficient explanation;succession will have no meaning. But we havealready seen that a form can have its specificcharacter only in a comparison and by its place in atime-series; a world of static elements is inconceiv-able and impossible. If then we go to the worldoutside for change, we shall only be able to seestatic forms, without that in which they get theirsuccession and so meaning; the very paraphrase ofthe expression 'to be outside' is 'to have a statiq


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form', 'to be a definite this or that'. While, on theother hand, succession requires that in which thesucceeding moments or succeeding perceptions areone. Mere succession, without this unity behindit, can never have the form of succession ; it will bea number of discrete points, a universe of staticelements, that has no meaning, no possibility. Thetrue meaning of change or succession must thereforebe sought not in the world outside, not in thesucceeding forms of the mind which partake of thesame world,but in that timeless unity whichexplains change without itself changing, and givesform to perception without itself having any. Suchis the unity of consciousness, our true nature. Itcannot change, because change postulates It; it canhave no form, because form gets its meaning fromIt; it cannot be in time, for moments or successionpoint back to It; it cannot be 'inside' or 'outside',for 'ins and outs' are mere forms of space dependentupon It. Thus we find that the true meaningof change cannot be found in the world outside, or themind,but in the unchanging Self. We do not knowwhat we mean,for really there is no meaning,insaying that the world or the mind changes. Thetruth of change is the changeless Self. And if thequestion is raised, Whence this change, How is itthat we see it and believe in it?, the only reply can


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17bo, Lhere is no ciiauge, you do not see it; and still ifyou think you see it and that your belief is unques-tionable, you see and believe in a meaningless, self-constructed or sense-constructed, myth.

Even granting that there is real change outsideand so real energy, this energy can only be conceivedas different from matter and moving it. But wher-ever we have two reals, we must necessarily thinkof them as formal in character, limiting each other,and thus conforming to our idea of 'things' ; andthings are by nature inert. If, then, energy is the'other' of matter, the sense in which it is differentiatedfrom the latter will prescribe to it its form, which,like every other speciflcality can get meaning onlyin change, that it itself was designed to explain.Energy will itself become a thing, and cease toexplain change in which things get their meaning;or, what is the same thing, the purpose for whichenergy was conceived to be different from matterwill be frustrated, and it will be found, on exami-nation, that no real distinction exists between ourmeaning of the two terms. Whatever we place out-side ourselves as an object of knowledge, can haveonly one form of existence,that proscribed by thesenses and the intellect; we can never have ojijrealdistinction in the objective world, a distinction ofkind; but if we want to get at this, we must find


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out a way beyond our common notion of existenceto That which is never an object of knowledge, butrather, in the light of which, all other things appearto exist, move and have their being. This is ourtrue Self.

Still, supposing, that energy is a formless andimmaterial reality outside us, how arewe to conceiveit as moving matter? We know the contact ofmatter with matter,and all our notions of motionare based upon this contact. How is energy, itselfimmaterial, to initiate a movement? It must act uponmatter in some place, seek points of rapproachmentwith it. How is it to achieve this, and leap over thegulf, dividing it from an absolutely different realitylike matter? No scientific acumen can solve thisproblem, the very postulates of which are absurd.And yet that bold thinker who can ride over allimpossibilities, will only succeed in reducing themoving force or energy to a kind of stuff, howeversubtle; in the rising arm or a moving engine, weshall begin to perceive animated fluids or particles;this is the only image that will swim to our sightthe moment we conceive energy as moving matter.But once energy is thus thought of, it ceases toexplain motion, and leaves the problem where itwas; it has itself become a kiad of stuff or substance,


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19and no notion of stuff or substance can accommodateitself with the idea of self-initiating movement.

' The universe is a manifestation of energy ', notbecause it is the creation of a subtle fluid that is con-tinually manipulating or changing it; nor because,by a poetic exuberance, the conscious rhythm of thehighest reality has transformed itself into thingsand activities; but because, change is the form ofthe universe, and the true meaning of this changewhich we seek to denote by energy, can only befound in that changeless Self, that pure Conscious-ness, the ignorance of which assumes for us the formof a universe of manifold things and motions.


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CHAPTER I.Energy in Physical Sciences-

All modern physical sciences agree to repudiateThe stand-point of the Substantiality of the forces

mechanics. of nature. Mechanics which is ascience of motions of matter in bulk, indeedpostulates forces; but unable to understand thenature of these forces or the substances upon whichthey act, it divests them of all real qualities, andreduces them to mere abstractions of mathematicalimagination ; it disowns the categories of causalityand substance. The mechanical theory of theuniverse is thus obliged to sacrifice concreteness forexactness. It defines its notions, and like mathe-matics, does not measure and weigh, but starts withideal conditions, and ideal weights and measure-ments, and then draws conclusions from these,which conform only very approximately to thingsoutside. It is, therefore, as a theory of the universe,rightly called, abstract dynamics i. e. science ofabstract motions.

Now, if we want to study motions thoroughly.Its method contrasted we must be able to detect thewith its ambitions. slightest displacements, such asthose of the molecules, or better still, of the ultimateconstituents of matter, whatever these are taken to


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21be; nay, we shall have to go farther than that; wemust trace energy to its ultimate source, find out itsconnection with the supposed constituents of matter,and lay open to our view the inwardness o allmovement, perceptible or non-perceptible by ourgross senses. The enormity of the problems involvedin this determination can hardly be imagined whenwe remember that the slightest displacement requiresfor its complete explanation not only the movementof the neighbouring parts, but that of the wholesystem of interconnections represented by theuniverse. To understand completely the slightestmovement, we must have the secret of the wholeuniverse open to our eyes. This secret does notonly involve the relative movements of the ultimateconstituents, taking the universe to be a closedsystem of such movements; for it is no explanationto advance one movement as the occasion or thecause of another, and so on in a final circle ofmutuality; we must break this circle somewhere,and catch the meaning of motion in the ultimatenature of energy, matter, their connection, and thefirst law ordaining all movement. The task isimpossible and beyond the very scope and ambitionsof a physical science. Our conception staggersbefore the problem; where is room for mathematicalreasoning whereby abstract mechanics would try toexplain and foresee every movement of the universe?


