MicroFinance and Women's Empowerment in Africa.pdf

QUESTIONING VIRTUOUS SPIRALS:MICRO-FINANCE AND WOMEN'S

EMPOWERMENT IN AFRICA

LINDA MAYOUX*

Cambridge, UK

1 INTRODUCTION

The Micro-credit Summit in Washington in February 1997 presented an extremelyattractive vision of increasing numbers of expanding, ®nancially self-sustainablemicro-®nance programmes1 reaching large numbers of women borrowers and makinga signi®cant contribution to global poverty alleviation. Funding for micro-®nanceprogrammes targeting large numbers of women has recently been signi®cantlyincreased under initiatives by CGAP and its member agencies.2 Those promotingmicro-®nance for women see it as initiating a `virtuous upward spiral' of economic,social and political empowerment. However parallel to this enthusiasm someresearchers based on research in South Asia, particularly Bangladesh, have ques-tioned the degree to which micro-®nance services in fact bene®t women.3 Some haveargued that for some women in some contexts programmes may even bedisempowering, reducing women to unpaid debt collectors for development agenciesand increasing tensions within the family (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996). Some arguestrongly that micro-®nance programmes divert resources and/or the attention ofwomen themselves from other more e�ective strategies for empowerment (Ebdon,1995). These gender considerations have added to recent questioning of the usefulness

CCC 0954±1748/99/070957±28$17.50Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Journal of International DevelopmentJ. Int. Dev. 11, 957±984 (1999)

* Correspondence to: Dr Linda Mayoux, 61 Cheney Way, Cambridge, CB4 1UE, e-mail: [email protected] The term micro-®nance is used as an umbrella term to refer to a range of services: credit, savings andother ®nancial services like pensions and insurance which are attracting increasing attention. Most of theresearch discussed here however has focused on credit.2 Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest is an international initiative arising from the 1993 InternationalConference on Actions to Reduce Global Hunger and was formally constituted in 1995. The nine foundingmembers are Canada, France, the Netherlands, the United States, the African Development Bank, theAsian Development Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the United NationsDevelopment Programme/United Nations Capital Development Fund and the World Bank later followedby Australia, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Inter-American Development Bank.Approximately US$200 million (including ongoing programmes) was pledged to Micro-Financeprogrammes for the poorest groups in low income countries, particularly women (World Bank, 1996).Although there has been considerable dispute over actual amounts disbursed through CGAP under theauspice of the World Bank, considerably more than this has been disbursed independently by memberagencies and further expansion is planned.3 For a discussion of some of the Bangladesh literature see Kabeer (1998a). For an overview of the SouthAsia literature in general see Mayoux (1998a) and particularly (1999c).

of credit as a strategy for poverty alleviation (Hulme and Mosley (eds), 1996; Rogaly,1996) or micro-enterprise development (Buckley, 1997).

The promotion of micro-®nance programmes for women has therefore becomeincreasingly controversial. There has been no systematic cross-cultural or inter-organizational comparison of relative impacts of di�erent models or strategies. As apreliminary to such a study this paper attempts to piece together existing and largelyunpublished evidence on 15 programmes in Africa, based on secondary sourcematerial and the author's own exploratory research. The ®rst section of the paperclari®es some of the assumptions about `virtuous spirals' of empowerment underlyingdi�erent paradigms of micro-®nance provision. The following sections then examinethe degree to which the evidence supports or challenges these assumptions and thequestions which need to be asked by gender analysis. The evidence indicates that forsome women in some contexts, even very poor women, micro-®nance programmescan indeed contribute to empowerment. However, for many women impact on botheconomic and social empowerment appears to be marginal and some women may bepositively disempowered. These diverse outcomes indicate extremely complex inter-relationships between women's own strategies for use of micro-®nance to further theirperceived interests, contextual opportunities and constraints and programme policies.Although existing data is inadequate to reach ®rm conclusions about details of policy,it does indicate the need to explicitly incorporate strategies for empowerment ratherthan just increasing women's access to micro-®nance.

2 VIRTUOUS SPIRALS: COMPETING PARADIGMS AND UNDERLYINGASSUMPTIONS IN AFRICAN MICRO-FINANCE FOR WOMEN

The expansion of credit programmes for women in Africa dates back to the mid-1980sbut is set to increase dramatically in the late 1990s and into the next century. From the1950s poverty-targeted credit became an established part of many large-scaleagricultural programmes. In Zimbabwe, Cameroon and elsewhere Savings Clubs andCredit Unions were set up for women and men by missionaries (Mayoux, 1998c;1999a). By the 1980s gender lobbies within some governments and aid agencies wereattempting to increase women's access to credit and savings within this wider contextof poverty-targeted micro-®nance.4 The 1980s also saw a mushrooming of govern-ment and NGO-sponsored income-generation programmes for women, particularlyin the wake of the Nairobi International Women's Conference in 1985. Thesefrequently took the form of small revolving loan funds for group economic activities,often based on stimulating and supporting grassroots revolving savings and creditassociations (ROSCAs).5 In the 1990s large international donor agencies like USAID,ODA-UK and World Bank became increasingly interested in micro-enterprisedevelopment as a central plank of a neo-liberal poverty-alleviation strategy. Evidence

4 As early as 1981 a conference held in Nairobi by ACOSCA aimed to form a network of leaders whowould work to make credit unions more representative to women's needs and to make country-speci®cplans. They recommended a programme of information for women, research on women in credit unions,®nancing of labour-saving technology for women and child-care facilities and increasing women'srepresentation on decision-making bodies (Mbogo, 1989). For an overview of selected programmes inKenya, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Zambia and Zimbabwe see FAO (1988).5 For general literature review and case studies of women and ROSCAs see Ardener and Burman (eds)(1995).

Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Int. Dev. 11, 957±984 (1999)

958 L. Mayoux

of women's higher repayment rates and higher levels of expenditure on family well-being were used by gender lobbies within these agencies to argue for targeting womenin micro-®nance programmes (Mayoux, 1995). Programmes targeting women werealso introduced by some private sector and government banks.6

There are now an increasing number of micro-®nance programmes in Africatargeting women and most of these are also expanding to reach ever large numbersof women. Targeting women is now generally acclaimed as à good thing' by donors,NGOs and governments of widely di�erent political persuasions. However, asdiscussed in detail by the author elsewhere (Mayoux, 1998a) targeting women hasbeen the result of a con¯uence of three rather distinct paradigms of micro-®nance7

which come from di�erent underlying development ideologies of the promotingagencies (see Box 1). In all three paradigms it is assumed that increasing women'saccess to micro-®nance leads to a set of mutually-reinforcing `virtuous spirals' ofincreasing economic empowerment, improved well-being and social/political/legal empowerment for women as indicated by the arrows of Figure 1. However,there are di�erences in de®nitions of these terms, priorities and programmeemphases.

The ®nancial self-sustainability paradigm has dominated micro-®nance debateswithin many major donor agencies since the mid-1990s.8 This advocates large-scale,minimalist and ultimately ®nancially self-sustainable and even pro®table micro-®nance services for micro-enterprise and agricultural production.9 The increasingstrength of gender lobbies, coupled with accumulating evidence of women's higherrepayment rates (see below) has led many of these programmes to increasingly targetwomen based on e�ciency arguments. It is assumed that sustainable micro-®nanceservices alone will lead to women's individual economic empowerment throughstimulating women's micro-enterprise development, leading to increased incomeunder women's control. It is assumed that women's control over income will then leadto increased well-being (health, nutrition, literacy) for women and their children. Thisindividual economic empowerment is also assumed to lead to wider social, political

6 In Kenya programmes include the Women Credit Programme of Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd and inZambia Barclays Bank. In Sudan, the Agriculture Bank has to allocate 10 per cent of its lending to`productive families', most of which go to women.7 The three paradigms are discussed in detail by the author elsewhere (Mayoux, 1998a). They constitutedistinct discourses arising from di�ering value and political premises which, despite internal inconsistenciesin practice, are internally logically consistent in relating values to aims and policies on micro-®nance,gender and empowerment and to criteria of evaluation.8 The most detailed articulation of this approach is given in Otero and Rhyne (1994). The paradigmunderlies all current policies of CGAP and most of its member agencies (see note 2).9 The emphasis is on programmes which o�er micro-®nance services alone, with minimal training or otherservices. In Rhyne and Otero's formulation achieving ®nancial sustainability is seen in terms of four stages.The ®rst level is where grants for soft loans cover operating expenses and establish a revolving loan fund.However, when programmes are heavily subsidized and performing poorly, the value of the loan funderodes quickly through delinquency and in¯ation. At the second level programmes raise funds by borrow-ing on terms near, but still below, market rates. Interest income covers the cost of funds and a portion ofoperating expenses, but grants are still required to ®nance some aspects of operations. At the third levelmost subsidy is eliminated. At the fourth level programmes are fully ®nanced from the savings of theirclients and funds are raised at commercial rates from formal ®nancial institutions. Fees and interest incomecover the real cost of funds, loan loss reserves, operations and in¯ation and pro®ts. The ultimate aim isprogrammes which are pro®table and fully self-supporting in competition with other private sectorbanking institutions and able to raise funds from international ®nancial markets rather than relying onfunds from development agencies. Recent guidelines for CGAP funding and best practice focus onproduction of a `®nancial sustainability index' which charts progress of programmes in covering costs fromincomes.


