1

The Impact of the EU on Minority Rights Issues

During the Accession Process

- New Ways to Ensure

Societal Security in Europe -

Pawel Grabowski (Wroclaw University)

Shayan Khawja (De Montfort University, Leicester)

Júlia Lampášová (Charles University in Prague)

Stephanie Schramm (Technische Universität, Dresden)

2

Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 3

1 Theoretical Considerations ................................................................................................. 6

1.1 The Concept of Societal Security ................................................................................ 6

1.2 Historical Background and the Identity Perception ..................................................... 8

2 Historically-rooted minority groups ................................................................................. 11

2.1 Legal Position of Minorities ...................................................................................... 11

2.2 Position of Minorities in Reality ............................................................................... 14

2.3 Recommendations for Turkey ................................................................................... 16

3 Roma Minority .................................................................................................................. 18

3.1 Legal Position ............................................................................................................ 18

3.2 Position of Roma in Practice ..................................................................................... 19

3.3 Recommendations ..................................................................................................... 20

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 22

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 25

3

Introduction

„Tension has increased between Slovakia and Hungary,

following recent attacks on members of Slovakia's sizeable

Hungarian minority. The SNS leader, Jan Slota, has referred to

Hungarians as a "cancer" and expressed regret that they had

not been expelled after World War II.“1

This quotation shows how deep the tensions between different ethnic, religious, or national

groups may be even within modern democratic states. In order to avoid these tensions, the

European Union (EU) has developed the „Copenhagen criteria‟ that “have been widely

viewed as constituting a successful incentive structure and sanctioning mechanism for the EU

in the promotion of human rights and the protection of minorities.“2

The issue of minority protection has been given highly rhetoric prominence by the EU. The

monitoring during the accession process involves recommendations and the requirements of

legal implementations in the given country. But the EU‟s main instrument for accession and

convergence, the Regular Reports, have been characterized by ad hocism, inconsistency, and

a stress on formal measures rather than substantive evaluation of implementation3. While the

European Commission proposed both short and mid-term recommendations, it rather looked

at fast achievements. Nevertheless, by pushing on the legal implementation of minority rights

and with the assistance of other international organizations, the EU helped substantially to

protect minorities and put the light on this issue. Because in „most states, minority protection

was a second-order issue at the outset of transition in the Central and Eastern European

Countries (CEECs), as these states prioritized the strengthening of central state capacity and

the position of the majority nation“4.

Multi-ethnicity is also viewed, more generally, as a significant issue for the political stability

of nation-states. The EU perceives it as a potential for instability, perhaps leading to the worst

1 BBC News: Row harms Slovak-Hungarian ties. August 2006.

2 Hughes; Sasse: Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality and Minority Protection in the

CEECs. In: Jemie; 1/2003.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

4

possible outcome of violent secession. This potential is particularly associated with the

presence of territorialized minorities, like the Hungarians in Slovakia or the Russians in some

areas of Baltic states. Much of the research on national and ethnic conflict suggests that such

deeply divided societies can be stabilized by institutional designs which would accommodate

diversity. This is the focus the EU took. It tried to solve ethnical tensions by recommending

the implementation of minority rights. In practice, it put forward the naturalization process in

Estonia and Latvia, and focused on the establishment of language courses or put pressure on

the protection of the Roma in Bulgaria and Slovakia.

But still, even nowadays, there can be seen discrimination of the Kurdish people in Turkey,

tension between the Russians and Estonians according to the „Bronze Soldier Affair“ of 2007,

or discourse struggles between Hungarians and Slovaks.

The Policy Paper deals with the phenomenon of minority rights in the EU from the societal

dimension of security. It develops central arguments that show how important minority rights

are to stabilize a country and the region of the EU. The research question is following: Has

the EU securitization of minority rights (MR) improved or exacerbated societal security

problem? Or, in other words: Has the emphasis placed by the EU on the issue of MR during

the accession process made things better or worse?

The policy paper investigates two different aspects of minority groups protection in the EU –

historically-based minorities, and Roma. The paper examines minority protection in four

European countries – Bulgaria, Slovakia and Baltics (here Latvia and Estonia) as the

representatives of the new MS from the recent enlargements in 2004 and 2007, with the

precondition of implementing the Copenhagen criteria, and one candidate country - Turkey.

In all these countries, the minority issue is highly alert. The EU, along with other international

organizations as the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Stability and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE), and the Council of Europe (CoE), put an affort on the minority protection in

all these countries and discussed the development in their Regular Reports. It can be seen that

the EU focused mainly on the implementation of minority rights to secure the new members

as well as the Union.