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22Mathematics moves in its abstractions, defining onething in terms of another; postulating ideal weightsand measurements that have no relevancy with theactual and the real world of our experience; creatingfulcrums and balances that have no absolute value,and are true only relatively to arbitrary standardsof reference and within arbitrarily closed systemsof movement. How can mathematics solve theproblem of this immensity, the visible universe,when it cannot, with its abstractions, even approachit? Wisely, therefore, has modern Dynamics givenup its ambi tion of explaining the universe, limitedthe generality of its questions, and concerned itselfwith the practical aspect of the problem satisfiedwith merely approximate determinations.

Mechanics does not directly answer ourMeaning of matter and questions,What is matter? and

energy in mechanics. What is force? It regards matteras that which can be moved by the application offorce; that is, it does away with all the physicalproperties of matter, and reduces it only to theconception of mass ; and mass is that which ismoved by force. But the idea is still incomplete.A mass cannot be a mass, unless it enters into asystem of masses and thus gets its relative value.A mass must be weighable; there is no absolutemass, but only determinate masses; and this means


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23that it must be calculated in terms of some otherknown mass; this mass again will require another,and so on ad infinitum. What is then the truedetermination of mass? Unable to solve this ques-.tion, mechanics shifts the burden to forces,twomasses are equal, if equal forces, in equal times,produce equal changes of velocity. And what isforce? Evidently, that which moves matter ormass, for we have no other means of knowing itsnature; we do not know ivhat it is; we only knowthe amount of work done, (and the conception ofwork itself is correlative with it), and from this wedetermine its intensity or quantity ; force is only aname for mass-acceleration, i. e. a number of unitsof mass, moved through a number of units of space,in a number of units of time; nowhere do we meet,in the conception of force, with any idea of 'power.

We thus find that the only fact of experiencewith which mechanics deals isIts conclusion. motion, and from this it abstracts

two correlative ideas, mass and force, and thenmeasures the one in terms of the other, whilerelegating the study of their specific qualities toother sciences. But we niust remember that suchcorrelative conceptions are both meaningless ascorrelatives. It is to explain one unintelligible byanother, ani^ this again by the first, in a circle o%


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24unintelligibility. Yet this impasse emphasises thefact that the truth of motion can only lie beyondthese mutually destructive conceptions,' in a realitywhose meaning cannot be grasped by an intelligencethat can only think correlatives.

Physics like mechanics disclaims real forces.The stand-point of F. Soddy in his book on Matter

Pbysics. and Energy, says. Early writers,when they really meant what is now called energy,often used the term force The very idea of forceis, however, what would be termed an anthropo-morphism, that is to say, it ascribes the behaviourof inanimate objects to causes derived from thebehaviour of human beings. We have come to^associate the motion of matter with somebody orsomething pulling or pushing it. f Physics alsorepudiates the abstract force of the mechanicaltheory. It studies concrete phenomena and specificenergies (also called natural forces), such asgravitation, light, heat, electricity, and chemicalattraction. But where it gains in concreteness, itloses inexactness; for, as the history of the develop-ment of the physical science shows, the theoriesabout heat, electricity etc. have had not only to bere-adjusted from time to time, but are open questionseven at present,f Matter and Energy, by F. Soddy; Home University Library, pp 19-20.


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25The uucertaiuty hanging about these theorieb is

The inherent uncer- quite natural. The very formu-tainty about alltheories. lation of theories points to ourignorance. That which i& a certainty and a fact cannever give rise to a question. We question in doubtand ignorance; and a theory has meaning only solong as there is a standing question. No doubt theprogress of science is continually transformingtheories into facts; but such facts are facts onlyrelatively to a more general question; the theorychanges its form and direction, but never its abstractand doubting character,it only shifts the burdenof solution from one quarter to another. This mustnecessarily be the case, when we remember thatevery theory is based upon certain conditions orpostulates which it leaves unquestioned; it isolatesa particular aspect of phenomena into a separateuniverse ; this necessitates a limitation of theproblem, which is the same thing as to say that ittakes certain facts for granted. And all our factspartake of this nature,they are so many assump-tions, necessary for the formulation of any question,problem or theory. We do not know any absolutefact, any item of our experience which is completelyself-explanatory. And it is literally true that inorder to understand the smallest fact, we mustknow tlie whole umve]:8@ o which it forms a parji


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26or an aspect. The truth is that the universe ofour experience is a universe of doubts, questionsand assumptions, and within this, a real fact has noplace.

The theory of gravitation can pass off as anExamination of some explan ation of actual phenomena,

theories of Physics. only for those persons who aresatisfied with the shallow utilitarian stand-point ofscience. What is the real nature of the force or thekind of attraction between objects, we do not know;the law of gravitation is only a formulation of arelation, and not an explanation of facts. Heat isa certain motion of molecules. But what is thenature of this motion, we cannot say; nor can wefind any connection between such motion and thephysical sensation we call heat. Again electricityis known to be a certain movement of minuteelectric corpuscles; but it is not given to us to knowthe nature of this movement and the nature of thesecorpuscles beyond their evident, and sense-verifiableresults. In shoTt, physics is unable to understandth nature of the specific energies; its theories inthis respect do no more than postpone the questionthey cannot close it; for whatever might he postulatedns tke final hasis ofphenomena, will still be amenableto Soubt and quesUon^and surpriseus with its myt^terynvot the less. The very nature of the line of investx-


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27gation is such, that it can never be satisfactorilyclosed. Any possible fundamental fact ovtside, willneither explain itself, nor the variety of phenomenait is supposed to give rise to.

The progress of science has been so rapid latelyThe theory of one that it is seriously put forth that

substance. ^-^^ ultimate basis of all changesof quality must be sought in one substance, theelectrons and their varying relative movements.The article on Science in the EncyclopeadiaBrittannica, contains the following passage: In1897 Thomson discovered that in certain cases, themoving particles which carried the electric currentwere of much smaller mass than the smallestchemical atom, that of hydrogen, and that theminute particles, to which he gave the name ofcorpuscles were identical from whatever substancethey were obtained. They enter into the structureof all matter, and form a common constituent ofall chemical atoms It is impossible to resistmaking the speculation that the whole of an atomis made up of electrons, and that mass is to beexplained in terms of electricity. f But the natureand the power of these electrons is a greater wonderto us than the facts of our experience which theseelectrons seem to explain. Can we rest in such an

t Vol. 24- p402.