Questioning Virtuous Spirals 959

and legal empowerment (RESULTS, 1997). Micro-®nance groups are seen ascontributing to building `social capital' through developing and strengtheningwomen's networks.10 This building of `social capital' is then seen as potentiallyleading to women's collective empowerment.11 It is further assumed that support forfemale entrepreneurs will increase women's employment more generally, tapping anunderutilized resource for economic development (Downing, 1991). These mutuallyreinforcing spirals of empowerment are assumed to result from access to micro-®nance per se without explicit strategies to address other dimensions of poverty orgender subordination.

The poverty alleviation paradigm is espoused by many NGOs and sees micro-®nance as part of an integrated development programme where the main aim ispoverty alleviation and institutionally sustainable community development.12 Argu-ments in favour of targeting women stress the poverty alleviation bene®ts, particularlythe higher levels of poverty of women and especially female-headed households andwomen's higher levels of responsibility for family wellbeing. In this paradigm, theconcern is not so much with micro-enterprise and individual income but withdecreased household vulnerability to ¯uctuations income and to crises. Micro-®nanceprogrammes are also seen as an entry point or complement to community develop-ment programmes like literacy, health and family planning. Decreased householdvulnerability and women's role in achieving this are assumed to lead to higher statusfor women in the household and greater well-being for women and their children.Although gender subordination is recognized as an issue, the focus is on assistance tohouseholds on the assumption that the household is a locus of mutually synergisticinterests. It is assumed that addressing women's `practical needs' is the best way ofenabling them to address gender inequality and there is considerable resistance toattempts at direct feminist organization.

The feminist empowerment paradigm, promoted by gender lobbies within somedonor agencies and NGOs, takes inspiration from the international women's

10 For example contribution to social capital has been included in criteria for programme evaluation inrecent USAID-sponsored impact studies. Sebstad, Neill, Barnes and Chen write: Àn important aspect ofdevelopment at the community level involves the building of social capital, whereby members of thecommunity mutually encourage each other . . .This encouragement within groups or networks may take theform of patronizing each other's businesses or forming market associations to discuss infrastructureimprovements. There may also be a social dimension to this encouragement as when members of thecommunity make contributions to a family experiencing a life event, such as a birth, a wedding or a funeral.Social capital links individuals, enterprises and households to each other through two related channels:information and reputation (Rochlin and Garg 1994). The transfer of information helps to establish acommon belief system and a code of behaviour upon which individual and institutional reputations arebuilt. Reputations then become the basis of further interaction, on an economic, social, or political basis'(Sebstad et al., 1995, p. 16).11 Sebstad et al. continue: `Social networks are important for the economic and social purposes mentionedabove. In some contexts, social networks are able to take on added political role as well. Where individualshave organized themselves to address a particular problem or concern, the social network may serve as ameans of political mobilization. In addition, social networks, which in the short run serve a social function,may in the longer term become vehicles for political action as group members become more linkedeconomically and socially and begin to identify their interests with that of the group (Sebstad et al., 1995,p. 17).12 The most persuasive account from this perspective of the role of micro-®nance in poverty reduction, andits limitations, is Johnson and Rogaly (1997). The description here of assumptions about empowerment isbased on discussions with NGOs during the research and workshops held in the pilot project on whichmost of this paper is based. It is not ascribable to Johnson and Rogaly, both of whom have beensupportive of the gender critique given here and some of which is based on parallel work by SusanJohnson.


960 L. Mayoux

movement and sees women's empowerment is an end in itself.13 Gender subordina-tion is seen as a complex, multi-dimensional and all-pervasive process, a�ecting allaspects of women's lives and embedded at many di�erent mutually reinforcing levels:individual consciousness, the household, work, legislation, state structures andinternational economic and political systems. Empowerment is consequently seen asrequiring both a process of internal change at the individual level and organization at

BOX 1. WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT INMICRO-FINANCE PROGRAMMES:

CONTRASTING PARADIGMS

Financial Self-sustainability ParadigmProgramme emphasis: increasing women's access to minimalist and ®nancially self-sustainable micro-®nance provision.Target group: existing micro-entrepreneurs or those with èntrepreneurial ability'.Primary rationale for targeting women: better repayment rates contributing toprogramme ®nancial sustainability.Contribution of micro-®nance to empowerment: individual economic empower-ment.Underlying assumption: that it is possible for women to become economicallyempowered through micro-®nance and for this to lead to improved well-beingand social, political and legal empowerment without explicit attention to otherdimensions of gender subordination.

Poverty Alleviation ParadigmProgramme emphasis: micro-®nance as part of integrated community developmentprogramme as an entry point for alleviating household poverty and communitycollective action.Target group: the poor and particularly the poorest men, women and children.Rationale for targeting women: because they are seen as poorer than men and alsomore likely to spend income on the wellbeing of their families.Contribution of micro-®nance to empowerment: increased household well-being andgroup organization as an entry point for and/or complement to other communitydevelopment activities.Underlying assumption: that household wellbeing and women's empowerment areinherently synergistic.

Feminist Empowerment ParadigmProgramme emphasis: as part of sectoral strategies of women workers and/or entrypoint for wider mobilization for gender equity.Target group: mainly women but aiming also to change men.Rationale for targeting women: in terms of equity and human rights of women.Contribution of micro-®nance to empowerment: individual economic empowermentand group organization as an entry point for and/or complement to otherstrategies for transformation of power relations throughout society.Underlying assumption: that women are, or should be, aiming for social andpolitical change in ways advocated by the international women's movement.

13 For one of the earliest formulations see Sen and Grown (1988), later elaborated in e.g. Batliwala (1993);(1994). For a detailed account of the empowerment approach to micro-®nance see Chen et al., 1996.



Figure 1. Virtuous spirals: paradigms compared.


962 L. Mayoux

the macro-level. Micro-®nance, together with appropriate complementary serviceslike business training and training in new skills, is seen as leading to economicempowerment de®ned largely in terms of women's control over income, changes ingender roles in production and increased control of productive resources. At the sametime micro-®nance groups are seen as an entry point for, or complement to, strategiesfor wider social, political and legal empowerment. Here it is assumed that women willbe interested in using their economic independence and/or group membership in waysenvisaged by feminist gender lobbies in development agencies.

The discussion in this paper focuses on 15 micro-®nance programmes in Cameroon(Cameroon Gatsby TrustÐCGT, Mbonhweh Women's Development Associationand BERDSCO), Zimbabwe (Self Help Development FoundationÐSHDF andZambuko Trust), Zambia (CARE-PULSE), South Africa (Small Enterprise Founda-tionÐSEF), Kenya (Kenya Rural Enterprise ProgrammeÐKREP, CARE-Kenya),Uganda (Uganda Women's Finance and Credit TrustÐUWFCT), Niger (MaradiWomen on the MoveÐMMD), Chad (VITA-sponsored programme), Sudan(ACORD-sponsored programmes in Port Sudan and Kassala) and Ethiopia(ACORD-sponsored programme in Dire Dawa). Details of these programmes andsources used are given in the Appendix. This information is supplemented by evidencefrom general impact studies and/or discussions and subsequent correspondence withprogramme sta� who attended three recent regional workshops in East, West andSouthern Africa co-facilitated by the author.14

The programmes have di�erent origins, follow di�erent models and strategies andoperate in di�ering social, political and legal environments. SHDF was started in the1960s, Mbonweh, KREP, UWFCT and ACCORD-Port Sudan in the 1980s and theothers were started in the early to mid-1990s. They represent a number of di�erentmicro-®nance models and di�er in the degree to which they are dominated by each ofthe paradigms, and the ways in which they are attempting to reconcile potentialcon¯icts between them. In most programmes all three paradigms coexist in uneasytension as programmes attempt to reconcile competing, and frequently con¯icting,demands of donors, programme sta� and programme clients. This con¯ation ofparadigms means that, as evidenced from discussions at the regional workshopsduring the pilot study, women's empowerment is frequently an assumed outcome of®nancially sustainable micro-®nance programmes or female and poverty-targeting.De®nitions are constantly shifting and empowerment is rarely strategically planned.The only programmes where there was an explicit gender policy with gendermonitoring were the programmes sponsored by Northern-based NGOs: ACORD-sponsored programmes, the CARE-sponsored programmes and Zambuko which ispart of the Opportunity Trust network.

What follows does not claim to be a systematic comparative study. Assessing pro-gramme contribution to women's empowerment is inherently problematic, exacer-bating methodological problems encountered in other types of impact assessment.

14 Regional workshops were hosted by Action Aid Regional O�ces in Ethiopia and Ghana and byOpportunity Trust in Zimbabwe. These were part of a pilot project entitled `Micro-®nance programmesand women's empowerment: strategies for increasing impact'. This was funded by the Small EnterpriseDevelopment Fund, DFID UK and later by Hivos and sponsored by a steering committee of UK-basedNGOs headed by Action Aid and including ACORD, CAFOD, CARE-International, Christian Aid,Friends of ASSEFA, Oxfam, Opportunity Trust, Save the Children, WOMANKIND and World Vision.Details of participating programmes and discussions are given in the workshop reports: Mayoux andJohnson (eds), 1997; Owusu-Gyam® et al. (eds), 1997; and Mayoux and Duursma (eds) (1998).



This is because of the contentious and complex nature of empowerment itself,di�erences and con¯icting interests between women and complex interrelationshipsbetween women's own strategies, contextual constraints and programme design(Mayoux, 1998b). Existing evidence is patchy, limited in the depth of questions askedand/or based on very small samples. It is unlikely that either positive or negativeimpacts are limited to those programmes for which they are reported. Reportedpositive impacts appear in some cases to be more an indication of the limitedquestions asked and unrepresentative sampling. Reported negative impacts on theother hand may be more an indication of a programme's level of gender awarenessand accountability rather than higher prevalence of the problems described.

It is nevertheless clear that some micro-®nance programmes in some contexts canmake a signi®cant contribution to all dimensions of empowerment for some women,pointing to the potential of micro-®nance as a development intervention for women.At the same time the evidence does raise serious questions about any automaticcontribution of micro-®nance per se to any of the links in any of the assumed`virtuous spirals'.

3 QUESTIONING ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT: CONSTRAINTS ONINDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES

The assumption underlying all three paradigms is that women's access to micro-®nance contributes to increased incomes, generally through stimulating women's owneconomic activity. The programmes discussed here are operating in very di�erentmarket contexts where women have di�ering economic roles and this a�ects the waysin which women use micro-®nance. Even within regions within countries, there aresigni®cant di�erences between rural and urban areas and between women in di�erentethnic groups. As a broad generalization of diverse reality however a distinction canbe made between Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Zambia, South Africa, Kenya and Uganda,where women play a prominent role in agricultural production and informal sectormarketing. This contrasts with Sudan, Chad, Ethiopia and Eritrea where, as in partsof Asia, restrictions on women's movements outside the home place greater con-straints on their participation in marketing and agricultural production. It is clearthat in all these contexts women's ability to increase incomes is limited by a complexinteraction of market constraints and continuing lack of resources for entrepreneur-ship which also limit men's ability to use micro-®nance for self-employment (Buckley,1997). For women these problems are further compounded by gender constraints inmarkets and in the household.15

Women's Access to Micro-®nance: Some Very Basic Questions

The impressive achievement of micro-®nance programmes in making micro-®nanceservices available to large numbers of women who previously had no such accesscannot be underestimated. All except three programmes (Mbonweh, ACORD-Dire

15 For detailed discussion of complex interaction of market and household level constraints and the wayswomen seek to overcome them in Zimbabwe see Horn (1994).


964 L. Mayoux

Dawa and ACORD-Kassala) had over 3,000 clients and four (SHDF, Zambuko,KREP and ACORD-Port Sudan) have over 10,000 and most are aiming for rapidexpansion. All programmes report high levels of demand for credit by women.16

Although as pointed out by recent critics (e.g. Buckley, 1997) `credit is also debt',most of the women interviewed by the author in Mbonweh, CGT, SHDF and CARE-Pulse had reasonably clear business plans and were aware of repayment implications,even very poor women. Women's repayment levels in most organizations discussedhere are also high. Although repayment data are notoriously problematic, o�cialestimates in the women-dominated programmes are over 95 per cent. Signi®cantly,most mixed-sex programmes for which gender-disaggregated data were availablereported higher levels of repayment for women and women's groups than for men andmixed sex groups.

Nevertheless evidence indicates ®rstly continuing widespread barriers to women'saccess in many programmes. This is partly because of regulations in many mixed-sexprogrammes e.g. collateral/guarantee requirements or targeting of services toparticular activities where men predominate or have an advantage and/or oppositionof male programme members (e.g. ACORD, 1996; Kebede, 1997; ACORD-Dire-Dawa, 1996). Even in women-only or women-targeted programmes women werebeing prevented from participating because of opposition from husbands and/orrequirements for husband's signatures in loan applications (Karamagi, 1997).

Most programmes for which data are available are not reaching the poorestwomen, even when this is a stated aim. Despite emphasis on poverty-reach in pro-motional material and funding applications, some programmes explicitly exclude thepoorest women by focusing on existing women entrepreneurs with proven businessrecord. In some programmes like Port Sudan there is a marked shift towards thebetter-o� over time because of pressures toward ®nancial sustainability (Gibson,1995). As discussed in more detail below, where groups are self-selecting they tend toexclude or discriminate against the most disadvantaged. This discrimination is oftencombined with self-exclusion from programmes by the poorest themselves whenbetter-o� (though still poor) people are involved. For example in SEF the `better-o�poor' joined and remained members for a long time in the hope of larger future loans.They either actively pushed out very poor people who slowed things down, or createdan environment where the very poor left.

Increases in Women's Incomes

In the programmes discussed here women generally appeared to control use of loansin their name and male appropriation of loans does not appear to be as prevalent asreported for Bangladesh and Pakistan. This may be because the programmesdiscussed here are based on existing savings groups and/or explicitly target womenmicro-entrepreneurs and track them through programme monitoring as in the case ofSHDF, MMD, Zambuko and CARE-PULSE. It may also simply be a lack ofinformation in most programmes. Male appropriation of loans was however reported

16 In Chad, a report describes news of VITA `spreading like wild ®re by word of mouth in communities,churches, markets and other public places' (Bangui and Miankeol, 1995). Mbonweh, CGT and BERDSCOall had far more potential borrowers wanting loans than they were able to fund. The ACORD-Sudanprogrammes reported twice as many applications for credit as they were able to meet.



for Port Sudan (Amin, 1993) and various forms of `loan diversion' by some extensionagents and false applicants in CGT. Male appropriation of loans is also reported inprogrammes not included in this sample: three ACORD-Uganda programmes(ACORD, 1996) and programmes in Tanzania (Locke, 1997), indicating that maleloan appropriation may be more widespread elsewhere.

Programme impact on incomes is notoriously di�cult to measure. Repaymentstatistics cannot be used as an indicator of contribution to incomes as women mayrepay from other sources and repay in order to get access to a second loan (Marx et al.,1997). It is di�cult to trace the usage of loans and savings withdrawal with any degreeof certainty. It is also di�cult to determine how far any increases in incomes are dueto micro-®nance rather than other factors.17 Problems are particularly acute forcommissioned consultancies where women, like men, may be unwilling to divulgesensitive information on incomes and use of credit because of anticipated reper-cussions for access to credit and/or other programme bene®ts (Hulme, 1997). Theauthor's own ®eldwork in Cameroom and Zimbabwe indicates that loans and savingswithdrawals are often used in a complex juggling of income and expenses whereimmediate use of loans for consumption is necessary for subsequent increases inproduction e.g. medical care, house improvements or purchase of staple food in bulkat low prices to free income for subsequent investment. Participants frequently alsocombine ®nance from programmes with other sources of informal ®nance (Marxet al., 1997).

There are few gender-disaggregated statistical studies but anecdotal sources indi-cate clear evidence of positive contributions to incomes. The promotional literature ofall programmes cite individual case studies of successful women entrepreneurs. Somevery poor women may be bene®ting as can be seen from the cases of Wube Cherinetand Mrs Agnes in Box 2. In some programmes operating in favourable urban andperi-urban contexts where there are dynamic markets and women already havebusiness skills, increases in incomes may be occurring for many women.18 Particularlywhere loans are targeted to micro-enterprise, evidence indicates that programmeshave contributed to setting up of new economic activities for some women andexpanding existing activities for others.19 More commonly there is evidence of smallincreases for larger numbers of women borrowers and decrease in vulnerability tocrises (Barnes, 1997). In some cases loans may make very poor women more able to

17 For example in CARE-PULSE an impact study of male and female participants found that 87 per centof respondents would have been able to operate their business without the loan (Moyo, 1997), thoughchanges in income levels were not measured.18 For example in SHDF a survey of 59 borrowers found that average net additional income came to 152per cent of loan amount adjusting for interest payments. 51 per cent had higher returns than 20 per centand 28 per cent were able at least to double the amount they invested (Marx et al., 1997). Preliminary®ndings of a participatory monitoring process in SEF's Tsomishano poverty-targeted programme ®nd thatfor the majority of participants income increases of 20±50 per cent occur in the ®rst year and for 10 percent increases are very large. Gender di�erences are unclear but over 90 per cent of participants are women,mostly female-headed households (Simanowitz, personal communication).19 A participatory gender impact study of the ACORD-Sudan programmes reported that a highproportion of enterprises assisted with ACORD credit were successful, in some cases nearly doublingoverall household income and many women had applied for successive loans to start up supplementaryinitiatives. In Seraye it was noted that although women clients had fewer ®xed assets than men and lowerworking capital, in some cases they were able to have higher income increments than men (thoughpresumably from a much lower initial level). A consultant's survey of 79 members in CARE-Keyna in 1995found that while ®rst loans tended to be used to increase stock, later loans were used to diversify and abouthalf the women had more than one business (CARE-International, 1996).


966 L. Mayoux

BOX 2. ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT: INCREASED INCOME ANDDECREASED VULNERABILITY

EthiopiaACORD-Dire Dawa: Wube Cherinet: 45, husband retired factory worker and3 unemployed sons. Even before retirement the husband's wages as a factory workerwere low, leading to serious domestic con¯ict. Wube took training from the creditprogramme and used the stipend to start a catering business. Then she took a loanand enlarged her business. She has now taken a second loan and also joined anèqub' [ROSCA]. She plans to increase her income attending pilgrimage centres andhopes eventually to furnish her house and make it into a snack bar. Relations withher husband have greatly improved now she is earning an income. She no longerasks her husband for money to cover household expenses. She is also able topurchase luxuries for herself. As her health is not good following a miscarriage, herhusband helps serve the customers and also houseworkÐ like cleaning. He getsup every morning at 5 o'clock to clean and sweep the ¯oor and buy food for thebusiness before waking her up at 8 o'clock. He then makes the bed, preparesbreakfast and co�ee before going to work as a stone-cutter. Her main constraint iscontinuing reliance on credit from the wholesalers, but slowly she is accumulatingsavings after household expenditure to become independent (ACORD-Dire Dawa,1996).

CameroonMbonweh: Mrs Agnes: has 9 children and 8 grandchildren. Her husband drinks alot, is violent and refuses to help her with either work or money. She took aMbonweh loan and bought 2 poles of land for CFA 50,000 in her own name.Before that she had been renting land for CFA 10,000 per pole per year. The land is3±4 km from her home. She paid CFA 15,000 to clear the land and takes a loaneach year for cultivation. She grows plantains, co�ee, cocoyam and cassava.Mbonweh: Mrs Mari Magdelene: a very old women who buys and breaksgroundnuts to sell to school children and has a small farm which she still cultivates.She herself has no children but neighbours and their children help her in return forfood from her farm. Other people gave her money to join Mbonweh and shereceived a loan of CFA 45,000. With this money she bought bunches of greenbananas and sold these in front of her door. She is repaying the loan.Mbonweh: Mrs Angela: is about 40, very poor and ill. She sends her 20 year olddaughter to buy yams which she sells in front of her house. Her daughter alsoworks her cassava farm. She got some money from the family meeting to joinMbonweh and got a loan of CFA 90,000. She used the money for trading and tobuy medicine. She cannot estimate pro®ts but has become used for food, medicinesand loan repayment.Mbonweh: Mrs Martina: is a widow of about 50, partially blind and handicappedwith a swollen leg, high blood pressure and diabetes. She took a Mbonweh loanand paid workers to work her farm and bought medicines. She is managing torepay through buying egusi melon seeds which she cracks and sells. If she had alarger loan she could stock more things to sell from her house at the road side.



deal with a desperate situation, even where actual incomes are not very high as in thecases of very poor Mboweh borrowers in Box 2.

However, contribution to increased income may be marginal. All existing studies®nd that most women use loans for existing activities or further diversi®cation withina narrow range of low-pro®t activities, with which they are familiar or which aretraditionally open to women, in food processing and petty trade, handicrafts andmanufacturing (Buckley, 1996; CARE-International, 1996; ACORD-Dire-Dawa,1996; Marx et al., 1997). It is clear that women's choices about activity and theirability to increase incomes are seriously constrained in most cases by lack of skills andlack of access to markets. In Sudan Fikka women were not allowed to go to themarket to sell their products. They had no idea who their customers were and senttheir children who were sometimes exploited and forced to sell the baskets at lowprices (ACORD-Kassala, 1996). In Ethiopia, Eritrea and Zimbabwe reports note thelimitations on women's ability to increase incomes because of gender discriminationin access to education and skills which limit women's ability to diversify into morelucrative activities and see little prospect of signi®cant increases in income fromwomen's existing activities (Kebede, 1997; Abudulahi, 1996; Phillips, 1994; Marxet al., 1997; own ®eld notes). In some cases social pressures have led successful womento give up more lucrative activities. For example in UWFCT one woman who had setup a successful butchery business, seen as a `male' occupation, gave this up for a lesslucrative but more socially acceptable second-hand clothes business (Rugasira, 1997).This tendency to low incomes and market crowding is frequently reinforced byassumptions by male sta� and clients within mixed sex programmes and by the lowerloan amounts given to women.20

In some cases loans may be positively disempowering and losses may be made bysigni®cant numbers of women. For example in SHDF 23 per cent of the 58 borrowersinterviewed made a loss (Marx et al., 1997) and many women expressed fears of notbeing able to repay. There are also serious dangers of programmes contributing tomarket saturation (Kebede, 1997; Abudulahi, 1996; Phillips, 1994; Marx et al., 1997).Problems of market access are particularly acute for poor who often lack the socialskills necessary to interact with customers and to e�ectively market their businesses.Negative self-perception is often mirrored by community attitudes, which view thepoor as dirty or lazy; and is re¯ected in preference shown to buying goods from bettero� people's businesses (Simanowitz, 1998). Within highly competitive markets better-o� women with access to programmes will have an advantage over very poor womenwithout such access unless there are explicit programme strategies for diversi®cationout of existing female activities and poverty targeting.

