MFR NARA- T3- DOS- Chamber Lin Wendy- 10-28-03- 00141

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD"

Event: Wendy ChamberlinType of Event: InterviewDate: October 28, 2003Special Access Issues: Treat as 8ECRET,1

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)lJAdditional notes: NAPrepared by: Scott AllanReviewed by: Len HawleyTeam Number: Three (Counterterrorism Policy)Location: 2100 KParticipants - Commission: Scott Allan, Doug MacEachin and Len HawleyParticipants- State: John-Alex RomanoMajor Questions:--usa Afghan policy pre and post 9-11--usa relations with Pakistan in connection with counterterrorism--I SID support for the Taliban=Musharrif" s ability to tackle terrorismInterviewee BackgroundChamberlin served as Ambassador to Pakistan from August 11, 2001 through May 29,2002. Before that she served for two years as DAS at INL. Prior to that assignment, shewas the US ambassador to Laos, from September 1996 through June 1999. She alsoserved as DCM to Embassy Kaula Lumpur. In the early 1990's she was detailed to theNSC, for a year and a half, as a director for counter terrorism. [U]

I. Pre Approach to AfghanistanDuring the summer of 200 1, State was frustrated with the Taliban because ofAfghanistan's role as a terrorist sanctuary and its poppy production. The USG's maininstrument for pressuring Kandahar on the Al-Qaeda issue was through UN sanctions.While a sanctions regime, she said, was the "primarily diplomatic" tool used against theTaliban, the usa was also working the issue by applying pressure to Afghanistan'sneighbors. This included pushing the matter at the "6 + 2" meetings which she did "notsee as being effective." [U]Chamberlin went on to describe the poppy problem in the country and the Taliban'sapproach to it. By combining their puritanical theology with their authoritarian tactics,the Taliban all but eliminated the 2001 poppy harvest. However, the true motive, manyanalysts believed, was to increase the price of poppies they had in storage. But without

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an embassy in country, it was hard for the usa to initially realize the Taliban's realmotive towards reducing the poppy production. [U]Afghan humanitarian issues also deeply concerned Chamberlin during the summer of2001. Years of drought, civil war, Taliban interference with aid distribution made thepossibility of "catastrophic famine" a reality. When she arrived in Islamabad,Chamberlin quickly traveled to the Afghan border and witnessed the amassing ofrefugees. Pakistan was closing it borders to refugees and she was very concerned withthe consequences. [U]Chamberlin summarized our summer 2001 concerns and approach to the Taliban issue asbeing correct. However, there was "frustration" at the lack of success with the UNSCRsas well as Pakistan's porous border which permitted arms trafficking and personnelmovement. [U]

he did not know jf Russian or Iranian support for the Northern Alliance restricted ourability to approach that group. [C]

The Ambassador also indicated that there had always been discussions with the Talibanon the UBL trial options, but nothing substantial arose. [U]Finally, she criticized the allegation that the usa was deferring Afghan policy toPakistan. Just the opposite, she said, as Washington was critical of Islamabad's Afghanpolicy which included its support of the Taliban. [U]

II. Pre 9/11 Relations with PakistanUpon her arrival in August 2001, US-Pak relations were "scratchy" for a number ofreasons. Primarily, the USG had imposed sanctions on Islamabad in connection withtheir nuclear ambitions and these sanctions "cut very deep" into our relations. Additionalpenalties included abstention from voting for IMFlWorld Bank programs relating toPakistan at a time when the country's economy was in very bad straits. [U]According to Chamberlin, sanctions had not been effective on the nuclear issue because"that horse was already out of the barn." She believed that the nuclear sanctions weredoing more harm than good in that they "were driving Pakistan into the ground" andgiving ammunition to anti-American voices in that country. Chamberlin noted that manyPakistanis felt abandonment and betrayal by the US during the 1990's. This, shementioned, was a major thorn in our bilateral relations with Islamabad. [U]

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She described a military conflict with India as a concern and one which was a constantthreat, but noted that this did not reach a heightened level of concern until the December2001 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament. [U)During the summer of2001, the USG's primary concern with Islamabad, according toChamberlin, was the Taliban. We had been pressing Pakistan on the Taliban issue andthe UN passed a nwnber of anti- Taliban sanctions, but Chamberlin said that "we weresuspicious of [arms] trafficking" from Pakistan into Afghanistan, which were prohibitedby the UN resolutions. There "were always doubts about Pakistan's commitment toblock" the flow of weapons and militants from Pakistan into Afghanistan. [C]Upon her arrival in Pakistan, Chamberlin had to keep a low profile until she presented hercredentials. ]