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S8explanation? Again, if homogeneity is at the basisof heterogeneity, between which science can shotvno necessary connection, the latter becomes movemysterious than before. If electrons and theirmovements are the only reality, then to the eye ofthe all-seeing scientist, the different qualities ofform can only be illusory. The same will be theposition of the scientist who wants to explainchange of qualities by different spatial adjustmentsof permanent and unchanging molecules of variouselements. The attempt to explain heterogeneity bycomplete or partial homogeneity, only means thatthe phenomenon of mirage is the type of all reality.There, the unchanging sand -particles and the sun'srays are the real substance, and the appearance ofwater can in no real sense be connected with thesethe latter can only be attributed to the limitationor the perversion of our senses.

Without however going so far with the specula-The tenability of as- ^i^e Scientist, we may reasonably

cribing specific charac- question the success of physicsteristics to energy. . -t .1 ^ e -f-m unveiling the nature of specificenergies. If we divest natural forces of the pheno-menal mark, or the curtain of sense-impressionswhich are evidently irrelevant to them, physics hasno means of distinguishing one energy, in and byitself, from another. All kinds of motions, attrac-


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tions and repulsions, aro homogeneous in the ideaof energy; the specific qualities are attributed tothem by our senses. There is no speci Reality in thenofcioB of energy itself, Wundt, therefore, simpli-fied the problem by reducing all change to merechange of place, and rendering thereby physicshomogeneous with mechanics. We cannot conceivea change of quality; for, every change requires asubstratum, a permanent something that appearsto change,and in a change of quality, any subs-tratum is lacking ; while, we can more easilyconceive motion, for the object moving remains thesame throughout. Prof. Mach is quite correct whenhe argues, in his Popular Scientific Lectures (p 159),that the reduction of all change to mere change ofplace does not solve our problem. He says, Afterall, do we really know more why a body leaves oneplace and appears in another, than why a cold bodygrows warm? Indeed, the 'why' of both is equallymysterious as we shs^ll see later; but there is adifference in the nature of the respective changes.We can conceive a moving body, for the body is afixed something; but we cannot conceive a qualitychanging into another quality, for the gulf betweentheir respective forms is absolute. If we canconceive the gulf as bridgeable, one form meltinginto another by slow degrees, we shall get a


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mcontinuous series, (if such an expression nan haveany luoaning), in which no quality can be what itappen rs to be, for the simple reason that a movementor a true continuum is not a set of forms or things.There is no meaning in 'preceding' or 'succeeding'except in an understanding which creates qualitiesby its static habits: and once we move within these,we can only leap from form to form. Even twoshades of the same colour cannot be continuous;for, a shade is static, and cannot move or becomeanother; and yet, the law of continuity requiresthat a shade or a quality must become anotherconsistently with itself,an impossible demand, f

t Lotze, in liis Metapliysics (p 359), makes a distinction betweentlie eliange of one quality into another, and tliat from one sbade of tliesame quality into anotlier shade. lie says, ' Of course th* applicationof the law of continuity is not attempted where disparateness betweentwo extremes excludes all possibility of a path leading fi'om one to theother in the same medium. No one conceives a musical note as changingcontinuously into colour; a transition between the two could only beeffected by annihilation of the one and creation of the other anew; butthat negation of the note would not have the import of a definite zeroin a series such as could not but expand into colours on the other sideof it..,,' The fallacy of this distinction is quite evident when weremember that every form, even within the so-called homogeneousmedium is static, and discontinuous as a form; his mistake is due to hisconceiving continuity as objective; see chapter III,


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uEither, therefore, we must do away with the

notion of one quality being continuous withanother, or with the notion of qualities altogetherthereby making change quite meaningless. Changerequires something that persists through it, and aqualitative change does not warrant that something.Prof. Mach is thus unaware of the philosophicalissues when he continues, Granted that we had aperfect knowledge of the mechanical processes ofnature, could we and should we, for that reason,put out of the world all other processes that we donot understand? We must, indeed, put all suchprocesses out of the world, if our world is to beour knowledge-world or thought-world. When aqualitative change challenges the most fundamentallaws of thought, we cannot even formulate ourproblem with regard to it. Science is, therefore,obliged to accept a mechanical basis for all qualita-tive changes; it only knows homogeneity, fixedatoms and their raotions; the heterogeneity isconnected with these by a sort of marriage deconvenance. Prof. Mach recognizes this mistakenattitude of science, but can offer no solution of hisown. He says, Intelligible as it is, therefore, thatthe efforts of thinkers have always been bent uponthe 'reduction of all physical processes to themotions of atoms', it must yet be affirmed that this


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33is a chimerical ideal...'' Cliimorical no doubt it is,but this is because all science is chimerical; and weshall the more gladly re-echo his conclusion, comingas it does from a distinguished scientific thinker,when he says, Physics treated in this sense suppliesus simply with a diagram of the world, in whichwe do not know reality again. It happens, in factto men who give themselves up to this view formany years, that the world of sense from whichthey start as a province of the greatest familiarity,suddenly becomes, in their eyes, the supreme'world-riddle'. Science is incapable of solving thisriddle,let Prof. Mach save it.The investigation of qualities, therefore, is not

The problems of ^^ ^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^ physical science;homogeneous energy the relevant problem for it is notalone relevant to science. ./.. u j. ^x. lspecific energies, but energy thatis described as ' accumulated mechanical work,which, however, may be only partially available foruse.' * It is this 'capacity for doing work,' *and'the work done varies as the resistance overcomeand the distance through which it is overcomeconjointly,'to which all forms of energy arereducible, and which lends itself to scientificinvestigation, AVe shall now proceed to examine theproblems of this homogeneous, measurable energywhich alone falls within the province of science.

* Guojdopeadia Srittauuica, article oa energy.