4 INCREASED WELLBEING? QUESTIONING RELATIONS WITHINTHE HOUSEHOLD

In both the poverty alleviation paradigm and the ®nancial self-sustainabilityparadigms the household is treated as a `blackbox', a terrain where programmes

20 For example one woman interviewed in CARE-PULSE had wanted a large loan to replace hairdryers inan existing successful small business but could only get a small loan su�cient for informal trading. Shetried trading but was unsuccessful because of lack of experience and is now saddled with a debt trying tomake ends meet in tailoring.


968 L. Mayoux

prefer not to tread. This is despite the now extensive academic literature revealing thehousehold as a complex locus of negotiation over rights and responsibilities wheregender subordination is central to women's ability to bene®t from their owncontribution to household income and wellbeing.21 Household structures are veryvariable between and within the di�erent countries discussed here.22 On the one handthere are very di�erent norms regarding intra-household responsibilities and rightsover resources varying from patrilineal arrangements to matrilineal, even within asmall geographical area of the same programme (Mayoux, 1999a; Hadjipateras,1996). There are signi®cant variations in adaptations of these norms in response toreligious norms regarding for example polygyny and divorce. There are alsosigni®cant variations in the degree to which households follow or challenge thesenorms in response to economic factors like land shortage, male migration and so on.Finally there are signi®cant variations between women and men in their opinionsabout these norms, depending on their individual preferences and the degree ofmutual understanding and respect they have for each other. This was highlighted bynumerous conversations with women during the author's ®eldwork. Any general-izable predictions of programme impact on wellbeing even between wives within thesame household are therefore problematic.

Increased Women's Control Over Income and Assets

The data on women's control over income in the household and impact of micro-®nance is inadequate in many ways and needs to be substantiated by much more in-depth qualitative and quantitative work. The picture is one where householdcontributions and decision-making are generally a complex negotiation withinhouseholds depending on availability of income from particular sources in relation toparticular needs at the time rather than a ®xed allocation of rights and respons-ibilities. Signi®cantly men and women may have very di�erent views of their relativerights, responsibilities and power.23

Nevertheless, in many parts of Africa the prevalence of polygyny in many areas andexistence of separate `hearthholds' means that for many women individual controlover income is both expected and desired.24 Where women have been able to set upeconomic activities this success has therefore often led to increased control overincome. Women in CGT and Mbonweh in Cameroon invariably said they controlledtheir income and that this was very important to them. In some communities,particularly where Catholicism led to disapproval of polygyny, men expected womento keep their own income and they also contributed to the household consumption

21 For early discussions see Bruce and Dwyer (eds) (1988). For a recent overview of these debates seeKabeer (1998b), and for detailed discussion of complexities in use of credit within the household inBangladesh see Kabeer (1998a).22 For overviews of the literature on gender and the household in Africa see early discussions in Dwyer andBruce (eds) (1988) and for more recent research see papers in Bryceson (ed.) (1995).23 For example in SHDF there were di�erences between women and men in views about ownership ofassets and it is possibly signi®cant that male respondents reported a higher level of contribution tohousehold subsistence than female respondents ( from di�erent households) (Mayoux, 1998c).24 This is in contrast to women in Bangladesh studied by Kabeer, many of whom were attempting toincrease their in¯uence within a context of joint household decision-making (Kabeer, 1998a). Individualcontrol over income was however a priority for poorer women in CODEC, Bangladesh who had receivedgender training alongside savings and loans (Mayoux, 1999c).



budget. In many households in other communities women's control was despite theirhusbands' attempts to take their money. As one group of women commented wryly:Àfrican men demand any money you have if they see it' (Mayoux, 1999a). In MMDin rural Niger Muslim Hausa women are given their own plots of land to cultivate, tobuy and raise livestock and control all the pro®ts. Again households are frequentlypolygynous and divorce is frequent but women are allowed to take all their personalbelongings, including livestock and other assets. In this context micro-®nance and thecontribution to setting up women's businesses helped many women to build up anindependent resource base. The women valued savings as well as credit in this regard,particularly where these were a compulsory requirement of programme membershipthus giving them a means of protecting savings from being diverted to male or generalhousehold expenditure (Kiefer, 1996).

Even in urban and peri-urban Zambia and Zimbabwe where polygyny is not verycommon, the traditional acceptance or ultimate threat of polygamy and divorce orin®delity (with all its accompanying diversion of male income) also meant thatwomen interviewed by the author wanted control over their own income. All womeninterviewed by the author in SHDF and CARE-PULSE said they controlled at leastpart of the income they earned from the income ®nanced by the loan. Signi®cantlyeight of the eleven women interviewed in SHDF said that `®nancial independence'was the most important change in women's status in recent years, though it wasobvious that such independence remained seriously limited and amounted mainly toaccess to limited amounts of their own cash. In some cases control over income wasmainly to increase their self-esteem and ability to make purchases independently oftheir husbands and in some cases as insurance against divorce. In some cases femalecontrol was the result of a lengthy conscious strategy for negotiating change on thepart of the woman concerned involving avoidance of overt con¯ict and continuing togive some control to the husband as in the case of Mrs Mapako in Box 3. In othercases men would take the money if they could and women would resort to secrecy andsubterfuge. Again the savings programme as well as credit was important, althoughwomen often used other savings facilities apart from those of the particular micro-®nance programme studied.

Control over income had also increased in Sudan where women were previouslywholly economically dependent on their husbands and had not engaged in anyeconomic activities outside the home for fear of social disapproval. Economic incomeactivity generated by the programme had led to increased con®dence in dealing witheconomic a�airs. Before the programme men, as sole breadwinners, felt that they hadthe right to decide how the household income should be spent. Now men were said totreat their wives with greater respect and allow them more say in the management ofthe household's ®nancial a�airs (Hadjipateras, 1996). Positive impacts were alsonoted for Ethiopia as in the case of Wube Cherinet in Box 2 above.

Increased Wellbeing for the Household

Statements about bene®cial impacts on households of members are frequent in NGOfunding proposals and promotional material, in some cases leading to multiplicationof numbers of programme bene®ciaries by a factor of as much as 7 on the assumptionthat members live in large households and that membership bene®ts all. As noted


970 L. Mayoux

BOX 3. NEGOTIATING CHANGE: SOME MORE PROBLEMATIC CASES

ZAMBUKO-Trust: Mrs Mapako: has been operating a kiosk for the last ten years.She is married and has two children. Her husband lost his job a couple of years agowhen he became seriously ill. He is still ill, but at times assists in the shop. Heoccasionally collects and sells empty bottles to earn some income for his personaluse. Mrs Mapako owns and manages the kiosk. Her husband tries to control theuse of her earnings. He is especially inquisitive and suspicious about the use ofsmall discretionary funds. For some time after he lost his job there was an increasein tension and domestic disputes. Her strategy has been to consult her husband onmost business decisions although she makes most of them. Gradually, she and herhusband have developed a common understanding of each other's new role in thehousehold. She has more control over the use of household income than previouslysince she is the primary contributor (Barnes, 1997).

World Vision-Bostwana: Violet Makgosa: runs a poultry business. She built apoultry house in her yard, as many of her colleagues have done, and began to travelaround the villages to sell her chickens. She deposited all the money she made fromher sales, except for her salary. Although her husband tolerated the ®rst few marketand bank trips, he was not happy about her going around nor depositing the moneyin the bank: he wanted her to stay at home, and to use at least part of the businesssavings. One day Violet went to a road camp in a nearby village to sell chickens. Shedid not ®nish selling them, and in order to save transport money she decided tospend a night there and sell the rest the following day. When her husband camehome and did not ®nd Violet he was furiously angry. The next day, having sold allher chickens Violet returned home happy and encouraged. As soon as he sawViolet, her husband told her she had to choose between him and her chickens. Shechose the latter and went to her parents. However, she later reported the matter toher VWC members who negotiated with her husband on her behalf and reconciledthem. Now the husband has accepted Violet's market and bank trips and the factthat she deposits her business revenue for future expansion (Getu, 1996).

Uganda Women's Finance and Credit Trust: Edith Kagino: married, with sevenchildren. Before marriage, she developed an interest in dairy helping her mother.After marriage she worked in the workshop of her husband. From 1991 she was aregular saver with the UWFCT and acquired a loan in 1992, for two in-calf heifersand for the construction of a small cow shed. She planted napier grass to feed thecows. Edith started o� very well, with the ®rst cow calving normally. Problemsstarted when her husband instructed her to go back to the workshop. She could nolonger take care of the cows, and eventually she lost one of them. Despite herprotestations, her husband insisted that she remain in the workshop. Eventuallyher husband chased her away from home and she had to ®nd shelter for herself andthe children. The husband claimed the cows as his so she was not allowed to takethem. After some months, with help of the in-laws, the husband called her back.But he had already sold the roo®ng sheets and construction materials of thecowshed and all the grass was gone. She got pregnant again, then her husbanddecided to live with another wife. Edith is recovering from the shock, trying to startagain. Her projects is marked as a doubtful debt (Ngajja et al., 1993, p. 20).



above, some studies conclude that there has been some reduction in householdeconomic vulnerability because of both expenditure of loan on consumption orinvestment in economic activity. In most of the cultures where the programmesdiscussed here work women are responsible for decisions related to provision of foodand children's daily needs. All studies for which data exist and all the interviews by theauthor found that much of women's increased income or loans themselves is spent onhousehold consumption and children's welfare or repayment of old debts which wouldotherwise might have had to be met from production income or loans from elsewhere.

However, ®rstly where women's loans are used for household consumption and/orwomen are prevented by domestic responsibilities from increasing incomes impacts onconsumption are likely to be unsustainable in the longer term. Women's very e�ec-tiveness as guardians of family welfare and their responsibilities for familyprovisioning and reproductive work limits their ability to invest in and expandeconomic activities. Many women interviewed in Cameroon had little income left forinvestment in production after providing for their families. For many this was incontrast to their husbands who spent little on the household. The prospect here wastherefore long-term dependency on continuance of small loans to subsidise householdconsumption rather than a process of upward mobility out of poverty and debt.

Secondly, there is considerable evidence that women's increased control over incomemay be accompanied by a withdrawal of male contributions for their own luxuryexpenditure, limiting the total increase in income going into household wellbeing.

In Zimbabwe and Niger men were quite explicit in valuing women's increasedcontribution to the household because this freed them from some of their responsi-bility.25 In two ACORD-sponsored programmes in Uganda some women wereleaving all household expenditure to the women once they had funds. Some husbandswere even claiming a share of their wives' incomes as payment for forgone domesticservices or for the use of the lands that belong to their husbands (ACORD, 1996).

In some contexts pressures on women to earn an income were increasing toworrying levels. In Zimbabwe women said if they did not try to ®nd an income theirhusbands would simply look for another wife.

Thirdly women's expenditure patterns may replicate rather than counter genderinequalities. There is some anecdotal evidence from Cameroon that women arespending some of their loans and income on school fees for daughters as well as sons.However there is also anecdotal evidence that women employ daughters anddaughters-in-law as unpaid family labourers increasing their workload and decreas-ing their ability to attend school unless this issue is directly addressed. Althoughincreased family income channelled through women often bene®ts children consider-ably, anecdotal evidence suggests they may often still prioritize the interests of boychildren and priority is given to boy's education (Kebede, 1997). Without substitute

25 For example in SHDF one old man said Ìt is good now women have their own savings because men areirresponsible and women are the backbone of the family'. When asked whether it would not be better tomake men responsible also both he and the women present laughed and said this was unlikely (author's®eld notes). In MMD one man said `Before the associations our wives were a large weight on us. We wereobligated to respond to all their problems, even the little ones. But since this good initiative with our wives,they are a little more independent from us. They are able to meet all of their little needs. So now they aren'tasking us for these things anymore'; and another `Before, we really su�ered because all of the expensescome back on us. For example, if my wife organized a biki or something else, I was obligated to give hermoney, and if I didn't have the money, I was obliged to sell my millet or some of my livestock. Now withthe association, my wife can go and take out a loan for these problems' (Kiefer, 1996).


972 L. Mayoux

care for small children, the elderly and disabled, and provision of services to reducedomestic work many programmes attending all three African workshops involved inthe pilot study reported adverse e�ects of women's outside work on children and theelderly (Mayoux and Johnson, 1997); Oxusu-Gyam® et al. (eds), (1997); Mayoux andDuursma (eds), (1998).

Improvement in Women's Wellbeing

There is also evidence of positive impacts on women's wellbeing. Many studies notethat household wellbeing is of central concern to many women themselves. In mostcultures the gender division of labour and responsibility in the household, mean thatit is generally women who bear the brunt of child and male ill-health, women who areexpected to forego food if this is scarce and women who have to su�er the stress, maleviolence and in some cases desertion to which this can lead. Women themselves oftenvalue the opportunity to be seen to be making a greater contribution to householdwellbeing and their con®dence, sense of self-worth. In Cameroon women wereparticularly happy not to have to ask their husbands for cash for buying things forthemselves and in Niger they valued their ability to contribute to social obligations.26

Some poor women in Cameroon also spent loans on their own health care (see Box 2)and also on labour-saving technology like carts or grain mills. Some were able tomove up from high labour input, low pro®t activities, into easier but more capital-intensive activities or to employ labourers. For some women earning an income hasalso been accompanied by husbands playing an increased role in unpaid domesticwork as in the case of Wube Cherinet in Box 2 above.

Nevertheless women's increased control over income also does not translateunproblematically into increased wellbeing for women themselves, but is stronglyin¯uenced by gendered rights to household expenditure and norms of femalealtruism.27 Firstly, as noted above, in many cases women's ability to increase incomesare limited. Somewomen face considerable hardship in order tomeet loan repayments,forgoing food and other consumption expenditure. Secondly small increases in accessto income may be at the cost of heavier work loads. In Cameroon, Zimbabwe andZambia women interviewed reported an increasing expectation that women will earnan income, in addition to unpaid domestic work. In Niger women's income earningwas in addition to a wide range of time-consuming unpaid tasks including working inher husband's ®elds four days a week during the growing season (Kiefer, 1996).Participants from Uganda at the Ethiopia workshop expressed particularly strongfears of serious adverse e�ects on women's health and wellbeing of heavy workloads asthey struggle to combine income-earning with unpaid domestic responsibilities.

26 In Niger a survey of 170 women in 4 associations found that although 40 per cent of members used theirloan in small business activities mostly food preparation and peanut oil extraction and 9 per cent for farminvestments, 28 per cent used them for social obligations and 23 per cent for household needs. However ina society where women's reputation rests on their ability to participate in reciprocal gift exchanges (biki), itwas signi®cant that 75 per cent of women said that before the loan they would have had to stop business tomeet social obligations (Kiefer, 1996). In Chad it was found that, despite high repayment, few womendeveloped their enterprises and in some cases incomes were largely taken up by social obligations. (Banguiand Miankeol, 1995).27 The issue of women's ability to translate contributions to the household into bene®ts has beenextensively discussed elsewhere see Note 19 above.



Thirdly, although in many cases, women's increased contribution to family incomehas considerably improved domestic relations, in other cases it intensi®es tensions. InHarare women said that nowadays unless a woman could bring in an income herhusband would leave her. In some programmes there were fears that supportingwomen's productive role through credit might be encouraging polygamy because ofthe freeing up of male income and the economic attractions of having more than onewife (ACORD-Kassala, 1994; ACORD, 1994). Increase in domestic violence andabandonment was of considerable concern to many participants at the East Africaworkshop (ACORD-Kassala, 1996; ACORD, 1996; Karamagi, 1997). In some caseswomen's increased autonomy has led to complete withdrawal of male support as inthe case of Edith Kagino in Box 3 above. As can be seen in the case of VioletMakgosa, in some programmes advocacy on behalf of individual women and actionby women's groups are able to resolve these issues. However in most programmeswomen receive no support and women interviewed in SHDF and CGT wanted moresupport in claiming their rights against `male oppression' (their quote).

5 QUESTIONING SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND LEGAL EMPOWERMENT

All three paradigms assume that increasing women's individual economic empower-ment will also contribute to wider economic, social and political empowerment. In the®nancial self-sustainability paradigm this is assumed to occur through micro-®nanceprovision alone and in the poverty alleviation paradigm through addressing women'spractical needs. It is only in the feminist empowerment paradigm that explicitattention to organizing women around gender concerns is advocated. Again theevidence indicates very diverse outcomes resulting from the complex interaction ofdi�erent dimensions of gender subordination and con¯icts as well as commonalitiesof interest between women.28 It is however clear that the degree to which micro-®nance leads to a wider questioning of gender subordination depends ®rstly on thedegree of exposure of the women concerned to alternative ways of thinking andsecondly the degree to which programmes seek to build on these alternative visions,both in terms of awareness raising and explicit organization.

Changes in Gender Roles, Networks and Experience of Management andDecision-Making

Micro-®nance programmes have contributed to some changes in gender roles. Wherewomen who previously had no access to income set up economic activities andparticularly where they are involved in marketing this may lead to signi®cant changesin women's mobility and knowledge of the world outside the household. Economicactivity may provide one of the few acceptable èxcuses' women may use to challengegender restrictions on interactions with men. Programmes appear to have contributedto signi®cant changes in societies like Sudan where women's role has been verycircumscribed. Early in the Port-Sudan programme even to be seen discussing with anACORD worker had initially aroused fear and shame but now women queue outside

28 Again this is not surprising in view of the literature about the complex nature of the articulation of`gender interests'. For overviews of debates see Molyneux, 1998; Kandiyoti, 1998.


974 L. Mayoux

ACORD sub-o�ces waiting to be served alongside the men, and are as assertive asmen in dealings with ACORD (Hadjipateras, 1996). In Mbonweh and CGT somewomen noted signi®cant changes in acceptance of their freedom to attend meetingsand other activities, even at night. One woman interviewed in SHDF had used a loanto purchase an ox, normally only owned by men, as a challenge to dominant genderroles. Some women in CGT were wanting training in butchery, currently a lucrativemale preserve. However as noted above for many women there is little impact on typeor level of economic activity.

Women in many parts of Africa already have well-developed networks in the formof work groups, informal marketing networks and ROSCAS.29 Participation insavings and credit groups may also bring together women who did not previouslyknow each other and provide the basis for development of information exchange anda forum for discussion of gender issues. In Port Sudan women have developed strongsolidarity mechanisms through their involvement in women's centres and other groupactivities. Many women-only groups had decided to acquire resources which theycould manage and control. In a number of mixed-sex groups, women occupied keypositions on management committees and women had begun to demand a moreequal role in the management of group enterprises, including the appointment of bothfemale and male signatories for bank accounts where formerly men had handled allthe cash receipts (Hadjipateras, 1996). Some groups have used loans for groupmarketing and production, strengthening bonds between women and giving themgreater status in the community (Mayoux, 1998b). In Zimbabwe SHDF SavingsClubs have also provided a focus for collective self-help in other activities, inparticular purchase of production inputs (Marx et al., 1997). In SEF informationexchange between borrowers is facilitated to strategically build networks and inwomen-dominated programmes like Zambuko and SHDF by involving women inregional level networks.

However, the degree to which micro-®nance programmes increase networks cannotbe assumed, and ways in which networks can be enhanced must be strategicallyplanned. Firstly contribution to networks is likely to be extremely limited where groupsizes are reduced and limited to women who already know each other in order tomaximize repayment pressures, unless there are explicit strategies to develop network-ing. For example inKREP primary loan groups largely replicate existing networks andsharing of knowledge and skills mainly take place at secondary levels for grouprepresentatives where women are underrepresented (Buckley, 1996, p. 313). In CARE-PULSE these higher level meetings were also dominated by men.

Secondly, repayment pressures may not only increase stress for individual womenbut also increase tensions and inequalities between women and within communities.Evidence overwhelmingly indicates that where the group as a whole, or group leaders

29 In Cameroon most women in both rural and urban women belong to `tontines' or `njangi' groups(Niger-Thomas, 1995; Rowlands, 1995; Mayoux, 1998). In Uganda rural women belong to di�erent typesof groups including: Rotational Contribution Groups: for school fees, clothing, medical care, assets likebicycles, payment of bride price; groups for burial expenses; trade groups, where produce is bought andstocked then sold when prices rise; digging groups on common, hired or owned piece of land which sell theproduce and share the proceeds or convert them into group savings for on-lending to members on interest(Ahtimbisbwe, 1993). In Kenya women formed `merry-go-rounds' (Nelson, 1995; Grace Okungu, KREP,personal communication), in Ethiopia/Eritrea èqub' and ìddir' (ACORD-Dire-Dawa, 1996; Kebede,1997; Negassi, 1997) in Sudan to `sanduq' savings box systems (ACORD, 1996) and in Chad to `tontine'and other types of mutual support organizations (Bangui and Miankeol, 1995).



are responsible for ensuring loan repayment or where better-o� women want access toloans, women's groups are excluding the poorest and most disadvantaged women. Inboth SHDF and CGT there is evidence that committee members might be using theweight and in¯uence of their posts to get priority in loan disbursal (Marx et al.,1997; Mayoux, 1998c; 1999a). In Uganda the group-based system also often led to theexclusion of AIDS su�erers (ACORD, 1996). In SEF and BERDSCO this sort ofdiscrimination led to changes in the programme to enable more e�ective poverty-targeting.

Thirdly, there are indications not only of exclusion of poor women, but alsoexploitation within groups and diversion of resources to the better-o�. For exampleKREP found that richer members were not repaying and making poorer memberscover their loans (pers. com. Okungu). In VITA-Chad it was reported that revolvingcredit groups were insu�ciently structured and group leaders did not always deliverrepayment on time or simply diverted funds which had to be repaid by other members(Bangui and Miankeol, 1995). In Cameroon some existing tontines included `troublefunds' (a fund for interest-free loans in times of crisis) accessible to both poor andbetter-o� members. However CGT loans to better-o� women within these groupsappeared to be depleting these trouble funds as these better-o� women divertedmoney into loan repayment rather than fund contribution. This was decreasing theaccess of poorer women to cash in times of crisis (Mayoux, 1999a).

Wider Political Activity and Addressing Legal Constraints

There is some evidence of women actively using groups to address wider constraintswithin the community, particularly where sta� are very gender aware or where micro-®nance is in the context of a broader gender programme. For example in Zambuko awoman giving talks on `how to manage your husband and mother-in-law' had beeninvited to give talks to many group meetings on the spontaneous initiative of thegroups themselves. A group funded by CGT, supported by peasant organizationdeveloped by a partner environmental NGO and building on existing women'sstrategies, had succeeded in stopping domestic violence in the area. In Sudan exposureto new ideas and knowledge, including awareness of the international women'smovement, has also inspired women to ®ght for their own rights, both individuallyand collectively. For example, in some slum areas in the Sudan programmes womenhad organized to demand their rights from the Town Council. Another example issuccessful organization by the Association of Women Caterers against harassmentmany women were experiencing at the hands of o�cial authorities (Hadjipateras,1996).

However, in the absence of speci®c support and organization to address genderinequality, bringing women together for savings and credit does not necessarilydevelop a sense of solidarity or joint explorations of ways in which women's problemscan be overcome. Women in Chad were reported to have rejected more empower-ment-focused programmes for minimalist credit provided by VITA (Bangui andMiankeol, 1995). The degree to which this is a result of a badly designed genderprogramme, pressure from men to get access to credit while maintaining their ownpower and/or women's own decision to switch allegiance because of better creditterms is unclear from the study. There is nevertheless the possibility that in certain


976 L. Mayoux

contexts micro-®nance may detract attention from addressing underlying genderinequalities, as discussed by others for Bangladesh (Ebdon, 1995).

6 `VIRTUOUS SPIRALS AND VICIOUS CONSTRAINTS': IMPLICATIONSFOR GENDER ANALYSIS AND POLICY

The evidence indicates extremely complex interrelationships between women's ownstrategies for use of micro-®nance to further their perceived interests and contextualopportunities and constraints and programme policies. As a broad generalizationthere are a number of points of contrast between the African context and that inBangladesh and many parts of India noted in previous studies. Firstly the fact thatwomen are more widely involved in production and market activities make it morelikely that they will use savings and credit for their own individual activities. Secondlythese roles, coupled with kinship and marriage patterns which frequently lead toseparate `heartholds' mean that women are more likely to seek to retain their ownincome, and more likely to be successful in this. The existence of separate hearthholdsdoes however also raise the problem of men increasingly withdrawing their ownincomes and further decreasing their responsibility for household wellbeing. Thirdlythe existence of already well-developed networks between women mean that micro-®nance does not necessarily make the considerable contribution to women's socialempowerment noted for some South Asian programmes.

In the absence of systematic research on inherently complex interactions betweenprogramme contexts and policy, any conclusions about the relative impacts ofdi�erent models and strategies are inevitably tentative. We know very little about howmany women are bene®ting or losing and it is clear that there is considerable variationin impact between women within the same communities and within the sameprogramme.

Nevertheless, the questions raised by existing evidence about any automaticcontribution of micro-®nance per se to empowerment point to need for a much morestrategic approach if the full potential of micro-®nance is to be realized. A fulldiscussion of what this entails is outside the scope of this paper. As argued in detail bythe author elsewhere (Mayoux, 1998a) and indicated in Box 4 this requires not onlystrategies targeting women, but strategies targeting men, institutionalized genderguidelines in `malestream policy' and greater attention to linkages with otherorganizations working for change in gender relations.

There has however been far less questioning of the dominant ®nancial self-sustainability paradigm in Africa than in South Asia. What is most disturbing incurrent debates is the frequent lack of concern about programme impact onempowerment. The requirements for funding from the enormous CGAP budget, themain driving force behind micro-®nance development in Africa, are solely concernedwith ®nancial sustainability indicators and contain no reference to gender strategies.Failure to explicitly incorporate empowerment strategies into programme design willat best miss an important contribution to development. At worst it may lead todisempowerment of signi®cant numbers of women through burdening them with debtand diverting resources from more e�ective empowerment strategies.



REFERENCES

Abudulahi, H. (1996). `Women's entrepreneurship in the informal sector: a study of some

markets in Addis Ababa'. Paper prepared for the Sixth Annual Conference on the Ethiopian

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ACORD-Kassala (1996). Annual Report, Kassala.

ACORD-Port Sudan (1996). Programme Document 1996±1998, Port Sudan.

Amin, S. (1993). Port Sudan and Red Sea Field Trip Report, Port Sudan.

BOX 4. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A GENDER POLICY

Strategies Targeting Women. conditions of micro-®nance delivery: to be ¯exible to women's aspirations, needs

and existing strategies.. complementary services: to include explicit attention to gender rather than only

support for economic activity.. structures for participation: by women clients in decision-making and strategies

to increase the contribution of groups to empowerment rather than merely usinggroups as a mechanism for ensuring repayment.

. mechanisms for the representation of very poor women, women in di�cultrelationships, younger women in decision-making and/or for ensuring that theyare not disadvantaged by the programme.

. inter-organizational linkages with other organizations o�ering support servicesand challenging gender subordination.

Strategies Targeting Men: explicit strategies for redistribution of power andresources including:. gender awareness for men throughout the programme with concrete incentives

for `good practice'.. incentives to register property and assets in women's names or in joint names.. strategies for reinforcing and strengthening male responsibilities for household

wellbeing including that of their wives and daughters.. organizing male support for change in gender relations.

Institutionalized Gender Guidelines in `Malestream' Policy: to increase access,enabling articulation of women's aspirations and needs and ensuring gender equityin overall programme policy. examination of all policies from a gender perspective in particular concepts of

`household' and `community' and implicit assumptions about gender di�erencesin rights, responsibilities and roles and consequent gender di�erences inopportunities and constraints.

. commitment to gender equity in sta� recruitment and promotion includingnecessary changes in ìnstitutional culture' to assist female sta�.

. concrete incentives for gender equity in programme implementation by both maleand female sta� to ensure that women bene®t from programmes.


978 L. Mayoux

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982 L. Mayoux

APPENDIX: SUMMARY DETAILS OF MAIN CASE STUDIES

Name Country Date Size and target group Programme type Gender policy Sources used

ACORD-Dire-Dawa Ethiopia 1994 1,994 clients of whom 45%

were women. Targets poorest in

urban area.

Credit and savings programme

through community-based

organizations.

Detailed gender policy at

all levels monitored by

ACORD.

Programme annual

reports.

ACORD-Kassala: Kassala Small-

Scale Enterprise Programme

Sudan 1991 1,966 clients assisted of whom

54% were women.



organizations.



ACORD.

Programme annual

reports; Hadjipateras

(1996).

ACORD-Port Sudan: Sudan Small-

Scale Enterprise Programme

Port Sudan 1984 15,077 clients assisted up till

1995 of whom 49% were

women. Targets the poorest

refugees in urban areas.



organizations.



ACORD.

Programme annual

reports; Amin (1993);

Hadjipateras (1996);

Gibson (1995); Stallard

(1996); Gasim et al.

(1995).

BERDSCO: Benevolent Community

Education and Rural Development

Society

Cameroon 1990 5,000 members of whom 90%

are women.


recently adopting a Grameen model.

No formal gender policy. 3 weeks ®eldwork,

internal reports

documented in detail

in Mayoux (1999a).

CARE-WED: CARE-International

Women's Enterprise Development

Programme

Kenya 1992 8,000 members of whom 80%

were women in 1995. Targets

poor rural entrepreneurs.

Group credit and savings programme. No formal gender policy. CARE-International

(1996); Dichter (1996).

CARE-PULSE Zambia 1995 4,987 members 68% female.

Micro-entrepreneurs in peri-

urban Lusaka.

Group credit and savings programme. General statement on

gender principles.

Five days ®eldwork,

discussions with sta�;

Moyo (1997).

CGT: Cameroon Gatsby Trust Cameroon 1994

reg

1996

About 4,000 women in rural

and semi-rural areas.

Credit programme operating through

tontine groups.

No formal gender policy. 3 weeks ®eldwork,

internal reports


in Mayoux (1999a).

KREP: Kenya Rural Enterprise

Programme

Kenya 1984 12,885 clients of whom 23%

were women in 1996. Targets

existing micro-entrepreneurs.

Grameen model and ®nancial systems

approach.

No formal gender policy. Buckley (1998); Okungu

(1998).

Continued . . .

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11,957±984(1999)

Questio

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ls983

Name Country Date Size and target group Programme type Gender Policy Sources used

MMD: Maradi Women on the Move Niger 1991 Goal of 3,750 women in rural

areas.

Credit programme delivered through

ROSCA-based Savings Associations.

No formal gender policy. Kiefer (1996).

Mbonweh Women's Development

Association

Cameroon 1988 About 300 women. Credit programme operating through

family meeting groups.

Women-only programme

with commitment to

empowerment but no

formal gender policy

3 weeks ®eldwork,

internal reports


in Mayoux (1999a).

SEF: Small Enterprise Foundation South Africa 1992 5,000 clients of whom 97% are

women.

Grameen model but focus on poverty

targetting.

Gender policy being

developed.

Simanowitz (1997) and

personal

communications.

SHDF Self-Help Development

Foundation

Zimbabwe 1960s

credit

1996

Over 200,000 members of SCs,

loans 1,200 98% female. Rural

and urban poor.

Savings club with credit programme

added.

No formal gender policy Three days ®eldwork,

discussions with sta� and

secondary sources, in

particular Marx et al.

(1997).

UWFCT Uganda Women's Finance

and Credit Trust

Uganda 1984 9,408 women savers and 1,050

loans in 1996.

Savings and credit programme as

a�liate of Women's World Banking.

Women-only programme

but no formal gender

policy.

Ngajja et al. (1993);

Mensink (1995);

Rugasira (1997).

VITA-Chad: sponsored by US

Volunteers in Technical Assistance

Chad 1990 Size NA. Mainly women. Minimalist group credit programme. NA. Bangui and Miankeol

(1995).

Zambuko Trust Zimbabwe 1992 17,000 clients, 80% Women.

Targeting women micro-

entrepreneurs in urban areas.

Savings and Credit on Trust Bank

model of Opportunity International.

sta�.

Formal gender policy for

sta�.

Three days ®eldwork,

discussions with sta�;

Barnes (1997).

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