Miscellaneous 9/11 Commission Staff Notes about Drafting the Final Report

8/14/2019 Miscellaneous 9/11 Commission Staff Notes about Drafting the Final Report

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Dan Bvman and Mike Hurley

• Start writing conclusions and analysis.

• These will lead to recommendations. Our best thinking.

• Why Dan and I?

• David Tucker and TimNaftali? Their roles?



. LE intel vulnerability reduction. In Cold War can't shoot all world's communists.Ideological battle involving religion.

Need an information effort that exceeds what we did against the Soviet Un ion

Real drain the swamp initiatives, world-wide program, revamping CA for influenceprograms, language hard priorities

Battle of ideas, we are fighting an ideology in which religion plays a big part. We needto address it the way we took on the communist ideology. We need a full counterweight,and we should not shy from identifying it as a deviant strain a great religion. Battle ofideas

Systematic inventorying of the country's capabilities and hardening, massive covertaction program, m assive public diplomacy, military role, po l/mil, defensive and offensive

Pre 98 disruption liaison, LE, disruption of sanctuary was principal change post 9/11,

how are we bolstering countries as we did in Cold W ar?

We are still dominated by current options

Shatter the climate of disbelief



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Military Operations in Afghanistan Case Study

Going after Mullah Omar. The risks involved . The losses incurred. How hard this is.Difficulty of mounting an operation.

Without being glib, they are missing something.

Th e lethal nature of the threat. Who was watching this? Were they convinced that it was

lethal and required taking risks and leaving a big footprint.

Did they know how dangerous this was, and why not?



Predator Case Study

Magic solution

No one would get hurt except the bad guys. Low and acceptable costUse technology as our answer

We rely on hi-tech, enemies rely on low-techThis reflects just how much no one wanted to go to war



Predator Case Study

Typical American response, solution to a problem: throw technology at it, kill oneguy.

Was the answer for CIA and for DoD. Meant none of the good guys would get killed or

injured. American answer, apply technology, solve the messy problem of terrorism w itha magic bullet.

Started out as an intelligence collection platform, then became weaponized, w as going tosolve the problem

Big pissing contest b/w DoD and CIA as to who would pay. But,more importantly, whowould have responsibility to pull the trigger, and make a mistake.



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Pentagon: PLANORDS & EXORDS

Operation Infinite Resolve - Follow-on campaign to Operation Infinite Reach

(TLAM strikes against Afghanistan and Sudan)

Able Danger - Information Operations (restricted plan); conducted by J-39

Series of contingency plans, documents, dates, details

Military planning is going on



Political leadership really wanted to be resolute but they didn't go all the way.

Couldn't take it any further.

Why not?

Why couldn't they have gone further ?



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10-15 pages of analysis

We w ere doing many things

Agitating for an aggressive policy against a new and non-state actor.

What does that mean?

Calls on capabilities. We had them, but military is not so strong on this. Lay outsidetheir comfort zone.

Committed group of people within each agency trying to shake them out of a mindset.

The orders never came from President Clinton, or President Bush. It didn't happen on hiswatch. Was not seized with the issue. Never spoke to his top expert on it.

Institutional change. Could it have come without 9/11. Perhaps not. Did not come from

President Bush. Less a chance and less time. Was it a priority? There is some evidence?Was the level of engagement as high?

Direct presidential involvement?

Less engaged in a shorter period of time.

Needed radical institutional change. When does that come? A radical and new enemy.

Taken seriously, did not have divisions or air force or navy or easily targetable assets. Ahard problem



Outline of the final report

Final report should segue from narrative to policy recommendations

Meta-narrative, with back stories

Narrative analysis, then policy recommendations

Mongraphs: maximum reference value, concise tight standard, no long block quotes

Don't be constrained by classification issues

Work in the interviews

Monographs will be semi-visible bulwarks supporting the final report



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Clarke has his own cell w/i the USG.

Same problems within CIA that you had in the policy community

Change between CSG and Principals, it kept becoming less defined

DCI and other Principals, you've got a problem that cut across the lines

Lots of options, though the first time CIA has control and can plan for lethal action.

Engaged on problem, but not coherent, forward leading or advance looking

Govt had designed a way to respond, a new threat, but only used more $, someinstruments used, but military not fully integrated or included

This big threat required military action, to slam into the places where it was, and act on

intelligence

Willingness to risk lives, all our methods were stand o ff, TLAMs, proxies, renditionsother liaison services, behind the scenes. There were reasons for this. But we were notready to jum p in. No mood in Congress. Renditions, liaison, not direct, kinetic action.

What was the difference in the threat between September 10 and September 12? Whatwas the difference in capabilities?

Intention vs. Threat?

By 2001, UBL has hijacked Afghanistan

Here's what success is. Here's where we're falling short, here's how we're going to get

there

Measures/milestones

Are foreigners just thinking about their own problems?

Beofe 9/11: needed an Afghan strategy, not just a CT strategy; before 9/11 needed aPakistan strategy not just a CT strategy

How do you get threat to policy makers in 1997?

And then what p riority to you give it.

Use hindsight to improve forsight



Policy people acting differently

Small Group, restricted group. Ask Clarke about this. So that we have our terms right.

What were these called. Principals Small Group.

Small Group and the CSG got it.

Principals intermittently got it. Shelton? Cohen? Tenet? Rumsfeld?

But gets worse because threat grows.

'98 multiple, complex, international, timing

'99 Millenium plots, w ide ranging m any countries, U.S. hom eland, reach us here

2000 - take on a U.S. warship directly

2001 - WMDspectacular attack

Dick Clarke's shop carried over a level of knowledge, it was the constant.

What w asn't constant was access.

Pre-9/11, what strategy was in place? How far short was it?

Safehavens. How do we deny them? What are we trying to do? What is one? Whenwill we know we have been successful?

Why couldn't we have used SF?

Why couldn't we have seized territory in Afghan istan and ripped up the al Qaeda camps,gone after al Qaeda, taken the fight to them.

They didn't want to.

It wa sn't the m ilitary's war. It wasn't their war overseas militarily or internationally, ordomestically.

Leadership was engaged. It was an issue for him. But the forceful push, with follow-

through was lacking.

Politically could this have been done?

John Poindexter: the only person who lost his job as a result of 9/11, and that's onlybecause he got himself cross-ways on privacy issues. Contractor in the cellar of the

Pentagon. He was in DARPA.



Doom czar: You mean C IA had to develop its own capability because NSA wo uldn 'tshare informa tion? Slow to see that the extreme secrecy of the U.S. government was lessurgent than the exigency of responding to UBL.

Read Mike D eWine statement in the JI

President Clinton's concern, comm itment, determination. Indicators?

SEIB: December 16, 2003 "Terrorism Complexities Make Repeating September 11Difficult"

What don'twe know?

What are the mysteries we don't understand?

Look at prior statements and impeach

Freeh was at the top of the list of officials who didn't get it

Clarke was the longest serving and best analyst and policy maker

CIA had the best record

Why w as there no institutional change? The millennium provided good and sufficient

reason to do something other than just handling via surge

Did you change the institutions; no one changed the institutions fundamentally

How ma ny people needed to be killed to work this fundamental change?

Between 17 and 3000

CIA knew supplemental were coming. They planned on supplemental. But you are not

supposed to know about them. They are supposed to fall from the sky.

Problem is not incident response, assume if there is a bomb in NY there will be areaction.

Problem is after the millennium plots, why not a sustained 5-10 year plan postmillennium

But everyone jus t breathes a sigh of relief

Sandy doing Small Group meetings, p re-millennium, everyone's response was a surge,

not a major institutional change



CIA handled it like a short term, budgets only problem

Not one of major international change

Needed to change your base

They argued it wou ld destroy the DO if you changed the base, but on ly the DO as theyknew it.

Someone had to develop the urgency

Set and coordinate the priorities.

Is this going to help us fight terrorism?

What difference does it make?

AG says no, no way.

Pull together the key points of the MON

Need to not just side with the people who were fighting the war on terror.

Tendency to say that because no one else got it, what were they doing?

Al-Shifa, end of the campaign.

We pretend to w ork, and they pretend to pay us

Lives at risk would require presidential decision

Clarke's manuscript, no surprisesEO 12333—What does it really say?

Why didn 't w e use the military?

Sense the rpesident w ould n't do it?

Politically, he had the authority.

They didn't want to violate EO 12333

Why didn't Tenet push it?

Political vibes, wasn't going to take it on?



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Monograph Quotations for Section Headings

"If you didn't like 9/11, you're not going to like yourfuture. '

"The U.S. has never in its history had a more dangerous or

bitter enemy than al-Qaida."

"I spent most of my time defending the Constitution."

Trying to stop al-Qaida with these methods was like trying to

chop down a tree by picking the fruit.



Were We at War with Afghanistan? From the August 1998 embassy bombings on?

Were we at war with the Taliban?

The Taliban didn't control all of Afghanistan.

We didn't recognize them as the government of Afghanistan.

Did the Taliban commit an act of war against the U.S. by connection to a-Q who

attacked our embassies and later the USS Cole?

a-Q a non-state actor, but so what?

We violated Afghanistan airspace in retaliating with TLAM strike in August '98.

Were we then at war?

Should we have seen ourselves at war?

If we had, would that have made a difference?

What about Serbia?

Did we take these actions with a sense of impunity? Did we go to defcon three?

We wanted to characterize it as a crime.