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33The distinction between difEuse energy and that

Energy diffuse and which is available, can be easily^^'''^^^^^' understood from the followingpassage; the formsof energy which are most readilyrecognized are ofcourse those in which the energycaa be most directly employed in doing mechanicalwork hence when useful work can be obtainedfrom a system by simply connecting visible portionsof it by a train of mechanism, such energy is morereadily recognized than that which would compelus to control the behaviour of molecules, before wecould transform it into useful work , f Energywhich can be utilized is available; but energy whichcannot be utilized, requiring molecular control, isdiffuse and unavailable for our purposes. Thedistinction is only practical, and is unimportantexcepting as a further item of evidence to show theunity of our conceptions of energy and work.

The distinction between potential energy andthe kinetic is thus laid down inPotential energy. , -r, , -, -r, ,,the Encyclopeadia JSrittannica:

The energy which a system possesses in virtue ofthe relative positions of its parts or its conjagurationis classified as 'potential energy' to distinguish itfrom energy of motion; it is stored away in somelatent manner and can be drawn upon without limit

f Eflcydopeadia Brittannica, article on energy.


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34for mechanical work. This distinction is very-important as it shows that the conception of energy-is completely relative to our use, and has meaningonly in work. How otherwise could the so-calledpotential energy, which is absolutely indistinguish-able from a state of rest, be called energy? We seeenergy there, only in view of the later work thaj: isdone for us. We think we can imagine energygoing to sleep, or being stored away in some latentmanner. But energy that can sleep or lie latent,how and in what sense is it energy? Those whodeal with meanings rather than words can easilyanswer it.

Some, with a truer intelligence, picture everyEnergy must be in state of equilibrium as a real war

continuous effort. between counter forces that areonly apparently at rest ; they conceive , a stoneresting on a wall as always pressia,g^|ainst thelatter, always about to fall,its^^ice abo'tit to giveway; energy is in a continuous tffort. Buftpressureor tension can have meaning j^y ^nen theelements in opposition are free to vacate in space.Neither, however, the stone, nor the Vail it restsupon, are in any sense free. They form parts of acompact system, the earth, and can only move'whentheir compactness has been broken by causes otherthan those by whiph they are in equilibrium. If


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85then, they have a compact setting, they cannot pressagainst each other; bat, if they are froe to move inspace, all talk about potential or sleeping energy ismeaningless.

This becomes more evident when we considerThe question consi- ^^^ question from the molecular

dei-ed fiona the molecu- point of view. The stone hasai poin view. potential energy; but so also haseach atom and particle of the wall, and it will notbe wrong to say that the stone forms a part of thewall. This pressure of atom upon atom can becontinued from the top of the stone right up to thecentre of the earth. And yet, if we are to judge bythe behaviour of visible masses, each atom musttransmit the pressure upon it to the next below it,and find its own place of rest. Prom one end of theglobe right up to the other, we shall find no evidenceof any struggle going on indefinitely; we can easilyconceive an atom falling to any depth under pressureto find its place of rest; all motions of nature tendtowards equilibrium. This is the basis of the lawof impossibility of perpetual motion, and is easilyverifiable in the case of visible masses: for, in thereal world, every force is bound to spend itself upin doing work, i. e. in overcoming resistance. Thelimit of this work will represent inertia or a stateof complete rest. If we conceive the result of this


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36work continued by new forces perpetually, we shallget unceasing motion, or the kinetic form of energyonly. We must, therefore, either accept this andgive up potential energy, or accept the law of theimpossibility of perpetual motion and regard everyform of potential energy as a real state of rest repre-senting the exhaustion of all driving power.

Another point may also be noted here. It isNo ground for pofcen- Only in the separation that the

tiality anywhere. g^rth and the stone evince energyand then it is as true to say that the earth wasresting on the stone as that the stone was resting onthe earth. Yet we do not say that the earth wasendowed with potential energy relatively to thestone, though theoretically it too must be conceivedas advancing to meet the stone f ; we say the stone

t The following passage from Lotze will be interesting in thisconnection. It points out that our experience fixes upon one element asmoving and keeps another as relatively static only because of the practicaladvantages of such an attitude; otherwise it has no warrant either initself or in abstract reasoning for such distinction. This possibilityof interpreting what to our perception is the same result by differentconstructions continues to exist most obviously as long as we lookexclusively to the reciprocal relations of two elements without regard totheir common environment; nor does it cease when we consider the latteralso; only in that case the possible constructions will not all seem equallyappropriate. We should prefer to regard as in motion the element whichis alone in altering its position relatively to many which retain theirreciprocal situations; still there is nothing to prevent us from conceivingthat one as at rest, and the whole system of the numerous others asmoving in the opposite direction. Metaphysic, p ,370.


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87rested on the earth and was endowed with potentialenergy. The arbitrariness of this assertion is qniteevident, and throws light upon the utilitarian wayof our judging things. If, on the other hand, woget behind the moment of actual separation andregard the stone as merely resting, ib forms a partof the earth, and is only endowed with energy inthe same sense in which every particle of the earthis endowed. In the former case i. e. separation, wehave kinetic energy only; in the latter, a systemwhich acts as a unit in the mutual gravitativerelation of its parts.

(The inherent meaninglessness.)Lastly, we must remember that the expression

'potential energy' ^,s a strange combination ofmeanings; if we retain the conception of energy, wecan only conceive it as struggling and doing; andyet when we say that it is potential, we haveallowed it to lapse into a slumber and thereby ceaseto be energy in any sense.

We now come to another problem,the conser-The conservation of vation of energy. Energy was

^ ^' y- originally recognized only inmechanical phenomena; it was there, therefore, thatthe principle of its conservation received firstrecognition. When, however, the subtler forms of


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3Senergy came to be converted into mechanical work,tbo principle was extended to tlie whole range ofthese phenomena. Prof. Mach, in his 'PopularScientific Lectures', lays down the principle in thefollowing words, The most multifarious physicalchanges, thermal, electrical, chemical and so forth,can be brought about by mechanical work. Whensuch alterations are reversed they yield anew themechanical work in exactly the quantity which wasrequired for the production of the part reversed.This is the principle of the conservation of energy;'energy' being the term which has gradually comeinto use for that 'indestructible something' of whichthe measure is mechanical work''' This principleexplicitly reduces all energy to quantity of work,and then it says that no change can take placewithout some work being performed, which workonly represents the transformation of the energyspent upon iL into potential form. It is argued thatenergy that is always in motion, and is alwaysdoing, can do no work; and doing, without any workdone, is inconceivable. This is quite true; for, workabsorbs energy, and energy that is always unspent,always moving and always doing, can turn outnothing substantial; its effects will cease to be themoment they are brought into being, which is thesame thing as to say, there will be no effects at all;in short we shall have energy that is without any


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89efficiency. Wherever, therefore, work is performed,the impassibility of perpetual motion becomes quiteevident; we can conceive perpetual motion only inthe meaningless dance of molecules, which do notvork^ for the very reason that they are alivaysdoing.

