MIDDLE EAST

auto­iSfclly SiiliOM) UUo.il L I f

77/e R.A.F. Middlv East Review is Secret. It is intended for ttw information of all officers and flying crews, under conditions of security approve ' by the Commanding Officer, who is to ensure that within these limits it has as wide a circulation as possible.

No quotation may be made from it without the authority of S.A.S.O. H.Q., R.A.F., M.E. ; neither are any of its contents to be communicated to anyone outside the Services.

All persons are hereby warned that the unauthorised retention or destruction of this document is aa offence against the Official Secrets Act, 1911-1920. Any unauthorised \ person obtaining posses^iqn of a copy should immejjiafely Jgeward it Ja a closed unstamped envelope to H.Q. RJ.Fjjfcg,,.

HEADQUARTTRS ROYAL AIR ?O

MAY-DECEMBER* IQ42

MIDDLE EAST

REVIEW NOI

HEADQUARTERS ROYAL AIR FORCE MIDDLE EASUi * A i M n i r n

1 fit

Contents

The Battle for Egyptr

Air Attack on Coastal Traffic '

The War at Sea

Provisioning Malta in the Dark Days of 1942

R.A.F. Operations from Malta

The Eyes of the R.A.F %

Enemy Devices to makes Aerodromes Unserviceable

Back from the Blue

The Entry of the U.S.A.A.F. into the Middle East

Takoradi to Cairo

Stratospheric Reconnaissance

Page 5

52

54

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88 ,,

90 „

94

97 ,,

-99'

Foreword

The purpose of the R.A.F. Middle East Review is to present the story of air force activities in the Middle East, and various aspects of those activities for their instructional as well as their informative value. The circulation is therefore Secret and limited to air force personnel.

This first issue covers the period May to December, 194-2; the most momentous period in the Middle East of the present war, and one of the most eventful in the history of the modern world. Subsequent numbers of the Review .will appear quarterly.

The R.A.F. Middle East Review is designed to be as comprehensive as possible, for behind the big events lie many smaller operations which, although taken as part of the day's work, are nevertheless important, and merit inclusion in any complete survey of R.A.F. activity.^

THE

BATTLE AR MAY-JUNE

C Y K E N A I C A E G Y P T /

* •

OPS. (UCO&0J, H.q.,C-A F..M.E.

The Battl

The period 26th May, 1942, to the end of the year witnessed the grimmest fighting in the Middle East since the outbreak of war. The series of major engagements which at first appeared to foreshadow the enemy's seizure of the Delta and later ended in his utter rout have come to be known to the world as the "Battle for Egypt".

This account treats of the air activity and indicates its effect on the course of the battle: for the purpose of clarity, it is divided into phases covering operations in Egypt and Cyrenaica.

R.A.F. operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and Malta theatres, without which the story would be incomplete, are dealt with separately elsewhere in the Review.

THE FIRST PHASE-BACK TO EGYPT OUE SECOND OFFENSIVE in Libya, known as

" Crusader," which began on 18th November, 1941, achieved spectacular success, and within two months our land forces had driven the enemy from Halfaya to El Agheila. In doing this, how­ever, we had extended our lines of communica­tion beyond our strength to hold them, and on 21st January, 1942, the enemy successfully launched a counter offensive which obliged us to withdraw as far as Gasala, where, by the 16th February, our position was established.

For the next three months both the enemy and ourselves were reinforcing in preparation for the renewal of the battle. The enemy's air offensive aginst Malta) in April had limited the R.A.F. attacks on his shipping, and consequently adequate reinforcement of Axis men and material had coached Cyrenaica ; off-loading continued at Benghazi in spite of the R.A.F. raids and Derna was developed as a base for transport aircraft from Crete. On our side, the reinforcement and equipping of the VHIth Army continued steadi­ly and this was helped by the extension of the desert railway to El Adem.

By the middle of May both sides were ready to launch an attack, but it was our policy to let the enemy make the attempt first, weaken him­self against our superior strength, and then counter-attack with our full weight. After a good beginning our plans went awry, and the

enemy, seizing his chance with characteristic opportunism, forced us to retreat to Egypt. The part played by the R.A.F. before and during that retreat provides the theme for the first phase.

At the beginning of the campaign, it was esti­mated that in numbers we had a seven to five superiority in tanks and eight to five in guns, but in respect of aircraft the Axis had the ad­vantage.

Based in Cyrenaica, Crete and the Dodecanese, the enemy had approximately 928 aircraft at his disposal with serviceability estimated at 50% and, in addition, powerful forces were based in Greece, Sicily and Southern Italy. The R.A.F. strength in the Western Desert and Egypt (in­cluding the Fleet Air Arm) on the 28th May, two days after the commencement of the cam­paign, totalled 849 operational aircraft, with an average serviceability of 60 per cent and there was a specialised force in Malta which, included torpedo and medium bombers and four Spitfire squadrons. In particular, as regards Western Desert operations, the R.A.F. single-engined fighter strength was particularly low compared with that of the Axis.

The R.A.F. possessed approximately the same number of fighter aircraft as at the beginning of the "Crusader" campaign in November, 1941 — but with important differences. There were now two Kittyhawk-bomber squadrons in addition to

the one Hurricane-boi early days of the batf IIDs made their first

Throughout the. shortage of Kitt'yhawks and Spitfires was a limit­ing factor' and fthe. Hurricanes .were 'obliged !to bear the bfiiiht df the normal-fighter activity..* •

The R.A.F. formations concerned in the battle remained the same as during the "Crusader" campaign, with the addition of No. 211 Group. A.H.Q., Western Desert, divided into Advanced and Rear sections, controlled our desert striking force and worked in close proximity to and in co-operation with VHIth Army H.Q. Working under A.H.Q., Western Desert was No. 211 Group which controlled three fighter wings, each or four to six squadrons. This decentralisation of command aimed at closer supervision of squad­rons in order to secure the greatest operational readiness possible. A.H.Q., Egypt was respons­ible for the air defence of our lines of communic­ation, the Delta and back areas and provided protective cover for shipping in coastal waters in conjunction with No. 201 (Naval Co-operation) Group. The last-named formation co-operated with the Royal Navy in providing protection for friendly shipping, reconnaissances for and strikes against enemy vessels and maintained anti-sub­marine patrols and general sea reconnaissance. No. 205 Group was responsible for all medium and heavy bomber squadrons and also controlled the newly arrived U.S.A.A.C. detachment of heavy bombers.

The enemy's final line ran from Tmimi to Seg­nali and, as became evident during the battle, had several advantageous features. From it he was able to redistribute his forces with ease and keep his armour mobile; he could check our deep patrolling to a certain extent, and the landing grounds at Martuba, Tmimi and Derna> were well protected from ground attacks. Our land forces held defended positions running South from Gazalai to the fort at Bir Hakim, pro­tected by minefields and strong points in con­siderable depth. Our fighter aircraft had bases at Maaten Bagush and Sidi Haneish but operat­ed principally from the landing grounds at Gambut; our light bombers were located in the Daba area, with advanced landing grounds at Baheira; and our medium bombers operated from landing grounds in the Daba area.

By the third week in May, the signs of an impending offensive were particularly marked: enemy air attacks increased on our landing grounds and the desert railheads at Capuzzo and Misheifa, and every effort was made to prevent our air reconnaisssance observing troop movements. As a counter-measure, the R.A.F. intensified the attacks on enemy aerodromes, and from the night 21/22nd to 25/26th May Welling-tons, with Albacore illumination, made 94 effect­ive sorties against the Martuba and' Tviimj-; groups of landing grounds; in the meantime, our1

light bombers concentrated on the Derna land­ing grounds.

role of the R.A.F. was to maintain T*iat tkis was achieved in spite

inferiority at the beginning, and er aircraft equal in performance

o tWaTOf^M ME. 109s and MC.202s throughout the whole of the phase, was due to the fighting spirit of our pilots aided by the work of ground personnel, particularly maintenance crews and Repair and Salvage Units.

The employment of the Air Force fluctuated according to the commitments imposed by the changes in the land and sea situations, but the following tasks were performed throughout the entire battle :—•

(a) The neutralisation of the Axis Air Force by attacking landing-grounds and destroy­ing enemy aircraft whenever encountered.

(b) The denial to the enemy of the air over the battlefield.

(c) The provision of close support to our land forces.

(d) The destruction of supplies and reinforce­ments by attacking ports and bases, dumps, shipping, and transport on all lines of communication.

(e) The defence of our rear areas and lines of communication.

(f) The protection of our convoys and sea lanes and strikes on enemy shipping and naval units at sea.

The Campaign Opens The Axis offensive began on the evening of the

26th May with a minor thrust by Italian units in a south-easterly direction from Segnali, which was watched and reported by escorted Tac./R aircraft of No. 40 Squadron. During the night, however, the enemy's 15th and 21st Arm­oured Divisions passed round Bir Hakim in the south and the next morning moved forward in two columns from the east of the fort to­wards Acromca and El Adem respectively. Their advance was checked by our armour and, in particular, the column advancing on Acroma was split into two parts, one of which moved south and the other north. In the meantime, an attack on the fortress of Bir Hakim by Ita­lian tanks and infantry was easily repulsed by the Fighting French garrison.

At this stage, the R.A.F's first concern was to achieve air superiority, and during the first day of the battle proper over 160 sorties were carried out on offensive and defensive patrols. Heavily escorted Stuka formations in the battle area were persistently attacked, and in the course of the day two JU.87s were destroyed, two were damaged, and the mixed bag of BR.20s, MC.202s and ME.109s included five destroyed, one prpbablyr&e&rotyed and six damaged at the cost of:tfW-fljpfrter>s^lost by us.

eA'ern'y^ aYr efft.rt was also hindered by day attacks on his landing grounds by Bostons and Baltimores and night attacks by Wellingtons.

Valuable close support was given to our lane forces by light bombers and, to a greater extern, by Kittyhawk-bombers which attacked supply columns in the rear of the enemy's armour and put out of. action about 200 vehicles.

In view of the threat to Gambut from ad­vanced enemy armoured units and the lack of an adequate force for protection of the landing grounds, six fighter squadrons were withdrawn to base aerodromes but returned on the follow­ing day.

The R.A.F's Close Support

The following day, 28th May, a renewed attack on El Adem from the south was repulsed, and the main German armour, estimated to number 200 tanks, which attempted another drive on Acroma,, was dispersed by our armoured forces and air attacks. Attempts by one tank force to attack our Gazala positions in the rear were also frustrated.

It was evident that the enemy had under­estimated the strength of our land forces and the effect of the R.A.F's close support, which is mentioned in the next paragraph. Captured documents show that he had planned on the capture of Bir Hakim on the 28th May and an immediate attack by his armour from the east in the rear of our Gazala positions coin­ciding with a frontal attack from the west by Italian units. Although, as has been indicated, the attack from the east could not be made, the Italians carried out their attack, but in a half­hearted and ineffective manner. In the mean­time, attacks were continued against Bvr Hakim, but these were all unsuccessful through combin­ed land and air action, and accordingly enemy supplies were forced to travel by the long route round to the south.

At the request of our land forces, the full force of the light bombers and fighters was directed against the enemy columns and supply transport which, having been split up, were endeavouring to contact each other. During the day, three well-escorted Boston attacks were made on enemy columns in the Acroma and Bir Hakim areas, and low-flying fighter at­tacks continued on suitable targets in the battle area generally, causing havoc and confusion; the Kittyhawk-bombers, which made over 50 sorties, were particularly effective.

The most significant feature of the air activity that night was the successful interception by No. 73 Squadron Hurricanes of enemy aircraft raiding Gambut: two JU.88s were shot down, one probably destroyed and five damaged. For some nights after this, enemy bombers on night raids dropped their bombs on the first run up and made for home at top speed.

On 29th May, the fourth day of the campaign, the position of the Axis forces deteriorated still further, and serious casualties were sustained through determined air attacks and successful action by our land forces.

failure of the Axis plan, and in particular the failure to reduce Bir Hakim, obliged the enemy's armoured forces to make a general move southwards in an attempt to shorten their lines of communication. Meanwhile, the Italian Trieste Division had succeeded in opening a small gap in our minefields near Rotunda Ualeb, but this passage to the west could be used only intermit­tently as it was under fire from our artillery.

During the day, fighters and fighter-bombers harassed the enemy in 250 sorties against his supply lines south and east of Bir Hakim. Attacks which began at first light continued until sandstorms curtailed operations in the afternoon; apart from the 120 vehicles whicn were put out of action, general confusion was caused. In response to a call from our land forces, also, an enemy column west of Acroma was bombed and machine-gunned by nine Bostons escorted by Tomahawks and Kitty-hawks, and our troops were able to make a suc­cessful attack immediately afterwards.

In addition to the considerable close support afforded, offensive patrols were maintained over the Acroma^Gazala area: two Stuka form­ations were forced to jettison their bombs, two JU.87s and two ME.109s were destroyed, and six other fighters were damaged. The effect on enemy morale of these determined inter­ceptions was apparent next day, when on several occasions Stukas jettisoned their bombs on sight­ing our fighters and fled; intercepted R/T mes­sages from Stuka formations betrayed nervous­ness generally, pilots often stating that they had seen our fighters when in fact none was airborne.

The Axis at Bay

On 30th May, the enemy's position was becom­ing desperate. He was held at every point he attacked, unable to obtain supplies, with our minefields blocking his withdrawal westwards, and our air force continuously bombing and straffing his troops and transport. In a final attempt, therefore, to force an adequate passage through our minefields, the whole weight of the Axis armour was turned westward and after heavy fighting a bridgehead was established with a gap made by German sappers near 8idi Muftah protected by a strong screen of anti­tank guns in a semi circle from Taieb El Ess/em to Got El Aslaga.

This gap and the smaller one at Rotunda Ualeb now became the focal points of attack for the R.A.F. as the enemy columns, armour and transport, tried to withdraw to the west. The concentration of vehicles afforded better targets for the light 'bombers than formerly and three attacks were made by 27 Bostons (nine to a formation) escorted by Kittyhawks and Tomahawks. Two of the attacks were against the Ualeb gap, in which 36 direct hits were scored on vehicles, causing complete chaos to the enemy's transport. Kittyhawk-bombers also repeatedly bombed and machine-gunned the two

gaps, oper^j0£pff)MEL *Hlfhg"or"B,ODD feet and dropping bombs from 1,000 feet.

The, enemy made strenuous efforts to protect his forces from these air attacks and, whereas in the previous two days columns had been strung out with bad dispersal and little anti­aircraft defence, they were now concentrated and well protected by guns. These two factors made our attacks expensive, but the damage and dis­organisation caused to the enemy on this critical day justified the heavy casualties which included four Kittyhawks destroyed and four seriously damaged.

Close Support Reduced On 31st May, the battle continued with con­

siderable enemy armoured forces still east of our minefields and fighting was intense at Knightsbridge (the junction of the Trigh Capuz­zo and the track south to Bir Hakim) and along the Sidi Muftiah ridge. Some of our troops suc­ceeded in piercing the main gap in the region Taveb El Essem - Rotunda Ualeb, which became known as the "Cauldron," and the resulting mix up of forces here, combined with the fact that our land forces believed they had the situation well in hand, led to a reduction in close support by our aircraft. Fighters were ordered to revert to their normal role, an essential measure in view of the risk now entailed in low-flying attacks against organised ground opposition and the need for conserving Kittyhawks, for which no replacements were available.

Enemy air activity had now increased and on this particular day Axis aircraft had the best of it, our losses being eleven aircraft with a number damaged against three enemy aircraft shot down and three probably destroyed.

During the next day, 1st June, fighting continued in the Knightsbridge and "Cauldron" areas, but unfortunately severe sandstorms ham­pered our operations in the afternoon, and the enemy was able to proceed unobserved with clearing our mines and re-organising his supplies. In the morning, Spitfires made their first desert sorties, but owing to their fewness in numbers they were employed only as top cover with orders to avoid risk by using "tip and run" tactics.

The Enemy Initial Failure The Axis plan to by-pass Bir Hakim, capture

Acroma and El Adem, cut our supply lines and reduce Tobruk, all in the course of three or four days, had failed, but the strength of the bridgehead which enabled the enemy forces to be regrouped and replenished from the west, coupled with the exhaustion of our land forces consequent upon six days of severe fighting, prevented a decisive defeat being inflicted on them. In great part, the turning of the enemy from the offensive to the defensive was due 10 the air attacks on his extended lines of com­munication and supply in which fighter-bombers (two squadrons of Kittyhawks and one of Hur­

ricanes) made 236 efective sorties between 26th and 31st May. When Hurricane-bombers were first used in the desert during the "Crusader" campaign, they were equipped with 8 x 40 lb. bombs, but in practice these proved ineffective against armoured vehicles, and for the present battle Hurricanes were fitted to drop 2 x 250 lb. and Kittyhawks 1 x 250 lb. bombs. The success achieved led to the adaptation of further Kitty-hawks, some carrying 1 x 500 lb. bomb.

The close support given by the fighter force was naturally expensive and, during the first seven days of battle 38 fighters were destroyed, including 23 Kittyhawks, and 31 seriously damaged.

Throughout the week pressure was maintain­ed by medium bombers at night against the enemy landing grounds at Martuba, Tmimi and Derna, 161 effective sorties being made with illumination by Albacores. In fact, the success of the latter led to the procedure becoming per­manent. Albacore pilots were carefully briefed with details of the area to be attacked and ar­rived over the target about fifteen minutes ahead of the bombers. The slow speed, good visibility and big flare-carrying capacity made it an ideal aircraft for the task, and the pilots, who at first were not keen on what they considered to be "sto6ge" work, later became enthusiastic when they learnt what good results were obtained as a result of their assistance.

The Enemy Recovers

By 2nd June, the enemy, by excellent organisa­tion and helped1 to some extent by two days of sand storms which restricted ground and more especially air operations gainst him, had regroup­ed his forces in the "Cauldron" and with his for­ward base firmly established at Got El Uaieb was being reinforced from El Cherima.

He now realised that the reduction of Bir Hakim was essential to ensure the safety of his southern supply route and to remove a base from which we could operate westwards. Ac­cordingly, on 2nd June Italian troops, supported by tanks, initiated another attack. In spite of the unfavourable weather, Hurricane-bombers answered two calls for ground support and bomb­ed enemy vehicles north of the fortress.

The next day, the assault on Bir Hakim was resumed and, in particular, shelling and dive-bombing intensified. The seriousness of the threat was appreciated by our land forces, but commitments in other regions of the battle ground, coupled with the assumption that in attacking Bir Hakim, the enemy intended to create a diversion and split our armour, prevented adequate assistance being sent, and accordingly the R.A.F. fighter and fighter-bomb­er squadrons "adopted" the fortress for two days—the 3rd and 4th June. More than 100 fighter sorties on offensive patrols over the area were made on 3rd June, and Kittyhawk-bombers,

on enemy eoncentra­

tions to the so 60 vehicles out ed interception of a strongly escor.._ formation occurred at noon when Tomahawks of No. 5 Squadron g.A.A.F. completely broke up the attack and destroyed seven Stukas. Five Tomahawks were lost,­ but three pilots were saved.

" Merci Pour La R.A.F."

During the morning, 4th June, Tomahawk and Kittyhawk patrols were again successful in saving the garrison from dive-bombing attacks; in an engagement with twelve JU.87s, escorted by ME.109s, six Stukas and one fighter were shot down and two more bombers probably destroyed at the cost of four Tomahawks and one Kitty-hawk. .

At midday, signals intercepted by our land forces intimated that an enemy ground attack supported by dive-bombers was due to begin at 13.00 hours. Accordingly, Kittyhawk-bombers were despatched and found suitable targets m the- form of enemy 'vehicles protected by few anti-aircraft guns; as a result of 32 sorties, more than 50 vehicles were destroyed or damaged. The intended Stuka raid was also prevented and our fighters, in addition to forcing the JU.87s to jettison their bombs, shot down two CR.42s and damaged another without loss to themselves.

Many of the day's air combats were fought in sight of the fort, which was surrounded by burn­ing and damaged enemy material before our air­craft left the scene. •

The thanks of the Free French garrison for the R.A.F. help was expressed in a signal sent by the Officer Commanding to A.H.Q., Western Desert, which ran:— " Bravo! Merci pour la R.A.F. "

Attack on the " Cauldron "

Shortly before dawn on 5th June, a formation of Bostons attacked gun positions protecting the "Cauldron" area and successfully prepared the way for an attack by our -land forces. Assaults were launched from the east and the north simultaneously and the latter succeeded in pene­trating the "Cauldron" and certain units estab­lished positions South of Bir Tamar. During the morning, enemy tanks and vehicles began to re­tire from the "Cauldron" and these were attack­ed at noon by Bostons, escorted by Tomahawks and Kittyhawks, in the area west of Sidi Muftah. Large fires were caused among the enemy's trans­port, and photographs revealed that about twenty direct hits and thirty near misses were scored on armour and vehicles. Our troops later reported that several tanks had been knocked out.

Both the "Cauldron" and the Bir Hakim areas were patrolled by our fighters during the day. Hurricanes on morning patrols more than held their own with enemy fighters, and Toma­hawks and Kittyhawks again inflicted casualties

ed bomber formations which attempted Bir Hakim.

emy Counter-Attacks

The enemy's reaction to our thrust was a firm resistance which developed by 6th June into a successful major attack. The main German armour threatened Knightsbridge with a pincer movement and tank reinforcements were sent south to Bir Hakim to help the attacks which were now made with increasing spirit.

In view of the threat to our forces .A Knightsbridge, the air effort was principally diverted to that area. Throughout the day, Kittyhawks, using cloud cover, repeatedly bomb­ed and machine-gunned enemy supply columns moving up. On one occasion No. 112 Squadron, after dropping their bombs, "jumped" a formation of ME.109s, shooting down three and damaging another without loss to themselves. Light bomb­ers also hit the enemy hard in attacks on dis­persed tanks and vehicles in the neighbourhood of Sidi Muftah.

The most significant features of operations on 7th June were the speed with which calls for close support were answered, the increased ac­curacy of the fighter-bombers and their skill in identifying enemy troops. One call for support in the afternoon was answered within thirty-five minutes, the result of the establishment of Air Support Control close to Combined Headquarters.

Kittyhawk-bombers attacked supply columns and motorised infantry during the morning and afternoon in the "Cauldron"-Knightsbridge area and Bostons successfully bombed vehicle concen­trations some ten miles north of Bir Hakim.

On this day, also, Hurricane IIDs of No. 6 Squadron, aircraft specially equipped with 40 mm. cannon for " tank-busting," made their first operational sorties, but failed to locate suitable targets.

The next morning, 8th June, two particularly effective bombing attacks were carried out by escorted Bostons on transport vehicles and tanks south-west of Knightsbridge; one of several fires which were started was visible for 30 miles, and our land forces confirmed the serious damage inflicted. The striking force of fighters and fighter-bombers, however, was held until word was received from VIHth Army Headquarters as to whether the "Cauldron" or Bir Hwkim was to receive particular attention.

Priority was given to the fortress, as it was evident that a heavy attack was impending. At once, Kittyhawks and Hurricanes carried out continuous bombing and straffing sorties and, in particular, two combined attacks by Kittyhawk­bombers and Hurricane IIDs were made. As a result of the two attacks, two tanks were des­troyed by the Hurricanes and at least one tank was destroyed by a direct hit from a Kittyhawk­bomber. Intense anti-aircraft fire was encounter­ed and one Hurricane Hd and two Kittyhawk­bombers were destroyed.

. ; . % TO fighter

sorties were made on offensive paTroIs; principal­ly in the Bir Hakim area, and combats with enemy fighters were numerous. As a result of the fights we lost two fighters and the enemy lost four and four others were damaged on either side. The enemy was now using JU.88s for bombing Bir Hakim with greatly increased escorts and patrols which impeded interception.

Supply-Dropping on Bir Hakim Bir Hakim had now been isolated for some

days, and the situation was rapidly becoming critical due to the intensive dive-bombing and even more intensive shelling. Supplies, especial­ly medical, were urgently needed, and owing to the risk and difficulty of penetrating the besieg­ing forces, it was decided to employ aircraft for supply-dropping. An Albacdre was despatched during the night of the 8/9th, but in spite of a search lasting eighty minutes it failed to identify the fort and returned. The following morning, eight Hurricane-bombers and six fighters left on . the same mission. Six aircraft made a fighter-bomber sweep to the south-east of the fort, while the six fighters patrolled to the south, and under this cover the remaining two aircraft dropped supply canisters which landed within a hundred yards of the fort.

Later on in the morning, the garrison launch­ed a counter-attack in the northern sector with the object of reducing the heavy barrage. The attack was preceded by Hurricane and Kittyhawk ground-straffing, but in spite of this preliminary aid the garrison achieved only temporary suc­cess, and throughout the rest of the day dive-bombing and shelling increased. Our fighters continuously swept the area, and in the course of the day destroyed five ME.109s, probably destroy­ed four, and damaged seven other aircraft; we lost one Tomahawk and one Kittyhawk.

That night, a^ Bombay of No. 216 Squadron successfully dropped further supplies to the besieged garrison.

On the following day, 10th June, heavy shell­ing and large scale bombing attacks were direct­ed against the fortress. Spitfires and Hurri­canes succeeded in saving the garrison from one of the raids and inflicted heavy losses on the Stukas, but two other attacks, including one by sixty heavily escorted bombers, attained their objective. In the meantime, Kittyhawks bombed enemy concentrations around the fort and attack­ed gun positions.

Evacuation of Bir Hakim The increased ground and air pressure, and

above all the enemy's accurate shelling, had ren­dered Bir Hakim untenable and the evacuation of the fortress began during the night 10/llth June.

The fall of Bir Hakim was a sad blow to the R.A.F. which had done everything in its power to mitigate the force of the enemy's attacks, and R.A.P. fighters covered the garrison's withdrawal

o#the morning of 11th June. Over 2,000 men of the Fighting French garrison eventually got to safety, but they had been compelled to leave most of their guns behind.

The enemy now displayed astonishing speed in the orientation of his forces, and the original plan of attacks on El Adem and Acroma, an assault on our Gazala positions from the rear, and then an advance eastwards, was put into effect during the following days.

On 11th June, Bostons made thirty sorties on attacks against concentrations menacing our Knightsbrige positions and our fighters suc­ceeded in intercepting a Stuka attack over the Acroma area. In the late afternoon, the rapid movement of enemy forces north-east from Bir Hakim and east from the "Cauldron" focus­sing on El Adem was reported by our aircraft. It was clear that a major attack was pending and the R.A.F. prepared itself to give the great­est possible support on the morrow.

Two Decisive Days Throughout the day, 12th June, Bostons in

"boxes" of six, with small escort, and fighter-bombers made continuous attacks on the enemy columns advancing towards El Adem from the south-west and tremendous damage was inflict­ed; in all, the fighter-bombers made over 100 sorties on bombing and straffing and the bomb­ers carried out 50 effective sorties.

The fighter force made 181 sorties on patrols over the area throughout^ the day, and it was ensured that the enemy air forces did not use El Adem aerodrome, which had been captured. The enemy made five bombing attacks against our positions, but the largest one, north-west of El Adem, was broken up by Hurricanes. This enemy formation included twenty JU.87s and twenty JU.88s with a strong fighter escort; the Hurricanes shot down six JU.87s, five ME.109s, one JU.88 and one MC.202 and damaged at least ten other aircraft.

Our losses for the day were five Hurricanes and five Kittyhawks, but strong support had been given to the land forces and the "box" at El Adem remained intact. The enemy, however, by a skilful use of guns in close co-operation with his tanks had inflicted great losses on our armour and from that time his armoured forces dictated the trend of the battle.

During the afternoon of 13th June, the enemy's armoured units, leaving the El Adem escarp­ment, continued the battle with our armour north of Kmghtsbridge with such success that our land forces were obliged to abandon the area and fall back northwards to Acroma. Once again, the enemy had induced our forces to employ our armour against his guns to the great detriment of our tank strength, which during the week had suffered 200 casualties.

Air activity during the day was restricted owing to sand storms, but offensive fighter patrols were carried out when practicable. Only

10

a few fighter-bomber attacks werg fnade as the interlocking of the armoured forces limited the number of suitable targets.

Withdrawal From Gazala On 14th June, the bulk of the enemy's armour

closed in on Acroma. It was evident that our troops holding positions at Gazala were now in danger of being cut off and accordingly tht withdrawal began of the 1st S.A. Division by the coast road to Sollum while the 50th Division fought its way round Bir Hakim and proceeded to the frontier.

This withdrawal was covered by R. A. F. fighters for three days and the air supremacy which had been achieved is illustrated by thu

-fact that the total losses our retiring troops suffered from air attacks were six men only. During this time the main road beyond Acroma and through Tobruk eastwards was packed with vehicles affording perfect targets to aircraft, yet the enemy did not dare to make determined attacks.

R.A.F. Full Support All commitments in the battle area continued

to be met in spite of the diversion from Western Desert operations on 14th and 15th June of air­craft, including a complete squadron of Kitty-hawks, to provide protection for a convoy which was en route westwards to Malta. The work of the R.A.F. in this connection is described else­where in the account of air operations in the pro­visioning of Malta.

On 14th June, as on the previous day, air activity was restricted by sand storms, but at dusk, when conditions had become better, an effective raid was carried out by seven escorted Bostons on enemy forces attacking Acroma and damage was inflicted on tanks and transport.

The next day, 15th June, the enemy increased his pressure on Acroma and renewed his tank and artillery attacks on El Adem. With the improvement in the weather conditions, the R.A.F. threw in the full weight of its available striking force. Bostons and Kittyhawk-bombers, escorted by Tomahawks, made four bombing at­tacks on the main enemy concentrations threaten­ing our positions, and smaller concentrations of tanks and armoured cars were also attacked by Hurricane IIDs of No. 6 Squadron and the re­mainder of the Kittyhawk force. The straffing attacks of the Hurricane IIDs were timed to take place immediately after the bombing by the fighter-bombers. Pilots lost height rapidly some distance from the target and positioned them­selves so that they could fly straight at the side of a selected tank at about twenty feet from the ground, at a speed of approximately 240 miles per hour. Fire was jopened at 700 yards closing to 200 yards; these tactics were employed to ensure that a direct hit or penetration into the tank was made by the 40 mm. shell. The pre­liminary bombing was considered essential as the dust thrown up by the bombs marked the targets

'and ^also~ distracted TRe attention of the tank crews. A tank was not considered destroyed unless it went up in flames and consequently claims were conservative as a tank hit at right angles in the manner described was almost certainly immobilised. Great damage was done in the course of these attacks and, in particular, ten tanks were immobilised. On this day and the following two days, Bostons, at 6,000 to 7,000 feet, bombed the main enemy concentrations, where the flak was particularly heavy, and the fighter-bombers and Hurricane IIDs skirmished on the outskirts. As a result of stubborn ground resistance and these effective air attacks, a tank assault on the El Adem area was repulsed.

Fighter Force Stays at Gambut Although on the 15th June the enemy was held

wherever he attacked, he now had the initiative and was testing for weaknesses in all sectors. An ominous move was the by-passing of El Adem by enemy armoured units and the infiltra­tion eastwards in the Belhamed - El Duda - Sidi Rezegh area. From this time, our landing grounds at Gambut were constantly threatened by enemy forces only twenty miles away and no adequate land force could be allotted to ensure their security. Nevertheless, the courage­ous decision was made to operate the fighter squadrons from Gambut until the enemy were practically on the threshold, so that air support should not be denied our troops in the El Adem "box" and cover could be given to our forces retiring from Gazala. This cool risking of the fighter force indicated the confidence reposed in pilots and ground staffs alike. Indeed, these considered the conditions ideal, as our air force was concentrated, control was close at hand and excellent targets were only a score of miles distant. Morale was never higher and the only fear, which proved unjustified, was that the re­arming, refuelling and maintenance personnel would be unable to bear the strain of the tre­mendous effort now required of them.

Meanwhile, landing grounds were prepared right back to the frontier and a plan for the steady withdrawal of squadrons, keeping about twenty miles in front of the enemy, had been drawn up and could be implemented at an hour's notice.

The Enemy Moves Eastwards On 16th June, the enemy's main armour pushed

on eastwards from El Adem and inflicted heavy tank losses on our forces at El Duda and Sidi Rezegh.

Our air striking force operated at full pressure throughout the day. Bostons and Kittyhawk­bombers, with fighter-escort, carried out seven intensive bombing attacks on enemy concentra­tions around El Adem and on columns advancing on Belhamed and Sidi Rezegh. Due to success­ful bombing at El Adem, an intended enemy attack did not materialise, and the devastating effect of the attacks on enemy armoured units

J^^p jf and sub­sequently reported by our land forces stationed on high ground in that area. In addition to enemy concentrations, a tank repair shop and a suspected headquarters were bombed. Kitty-hawks and Hurricane IIDs also made conti­nuous attacks on enemy columns and, apart from the havoc caused to vehicles, at least ten tanks received direct hits. In the course of the day, 59 Boston and over 200 low-flying fighter sorties were carried out. Four Kittyhawks were destroyed during the day, chiefly by intense anti­aircraft fire, and two Tomahawks engaged Jn bomber escort duties were shot down in combats.

Patrols were carried out by Spitfires, Hurri­canes and Kittyhawks over our troops retiring along the coast road towards Tobruk and over the El Adem and Sidi Rezegh battle areas. There were a number of engagements with the enemy in which our fighters had the upper hand: one JU.88 and two ME.109s were destroy­ed and three ME. 109s probably destroyed against the loss of one Hurricane.

Wellingtons, in the continued absence of suit­able night targets in the battle area, continued the policy of attacking enemy aerodromes, con­centrating that night on landing grounds at Tmimi where Stukas were known to be based.

On 17th June, the enemy increased his pressure on El Acfrsm and attacks multiplied against El Duda, Belhamed and Sidi Rezegh. In spite of the effective air support described in the following paragraphs, our land forces were at last obliged to withdraw from these areas and a general retreat eastwards began.

During the morning and afternoon, Bostons, with fighter escort, repeatedly bombed the con­centrations around El Adem and the columns moving on Belhaimed and Sidi Rezegh, and in all 43 effective sorties were carried out, causing numerous fires and explosions.

In the morning, the enemy kept standing patrols of 30 + ME.109s over El Adem and Gazalai and this led to a number of engage­ments with our bomber escorts and offensive patrols. The enemy fighters, chiefly by "jump­ing" tactics, shot down ten of our fighters, in­cluding five Hurricanes, at the cost of two ME.109s and two MC.202s destroyed and another ME.109 probably destroyed. A fighter reconnais­sance was carried out to discover from which forward aerodrome the enemy was operating his fighters. This was established as being at Gazala and an attack was immediately made on it by 27 Kittyhawk-bombers. Of the twenty ME. 109s found on the landing ground, fifteen were hit and two Fieseler-Storch aircraft were also damaged. This raid effectively grounded the enemy's fighter force for the remainder of the day.

It was learnt during the afternoon that the El Adem "box" had been evacuated by our land forces some hours previously and that German tanks were in the immediate neighbourhood of Gambut. The R.A.F.

cordingly put into force forthwith and the fighter squadrons moved back to Sidi Azeiz.

R.A.F. Achievement, 26th May to 17th June

The 17th June marked a turning point in the Battle for Egypt. The enemy's land forces now held full initiative; the VHIth Army was retreatinsg eastwards to positions where a stand could be made; the R.A.F., although having the ascendency over the opposing air forces, was also obliged to withdraw, as the battle for aerodromes had been lost.

The R.A.F. had maintained air superiority and given the fullest close support to the land forces. Twelve squadrons of fighters, each with an average serviceability of ten to twelve aircraft, and two squadrons of light bombers, each with an average serviceability of fifteen aircraft, carri­ed out nearly 5,000 and 400 sorties respectively.

The effective work of the fighter-bomber and Boston attacks has already been described in some detail; it is estimated that the fighter-bombers, taking full advantage of the lack of adequate protective air cover for the enemy's transport columns, destroyed over 1,000 vehicles and the Bostons inflicted equal damage, although it is impossible in their case to give a reliable estimate.

Apart from the damage caused, enemy morale was adversely affected by our continuous air attacks. The following statements by prisoners of war indicate what was generally felt:— "British aircraft seemed to do what they liked without interruption"; "Troops are at the end of their tether owing to the worry of R.A.F. straffing"; "Infantry complain that they, get no support from their fighters when they are straffed by the R.A.F." Indeed, the VHIth Army Inter­rogation Centre, summarising the results of the questioning of prisoners, began its report:— "Ground straffing and low level bombing has apparently had very demoralising effect."

It is significant that not one escorted light bomber was lost in combat in the course of intensive operations, clearly illustrating the ascendancy achieved by the offensive spirit of our fighters which rendered enemy attacks on escorted formations most costly. The enemy's escorted bombers, on the other hand, were at­tacked on every possible occasion, and in the enemy attacks on Bir Hakim alone, seven raids were intercepted and twenty-three Stukas were shot down.

Advent of the Heavy Bomber

From June onwards heavy bombers began to play an increased part in the bombing of the Axis supply ports and enemy shipping in the Mediter­ranean. The first Fortress and Liberator sorties in the. Middle East had been made as early as November, 1941, but in the course of the follow­ing six months few sorties were carried out as reinforcements were negligible and maintenance

it difficulties.

In preparation for the ne an effort was made to reinforce the R.A.F: Liberators and a new American force, known as the " Halverson Detachment," had arrived in Egypt.

After an initial failure, on the night of llth/12th June, when an attempt was made ro bomb the Rumanian oilfields, the American de­tachment quickly gained operational experience and gave increasingly valuable aid to the R.A.F. bomber force.

From the commencement of the campaign until 17th June, the heavy bomber effort against the enemy's ports was very limited, only six R.A.F. and nine American effective sorties being carried out. The effort gradually increased, however, and by the end of the next month appreciable help was consistently given, particularly in the bombing of ports out of range of the Wellington force.

The Wellington Effort

The close fighting on the battlefield precluded the use of the medium bomber force and their night attacks were directed against the enemy's ports and landing grounds, over 400 sorties being carried out in the first three weeks of the battle, mostly with Albacore illumination.

Attacks were continued against Benghazi, the principal Axis reinforcing port, and, as a re­sult of 80 effective sorties, ponsiderable damage was done to shipping in the harb»ur and to the docks. Piraeus was the only other port at­tacked, and this only on one night, 11/12 June, when fourteen effective sorties were made in attacks on oil and chemical installations.

The majority of the Wellington sorties were made against the enemy's landing grounds and as a result of determined attacks, compared with which the Axis' raids seemed mere parodies, the enemy's air effort was consistently limited. Martuba, the enemy's principal aerodrome in Cyrenaica, against which 99 effective sorties were made, was most heavily attacked, but the landing grounds at Derna and Tmimi received almost equal attention with 75 and 67 effective sorties, respectively. During the second week of June, also, the JU.88 bases in Crete were bombed with the object of neutralising the Ger­man air striking force against the important Malta convoy, a total of 60 effective sorties be­ing made against the principal landing grounds on the island.

Light Bomber Raids In addition to their day bombing of targets in

the battle area, Bostons made successful night attacks against enemy aerodromes : 36 effective sorties were carried out against Derna landing grounds, fourteen against Tmimi and ten against Martuba. These were the Bostons' first at­tempts at night bombing satisfactory.

| ^ f y ^ | Baltimores of No. 223 quWdsron were presented from taking much part

in operations owing to carburettor trouble and difficulties experienced with the rear guns, and about twenty day sorties only were carried out against enemy aerodromes in Cyrenaica.

Blenheims of No. 14 Squadron could not be used unescorted over the battle area and their slow speed rendered fighter-escort virtually im­possible; during the second week in June, how­ever, they made nineteen night sorties against landing grounds in Crete, as part of the bombing plan to limit the enemy air effort against ship­ping en route westwards to Malta.

Hurricane IID Operations Hurricane IIDs of No. 6 Squadron made about

30 sorties up to the withdrawal from the Gambut landing grounds. 29 tanks were hit of which three only went up in flames and one exploded, and many of the other tanks immobilised were later recovered by the enemy. It was clear that these special Hurricanes were useful in knocking out tanks, but could be regarded only as a sub­sidiary help in destroying the enemy's armour. Experience showed that they required strong fighter escort and were effective only where flak was not intense; their best employment was against retiring forces as damaged tanks which were repairable, even though hit more than once, then fell into our hands and were not recoverable by the enemy.

Aerial Reconnaissance Valuable aid to the land forces was rendered by

the two tactical reconnaissance squadrons, No. 208 Squadron and No. 40 Squadron S.A.A.F. No. 208 Squadron, based at Sidi Azeiz, was al­located to 30th Corps and covered the whole of its front, while one flight was put at the disposal of 5th Indian Division and operated over the coastal area and the desert as far south as Maddalena and west to Bir El Gubi. The battle of Knights-bridge was regularly covered and on 1st June pilots brought back the first intimation that the enemy's "Cauldron" forces were being reinforc­ed from El Cherima. Bir Hakim was also con­tinuously watched and an accurate picture of the enemy's encirclement of the fort was given to 30th Corps through visual and photographic reconnaissance. No. 40 Squadron S.A.A.F., al­located to 13th Corps, operated from El Adem aerodrome until land operations there necessitat­ed the withdrawal to Sidi Azeiz. In particular, enemy lines of communication and dispositions west of Gazala were covered, but assistance was also given to No. 208 Squadron. After the fall of Bir Hakim, the task of No. 40 Squadron S.A. A.F. was practically a watching brief to ensure that the enemy's advance to the north-east was carefully gauged in relation to Tobruk.

Strategical reconnaissance was carried out by No. 1437 Flight, re-equipped with Baltimores, and

.west as Sirte was regular-ling of operations was great­

1. Advent of ike Heavy Bomber.

2. A convoy of JU.52s looking like flies on a window pane unloading at El Gubbi.

3. and 4. As a result of attacks on his landing grounds, the enemy's air effort -was consistently limited.

ft I

Photographic Unit, flying four Spitfires, which was attached to A.H.Q., Western Desert.

Fall of Tobruk On 18th June, the position in the Western De­

sert resembled that during the previous No­vember. The Vlllth Army was now back on the frontier line, having left a strong, amply pro­visioned garrison at Tobruk, which had been reinforced by the troops withdrawn from El Adem and Acronva. It had previously been planned that Tobruk would not be held in the event of an enemy advance, but by 15th June this decision had been changed, as the stocks ac­cumulated in the port were considerable, the speedy evacuation of the garrison would be ha­zardous, and there was no reason to suppose that the fortress, which had withstood one pro­longed siege, could not withstand another, es­pecially as its resources were now greater.

It became clear that the enemy had no inten­tion of continuing his push eastwards until the stronghold of Tobruk had been reduced, and during the 18th and 19th June preparations wero made for launching an attack from the south­east. Attempts were made by certain of our mobile units to harass the enemy's flank, but the attrition of our armour during the previous week rendered these forces too weak for the task.

The enforced withdrawal of the R.A.F. squad­rons from G-azala had put Tobruk out of range of our fighter aircraft and the garrison had to rely solely on anti-aircraft fire to repel Stuka at­tacks. Efforts were made, however, to limit the scale of enemy raids by attacks on his landing grounds, Baltimores successfully attacking des­persed aircraft at Gazala and Tmimi. The light bomber force was now operating from aero­dromes west of Mersa Matruh, having left Ba­heira at first light on 18th June.

Meanwhile, the fighter force covered the with­drawal of our land forces from Sidi Rezegh along the Trigh Capuzzo and the coastal road, operating on 18th June from Sidi Azeiz and the following day from landing grounds in the Sidi Barrani area, as no protection could be given to the Sidi Azeiz landing grounds from fast moving enemy columns reported near Ba­heira.

At dawn on 20th June, the enemy attacked Tobruk on a narrow front south of Sidi Baud and his armoured forces had almost instantaneous success in piercing the main defences; how or why the garrison succumbed so quickly is not fully known but Tobruk was almost entirely in enemy hands by last light on the same day the assault was launched.

Although Tobruk was out of range for norm­al fighter aircraft, the R.A.F. hac hawk £A£ purpo be us

20th June, no intimation of heavy enemy air at­tacks was received from Support Control co­operating with the South African Division in T&bruk, and, as this special fighter force could be over the area for a few minutes only, it was employed, shortly after noon, to escort nine Bos­tons on an attack on enemy concentrations on the eastern side of the Tobruk defences, where penetration had taken place. Further attacks were made at last light and during the night by twelve Bostons which, although effective, were able only to cause temporary setbacks to the enemy's armoured forces.

After the fall of Tobruk, it became the object of our land forces to delay the enemy at the fron­tier as long as possible by harassing tactics and to withdraw the main body of our troops to Mersa Matruh, where strong defences had been prepared.

The R.A.F. function in the battle area was to delay the enemy's *dvance, and to enable this ro be done effectively the land forces were to keep the forward landing grounds west of Matruh secure to the last possible moment. Meanwhile; the medium and heavy bombers continued to make attacks on an ever-increasing scale on the enemy's ports and bases to prevent his reinforce­ment at this vital stage, and on his landing grounds to hinder his air effort, which was now helped by the acquisition of forward landing grounds.

The Enemy's Drive Continues Once again, the enemy showed incredible speed

in reorganising his forces and continuing his ad­vance, and on 21st June advanced units, supported by armour, approached our frontier defences. For the next two days our land forces fought a rear-guard action but by 24th June the enemy was advancing in strength through the frontier wire.

During the morning of 21st June, concentrations of tanks and transport were reported on the Sidi Azeiz landing ground and these were attacked at noon by Kittyhawk-bombers and at last light by nine Bostons; considerable damage was inflict­ed and several fires were caused. Later in the evening another Boston force, operating from 4,000 to 5,000 feet, bombed motor transport on the Barditw - Tobruk road from Bu Amud to Bvr El Bah&vra causing explosions and fires: some of the explosions were of sufficient violence to rock the aircraft and one fire was visible for thirty miles. Throughout the day, offensive fighter patrols were maintained west of the fron­tier to cover the withdrawal of troops to the Matruh positions but no engagements with ene­my aircraft took place. *

That night, nine Liberators of U.S.A.A.F. and three Wellingtons bombed harbour installations at Benghazi, causing damage to the Central and Cathedral Moles, and another force of seventeen Wellingtons effectively attacked the enemy's land­ing ground in the Gazala area. Also, in order to hinder the enemy in his plan for putting the

16

newly won port mines were successfully laid in the harbour by twelve Albacores of the F.A.A. and again on the next night by eight more aircraft.

The next day, 22nd June, our fighters continued their reconnaissances and patrols west of the frontier, but once again there were no engage­ments with enemy aircraft. It was evident that the advance of the Axis land forces had overtaxed the ability of their air force to keep up with them, and it is possible that our timely attack on the Gazala landing grounds on 17th June made them excessively cautious; at any rate, the enemy air force was moving forward timidly and in small numbers.

At dusk, six Bostons bombed dispersed fighter aircraft on the Baheira landing ground 3 and later on a further force of ten continued their nightly bombing and straffing of transport on the Bardia - Tobruk road. Our principal air ac­tivity that night, however, was directed against Tmimi aerodrome, where many fires and explos­ions-were caused among dispersed aircraft as a result of attacks by 39 Wellingtons.

Information regarding targets in the battle and forward areas from ground sources was now neg­ligible and fighter reconnaissance provided the sole basis for planning operations. On the morn­ing of 23rd June, suitable targets in the form of transport concentrations were established for Bostons and Kittyhawk-bombers west of the fron­tier between Sidi Omar and Sheferzen and these were attacked at noon and several other times during the day. Baltimores also made two attacks on these targets, a raid shortly before dusk on concentrations at Sheferzen being par­ticularly effective.

For the fifth day in succession, no enemy air­craft were encountered by fighter patrols oper­ating west of the frontier.

In the evening, Bostons continued their bombing of transport on the Trigh Ca(puzzo and one of the several fires caused was visible for thirty miles. A few hours later, Wellingtons, having dealt with Tmimi aerodrome on the previous night, now turned their attention to the landing grounds further east,' carrying out 42 effective sorties against Gazala and three against Gambut.

R.A.F. Withdraws Further East The remarkable speed of the enemy's advance

necessitated another re-arrangement of units and the moving of bomber and fighter squadrons towards or into the Delta area. A widespread reshuffle of units located there was made in the shortest possible time. Some moved further south and others were placed closer together. Advanc­ed landing grounds were now located in the Maati&n Baqush - Fuka area and base landing grounds were dispersed around Amxriya, Burg El Arab and Wadi Natrun. Medium and heavy bombers remained based in the Suez Canal zone, except for two Wellington squadrons operating from Qotaifiya and Daba.

my Crosses the'Frontier • By 24th June, the "VTIIth Army had taken up

positions at Mersa Matruih and mobile forces covering the withdrawal of our troops, having delayed the enemy's progress for a few days only, were returning to join the main body.

Early morning fighter reconnaissances on 24th June reported the advance %of enemy columns, including tanks, across the frontier into Egypt from a point South of Sheferzen. At once continuous attacks were made on these vehicles until after dusk by Bostons, helped by Kitty­hawk-bombers. Bostons made 53 effective sorties and, as the enemy vehicles were massed to­gether at various points, considerable damage was inflicted. The most punishing raid was that carried out in the early evening by nine aircraft of No. 24 Squadron S.A.A.F. which, operating from 7,000 feet, dropped 18 x 250 1b. and 18 x 500 lb. bombs on transport columns, scoring twenty direct hits and many near misses. Two attacks totalling twelve effective sorties were also made by Baltimores during the afternoon and in the second of these five fires were started.

Offensive patrols and escort for bombers were provided by the fighter force but there were few encounters with enemy fighters: one ME.109 and one G.50 were shot down and another ME.109 was probably destroyed against one fighter lost by us.

Two Beaufighter squadrons had now been at­tached to the air striking force from No.201 Group and these were emplo.yed for daylight at­tacks on enemy columns moving eastward from back areas where fighter defence was unlikely and later, also, in low-flying attacks against advanced landing grounds, before adequate anti­aircraft defence had been provided.

Blenheims of No. 14 Squadron were again avail­able and these were now employed chiefly for night attacks against the enemy's coastal road traffic, beginning on the night 24/25th June with single attacks on small concentrations of trans­port near Gambut. Last Full-Scale Attack on Benghazi

On the night 24/25th June, Wellingtons took "a final crack" at Benghazi before the relinquish­ment of forward landing grounds led to the harbour going out of their range. 63 sorties by Wellingtons and 17 by Liberators of No. 159 Squadron and the "Halverson Detachment" were made; fires and explosions were caused all round the harbour and railway sidings in the vicinity were also attacked.

From 18th to 24th June, when the Axis advance was most rapid, 105 Wellington and 31 Liberator night sorties were made against the port to pre­vent the off-loading of supplies intended to help the enemy in his final break-through to the Delta.

Advance on. M[atruh The Matfyfi defences ^consisted basically of

T " b " aii intensive %iS(iefleld

ste'rly direction. It had been hoped to delay the enemy at the frontier for a considerable time while the Matruh defences could be strengthened, but the swift advance of the Axis armoured units deprived our land forces of the expected respite. The Matruh minefield had been laid previously with a gap in the middle and this gap had been hur­riedly closed. It was through this -sparsely mined area, north of Hamza, that the enemy pushed through with his armoured forces on 26th June. Our main forces now gradually retired to the Alamein line, while mobile units fought delaying actions in their rear.

R.A.F. Non-Stop Attacks During the time that the enemy was penetrating

our Matruh defences, the R.A.F. struck with its full might against the advancing columns and retained air supremacy over the( battle area.

Throughout the day, 25th June, escorted Bostons and fighter-bombers made continuous attacks on the enemy columns advancing from Misheifa towards Matruh. Targets were now close at hand and a high-pressure "shuttle service" was operated in an attempt to stem the advance of the armoured forces; 71 sorties were carried out by Bostons and 118 by fighter-bomb­ers. Unescorted Baltimores, operating at 17,000 to 18,000 feet, bombed large enemy concentrations, and Beaufighters ground-straffed the following columns which were more widely dispersed, scor­ing hits on transport vehicles and inflicting casualties on enemy troops. Beaufighters and Hurricanes also shot up aircraft on the landing-grounds at Sidi Barrani, which the enemy was attempting to put into commission as advanced landing grounds for his fighter aircraft.

As the enemy vehicles were now closely pack­ed, our medium bombers could at last be put on to battlefield targets and the non-stop bombing of the Axis columns continued throughout the night. Wellingtons, helped by Albacore illu­mination, made 36 effective sorties against tanks and transport, causing numerous fires and ex­plosions. In addition to the main effort of the medium bombers, eight Albacores dive-bombed forward columns, nine Bostons attacked the main concentrations, and nine Blenheims of No. 14 Squadron continued their nightly bombing of the coastal road traffic.

In spite of this preoccupation in the battle area, the need for constantly hindering the enemy's accumulation of supplies was not lost sight of. It was learnt that the enemy was al­ready bringing Tobruk into use as a reinforcing port, and so that night, 25/26 June, seven Libe­rators were despatched to bomb the harbour jetties, and continued their attacks for the next few nights.

On 26th June, the R.A.F. attacks on enemy columns south-west of Matruh with e

his.way through the inadequately covered area in the Matruh -minefield.

Bostons, acting* in close co-operation with Kittyhawks, made a record number of 101 sorties and the fighter-bombers carried out 178 sorties. Low-flying attacks on tanks and vehicles away from the main concentrations were also made by Hurricanes IIDs, and enemy transport in the rear between Buq Buq and Sidi Barrani was straffed by Beaufighters.

Enemy air activity over the Matruh area had now increased and our fighters made a number of interceptions. Hurricanes of No. 213 Squadron shot down five ME. 109s over Char­ing Cross, and patrols of Tomahawks, Kitty-hawks and Hurricanes each intercepted Stuka attacks at dusk directed against the Matruh " box," shooting down five of the JU.87s and damaging eight others. Our losses during the day were heavy, totalling 12 fighters destroyed, including 8 Kittyhawks, and two fighters and four light bombers seriously damaged.

The night bombing of the enemy columns from Sidi Barrani to Matruh was begun shortly after dusk by ten Bostons and was continued by 27 Wellingtons and seventeen Albacores until an hour or so before dawn, some of the last-named aircraft dropping flares to assist the Wellingtons.

R.A.F. close support the next day, 27th June, was much the same as on the previous day, except that the fighter-bombers were rested in an effort to build up serviceability. Escorted Bostons continued their attacks on the enemy columns south-west of Matruh and Beaufigh­ters straffed road traffic between Matruh and Bardia, putting out of action about 40 vehicles and causing much confusion and panic.

That night, the bombing of the enemy con­centrations now almost encircling Matruh was carried on with greater vehemence than ever, the closely packed vehicles and tanks affording splendid targets for Wellingtons, which made 63 effective sorties in the Matruh area, helped by Albacore illumination. In the enemy's rear, the Axis following columns stretching for miles westward were attacked by nine Liberators of No. 159 Squadron, and the group of landing grounds at Sidi Barrani were bombed by eleven Wellingtons and twenty Bostons.

Matruh " Box " Surrounded By 28th June, the main forces of the Vinth

Army had retired to the Alamein line, the with­drawal being covered by mobile units, help­ed by the non-stop R.A.F. bombing which im­peded the enemy's advance, and protected from air attacks by strong fighter patrols. The 10th Corps units surrounded in the Matruh "box" were now ordered to fight their way out to the south-east which they proceeded to do with magnificent courage, assisted by the 7th Motor­ised Brigade which turned back to help them. In order to protect this retreat on the 29th June, a fighter wing was retained at an aerodrome

in the Daba area in spite columns were east of Fukl from the landing ground, wJ idequate­ly protected.

Final Withdrawal of B.A.F. Squadrons From the time the enemy crossed the frontier

on 24th June, the R.A.F. withdrawal was speed­ed up as the advance of the Axis columns was practically unchecked. By 30th June, the dis­position of squadrons had been completed in readiness for the decisive battle.to be fought at Alamem. The squadrons concerned with opera­tions in the battle area and in the enemy's rear were now located as follows: fighters were based near Heliopolis<, H\elwam, and at a point ten miles south-west of Cairo, with operational bases in the Amiriya area; light bombers had bases in the Sues; Canal zone with advanced landing grounds south-west of Amiriya; medium bombers had withdrawn to aerodromes in Pales­tine, with operational bases in the Sues; Canal zone; the heavy bombers were now located entirely in Palestine.

The successive withdrawals culminating in the locations as given above were carried out smooth­ly and accompanied by the systematic destruction of material where this could not be taken away. Aircraft operated until the last minute, often attacking enemy units until they were within twelve miles of the landing ground. Due to the thorough work of the Repair and Salvage Units, all damaged aircraft were salvaged except five which were burnt on the ground on the approach of the enemy forces.

The full value of this work will be understood when it is remembered that the enemy in his retreat in the winter of 1941 had abandoned over 200 aircraft on his deserted aerodromes, many of which were only slightly damaged. In spite of our repeated moves and often unfavourable conditions, serviceability of aircraft was not only maintained at a high level but the percentage of serviceability in relation to strength actually rose; for example, this percentage for single­engined fighters rose from 67 per cent, for the first week of the campaign to 84.8 per cent, for the last week in June.

Prelude to Attack on Alamein R.A.F. activity on 28th and 29th June was on

a reduced scale, due to the final withdrawal of squadrons to new locations, which was then tak­ing place, and also the need to build up service-' ability in readiness for the imminent Alamein battle. Small fighter patrols were maintained over the battle area, but bombing operations there were confined almost exclusively to night at­tacks, Wellingtons on the night 29/30th June car­rying out 36 offective sorties on enemy columns between Sidi Barrani and Fuka. In addition, the Sidi Barramd landing grounds were heavily attacked on the two nights by light and medium bombers and attacks on the port of Tobn '

ontinued by eighteen heavy and nine medium bombers.

On the eve of the enemy attack, 30th June, the light bomber force again went into action against the advancing enemy columns, concen­trating particularly on tanks and vehicles in the area south of Daba. Bostons made 46 effective sorties and Baltimores, whose "teething troubles" were now practically over, made seventeen. Dust storms prevented the full observation of results, but numerous fires were seen. Beaufighters attacked transport vehicles in the Fuka area but, in general, weather conditions were un­favourable for low-flying ground attacks.

By this time, the enemy had brought forward a strong force of fighters and Stukas to Fuka, and an advanced landing ground for fighter air­craft was established at Daba. On the 30th June, however, and for part of the following two days, sand storms which were more prevalent in the above mentioned areas than at Amiriya grounded the enemy's forward-based aircraft. On the night 30th June/lst July, these forward landing grounds, and enemy concentrations in the vicinity, were bombed by Wellingtons, Blen­heims and Albacores, a total of 38 medium and 28 light bomber effective sorties being made. To limit the long-range bomber effort, also, JU.88 bases in Crete were attacked by 24 medium bombers.

Attack on Alamein By 1st July, our land forces had taken up their

positions on the Alamein line. This defended line, beginning- at the village of El Alamein on Arabs Gulf, extended south-south-west across Ruweisat Ridge 35 miles to the north-eastern tip of the impassable Qattara Depression. The defences included three strong points: El Ala­mein, a fortified central point, and a strongly defended southern section north-east of the Qattara Depression. In front of the positions, and harassing the enemy's right flank, were our motorised forces, but our main armour was with­drawn behind the line to act as a mobile reserve.

The battle opened on the morning of 1st July with an attack close to El Alamein by Ger­man and Italian units supported by tanks, but this was repulsed. In the afternoon, German armoured forces by-passed our central position and attacked it from the rear. This attack was also repulsed and our armour engaged the enemy and forced him to withdraw.

Early information was vital for.the rapid em­ployment of our air forces but little could be learnt from our forward formations and opera­tions were planned solely on air reconnaissance.

The light bomber "shuttle service" again came into operation against the enemy columns, particularly against those attacking the northern end of the Alamein line during the morning. In spite of a four-hour hold-up in the afternoon due to dust storms, over 100 bomber and an equal number of low-flying fighter attacks were made.

A i BATTLE AREA OCTOBER

The high light of the day, h vastating attack by BeaufightdW^oTnhe^gfoup uf landing grounds at Sidi Barrani, in which four JU.87s, one ME.109 and one ME.110 were destroyed and ten more Stukas and three other aircraft were damaged.

Offensive fighter patrols, now helped by a second Spitfire squadron, were maintained over the forward battle areas when weather conditions made them possible, but the enemy's fighter force was grounded through dust storms for the great­er part of the day and very few engagements occurred.

The entire Wellington force 'of seven squadrons, aided by Albacore tiare-dropping, was that night put on to targets in the battle and forward areas. The majority of the medium bombers at­tacked the enemy concentrations menacing the nortnern and central sectors of the Alamein front, inflicting widespread damage and again denying rest to the enemy's battle-weary troops; the remaining Wellingtons bombed the enemy's advanced landing grounds at b'uk,a and the rail­way at Daba. Anti-aircraft fire from the enemy's concentrations was now intense and two Wel­lingtons were shot down and three badly holed.

The next day, 2nd July, enemy armoured units overran our cencral position but our armour ul­timately forced them to retire to the north-west; an attack in the northern sector which developed in the afternoon was also repulsed by last lignt. Meanwhile, our land forces in the southern sector began an outflanking movement towards the north-west.

Air support for our land forces in the northern and central positions was continuous throughout the day, except for an enforced break in the afternoon due to low cloud. Combined sorties by light bombers and lignter-zbomoers again exceeded 200 and, in particular, two heavy raids in the evening helped our tioops to repel the enemy's attack in tne north. Beaufighters were again employed on shooting up dispersed aircraft on the enemy's advanced landmg grounds, but increased fighter opposition pre­vented a repetition of the previous day's success; an early morning attack on the enemy's fighter landing ground at Daoa was prevented by an enemy fighter patrol, and an attack on the aero­drome at x'uka, although moderately successful, proved expensive as two of our aircraft were shot down and a third was seriously damaged.

The enemy columns which had withdrawn westwards after the failure of their attacks, and other concentrations in the rear stretching back to Daba, were attacked throughout the night by the entire Wellington force. Numerous direct hits were registered on vehicles, including tanks, and many fires and explosions resulted; in the Daba area, one of the explosions shook a Well­ington flying at 6,000 feet ten miles away, and smoke from the larger fires started rose to 7,000 feet.

StftggTe>"Tor the Nile Valley "

The enemy made two major attacks on 3rd July and both were held and subsequently repulsed. An attack in the morning in the southern sector, made chiefly by Italian forces supported by tanks and artillery, was routed by New Zealand troops who captured 200 prisoners, 28 guns and over 100 vehicles. The thrust eastwards against our position on a ridge ten miles south of Alamein by German units, strongly supported by armour and guns, was checked by our 1st Armoured Division and artillery and the enemy was forced to retire to the north-west.

The outstanding R.A.F. effort on this day, made possible by ideal flying conditions, con­tributed greatly to the enemy's failure by well-timed attacks on his tanks and vehicles and the upsetting of his dive-bombing programme.

A record number of light bomber and fighter-bomber attacks, totalling over 300 effective sorties, was made, principally against enemy forces in the northern and central sectors, and some indication of the extensive destruction caused is given by the fact that over fifty fires were started among vehicle concentrations and gun positions.

The fighter effort was the greatest since the opening of the campaign: 219 sorties were carri­ed out on bomber and fighter-bomber escort duties, IV 3 on tighter-bomber and ground-straff­ing attacks, and 159 on offensive patrols.

The enemy air forces now attempted to give belated support to their tired troops and to hinder our bombing effort, but received a mauling from our fighters. Kittyhawks and Tomahawks escorting light bombers had four engagements with enemy fighters, shooting down an ME.109 and an ME.110 at the expense of two aircraft damaged, and Kittyhawks engaged on low-flying ground attacks, on being engaged by German and Italian fighters, shot down two of them for the cost of one aircraft damaged. Five Hurricane squadrons, aided by Spitfires and Kittyhawks, patrolled the battle area the entire day and suc­ceeded in intercepting three out of five Stuka attacks. The most spectacular "Stuka party" was that of No. 1 Squadron S.A.A.F. This squadron, with No. 274 as top cover, was on a sweep over Alamein at 19.000 hours when the .formation suddenly encountered fifteen JU.87s, escorted by about twenty M.E.109s. The Stukas jettisoned all bombs on sighting the Hurricanes and then dived down on to the " deck," where they weaved and jinked in a desperate effort to elude the attackers. The squadron leader of No.1 Squadron, having shot down a Stuka in the first few seconds, stayed above the combats and directed operations by R/T, while No. 274 Squad­ron kept the enemy's top cover of ME. 109s engaged. Fourteen of the fifteen JU.87s were destroyed without loss to No. 1 Squadron, and one fighter was also shot down: our casualties were one Hurricane of No. 274 Squadron damag­ed. In other engagements, three JU.87s and four

21

^ ^ W f c three ere probably destroyed, and four

JU.87s, five ME.109s and two MC.202s damaged. Our casualties for the day were eight Hurricanes destroyed, three Hurricanes and two Kittyhawks badly damaged and a number of other aircraft slightly damaged.

Beaufighters also added to the destruction of the enemy's air force by the successful straff­ing of landing grounds at Si<$i Barmni, des­troying four ME.109s, one S.79, and damaging six other ME.109s.

The VIHth Army daily signal to London summed up the 3rd July as "a satisfactory day much helped by the splendid work of the R.A.F."

The devastating bombing was continued throughout the night by the entire medium bomb­er force, supplemented by Albacores, Blenheims and two Fortresses. Enemy concentrations and communications from Alamein to Matruh were heavily attacked, the most striking features of the night's activity being the blowing up of an ammunition train near Daba and an attack on a tank repair depot east of Matruh, which caused explosions and fires with smoke rising to 1,000 feet.

The Axis Checked

The 4th July proved to be the turning point of the battle. Fighting was resumed by the arm­oured forces of either side in the northern sector and our armour, now reinforced, and helped by the well-directed bombing attacks of the R.A.F., forced the enemy to retire to the west. A sub­sidiary cause of the enemy's withdrawal was the fear of being enveloped by the movement of our forces moving west from the southern sector. During the day, about twenty German tanks were knocked out by our armour and 600 Ger­mans, suffering from exhaustion and lack of sleep, surrendered with an alacrity which indi­cated that the enemy troops were nearing the end of their tether.

On this critical day, the air effort was main­tained at its full intensity. The combined light bomber and fighter-bomber effective sorties totalled approximately 200, and their consistent attacks on the enemy's armoured forces closing in on the Alamein "box" contributed greatly to the enemy's decision to withdraw to the west.

In the enemy's rear, fighter-bombers also at­tacked his fighter landing ground at Daba, and Beaufighters shot up lorries filled with troops, putting out of action about 50 of these vehicles and straffing the occupants.

Six Hurricane squadrons, stiffened by Spitfires and Kittyhawks, carried out over 180 sorties on offensive patrols and intercepted three fighter sweeps and two Stuka attacks, the day's. bag consisting of three Stukas, three ME.109s and one MC.202 destroyed, four Stukas and six fight­ers probably destroyed and six more aircraft damaged. Our total losses for the day were four Hurricanes, two Kittyhawks and one Beaufighter

destroyed and four Kittyhawks and three Hur­ricanes badly damaged.

The Enemy's Difficulties

The impetus of the enemy's advance had been checked: thereafter, land attacks were launch­ed by both sides from fortified positions t« probe for weaknesses which might be exploited, but the much-advertised triumphant march to the Delta had taken its due place among historical might-have-beens.

The enemy was now beset with the difficulties attendant on supplying an army with land lines of communication stretching 600 miles to the west and an army, moreover, which was in im­mediate need of reinforcement in men and equip­ment. Matruh and, above all, Tobruk were now brought into use as reinforcing posts, and these became our objectives in ever-increasing bombing raids. Meanwhile, air attacks on the enemy's concentrations in the battle area and on landing grounds continued, and our ascendancy in the air remained unquestioned.

Probing of Defences

After the failure on his major attack against the Alamedn line on 4th July, the main enemy force moved southwards with the object of clos­ing the right flank and establishing suitable positions for operations against our southern sector. The reaction of our land forces to this move was an attack westwards on 9th July from the Alamein area, which forced the enemy to rush up forces to counter it. These enemy units then attempted to cut off our advanced troops by a frontal attack on Alamein which began on 13th July : this, however, was soon checked by our land forces, backed up by effective air support.

From 4th July onwards, it became increasing­ly clear that the VHIth Army had recovered its resilience and had the situation well in hand. All evidence pointed to the effectiveness of in­tensive 24-hour bombing in reducing the enemy's resistance and will to fight and consequently the R.A.F. bombers carried on at full pressure until the night of 6/7th July, after which, owing to the dispersal of the enemy's vehicles, suitable targets for a while became scarce, particularly for our night bombers. From the evening of 4/5th July to the evening of 6/7th July, Bostons and Baltimores made approximately 190 day sorties against enemy concentrations in the battle area and Wellingtons carried, out 176 sorties, aided by 57 sorties made by Albacores and Blenheims.

Captured letters seldom failed to dilate on the hell dealt out by our bombing and ground-straff­ing and the commander of at least one Italian corps found it necessary to issue a special order exhorting his troops to endure what he optimist­ically described as "the enemy's momentary superiority in aviation."

With the wider dispersal of the enemy's vehicles, the Boston and Baltimore effort return-

SSINEO 22

ed to normal, but the consequent r concentrated anti-aircraft fire favourfgp'fTgmef^ bomber activity, which continued at fun pressure. From 5th to 16th July, fighter-bombers carried out 1,321 effective sorties, iauing to exceed the 100 mark on three days only, wnen weatner con­ditions were unfavourable. Dawn to dusK attacks were made on transport columns and gun em­placements by the Murricane-bomber squadron and live Kittyhawk squadrons, which had now been fitted wicn bomb racKs.

Tne eitort was particularly intense on 9th and 10th Juiy, wnen our land torces were making their advance in tne nortnern sector and irom 13th to ltsth July wnen tne fullest support was given to our troops countering the enemy's irontal attacK directed against our Aiamein posi­tions.

On 9th July, the fighter-bombers made 140 ef­fective sorties in attacKs on enemy tanks and supply coiumns in tne Atomem aiea, but the enemy, tearing a repetition of tne destruction caused by our attacks wnen his venicies were concentrated, was keeping his transport wen dispersed. Unly two reaiiy good targets were located, consisting or a suppiy column oi 2,uuO dispersed venicies and a group or ouu lomes ; tnese were enectiveiy bomoed and at least 5u venicies were destroyed. Tne next day, over 100 rignter-bomoer sorties were carried out in the same area and, in addition to tne destruction of transport, successrui attacks were made on enemy gun emplacements.

From the 13tn to ltitn July, inclusive, the lignt bomber " shuttle service" again came into operation and tignter-bombers made a supreme enort as tne enemy attempted to pierce our northern derences.

As the enemy concentrated his forces, targets were again pientirui tor tne Bostons and Baici­mores and in tne tour days tney carried out 2b0 sorties. Six attacKs, comprising »Y sorties, made on 14th July were especially destructive, many enemy vehicles being immobilised and seven tires started. ttven greacer havoc, however, was wrougnt by the fignter-bomber force wnich aver­aged l«0 sorties on each of the four days in question, co-operating with Hurricane IiDs on three of the days. The 15th July may be taken as indicative of the scope of the raids. Con­centrated attacks were made on the enemy's armour; in one attack, direct hits were scored on several tanks and one burst into flames, and in another attack a number of 500 lb. bombs were dropped among several groups each con­sisting of fifteen tanks. Other attacks were directed against concentrations of transport vehicles and in one attack alone fourteen large lorries were destroyed. In addition, an enemy headquarters in the battle area was twice bomb­ed and forced to move, at least one direct hit being scoied on a group of three trailers.

The continuous bombing and straffing, helped by effective dive-bombing at night by Albacores,

le main reasons for inducing the enemy to abandon his attack.

Local Initiative Passes to Vinth Army

By the 17th July, the German land forces were seriously depleted and many units were reduced to as little as 25% of their establishment. Re­inforcement of personnel was proceeding rapidly, however, helped by the employment of transport aircrart from Crete, and as many as 1.0U0 men were brought over in a single day. It may be noted that these JU.52s did not always enjoy an uninterrupted passage, a case in point being the successful interception by Beautighcers on 11th July. On that day, aircraft of Nos. 252 and 272 Squadrons, on orrensive reconnaissance off the coast north of Tobruk, encountered about 25 southbound JU.52s full of troops: three of the troop carriers were shot down, one was probably destroyed and at least ten damaged.

More serious than the depletion of his man­power, however, were the enemy's losses in tanks, and it was estimated that he had 50 only, al­though these were, in general, superior in per­formance to the English types. To add to tnese troubles, the moraie of tne Italian troops was now at its nadir and their surrendering was be­coming a " tactical rule." On the asset side, however, the Axis retained a superiority in artil­lery and anti-tank guns.

Un the nignt 2lsc/22nd July, our land forces, intending to exploit the enemy's temporary weak­ness, began a general attack on the whole front, which was preceded by heavy artillery and air bombardment. During the night, Wellingtons made 48 and Albacores 27 efrective sorties in attacks against enemy tanks and transport vehicles: tour direct hits were scored on a group of tanks, an ammunition lorry was blown up, numerous vehicles were put out of action, and among the many fires started, three appeared to be petrol burning. Our land forces made con­siderable progress, capturing Tel hli htisa in the north, advancing along the Ruweisat RtriLge in the Central sector, and reaching Ml Taqa plateau in the south.

The next day, 22nd July, escorted light bomb­ers made five attacks on enemy columns in tne northern and central sectors, Bostons carrying out 53, and Baltimores, which had now been re­inforced by a second squadron, making 24 effect­ive sorties. Fighter - bombers also operated at full intensity, carrying out over 120 effective sorties, principally in the same areas as the light bombers. One attack in the northern sector was made immediately before an attack by our land forces, and in the southern sector enemy artil­lery which was holding up the advance of our troops was also successfully bombed. These at­tacks, which caused widespread destruction, were made at the cost of three Kittyhaws destroyed and one seriously damaged.

The intensive bombing of the enemy's trans­port and supply dumps in the battle area was continued throughout the night_by-4j2 Welling­

cons, aided by 34 Albacpres. Tne attacks were, particularly successful; many direct hits were scored on vehicles of all types, thiee petrol bowsers were seen to go up in flames, and the last aircraft to leave the scene observed fifteen fires burning, the smoke rising to 2,000 feet.

The battle continued during the 23rd July, but by the end of the day our forces, in general, had withdrawn to their original positions; in the northern and central sectors our armour was checked by the enemy's anti-tank guns and in the south stony ground had prevented our troops digging in to consolidate the positions won.

Escorted light bombers made three 'morning attacks on about 500 vehicles, including tank carriers north of the central sector, immobilising 25 vehicles and causing five fires, and in the southern sector transport and gun emplacements were effectively bombed. Fighter-bombers made 73 sorties in the course of the day, helping our withdrawing troops by attacks on enemy posi­tions, transport and gun emplacements.

For the next few days, the wide dispersal of vehicles in the battle area limited the scope of our day bombing, but a proportion of the Welling­ton force, helped by Albacores, made nightly attacks on rear concentrations south-east of Daou, making 77 effective sorties in the four nights 24/25th to 27/28th July.

During the night 26/27th July, our land forces resumed their offensive, making some progress in the north and in the' central sector. The enemy's minefields and artillery, however, proved to be more formidable than expected and on the 27th July our troops were obliged to return vo their original positions.

During the morning of the 27th July, escorted Baltimores and Bostons made 30 sorties, bombing transport vehicles and enemy positions in the northern sector in support of our troops, and these objectives were also bombed by four squadrons of Kittyhawks. Later in the day also, enemy tanks and gun emplacements were attack­ed by further Kittyhawk-bombers, and the bombing was reported by our advanced troops to have been very effective.

Stalemate at Alamein By the 28th July, it was evident that neither

side was sufficiently strong to deliver a knock­out blow to the other and each required a breathing spell in order to accumulate the men, material and supplies necessary for the re­sumption of full-scale operations.

The R.A.F., by its non-stop bombing in the battle area, had played a major part in the ar­resting of the Axis advance and had afforded support to our land forces in their attempts to launch counter-attacks.

R.A.F. Fighter Effort, 5th to 28th July There had been no slackening of the R.A.F.

fighter effort as the Alamein line became stabi­lised. In fact, with the enemy gradually con­centrating his air striking force at Fuka and

Daba, the need for retaining air supremacy be­came increasingly vital and that this was achi­eved was freely admitted even by the enemy.

During the period 5th to 28th July, R.A.F. fighters carried out a total of 9,460 sorties, 87% of these being made over the battlefield and for­ward areas.

2,174 sorties were made on low-flying attacks and 1,470 on bomber and fighter-bomber escort duties: the effect of the ground attacks in the battle area has already been indicated, and the success of our escorting fighters is shown by the fact that one escorted light bomber only was shot down in combat during the entire campaign.

The principal part of the fighter effort during the twenty-four days in question was directed to offensive patrols, 4,298 sorties being carried out on this activity. As a result of combats arising from interceptions at least 44 bombers were shot down and an equal number probably destroyed or damaged, and fighter losses were estimated ut 53 destroyed, 32 probably destroyed and 80 dam­aged. , Our fighter losses were 73 destroyed and 45 seriously damaged.

Offensive patrols and sweeps were particularly active on the 10th and 11th July, the 13th to 16th July inclusive, the 22nd to 24th July inclusive and on the 27th July.

On the 10th July, aircraft drawn from nine Hurricane squadrons, supplemented by Spit­fire, Kittyhawk and Tomahawk squadrons, made a record total of 373 sorties covering our troops making their advance westwards in the northern sector. Six engagements occurred with enemy aircraft, as a result of which two large form­ations of enemy bombers and dive-bombers, heavily escorted by fighters, were forced to jet­tison their bombs; three ME.109s, one MC.202 and two CR.42s were shot down, five ME.109s and one MC.202 probably destroyed, and twelve other fighters damaged. We lost four Hur­ricanes. On the next day, 11th July, our fighters continued their task of providing cover for our land forces, carrying out 302 sorties on offensive patrols, but there were few engagements with escorted formations of enemy bombers, and three escorting ME.109s only were shot down.

In the course of the four days 13th to 16th July inclusive, 1,088 sorties were made by Hur­ricanes, Kittyhawks and Spitfires on offensive sweeps planned to intercept enemy formations which sporadically attempted to give close sup­port to the enemy land forces in their frontal attack on our northern positions. The results achieved on the 16th July were especially good: several bomber formations were intercepted and two JU.87s, one JU.88 , and two ME. 109s shot down, three ME.109s probably destroyed, and seven JU.87s and one ME.109 damaged, for the loss of two Hurricanes.

Although patrols were maintained over the battle and forward areas on the days 22nd v.o 24th and on the 27th July, when our- land forces were launching counter-attacks, over 150 sorties being made on offensive sweeps on each of the

24

days in question, relatively few combats place. This was due to the fact that the en air effort was now reduced, partly owing tv, successful attacks on his aerodromes and partly to his need for building up serviceability.

Attacks on Enemy Landing Grounds

As the Alamein line became stabilised, the enemy air forces gradually caught up with their land forces, establishing operational bases in the forward area, particularly at Fuka and Daba. These landing grounds became the objective of ever-increasing R.A.F. attacks.

From 5th-14th July, before anti-aircraft pro­tection was too formidable, constant attacks on the enemy's advanced landing grounds at Daba were made by Kittyhawk-bombers. On 5th July, fighter-bombers, using cloud cover, put out of action six JU.88s, nine JU.87s and seven ME. 109s on-the Daba landing • grounds. The next day, a force of Kittyhawk-bombers, co-operat­ing with eleven escorted Bostons, made another attack destroying one ME.109 and one HE.Ill and damaging four JU.88s, one HE.lll and over ten ME.109s. Two days later, on 8th July, 32 Kittyhawk-bombers made a further successful surprise attack at noon against two landing grounds in the same area. On one landing ground a large fire was started among ten ME.109s, which were refuelling, a JU.87 was destroyed by a direct hit and three JU.88s were damaged. On 10th July, also, repeated Kittyhawk-bomber at­tacks were made on the Daba landing grounds in order to limit the enemy air effort against our troops launching their counter-attacks, and the aircraft damaged on the ground included four dive-bombers.

During the second fortnight in July, light and medium bomber activity against enemy landing grounds increased as the enemy's squadrons be­came firmly established in the forward area.

Experience showed that night bombing, in­cluding the dropping of delayed-action bombs and spikes, followed up by early morning at­tacks on the next day, was the most effective form of attack. During the night 23/24th July, for example, 30 Wellingtons aided by 12 Bostons bombed the two main Daba landing grounds, scoring direct hits on aircraft and causing firea and explosions, and this attack was succeeded by two more raids the next morning by 12 Balti­mores and 18 Bostons, escorted by Kittyhawks and Tomahawks, and 30 Kittyhawk-bombers. As a result of bombing, direct hits were scored on dis­persed aircraft, fires were started among several other groups, and two aircraft which attempted to take off during the raid crashed. When the dust had cleared, the Kittyhawks machine-gunned one landing ground from a low height, damaging 21 more aircraft. In addition, the Kittyhawks, before releasing their bombs, shot down two JU. 88s and one ME.109 over the landing ground. The effect of the raid was apparent the next day when enemy activity was on a greatly reduced scale.

n W W r o u n d s m tne

s on the nights 24/25th and 25/26th July bombed aerodromes at Herak­lion, Crete, in order to limit the enemy long-range bomber activity.

As a result of these well-planned raids on his landing grounds (it was estimated that about 40 aircraft were destroyed and many more damaged) the enemy's power to support land operations with air attacks was limited and his chance of disput­ing our air ascendancy was constantly reduced.

Bombing of Enemy Ports and Bases

As soon as the enemy had been halted at Ala­mein, the interruption of his supplies both at sea and in port, which had never been neglected even when commitments in the battle area were most exacting, became the main pre-occupation of the long-range bomber force. From 5th to 28th July, 187 heavy, 806 medium and 97 light bomber effective sorties were carried out against enemy bases and harbours.

Benghazi was now out of range for Welling-tons carrying an effective load, but in the 24 days under review, Liberators of No. 159 Squadron and U.S.A.A.F. made 56 effective sorties against the port and caused considerable damage to docks and shipping in the harbour. The smallness of the Middle East heavy bomber force, how­ever, precluded any possibility of actually closing the port.

Immediately after the capture of Tobruk on 20th June, the port was put into use for the off-loading of Axis supplies, and, owing to its ample harbour facilities and not too formidable distance from the front, it rapidly became the enemy's principal reinforcing port and, in consequence, the predominant target of our long-range bombers. From 5th to 28th July, heavy bombers made 112 and medium bombers 798 effective sorties in at­tacks against Tobruk, all of which except for 31 heavy bomber sorties were made at night. On the night of 17/18th July, the Wellington effort rose to 50 effective sorties and on four other oc­casions the medium bombers exceeded the 40 mark. The raid on the night 20/21st July may be taken as a typical example. Eight Halifaxes and twenty-nine Wellingtons co-operated in this at­tack on shipping and harbour installations; one ship was set on fire by a direct hit and several fires accompanied by violent explosions broke out on a jetty and along the entire water front; in-addition, five of, the Wellingtons laid mines in the harbour.

Matruh harbour, which was being used as an advanced reinforcement port, was also at­tacked as the occasion demanded, and shipping, jetties, dumps and tank repair shops in the vicin­ity became the objects of night attacks by light bombers. In all, 97 effective sorties were carried out against the port and other targets in the area.

The R.A.F. attacks on the enemy's reinforce­ment ports were continued on an even greater scale during the succeeding month, and the date

for the resMptUft aPfh^lfis*6ffensiVB WHs cons­tantly postponed due to the failure to accumulate the necessary supplies.

Development of the Air Arm

Any lingering idea that the R.A.F. was simply a useful adjunct of the land forces, capable of ren­dering help at given times in restricted areas r>f the battlefield, was finally swept away.

From 20th May, a week before the opening of the land offensive until 28th July, when the Ala­mein line was stabilised, R.A.F. bombers carried out nearly 7,000 and fighters nearly 20,000 ef­fective sorties against targets in the Western Desert and Cyrernaica.

When the battle was mobile and protection was afforded to the enemy columns by dispersal and movement, air attacks, particularly by fighter-bombers, which proved more effective and eco­nomical than the enemy's dive-bombers, were de­vastating but not decisive. When, however, the enemy's forces were concentrated before our Alamein positions, the R.A.F's non-stop bomb­ing proved a decisive factor in the stemming of the enemy's advance.

In the enemy's rear, moreover, the air arm reached out to destroy supplies on the sea and at the ports and struck at the enemy's aircraft at their bases.

In spite of these tasks, sight was never lost of the need for maintaining air superiority.

THE SECOND PHASE • THE REINFORCEMENT RACE 29lh July -30th August

THE ENEMY REALISED that the longer the stalemate at Alamein continued, the better or­ganized and reinforced the Vlllth Army would become. Accordingly, the Axis land forces con­centrated on strengthening their forward positions in order to withstand any surprise counter-attack and, in the meantime, every effort was made lo remedy deficiencies in men, material and supplies in readiness for the resumption of their offensive.

The greatest difficulty which the enemy had to overcome was that of transportation which in­volved the keeping open of his Mediterranean shipping routes and the maintenance of lines of communications stretching westwards to Ben­ghazi. Shipping was supplemented by the use of air transport from Europe via Crete to To­bruk, with a feeder-line running to Matruh and later as far as Fuka. To obviate the difficulties of transporting supplies from Benghazi, Tobruk was used on an ever-increasing scale and traffic with "F" boats was developed along the coast westwards to Matruh. In addition, captured motor transport had been pressed into service and the desert railway was brought into use again early in August.

During this quiescent phase in the ground fighting, our land forces maintained the initiative in local activity but weakness in armour limited the extent of their offensive operations. In the meantime, while reinforcing went on a pace, depth was given to the defences in the rear of the Ala­mein front; in particular, the defence covering Alexandria was vested in an independent for­mation, the Delta Force; defensive positions were prepared at Wadi Natrun, and the Mena de­fences were undertaken by British Troops in Egypt. In short, until the building-up of the land forces was completed the VTIIth Army was prepared for a defensive battle.

To fulfil our fixed purpose of hindering the enemy's reinforcement while continuing

own, the R.A.F. had a full part to play. In co­operation with the Royal Navy, attacks were made on enemy shipping and protection was given -to our own vessels: these operations in the Eastern Mediterranean are considered separately elsewhere in this Review. On the mainland, the bombing of the Axis 3upply ports continued with increased vehemence and constant attacks were carried out on the enemy's land lines of communication.

In addition to the considerations indicated in the preceding paragraph, the skilful handling of the fighter force and well-planned attacks on enemy aerodromes were ever necessary to retain air superiority, and close support to the land for­ces was given whenever the opportunity arose.

Increased Strength of the R.A.F.

On 29th July, the strength of R.A.F. operational aircraft in Egypt and the Western Desert (in­cluding the Fleet Air Arm) totalled over 900, representing, in spite of the previous two months' battle wastage, an increase of more than 50 air­craft since the commencement of the campaign. The light bomber force had been greatly strength­ened by the introduction of more Baltimores and the withdrawal of the outmoded Blenheims; the fighter force, however, was still depleted and, in particular, was low in Kittyhawk strength while the Spitfires still constituted merely a token force.

During the next month, aircraft reinforcing continued at a steady rate. Between 29th July and 26th August, 181 bomber and 254 fighter air­craft arrived in the Middle East for disposal as the need arose. The principal bomber rein­forcements consisted of Bostons and Wellingtons, and among the fighter aircraft Hurricane Us predominated. The number of new and recon­ditioned aircraft actually issued to squadrons from the maintenance units totalled 149 bombers

and 335 fighters: the principal bombe were 60 Baltimores, 24 Wellingtons and tons, and the fighter aircraft included 145 Hur­ricane IIs, 85 Kittyhawks and 47 Spitfires.

The strength of the bomber force gave few-grounds for worry. The small force of R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. Liberators was valuable for long-range bombing and Halifaxes arrived in the Com­mand on 8th July and began operations almost immediately; but it was realised that the im­mediate building-up of a large heavy bomber force in the Middle East was an impracticability.

The average total weekly strength of Welling-tons during the phase under review was 100 air­craft and serviceability averaged 67 per cent.

The light bombers regularly operating in the Western Desert comprised two squadrons of Bostons and two of Baltimores. The average to­tal weekly strength of Bostons during the phase under review was approximately 46 aircraft, with an average serviceability of 69 per cent., and that of the Baltimores was approximately 47 aircraft, with 65 per cent, serviceability.

The strength of the fighter force, particularly in respect of those types which bore any compar­ison with the performance of the latest Axis fighters, continued to be a source of misgiving <-o the higher command.

The Kittyhawk squadrons were especially short of aircraft. At the beginning of the phase, the total Kittyhawk strength was 87, averaging 14-f aircraft per squadron. By conserving these air­craft as much as possible the average strength per week rose to 92 aircraft, with serviceability averaging 73 per cent.

Hurricane squadrons had been operating at full intensity against superior aircraft and were strained. On 29th July, the strength of Hurri­canes actively engaged in Western Desert oper­ations was 214 aircraft, but the aircraft weekly strength during the phase rose to 251 aircraft by reason of reinforcements and few casualties.

Spitfires remained at low strength throughout the phase. On 29th July, the total strength amounted to only 23 aircraft. By the middle of August, however, a third squadron had begun operations, and the average weekly strength during the last fortnight in August rose to 43, with an average serviceability of 69 per cent. Ac­cordingly, Spitfires could now take an appreciable part in operations, although fewness in numbers still prevented this part being decisive.

B.A.F. Bomber Effort

The bomber effort during August was, for reas­ons already considered, primarily directed against the enemy's ports and bases, the attacks being carried out chiefly by heavy and medium bombers.

Prior to the middle of the month, Halifax squad­rons were stationed in Palestine, but thereafter they operated from the Canal zone; conversely, Liberators first operated from the Canal zone and then removed to Palestine. Wellingtons were now based in the Canal zone once again, and. by

landing grounds theT itfesfT'beTw'een ~Cak-o and Wadi Natrun,

were also brought into use. Tobruk, the chief Axis supply port, was with­

in handy range and received nightly visits from large formations of bombers. During the phase under review, 1,200 medium and 245 heavy bomber effective sorties were made against the port. These attacks on Tobruk, coupled with the Royal Navy and R.A.F. attacks on shipping, hindered the enemy's accumulation of supplies to such an extent that he was obliged to postpone the resumption of his offensive, originally timed for 25th August (the period of the full moon) till the night of 30/31st August. These days of grace were a great help to our land forces.

Apart from Tobruk, the advanced base of Ma­iruh was most heavily attacked, 113 light and 50 medium bomber sorties being carried out against the harbour installations, dumps and re­pair shops. In addition, heavy bombers made a few raids on Benghazi, Heraklion, Navarino and Suda Bay, when aerial reconnaissance reported particularly suitable targets, and light and me­dium bombers occasionally bombed Bardia and Sollum.

Owing to the static nature of the ground fight­ing, far fewer targets were available in the battle and forward areas than during the previous month of close fighting, but adequate close sup­port was given to the* land forces: in all, medium bombers carried out approximately 260 sorties and light bombers 240 against enemy camps, positions and lines of communication. From 29th July until 21st August, sorties were comparatively few, the biggest attack being carried out by Bostons and Baltimores on transport concentrations on the 4th and 5th August. From the night of 21/22nd August until 31st August, however, when the enemy was preparing to resume his attack, 216 medium and 81 light bomber sorties were made against targets in the battle area, particularly in the central sector. Throughout the phase, also, Bostons made successful night raids against the enemy's lines of communications immediately be­hind the front, but Baltimores were found to be unsuitable for night operations as distortion due to curved windscreens affected night landings.

Attacks on enemy aerodromes and landing grounds were continuous throughout the entire phase, over 220 sorties being carried out against these objectives, particularly against those in the Fuka and Daba areas. From the night of 25/26th to 30th August 45 medium and 46 light bomber effective sorties were made, and these seriously hampered the Axis air forces' prepar­ations for their impending attack. The success of these raids is best illustrated by the fact that the Stukas were ultimately withdrawn from the Daba area to a base at Sidi Haneish.

Bombing Attacks in Detail

The following accounts illustrate the scope of the raids during the phase under review.

Tobruk : Night 29/30th July

This attack indicates the intensity of the Tob­ruk raids, their combined nature, and the va­riety of the targets attacked. From 00.40 to 03.05 hours, 57 Wellingtons, 3 Liberators and 7 Hali­faxes took part in a series of attacks. The docks received most attention and many fires were started. In particular, bombs from the Liberators started a yellowish blaze which could be seen for twenty miles. The Halifaxes concentrated on fuel installations, and Wellingtons which arrived on the scene later "stocked-up" the conflagrations caused. At least one direct hit was scored on a ship in the harbour and a number of near misses on other vessels were reported. Other targets attacked included power houses, searchlight positions and the El Ghilobi aerodrome. Six Wellingtons also laid twelve mines in allotted areas of the harbour. Although the anti-aircraft fire was fairly intense and accurate, all of our aircraft returned safely.

Day Attacks on Landing Grounds

The effectiveness of these raids is exemplified by the following attacks on landing grounds on Daba and Fuka.

Attacks were carried out on the Daba land­ing grounds by six Baltimores of No. 223 Squad­ron and twelve Bostons of No. 12 Squadron, short­ly after 07.00 hours on 9th August. The Baltimores, operating from 9f000 feet, dropped 18 X 250 lb. and 12 X 500 lb. bombs. One near miss on aircraft was claimed, and a fire, with smoke rising to a height of 1,000 feet, was report­ed. The Bostons, attacking from 7,500 feet, drop­ped 24 X 500 lb. and 24 X 250 lb. bombs. Three near misses were claimed on a JU.52.

The conservative nature of the claims is shown by the fact that "the examination of photographs later proved that, in all, 27 dispersed aircraft had been damaged or destroyed on L.G.104, which had "been attacked principally by the Baltimores. It had taken two months to reach such a hig'u standard in accurate bombing, as the aircraft had no automatic distributors. The Baltimores were by now considered to be even more effective than the Bostons for day bombing.

In the early morning of 14th August an ex­tremely successful attack was carried out by twelve Baltimores of No. 55 Squadron and eleven Bostons of No. 24 Squadron against the enemy's main landing grounds at Fuka. In all, 45X500 lb., and 35 X 250 lb. bombs, and eleven boxes c f 20 X 4 lb. incendiary bombs were dropped. Many direct hits and near misses were scored on dis­persed aircraft and numerous fires were started. The effectiveness of the raid can be judged by the fact that it stopped the Italians from operating for four days. The only damage sustained by our aircraft was the slight holing of two Balti­mores by anti-aircraft fire.

Attacks prior to Enemy's Offensive

Heavy attacks were carried out during the last week in August in order to hinder the enemy's

preparations for the renewal of his offensive, the following raids being characteristic efforts.

From 22.30 to 02.15 hours on the night of 23/24th August sorties were carried out by 41 Wellingtons and ten Albacores, which also pro­vided illumination, on enemy concentrations in th« central sector. The Albacores dive-bombed M.T. concentrations, while the Wellingtons scored hits on tanks, transport and tents, and these objec­tives were also machine-gunned with good effect.

Two nights later, the enemy's forward land­ing grounds at Daba were attacked by twenty-six Wellingtons, eleven Bostons, six Albacores and nine Mitchells (of U.S.A.A.F.). In all, 437 X 2501b. bombs and 36,000 spikes were dropped. Bursts were seen among dispersed aircraft and many fires were started. After this raid, Stukas were chary of operating from Daba and removed some sixty miles in the rear, and consequently their activity against our" land forces was res­tricted.

The U.S.A.A.F. Bomber Effort

Liberators of the U.S.A.A.F. concentrated main­ly on dusk attacks on enemy convoys, shipping in Sudu Bay and Navarino harbour and shipping and docks at Tobruk, more than 115 effective sorties being carried out during the phase. Mitchells, which ibegan operations in mid-August, had made over 50 sorties by the end of the month: their principal objectives were Matruh and the landing grounds at Qotaifiya. The Ame­ricans had' settled down well, and as their air force increased, more and more valuable help was given to the Middle East striking force.

R.A.F. Fighter Effort

During the lull in the main battle, the fighter strength was conserved, as far as possible, so that it could again put forward a maximum effort when the enemy attempted a renewal of his of­fensive.

From 29th July to 30th August inclusive, 5,700 sorties were made by fighter aircraft, excluding shipping sweeps and protection, which are dealt with elsewhere. This total is somewhat over half of the previous month's figure, when the fighters were operating at the highest intensity. In consequence of the static ground situation, there were comparatively few low-flying attacks and bomber and fighter-bomber escort duties also required less fighters as the bombing in the battle area declined. Offensive patrols were maintained, but on a more limited scale than formerly, as there was, in general, little enemy air activity over the forward areas. 1,955 sorties were car­ried out on this activity, representing about 45% of the effort expended in the previous months.

More fighter aircraft were now available for local defence, however, and adequate protection was given to our advanced landing grounds around Amiriya and Burg El Arab and to the back areas, 1,272 sorties being made on these duties.

28

The Hurricane squadrons had been operating at the limit of their range against superior aircraft and were strained, so these aircraft were now almost entirely confined to an anti-Stuka role and as escort to tactical reconnaissance aircraft, and their employment against enemy fighters was restricted. The Hurricanes proved success­ful in intercepting the enemy's dive-bombers, and the experience gained served them in good stead during the early days of September, when the enemy launched another attack against the Ala­mein line.

Combats and Interceptions Owing to the limited enemy air activity over

the forward areas, combats were comparatively few and casualties on either side were not heavy. The following two short accounts, however, in­dicate how air superiority was maintained during the entire phase.

On 19th August, twelve Spitfires of No. 92 Squadron, which had begun operations in the Middle East Command only six days previously, were flying on a protective sweep, while No. 274. Squadron Hurricane - bombers were bombing enemy transport concentrations, with No. 1 (S.A.A.F.) Squadron Hurricanes acting as top cover. A mixed formation of twenty ME.109s and MC.202s, flying at 12/14,000 feet, were sight­ed and immediately attacked by the Spitfires. As a result of the ensuing combats, four ME.109s were shot down, four probably destroyed and four damaged. Nine of the twelve Spitfire pilots claimed victims, and only one Spitfire was dam­aged.

While on offensive patrol over the battle area on 29th August, eleven Kittyhawks of No. 2 S.A. A.F. Squadron'were jumped by five MC.202s and two ME.109s. A dog-fight followed from which only one enemy aircraft escaped unscathed. 'In all, one MC.202 was destroyed, another probably destroyed, and two MC.202s and two ME.109s were damaged for the loss of one Kittyhawk.

Reconnaissance Effort As the enemy's air strength increased in the

forward area, the opposition to No. 208 Squadron tactical reconnaissance aircraft increased. For­merly, these aircraft operated singly or with a "weaver" and obtained guidance on the enemy air activity from the fighter control by having the enemy plots over the battle area broadcast. In August, however, enemy air opposition forced es­corts to be provided, with a resultant reduction in the number of sorties which could be carried out. Valuable information was obtained, how­ever, about enemy transport movement and con­centrations, gun positions and digging-in acti­vities.

Strategical reconnaissance was continued by Baltimores of No. 1437 Flight and when possible photographs were taken. The coastal area from Matruh to Tobruk was constantly covered. Re­ports were made of shipping in harbours, road

In addition, a number of reconfiai5sa?feeg V1vere made of enemy positions in the forward area, at Tobruk and the Siwa Oasis.

The work of the P.R.U. Flight was outstanding. The battle area, enemy landing grounds and ports were regularly covered and the majority of the greatly increased photographic requirements was successfully met.

Air Defence of Egypt With the enemy's fighter force located at Daba,

^Alexandria and the great part of the Delta were within range of the enemy long-range fight­er force. As nearly all the R.A.F. fighter force, apart from the night Beaufighters and No. 94 Squadron Hurricanes, was employed in the battle area, a Hurricane night-fighter squadron (No.73) was also allotted for defensive operations. Later, No. 211 Group held two squadrons and No. 252 Wing kept six aircraft in readiness for the day fighter defence of iheAlexandria area.

During the phase under consideration, the de­fensive fighters destroyed five HE.Ills, three JU.88s, one JU.86 and three C.Z.1007s; another JU.86 was probably destroyed and five other air­craft _were damaged.

Linked up with the general defence of Egypt was the safeguarding of our landing grounds. During August, it became known that enemy parachute troops were in the battle area, and gliders had been observed at Tobruk. There was, accordingly, a possibility that the enemy might use these troops in attacks against our landing grounds, and the following precautions were taken. Strong detachments, including tanks, were allocated to 12 A.A. Brigade, the formation responsible for the anti-aircraft defence of our aerodromes; R.A.F. units were warned to make full local preparations to encounter possible at­tacks; Hurricane squadrons were trained and ready to provide a night-fighter force to help No. 73 Squadron if determined enemy night attacks were made.

Enemy Air Operations During August, the German Air Force was

located at Fuka and using the Daba landing grounds as advanced bases. The Italians had their forward aerodromes at Fuka, with the greater part of their air force in the rear, stretching back to Tripoli. Until the last few days of the month the enemy air forces were primarily employed on the tasks of helping with the -conveying and protection of reinforcements and supplies to the Axis' African supply ports, particularly Tob­ruk, and attempting to deny us the passage of supplies to Malta. Above all, the enemy, like ourselves, was building up serviceability in readi­ness for the renewal of his attack. In con­sequence, operations against our Alamein po­sitions and Egypt were on a limited scale until 28th August, when renewed air activity heralded the resumption of the Axis offensive.

In general, throughout the phase, offensive action was undertaken by the German Air Force, while the Italians occupied themselves almost ex­clusively with defensive duties, particularly pro­tection of shipping.

From 18th to 25th August, the enemy's bomber activity was on an increased scale. With the rising moon, German long-range bombers re­sumed their night attacks against targets in Egypt. In particular, aerodromes in the Ami­riya and Wadi Natirun areas were attacked on the four nights 21/22nd to 24/25th August by forces of five to twelve aircraft, chiefly JU.88s, but on the whole little damage was done. Activity in the forward areas was slight until the night of 25/26th August, when the bombing of our po­sitions was carried out by Crete-based aircraft. Heavy raids were also made on our aerodromes, but as in the previous May, the attacks were singularly ineffective.

^Position at 30th August The v m t h Army had utilised the lull in the

ground fighting in training newly-arrived units, and the defences and dispositions were such that the enemy attack was awaited with confidence.

The R.A.F. was also fully prepared to play its part in the coming battle, and the total strength of operational aircraft based in Egypt and the Western Desert well exceeded the 900 mark. The maximum force was concentrated and con­trol was facilitated by excellent telephonic com­munications. All units which had been withdrawn for the defence of the Delta were once more in the field, and pilots who knew the terrain, in­timately were plentiful. Supplies for a maximum effort were ready on all landing, grounds. The word was awaited to throw in the full weight of the air striking force.

The next few days would tell if the Axis had won the all-important reinforcement race.

THE THIRD PHASE-THE OFFENSIVE THAT FAILED Night 30th/31st August to 5th September

ON THE NIGHT of 30th August, the Axis forces resumed their offensive in a fresh endeavour io defeat the VTIIth Army and occupy the Delta.

The move was expected as clear signs of an impending attack had been apparent for several days. The enemy's dive-bomber and fighter activ­ity had been reduced in order to build up service­ability; long-range bombers had been switched from Sicily to Crete; heavy night attacks had been carried out on our main aerodromes; and determined attempts were made by strong stand­ing fighter patrols to prevent our aerial recon­naissance of the southern sector. With regard to the enemy's night bombing effort, it is interesting to note that some of it was wasted against decoy landing grounds and decoy fires which had been skilfully improvised at suitable places in the Delta.

The last tactical reconnaissance aircraft operat­ing on the evening of 30th August reported three fresh concentrations of enemy vehicles in the southern sector and a force of Wellingtons and Albacores was briefed to attack these targets. By midnight, it was clear from the ground and air reports that a full-scale enemy attack had begun.

The enemy's armour in two main columns pe­netrated our minefields between Munassib and Himeimat '• the northern column, comprising the 15th Armoured Division, included 140 tanks and the southern column was made up of the 21st Armoured Division, with approximately 70 tanks. The 90th Light Division also advanced on the left flank but made little progress.

The enemy concentrations were bombed during the night by twenty Wellingtons and eleven Al­bacores, the latter also illuminating the targets. Most of the bombs dropped burst among tanks

and transport vehicles, destroying several by di­rect hits and damaging others by near misses, and at least five fires were caused. One Albacore forced-landed after completing its bombing and one Wellington crash-landed as a result of an attack by an enemy night-fighter.

The next morning, 31st August, the two main enemy columns continued eastwards until noon, when the northern column halted a few miles south-west of Deir El Ragil and the southern column stopped a short distance south-west of Deir El Risw, apparently waiting for the 90th Light Division to join them. The pause was pro­bably used for replenishment and may have been extended, moreover, owing to poor visibility.

The rear enemy columns were attacked twice by escorted light bombers during the morning: 15 Bostons and 17 Baltimores bombed tanks and vehicles a few miles south of Munassib, scoring direct hits and starting three fairly large fires, and three Mitchells (of the U.S.A.A.F.) attacked transport between Munassib and Himeimat. The anti-aircraft fire protecting the enemy's con­centrations was intense and three Bostons and eight Baltimores were damaged.

At about 15.30 hours, the German armoured divisions continued without the 90th Light Divi­sion, moving off in two columns in a north­easterly direction. By 18.00 hours, contact was made with our land forces about three miles south-west of Alam El Bueib and in the ensuing engagement the enemy suffered at least 25 tank casualties. The enemy's armour then withdrew further south for the night.

During the time that the Axis columns were halted dust storms prevented any air operations, but in the evening, in spite of adverse weather

30

conditions, attacks were resumed on transport following up the main enemy columns in the area between Mtmassib and Himeimat by eighteen Bostons and two Mitchells, escorted by Kitty-hawks. Three direct hits were scored and five fires were started, but poor visibility prevented the observation of full results.

Offensive patrols were maintained over the bat­tle area by Hurricanes and Spitfires, except dur­ing the afternoon when dust storms were preval­ent. Special mention may be made of an inter­ception by twelve Hurricanes of No. 213 Squadron of 40 JU.87s escorted by fifteen plus ME.109s and MC.2.02s. The JU.87s were forced to jettison their bombs in their own territory and.three of them were shot down. On our side, one Hur­ricane was destroyed and one damaged. As a result of other engagements during the day, one ME.109 and one MC.202 were destroyed, and two ME.109s and two JU.87s damaged, at the cost cf one Spitfire and three Hurricanes destroyed.

In addition to the casualties inflicted by R.A.F. fighters, our anti-aircraft fire shot down three JU.87s, three ME.109s, one CR.42 and one un­identified aircraft.

Heavy Night Bombing The bombing of the Axis concentrations, par­

ticularly between Deir El Agram and Deir El Ragil, was continued during the night by 46 Wellingtons and 27 Albacores,, most of the Wellingtons carrying out two sorties each and some of the Albacores three. The raids were very successful as the closely-packed concentrations of enemy tanks and vehicles in a confined area presented excellent targets. Over thirty fires were started and, apart from the havoc wrought among vehicles generally, several ammunition lorries were blown up.

The German •Armour Cheeked The next morning, 1st September, the main

battle was resumed in the area between Point 102 (about three miles south-west of Alam El Bueib) and Alam El Haifa. The German ar­moured divisions made two attacks against our positions- expecting to entice our armour into the open. We had learnt our lesson in this respect, however, and the attacks were repulsed by our artillery dug in on high ground and by tanks fir­ing from hull down positions; no mobile tank engagements took place.

The good work of the artillery was aided by the light bomber attacks delivered in the enemy's rear. The effect of this bombing is indicated by the damage caused by eighteen escorted Balti­mores in the early morning on badly dispersed transport in the Deir El Ragil area. In addition to a large fire which was started, photographs revealed that five direct hits and 32 very near misses had been scored.

During the afternoon, the German armour again formed up to launch an assault, but no attack materialised. In the meantime, 90th Light Di­vision had made a little more progress than on

TaliSIP Pftolfef .ftf%^i^f§-§r UTni venced to Deir El MuhaffT our forces they achieved little success.

In the course of the day, in spite of intermit­tent dust storms, eight attacks were made by our light bombers, comprising 65 Boston, 54 Bal­timore and six Mitchell sorties, the formations being escorted by Kittyhawks and Tomahawks, which carried out 155 sorties on these duties. Great damage was done to tanks and transport, chiefly in the Deir El Turf a area, and concentra­tions to the north-west of Munassib were also bombed. Enemy anti-aircraft fire was again in­tense and one Baltimore, one Boston and one Mitchell were shot down and several other air­craft damaged.

Enemy fighters attacked five of.the bomber formations and in the ensuing combats Kitty-hawks destroyed one ME.109, damaged another, and probably destroyed one MC.202. Our losses were three Kittyhawks and two Tomahawks destroyed.

Continuous patrols were carried out by Hurri­canes, Kittyhawks and Spitfires throughout the day. Two formations of JU.87s and one formation of JU.88s were intercepted, and one formation of each type was forced to jettison its bombs. Four Stukas, two JU.88s, three ME.109s were shot down, three ME.109s probably destroyed, and one JU.87, one JU.88 and ten ME.109s damaged, for the loss of one Spitfire and five Hurricanes. In other engagements, at least two ME.109s were destroyed and several others were damaged, our losses being one Spitfire and one Hurricane.

Night Bombing Intensified That night, lst/2nd September, the bombing of

enemy tanks and transport concentrated in the central and southern sectors was intensified, at tacks being carried out by 66 Wellingtons and 16 Albacores. The greatest destruction inflicted was at Mirbat Aza, Deir El Tan-fa and Deir El Ragil. Very many vehicles were destroyed and damaged, and a large number of fires and ex­plosions were caused. In the main, 250 lb. bombs were used, but, in addition, three 4,000 lb. bombs (one of which failed to explode) were dropped among dispersed vehicles, causing large fires. Light bombers operating over this area on the following morning confirmed the great damage caused by these attacks.

" The Boston Tea Party " The next day, 2nd September, the German

armour in front of our Alam El Haifa posi­tions, after their unhappy experience of the pre­vious day, made no attempt to attack and, in fact, withdrew some distance to the south. The German force then included approximately 150 tanks, .which were protected by a screen of 8.8 cm. guns. The 90th Light Division on the left flank was relieved by the Trieste Division, but before the change was effected the Italians suf­fered casualties at the hands of our land forces

***""

***­

1. 77(1- Wellingtons played a memorable part in the Battle for Egypt.

2. Bostons take off in for­mation designed to mini­mise dust interference with the I'ision of pilots.

3. and 4. Good bombing h\< light homhers during "The Boston Tea - Tarty"

5. — and a typical result.

etween Himeimat and Deir El Ragil. On being relieved, elements of the 90th Light Division fell back to the area east of Khadim.

Throughout the day, our artillery fire, combin­ed with continuous R.A.F. bombing attacks, kept enemy vehicles on the move and inflicted heavy casualties. Our light bombers made 176 effective sorties, comprising 110 Boston, 57 Baltimore and nine Mitchell sorties; in all, ten attacks were made, escorted by Kittyhawks, Tomahawks and P.40s (of the U.S.A.A.F.). Enemy concentrations in the areas of Deir El Agram, Deir El Tarfa, Deir El Ragil and, to a lesser extent, Samaket Gaballa were attacked. Great damage was in­flicted and many fires caused; some of the con­flagrations started by formations operating in the morning were observed to be still burning by our aircraft continuing the bombing in the even­ing, and the havoc caused by the raids in general was confirmed by our land forces. As a result of the intense anti-aircraft fire which protected the enemy's concentrations, six Baltimores and two Bostons were slightly damaged.

Escorting fighters shot down two ME.109s which attempted interceptions, but in the engage­ments we lost two Tomahawks and one Kitty-hawk.

Offensive patrols over the battle area com­prised 78 Spitfire and 178 Hurricane sorties. The most successful bomber interceptions were made by ten Hurricanes of No. 274 Squadron and twelve Hurricanes of No. 127 Squadron. These aircraft encountered formations of Stukas escort­ed by M.E.109s and forced one formation to jet­tison their bombs. Six dive-bombers were shot down, four probably destroyed and seven dam­aged and four enemy fighters were also damaged.

In other engagements, three M.E.109s and one MC.202 were shot down, one ME. 109 probably destroyed and several others damaged. Our losses were three Spitfires and one Hurricane. During the day, also, our anti-aircraft fire shot down three JU.88s and one ME.109 attacking our posi­tions in the central sector.

Intensive Night Bombing Continued

When the light bombers had completed their day's work, the medium bombers took over, car­rying out during the night 71 effective sorties, aided by eight flare-dropping Albacores. Most of the aircraft again made "double sorties." Ene­my armour and transport concentrations in the central sector were bombed unceasingly and, apart from the great damage done, enemy troops were again denied the rest which was becoming increasingly necessary. The actual results ob­served included many vehicles destroyed by direct hits, the blowing up of two ammunition lorries and over thirty fires, some of which were fuel burning.

Record R.A.F. Sorties

In the early morning, 3rd September, the main enemy force withdrew from Deir El Alam to Deir El Ragil, leaving a tank__a.ild» anti-tank

BP

screen in the neighbourhood of Deir El Tarfa. Harassed by our light forces from the south and by continuous R.A.F. bombing attacks, the ene­my continued his withdrawal to the area between Munassib and Himeimat Abandoned German tanks numbered at least 80; of these, 39 were demolished and most of the others required no further demolition.

The light bomber "shuttle, service" was in ope­ration from dawn to dusk. A record number of 200 effective sorties were made, comprising 52 by Baltimores, 90 by Bostons and 18 by Mit­chells. Eleven attacks were carried out on the withdrawing enemy columns, wherever suitable concentrations were found, from the area south of Deir El Agram southwards to the area be­tween Munassib and Himeimat. Most of the 250 lb. and 500 lb. bombs dropped burst among enemy vehicles and widespread destruction and confusion was caused. Our land forces reported that the accuracy of the bombing compelled the enemy to attempt the rapid dispersal of his ve­hicles every time our bombers approached.

The light bombers were escorted by Kitty-hawks, Tomahawks and P.40s which made 156, 21 and 60 sorties respectively. Six of the bomber formations were attacked by ME.109s and the escorting fighters shot down two, probably des­troyed five and damaged several others for the loss of three Kittyhawks and one Tomahawk.

Six Hurricane IIDs, escorted by twenty Hurri­canes, had a particularly successful day, des­troying three tanks Mark III, two unidentified tanks, one armoured car and a large lorry.

156 Hurricane and 60 Spitfire sorties were car­ried out on offensive patrols. Six Spitfires of No. 145 Squadron encountered thirteen ME. 109s and succeeded in destroying one enemy fighter, probably destroying two and damaging another for the loss of one Spitfire. In other engage­ments, one ME.109 was destroyed, two probably destroyed and two others damaged, but our losses were higher, including the destruction of one Spitfire and three Hurricanes.

Air Activity Night 3rd/4th September

"Double sorties" were again made by Welling-tons and Albacores against enemy concentrations now located in the southern sector, the medium bombers making 71 and the Albacores ten effec­tive sorties. Bombs were dropped on tanks and vehicles and many direct hits and near misses were scored and numerous fires were started.

The enemy air force was also active. From 22.00 hours to first light, enemy bombers, be­lieved to be chiefly JU.88s, bombed and straffed our forward positions, particularly in the south­ern area. Searchlights and Verey lights were employed to guide the attacking aircraft and, in all, approximately 60 sorties were made. The effect of the bombing was not comparable with that of our medium bombers on the same night, partly owing to the relative scarcity of suitable targets in the form of concentrations of vehicles

34

and partly due to the absence of flare-di-opping aircraft corresponding to the Albacores.

The Enemy's Withdrawal Continues On the 4th September the enemy reacted to an

attack by our land forces southwards on to the area west of Deir El Mwhafid by counter­attacking twice in the morning and twice, on a larger scale, in the afternoon. Our heavy artil­lery fire and bombing attacks, however, drove the enemy back. Meanwhile, the main German armour continued its withdrawal to the west con­stantly harassed by our armoured forces operat­ing from the east and south and disorganised by R.A.F. bombing attacks.

Air operations were more restricted than on the preceding two days due to dust storms which prevented operations in the afternoon, but four escorted light bomber attacks were made on ene­my tanks and transport withdrawing in the area between Munassib and Himeimat. The raids were extremely successful and caused many fires and explosions. Two attacks were also made to assist our troops to repel the enemy's-counter­attacks mentioned in the previous paragraph. In all, 42 Boston, 18 Baltimore and 12 Mitchell sor­ties were carried out.

Escorted Hurricane-bombers of No. 7 Squadron were also busy during the day: 110 Jeffrey 9 lb. bombs were dropped on a group of tanks and armoured cars a short distance south-east of Himeimat and two tanks and one armoured car were hit and left smoking, and troops in the vi­cinity were machine-gunned.

Spitfires and Hurricanes carried out offensive patrols, making 47 and 72 sorties respectively. There were, however, only three engagements with the enemy, in which one ME.109 was shot down, one probably destroyed and several dam­aged.

The medium bomber effort during the night was reduced as it was evident that the enemy was in the process of abandoning his offensive. His withdrawal had been going on for two days and fewer suitable targets were now available, due to the more thorough dispersal of vehicles.

The Enemy Offensive Called Off By 08.30 hours on 5th September, H.Q. 15th

Armoured Division had withdrawn to Khadim and no doubt now existed that the enemy's offen­sive had proved abortive. The enemy's with­drawal did not proceed unmolested: our troops harassed him from the east and north and the R.A.F. made a number of bombing attacks on the retreating transport columns, although bad weather restricted air operations.

There were a few engagements with enemy fighters as a result of which one ME.109 was des­troyed, one probably destroyed and three dam­aged; our losses, however, were higher, three Spitfires being shot down and two damaged and one Kittyhawk destroyed and another damaged.

The jettisoning of bombs by Stukas was now more or less expected, but during the day a well-

escorted formation of JU.88s, on sighting Spit­fires and Hurricanes, played the same cautious game and fled.

Scale of the R.A.F. Battle Effort From the night 30th/31st August to 5th Sep­

tember, practically the entire R.A.F. bomber force, except the heavy bombers, was exclusively employed on bombing the enemy's columns in the battle area. During the period of the battle, our bombers dropped approximately 6,600 bombs, having a total weight of 1,736,000 lbs. This re­presents roughly one bomb dropped evei-y 71 sec­onds. The average concentration of our bombing was estimated at 25,000 lbs. per square mile per hour.

In the course of the continuous night bombing, Wellingtons carried out 288 effective sorties and Albacores assisted with 77 effective sorties: 3,172 bombs, weighing 816,300 lbs., were dropped.

Light bomber sorties totalled 652, including 48 by Mitchells of the U.S.A.A.F., and bombs with a total weight of 915,000 lbs. were dropped. In particular, on the "peak day," 3rd September, 200 effective sorties were made and 1,036 bombs, totalling 269,750 lbs. in weight, were dropped.

R.A.F. fighters carried out 2,500 sorties, ex­cluding those over the Eastern Mediterranean. 1,165 sorties were made on offensive sweeps and 912 on bomber escort duties. P.40s of the U.S.A.A.F. also helped with the latter activity, carrying out over 150 sorties during the last four days of the battle.

Features of the Air Activity The most striking feature of the R.A.F. effort

was the continuous bombing of the Axis columns. In particular, an efficient "shuttle service" of Bostons and Baltimores was operated during the daytime, the strength of each bomber formation being normally limited to eighteen aircraft in order to conserve our fighter strength.

Owing to the low strength of the Kittyhawk squadrons, these aircraft were principally allot­ted the task of providing escort for the light bombers to the exclusion of fighter-bomber at­tacks. In spite of the repeated attempts of ene­my fighters to interfere with our bombers, not one of these was shot down in combat during the entire battle period.

The Hurricanes were retained chiefly in their bomber interception role, and due to the deter­mination with which they pressed home their attacks were extremely successful.

The failure of the JU.87s was most noticeable. The Stukas almost invariably jettisoned their bombs on sighting Spitfires or Hurricanes and made for home. By the end of the battle, more­over, the Stukas had abandoned dive-bombing and were hurriedly dropping their bombs on the level. The bogy of the dive-bomber had been finally exposed, when opposed by a determined fighter force it proved to be a crow masquerading in an eagle's feathers.

lere was only one effective enemy night raid in the battle area and it wasvevident that the enemy felt the lack of a suitable flare-dropping aircraft corresponding to the Albacore.

Once again, Beaufighters* showed their great value by most successful attacks on enemy road traffic striking as far back as Sollum; apart from attacks on lorries filled with troops, petrol-laden vehicles urgently needed at the front were destroyed.

The aid given by the U.S.A.A.F. was indicative of what was to come when American squadrons arrived in strength in the Middle East. Mit­chells co-operated with our light bombers, car­rying out 48 effective sorties and P.40s made their first appearance in the desert assisting with bomber escort duties.

Air Defence of Egypt

In an attempt to incapacitate our light bomber and fighter forces, four enemy night raids and one day attack were made on groups of landing grounds in the Burg El Arab, Amirya and Wadi Natrun areas, but these were all com­paratively ineffective. In addition, attempts were made at aerial reconnaissance.

Hurricanes controlled by No. 211 Group shot down 'two JU.88s near Burg El Arab on the night 30th/31st August, and Beaufighters dam­aged a HE.Ill near Alexandria on the night 31st August/lst September and destroyed two Cant.1007s in the same area and one JU.88 over Burg El Arab during the evening of 4th September. Day time interceptions, moreover, included the shooting down of a Cant.1007 by Spitfires and a JU.88 by Hurricanes, both in the vicinity of Wadi Natrun.

Attacks on Ports and Leading Grounds

Although during the six days battle the R.A.F. bombers were primarily concerned with attacks on the enemy concentrations in the battle area, raids on the Axis supply ports and aerodromes were still carried out, although on a necessarily more limited scale.

On the night 30th/31st August, Tobruk was bombed by 21 Wellingtons, six Halifaxes and seventeen Liberators (including eleven of the U.S.A.A.F.). Many fires were started near the main jetties and a particularly large one, ac­companied by explosions, occurred near the tank workshops. Six Liberators were briefed to attack a large tanker which, in view of the enemy's great need of fuel, was described in the briefing in­structions as " the prize target of the year." The tanker was not located, however, probably due to the moderate visibility.

After this attack, until the night of 5/6th Sep­tember, Wellingtons were used almost exclusively for bombing in the battle area and the Tobruk attacks were continued by the heavy bombers only. In all, 48 effective sorties were made on the four nights in question.

The only other

Liberators (all of the U.S.A.A.F.) on 1st and 2nd September, respectively.

Two heavy night attacks were made on enemy landing grounds. On the night of 31st August / ls t September, attacks were made by 25 Wel­lingtons and 16 Liberators (of U.S.A.A.F.) on landing grounds from Daba to Sidi Haneish. In addition to the usual loads of 2501b. and 5001b. bombs, two 4,000 lb. bombs and over 20,000 spikes were dropped. On the next night, 2nd/3rd Sep­tember, landing grounds at Daba and Qotaifiya were attacked by sixteen U.S.A.A.F. Liberators which dropped a total of 96,000 lbs. of bomb.?, causing numerous fires.­

Comparison of Casualties

During the six days of battle, the enemy suf­fered many more bomber casualties than the R.A.F., in spite of a more limited activity. Twenty-six enemy bombers were destroyed, in­cluding thirteen Stukas, five probably destroyed and seven damaged. Our losses were seven bombers destroyed, including four Baltimores, and thirteen seriously damaged.

Our fighter casualties, however, were higher than those of the Axis air forces; 43 aircraft were shot down and 27 seriously damaged. Hurricanes, which bore the brunt of the offensive operations, were outclassed in performance by the ME.109s and MC.202s and accordingly suf­fered the heaviest causualtiesv seventeen being destroyed and seventeen seriously damaged.' Enemy fighter casualties totalled 22 destroyed, 18 probably destroyed and 39 damaged. The ME.109s, which played a predominant part in the enemy fighter activity, suffered 90% of the total casualties.

Causes of Enemy's Failure

The failure of the enemy's offensive can be ascribed in great part to his misappreciation both of our military position and our reactions: he was obviously unaware of the strength of our positions in the Alam El Haifa area and, what is more important, assumed that we would, as usual, join battle in the open with our arm­oured forces. Instead of the anticipated mobile tank battles, however, the enemy found himself checked south of Alam El Haifa and the concentrations of tanks, armoured cars and transport vehicles presented ideal targets for the heavy artillery fire of our land forces and the R.A.F.'s continuous day and night bombing at­tacks. Thus, unable to make the quick break­through as planned, the enemy realised that the longer he remained before our positions the greater casualties he would incur; accordingly, he decided to withdraw, particularly as our nightly bombing was denying all rest to his battle-weary troops who were nearing the point of exhaustion. %

Once again, it had been proved that the con­tinued bombing of an army which has been

forced to concentrate in a restricted area Axis have a decisive effect.

Above all, the enemy had not the necessary previous month. supplies, especially of fuel, to keep up a sustain- Rommel had lost the reinforcement race, rt ed attack. This shortage was due to the success- was now clear that the VHIth Army was strong ful interference with his Mediterranean ship- and confident and that the next offensive would ping by the Royal Navy and the R.A.F., and be launched from our side of the Alamein line.

THE FOURTH PHASE-THE TABLES TURNED IMMEDIATELY THE. SEPTEMBER battle had

ceased, preparations were put in hand by the VHIth Army for the opening of a full-scale of­fensive on an opportune date in the latter half of October.

Similarly, the R.A.F. seized the opportunity afforded by the breathing space between battles to carry out the re-organisation, equipping and training necessary before it could again play a full part in the coming decisive struggle.

Re-O rganisation

Consequent on the arrival of American bomber and fighter squadrons, certain re-organisation was essential in respect of fighter and light bomber formations in order to absorb these units into the Middle East air striking force.

No. 57 Fighter Group of three P.40 (Kitty­hawk) squadrons and the 12th Bombardment Group of three B.25 (Mitchell) squadrons had been allocated to strengthen the air force in the Western Desert. The American pilots were highly skilled, but naturally lacked experience in war and particularly desert operations. Accord­

- ingly, section leaders were infiltrated into R.A.F. squadrons followed later by other flying person­nel The Americans proved apt pupils and were soon ready to take a full part in operations.

The operational control of the American squadrons was vested in the A.O.C., Western Desert, and. an American Headquarters was at­tached to Advanced Air Headquarters, in order to gain experience in the control of air forces in the field and watch over American interests. One of the American Kittyhawk squadrons was attached to an R.A.F. Kittyhawk wing (No.239), which was prepared to go forward in the event of an advance, and the remaining two squadrons formed a separate fighter wing under the operational control of No. 211 Fighter Group. The Mitchell squadrons were attached to a newly formed R.A.F. light bomber wing for operations.

With the addition of the American fighter squadrons it was found advisable to form a se­cond fighter control formation ; accordingly, No. 212 Group came into existence. There were now two mobile .fighter groups in the Command, and one could be immediately transferred to an­other sphere of operations when required.

The three Spitfire squadrons had previously been in two wings which also included Hurri­cane squadrons. They were now concentrated

into a single wing and trained together as a complete formation, ready to move forward when the expected advance occurred.

The light bomber strength, with the addition of the U.S.A.A.F. Mitchell squadrons and the arrival of a third Baltimore squadron, was now too unwieldy to be controlled by a single wing; accordingly, a new wing (No.' 232) was formed to control the two R.A.F. Baltimore and thu U.S.A.A.F. Mitchell squadrons, while No. 3 S.A.A.F. Wing retained control of the Boston squadrons and the new No. 21 S.A.A.F. Balti­more Squadron.

The new squadrons needed additional aero­dromes and these were quickly constructed. Moreover, two landing grounds were prepared immediately behind the battle area from which Hurricanes could operate during the battle period and thus extend their range and time on patrol.

Rest and Training of Squadrons

After the conclusion of the September battle, the Delta was still within range of the enemy's long-range fighters. Accordingly, a few Western Desert fighter squadrons were again allocated 'o Air Headquarters, Egypt, for the protection of Alexandria and the Cairo area. The change from desert operations constituted a rest and the proportion of the squadrons held in readi­ness to provide close defence was kept as low as circumstances would allow, so that full training could continue.

The remainder of the Western Desert fighter force was rested and granted time for training in turn, but sufficient squadrons were always kept in the field to meet all commitments.

Owing to the static character of the ground fighting, targets for the light bombers were now scarce; a small striking force only was kept at the forward aerodromes and the remainder re­turned to base aerodromes for rest and training.

Meanwhile, the medium and heavy bombers continued their work of blasting the enemy's supply ports, the American heavy bombers now being controlled by the U.S.A.A.F. Headquarters.

R.A.F. Attacks on Ports Continued

During the lull in the ground fighting the bombing of the Axis supply ports by the heavy and medium bomber force continued: the R.A.F. carried out 183 heavy and 903 medium bomber effective sorties against these objectives from

jclusive, - and during the-same period "tlie^fl^A.A.F. heavy bombers made over 120 effective sorties.

Practically the entire medium bomber and the greater part of the R.A.F. heavy bomber effort continued to be directed against Tobruk. Few nights passed without that port receiving a visit from 20 to 30 Wellingtons, often supplemented by heavy bombers, and these incessant attacks, although not actually closing the port, seriously hampered the enemy's reinforcement programme. It was estimated that from the time the port was re-occupied by the enemy approximately 4,000 tons had been dropped on it by R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. aircraft.

During October, aerial reconnaissance revealed that a larger proportion of Axis shipping was being1 diverted to Benghazi, 250 miles to the west, a tribute to the effectiveness of the Tobruk attacks. Increasing attacks were ac­cordingly made on Benghazi by the heavy bomber force and, in particular, U.S.A.A.F. Liberators did outstanding work, carrying out from 6th September to 22nd October over 80 effective sorties. A heavy raid by R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. Liberators on the night of 22nd/23rd September was the most damaging attack and it was estimated after a close examination of photographs that the unloading capacity of the port had been seriously impaired for several weeks, due primarily to the blowing up of a large merchant vessel lying alongside one of the main piers.

Other enemy harbours bombed, although only intermittently, included Matruh, Sollum and Bardia by medium bombers, and Suda Bay and Navarino by U.S.A.A.F. heavy bombers.

Combined Operations, Night 13/ 14th September While our land forces were holding the Ala­

mein line and reinforcing and training units ready for their offensive, patrol activity was continuous and full local initiative was held. In addition, the Long Range Desert Group, sup­plemented by other land and naval units as the occasion required, carried out daring and well-planned operations in the rear.

The most ambitious series of raids were plan­ned to take place on the night of 13/14th Sep­tember. The principal attacks consisted of com­bined operations against Tobruk and Ben­ghazi, with the object of blocking the respective harbours and inflicting damage on port facilities. Simultaneously, a force from Kufra advanced to Jalo in an attempt to secure the oasis as a base from which the Benghazi party, after completing its work, could operate further against the enemy's lines of communication. Another force, drawn from the L.R.D.G., raided Barce as a diversion to prevent reinforcements going to Benghazi, and successfully destroyed aircraft on the landing ground and attacked other objectives, including barracks. «

On the whole, only limited success was obtain­ed from all these operations, due to the strength

of me opposing forces and the fact that in some instances the enemy appeared to have prior knowledge of the attacks and had prepared ac­cordingly. Great credit, however, is due to the forces concerned for the daring and initiative displayed, and with slightly more luck the raids might well have had a disastrous effect on the enemy's North African supply line.

The air commitments were all carried oui satisfactorily. In preparation for the attack, re­connaissances were made of the Benghazi and Kufra - Jalo areas, and Malta - based aircraft reported enemy shipping movements; Bombays transported supplies to Kufra for the use of the Sudan force proceeding to Jalo; and night bombing was carried out on Benghazi during the nights immediately preceding the attack in order to deprive the garrison of sleep. *

On the night when the combined assaults were made, selected areas of Tobruk and Benghazi were heavily bombed. Against the former port, 35 R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. heavy and 66 medium bomber effective sorties were carried out, and against the latter 20 effective sorties were made by R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. heavy bombers.

After the combined operations were complet­ed, a Bombay rendered good service by transport­ing personnel wounded in the Barce and Tobruk operations from a pre-arranged rendezvous to Kufra and thence to Cairo.

Opportunist Action Against Landing Grounds Repeated attacks on enemy landing grounds,

particularly at Daba, Fuka and Sidi Haneish were made in order to limit the enemy's air strength. From 6th September to 22nd October, 14 heavy, 219 medium, 595 light and 333 fighter-bomber effective sorties were carried out against these objectives by R.A.F. aircraft, and U.S.A.A.F. Mitchells co-operated with over 80 effective sorties.

The heaviest and most determined attacks were made on the Daba and Qotaifiya group of landing grounds on 9th October and on Fuka landing grounds during the following night, 9/lOth October. Photographs taken by recon­naissance aircraft on 6th October and the follow­ing two days disclosed that the enemy's forward landiuig grounds in the Daba and Qotaifiya areas were water-logged as a result of recent heavy rains which, fortunately, had left our own landing grounds comparatively immune. The decision was taken to interrupt training and or­ganise the maximum air striking force in order to seize this opportunity of delivering a decisive blow to the enemy's air strength. Accordingly, throughout the day of 9th October, heavily escort­ed light bombers made repeated raids on the Daba and Qotaifiya landing grounds and the same targets were attacked by fighters and fighter-bombers. In all, Bostons and Baltimores carried out 144, Mitchells 16, and fighter-bomb­ers 32 effective sorties; escort was provided by Kittyhawks, P.40s, Spitfires and Tomahawks

which made over 200 sorties on this duty. In addition, over 100 effective sorties were made by fighters on ground straffing attacks, includ­ing 84 by Hurricanes which were particularly devastating. As a result of the combined at­tacks during the day, at least ten aircraft, in­cluding such diverse types as the JU.52, JU.88, JU.87, ME.110 and ME.109, were destroyed and over twenty-two aircraft, chiefly ME.109s, were damaged. In addition, transport was destroyed, ammunition dumps were blown up, gun positions were put out of action and troops were straffed.

Our fighters on offensive patrols and engaged in ground-straffing and escort duties had many engagements with enemy aircraft, as a result of which seven ME. 109s were shot down, four probably destroyed, and at least two ME.109 and one MC.202 damaged. Our casualties through combats and determined ground opposition were naturally heavy; thirteen fighters were destroy­ed, including seven Hurricanes and four Kitty-hawks, and four other fighters seriously damag­ed. The bomber casualties, however, were light: only one Baltimore was shot down and another damaged

In order to incapacitate the enemy's air force still more, during the night (9/10th October) 47 Wellingtons, aided by flare-dropping Albacores, attacked the landing grounds at Fuka, which were being used by1 the enemy as a forward base while the Baba landing grounds were unservice^ able. Bombs were dropped among dispersed aircraft and four were observed to be destroyed; in all, four large and twelve small fires were started and several explosions were caused in the vicinity of the landing grounds, probably due to the blowing up of ammunition dumps.

The enemy's air force never really recovered from the material damage and demoralising ef­fect of the raids and these opportunist attacks were of the greatest value to our imminent offensive.

Further, the enemy's attempts to recover were thwarted by renewed large-scale attacks begin­ning on 19th October against the Daba landing grounds, which were again brought into use, and extended by night to include the main Stuka base in the 8idi Haneish area.

R.A.F. Attacks on Enemy Positions After the September battle and prior to the

opening of our offensive, air activity in the battle area was restricted, due to the scarcity of targets consequent in the absence of full-scale ground fighting and the need of both sides to build up serviceability.

From 6th September to 22nd' October inclusive, R.A.F. aircraft made 24 medium and 77 light bomber effective sorties against enemy positions and lines of communication and fighter-bombers carried out 341 sorties. In addition, low-flying fighter attacks were made at opportune times against road and rail traffic, particularly by Beaufighters, and their success in disorganising

oir~immediately behind'.the F'front was considerable.

The Plan of Battle The enemy held a strong defensive line from

the coast west of Alamein southwards to the impassable Qattara depression, with strong fortified positions and continuous deep belts of minefields throughout its length.

The enemy's land forces were disposed on the set plan of mixing up German and Italian units so that Teutonic fortitude could inspire the weaker Axis brethren. Behind the front, German and Italian armour was disposed in groups : 15th Armoured Division was located in the northern sector, 21st Division was in the south­ern sector and 90th Light Division was engaged in coast protection at Ghazal, and each division had an Italian counterpart in the same locality.

There was no possibility of an outflanking movement; frontal attacks were alone possible and these needed'to be on a large scale to effect any appreciable penetration.

Our land forces planned to break through the enemy's positions in the northern sector. It was realised that the initial thrust could not be made by our armour as the combined effects of the opposing minefields and guns would prove too formidable: infantry would have to clear the way for the tanks. Accordingly, it was planned to use 30th Corps to make the necessary gaps in the northern minefields and at the last moment our main armour was to move from its base m the Delta to assembly areas east of Alamein, and be ready to go through the gaps made by 30th Corps in order to join battle with enemy armoured forces in the open country beyond. Simultaneously, our troops in the central sector were to make limited attacks to draw fire from the main northern attacks, and troops in the south were to launch an assault with the primary object of keeping the enemy's armour in this area concentrated on its own immediate from. To aid the impression that the main push was lo come in the southern sector, numbers of vehicles and tanks were concentrated in that area some days before our attack developed.

The Army plan involved extensive changes of disposition in the battle area and the quick move of armoured forces to the front with the in­evitable road congestion. It was essential, there­fore, that enemy air activity should be restricted in order to prevent disorganisation at this vital initial stage of the offensive. Reference has already been made to the R.A.F. re-organisation and training, and an account has been given of the opportunist attacks against the enemy's ad­vanced aerodromes followed by the pre-battle attacks which paralysed his air effort. It re­mains to be emphasised that the R.A.F. was at its strongest and the U.S.A.A.F. was now ready to give most valuable help.

The domination of the enemy air forces was completed before the battle began and assurance was given to the Army that air superiority could

39

Attack on a train by tivo Bisleys and four

be counted on. The Army moves were completed according to plan by 22nd October without inter­ference from enemy aircraft and air reconnais­sance had been prevented. Tactical surprise was virtually certain.

The Offensive Opens

At 21.40 hours L.T. on 23rd October, the heaviest artillery barrage ever witnessed in Africa preceded the VHIth Army's attacks along the entire front at 22.00 hours. According to plan, the most determined attack was made on a six mile front in the northern sector with the object of making two gaps in a south­westerly direction in the minefields and strong points preparatory to the passing through of our armour. By dawn, 24th October, the gaps had been made. Meanwhile, the diversionary attacks were launched by our land forces in the central and southern sectors.

In support of our attacking troops and to sup­plement the effect of the artillery barrage, con­

Beaufighters in progress on 9th October.

tinuous attacks were made during the first night of the offensive by 66 Wellingtons and 24 Albacores in the northern and southern sectors. Particular attention was paid to enemy gun positions; many of these were silenced and the explosions caused by blowing up ammunition dumps in their vicinity rocked our aircraft at 6,000 feet. The last aircraft to leave the target area reported that no enemy guns were then in action. Bombs were also dropped on the leaguers of the enemy's armour and encampments, causing ten fires, on of which sent up smoke to a height of 3,000 feet. In the enemy's immediate rear, also, considerable confusion and damage was caused by 30 night-flying Hurricanes of No. 73 Squadron, which straffed such diverse targets as ammunition trucks, field guns, ammunition dumps, vehicles and transport repair shops.

During the next day, 24th October, our infantry in the northern sector consolidated their posi­tions. Our armoured forces were held in read­iness to pass through the gaps in the enemy's

40

"That's a train

minefi.-Ms, but were detailed from making th:1

attempt as the gaps were still commanded by enemy anti-tank guns.

Throughout the 'lay, a record number of light bomber sorties were carried out in attacks on enemy vehicles near the gaps in the enemy's minefields. Fourteen attacks were made on these targets which comprised 174 effective sorties by Bostons and Baltimores tmd 48 by Mitchells. The bombers were strongly escorted by Kittyhawks and P.40s and some of these added to the weight of the attacks by dropping bombs. Many enemy vehicles were put out < f action, numerous fires and explosions were; caused, and great help was afforded to our troops in consolidating their newly-won positions. Anti­aircraft fire from the enemy concentrations, however, was intense and our light bombers suffered the highest casualties to date for a single day: five Bostons and one Baltimore were destroyed and seven Bostons and three Balti­mores seriously damaged.

that zvas!"

The attacks of the light bombers were sup­plemented by sorties carried out in the northern and southern sectors by escorted Kittyhawk bombers, and twelve Hurricane IIDs, escorted by Hurricanes, had a most successful day "busting" on the El Taqa plateau, scoring hits on eighteen tanks.

In order to ensure that enemy fighter activity \va.s kept on a reduced scale, two attacks wei.­carried out on the enemy's forward landing grounds at Dubn by twelve Bostons, six Balti­mores and twelve Kittyhawk-bombers, escorted by Tomahawks and Kittyhawks, and direct hits were scored on grounded aircraft.

Constant fighter patrols were maintained over the battle and forward areas by Spitfires and Hurricanes. Few engagements occurred, how­ever, as enemy air activity was slight. The most important feature of our fighter activity on this day was the providing of fighter cover over our armoured units assembled ready to pass through the gaps in the enemy's minefields;

•; W?LS\provided by Hur^icajves operating rBewrlandinW grounds- immediately

L^hiridr'the battle area.

Our Armour Advances During the night 24/25th October, our armour

passed through the gaps in the enemy's mine-fields and by dawn on the next day had arrived at the open country beyond. Meanwhile, heavy air attacks were made by 69 Wellingtons and 16 Albacores on enemy transport convoys in the northern sector and large fires were started near 8idi Abd El Rahman. As on the pre­vious night, No. 73 Squadron Hurricanes con­tinued their straffing, but on this occasion their efforts were directed against targets in the central and southern areas.

The next day, 25th October, R.A.F. bomber operations were directed principally against enemy transport vehicles in the northern sector in order to prevent their concentration prepa­ratory to attempted counter-attacks. During the morning, seven light bomber attacks were made on transport and gun emplacements by 96 Bostons and Baltimores and 24 Mitchells, strong­ly escorted by Tomahawks, Kittyhawks and P.40s, and the attacks were supplemented by 46 fighter-bomber sorties. These attacks combined with the concentrated fire of our artillery achiev­ed their'purpose, as in the afternoon our bombers could find no suitable targets owing to the dis­persal of the enemy's forces.

The policy of consistently attacking the Daba and Fuka landing grounds with the object of curtailing enemy air activity over the battlefield was continued, escorted light bombers scoring many hits on blast shelters containing aircraft and starting fires.

Spitfires and Hurricanes carried out offensive patrols the entire day, covering the whole front and the forward areas. Standing patrols of Spitfires were now maintained over the enemy's advanced landing grounds; it was indeed a far cry from the early days, when two Gladiator squadrons were the cream of the fighter force.

Combats with enemy aircraft were more frequent than on the preceding days and our fighters came out definitely on top: six ME. 109s and one MC.202 were shot down, four ME. 109s probably destroyed, and eight fighters damaged for the loss of one Kittyhawk destroy­ed. American P.40s had a field day, being responsible for destroying three of the German fighters and damaging others.

That night, a large force of Wellingtons and Albacores continued their attacks on transport in the battle area, but vehicles, in general, were well dispersed.

R.A.F. Bombing Prevents Counter-Attacks On the 26th October, our infantry extended

their break-through in the north. Enemy land forces were drawn up to make counter-attacks from the west and south-west, but the effective

bombing of these concentrations by our light bombers prevented any attacks from developing.

Seven attacks were made against the threa­tening concentrations in the northern sector by 100 Bostons and Baltimores and 22 Mitchells and a number of the escorting Kittyhawks inten­sified the attacks by bombing. Independent attacks were also made by 30 well-escorted Kit­tyhawks. The accuracy of 4he bombing was com­mented upon by our land forces and its efficacy is proved by the fact that no enemy attacks developed. Other light bomber activity included the daily bombing of the enemy's advanced land­ing grounds.

Attacks were again made by "tank busters" of No. 6 Squadron and No. 7 Squadron S.A.A.F. in the southern sector and four tanks and two armoured cars were immobilised.

The enemy air forces were now attempting to challenge our air superiority and our fighters had many engagements' during the day. Enemy casualties were heavy: six ME. 109s, eight MC. 202s and three JU.87s were destroyed; five ME. 109s, two MC.202s and two JU.87s probably des­troyed!; and five ME.109s, two MC.202s, five JU.87s and one JU.88 damaged. Our losses were four fighters. It was evident that we ruled the air over the battlefield.

Enemy Armour in the North During the night of 26/27th October, the

enemy brought his 21st Armoured Division from the southern to the northern sector and concen­trated his armour in that area.

On our part, the medium bombers continued their nightly attacks in the northern sector and also bombed the Sidi Hcmeish landing grounds in order to limit the enemy's night bomber effort. Night-flying Hurricanes also carried out offen­sive patrols over these enemy landing grounds.

The next day, 27th October, concerted attacks were made by the enemy's armoured divisions and infantry in an effort to stem our advance in the northern sector* The assaults were all repulsed by our land forces and in accomplishing this, great help was rendered by ten attacks on enemy concentrations by 177 escorted R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. bombers. In the meantime, fighter-bombers attacked smaller concentrations of enemy transport in the central and southern sectors where the flak was less formidable. Ad­ditional bomber activity included successful attacks on the docks and railway at Matruh and the landing grounds at Fuka.

As on the preceding day, combats with enemy aircraft were numerous, the heaviest casualties on the enemy being inflicted during a running fight from Daba to the front with a heavily escorted Stuka formation. The total losses during the day incurred by the enemy, which were shared equally by German and Italian air­craft, were seven bombers and eleven fighters destroyed, seven bombers and one fighter "pro­bables" and five other aircraft damaged. R.A.F.

42

losses for the day were in combat and one aircraft fire.

Enemy vehicles were again well dispersed during the night and medium bombers operating over the battle area found few good targets. At­tacks were renewed against the enemy's bomber bases at Sidi Haneish and night-flying Hur­ricanes on interception and straffing duties shot down a JU.88 near Daba.

Axis Counter-Attack Prevented

In the afternoon of 28th October, the enemy formed up in the northern sector to make a full-scale armoured counter-attack in the old style. At once the light bomber force went into action against the enemy's tanks and vehicles which were concentrated in an area three miles by two. Seven attacks were made which com­prised 63 effective sorties by Baltimores, 39 by Bostons and 24 by Mitchells, the .bombers being escorted by 108 Kittyhawks, 39 P.40s and 12 To­mahawks. So devastating was the bombing that the enemy forces were unable to concentrate and the planned attack was abandoned. This was the last occasion on which the enemy's land forces took the initiative.

Once again combats with enemy aircraft were numerous and once again the Allied fighters came out on top, shooting down nine fighters, probably destroying three others and damaging another six for the loss of two R.A.F. fighters. U.S.A.A.F. P.40s again excelled, destroying four ME.109s without loss to themselves. The enemy seemed to be unable to deviate from the set plan of sending over heavily escorted Stuka forma­tions in spite of the heavy losses sustained; little assistance was given to their land forces and, in fact, the Stukas often jettisoned their bombs on their own positions when threatened by our fighters.

Reduced R.A.F. Bomber Effort From 29th October until the evening of 1st

November, comparatively few targets were estab­lished for our bombers in the battle area due to the dispersal of the enemy's vehicles and dur­ing this time the light bombers carried out only 150 effective sorties and Wellingtons 66, chiefly against small concentrations in the northern sector.

Conditions in the battle area were now suitable for fighter-bomber employment, however, and during the four days in question over 400 sorties were made on groups of vehicles, gun emplace­ments, encampments and suspected enemy head­quarters. The greatest effort was on 1st No­vember when 173 sorties were carried out by Hurricane and Kittyhawk-bombers escorted by Tomahawks, Kittyhawks and P.40s. Fourteen attacks were delivered in the northern sector against enemy forces which were attacking our troops in order to relieve the pressure on enemy units which were encircled in the coastal area west of Alamem. In the fruitless effort

ent thug cut off, the enemy ^ j field his remaining fresh for­

mations and owing to the casualties inflicted on these was in no shape to withstand the onslaught of our land forces on the night lst/2nd November.

A significant feature of the low-flying fighter attacks was the activity of long-range Kitty-hawks and Spitfires in the Matruh area and west­wards to Sidi Barrani: road traffic, trucks, landing grounds, wireless stations, supply dumps and a variety of other targets were all attacked in an effort to produce the maximum confusion in the enemy's rear. The destruction caused was an earnest of what was to come when the enemy's retreat developed into a rout.

From 29th October to 1st November, the enemy was still attempting to challenge our air ascen­dancy and in consequence R.A.F. offensive patrols were maintained at full pressure.

As a result of combats arising from our inter­ceptions on patrols, thirteen ME.109s, six JU.87s and one JU.52 were destroyed, nine ME.109s, three JU.87s and one MC.202 probably destroy­ed, and twenty other aircraft damaged.

In addition, our fighter-bombers, long-range single-engined fighters and Beaufighters encount­ered enemy opposition and succeeded in shooting down such diverse types of aircraft as JU.52s, JU.87s and ME.109s. Special mention may be made of the successful interception of a heavily escorted Stuka formation by fighter-bom­bers on 1st November. During the early morn­ing, Kittyhawks of No. 112 Squadron and U.S. A.A.F. P.40s intercepted a formation of 30 JU. 87s escorted by 15 ME.109s. The Stukas were forced to jettison their bombs on their own troops and then, while the P.40s prevented the enemy fighters from interfering, the Kittyhawks attack­ed the dive-bombers shooting down seven, pro­bably destroying three and damaging five others without loss to themselves.

Our casualties during the four days in ques­tion -totalled one Wellington and eight fighters destroyed and two Bostons and six fighters seriously damaged.

Vinth Army Advances On the night lst/2nd November, our land

forces struck hard due west, aiming at the Rahman track in the neighbourhood of Tel El Aqqaqir. The enemy was caught napping as he expected our attack along the line of the railway. By dawn, our armour was between the enemy's armoured divisions and soon afterwards out Ln the open country.

During the time that our troops were making their first advance, continuous attacks lasting for seven hours were made on the enemy's forces in the Ghazal and Sidi Abd El Rahman areas by 100 Wellingtons aided by 13 Albacores. Great destruction was caused among large vehicle con­centrations, twenty fires were started) and hits scored on the railway line and the main road. The raids were of inestimable value in limiting

s resistance to our push. Full pene­

tration of the enemy's defensive line was accord­ingly achieved and victory was in sight.

The next day, 2nd November, our armour went ahead of our infantry. < It was attacked from the north and the south-west by the two German armoured divisions. The south-westerly attack was repulsed with heavy enemy losses but the attack from the north was stemmed only after we had been forced back and had suffered tank casualties. The battle ended in our favour by the evening but it was the most bitterly contested battle of armour of all the Alamein clashes.

Once again, the light bomber "shuttle service" went into operation. Thirteen attacks were de­livered in the course of the day on enemy forces massing to counter-attack in the northern sector; 171 effective sorties were made by Bostons and Baltimores and 40 by Mitchells, escort being provided by Tomakawks, Kittyhawks and P.40s. The effects of the attacks were most apparent in the afternoon; thus, as a direct result of one of the light bomber raids in front of our lines 200 demoralised enemy troops walked over to our po­sitions with hands upraised as token of surrender.

That evening, a German artillery officer wrote in his diary "Where are our fighters, our Stukas and A.A. ? Can't see a thing of them. Tommy comes every quarter of an hour with eighteen heavy bombers." To his untutored eyes, the Bal­timares and Bostons appeared to be "heavy" bombers and this slip unwittingly pays tribute to the effectiveness of their attacks.

Spitfires and Hurricanes carried out a record number of 374 sorties in patrols over the battle­field. Two Stuka formations were prevented from bombing our' forward troops and five JU. 87s were shot down, four probably destroyed and nine damaged and one escorting ME.109 was pro­bably destroyed and two damaged. In other comibats, six German fighters were destroyed, and a't least three damaged. Our total casual­ties for the day were six R.A.F. and one U.S. A.A.F. fighters shot down, two Baltimores des­troyed by anti-aircraft fire and four fighters and one Baltimore seriously damaged.

The bombing of the enemy's northern concen­trations was continued throughout the night by the entire Wellington force with the usual Alba­core complement. A total of 85 effective sorties was made by the medium bombers and eleven by the flare-dropping Albacores. These attacks allowed no respite to the weary enemy forces and no opportunity for necessary regrouping. During the night, No. 73 Squadron Hurricanes patrolled over the battle-field, but no enemy air­craft were sighted.

The Enemy Withdraws

The next morning, 3rd November, seven attacks comprising 94 effective sorties by escorted R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. light bombers were delivered against the weakening enemy troops in the north.

In the meantime, our tactical reconnaissance aircraft reported that there were signs of a with­

drawal and that the coast road from Doha to Fuka was black with traffic moving west. From midday, the maximum ibomber effort was diverted against these closely-packed enemy columns. Formations of Baltimores, Bostons and Mitchells escorted by Tomahawks, Kittyhawks and P.40s operated incessantly with fighter-bom­bers and fighters against the slowly-moving traf­fic. More than 300 vehicles were immobilised, anti-aircraft guns were silenced and troops were mercilessly mown down. By dusk, transport vehicles were seen to be burning along the whole length of road from Ghazal to Fuka. In the course of the day, 254 effective sorties were made by R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. bombers, 154 by fight­er aircraft on ground attacks, and 122 by fight­er-bombers.

The Luftwaffe's murder of fleeing civilians on the roads of France was being avenged: the Axis soldiery was having a taste of what their air force had so often joyously inflicted.

Some of the low-flying fighter attacks were made on targets in the central and southern sectors and IID Hurricanes located suitable tar­gets in the south, scoring hits on fifteen tanks and a number of armoured cars and large lorries.

In comparison with our intensive effort, enemy air activity was on a slight scale. Two escorted : JU.87 attacks were intercepted and some of the Stukas were forced to jettison their bonibs, and attempts to interfere with our fighters operating over the coastal road were unsuccessful. In combats with the enemy, eight JU.87s and six ME.109s were shot down, ten JU.87s and one ME.109 probably destroyed and ten other air­craft damaged.

It was to be expected that as a result of our intensive air operations R.A.F. casualties would be heavy: nineteen fighters and fighter-bombers were destroyed, one Boston was shot down by anti-aircraft fire and sixteen fighters and. two light bombers were seriously damaged. Hurri­canes, which were carrying the burden of the normal fighter activity and opposed by enemy fighters of superior performance, were extremely hard hit, thirteen being shot down and eleven badly damaged.

For ten hours that night, 3/4th November, the relentless bombing of the columns withdrawing along the coastal road was continued, particular­ly between Daba and Fuka, by Wellingtons which carried out 110 effective sorties, aided by 19 Albacores. During one period of the attack,; thirty fires were counted and many of these were accompanied by violent explosions. Further west, moreover, road traffic was straffed by night Beaufighters and Hurricanes.

Pursuit of the Enemy

The first line to which the enemy's main force withdrew ran southwards from Ghazal. Dur­ing the morning, 4th November, our armour and transport moved round the enemy's southern flank. There was no to time to think of Axis

The Luftwaffe's murder

of fleeing eii'diaus on the

roads of h'ranee was I'e'uuj

az'cnyed

^

IJJU,

rmans had to move fast "to live to fight another day." A headlong retreat westward ensued and the VHIth Army followed in close pursuit.

Light bombers continually bombed enemy positions on the Ghazal line and harassed the enemy's transport withdrawing along the coastal road. In all, 141 effective sorties were carried out by R.A.F. light bombers and 42 by U.S.A.A.F. Mitchells, and fighter-bombers and low-flying fighters operated at maximum intensity. Dur­ing the night no respite was allowed to the enemy, and bombing was continued to prevent him effecting a stand along the Fuka escarp­ment. 77 Wellingtons and 13 Albacores carried on with the destruction along the coastal road and on the beaches as far as Fuka, inflicting great damage on transport and tanks. At Daba, as a result of enemy demolitions and R.A.F. bombing, fires were visible for seventy miles.

On 5th November, remnants of the German armoured divisions and mobile infantry attempt­ed to make a stand at Fuka. The R.A.F.'s intensive bombing, however, had prevented the enemy re-grouping his forces. Our armoured and motorised forces broke the German line and the pursuit of the fleeing enemy troops was resum­ed. At this time, the Germans were estimated to have only 30 of their original 270 tanks and practically all the Italian tanks, through casual­ties or capture, were out of the battle.

Escorted light bomfbers and fighter-bombers harassed the enemy in the Fuka area during the morning and in the afternoon attacks were made on transport concentrations near Maaten Baguslh: Meanwhile, fighter patrols were main­tained over our forward troops in the Fuka and Sidi Haneish areas. Although enemy air activity was now curtailed, German fighters at­tempted to break up our patrols, but without success. Enemy casualties in combat totalled five ME.109s destroyed, one "probable", and three damaged; we lost four fighters.

Hampered by Rain The pursuit of our land forces was greatly

hampered on the 6th and 7th November by heavy rain which rendered all movement off the road impossible. Moreover, the rain rendered the recently captured Daba landing ground unser­viceable for a time, and low cloud limited our day bomber activity.

From 6th to 8th November inclusive, the light bomber activity was negligible, but heavy and medium bombers, unaffected by the extent of the enemy's flight, kept up their night attacks on enemy columns retreating along the coast road between Sidi Barrani and SoUum and through Half ay a pass. On the nights 6/7th, 7/8th, and 8/9th November, heavy bombers made 32 and medium bombers 127 effective sorties in these areas. The day attacks were now carried out by fighters and fighter-bombers aijfd 6f]fena|v , ^patfplsiv^^^tt^intained by Spit­

fires and Kittyhawks, operating from the land­ing grounds at Daba.

Movement of the R.A.F. in Pursuit From the moment the enemy's withdrawal

began, the maximum air effort had been directed towards causing havoc, confusion and delay along the enemy's restricted line of retreat.

The attacks at night, when the enemy's main movements took place,, presented no additional difficulties yet, as the medium and heavy bom­bers could carry on from their existing bases. The day attacks, once the retreat became a rout, were carried out principally by fighters and fighter^bombers, not simply because the targets were ideal for their employment, but due chiefly to the fact that these aircraft could be more quickly established at re-occupied landing grounds than the light bombers and could be more easily maintained. The fitting of long-range tanks to fighter aircraft ensured that the enemy could be harassed to extreme range. When later on in the pursuit enemy resistance stiffened, the light bombers were again brought forward and added weight to the- air attacks.

An R.A.F. aerodrome reconnaissance party, which was in W/T communication with Adv. Air KQ., W.D., and an R.E. aerodrome construction party went ahead with our forward troops and ensured the immediate repair of the re-occupied aerodromes. They were aided in their task by sappers who cleared landing grounds which had been mined as a No. £ priority job. Actually, in the first mad rush, the enemy left their landing grounds in such a hurry that many serviceable and hundreds of damaged aircraft were aban­doned, and attempts to prevent our occupation by mining or rigging-up of boody traps were not really formidable until Derna was reached. The work of the R.A.F. Regiment, also, in secur­ing landing grounds and providing protection for units on the move was of the greatest value throughout the pursuit.

When the word was received from the recon­naissance party that a certain landing ground was ready for use, the advance ground parties of squadrons and the control formation moved for­ward and these were followed by the air parties. Later, when distances became formidable, trans­port aircraft for the conveyance of personnel and supplies were employed on a large scale and enabled our fighters to hop to bases 150 miles further west at a time, much to the cons­ternation of the fleeing enemy troops.

Time-Tables The following time-tables showing the rate of

progress of the Vlllth Army and the R.A.F. clock-like reoccupation of aerodromes when the momentum of the retreat was at its greatest are revealing, not only as proof of Berlin's contention that Rommel was "a master of retreat" but more pertinently that our land and air forces were past masters in the art of pursuit.

46

VHIth Army's Advance 5th - 6th November Fuka Escarpment

8th November Mutruh. 9th November Sidi Bar rani. 11th November Halfaya. 13th November Tobmk. 19th November Benghazi. 23rd November Jedabya.

Fighter Occupation of Landing Grounds

6th November Daba, 9th November Sidi Haneish. 10th November Mischeifa. 13th November Sidi Azeiz. 14th November Gambut. 17th November Gazala. 19th November Martubu.

The impetus of the pursuit was maintained in spite of rain, which at times hindered the ad­vance of our armoured units and rendered land­ing grounds unserviceable, and mining which slowed up progress on the roads and delayed the re-occupation of deserted aerodromes.

R.A.F. Fighter Activity

During the enemy's headlong retreat to Je­dabya the R.A.F. attacks against the fleeing columns were for reasons already mentioned delivered almost entirely by fighters and fighter-bombers. From the 9th to 23rd November, R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. fighters carried out ap<­proximately 700 effective sorties in fighter-bomber and ground straffing attacks. These attacks on the enemy's extended lines of traffic caused great havoc and confusion and the speed with which the R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. fighters kept up with our land advance often enabled them to catch enemy columns, which imagined themselves out of range, totally unprepared for air attacks.

A particularly masterly move was that of two Hurricane squadrons on 13th November to a desert landing ground 180 miles due east of Je^­dabya, while our main fighter activity was still against the enemy in the Jebel area. The move of the ground personnel and necessary supplies was carried out by air transport and the Hurricanes were operating on the afternoon of the day of arrival. Thus, to the great surprise of the enemy, our fighters appeared over the enemy's leading columns in the Jeddbya-Agheila area while the main Axis units were still east of Benghazi. The results of the Hurricane attacks were excellent. 130 vehicles were destroyed and 170 damaged; two aircraft were destroyed in the air and twelve on the ground. By 16th Nov­ember, however, enemy fighter defence in the area was strengthened and the squadrons were brought back, again with the help of air trans­port, to a landing ground further east.

By 16th November, the enemy's rear columns had reached Benghazi. Owing to lack of motor transport and fuel, the enemy began to

^ ^ ^ejeteSistveLy1 f&'r* 1 cuaTiorf'dr^fliPImportant base. The main part ' of the fighter force located at Gazala was ac­cordingly directed against this activity. On 17th and 18th November, fourteen JU.52s were shot down and nine JU.52s and fourteen other aircraft, mainly transport, were destroyed on the ground. From this time, the enemy gave up using aerodromes in the Benghazi area.

Meanwhile, cover for a convoy westbound to Malta was provided on 18th November by fight­ers operating from Gazala. It was clear that day fighter protection could now be provided for such convoys for practically the entire route.

Offensive fighter patrols over our advancing troops and beyond were regularly carried out, in. spite of most unfavourable weather on many days, by Spitfires, Kittyhawks and P.40s, although difficulties of supply and maintenance at landing grounds increasingly distant from our bases ne­cessarily limited the scale of this activity. From 9th to 23rd November, R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. fighters made over 400 sorties on offensive land patrols. In general, engagements with enemy aircraft were few as the Axis air forces were hastily retiring and any tendency to hang on to landing grounds to the last minute, as the R.A.F. had done in the previous June, was thoroughly discouraged by our low-flying fighter attacks. Combats were most frequent on the 11th November, as the speed of our advance brought our fighters into contact with the enemy air forces based at El Adem and Gambut. Over the Sollum, area, No. 2 Squadrons S.A.A.F. en­countered fifteen JU.87s escorted by six ME.109s. The Kittyhawks shot down eight of the Stukas and probably destroyed four more. The remain­ing three dive-bombers were intercepted by P.40s as they were about to land at Gambut and all three were shot down. As a result of other com­bats on this day, six JU.52s, five ME.109s, one JU.88 and one Fieseler Storch were shot down. Our lossers were six Kittyhawks and one P.40.

R.A.F. Bomber Activity

The last time during the enemy's withdrawal that his transport was concentrated to provide a suitable day target for our light bomber force was on 9th November. During that day, 24 Bos­tons, escorted by Kittyhawks and P.40s, operated from Sidi Haneish against tightly-packed con­centrations of vehicles between Sollum and Hal­faya and inflicted considerable damage. There­after, until concentrations were located at Marble Arch and resistance hardened at Buerat in the following month, the light bombers were not called upon again as difficulties of supply and maintenance were too great to justify their spo­radic employment.

From 9th to 12th November, targets provided by enemy night moves were available for our medium bombers, and on these four nights the Wellingtons progressively followed the enemy columns from Sollum to Derna, making a total of 119 effective sorties.

these ports by the enemy. Against Tobruk, R.A.F. heavy and medium bombers carried out 28 effective sorties on the night ,10/llth Nov­ember, and between the 10th and 14th November, R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. heavy bombers made 28 and Wellingtons 19 effective sorties against Ben­ghazi.

From the night 21/22nd November onward, however, Tripoli took on the unenviable dis­tinction of being the principal R.A.F. target among the enemy's supply ports, and from that ('ate R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. bombers kept up a series of constant attacks.

With our speedy re-occupation of Cyrenaicu, targets thinned out for our medium bombers. Ac­cordingly, a large proportion of the Wellington force was transferred to Malta in order, primari­ly, to operate against Tunisia. The work of the medium bombers had been magnificent. In their constant hammering of the Axis supply ports, attacks on aerodromes, and breaking up of enemy concentrations on the battle-field, the medium bomber squadrons operated repeatedly at full pressure. The Wellingtons had played a most memorable part in the Battle for Egypt.

" On to Tripoli ! "

The Axis retreat from Fuka to Mcrsa Brega in eighteen days constituted a Libyan record, but even more remarkable was the success of our land and air forces in keeping on the enemy's tail, in spite of most unfavourable weather, the delays imposed by mining, booby-traps and des­truction of roads, and stubborn enemy rear-guard actions, particularly in the Jebel El Akdar.

At Agheila, there was an inevitable lull as our forces moved up in preparation for a stiff fight, but once again the enemy evacuated his positions before full pressure could be brought Lo bear on him. By the end of the year, ,the Axis forces had withdrawn to Busrat. Thereafter, our watchword was "On to Tripoli!"

The R.A.F. continued their attacks as oux ad­vance continued. From the time the enemy began to establish himself at Ayheila, on the 23rd Nov­ember, the Allied bombers increased their attacks on his Tripolitanian supply ports. From that date to the end of the year, R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. heavy bombers carried out over 70 effective sor­ties against the port of Tripoli, and Wellingtons also made an appreciable number of sorties against this all-important Axis base. In addition, constant attacks were made on Misuntta, Horns, Bucrat El Hsun and other bases in the enemy's immediate rear.

Meanwhile, air attacks wore continued against the enemy's Tripoli!am.an landing grounds and ex­tended to the long-range bomber bases in Crete. In all, from 23rd November to the end of the year over 150 effective sorties were carried out by R.A.F. heavy and medium bombers against these targets.

After a lull during the last fortnight in November, when the enemy forces went tempo­rarily out of range for the fighter force and targets were not suitable for medium bomber employment, air attacks were again resumed against enemy positions in December.

During the month, approximately 760 effective sorties were made by R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. fighter-bombers against vehicle concentrations, positions, and encampments and many ground straffing attacks were also made against the same targets. Our fighter-bomber activity was particularly intensive on the 13th and 14th De­cember against enemy land forces withdrawing from the Mersa Brega and Agheila positions. On 13th December from dawn to dusk a re­cord total of 276 effective sorties were made by R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. fighters on bombing and straffing attacks against enemy transport columns and tanks moving westward, bound for Tripolitania. The following day the attacks were continued but on a slightly reduced scale as suit­able targets gradually thinned out as the enemy's withdrawal proceeded.

During December, the light bomber force was again brought into action although targets were not comparable with those afforded by the vast concentration at Alamein. On 15th December, concentrations of transport vehicles were report­ed on the coastal road west of Marble Arch and in the wadis to the south. Three attacks were made by 36 Bostons and Baltimores and IS U.S.A.A.F. Mitchells, escorted by Kittyhawks and P. 40s, and these inflicted widespread damage. The knowledge that the dreaded light bombers were again close at hand must also have filled the enemy with forebodings for the future. On the following day, escorted R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. light bombers made 64 effective sorties against transport in the Nofilia area and anti-aircraft batteries in the vicinity were also attacked. Although considerable damage was done, the targets were still reported as "limited" for day bomber attack.

The dispersal of the enemy's forces likewise precluded the extensive use of the medium bomb­ers against them. During December, only 37 effective sorties were carried out by Wellingtons against enemy postions and concentrations and all but seven of these were made on the nights of 18/19th and 19/20th December against con­centrations near Buerat El Hsun where enemy resistance was again stiffening.

While the enemy was being chased into Tripo­lilaniu full reconnaissance of the forward areas was carried out by No. 40 Squadron S.A.A.F. and the coastal area was covered by No. 1437 Flight. This .work was of inestimable value to both our,, land and air forces.

Above all, in spite of constant unfavourable weather conditions, difficulties of supply, and the extensive damage to landing grounds by mining at Benina, Btrka and Marble Arch, by booby traps at Merrluma and ploughing at Ghindel,

Sirte and Tamet, R.A.F. Spitfires and Kitty-hawks maintained continuous offensive patrols and never lost air supremacy.

Air Power

In order to crush the enemy in the Middle East, the Royal Navy, Army and R.A.F. planned in unison but retained individual operational con­trol. The three independent partners, all special­ists in their own particular form of warfare, were imbued alike with the one aim of destroying the enemy wherever he was encountered — on land, on the sea and under it, and in the air.

From the opening of the enemy's campaign in May to the final rout of the Axis forces at the end of the year, the R.A.F. grew in power and consistently extended the scope of its activity. As is apparent in the foregoing account of opera­

tions, by its* denial or. essejatf&V sui>pi|es*fco•{ the enemy, ascendency over the bpposirig air forces and sustained attacks in the battlefield, the R.A.F. played a decisive part in the Battle for Egypt. From 20th May, a week before the Ga­zala battles began, to the end of the year, R.A.F. aircraft based in Egypt and Cyrenaica carried out nearly 22,000 bomber and fighter-bomber ef­fective sorties against land and sea targets and R.A.F. fighters, excluding the fighter-bomber at­tacks included in the above total, made approx­imately 50,000 sorties.

The whole power of the air, both tactical and strategical, had been brought to bear on the ene­my. The results achieved are significant not only as they concern the campaigns in Africa but as an augury of what is to come in the final reckoning with the Nazi and Fascist Powers.

LAND AND HARBOUR RECONNAISSANCE BY AIRCRAFT BASED ON CYRENAICA/EGYPT

19/20 MAY - 29 DECEMBER, 1942. Summarised in Fortnightly Periods.

Sorties include CRETE and GREECE

FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS

19/20 May - 2 June ...

2/3 - 16 June

16/17 - 30 June

30 June/1 - 14 July .

14/15 - 28 July ...

28/29 July - 11 Aug.

11/12 - 25 Aug.

25/26 Aug. - 8 Sept.

8/9 - 22 Sept

22/23 Sept. - 6 Oct.

6/7 - 20 Oct

20/21 Oct. - 3 Nov. ...

3/4 Nov. - 17 Nov. ...

17/18 Nov. - 1 Dec. ...

1/2 - 15 Dec

15/16 - 29 Dec

GRAND TOTALS ...

* Included in LAND section —

Tac/Rand P/R Strat/R

P/R & V/R

Land Harbour

FORT­NIGHTLY TOTALS

85 14 45 144

85 21 24 32 162

32 22 18 24 96

123 23 22 30 198

194 18 37 43 292

77 20 18 34 149

88 15 33 35 171

43 13 27 50 133

25 16 35 35 111

35 14 27 23 99

80 14 37 12 143

77 18 49 21 165

50 26 18 17 111

17 20 23 15 75

28 23 16 10 77

22 14 19 15 70

1061 291 448 396 2196

separate figures not available. Figures for SEA RECONNAISSANCE from CYRENAICA/EGYPT are attached to the article

"THE WAR AT SEA — SUMMER AND AUTUMN, 1942"

49

ATTACKS by BOMBER, TORPEDO and MINE-LAYING AIRCRAFT based on CYRENAICA/EGYPT . \ U.S.A.AAGAINST LAND TARGETS: 19/20th MAY —29th DECEMBER, 1942. KEY :

B R I T I S Summarised in Fortnightly Periods.

Effective Sorties. (Sor t ies by U.S.A.A.F. a r e not included from 8/9th September , by which date control of cer ta in Amer ican bomber t-quailron:-; h:iM assumed by H.Q., U.S.A.A.F.)

FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS

19/20 May - 2 June ...

2/3 - 16 June

16/17 - 30 June

30 June/1 - 14 July

14/15 - 28 July

28/29 July - 11 Aug.

11/12 - 25 Aug.

25/26 Aug. - 8 Sept.

8/9 - 22 Sept 22/23 Sept. - 6 Oct. ... 6/7 - 20 Oct 20/21 Oct. - 3 Nov. ... 3/4 - 17 Nov 17/18 Nov. - 1 Dec. ... 1/2 - 15 Dec 15/16 - 29 Dec

GRAND TOTALS ...

PORTS and BASES AERODROMES and LANDING GROUNDS-

ENEMY CAMPS, POSITIONS and LINES of COMMUNICATION

bJD

3

V CD

Is EM

tD 0)

£•2 bog to

3

32 17 49 255 71 3.T1 15 122 359 6 (6 9 82 9 100 172 70 212 9 667 94 8 31 31 20 117 17 154 196 61 33 290 12 273 120 38 38 24 386 28 438 76 49 186 311 417 1039 1072 61 61 77 443 69 89 130 105 93 328 195 665­ 681 1541

34 34 86 753 66 05 26 55 81 12 85 329

n 27 U 1

88 411 53 552 25 24 49 129 107 255

74 34 34 98 82 149 231 5 73 48 126 14 401 697 92

78 345 423 26 93 123 11 43 69 246 315 62 162 224 4 97 22 216 238 2 55 229 149 435 9 1 1N9

35 43 62 128 348 204 742 541 lit 15 9 if) 17 44 61 21 23 19 526 27(i 417 22 3 ' 25 6 69 75

26 10 36 10 16 21 47 7 36 428

14 17 38 50 50 30 154

261 27 35 35 98 100 634 3289 2 4 4197 106 1359 1315 726 3506 73 2579 5294 6012 13958 21661

OPERATIONS BY FIGHTER AND FIGHTER-BOMBER AIRCRAFT BASED ON CYRENAICA/EGYPT AGAINST LAND AND SEA TARGETS. — 19/20th May - 29th December, 1942.

Summarised in fortnightly periods.

FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS

Offensive sweep— Land.

Ground Attack .E.&T.E. (includ. Cannon)

Ground Attack-anti-tank

Ground Attack— Fighter-Bombers

Bomber Escort

Recon­naissance Escort

Local Defence

Anti-ship­ping and offensive sweeps

Shipping Protection

TOTALS

19/20 May ­ 2 June . 619 211 258 386 125 837 10 742

2/3 ­ 16 June ... . 1755 118 37 731 776 90 501 3 887

16/17 ­ 30 June ... . 1198 69 6 508 441 11 135 52 344

30 June/1 ­ 14 July . 2655 87 23 1507 1265 20 563 54 360

14/15 ­ 28 July ... . 2101 60 14 955 800 69 . J.23 24 428

28/29 July ­ 11 Aug. . 1142 51 3 359 364 147 393 82 346

H/12 - 25 Aug. ... 559 18 265 305 126 581 42 455

25/26 Aug. ­8 Sept. 1665 92 18 92 946 261 797 53 380

8/9 ­ 22 Sept. ... ' 1246 48 63 20 336 349 15 392

22/23 Sept. ­ 6 Oct. 866 69 6 101 149 281 160 8 268

6/7._ 2 0 O c t 726 173 5 364 560 239 132 11 219

20/21 Oct. ­ 3 Nov. 3040 375 63 1290 2773 201 397 11 317

3/4 ­ i ? N ° V - ••• 639 543 32 447 282 176 24 510

17/18 Nov. ­ 1 Dec. 327 102 39 26 527 29 738

1/2 ­ 15 Dec. ... 746 34 494 165 194 488 4 970

15/16 ­ 29 Dec. ... 355 79 508 116 134 350 8 798

GRAND TOTALS 19839 2129 207 7942 9387 2260 7609 430 S184 57987