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Mining Social Media in Extreme Events: Lessons Learned from the DARPA Network Challenge Nicklaus A. Giacobe, Hyun-Woo “Anthony” Kim and Avner Faraz [nxg13, hxk263] @ist.psu.edu, [email protected]

Mining Social Media in Extreme Events: Lessons Learned from the DARPA Network Challenge

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Mining Social Media in Extreme Events: Lessons Learned from the DARPA Network Challenge. Nicklaus A. Giacobe , Hyun-Woo “Anthony” Kim and Avner Faraz [nxg13, hxk263] @ ist.psu.edu , [email protected]. The DARPA Network Challenge. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Mining Social Media in Extreme Events: Lessons Learned from the DARPA Network Challenge

Mining Social Media in Extreme Events: Lessons Learned from the

DARPA Network Challenge

Nicklaus A. Giacobe, Hyun-Woo “Anthony” Kim and Avner Faraz

[nxg13, hxk263] @ist.psu.edu, [email protected]

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The DARPA Network Challenge

• Conceived to better understand and harness the power of the Internet– How does one get a video to go viral on

YouTube?– Leveraging social networks to solve

“intractable” or “impossible” tasks– Short time frame

• Announced on October 29, 2009• Challenge occurred on December 5, 2009 (5 weeks

of possible prep time)

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The DARPA Network Challenge

• DARPA launched 10 red weather balloons• Tethered to fixed locations in public places

across the continental United States• Find them and report GPS coordinates of

all 10 before anyone else does and win the $40,000 prize

• The balloons would be “up” from 0900 EST until 1600 local time (7-10 hours) and then taken down

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Final Results

• 4600 “Teams” registered with DARPA• 58 Teams were “in the hunt” and submitted

2 or more correct locations• Top teams used mass marketing and

mass motivation techniques (offered to share the prize $ with observers)

• Each team has a “lesson” applicable to homeland security

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Top Finalists – We’re #10!

From: https://networkchallenge.darpa.mil/FinalStandings.pdf

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Overview

• Who are the ?• Caucus of academic institutions studying information

science• The iSchools are interested in the relationship between

information, people and technology. • There are 28 academic Institutions (Colleges or

Departments) in various universities across 8 countries• Some iSchools have roots in Library Science,

Computational Sciences, MIS, Business Management, Cognitive Science, Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) and other fields. Each iSchool has its own focus and competencies.

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Page 9: Mining Social Media in Extreme Events: Lessons Learned from the DARPA Network Challenge

Team Organization

• Command Structure– Attempted to follow ICS from Fire Service– Most Team Members unfamiliar with this

organizational structure, therefore very limited success

• Operational Section– 2 Branches – Direct Observation and Cyberspace

Search

• Facilities– 211 IST – EEL – Command Post– 208 IST – Classroom – Cyberspace Search

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Methods

• Direct Observation– Recruit observers from the iSchools Caucus– Report sightings through

• Website• Phone / SMS• Email

• Cyberspace Search– Multiple Intel Teams searching open communications

online• Twitter, Competitor Websites, No Hacking

• Confirmation and Decision Making

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Methods

• Technologies Used– Twitter Capture – Anthony Kim– Custom Crawler – Madian Khabsa– Maltego2 – Avner Faraz

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Methods

Direct Observation•Recruiting•All of

iSchools to send out recruiting messages

•Phone/SMS/Web/Email Reporting

Cyber Search / Intel• Twitter• Websites• Competing Team Sites

Observer Confirmation• Pre-Registered Observers• Recruited Observers

• iSchools Network• “Friends” Network

Analysis•Photo

Analysis•Provenance

Evaluation

D-S Evidence Theory

Combination

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Methods

• Dempster-Shafer Evidence Theory Combination– Combine evidence from multiple sources under

uncertainty– Apply confidence weights to sensor data

• Intended, but applied cognitively– Analysts were to provide report data with confidence

values (0=low, 10=high)– Some algorithmic process would have been needed

to combine large numbers of reports– … but we had *extremely low* # of reports

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Pre-Challenge Org.

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Team Organization

• Other Universities– Various Schools to send recruiting messages– UNC – distributed own phone number and

email address for their recruiting messages– Univ. of Illinois – single-person cyberspace

search division

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Team Organization

• Finance and Logistics– Google Voice (814-4BALL01)

– Website Design (balloon.ist.psu.edu)

– Email Address ([email protected])

– Google Wave (Intel and Command Comms)

– Private Twitter (late attempt at outbound comms)

– Coffee, Donuts, Pizza, Soda and Homemade Cookies ($100!)