According then to the law of conservation ofCon^ei-vation and the energy, whenever work is done, a

law of impossibility of part of the kinetic energy of theperpetual motion. moving body is transformed intothe potential energy of heat by friction, and theavailable part spent in the production of thepermanent effect. Anyhow, no part of energy islost; it only changes its form; and if we couldcontrive a perpetual process of reversibility, we shallnot only get the same amount of work for the- samequantity of energy thus reversed, but we shall alsohave a . phenomenon of perpetual motion. Thepossibility of such a contrivance is, however,doubtful. If it could be achieved, we can have asteamer propelled by the heat of the ocean, whichheat it as readily returns to it by its movement. Thedifficulty is that we can never contrive a perfectmachine which utilizes all the available energy forwork; our machines are all imperfect and absorbsome of the available energy. Where, therefore, amechanism is involved in the reversing processes^


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41

Some may argue that this will be raising theSucli independence oM contention of the substan-

cannot be merely con- tiality and independence of ourceptual and abstract. concepts. But while these con-cepts are always abstractions, energy occupies quitea different status in science; and it is owing to thisstatus, that we conceive its conservation. Whathas conservation meaning, if not that of independ-ence and a definite quantum?

We also feel quite sure that heat changes intoelectricity, electricity into heat, and so on. But thistransition, understood as a transition of one forminto another, is inconceivable as we have alreadyseen ; forms are necessarily heterogeneous. We thinkevery change intelligible, because, consciously orunconsciously, we concede an independent groundto it which maintains the continuity behind qualita-tively different forms. We need not here enter intothe metaphysical import of such a ground in theworld outside; the confidence and certainty withwhich we trace energy under different forms, deter-mine its quantity and prove conservation, unmis-takably point to our belief, conscious or unconscious,that energy remains unchanged through all forms.

If this is true, energy cannot undergo anyThe theory of conser- change in its kinetic character:TZi ifrealTy ^i^her, which is necessarily con-

iaoompatible with it. ceived as its true and proper


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42nature. The kinetic energy changes into thepotential and vice versa only when some work isdone entailing a change of form of energy as thatof mechanical work into heat. But we have seenthat this change is irrelevant to it. Energy toremain homogeneous with itself therefore must dono work, i, e. it must remain a principle of actionwithout doing any action; it must never lose itself,and work means loss.

Here is our dilemma. Pure energy, free of allThe consequent formal associations, and as pure

dilemma. activity itself, can do no work,and ceases to be cognizable as energy ; for, ourconception of it is correlative to the conception ofwork. The law of conservation becomes meaning-less. If, on the other hand, we allow it to do workand so justify the law, it falsifies its own nature,assumes irrelevant forms and passes into potentialitywhich is another word for non-energy. Either,therefore, the law of conservation is meaningless, orenergy is meaningless. The fact is that there is afundamental blunder in the scientific conception ofenergy as something real in the world outside.

One more argument may yet be advanced byEnergy, as science science to prove the Validity of

conceives ifc, is a self- its own conception. It may becontradictory notion. ^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^any fprmalisation or dissipation of energy, but only


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43its division or diversion into other channels, withoutin any way affecting its character or its quantity.But division cannot be effected without a counter-force, and inertia cannot be understood as indifferentto the energy it divides. Here the difficulty is howto divide energy, when every opposing elementthat can assume the form of resistance must beincluded in its original stuff, if we may so speakof it. This difficulty is only augmented when weconsider that any fixed quantum of energy mustcontradict itself; for, a quantum means a certainlimit to its effectivity, but such limit, as a counter-acting force, cannot but be included within energyitself. Where and how can we draw a line betweenenergy and non-energy, when the latter, by thevery fact that it restricts energy, demonstrates itsown effectivity or energy-hood? A quantum ofenergy is self-contradictory; and energy, as scienceconceives it,-a real natural existerce outside,-mustnecessarily be limited and quantified.

We may here note another peculiarity of theThe Law of Conser- law in this connection. The law

vation cannot measure . l-u j x. t j.^all the energy of the Provides no method whereby to ^^^''^^- measure all the energy there isin the universe. This is so, by the very nature ofthe case; for, the working of a balance, or measure-ment itself, is possible only on the ground of a


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44difference of energy,--how can energy, conceived asa generic stuff, be one of tlie weighing scales? Interms of what measure in the other scale, can thisbe achieved even if it were possible? All theseconsiderations show the limitations of the law, andreduce it to a mere convenient assumption that canbe elevated to a reality of nature only by thesuperstitions of an arrogant science, that refuses toanalyse its own conceptions.

Prof. Mach in one place has given a veryHow Prof. Mach would interesting enunciation of the

prove conservation. jg^^ ^f j-he conservation of energy,and we shall do well to take note of it before weclose this subject. He says, (p 164), If we estimateevery change of physical condition by the mechanicalivorJc which can be performed upon the disappearanceof that condition, and call this measure energi/, thenwe can measure all physical changes of condition,no matter how different they may be, with the samecommon measure and say: the sum-total of all energyremains constant. Here, the only measure ofenergy is admittedly mechanical work. But thispresupposes the measurement of work itself, whichcan only be done in terms of some other form ofenergy. What m'eaning is there in saying then that'the sum- total of all energy remains constant,' whenwe can measure energy only in terms of energy?