Chamberlin also discussed the "Taliban Engagement" policy. The ISID had, for sometime, encouraged the USG to structure an engagement policy towards the Taliban ratherthan continue with the hard-line approach. The logic was that Al-Qaeda and the Talibanwere separate elements and the Taliban, being logical actors, would react positively tocarro ts and could be p ersuaded to rem edy the A l-Q aeda problem . Cham berlin thought

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that the ISID sincerely believed that this policy was the correct one, until late August of2001. [U]In August, American missionaries were being held by Taliban forces and ISID DirectorMahmoud Ahmed made two trips to Afghanistan (once to meet with Mullah Omar andanother tri to meet Omar's de ut to seek their release.

Chamberlin characterized Mahmoud's faith in the Taliban as sincere, but misguided andthat his judgment of the Taliban was ultimately wrong. She also gave her views of lowerlevel ISID support for radicals. While she doesn't have knowledge on ISID support forKashmiri militants, she assumes that there was a link between the ISID and the Kashmirimilitants

tS]III. Post 9/11 Relations with Pakistan

Chamberlin learned of the 9-11 attacks on CNN and immediately called together a smallteam. The first priority was to secure the embassy and guarantee the safety of embassypersonnel. At a very early stage it was understood that AI-Qaeda was behind the attacks.[U]Her first contact with the Pakistani Prime Minister after the attacks was on SeptemberIth. On the 12th, Musharrifwas on naval exercises on the Arabian Sea and spoke withChamberlin whom stressed the gravity of the situation. She advised him to issue astatement both condemning AI-Qaeda and supporting the U.S. On the 13th, Musharrifreturned to Islamabad and met with Chamberlin.

[Over the next two weeks Chamberlinconducted a number of meetings with the Prime Minister. [tNODIS]Musharrif reacted, Chamberlin said, is a very positive way. Pakistan would allow forU.S. over flight and would provide logistical support; Musharrif would not permitPakistani troops to cross the border and fight fellow Muslims nor would he permit Indiato use Pakistani airspace should they assist US efforts. While Musharrif mentioned thathis su ort for the U'S could resulti . . .

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The Ambassador indicated that Musharrif s moves against radical elements in his countrywere risky. But our critical economic support for Pakistan made this possible.Chamberlin also noted that our positive recognition turned Pakistan from a pariah state toa "darling" in the war on terror. [U]

IV. MiscellaneousChamberlin said that the country team at Embassy Islamabad was good. "It was a veryclose team" both before and after 9-11, she indicated. I

After the 9-11 attacks, the Ambassador indicated that she was given much discretionfrom Main State as to tactics in pushing Islamabad on the Afghan issue. [C]

Chamberlin mentioned that a major weapon in the war on terror are tangible/identifiableprograms for the marginalized, not only in Pakistan but in the Islamic world as a whole.Building roads and schools are prime examples, and USAID is working hard on fundingnew schools in western Pakistan as alternatives to madrassas. Poor families would oftensend male children to the madrassas which provided some semblance of an education, butmore importantly meals and clothing. Unfortunately, the children were taught to chantand not trained for vocational tasks. Upon reaching adulthood, the males were oftenradicalized and left frustrated at their job prospects. [U]

I Chamberlin indicated that Musharrif's goals for Kashmir were: 1) Indian withdrawal from urban centers;2) In dian p erm issio n fo r h um an rig hts o bserv ers to ac ce ss areas o f alleg ed In dian atro citie s; an d 3 ) adeclaration that India would respect the rights of Muslims in Kashmir. [l'~IODI]

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Chamberlin also discussed the US military's focus on Pakistan, both before and after the9-11 attacks. Prior to the attacks, Chamberlin indicated that, because of the US sanctionsregime, there was no relationship between the US and Pakistani militaries. CENTCOMwanted to reestablish a "military-to-military" relationship with their Pakistanicounterparts, which they respected as highly professional. CENTCOM felt that they "hadlost [contact with] a generation" of Pakistani officers due to the sanctions. Two weeksafter 9-1 l , Chamberlin said that a General from the arrived to establish contacts withthe Pakistani military and to lay the logistical groundwork for the Afghan campaign.

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MFR NARA- T3- DOS- Chamber Lin Wendy- 10-28-03- 00141