– Incentives and Rewards (10 GPS Systems Offered by iSchools)

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Team Members

• University of Illinois– John Unsworth– Maeve Reilly– Karyn Applegate

• University of North Carolina– Aaron Brubaker– Kjersti Kyle

• Other iSchools– Marketing/Communications Staff

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Team Members

• Penn State University– Command Post Team

• Nick Giacobe• Wade Shumaker• Louis-Marie Ngamassi Tchouakeu• John Yen• Jon Becker (p/t)• Michelle Young (p/t)

– Logistics / Website• Shannon Johnson• Lei Lei Zhu

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Team Members

• Penn State University– Operations (Cyberspace Search Branch)

• Crawler Task Force– Madian Khabsa and Jian Huang

• Twitter Capture Task Force– Hyun Woo “Anthony” Kim and Airy Guru

• Intelligence Analysts– Chris Robuck– Greg Traylor– Anthony Maslowski– Gregory O’Neill– Joe Magobeth– Avner Faraz– Matt Maisel– Earl Yun

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Results

• Recruiting Message Reports– University of Illinois – Email to iSchool alumni; to faculty, staff and

students.– University of Pittsburgh – Email to all alumni; to faculty, staff and

students; Webpage article on main page & alumni news page; LinkedIn announcement to iSchool at Pitt group members; and Facebook announcement to iSchool at Pitt group members. Alumni email distributed to 4,674 alumni. 114 opened the DARPA link. Email blasts to 936 students 41 faculty.

– Penn State – 338 fans on Facebook and 377 followers on Twitter. Re-tweets, questions about the Challenge on Twitter, but no activity on Facebook. 2,125 alumni received the e-mail.

– UCLA – Sent messages to faculty, staff, students and alumni.– Drexel – Alumni listserv, Facebook, Tweeter electronic newsletter for

undergrads and grads, online learning system grad web site release.

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Results

• Direct Reporting Data– 1 Report From Observer– 1 Pre-recruited Observer tasked for confirmation– 8 Observers recruited for confirmation

• Website Hit Data– 567 hits (Terrible!)

• 16 Case Studies of Individual Balloon Reports…

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Overview of Cases

Erie, PA

Competitor Site

Observer

Albany, NY

Twitter w/ picture

Observer/Photo Analysis

Royal Oak, MI

Twitter w/ picture

Observer - Fake

Providence, RI

Twitter w/picture

Observer/Photo Analysis

Seattle, WA

Twitter w/o Picture

Observer

Champaign, IL

Competitor Site

Observer

Des Moines, IA

Twitter

Self Recant

Christiana (Glascow), DE

Twitter w/ Photo

Detail /Photo Analysis

Bithlow , FL

Custom Cralwer

Observer

Charlottesville, VA

Observer Report

Conf.Details / Call Back

Scottsdale, AZ

Competitor Site

Detail /Photo Analysis

Portland, OR

Twitter w/ Picture

Observer

San Francisco, CA

Twitter/Blog

Detail/Photo Analysis

Santa Barbara, CA

Twitter

Detail/Photo Analysis

Westfield, NJ

Twitter w/o Picture

Conflicting Data

Memphis , TN

Competitor Trade Offer

Never Confirmed

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Results: Case Study 1

• Location: Erie, PA• Original Report: 10balloons.com website• Method: Observer mobilized• Notes:

– Early report – 9:30AM– Evaluated whether 10balloons.com website

was going to be useful intel or not– Observer was not pre-registered, was

personal friend of command post personnel

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Results: Case Study 2

• Location: Albany, NY• Original Report: Twitter Feed• Method: Observer mobilized• Notes:

– Observer provided convincing photo evidence – no balloon at this location

– Subsequent photo analysis confirmed this was a manufactured image

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Results: Case Study 2

• Evidence for– Reputability (3/10)

• Established Twitter Acct

– Content (6/10)• Photo of a balloon• Balloon Number 6?• Weather – match • Location – exact coords

not provided, but

discoverable

• Evidence Against– Reputability (9/10)

• Pre-recruited observer• Known person (PSU

Alumni Assn chapter president)

– Content (10/10)• Excellent quality photo• Same angle, confirming

coincidental landmarks/features

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Results: Case Study 3

• Location: Royal Oak, MI• Original Report: Twitter• Method: Observer Mobilized• Notes:

– Observer went to the location and talked to the store owner who admitted that the balloon was a “publicity stunt” – knew about DARPA challenge and put up own balloon.