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45Does measurement itself, even thus understood,convoy any meaning? It is as true to say that wemeasure energy in terms of energy as that wemeasure inertia in terms of inertia,a pound of icein terms of a pound of iron. No doubt we commonlydo this; but if we do away with the sensible qualitiesof things, and retain only their inertia, all weightor measurement would become impossible ; for,inertia as such, cannot form a measure of inertia,we shall have one term and not two. Supposingthat the world of our inertia were made only ofcotton of uniform density,and we have a right topostulate this of pure inertia, since density is aquality of sensible objects and not of inertia assuch,would there be any possibility of weighingcotton? As a matter of fact, it is the difference indensity, or the specific weight of things, that givesus our standards of measurement, and makesmeasurement itself possible; in uniform density,attractions and repulsions will also be uniform, andmeasurement in any sense will bo out of question.Even supposing that pure inertia could be handledand weighed in its own terms, and that we had anideal balance with an ideal fulcrum that measuredweight without itself having any, and balancedforces without absorbing any part of them byfriction or otherwise, wo shall yet have to postulate


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46

besides this inertia uniformly pulling forces, (andthis is not warranted by the difference, in any case,oC their position on the surface of the earth, andthe necessity of separating in space the scales ofany balance). Here the all-important question is, isit inertia that has weight, or the forces that pullthem? Or, to put it in the words of our ownproblem,Does work measure energy or energywork? The law of conservation of energy is evidentlybased upon the former supposition, which is thesame thing as to say that inertia has weight in andby itself, and measures energy in its own terms.The meaninglessness of such a view is quiteevident.

We now come to the principle of dissipation^. of energy. The EucyclopeadiaDissipation of energy. Brittannica contains the follow-

ing passage on the subject. ...If a system beremoved from all communication with anythingoutside itself, the whole amount of energy possessedby it will remain constant, but will of its ownaccord tend to undergo such transformation as willdiminish its availability,this is the law of dissipa-tion of energy....The availability of heat increaseswith the temperature. Again it goes on, Inreality, no heat is lost, and no energy expended.The principle of the dissipation of energy has


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47control over the actions of those agents only whosefaculties are too gross to enable them to grappleindividually with the minute portions of matterwhich are the seat of energy. 'Ihus while we mayconceive of no means of circumventing the principleof the conservation of energy, it seems that theactions of intelligent beings are subject to theprinciple of the dissipation of energy only inconsequence of the rudeness of the machinery whichthey have at their disposal for controlling thebehaviour of those ultimate portions of matter, invirtue of the motions or positions of which, theenergy with which they have to deal, exists.

This principle is based upon the fact that allThe meaning of the mechanical work is accompanied

law- by the production of heat at thepoints of friction, and that this heat is distributedby conduction till it finds its place in the ultimatesink of all heat-energy, the earth. Besides,mechanical work can be got out of heat only whenthere is a great difference between the temperatureof two bodies; greater this difference, greater theavailability of heat-energy. If, however, we haveuniform temperature, all the heat-energy thuscontained becomes unavailable for performing anywork. This gradual equalisation of earth-tempera-ture, and the consequent decrease of available


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48energy is what is signified by the law of dissipation.Carnot showed that this irrerersible heat-energy,or the entropy of the world, tended towards amaximum.

Prof. Bergson considers this principle as theConservation of energy iost metaphysical of all the prin-

is not opposed to its ciples of energy ; for, it suppliesdissipation. j^.^ ^.^j^ ^ ^j^^^ ^^ j^jg .^^^ ^j^evolution and the genesis of matter. We shallconsider this in greater detail in the next chapter.Here we must only note that dissipation is relativeto our capacity for utilizing energy at a uniformtemperature; thus it is not opposed to the law ofconservation, but is rather complementary to it.Both these laws are necessitated by the principlethat energy is work. Where the process is reversible,we have proof of conservation; where it is irrever-sible, we have dissipation.

The metaphysical issue is quite clear. EnergyThe metapbysical issue can be conceived as available or

involved in the law of non-available only when it isDissipation. . . , . , , . . ^ ,imprisoned m matter, dividedagainst itself, and reduced to levels. The analogyof water doing mechanical work is very appropriatehere. When water is at a high level, it turns outsome work in falling. But water and the solid


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49crusL enclosing it at the particular level, are energyonly in respect of their specific configuration or thedifference of level from the earth. If we couldmanage to reduce the whole universe to a flatbottomless plane in every direction and therebyabolish every conceivable centre of gravity, (whichis the same thing as to say that we should take ourmatter out of even single-dimensioned space), weshall have completely put an end to all attractionsand repulsions; these come into evidence with adifference of level and the consequent creation ofcentres of gravity, f

t How these dififerences of level are made in absolute space is aninteresting question. We can here only suggest that these differencescannot be traced to original matter of uniform density. The attempt ofsome scientists to derive the whole cosmos with its particular configurationfrom such matter is quite fruitless. They explain formations of varyingdensity by the attractions and repulsions inherent in this original stuff.But attractions and repulsions are rather the result of varying densitythan its cause. A uniform medium will be completely inert, and withoutthe possibility in itself of combining in different degrees of density; itwill not conform to our idea of ponderable matter at all. Another viewwhich is at present finding some favour with the scientists may also benoted. They hold that mass is not a fixed quantity in the universe;there is no mass at all in the sense of inertness; it is another word for theintensity, of force. If this be true, we shall get free forces workingtogether; and density will be a name for the power of attraction orrepulsion of forces between themselves. But such an explanation raisesmore difficulties than it solves. How the forces are divided, attract andrepel each other, and act as forces at all will be beyond the imaginationof the most extravagant scientist. Nothing is gained by reducing matterto force. We must take the difference of level as simultaneous with thedifference of density,and this can neither be derived from a uniformmedium nor from mere force or forces. We must begin with the cosmosof varying density,for that is the only cosmos we can think, know orreason about,rather than try to get behind it; every attempt at furthejfiimplifioation is bound to be followed by greater complexity.


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60If now we analyse the meaning of a difference

of level, we find that it impliesLevels of energy. the imprisonment of energywithin non-energy, its division into camps, and thereduction of all work to a flow from the higherlevel to the lower level or from the more intensiveto the less intensive. Water does work by fallingbecause it represents a flow of energy from the lessuniform to the more, from the higher level to thelower. Similarly, in the case of heat, we get workdone by the flow of energy from a less uniform to amore uniform condition. Anyhow, we start withlevels of energy, and dissipation has meaning only inthe disappearance of these levels; we conceive energyas a subtle substance that can occupy positions, andbe distributed, evenly or unevenly.

Heat is not an absolute conception. Heat cannotbe heat unless there is somethingExample from heat. relatively not-hot, i.e. unless there

are degrees of heat; and it is this difference ofdegree that at the same time endows heat withenergy; an absolutely uniform temperature, howevergreat, can never be felt as any temperature whatso-ever, and so a source of energy in any sense. From.tjxis point of view, the abolition of centres andlevels is a real dissipation of energy. If our ideaof energy is bound up with a difference of level and


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61a flow from the higher to the lower, the absence ofthese levels and any possible flow, must necessarilymean the negation of energy in every appreciableor conceivable form. And yet, once we have startedwith energy at different levels, such negation canonly signify the restoration of energy to its ownnature, its complete and ideal integration. Strangeas it may appear, we can think of energy only inpoints, centres, levels and flows, and every approachto its immaterial and truly integrated nature falsifiesall our ideas about it.

Our analysis of the problems of homogeneousA statement of the energy has brought out the fol-

^^^^' lowing issues: Can energy beonly conceived as correlative of non-energy, andgetting all its meaning from this correlation? Ifso, can such a notion of energy be satisfactory, i. e.as resolving the distinction in aid of which it wascalled forth, or what is the same thing,as keepingenergy, energy all the time and never confoundingit with non-energy? And lastly, whether there isno ground out of this correlation, to pure energyitself?

The mechanical school was obliged to face thisquestion of the relation of matter

Newton's attitude. _^ , .and force. Newton regardedmatter as made up of solid impenetrable particles;


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but he could not explain their action at a distance,it was a mystery to him; for he recognized onlymechanical action, or action by actual contact ofparts as in a machine. Accordingly, he contentedhimself with merely describing their motions ratherthan explaining them. He left the relation of matterand force to take care of itself, and proceeded withspecific scientific investigations.

Boscovich who followed him, reduced matter toThe solution of a combination of mathematical

Boscovicli. points, endowed with inherentforce. These points being themselves unextendedcould not come in contact with each other ; theyalways acted at a distance. Thus Boscovich replacedthe strictly mechanical notion of matter by anessentially dynamical one. There was no action bycontact, all action was action at a distance. Therewas no real extension, for there were no primitiveextended particles; extension was a result of substan-tial forces, and so also all other physical properties ofmatter. But forces can never be conceived as pointsnor can it be conceived how these points affecteach other; nor lastly, how extension can be madeout of inextension. The attempt to materialize force,or to spiritualize matter is bound to fail.

Lord Kelvin united the above two views in bis


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53Lord Kelvin's kine- hydro-kinetic theory of matter.

matic theory. jj^ showed that There is noaction at a distance; taut then there is no emptyspace; action and reaction are to be explained, notby impact, but by the physical continuity of theplenum. There are no hard atoms, yet the atomoccupies space dynamically and it is also elastic invirtue of its rotatory motion. f But such plenum,contradicting all our notions of grained matter, isindistinguishable from space; and the vortices bywhich Lord Kelvin tries to explain all physicalphenomena can never occur in a perfect continuum.

If there was originally a perfect and undifferen-tiated medium of uniform density, we could neversay that there was any motion, inertness, or evensubstantiality in it. Lord Kelvin himself recognizesthis when he attributes to this so-called 'perfectfluid',which may be conceivable by the kinematicideal of geometry, but never by any conception ofa concrete substance having a real surface,theopposite qualities of inertia' and perfect mobility.Again he says, 'There are no hard atoms; yet,the atom occupies space dynamically 'Occupying space dynamically is a meaninglessphrase. The atom must be a 'definite something'before we can even think of it as moving; and once

t See Prof. J. Ward's 'Naturalism and Agnosticism', p 123.


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55two attribates are compatible in any sense ofobjectivity. Prof. Ward has aptly described thiskinematic ideal of matter as 'non-matter inmotion',which is the same thing as to say thatthere is n&ither matter nor motion, neither inert-ness nor mobility, no possibility of a continuum ofthat kind at all.

The relation between force and matter couldFailure of these me- not be diagnosed by these scien-

chanical philosophers. ^ists. If they retained matter asinert mass, there was no room for force anywhere;for such matter could only be set in motion bycontact of other matter, this in turn requiring athird member, and so on ad-infinitum. We shallhave to go from inertness to inertness, without thepossibility of alighting on force at any place. Ifmatter was reduced to forces as by Boscovich, thenature and the behaviour of physical phenomenacould not be explained; unextended points cannotmake extension, nor mere forces interact; the verydistance which Boscovich postulated between theseforces showed that they had their spatial deter-mination, however minute. Again Lord Kelvin'sperfect mobility which is indistinguishable fromperfect rest, cannot explain our experience of'masses in motion'. This reduction of matter tomobility can no more conform to facts, than the


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56reduction of mobility or force to matter. Theidea of motion requires both these conceptions, andcannot be explained by any one of them singly.The mystery remains where it was. We makemass and force, matter and energy, without know-ing either of them excepting as 'correlatives in ourexperience'.


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CHAPTER II.Energy in Bergson's System.

Bergson has carried the relation of matter and , , force to a new field, the biologicalBergson's problem.

field, and has tried to give asolution in his own way. While discussing themetaphysical import of the law of the degradationof energy, he raises the question, Whence thismutability? For, according to him, change is thevery stuff of reality, and unless a perennial sourceof energy is found out, the energy of the materialuniverse, available at present, will, by slow degra-dation, disappear in course of time, and realitycease to be what it is. In his own words, It (thelaw) tells us that changes that are visible andheterogeneous will be more and more diluted intochanges that are invisible and homogeneous, andthat the instability to which we owe the richnessand variety of the changes taking place in oursolar system will gradually give way to the relativestability o elementary vibrations continually andperpetually repeated. f Two answers have beenproposed to his question. We shall do well to lookinto Bergson's criticisms of these first.

t P S57 Oreative EvolatioQ.


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58One view traces mutability to other points of

The view that traces ^pace. We might at first sup-mutability to some other pose, says Bergson, that it haspoint in space. come from some other point ofspace, but the difficulty is only set back, and forthis external source of mutability the same questionsprings up. True, it might be added that thenumber of worlds capable of passing mutability toeach other is unlimited, that the sum of mutabilitycontained in the universe is infinite, and that thereis therefore no ground on which to seek its originor to foresee its end. A hypothesis of this kind isas irrefutable as it is indemonstrable; but to speakof an infinite universe is to admit a perfectcoincidence of matter with abstract space, andconsequently an absolute externality of all theparts of matter in relation to one another. Wehave seen above what we must think of this theoryand how difficult it is to reconcile with the idea ofa reciprocal influence of all the parts of matter onone another, an influence to which indeed it itselfmakes appeal. f It is indeed true that mutabilitycannot be conceived as coming from some otherpoint of space; for, that will lead us from point topoint, all borrowing it but none producing it; weshall thus only be postponing the question. So far

t Sergsoa's Creative Evolution, p 257.


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Bergson is correct, though even here we must notethat the validity of the argument depends uponone postulate, namely, that there is a continuousstream of mutability in the universe, and that thismutability requires to be maintained by fresJisupplies of energy which tends towards degradation,equalisation and unavailability. If mutability weretaken as a passing phase only of the life of theuniverse, it will be a sufficient answer to ourquestion to say that the present inequality of thedistribution of energy is the cause of all mutability.Again, if the degradation of energy could beconceived as a transmission of mutability to someother unit in space, the view stated above cannotbo proved to be erroneous. Our argument holdsvalid, because we regard degradation as a realabsorption of energy by each unit, and require asource of new supplies of energy to maintaincontinuous mutability in the universe. But ourargument concedes the transmission, and alsopostulates continuous mutability, and to this extentit is defective.

We now turn to the latter part of Bergson'sWhat Bergson thinks criticism,an infinite universe

of an infinite universe, -^in mean an absolute Coinci-dence of matter with space, and the consequentimpossibility of reciprocal action between its


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different parts. Once, however, we admit rdcipracitpof action, we have put reality in space, extendedit, and must logically carry this extension to infinity.AVe shall shortly have to consider Bergson's theoryof the relation of space, matter and mind. Here wemust only note that matter cannot be conceived asoccupying only a limited portion of space whichlatter extends infinitely beyond it,for this willmake space an objective, independent, infinitething,a meaningless combination of ideas; thatmatter has necessarily the form of space, and is, assuch, indefinitely divisible into points like Bergson'sso-called abstract space, and like the latter indefi-nitely extensible in thought; and that the activitiesof matter cannot be explained by any interpenetra-tion of its parts, for once we have made parts whichare necessarily inert and mutually exclusive, wecannot put them each into the other; nor can theexplanation of these activities be sought in areciprocity of forces, for forces that interact andare thus separated in space, can only be conceivedas substantial in character,and a substantial forceis a meaningless term. Whatever occupies spacehas the very form of inertness, and we can give adynamical character to it only by unconsciouslyputting into it more than what this form warrants;or, to put it more appropriately, what is objective


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or spatial can never be conceived as dynamical. Inview of these reflections, the conclusion is quitejustified that Bergson's criticism has not succeededin disproving the theory of an infinite universepassing on mutability from unit to unit.

Another solution proposed to his question isThe theoretical con- ^hus Set forth by him: Again

ceivability of the hypo- it might be supposed that thethesis that stability andinstability succeed each general instability has arisen*^^^'^* from a general state of stability;that the period in which we now are, and in whichthe utilizable energy is diminishing, has beenpreceded by a period in which the mutability wasincreasing, and that the alterations of increase anddiminution succeed each other for ever. Thishypothesis is theoretically conceivable, as has beendemonstrated quite recently; but, according to thecalculations of Boltzmann, the mathematicalimprobability of it passes all imagination andpractically amounts to absolute impossibility, fHere the theoretical conceivability itself is ques-tionable. Stability and instability in the physicalworld can never be absolute states, and they implyan apparatus of real elements that is inconceivable.There must be inert things and forces before anybalancing operations can take place, giving rise to

t Creative Evolution, p 258.


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62Btability or instability. How these immaterialforces can come in contact with each other, or withthe material elements, is unthinkable. Again, notheory can explain how a real stability can giveplace to instability; the moment we conceive sucha transition, we must postulate a hidden current ofinstability all along. Lastly, a mere mathematicalimprobability cannot be a sufficient proof for thefalsity of any theory, having a metaphysicalsignificance. VVe are not here concerned withprobabilities, but with meaning, i. e. theoreticalconceivability, and this can only be conceded inthe above case by one who fails to realize theimport of the problem before us.

Bergson then enters upon an exposition of hisown view with the words, InBergsou's standpoint. reality, the problem remains

insoluble as long as we keep on the ground ofphysics, for the physicist is obliged to attach energyto extended particles, and, even if he regards theparticles only as reservoirs of energy, he remains inspace; he would belie his role if he sought theorigin of these energies in an extra spatial process.It is there, however, in our opinion, that it must besought. t Nothing can be truer than this rejectionof the physicist's standpoint; we cannot find energy

t p 258.


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63in space; for space and whatever it implies (e. g.matter) can only be conceived as an indefiniteexpanse of inertness. It is strange, however, thatsuch criticism of the physicist's standpoint shouldcome from Bergson who, as we shall now proceedto see, merges space into non-space and vice versa,and thus ceases to make any real distinction betweeninertness and mobility. His treatment of theproblem of space, matter and mind will supply uswith a clue to the proposed solution of an extra-spatial origin of mutability.

It is certain that Bergson makes a distinctionKelation of matter between matter and space. If

with space. the two were coincident, matterwill be without energy and absolutely inert, which,according to him, it is not. But evidently, hecannot keep them apart, for both partake of exten-sion, though, in his opinion, one more completelythan the other. Here the question is, can there bedegrees of extension, or of 'externality of parts?'The question can be answered in the affirmativeonly by one who fails to realize the meaning ofextension. We cannot conceive a part which isoutside another and yet in it; it can only be init, when it is identical with it, or to put the logicalimplication of such a position more clearly,whenparthood or extension is abolished altogether. There


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64is no via media, no de

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Metaphysics of Energy