5

The paper analyses the protection of minorities before, during, and after the EU accession

process with the help of five criteria:

identity perception,

legal position of minorities (constitution, citizenship),

educational system,

language,

political representation.

The content of the policy paper is divided into three chapters. The first one focuses on the

theoretical considerations – the theory of the Copenhagen School, from which the notion of

societal security is derived, and the historical background of the identity perception of

minorities within the given states, differentiating inclusive and exclusive identity.

The other two chapters are split according to the two chosen minority issues. The second

chapter focuses on the position of historically-rooted minorities, and the third on the Roma

issue throughout Europe. Both these chapters seek to provide results useful for

recommendations to other potential MS, especially for Turkey, where the minority issue is at

the top of the accession considerations.

The recommendations on the future treatment of the minority rights issues by the EU

institutions create the conclusion of the whole policy paper.

6

1 Theoretical Considerations

This chapter consists of two main parts. In the first part, the concept of Societal Security is

examined, with the main emphasis on the theory of the Copenhagen School, as well as on the

terms securitization, speech act and identity. In the second part, the historical development of

the countries is analysed, in order to show how important the historical memory of a country

can be if it tries to solve its minority issues.

1.1 The Concept of Societal Security

Since the civil war in Balkans during the 1990‟s, we have to be aware that the (inter)ethnical

conflicts and tension can destabilise countries, and even the whole regions. The conflict in

Balkans was caused by the existence of different national identities within one nation. It

shows that threats towards societal identity can escalate and cause war or violent action.

The (bad) treatment of minorities within one country is one possibility for a non-military

cause of conflict, as the European Parliament stated concerning the Russian minority in Baltic

countries.5 It is worth thinking how to avoid these conflicts and stabilize the regions within

the EU, or in its close neighbourhood.

Within the Copenhagen School of thought, the traditional dimension of security is widened.

The traditional notion of security considered state as a central object. The state representatives

are those who declare the emergency condition and have the right to use whatever is

necessary to block the threat. Whereas in societal security, described by the Copenhagen

School, the referent object is not only the state – it is formed by collective identities which

can function even independently from states.6

The referent objects are defined as things that are seen as essentially threatened and which

have a legitimate claim to survive. On the other hand, the actors are those who securitize these

issues by declaring them being existentially threatened. So the referent object may be really

everything what is essentially threatened.7

5 Statement of the European Parliament according to the Accession of the Baltic States into the European Union.

In: Mahler (2004).

6 Buzan, Waever (1998), p. 22.

7 Buzan(1991), p. 36.

7

The securitizing is constructed through the actor‟s speech act, which is an essential notion in

the Copenhagen School. In the traditional view of security, the government speaks for state,

so legitimization of the actor of securitization is clear. However, in the societal dimension,

where the actor may be any member of society, his legitimization may be questioned.

The most important criterion for the societal security is identity as the referent object. It

implies the claim of identity to survive and its capability of being securitised. Societal

security “refers to security of a collective group in relation to other communities or the

institution of the state in which they reside.”8 Identity is characterised by the creation of an

inside and an outside view. The implementation of “we” and the “others” creates essentially

different identity perceptions – the separation of oneself according in relation to “the others”.

On one hand, identity is formed by the society we live in, on the other hand, identity is

constructed and chosen by the people themselves.

There may, and do, exist different identities within one society. The issue in this case is the

question how they can live next to each other, while protecting their identity and, at the same

time, with neither the exclusion, nor the assimilation of one group within the society.

According to minorities, which have mostly another identity than the majority of the society,

they can be viewed as “we” or “the others” (inclusive or exclusive identity). In Bulgaria and

in case of Kurds and other Muslim minorities in Turkey, inclusive identity is applied, as

anybody living on the territory is perceived as Bulgarian or Turkish. In the case of Slovakia

and the Russian minority in Baltics, the different stay different, creating the exclusive

identity. In this case, two different identities live next to each other, try to protect themselves

and have a legitimate claim to survive.

The point within this view is that neither exclusive nor inclusive identity can protect the state

from ethnical tensions. The inclusive identity tends to ignore differences and that can result in

assimilation of the minority. Whereas the exclusive identities tend to overdraw differences

and create a huge border between the groups. The aim of majority in this case is to gain the

minority as little rights as possible.

8 Thiel: Identity, Societal Security and Regional Integration in Europe (2007), p. 9.

8

1.2 Historical Background and the Identity Perception

If we take a look at the countries and their identity perception, history plays an important role

here. In all countries analysed in the research, there exist historically-rooted hatreds between

different ethnic and national groups that may pose big threats to societal security.