– Observer was not pre-recruited

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Results: Case Study 3

• Evidence for– Reputability (3/10)

• Established Twitter Acct

– Content (4/10)• Photo of a balloon• No “DARPA” pennant ,

not balloon 6• Weather – match for location• Location – Had GPS

coordinates for location from photo

• Evidence Against– Reputability (9/10)

• Observer recruited after the fact

– Content (8/10)• No photos sent• Good report, verbal

description of events

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Results: Case Study 4

• Location: Providence, RI• Original Report: Twitter• Method: Observer Mobilized• Notes:

– Observer was a friend of one of the analysts in the Intel Division – reported no balloon at that location

– Photo analysis provided repeat of the exact fabricated image

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Results: Case Study 4

• Evidence for– Reputability (3/10)

• Established Twitter Acct

– Content (4/10)• Photo of a balloon

• Evidence Against– Reputability (9/10)

• Observer recruited after the fact

– Content (8/10)• No photos sent• Good report, verbal

description of location

– Photo Evaluation (10/10)• Reproduced shop job• Edge evaluation

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Results: Case Study 5

• Location: Seattle, WA• Original Report:• Method: Observer Mobilized• Notes:

– Report was for balloon over the University of Washington Library

– Observer was Assoc. Dean of LIS College at UW

Page 49: Mining Social Media in Extreme Events: Lessons Learned from the DARPA Network Challenge

Results: Case Study 6

• Location: Champaign, IL• Original Report: 10Balloons.com• Method: Observer Mobilized• Notes:

– No picture– Known observer/Team member in close

proximity to this location

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Results: Case Study 7

• Location: Des Moines, IA• Original Report: Twitter• Method: Self-Recant• Notes:

– Tweet gave location/street address of reporters home

– No photo evidence– Reporter then re-tweeted complaining about

people running through her yard and then recanted

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Results: Case Study 8

• Location: Christiana, DE• Original Report: Twitter w/ coordinates• Method: Photo/Details Analysis• Notes:

– Photos didn’t match Google Maps photos – site was under construction

– Called YMCA Across street from site to confirm

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Results: Case Study 9

• Location: Bithlo, FL• Original Report: Crawler• Method: Observer mobilized• Notes:

– Intel team member had a contact in the area– Reported that there was no balloon in that

location

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Results: Case Study 10

• Location: Charlottesville, VA• Original Report: Observer Submission• Method: Re-contact observer for details• Notes:

– Alternate observer not available in time– Primary observer re-dispatched to collect

DARPA paperwork– Additional confirmation through intel channels

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Results: Case Study 11

• Location: Scottsdale, AZ• Original Report: Fark.com (Competitor

Site)• Method: Extensive Detail Analysis• Notes:

– Interesting story– Unique username– Extensive investigation of reporter’s address, phone

number, etc in online records led to location– Poor attempt at deception– Photographic evidence confirmed location

Page 55: Mining Social Media in Extreme Events: Lessons Learned from the DARPA Network Challenge

Results: Case Study 11

• A forum had a member who spotted a red balloon near his house. The post was shortly deleted but his user name was Mini Ditka.

• Using only his username and e-mail address on the forum, I tried using Maltego to perform an OSINT trace on the e-mail address using a transform I had coded for maltego last year.

• The analysis pulled his real name (Scott Shepherd) facebook, linkedin, flickr, spock and Myspace profiles and was able to match it to that e-mail address.

• I further analyzed the subject and was able to find possible phone numbers and web-sites he might have owned.

• In the end: We surmised that the balloon must have been in the Scottsdale area using only his e-mail and username. The actual location was found using image analysis by other team members.

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OSINT on E-mail address from deleted post @ forum

FacebookFlickrMyspaceLinkedin

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Total Network View For Scott Shepherd

E-mails, Phones, Social Networks, Web-sites, Blogs, Address hits

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Phone Number Mining on Scott Shepherd

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Results: Case Study 12

• Location: Portland, OR• Original Report: Twitter Feed• Method: Observer mobilized• Notes:

– Photo matched location, gross coordinates, but wanted more details

– Observer confirmed location and provided• Additional photographic evidence• Photo of certificate

– Doctored photo of certificate circulated in the channel by others later

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Verify Location Using Google Earth

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Results: Case Study 13

• Location: San Francisco, CA• Original Report: Twitter/Blog• Method: Photo evidence• Notes:

– No observer available– Established Twitter Acct/Blog– Multiple photos/angles– GPS Data provided, matched

building/features on Google Maps

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Results: Case Study 14

• Location: Santa Barbara, CA• Original Report: Twitter• Method: Photo Evidence• Notes:

– High quality picture available– Unlikely photoshop job based on other photos

available– Location report matches pictures of location

on Google maps

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Santa Barbara, CA

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Results: Case Study 15

• Location: Westfield, NJ• Original Report: Twitter• Method: Conflicting Details with Known

Good Data• Notes:

– Balloon number conflicted with AZ data that we had high confidence in (both reported as Balloon #2)

– No additional information /no photo– Discussion/disagreement on whether the location for

this balloon was right or not

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Results: Case Study 16

• Location: Memphis, TN• Original Report: Competitive Team/Trade• Method: Unable to confirm• Notes:

– Email to [email protected] from a competitor

– Claimed to have location in TN– Unreliable Trade/info– Trading coordinates with other teams was not

part of our plan/strategy

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Results: Others

• Locations: – Katy, TX– Miami, FL– Atlanta, GA

• No evidence was found by our team regarding these locations

Page 73: Mining Social Media in Extreme Events: Lessons Learned from the DARPA Network Challenge

Summary of Results

• All 15 cases analyzed with correct assessment

• Dispatched observers to 9 locations

• 5 true locations

• 9 false locations

• 1 sighting reported to us directly

Direct Observation

Cyberspace Search

AnalysisObserver Confirmation

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Social Media in Extreme Events

• Information Source (Tweets + Geotag + Image) together with GoogleMaps

• Disturbance / Deception• Crowd Sourcing

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Tweets/hour (EST)

Dec 04 Dec 05 Dec 06 Dec 07 Dec 08 Dec 09

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Tweets/30min on the day of the challenge(Total: 6813 tweets)

A.M. P.M.

Winner Announc

ed

Ads.

Balloons Launched

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Three Uses of Tweets

1) Information Source (Tweets + Geotag + Image) together with GoogleMaps

2) Disturbance

3) Crowd Sourcing

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(1) Tweets as Information Source

• Tweets with Geotags– Currently only from Twitter Clients for iPhone – 39 out of about 20,000

Images from http://www.twitter-360.com/

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Image from http://img129.yfrog.com/i/nhhn.jpg/

“Spotted DARPA balloon #1 in this

very central location”

Tweets as Information Source - Example 1

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(1) Information Source - Example 1

Map from maps.google.com

Spotted DARPA balloon #1 in this

very central location.

(37.7879,-122.4073 ) Union Square

San Francisco, CA 94108

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(1) Information Source - Example 2

Map from maps.google.com

“Red balloon siting in Marina Del Rey,

CA #DARPA”

( 33.9741,-118.4317 ) Pacific Coast Hwy

Los Angeles, CA 90094

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Image from http://twitpic.com/s9k7a

Information Source - Example 2

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(2) Tweets as Disturbance Means

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(3) Tweets as Crowd Sourcing Means by the MIT team

A.M. P.M.

Help MIT Teamat balloon.media.mit.edu

Balloons Launched

Balloons began to

be put down

Winner Announc

ed

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Conclusions

• Open source and social media provide a rich source for gathering and fusing real-time information.

• The Challenge is a nation-wide experiment that is well aligned with the college’s strategic research regarding Extreme Events and Web Science.

• Data and experience gathered are incorporated into SRA courses to enhance the curriculum.

• Integrate social science and STEM education for K-12 using projects related to extreme events.

• NSF project on developing infrastructure for classifying, geo-tagging Tweets/messages for disaster relief at Haiti.

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Competitive Analysis

• MIT (10/10)– Market incentive, strong brand, strong pre-

contest press, Ultimately the Winner• Georgia Tech (9/10)

– Red Cross Donation, 2nd place– Why weren’t they part of our team, or us part

of theirs?• Groundspeak Geocachers (7-8/10)

– Market + Donation model– The “right” sensor network (?)

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Discussion

• Lessons Learned– Start Earlier– Motivate Observers (promise of cash seemed to work)

– Pick the “right” observer network– Communicate often to maintain motivation– Use OS Intel – it works and it’s cheap!– Be ready to weed out fabricated data

• Photoshop jobs are easy to do• Deceiving pictures are hard to refute

– Define and clarify roles/expectations early and often

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Future Work

• Automatic Classification of Microblog Data– Hyun-Woo “Anthony” Kim’s poster yesterday -

he’s here today as well, please see him after• Entity Extraction from Microblog Data

– Useful “entities” in this Challenge• Data Fusion Methods for “soft” data

– Higher levels of inference– Difficult to fuse textual information

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DARPA’s Intentions

What did DARPA intend? http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P_hjpva8gBM (11:15)

When the problems are great, the tendency for each of us is to step away because we believe, even hope that someone else, perhaps smarter, perhaps with more resources will solve those very difficult problems. But I have found that those imaginary people do not exist. There isn’t someone else. It is people just like you and me… There are no imaginary people to do this work. There is no backup plan.

Regina Dugan, Director of DARPA

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Thank You!

• Questions?

• QR Code to my website: