This article was downloaded by: [University of Connecticut]On: 10 October 2014, At: 19:27Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Comparative StrategyPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ucst20

Military Policy Options to Revise theFrench Military Presence in the Horn ofAfricaVernie Liebl aa Major, United States Marine Corp. Retired ,Published online: 04 Mar 2008.

To cite this article: Vernie Liebl (2008) Military Policy Options to Revise the French Military Presencein the Horn of Africa, Comparative Strategy, 27:1, 79-87, DOI: 10.1080/01495930701839787

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495930701839787

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Military Policy Options to Revise the FrenchMilitary Presence in the Horn of Africa

VERNIE LIEBLMajor, United States Marine Corp. Retired

French diplomatic and military operations in Djibouti, the Red Sea and the Gulf ofAden have or are in danger of becoming seriously compromised and weakened, to thedetriment of French policy in Africa and the Middle East. This article is a brief reviewof the French military presence in Djibouti and the Horn of Africa. It is written froma French viewpoint regarding how to either remove or enhance French capabilitiesin the Horn of Africa, with policy options provided. It is equally important that theU.S. presence be removed from Djibouti. Introduction of the European Union (EU) andexpansion of the African Union may benefit France. In the end, France should adopt aspecific policy that would benefit France militarily, exclude the United States, and shiftfunding from France to the EU.

France is increasingly finding its position in Africa difficult, Djibouti being no excep-tion. Although not engaged in active combat operations against rebel forces, Frenchoperations in Djibouti are running into increasing Djiboutian governmental interferenceand even outright hostility. Currently, a major source of contention is the investiga-tion of the 1995 assassination of French citizen and magistrate Bernard Borrel, then at-tached to the Djiboutian Ministry of Justice and tasked with investigating the bombingdeath of a French soldier. Faulty handling by President Jacque Chirac, the French Min-istry of Foreign Affairs, and the French Ministry of Justice has led to outright hostilityfrom the recently re-elected Djiboutian President, Ismael Omar Guellah, toward France.This mishandling has spurred anti-French attitudes, especially among the younger Dji-boutians, and a concomitant increase in Djiboutian nationalism. A complicating factor forFrance is the presence of U.S. forces in Djibouti (the Combined/Joint Task Force Hornof Africa or CJTF-HOA); their infusion of money, material and support to the Guellahgovernment; and the adroit use of their presence by President Guellah as a lever againstFrance.

The May 2007 election of President Sarkozy, a conservative, has not allayed anyDjiboutian fears, as he has enunciated strong views on immigration control and is believedto be far from the friendly minister that Chirac was (for all his faults). Bottom line—Frenchdiplomatic and military operations in Djibouti, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden haveor are in danger of becoming seriously compromised and weakened, to the detriment ofFrench policy in Africa and the Middle East. This is not simply a prestige issue. Any loss ofFrench presence in Djibouti directly threatens the French lifeline to its Indian Ocean- andPacific Ocean-based citizens and dependents, numbering over 1.4 million people (located inFrench Polynesia, Reunion Island, New Caledonia, Mayotte, and Wallis & Futuna Islands,to name the most significant locations).

France has had an interest in the Horn of Africa since Rochet d’Hericourt’s explorationinto the Shoa in 1839. After a treaty of friendship and assistance was signed betweenFrance and the sultans of Tadjoura, Raheita, and Gobaad, an anchorage was purchasedfrom the sultan of Gobaad in 1862, beginning a permanent French presence in the region.

79

Comparative Strategy, 27:79–87, 2008Copyright © 2008 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

0149-5933/08 $12.00 + .00DOI: 10.1080/01495930701839787

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 1

9:27

10

Oct

ober

201

4

80 V. Liebl

French interest in the area increased with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and with theexpansion of a French protectorate along the shores of the Gulf of Tadjoura and the northernSomali coastline. In 1896 the French administrative capital for the protectorate was movedfrom Obock south across the Gulf of Tadjoura to Djibouti, which had a natural deep-wateranchorage with ready access to the Ethiopian highlands. In 1897 the Franco-Ethiopianrailway was begun, reaching Addis Ababa in 1917 to further link the Ethiopian highlands tothe French terminus on the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden. Boundaries of the protectorate, markedout in 1897 between France and Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia, were affirmed by HaileSelassie I in 1945 and 1954.

In the 1930s, during the Italian invasion and occupation of Ethiopia and Somaliland,French and Italian forces constantly skirmished along the borders. It was during this timethat France built a “strongpoint” belt of fortifications covering the landward side of thecity of Djibouti, fortifications now crumbling and occupied mainly by spiders, bats, andsnakes. During World War II, after liberation by Free French forces attacking out of BritishSomaliland, a local Djiboutian battalion corseted with French volunteers was raised andsent to participate in the liberation of France. In 1957 the colony of French Somaliland(Djibouti) was reorganized to enable considerable autonomy and self-rule. In 1958, thepeople of French Somaliland voted in a constitutional referendum to join the French com-munity as an overseas department with representation of one deputy and one senator inthe Parliament and one counselor in the Union Assembly. President de Gaulle visitedFrench Somaliland in August 1966 and in September 1966 a referendum was held to de-termine whether or not the local inhabitants would remain within the French Republic orbecome independent. Over 60 percent chose to continue the territory’s association withFrance.

In 1967 a directive from Paris changed the name of the region to the French Territoryof Afars and Issas, also reorganizing the governmental structure of the territory, turning thesenior French representative, formerly the Governor-General, into a High Commissioner.In 1976, in response to increasingly insistent demands for independence, the territory’scitizenship laws, which had traditionally favored the Afar minority, were revised to reflectmore closely the weight of the Somali Isa majority. In May 1977, a referendum was heldin which a majority of the electorate voted for independence and on June 27, 1977, theRepublic of Djibouti was established.

In 1967 a Provisional Protocol defense agreement (hereafter referred to as the De-fense Protocol) was signed between France and the territorial government. This agreementwas ratified in May 1979 by the Djiboutian Parliament as Law No. 79-358 and directedthe prepositioning of French forces and equipment in Djibouti. This French presence notonly ensures that France has a secure military platform to maintain its position in EastAfrica, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean, but more importantly enables France tomonitor the safety and security of maritime traffic (both military and commercial) throughthe Bab el Mandeb into the Red Sea. This French basing platform represents the thirdlargest French force deployed outside of metropolitan France (the Caribbean is first, fol-lowed by West Africa) and monies paid by the Ministry of Defense (MOD) to Djiboutirepresent over 60 percent of the Djiboutian budget and nearly 25 percent of its GDP (FY2001). Based on the Defense Protocol’s legal framework, France is prohibited from us-ing Djibouti as a base for armed intervention into another country and can only act inthe event of aggression by a foreign-armed force, and then only at the request of theDjiboutian government. French troops are prohibited from being used to control internalDjiboutian uprisings by any existing Djiboutian government. The agreement has remainedessentially unchanged to the present, although with French entry into the European Union

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 1

9:27

10

Oct

ober

201

4

The French Military in the Horn of Africa 81

the Defense Protocol could be revised to represent EU interests versus exclusively Frenchinterests.

Problem

French military policy in Africa, including Djibouti, has suffered in the last ten yearsfrom the inclinations of the Chirac Administration, the neglect of the Ministry of ForeignAffairs (MFA), and U.S. military presence in Francophone Africa. Finally, two intertwinedissues have recently emerged to potentially cause the removal of the French presence fromDjibouti—a resurgent nationalism and the death of French citizen and Judge Bernard Borrel.

President Chirac chose to largely personalize foreign relations, especially with Araband Muslim leaders throughout Francophone Africa and the Middle East. He favorednondemocratic leaders who were viewed as amenable to continued French paramountcyin traditional Francophone regions as well as those leaders who opposed the United Statesand/or the United Kingdom. This had the effect of freezing out or minimizing traditionalMFA functions in Africa, thus often forcing the MOD to conduct its own “diplomacy” inthe region. Unfortunately, in the case of Djibouti President Chirac chose not to make anyparticular effort with President Guellah, and thus Djiboutian relations with France have suf-fered. The MFA and the French ambassador to Djibouti, both chosen by President Chirac,have done little to improve the situation.

The introduction of U.S. military forces into traditional Francophone areas of Africa,beginning with Rwanda in 1996, has had a deleterious impact on traditional French militarydeployments and actions. Often the simple presence of a significant foreign power, i.e. theUnited States, has encouraged African governments to play France off the United Statesor to cause the intervention of United Nation forces in areas normally not considered forsuch deployments. Often the UN deployments have been at the behest of France in order toforestall U.S. action and intervention in, for example, Rwanda and Chad. It is no differentin Djibouti. President Guellah is using the presence of approximately 1,500 U.S. troopsand mercenaries to demand increased financial compensation for basing rights. This hassucceeded. France agreed in 2003 to almost double the amount paid to Djibouti for basingrights, from 18 million Euros to 30 million Euros, as of 2004 (this does not include theapproximately 25 million Euros French Force Djibouti personnel, dependent civilians andexpatriate French civilians spend in Djibouti annually). There is every prospect of thisincreasing unless the U.S. can be persuaded to depart. Additionally, French assets have hadto be expended in nontraditional efforts, such as Djiboutian infrastructure improvementand humanitarian assistance (such as roving medical teams or veterinarian assistance tonatives). President Guellah continually asks the U.S. to remain, diverting a significantamount of his security force to insure U.S. forces safety, again with, from the Frenchviewpoint, concomitant deleterious effects on the safety of French citizens.

Djibouti is undergoing a resurgence of nationalism, primarily of an anti-French nature,but also with some echoes of Islamism. While a majority of senior Djiboutians in the currentgovernment remain solidly pro-French, many younger Djiboutians are either pro-U.S. or,even more disturbing, Islamist (although to be fair this remains a tiny, largely Somali, major-ity). This has been noted by the United States and has had some impact already in impairingFrench intelligence gathering and the safety of French citizens. Related to this resurgenceis the presence of U.S. troops in Djibouti. Already mentioned is the fact that they give analternate pole around which Djiboutian factions may accrete and that French funding andeffort needs to be expended in infrastructure improvements (to counter the U.S. efforts of thesame). Yet the U.S. presence also encourages Ethiopian intransigence against both Eritrea

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 1

9:27

10

Oct

ober

201

4

82 V. Liebl

and Djibouti, Somali Islamist (AIAI, etc.) activity in Djibouti and, most of all, completeDjiboutian independence from France. Thus, French capabilities in Africa, the Middle East,and the Indian Ocean may be or will be significantly impaired if no action is taken.

Finally, the murder of Magistrate Bernard Borrel (termed a suicide in 1995 by Dji-boutian investigators) has been the issue that has apparently brought a crisis in French-Djiboutian relations to a head. Borrel died while attached to the Djiboutian Ministry ofJustice (MOJ) and engaged in a Paris-directed investigation into a local bombing in thecity of Djibouti that had resulted in the death of a French soldier. Quiescent for nearly adecade, two factors converged to bring the issue back to the fore: Judge Borrel’s widow,politically connected, pushed for a reopening of the investigation by the French MOJ, andinformation indicating that a person or persons high up in the Guellah government mayhave been responsible for the death of Borrel was inadvertently uncovered. The FrenchMOJ issued a summons to the current Djiboutian head of security to appear in Paris forquestioning (he is a dual French/Djiboutian citizen), which was refused by President Guel-lah. A second summons in early 2007 was likewise refused. The French MOJ requestedall records concerning the investigation from the Djiboutian MOJ; this also was refused.Leaked to the French press, Djibouti and President Guellah were chastised and, in all butname, accused of murder by French newspapers. President Guellah was insulted and itassumed that this was done at the instigation of President Chirac. There is no Djiboutianunderstanding of the independence of the French press and the French judiciary from theChirac Administration. An additional factor is that there is some belief in the French press,as well as within the MOJ and the MFA, that select elements of the French Force Djibouti(FFDJ), unidentified as of yet, were in collusion with Djiboutian authorities in suppressingany evidence of wrongful death or murder of Judge Borrel.