In Slovakia, the hatred between Slovaks and Hungarians dates back to the existence of the

Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867 to 1918). Under the rule of Hungarians, characteristic for the

raised wave of Hungarian (Magyar) nationalism, Slovak minority, along with the others,

suffered of suppressed language and cultural freedoms. This past has never been forgotten,

and the anti-Hungarian sentiments of Slovaks remain very strong even nowadays, as well as

Hungarian “historical” claims on the substantial part of the Slovak territory.

As the European Commission against Racism and Intollerance (under the CoE) observed in

Slovakia, “politicians now freely fuel anti-Hungarian sentiment among population because

they know it can win votes.”9

“Due to the governing position of the Slovak national party,

radicalism becomes state policy in Slovakia. As a consequence, the unfriendly Slovak public

attitude (...) transforms into general public hatred.”10

The rising tide of xenophobia in the

Slovak society complicates the efforts to keep the balance between ensuring fundamental

minority rights for Hungarians and Slovakia‟s right of full territorial and cultural

independence.

To set another example: the Soviet occupation formed national identity of Estonians and

Latvians, that were „subjects of different western rulers since the 13th

century“11

and were

conquered by the Russian empire in the 18th

century. After a short period of national awaking

and independence, beginning in 1918, they were incorporated by the USSR in 1940. Russian

speakers from Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine entered Baltic states and caused crucial

demographic changes – predominant Soviet political and economic elites, as well as Soviet

soldiers have been shaping the society of both countries since 1940.

9 Stracansky: Slovakia: Getting Worse for Minorities (Global Geopolitics and Political Economy, 2009).

10 Hungarian-Slovak relations reach their nadir (10.12.2008);

http://www.cafebabel.co.uk/article/27506/hungary-slovakia-tensions-ethnic-violence.html.

11 Poleschuk (2000), p. 2.

9

During the 1980‟s, a protest movement against the Russian occupation developed.

Nevertheless, the Russian language became state language, while the Latvian nations‟ culture

and language were marginalised and it was impossible for them to bear their own identity.

The privileges of the Russian majority disappeared immediately as both countries gained their

independence in 1991. Even if in areas like Paldiski in Estonia the Russian speakers constitute

majority, in overall, they form minority in both countries. In the first years of independence, a

very rigid minority policy was pursued by the Latvian government during the process of the

recovery of the own identity. The Russian minority is seen as danger for the newly

independent states and rebirth of the culture and identity. Identity within these countries is

formed by the Russian occupation. After 1991 both countries began immediately to orientate

towards the West, seeing their independence as an important step out from the USSR

colonialism. Whereas the Russian perspective is different. The occupation is considered as a

victory and rescue from Germany at that time.

In case of the Hungarian minority, however, the identity perception is more exclusive, as the

Slovak anti-Hungarian sentiment causes that Slovaks perceive Hungarians not as a part of

their own community. And also Hungarians living on the Slovak territory identify themselves

as Hungarians, and not as Slovaks. Within Baltic states, everybody who lives there is called

Latvian, Estonian or Lithuanian. But according to the Russian minority, the reality is

different. Baltics have a very protectionist culture. After 1991, they tried to protect their

language, as a visible part of identity, by law. For example, Latvian became the only state

language. They have an exclusive identity perception as well, while Bulgaria and Turkey have

an inclusive identity perception. This means that, for example, Turkey may claim that all

citizens are treated equally, even if this is not the case for the controversial Kurdish

minorities.

For the creation of Bulgarian identity during the 20th

century, two historical factors played

main role – the liberation from the Ottoman Empire, and the post-communist heritage.

Especially in the mid-1950‟s, when Bulgaria and Turkey found themselves on the opposite

sides of the Iron Curtain, the Turkish and Muslim Bulgarians were viewed as “the fifth

column of imperialism.”12

Also in the early 1990‟s the Bulgarian public and politicians

continued to be opposed to view that minorities existed in Bulgaria at all. Moreover, the fact

12 Lozanowa, p. 28-29.

10

that the state was revitalised at a number of international conferences created the feeling that

“somebody outside” determined the development of Bulgaria.13

The existence of the Kurds on the territory of Turkey dates back more than two millennia ago.

They live in a region that spans several countries, predominantly throughout Iran, Iraq, Syria,

and Turkey.14

Kurds, mainly farmers and traders, speak a distinct language and have their

own national culture. Because of their strong self-identity, they have been viewed with

suspicion by Turkish authorities, who banned the language and large parts of Kurdish cultural

expression as part of a campaign to forge one Turkish nation.15

While most Kurds do not pledge to separatism and seek mainly policies that allow autonomy

for use of the Kurdish language, cultural practices, and free movement across borders, an

armed insurgency aimed at creating a separate state was launched in 1984 by the Marxist-

Leninist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), supported by the Soviet Union.16

Around 35,000

people were killed and one million people were displaced in the 15-year war, during which

Turkish military forces were accused of widespread abuses. The war ended with the capture

of the PKK's leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 1999.17

These cases show how important historical memory is when it comes to identity creation and

the implementation of minority rights, such as the freedom of expression or the use of own

language. On the other hand, the EU did manage to notice how sensitive this business is and

that ethnical tensions caused by the (bad) treatment of minorities can destabilize the country.

For example, the European Parliament noted that „[t]he treatment of the Russian minority in

Baltic states has the potential to destabilize the situation in those countries, and affect

adversely the development of relations with the EU, NATO and Russia.“18

13 Atanasova (2004), p. 359.

14 Democracy web: comparative studies in freedom, „Majority Rule, Minority Rights: Country studies Turkey‟, available at

http://www.democracyweb.org/majority/turkey.php

15 Ibid.

16 BBC, World: Europe Turkey captures Kurdish leader, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/77915.stm

17 Ibid.

18 Statement of the European Parliament according to the Accession of the Baltic States into the European

Union. In: Mahler 2004, p. 70.

11

2 Historically-rooted minority groups

This chapter tackles developments in protection of historically-rooted minorities in the

selected EU MS where they create at least 10% of the population – Turks in Bulgaria,

Hungarians in Slovakia and Russians in Baltics (particularly in Latvia and Estonia). The

historically-rooted minorities are, in majority of cases, the most numerous and influential

(sometimes also most problematic) ones, therefore they deserve a heightened focus in order to

preserve societal security of the European Union.

The chapter is divided into three main sections. In the first section, the legal position of

minorities is examined, based on the constitution and other legal measures in the country.

Afterwards, the focus is shifted on the EU accession process, during which the countries had

to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, aimed also to prevent potential societal security threats

caused by the accession of the new MS. The requests and recommendations of the EU and

other European institutions referring to the level of minorities protection are analysed, as well

as the states‟ attempts to respond to them.

The second section then seeks to reveal how the legislative protection of minorities is being

applied in reality, on the basis of the common criteria such as obtaining of citizenship, the

right to use and be educated in the minority language, and the level of political representation.

The third section uses the findings from the previous analysis in order to provide

recommendations to the EU in tackling the problem of minorities in Turkey and other

accession countries.

2.1 Legal Position of Minorities

Constitution

Constitutions of all analysed countries comprise the protection of fundamental rights,

including bars against any form of discrimination. However, they differ substantially in the

way of perception of minorities, as well as in the extension of rights provided to them.

For example, Article 11.4 of the new Bulgarian Constitution (from July 1991) prohibits

creation of ethnically based political parties. Moreover, there is no term „minority‟ mentioned

in the Constitution, instead, individual rights of every citizen are protected, which may be

understood as the result of the long-lasting historical Ottoman rule over Bulgaria.

12

On the other hand, the constitution of the Slovak Republic (from 1 October 1992) is very

opened towards minorities on its territory, stating that “every person has the right to freely

decide which national group he or she is a member of” (Part 2, Chapter One, Art. 12(3)). The

rights of national minorities and ethnic groups create a whole chapter of the Constitution,

ensuring that “membership in any national minority or ethnic group may not be used to the

detriment of any individual.” Their rights comprise specifically the right to use a minority

language in education and official communication, the right to participate in decision-making

of the country, and to create and maintain education and cultural institutions, as well as the

right to receive and disseminate information in their mother tongue, or to promote their

cultural heritage. However, the exercise of these rights may not threaten the sovereignty and

territorial integrity of the Slovak Republic (Part 2, Chapter 4, Art. 34 (1-3)).

The constitutions of Baltic states also provide basic minority rights. The Latvian constitution

(which dates back into 1922) provides the right to all ethnic minorities to preserve and

develop their language, ethnic and cultural identity (Art. 114). Estonian constitution (from

1992) also secures several rights for minorities, such as the educational institutions

established for minorities with the right to be taught in their mother tongue, the right to

establish institutions of self-government, or the right to communicate with government in

their language (paragraphs 37, 50, 51).

Other legal measures

After 1989, Bulgaria‟s strict assimilation policy was reformed – ethnic minorities were

allowed to restore their original names, “assimilation” prisoners received amnesty, and the

Penal Code was also improved.19

Despite of these considerable changes, until 1999, the

existence of minorities had not been recognized by Bulgarian authorities.

In the last decade, mainstream political parties introduced the “Bulgarian ethnic model”,

based on the notion of a peaceful co-existence between minorities. It sends a message to the

EU and international NGOs that Bulgaria has successfully solved its minority problems20

, but

19

Regular Report on Bulgaria‟s progress towards accession (2004).

20 Rechel (2008), p. 345.

13

the position of minorities in reality still remains problematic, particularly for the strong

inclusive identity, still restricting some minorities from their ethnic self-identification.21

In Slovakia, there may be no doubts that the Constitution secures all rights of minorities.

Nevertheless, some other legal measures have been strongly objected by the Hungarian

minority. The most feared is the amendment to the State Language Act (passed in June 2009),

primarily aimed at stopping the language discrimination of Slovaks, as “in areas of mixed

nationality (they) are often denied the right of access to information in the state language.”22

However, Hungarians fear that, in practice, they will lose the right to use their mother tongue.

But no such doubts proved, and even the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities,

Knut Vollebaek, regarded the act fully democratic, by “guaranteeing the right balance

between protecting and promoting the state language on the one hand and protecting the

linguistic rights of persons belonging to national minorities on the other.”23

Despite of the Baltic states‟ constitutions that provide fundamental minority rights, other legal

measures in the countries pose numerous restrictions to the real rights of minorities. After

gaining the independence, Latvia started the process of the recovery of its own identity, for

which the influence of the Russian minority was seen as a danger. Therefore, the country

pursued a very rigid minority policy24

, embodied in the law on citizenship, posing barriers

based on the knowledge of the state language, history and constitution. Moreover, in 1995,

both countries implemented a new term for non-citizens – “Aliens”.

21

Ibid.

22 „The Language act and minority rights in Slovakia“, Ministry of Culture of Slovak Republic,

http://www.culture.gov.sk/aktuality/the-language-act-and-minority-rights-in-slovakia [2. 4. 2010].

23 Ibid.

24 cf. Schmied-Kowarzik, p. 98.

14

Fulfilling the EU requirements

In case of Bulgaria and Slovakia, the Commission‟s regular reports on the progress towards

accession focused far more on the situation of the Roma minority.25

The countries managed to

synchronize all required legislation, and there were no special requirements or objections

towards the relationship with the historically-rooted minorities. The Council of Europe even

pointed out on the improvements in the relationship.

Considering minority rights in Baltics, the European institutions criticized especially the

forced participation of Russians in the naturalization process and the complicated access to

citizenship and state language courses. Subsequently, the countries improved many areas of

minority rights, such as simplification of tests for citizenship, possibilities to learn the state

language, or a certain improvement in the position of non-citizens on the labour market.

However, in its regular reports, the Commission focused on ad-hoc actions of the national

governments, and did not focus on long term developments.26

2.2 Position of Minorities in Reality

Citizenship

Obtaining of citizenship poses a problem to minorities only in Baltics, where the majority of

the Russian minority resides without the right of citizenship. As the citizenship is a

precondition for the voting right at all levels of governing and for the exercise of several

professions, it poses a high level of discrimination of the Russian minority.

Language and education

Turkish is an optional language for Bulgarian pupils in primary and secondary education.27

Turkish is taught mostly in Muslim denominational schools (as majority of Turkish in

Bulgaria are Muslims) and in private schools. Religious education is, therefore, well provided

25

For example, in its 1997 Opinion on Bulgaria‟s application for EU membership, the Commnission

concluded: “Although the Turkish minority seems well integrated, this is not the case with the Romany (tzigane)

population.”

26 cf.: Schmied-Kurvazik, p. 105.

27 In fact, only one fifth of Turkish pupils learn their mother tongue in schools, as English is more useful

for the future career.

15

for them, and is partially controlled by the Chief Mufti. In overall, since the transition of the

country, the proper education for Turkish minority is provided.

Under the pressure of Hungarian representation in Slovakia, educational system for their

minority in own language is at very high level. Even the Hungarian-language state university

was established in 2004.

Despite of the strict requirements of using state language, the educational system in Baltics

provided for minorities has developed considerably. Schools for minorities where pupils are

taught in their mother tongue already exist.

Political representation

As it has been already mentioned above, the Article 11.4 of the Bulgarian Constitution

prohibits creation of any ethnically based political party. Nevertheless, there exists the party

called Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) that is said to be Turkish, even though it is

not officially ethnically based. It has a strong political position – has been represented in

every parliament since 1991, and in 2001, it even joined the governing coalition. Turkish

minority also participates in local authorities, especially in regions where the Turkish

community is strong enough. However, at the seaside, Turks are under-represented, since any

Turkish authority there is perceived as a threat to the tourist-dependent economy.

Generally, Hungarian minority is strongly represented at all levels of Slovak governing, and is

not officially prohibited by any law. The most influential political party of Hungarian

minority, the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK) has been represented in the Slovak

Parliament since the independent existence of Slovakia, participating even in the government

coalition in years 2002 to 2006. In the last two parliamentary elections, it gained over 11% of

votes, and in the elections to the European parliament in 2004, even 13.24%.

In contrary, the Russian minority in Baltics is severely under-represented in all decision

making. As other areas of life, also the right of both active and passive voting are bound to

citizenship and state language28

. Therefore, especially in Latvia, where the Russian minority

creates nearly 40% of the population, elections do not reflect the real expectation of

population, as it should be in any democratic society. Estonia, on the contrary, tried to include

non-citizens into political decision making process and allowed them to vote at the local level.

28

For the seat in the Latvian Parliament, the knowledge of the highest level of the state language is required.

16

2.3 Recommendations for Turkey

Turkey creates a different approach towards the legal acknowledgement of minorities on its

territory, as its minority groups are classified exclusively by religious attachment.29

All the

minority rights policies in the country are based on the religious classification into three

minority statuses, first set out in the Treaty of Lausanne in 192330

– (1) non-Muslim

minorities recognized by the State at the signing of the Treaty; (2) non-Muslim minorities that

existed, but were unrecognized by the State at the signing of the Treaty; and (3) non-Muslim

minorities that did not exist at the time of the Treaty and remain unrecognized by the State.31

In other words, this classification means that only non-Muslim minorities are granted their

rights – the freedoms of living, religious beliefs and migration; the rights of legal and political

equality; using mother tongue in the courts, opening their schools or similar institutions; and

holding of religious ceremonies. All Muslim minorities “are denied recognition, and a

traditional emphasis on „Turkishness‟ over multiculturalism has left Kurds facing restrictions

on their language, culture and freedom of expression.”32

In comparison with the previously analysed EU MS, the Turkish situation is substantially

different, as none of them distincts minorities only on the religious basis. This is the main

point that must be reconsidered in order to give same rights to all minorities residing on the

territory of Turkey. In fact, following the 1980‟s military coup, there have been ongoing

attempts to make the Constitution more democratic, comprising also deeper minority rights,

such as the use of other languages besides Turkish.

Even though Turkey is still not within the EU, it has made numerous attempts to fulfill the

Copenhagen criteria. Applying to the minority rights, this was, for example, the new law

established in June 2004, allowing, for the first time, broadcasting in minority language.

Moreover, the Justice and Development Party acted to grant greater autonomy to Kurdish

regions. Nevertheless, while the EU securitization may have led to reforms, discrimination of

minorities in practice still pertains.

29

Country Report: Turkey (2005); http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=6851&year=2006.

30 Karimova N & Deverell E, Minorities in Turkey, (2001).

31 Oehring, Human Rights in Turkey (2002).

32 Country Report: Turkey (2005); http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=6851&year=2006.

17

In case of education and the use of mother tongue, the most important for minorities is the

right to be taught in their own language. All analysed EU countries have made efforts and

improvements to provide this basic right. In Turkey, the Kurdish language is still not allowed

in political communication, only in non-formal use. The Turkish educational system has been

criticized by European institutions for a different aspect – the following of Muslim faith at

schools, with no opportunity to choose an education in accordance with another, minority,

religion.

In overall, each European state, eather the EU member or candidate, must make more efforts

to co-exist with its historically-rooted minorities. For Turkey, this must apply, first of all,

putting end to the forcible „Turkification‟.

18

3 Roma Minority

“On May 1, Europe’s Roma will become

the continent’s largest and most advantaged minority.”33

The Roma minority is a special one in the EU, not only due to amount of Roma living in

European countries, but mainly due to the character of this community and the fact that they

have been one of the most visible minorities in Europe for over 700 years. Roma have been

marginalised due to their negative public image, but have also cultivated their marginal status

because of their different culture. What is more, divisions in the Roma society such as tribes

and families are also very strong. They might seem to be homogeneous, but they are not.

Since the mass education appeared, Roma have to face the vicious circle, caused by problems

with inadequate education. For years, they have used to be a scapegoat, but, despite of their

poverty, they are free, and that is the foundation of their culture.

Despite many programmes that are set to include Roma minority into the European society,

their position in practice is still different from those that are postulated. The most important

spheres are political representation and education, and those two are subject of the following

research.

3.1 Legal Position

The legal position of Roma within the new MS has been the case of the majority of objections

from the EU and other European institution during the EU accession process. On the other

hand, these objection caused responses from the new MS complaining on the creation of

a double standard in treating Roma in old and new MS.

The Roma minority has been touched mainly by the welfare reforms in the countries, tying

benefits directly to those actively seeking work or seeking further education, as the majority

of Roma is dependent on state handouts. In Slovakia, their reaction were: “How can we live in

this country normally when there are no jobs (...) To survive, the Roma have two possibilities

– either move away or steal. Worst of all, we are doing criminal things and stealing food for

our children, but we don‟t want this.”34

33

CNN, Slovakia seeks help on Roma issue (16.4.2004).

34 Ibid.

19

3.2 Position of Roma in Practice

Political Representation

As it has been mentioned for several times, due to the Article 11.4 of the Bulgarian

Constitution, the creation of ethnically based parties is prohibited. Roma, generally, have low

level of political representation, which is said to be an effect of the widespread social

exclusion and marginalisation. Beside, it is almost impossible for any political party that

represents interests of community that makes up only about 5% of society to be eleceted into

parliament – because of the 4% electoral threshold. What is more, the issue of Roma is

considered politically unpopular among political parties that represent majority. At the local

level, things are different and Roma minority is better represented, but still not sufficiently.

This situation is caused by a wide range of reasons, of which the most important seem to be a

low level of education and serious divisions into clans and families. That problem and those

reasons are common in each Eeuropean country35

where Romani societies exist and despite

any efforts, it seems to be unable to solve them.

Political representation in Slovakian anti-Roma political environment is almost impossible.

An important role in the creation of this environment play also media, by creating numerous

anti-Roma prejudices. Moreover, some statements made by politicians make the situation

even worse, especially the statements of the former prime minister Vladimir Meciar. “Indeed,

there is general anti-Roma sentiment among Slovak officials at all levels.”36

Educational System

Despite Bulgarian prohibition of any discrimination in the access to education by law,

discrimination against Roma is pervasive and generates serious effects. The main problem

pose separate classrooms, schools or even special schools for mentally or physically disabled

in which majority of students are Romany. It seems to be primarilly rooted in residential

segregation, as many Roma still live in separate districts. These schools are usually

overcrowded, and the lack of basic facilities and well qualified teachers makes them offer

very low level of education37

. In August 2002, new legislation on the education of children

35

Barany (1994), p. 326.

36 Roma in Slovakia; http://www.slovakia.org/society-roma.htm.

37 European Commission, Regular Report on Bulgaria’s progress towards accession (2001).

20

with special educational needs was issued to stop an uncontrolled acceptance of using welfare

criteria38

. Another positive development is that some NGOs have pursued projects on

desegregation of Roma schools.

Similar situation to that shown above is in Slovakia, where schools are also segregated. It is

common that Romany children, who mainly learn in special schools for mentally

disadvantaged even if they are mentally healthy, are offered low level of education. Without

education, it is highly difficult to find a job, and that is the main cause of marginalization of

Roma, not only in Slovakia, but in almost each European country.

3.3 Recommendations

The former Slovak PM Dzurinda said about the Roma position in the country: “I think that

we do our best, but we need understanding. We need help. And I guess that issue, this

question is not only a question for Slovakia but a broader wider problem.”39

Roma issue is

common in almost every European country, but despite many implemented policies, it has not

been solved yet, and that shows us that the policy on Roma issue should be changed.

As shown above, lack of education among Romani communities is the primary problem to be

tackled if we want to solve other problems connected with the Roma issue. Development of

NGOs and projects on desegregation of Roma schools is not enough, but it could be a good,

first step. Second step should be done by government, as it has been the case in countries

outside the EU – the F.Y.R.O.M. with its desegregation policy, or Macedonia with the

educational system. These countries show the Union that it is possible to face the problem

without prejudices.

“Ideally, the problems of the Roma and other minorities should be solved on regional and

community levels. It is essential to create mechanisms for constant consultation between

communities‟ leaderships and minority representatives and organizations. (...) the central

government should create effective administrative and judicial mechanisms to remedy

discriminatory acts against Roma and other minorities. Furthermore, it should provide

38

European Commission, Regular Report on Bulgaria’s progress towards accession (2003).

39 CNN, Slovakia seeks help on Roma issue (16.4.2004).

21

services to the regions to help them more comprehensively integrate the development of

Roma and other minority communities.”40

The main problem concerning Roma minority rights is a strong anti-Roma prejudice,

prevailing in almost all European countries. Nevertheless, it can be combated, but more

efforts, time and money are needed to do so, and, what is the most important, the combat

should be well controlled. Law implementation must be a wide process, including more than

only some law changes, but also changes in people‟s prejudices – to do so, new policy on

Roma issue should be implemented, a policy of real desegregation.

40

Roma in Slovakia; http://www.slovakia.org/society-roma.htm.

22

Conclusion

In the previous chapters, minority groups position in several EU or applicant countries were

analysed on the basis of the same criteria. It was shown how complicated the situation is,

based on the historical hatreds, prejudices, and own identity protection. Nevertheless, it is

highly important to struggle these factors in order to avert potential threats to societal security

of the European Union and its states.

The purpose of accompanying recommendations for candidate countries (like Turkey) is to

encourage and facilitate the adoption of specific measures to alleviate tensions relating to

minorities and to ease the EU accession process. These recommendations aim to provide

some practical guidance in developing policies and law, in accordance with international

norms and standards, and based on international experience and best practice which can

balance and meet the needs and interests of all sectors of the population, both majority and

minority ones. Obviously, the recommendations need to be implemented in a way which is

sensitive to the specific situation in each State.

Over the last few years, there have been a certain recurrent issues and themes concerning

minorities which have become the subject of attention for both Turkey and more importantly

the EU. Among these are the issues of minority education and the use of minority languages

which are of particular importance for the maintenance and development of the identity of the

persons belonging to minority groups. Other important issues are the effective participation of

national minorities in the governance of the State and the use of minority languages as a

vehicle of communication in the broadcast media. According to the EU accession partnership

recommendation, the Turkish government should abolish the language restrictions on

television and radio broadcasting contained in the Supreme Board of Radio and Television

Law. It is worth noting, since June 2004 new laws allowed broadcasting in minority

languages (mostly Kurdish language) for the first time in Turkey.

Another issue that is worth recommending for Turkey is a stronger institutional mechanisms

to support the interaction and co-operation between police and the persons belonging to

minority groups. In combination with the lack of training for operation in a multi-ethnic

society, an often mono-ethnic composition of the police service and discriminatory practices,

police have generated negative reactions among minority communities in a number of

situations and even a conflict catalyst. An enhanced communication will benefit all parties.

23

The minorities benefit from policing which is more sensitive to their concerns and more

responsive to their requirements for personal protection and access to justice. The police

benefit from greater effectiveness, since good communication and co-operation are keys to

effective policing in any community. The state benefits both from the integration of minorities

and from the greater effectiveness of its policing.

The EU should also look into the candidate countries voting system, if minorities have a fair

part at it. Rights of persons belonging to national minorities be able to take part in the conduct

of public affairs, including through the right to vote and stand for office without

discrimination. Additionally the use of minority language in political institutions (the Turkish

Constitution does not allow the use of any other language besides Turkish in any political

debate).

Even thought the Turkish legislation grants minority rights protection, international

organizations frequently contend that the EU‟s Copenhagen criterion of „respect for and

protection of minorities‟ should be applied not only to the Jews, Greeks and Armenians

covered by the Treaty of Lausanne, but also to the Assyrians, Kurds, Laz, Romas and many

other Turkish minorities.

The UN‟s Special Reporter offers the following general recommendations, applicable to all

religious communities in Turkey:

„The Government should ensure that Islam does not become a political tool, a situation

that could escalate in ways that would promote religious extremism‟.

„The Government should ensure both more legal protection against discrimination

based on religion or belief, and the implementation and respect of these legal

safeguards‟.

„Minority religious communities should be protected from any political manipulation

in the context of Turkey‟s foreign affairs‟.

„The Government should undertake a true dialogue with minority religious

communities so as better to understand their needs and to promote a climate of respect

and trust‟.

24

„Turkey should take advantage of technical cooperation services of the United Nations

High Commissioner for Human Rights in the area of freedom of religion and belief,

with particular attention to minorities.

To sum it up, the improvements in all sectors of the minority rights need some level of

reconsideration. It is not effective to focus only on one or two aspects. If the rights are not

protected in all the aspects of minorities„ existence within a state, nobody can be sure that the

tensions between minorities and majority of the population will not escalate into a conflict

that may be harmful to all the European Union.

25

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