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1BMA 1BLA 2BTF 1BTF Silo 1BRT 2BLA 3BLA 4BLA 5BLA 2BMA Methodology and results for the safety assessment for the low- and intermediate level waste repository (SFR) in Sweden Klas Källström, Eva Andersson Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co. [email protected] A schematic picture of the repository showing the existing part (in grey) and the planned extension (blue). The repository is situated approximately between 60 and 120 meters below the sea floor. The different rock caverns have different technical barriers, e.g. the silo were most of the radioactivity is placed has both bentonite and concrete barriers. • The safety assessment follow a ten step methodology. The FEP identification and initial state description sets the framework for the following steps in the assessment. • The purpose of the reference evolution is to provide an overall understanding of the repository evolution, inclu- ding important uncertainties for the post-closure safety. Safety functions defines important safety related aspects of the repository and its environs. • With the aid of the safety functions and the description of the reference evolution, a number of scenarios and calculation cases are chosen to cover possible future evolutions of the repository system. • A main scenario and a number of less probable scenarios are analysed to examine whether the total risk from all scenarios is below 10 −6 . The assessment period is 100,000 years under which the barriers degrade but also, the radionuclides decay to insignificant levels. Radionuclides with short half-life, which makes up the major part of the initial radiotoxicity, do not contribute significantly to the total risk. Instead long-lived radionuclides C-14, Mo-93 and Ni-59 contributes most to the risk. During the entire assessment period the risk is below the regulatory risk limit of 10 -6 , which corresponds to 1 % of the background radiation at the site. Acknowledgements: A large number of persons, too many to be mentioned here, are acknowledged for contributing to the safety assessment. 10 -10 10 -9 10 -8 10 -7 10 -6 10 -5 2,000 10,000 100,000 Annual risk Time (years AD) Total (SFR) Mo-93 C-14-org Ni-59 U-238 Ca-41 I-129 Pu-240 Pu-239 Am-241 Ac-227 Pa-231 Cs-135 U-235 Cl-36 Ra-226 Others 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 Relative activity (%) Time (years) Total Ni-63 Cs-137 Nb-93m Am-241 Co-60 Ni-59 C-14-inorg Sr-90 H-3 C-14-org Sm-151 Pu-241 Ag-108m Nb-94 Eu-152 1 Handling of FEPs (features, events and processes) - Initial state - Internal processes - External conditions 2a Site description - Site investigations - Site modelling 2b Initial state of existing facility - Reference design (System descriptions and drawings) - Current status 2c Initial state of extended facility - Reference design - Execution plans 2d Initial state of waste - Existing waste - Future waste - Acceptance criteria 3 Description of external conditions - Climate and climate-related issues - Large-scale geological processes and effects - Future human actions 4 Description of internal processes - Waste - Barriers - Geosphere - Biosphere 5 Definition of safety functions - Safety functions of the repository system - Measurable or calculable safety function indicators 6 Compilation of input data - Qualification and quality assurance of data - Assessment activities and used data 10 Conclusions - Summary safety evaluation - Future research needs - Requirements on operation and facility design 7 Analysis of reference evolution. Repository system evolution during - First 1,000 years after closure - Temperate climate conditions - Periglacial climate conditions 8 Selection of scenarios - Main scenario - Less probable scenarios - Residual scenarios 9 Analysis of selected scenarios - Selection and description of calculation cases - Radionuclide transport and dose calculations - Evaluation against the risk criterion Concrete in BMA considered to be flow limiting First potential freezing of concrete Institutional control is feasible Shoreline passes repository Time (years) 10t 1/2 Co-60 10t 1/2 Cs-137 10t 1/2 Ni-63 10t 1/2 Am-241 10t 1/2 Mo-93 10t 1/2 C-14 10t 1/2 ”short lived” 2% of initial radiotoxicity 10 10,000 1,000 100 100,000

Methodology and results for the safety assessment for the ......1BMA 1BLA 2BTF 1BTF Silo 1BRT 2BLA 3BLA 4BLA 5BLA 2BMA Methodology and results for the safety assessment for the low-

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Page 1: Methodology and results for the safety assessment for the ......1BMA 1BLA 2BTF 1BTF Silo 1BRT 2BLA 3BLA 4BLA 5BLA 2BMA Methodology and results for the safety assessment for the low-

1BMA1BLA2BTF1BTFSilo

1BRT2BLA3BLA

4BLA5BLA2BMA

Methodology and results for the safety assessment for the low- and intermediate level waste repository (SFR) in Sweden

Klas Källström, Eva AnderssonSwedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co.

[email protected]

A schematic picture of the repository showing the existing part (in grey) and the planned extension (blue). The repository is situated approximately between 60 and 120 meters below the sea floor.The different rock caverns have different technical barriers, e.g. the silo were most of the radioactivity is placed has both bentonite and concrete barriers.

• The safety assessment follow a ten step methodology.• The FEP identification and initial state description sets

the framework for the following steps in the assessment.• The purpose of the reference evolution is to provide an

overall understanding of the repository evolution, inclu-ding important uncertainties for the post-closure safety.

• Safety functions defines important safety related aspects of the repository and its environs.

• With the aid of the safety functions and the description of the reference evolution, a number of scenarios and calculation cases are chosen to cover possible future evolutions of the repository system.

• A main scenario and a number of less probable scenarios are analysed to examine whether the total risk from all scenarios is below 10−6.

The assessment period is 100,000 years under which the barriers degrade but also, the radionuclides decay to insignificant levels.

Radionuclides with short half-life, which makes up the major part of the initial radiotoxicity, do not contribute significantly to the total risk. Instead long-lived radionuclides C-14, Mo-93 and Ni-59 contributes most to the risk. During the entire assessment period the risk is below the regulatory risk limit of 10-6, which corresponds to 1 % of the background radiation at the site.

Acknowledgements: A large number of persons, too many to be mentioned here, are acknowledged for contributing to the safety assessment.

10-10

10-9

10-8

10-7

10-6

10-5

2,000 10,000 100,000

Ann

ual r

isk

Time (years AD)

Total (SFR)Mo-93C-14-orgNi-59U-238Ca-41I-129Pu-240Pu-239Am-241Ac-227Pa-231Cs-135U-235Cl-36Ra-226Others

0.01

0.1

1

10

100

1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000

Rel

ativ

e ac

tivity

(%)

Time (years)

TotalNi-63Cs-137Nb-93mAm-241Co-60Ni-59C-14-inorgSr-90H-3C-14-orgSm-151Pu-241Ag-108mNb-94Eu-152

1 Handling of FEPs (features, events and processes)- Initial state- Internal processes- External conditions

2a Site description- Site investigations- Site modelling

2b Initial state ofexisting facility- Reference design (System descriptions and drawings)- Current status

2c Initial state ofextended facility- Reference design- Execution plans

2d Initial state ofwaste- Existing waste- Future waste- Acceptance criteria

3 Description of external conditions- Climate and climate-related issues- Large-scale geological processes and effects- Future human actions

4 Description of internal processes- Waste- Barriers- Geosphere- Biosphere

5 Definition of safety functions- Safety functions of the repository system- Measurable or calculable safety function indicators

6 Compilation of input data- Qualification and quality assurance of data- Assessment activities and used data

10 Conclusions- Summary safety evaluation- Future research needs- Requirements on operation and facility design

7 Analysis of reference evolution.Repository system evolution during- First 1,000 years after closure- Temperate climate conditions- Periglacial climate conditions

8 Selection of scenarios- Main scenario- Less probable scenarios- Residual scenarios

9 Analysis of selected scenarios- Selection and description of calculation cases- Radionuclide transport and dose calculations- Evaluation against the risk criterion

Concrete in BMA consideredto be flow limiting

First potentialfreezing of concrete

Institutional controlis feasible

Shorelinepasses repository

Time (years)

10t1/2Co-60

10t1/2Cs-137

10t1/2Ni-63

10t1/2Am-241

10t1/2Mo-93

10t1/2C-14

10t1/2”short lived”

2% of initialradiotoxicity

10 10,0001,000100 100,000