The point has been reached in which French citizens have been expelled from Djibouti,the local transmitter of Radio France Internationale (RFI) has been shut down, Frenchcitizens are being episodically harassed by Djiboutian security elements, French militaryoperations are being impeded or even occasionally cancelled by the Djiboutian government,and French military advisors are being slowly displaced by U.S. advisors. The impact ofFrench miscalculations in Cote D’Ivoire and the resulting forced evacuation of Frenchcitizens and deaths of French citizens at the hands of Ivorians was widely reported inDjibouti. Note has been made of French efforts in Rwanda to favor the Hutu population,to the point where French forces have been portrayed as having assisted in the genocide ofthe Tutsis there. Much of the Djiboutian populace has lost respect for France. For now, theUnited States is not overtly taking advantage of the situation in Djibouti, as they are heavilyengaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it may only be a matter of time. The United Statesis increasing its efforts and influence, primarily in humanitarian assistance and securitytraining, in Yemen, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. It has established tentative links to theunrecognized government in northern Somalia, called Somaliland, and it is exploring waysto assist in Sudan. U.S.-flagged warships increasingly are calling in Djibouti and other portsalong the East African littoral, displacing traditional French patrols. The U.S. presence inDjibouti is a long-term threat to a continued French presence in Djibouti.

Options

There are several potential options that France could undertake to either preserve or removethe FFDJ. They are:

1. The “Do Nothing” option, in which nothing is changed as it currently exists. Thelikely outcome will be a slow degradation of French capabilities and an eventual

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 1

9:27

10

Oct

ober

201

4

The French Military in the Horn of Africa 83

replacement of French forces and presence by the United States or the creation of avacuum. A change in French political approach may lengthen any French presencebut may also have no positive impact. With the removal of the Chirac governmentthere is a hope for a more Afrocentric government, which may still happen underSarkozy, but is not likely.

This would probably be considered an undesirable option. French capability tomonitor maritime traffic through the Bab el Mandeb would degrade and eventuallydisappear, and a critical French base would be removed or become essentially acaretaker facility, severely hampering French ability to conduct strategic operationsin Africa and the Middle East while placing additional, possibly prohibitive, pressureupon selected elements of the MOD, namely the Navy and the Air Force. The nearlyone and a half million French dependents in the Indian and Pacific Ocean territorieswould be almost completely isolated, possibly leading to increased demands forindependence from, or increased dependence on, France.

2. The “Departure” option in, which France retreats from commitments, voluntarilysurrenders capabilities and removes the FFDJ from Djibouti. This option wouldlargely see the severance of French support to the Djiboutian government, removalof all French forces from Djibouti, and no effort made at aiding in the stability ofeither the Djiboutian, government or of the region. French security and monitoringoperations in the Bab el Mandeb would cease and only occasional French naval portvisits and Army/Air Force training team visits to maintain local security capabilitiesand ties would occur. Critical intelligence-collection and monitoring capabilitieswould be lost.

This would likely be considered an undesirable option. Total withdrawal wouldindicate the complete nullification of the Defense Protocol with Djibouti, forcingDjibouti to seek security guarantees with another power or powers (possibly theUnited States, Ethiopia, or even China). In 2005 France had to close down theAbidjan base of the 43d Marine Infantry Battalion (BIMA) in Cote D’Ivoire; further“retrenchment” of French forces in Africa can only have an immediate and long-term negative impact on French influence and capabilities in Africa as well as furtheraway in the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions. French arms have already suffereddisaster in Cote D’Ivoire and voluntary French exclusion from Iraq has left littlerespect for the prowess of French arms, there is no need to give potential foes apropaganda victory as well (the “West” retreating from a “colonial fortress” wouldbe a likely portrayal).

3. The “Reduce FFDJ Presence.” This is a middle variant of options 1 and 2, a forcepackage on a sliding scale. This has nearly all the failings of the previous two options,the only tradeoff being that with a reduced force presence comes some monetarysavings to the MOD. However, any cost savings are more than offset by the loss ofcapabilities in the region. It might be possible to maintain intelligence-collectionand surveillance assets at present levels while significantly reducing the availablecombat and combat service support elements of the FFDJ.

This would likely be considered an undesirable option. This option would nega-tively affect the Defense Protocol with Djibouti and would reduce available Frenchcontingency forces in the region. It would open up the Francophone region to theforces of other nations as a contingency force.

4. The “Humanitarian/Nation-building engagement” option. This option would see therotation of select forces, possibly removing an entire combat battalion, in exchangefor additional civic action/civil affairs elements, paramilitary units, training teams,

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 1

9:27

10

Oct

ober

201

4

84 V. Liebl

and engineers. This would see a more integrated effort to apply MOD/FFDJ assetsto Djibouti in a nation-building mode (e.g., road construction, school constructionand maintenance, hospital/clinic construction, water drilling, cistern and pipe/wellconstruction), while training teams would be embedded, at the advice and permissionof the Djiboutian government, in more than just combat units. Specific effort wouldbe made to enlarge or create paramilitary gendarmerie, military police, engineer,transportation, and medical units. Additional funding would need to be provided toFFDJ from the MOD for this option. Additionally, in line with the Defense Protocol,French forces could be more integrated into the Djiboutian forces, sharing trainingand exchanging personnel and units to further enhance interoperability. Great carewould be made to both improve the educational levels of the Djiboutians as wellas to respect the sovereignty aspects of Djiboutian statehood. Djiboutian officerswould be integrated into the FFDJ and a much more permissive intelligence sharingwould be conducted with the Djiboutian military.

The Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities Program (RECAMP),in which the FFDJ trains Djiboutians to promote self-reliance, could be significantlyexpanded to include all Djiboutian forces as well as regional forces that Djibouti se-lects, such as Comorian or Yemeni troops. The prepositioned equipment provided forRECAMP and Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) by Djiboutian and other Africanforces (three battalion equivalents, assuming approximately 800 troops per battalion)also could be increased and modernized to be compatible with current French/EUstandards.

This option would likely be considered moderately desirable as it retains sig-nificant French force structure and capabilities in Djibouti and the region, sees tothe improvement of Djiboutian forces in the defense of their country, improves thehumanitarian aspects of Djiboutian force projection (vitally needed in the Horn ofAfrica), and displays French resolve to be a benefactor country versus an exploita-tive one. It is less than satisfactory in that French combat capability will likely haveto be reduced while essential combat services are lessened in the effort to providegreater civic action/civil affairs capability. The integration of Djiboutian forces intothe FFDJ (and French elements into the Djiboutian armed services) might createpersonnel and small-unit turbulence that may not offset the gain in Djiboutian capa-bilities over the long term. Intelligence sharing will have to break current securityparadigms within the MOD; there will have to be some resolution to suffer reducedcollection and analytical capabilities as well as an increased likelihood of inadver-tent and purposeful disclosures of sensitive material, at least in the short and possiblymid term. Overall, this option is a workably acceptable option, but possibly not thebest one from a French point of view.

5. The “EU/AU” option. As in option 4, the RECAMP program could be strengthenedand expanded, to the point of actually standing up a deployable African Union(AU) PKO brigade, paid for and trained by France, or more properly, the EuropeanUnion (EU). The brigade would have a standing Djiboutian battalion, possibly anEthiopian battalion, a Kenyan battalion, and selected company or platoon slicesfrom other Eastern African/Horn of Africa countries. This unit could deploy withprovided French/EU airlift assets, and a likely first mission would be in Darfur oreastern Congo.

The main thrust of this option, however, is the subsuming of the French pres-ence into an EU mission. Much of the shipping transiting the Bab el Mandeb isEuropean, as evidenced by the German naval vessels operating from Djibouti, and

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 1

9:27

10

Oct

ober

201

4

The French Military in the Horn of Africa 85

the Spanish, Italian, Norwegian, Danish, and other naval vessels operating in theHorn of Africa littoral waters under a UN-mandated mission, Maritime InterceptOperations (MIO), run from the U.S. Headquarters on Bahrain. Realignment ofFrench forces in Djibouti under an EU rubric, along with the home porting of EUnation vessels and aircraft in Djibouti, would ease the financial burden on Franceand the MOD while allowing Djibouti the opportunity to directly interface with theEU, thus possibly escaping some of the current austerity measures imposed by theU.S.-led International Monetary Fund regime. The FFDJ could remain the mainpillar of the EU “platform” in Djibouti, but selected capabilities from other EUcountries could be exploited or stationed in Djibouti, such as Belgian Paratroopers,Polish Marines, or Italian Carabineri MPs. Djibouti would be enabled to “escape” acolonial past, which would undoubtedly appeal greatly to the Guellah governmentand any successors. There would also be the potential for graft and corruption fromnon-French sources.

This would likely be considered a desirable option as it retains majority Frenchinterests and capabilities in Djibouti and opens up new avenues of financial, ma-terial, and personnel support and acquisition of niche specialties from other EUcountries. Both France and Djibouti directly benefit. The AU benefits. And the EUbenefits strategically vis-a-vis the United States while potential venues for NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations or increased Chinese influence arerestricted.

6. A synthesis of selected elements of options 4 and 5, which can be decided at a laterdate. In this option, it is strongly recommended that the EU assuming the missionremain a centerpiece. This option would have all the advantages of both options4 and 5, if correctly applied, thus leaving French interests and capabilities in theregion greatly enhanced, Djiboutian/African regional capabilities reinforced, andU.S. presence diminished, marginalized, or withdrawn.

From a French perspective it is likely that option 6 would be adopted, a selectedsynthesis of options 4 and 5. French forces would engage Djiboutian military forcesmore closely in an exchange of information, training, and technology. Emphasiscould be placed on Gendarmerie forces, engineer forces, reconnaissance forces andhelicopter lift elements. Increases in humanitarian aid and infrastructure assistancecould be provided by MOD vice MFA (unless Quai d’Orsay and President Sarkozydecide to completely support the issue, then EU assets can be used), to include pro-vision of equipment and training of Djiboutian personnel. Realignment of the FFDJto an EU platform with provision of non-French EU military forces; possible reduc-tion and substitution of French combat forces into an EU-centric force (only if otherEU countries provide substitute combat force capabilities); provision of equipment,funds and personnel for an active African Union (AU) brigade force in Djibouti, un-der EU aegis. Finally, definition of U.S. presence magnitude and length in Djiboutiwould need to be established, followed by removal of U.S. forces and relocationelsewhere, if at all possible. Establishment of an EU platform and redirection ofregional interests in favor of the EU/France, along with a good security/surveillancepackage, would likely induce the United States to relocate out of the Horn of Africa,as they have shown some willingness to minimize their presence and are also pos-sibly suffering from “imperial overreach.” While the MOD could engage in directnegotiations with U.S. Central Command, it would be most desirable if PresidentSarkozy and the MFA communicate directly with the U.S. leadership and/or U.S.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 1

9:27

10

Oct

ober

201

4

86 V. Liebl

State Department, as they appear more amenable and accommodating to French orEU interests than does the U.S. Central Command.

References

Agence Djiboutienne d’Information. (30 January 2005). France Issues Statement to Djibouti on DeathCase of French Judge. Djibouti Information Agency.

Agence France-Presse. (22 January 2005). Radio France Internationale Transmitter Cut off in Dji-bouti.

Agence France-Presse. (7 February 2005). French Lawyer files Suit against Foreign Ministry ofDjibouti Remarks.

Agence France-Presse. (8 February 2005). French Magistrate Refuses to Pass on File on Judge’sDeath to Djibouti.

Agence France-Presse. (12 April 2005). France Hopes to Keep ‘Long-Standing’ Ties with Djiboutias President Re-elected.

Agence France-Presse. (17 May 2005). France’s Chirac Discusses Judge’s Death Case with DjiboutiPresident.

Agence France-Presse. (17 May 2005). French Judge Summons President of Djibouti as Witness.Public Broadcasting Company Radio France.

Amalric, Jacques. (10 February 2005). Justice Africa-Style. Liberation.Awdalnews. (19 Apr 2004). Djibouti Anger over French Judge Murder Claim. African News. Accessed

22 October 2005 from http://www.awdalnews.com.Bayart Jean-Francois and Patrick de Saint-Exupery. (6 July 2005). France’s African Policy is Regres-

sive. Le Figaro.BBC Monitoring Guide to Djibouti Presidential Elections. (8 April 2005). BBC.Berthemet, Tanguy. (8 April 2005). I Regret Not Having Opponents. Le Figaro.Bujumbura. (8 April 2005). Peace, Security Main Planks of France’s Africa Policy, Says Envoy. Le

Renouveau du Burundi.Cans, Charlotte. (10 September 2005). Terrorism: Africa Under US Surveillance. Jeune Afrique

L’Intelligent.CIA World Factbook—Djibouti. (October 2005). Accessed 20 October 2005 from http://www.cia.gov.De Wijk, Rob. European Military Reform for a Global Partnership. The Washington Quarterly

27.Ghorbal, Samy. (24 September 2005). France–Africa: All Out Redeployment. Jeune Afrique

L’Intelligent.Guibal, Claude. (7 February 2005). If the French Are Kicked Out, What Is Left in Djibouti? Liberation.Horeau, Louis-Marie. (26 January 2005). Judges and Diplomats Founder in Franco-Djiboutian Judi-

cial Investigation. Le Canard Enchaine.Julliard, Jean-Francois. (4 April 2005). A Very Crumpled French Flag in Africa. Le Canard Enchaine.Kiernan, V. G. (1998). Colonial Empires and Armies: 1815–1960. Guernsey, UK: Sutton Publishing

Limited.Remnek, Richard B. (December 1990). The Strategic Importance of the Bab al-Mandab and the Horn

of Africa: A Global Perspective. The Horn of Africa and Arabia, Defense Academic ResearchSupport Program, The Middle East Institute.

Lasserre, Iaabelle. (28 January 2005). Crisis Brewing Between Djibouti and France. Le Figaro.MCIA Country Handbook—Djibouti. Accessed 24 October 2005 from http://www.mcia.gov.Middle East Online. (12 March 2003). Djibouti News— France Ups Payment for its Djibouti Base.

Accessed 19 October 2005 from http://www.Middle-east-online.com.Middle East Online. (9 July 2004). Djibouti News—Alliot–Marie: France, Djibouti Ties Solid as Rock.

Accessed 19 October 2005 from http://www.middle-east-online.com.Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France. (31 January 2005). Djibouti: Precisions on the Borrel Case.

Accessed 22 October 2005 from http://www.diplomatie:gouv.fr.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 1

9:27

10

Oct

ober

201

4

The French Military in the Horn of Africa 87

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France. (29 January 2005). Statement on Borrel Case, Statement by MFAspokesperson Herve Ladsous, Paris.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France. (24 January 2005). Statement by spokesperson Cecile Pozzo diBorgo, Statements on Euro-Mediterranean Security, Council of Europe and French Expulsionsfrom Djibouti Paris.

Oliver, R. and Lemaric, P. (27 May 2005). French Army Chief Says Relations with Ivorians Back toNormal. Radio France Internationale.

Peigne-Giuly, A. (20 May 2005). Censorship Causes Interference on RFI Website. Liberation.Welsh, W. E. Update: France’s Global Reach. Strategy and Tactics, 231.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 1

9:27

10

Oct

ober

201

4