Not as an act of war because it wasn't a country that attacked our embassies, they

weren't British redcoat regulars.

They were not ordered to undertake this by a legitimate government.

But were those merely our legal constructs.

We had an enemy trying to kill us.

Should these things have been seen as acts of war?

We are at war with terrorism our governments and countries that harbor terrorism

post 9/11.

Why not pre-9/11? At war with Taliban

Magnitude of deaths. Did that change it? These non-state actors just did more

damage.



Their relation with the Taliban had not changed any. Neither closer nor further.



Formula for Addressing Deadly Issues

President

AsRingmaster

What affects our well-being?Projects our values?

What can kill us?In long-term? In short-termNeed a fast track, short-cut

So these issues are lifted out of the backgrou nd noiseNon traditional deterrence? Can it influence the terrorists?

Traditional deterrence can affect states, great powers, and wmd state actors

Can you institutionalize this agenda?

Euphoria that the Cold War was over

Coming anarchy was a distraction

9/11 has institutionalized a response but there is no guarantee that it will be effective

Steinberg and Holbrooke have written about NSC reorganization

Read it

Staff or NSC- How it addresses the issues



Conclusions from Review of NSC Papers

Clear from NSC and EOF documents that Clarke was driving process in the new BushAdm inistration, not Condi Rice or Steve Hadley.

Not much was going on at their level against AQ

Highest levels of government were not engaged, were not driving the process

It's possible to see from the style Dick C larke wrote his Memos that he was attempting toinfluence the new Administration. Frequently, he would use lead-in's such as: The

previous Administration attempted this but failed

But, of course, he was part of the previous Adm inistration. Did he need to do this to gaininfluence? Is it further indication that the higher levels were not engaged?



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Counterfactuals and other Essays:

• Sufficiency of the overall pre-9/11 strategy.

• Flying the Predator as an intel collection platform in spring/summer of 2001:What could we have learned?

• Weaponized Predator: When is the soonest it could have flown in summer 2001?

And what's the best outcome if it had? Could we have averted 9/11?

• Northern Alliance: If the Bush adm inistration had implem ented robust support of

the Northern Alliance in spring/summer 2001, what's the best outcome? Couldsuch a program have averted 9/11?

• Principals' and Deputies' response to 2001 summer of threat: Compare and

contrast with Principals/Deputies' hands-on m anagement of Millennium Plot.Bush administration P's and D's were engaged on policy management but notsimilarly engaged on threat. If they had been, what's the best outcome? W ouldwe have been at battle stations? Could we have averted 9/11?

• Response to the Cole by either Clinton or Bush administration: Analyze whethervarious military options would have averted 9/11 had they been taken.

• If Richard Clarke had been given everything he asked for by summer of 2001 (orinsert other dates) does 9/11 happen?

• Was the TLAM option a real policy?

• Was the Predator a policy?

• The Trouble with Proxies: Analyze what using proxies means.

• The cost of failure to hold Taliban responsible despite at least 2 warnings.

• "License to Kill", the Kill vs. Capture issue: What impact did this controversy

have on dealing effectively with UBL ? If it had been clear, could we haveaverted 9/11?

• The Hunt for UBL: The difficulty post-9/11 suggests the difficulty of finding himbefore before 9/11 in the Afghanistan sanctuary, at least after the August 1998

U.S. retaliation.

• Human costs of boots-on-the-ground: The raid on Mullah Omar's compound in

October 2001.



• UBL and the problem of actionable intelligence.

• The cost of addressing the threat through surges rather than institutional change.

• Result vs. Intent: Before 9/11, al Qaeda had killed only a comparatively small

number of Am ericans. But given UBL's declared aims (see his 1998 fatwa), thefact that over the course of several attacks it was clear that al Qaeda had intendedto kill many more than the actual numbe r of fatalities were produced, and thesteady stream of reporting concerning al Qaeda's interest in acquiring WMD ,should that have produced a stronger pre-9/11 policy reaction? In other words,did our own successes in foiling attacks (the Millennium, for example) cause us tounderestimate the threat and fail to respond with sufficient vigor?

• UBL was at war with us. Were we at war with him? What would that havemeant? Was it possible to be at war with him? How many deaths would it havetaken before 9/11 to make possible the kind of decisive response the USG m ade

after 9/11? What does it take to get government to change gears?

• The trade-offs in the Global War on terrorism: e.g., to get Russian help have we

had to give Moscow a blank check on C hechnya?

• How sustainable is our long-term Saudi policy?



For CIA and the military the Predator was the magic bullet. The answer. UBL could bekilled without endange ring the lives of U.S. personnel

A strategy in which negotiations on arms control would have a place

US military didn't act as a military. Didn't support covert action.

From 1998 on, CIA functioned as the military, defending the country.

The State Department didn't do very much

What were the most important options, dates, windows for the use of force.

When did the windows close?

What are the key dates?

Window of opportunity?

Do a time line

CT decision making time line

Warren?

What they didn't choose to do

1998 George Tenet declared war on terrorism

No declaration of war within the Pentagon

For the Pentagon, 1996 and Khobar Towers was a more decisive date than the Embassybombings in 1998

Tell Bonnie that with DoD w e need to go back to Khobar towers and we should ask forthat, Pat D owns, on the theory that that sets the stage for the military

GT delivers the war on terrorism aQ speech

What happened at the other agencies?

Did the declaration have any effect?

What changed at CIA?

What did DO do, with resources, $, CTC?



Post 9/11 shock w hen Bush declared war on Afghanistan

How do you keep bureaucracies from retrench ing back to the old ways and patterns ofdoing things?

Need to sustain the effort

What happened after Tenet delivered the we are at war speech?

Policy and intel fusion. Not divorced. Should be closer

Clinton Admnistration can shape opinion on Kosovo and Bosnia but not on Afghanistan

Was Europe with us?

We need to look at our allies

Balkans needed our leadership, Europeans could not do it alone. Bosnia, Kosovo moredirectly affected their interests

Europe did not care as much about aQ, because aQ not really killing them

Need to look at the quality of cooperation with the Saudis, with Saudi Arabia now

Was DoD cooperating with CIA?

Why was there no joint plan?

How much was each agency doing?

No effective plan or measures

Why was DoD not aggressive?

Africa embassy bombings; TLAM response, Clinton public statements, GT declaration ofwar; what changed?

What happened in CTC

Shift of resources? Expansion? Augm entation of personnel?

DoD not going to war on Dick Clarke's say so

What did administration do?

1998: a window of opportunity; why not with DoD?





The broader questions are whether the kingdom is still supp orting extremist schools andpreachers in other countries, and whether it is doing enough to make sure al-Qa'ida is notthe beneficiary of its charities. Since the bom bing in Riyadh this year, the Saudi

government has emphasized its break with past practices, and its movement has beenencouraging. But that fact does not wipe the slate clean.

Factors Contributing to the Spread of Terrorism -- 24 Feb 2003 KSMfile





AQ declared war on America. When?

9/11 was a history changing event. Because of its magn itude, accountability should befound at the top; did they take strong enough action? That's where fault is, with thoseentrusted to act and to protect the public.

If nobody made any mistakes there wouldn't be a big smoking hole in lower Manhattan.

There were a small number of obsessed people in government who were unfashionable in

their opinions and their exigency. Caused AQ fatigue?

CIA

Designed covert actionBut also pressed and pushed for itArgued for it and to expand its prerogatives

Tried to make it strongerTried to press the m ilitary

Tried to have its authorities expanded

What authorities was CIA operating under? 1996? 1998? 2001?

Need to look closely at MONs and look at the debate over sufficient authorities

Did the findings say that they had to attempt to capture bin Lad in first?

(recommendation: do these controls make sense now? Do we have to quibble about thisnow? An enemy who will commit mass murder. Can we not have robust response. Do

we want to be involved in these niceties? Streamlined review of lethal action/authority?

How many attempts to expand their authorities?

How did policy makers respond to these requests?

NSC

Position is that they asked CIA and CIA responded that it had sufficient authorities andsufficient funding.

Who was speaking for CIA? Director? Lawyers? CTC?

Military

Said it did not have actionable intel

What level of intel do you need ?



No CSAR capability

How do you build that? Who has the lead in buildin g it? State? OSD?What steps did the m ilitary take to bu ild the capab ility between 1998 and 9/11?Bases?

Readiness?Work with allies?

Had our policy makers articulated the danger?

In spring and summer of 2001 the meetings of Principals and Deputies not greater thanon other topics.

Characterize the responses of the players

Did we fail?

Did policy makers fail?

We should prioritize the threats against us

Why did this happen?

Why wasn't it snuffed out?

Was is the scale and place of the attack? On U.S. soil? 3,000 killed

Nothing like it since Pearl Harbor

Were we conditioned by the way we had responded to terrorism since the early 70's?

Should our report have a WMD section?

Was there strategic warning? If so, did the strategic w arning resonate. If not, why not?

Did we think we just couldn't be attacked?

Did the policy makers fail to push hard enough?

What about military

Why didn't theyjust give the orders to wipe out AQ in Afghanistan. That was the issue.

What would trigger an invasion of Afghanistan?

The families: at some level they are never going to be satisfied. They want what

happened not to have happened. They want their loved ones back.



Tell the story the way the story is. Tell the story, that's all we can do. And ask thequestions.

We knew AQ was audacious. But it was audacious overseas. Not on U.S. soil. Attackson U.S. Embassies and on a Navy vessel killing 17 did not amount to much.

Was it the fact that only 12 Am ericans were killed? The rest were foreigners? Was theresponse to East Africa Embassy bombings sufficient? What would trigger a militaryresponse?

Who laid out the redline? The line in the sand? What was it? Where was it?Somewhere between 17 sailors and 3000 citizens on U.S. soil.

There was not much out of the box thinking.

Who really was asserting we must go in there and wipe them out, now.

After 9-11 the bar was set mu ch lower. The bar that you had to clear.

Before 9-11 the bar was higher? Why? Should it have been lower before 9-11. We werestill using traditional instruments

What would have prevented it? Too much hindsight? Too complicated.

US military not focused n the US homeland.

Focused overseas.

If there had been an attack against AQ in Afghanistan, it would have amounted to adisruption. Not gotten them all with the black Ninjas, but disrupted them.

Maybe 9-11 would have still gone forward, hard to say, from Hamburg cell.

Very little imagination or out of the box thinking at the policy level. And not much risktaking in any of this, except from CIA. At lower levels people were doing their jobs.Not at higher levels.

What would it have taken. They had the JSOC options. Was there a decision on part ofpolicy makers or military command that sending these guys in would have resulted in

unacceptable casualties? Where did these decisions come from. Long and deep rootsabout how these views were conditioned.

What wou ld have triggered a response? An order from the President and policy makers.

At some level the President has to act. This is history changing stuff, why didn't theyact?



They still were usin g traditional instrum ents to wage battle against counterterrorism,against a limited enemy with limited goals.

This was a new enem y. Not satisfied with regional/local aims, but lashing out at ourdemocracy and our way of life. Traditional instruments INSU FFICIENT . And yet our

thinking appeared to be lim ited to them.

Policy makers use of OMB

Chart of all things we have to ask.

To consider

What resources were devoted to learning more about the threat at the time.

Military was calling it a backwater issue.

What was the resistance?

Did they just not want to do this—the military?

Did the military have a plan. Since 1993 they were told to have a plan. Was it a goodone? Was it on the shelf? Was it adequate or just pro forma response?

Did military slow roll all of this?

Did they not get the m essage?

Was there a communication problem?

Did they just not want to do this.

Did they not trust the D emocrats?

Many levels: Principals, Did CentCom have a plan? JSOC'srole.

What can we learn from this?

Or is it just military stuff?

Germany: What was going on there? What did CIA know? When did they know it?When did Mohammad Atta first come on the scope? Were the Germ ans covering him

and the group? What info was CIA getting? What did they do about it?



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Issue: National Command Options

How hard did policy makers press?

Is it the military's job to interpret?

Mixed messages being sent?

Mixed messages to the field?

What did the military think?

Trying to push it over on CIA?

Was it viewed as a military problem?

Who decided that the lead should not be the military's; Earlier CT policy? What was it?

There were other things that were urgent that captured the Bush Administration's

attention

Did the military come up with good options, or didn't it? If not, why not?

Did the U.S. have to be struck at home in order to get the full range of responses?

How many deaths?

Did policy makers order the m ilitary to m ake the right preparations?

Did the m ilitary take the required steps?

Wrong to say they had strategic warning. In hindsigh t, yes. At the time, no.

Regarded as low probability but high impact.

Warning, but who was listening?

Urgent?

Did not have a sense of urgency or of contingency. Only some.

GT beating the drum. Armitage said he was pound ing on the doors.

They heard it but were not persuaded.



What is the duty of intelligence.

If they had been persuaded we m ight not have a big smoking hole in lower M anhattan

What is the d uty of intelligence?

Don't just do something, stand there.

Start with proposition that they would have done something.

Why didn't they do something.

They weren't convinced it was a major strategic threat. They believed the blow wascoming overseas.

North Korea and Iraq were more important to the military and to others

Our job: Tell the history. What happened? How do we deal with it now?

Are we doing the right things?

What more should we be doing?

What should we be doing differently?

Lash-up b/w CIA & military

Smaller and more effective

What did we do right after 9/11

Some god things?

How do we lock those good things in?

Danger of agencies reverting, falling back, retrenching

How do you attack this?

What can be done?

Is this a pathology? What can be done? How do you attack it?

A comp lex strategy! This is one element. Need many elements

Are we on the right track?



How do we need to evaluate it?

Absence of attacks?

Well known penchant to bide time

Passage of time is not sufficient

Are these questions even answerable?

Will this die a natural death? But when?

Lessons learned

An unprecedented opportunity

To speak to the American public

Cumbersome

Can it move fast enough?

Sense of urgency

Analysis & warning

Examine the NSC: Does that system work?

Did we require a catastrophic event on our territory to get the country to respond?

Bush "swatting flies"; "time to go on offense".

When do we exert m ilitary force?

When do we use force?

Non-state actors?

When

Look at what happened

Understand it

How are we dealing with it now?



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We thought we cou ld contain UB L, that there would be some overseas attacks but that wecould absorb theseDisruptionsRenditions

That we could go along and do this for awhile

We did not perceive just how much of a threat we were in, and did not translate this into

action?We thought we could contain him and put a fence around him and figure out ways to deal

with him

What was the Bush adm inistration strategy for dealing with UB L?

They didn't have one; Clarke was just "maintaining", we were on cruise control

Foreseeability: "tort doctrine", what standard? A high standard for those entrusted withnational leadership. Ap ply legal doctrines

Palsgraf doctrine, negligence?

Robert Samuelson: "if the Times were serious about self-examination, it would haveassigned the task to outsiders. It is hard for insiders to be too critical of their organization

for both psychological reasons (their assumptions may be part of the problem) andeconomic se lf-interest (they may censor themselves to protect their job and to not impedeadvancement)

Candid appraisalsPentagon

What you couldn't get past, or get done

Tenet's declaration of war, but doesn't shift policy processWhat was his sense of dealing with Pentagon?

FBI: useless and obstructionist

Why didn't Clinton cut through this b.s.Was the system not giving you the full range of options to engage the prob lem?Did the president sink his teeth into it?

Leadership — the truth is somewhat more activism on specific things-but the nsc was

insulated, no one was saying let's put boots on the ground, it didn't happen

Concept of use offeree against aQ was limited

Why didn't it shift after '98

Shock of something new creates new opportunities

How hard were Clinton folks pressing for greater activism?

12



At levels higher than C lark?How hard was C ohen pressing for greater activism?Shelton?Was the military just n ot going to do anything unless ordered otherwise?

'98 was not going to get sold on invading Afghanistan

12 Americans killedcan't find on a map

no im agination as to what they could do

Military still don't see it as their problem

It's an intelligence matter and a civilian war

Pentagon/military didn't trust him as a commander

Which president in '98 would have gotten this right.A democrat or a republican?

Turf is not going to decide this

You have to have a strategy

We are in this for the long term

Where is the strategy?

National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism 7-8 pages, overall plan

Hard part is changing the landscapeEasy part is killing people

Did we have capabilities and technologies?

What was keeping us back?Would we have done it?

Did we have the level of reliable intelligence we require?Assum ptions—sho uld the threshold have been lower for so grave a threatContingencies

Institutional culture vs. capabilities

What about this?

Bickering on Preadotr w ent away on 9/11No problem post-9/11

Only a problem before, which shows that it wasn't a priority, or a first priority

Money no longer a problem

Military: had the capability, not he will, or the interest, didn't' see terrorism or aQ astheir problem

13



Even after the Cole?

CIA: had will and interest and knowledge but not tactical information, and not capability

Predator was an instrumentThey wou ldn't share it and wou ldn't fix it

Different culture

Something new that can overcome this, still don't want to play

DCI's declaration of war: but, if we're at war, some peo ple will die? It is the highestpriority. Was it the highest priority?

What about the administration? It wasn't really at war. Was CIA the only executiveagency at war?

Warning: needs to be rigorous, disciplined, ask many what-ifs

What dci was doing in spring and summer of 2001 was alarmism, keep the system up and

on red alert.

What happens when this is going on. Are people on a higher state of alert?

What about F AA? Was it on a higher state of alert? Was word getting out to it? Whynot?

DDCI should have been driving this, or DI—who is responsible for managing analyticalresources of the U.S. government

This stuff did not rise to warning level

Need risk management

And crisis management

Should Deputies be specified as a Warning Com mittee for the US G?

Crisis Management Committee

Authority and accou ntability

How should it be done?

Need analytic warning training

John Gannon:

Why do you have a structural solution to a functional problem?

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What was Congress doing?



Kevin Shaeffer's Point:

Don't just focus on the event. The threat was there. False to say it took 9/11 to make this

happen, to get bureaucracies really focused on this.

After 1998 we knew they were a strategic threat, many supposed th ey would use wmd if

they had it, by summer 2001 some thought attack would come in U.S.

Can't say we weren't warned, can't say that couldn't have used force, and deployed

troops to take them out.

ALREADY WE WERE OVER THE LINE. THE LINE HAD BEEN CROSSED

Focus on the threat of a possible 9/11. Why wasn't this envisioned?

Why wasn't more done?

CIA seemed to be function ing like DoD. Sort of doing it all.

How much was D oD doing really.

Most of this depended on CIA CA campaign

Predator seen as a kind of deus ex machina

By '98 there was ample strategic warn ing awareness. Should this have risen to prioritynumber 1

Fear of catastrophic deaths and mass deaths

Later fear of attacks in the U .S.

As of August '98 there was awareness of a threat that could go all the way up to '98

Did earlier DOJ prosecutions and the fact we treated terrorism as a law enforcem ent

problem color our views: Blind Sheikh, 1st World Trade Center b ombing in 1993—a-Qlooked like the gang who couldn't shoot straight

Why didn't we do more about it?

No excuse for not devising a serious strategy to counter the range of threat

Strategy assumed too mu ch time, that there was time to do this, higher levels did not have

the same sense of urgency

While we hadn't had a 9/11 attack yet, that was no excuse



No excuse to say we needed a 9/11 to wake up

Principals were awake

They didn't take the necessary action. Why?

Evaluate the threat, design an appropriate strategy

Appreciated the strategy bu t didn't take the next step within a timely fashion

Tenet and Clark beating the drum but they were from the previous administration

Point of intersection

Leadership issue

Mindset issue

MONs - why did it take so long?

Why didn't the system work?

Go back to fundamentals

Why does this system exist

NSC has gotten away from that which w ill kill us.

A mini-NSC - that which will really kill us, so that it doesn't get mixed in with other

things.

Focus on econ and all these issues, not as critical, preserving the safety, protecting our

people is the most important thing, national secu rity has become a catchall, too broad,

maybe we need a tighter group

Terrorism and wmd now

1998-2001: did system effectively identify aQ as a threat? Yes or No? Did policy

makers appreciate the threat? Implementation of the policy?

They were on edge

If Bush has had 6 more m onths and nothing happened? Wo uld they have done anything?

Would they have been out in front more? Working on the new MON because of thisNiagara of threat in spring and summ er of 2001



How did system respond to millennium threat? Why were we still playing defensive?

WHY WERE WE PLAY ING DEFENSIVE AT TIME OF MILLENNIU M THREAT?WHY WEREN'T WE DOING MORE?

The threat should have triggered a serious response.

Why weren't all capabilities engaged?

Could we have had a policy in effect that would have prevented this?

A grand strategy with aggressive elements?

Need a do ctrine to take aw ay for policy m akers to approach this.

We have gotten away from that which can kill us: Bosnia, Kosovo, even Iraq. So, that

which could kill us was not a higher priority. Put it on a special track: WM D; terrorism

Things where conventional deterrence doesn't work.

It was not a failure of information.

A failure of strategy and leadership

What actions could have been taken at the time.

Why was a more aggressive military action ruled ou t

Even if the FBI had been more aggressive and done things right, it's still playingdefensive.

We weren't playing offense much?

Should not have needed 100 killed

Political will lacking

Leadership will lacking

A lethal threat. What more do you need?

Chem/bio

A big problem

We were asleep



Responding from crisis to crisis.

Who re ally proposed snuffing it out

Was there a coherent strategy that had buy in

Shouldn't what had happened have kicked in a maximum level of response?

Is it the system, the mindset?

Are we set up for asymmetric threats

IF FUNDAMENTALS HAD WORKED CORRECTLY WE WOU LD HAVE SEENTHE THREAT AND WE WO ULD HAVE STAMPED IT OUT.

STAMPED OUT THE REMAINING SANCTUARIES

NOW WE ARE ON A HAIR TRIGGER

Learn these lessons

How this evolved

Guidance

Can never solve 9/11

Examples: make the caseDecisive

Warning; beating the drum ; critical mass of intelligence; standard is a reasonable national

security official's level of critical mass should be sufficient

Didn't evoke a response of stamping it out

Stamping it out

Strategy

After 1998 they just improved embassy security, we did not address the underlyingcauses

Employing every capability at the earliest stage, when threat has been identified

What actions have been taken



John Lehman's position is that need to think about recomm endations ve ry early

Doctrines: pre-emptive, lessons or guidelines

Future dealing with the next big one

Need to engage the full attention of policy makers

What are the things that have worked post -9/11?

De-centralizing

Need to break through the noise

Break through the barriers

Listen to the field

More empowered on the action level

Do changes have staying power over a period of years

Systematically lock in and enable the good things that have been done to continue

Government w ide lessons or review

CA focus on the monograph

Key points windows

Saudi Arabia: quality of participation

Are Saudis following through?

Immed iate threat that can kill us. Groups of people at our door

Immediacy and urgency of the threat

What happened didn't push the threat to the top of the list

CA by CIA: proxies, Predator, indirect approach, not going to be able to take onthousands

Critical mass of intelligence that you need



When do you reach it

Clinton administration years: 3 wars: Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan?

How m any can you do at once?

What did the State Dep artment do?

What were the priorities

What clear guidance came from the President. Who set the agenda. It wasn't clear. Noorders

How do we help these folks understand what they need to understand

State Depa rtment did not do much

Character of Strategic w arning that we have on aQ changes in '98, FD D 62, UBL fatwas,9/11 plot hatched

Gore Commission came out in '96 and '97 time frame



Points to Consider

Drain the swamp vs. swat the mosquito

Long-term vs. short-term

Nations are a threat to us, not because of their power, but because of their weakness(Afghanistan)

Non-State actors

Lessons Learned

No follow-through

People were on different wavelengths

There were disconnects

They were not persuaded

They were told but they were not persuaded

Disconnect with the top people

Not eno ugh people, or not people of sufficient weight challenging conventional wisdom

How do you ensure they understand the seriousness of the exercise

If you had it to do over again would you do anything differently?

Did the process go fast enough?

Is it a process question or a substance question

Not enough intel on plans

We knew they would attack inside the U.S. but were not prepared. Did not know where

or when

Why didn't we get them before 9/11? Who were they? Would we have gotten them?

Not perceived by key people as a mortal danger

Is Bush now overcompensating for that?



Not going to be accused of ignoring the signs on Iraq, No rth Korea

Was it a failure of intelligence?

Or of policy?

Or of leadership?

What do you do for someone who is tone deaf?

Give them mu sic lessons, or music sign language?

A hearing aid?

This is a new enemy

One we were not ready for

Bureaucratic problems

Focus was on the economy, n ot on what could kill us

We are better at process; this is not a process problem

Failure to see what could happen

Problem is in the com peting priorities

And that it would take many deaths to cause us to change and realize how much danger

we were in



Team 3 Key Questions

How do we tell - What is thebest way to tell - the story?

Do we need to do an outline

What does the public want to know?

What was the response of the U.S. Government to the threat of Al-Qa'ida?

What was the threat?

Before 9-11 we used less than full means available to us.

Were means that we used appropriate?

Who took what positions?

How during the period from January 1, 1998 - September 11, 2001 did the systemchange to deal with the threat?

What happened from July - August 01?

This was a critical p eriod. Did the instruments change? Yes? No? If not, why not?

Was the system ramped up?

If not ramped up, should it have been?

Given what they knew at the time, should they have taken greater measures?

What would have been the impetus for such changes? Intelligence? Analysis?

Are we doing the right things?

Did the 1998 Embassy bom bings raise covert action to a new level?

How good was Agency's strategic warning?

Was there warning fatigue in spring/summer 2001?

What effect did the length of time it took to get Bush Team deputies into office have ondecision making?



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Did the Pentagon accept the mission of defending the U.S.? What infrastructure? Whatbases? Did Rumsfeld have to invent this in Fall 2001? Hard questions.

Did the milita ry ramp up in the 80's? Had these measures fallen off by the mid-90's?

What was the template for Somalia? After WTC bombing in 1993? After Khobar in1996? After East Africa Embassy bombings in 1998? After bombing of USS Cole in

2000?

Did the military assert it cou ldn't do this?

Were their reasons plausible?

Was it the number one priority of the Clinton gov't? Of the Bush gov't? If not, why not?

Post-9-11 the situation/response changed drama tically. Why not before? Should it have?

Full strategic w arning

Knew where they lived, w here they were training, that they were training to attackKnow their capabilities and their general intentions

What were Dick Clark, Sandy, GT, Bill Cohen, Rumsfeld, Madeleine, Shelton, Myersgoing to try to avert this

Need to nail core policy story

Must be authoritative account

How did we deal with this threat?

Were the means devoted equal to the threat? At what times. Did the government movefast enough? With appropriate sense of urgency?



Team 3 Questions

• To what extent does a CinC have the responsibility to be taking steps, basing, etc.,in the absence of explicit instructions from SecDef or the Chairman.

Could/Should Franks have been making arrangements to be prepared to attack

AQ along a range of options when the orders came. What was happeningbetween August 1998 and September 11 2003?

• The issue is not that the military didn't act robustly; we know that. That is not

news. That story has been told. But the rationale for why no robust action wastaken, and why there were no serious preparations has not been fully articulated.That is where the story is: Vietnam Syndrome; Somalia; Desert One;

Commanders couldn't lose men, if they did their careers were over. Rumsfeldand the Powell Doctrine; exchanged between then Ambassador to the UNMadeleine Albright and Chairman Powell over Bosnia: "What good is an army ifwe never use them?"

• What about the military's relations with President Clinton? Was that a factor?

• What was the relationship?

• Recommendations should respond to the above. How do we fix those problems.Is there a fix? A fix for a military that doesn't respect the President. How w ouldyou go about fixing that?

• How would you go about fixing the problem of how long it takes to get agovernment into power after an election? Were we vulnerable?

• And what about after the Cole? Why wasn't this at the top of the Presidentialagenda following January 20, 2003?

• JSOC was ready to go. They are always ready to go. That is their job . Highercommand was holding them back?



Why not covert or clandestine unilateral military operations in Aghanistan pre-9/11, whatwe're doing now?

What were the capabilities of CIA's military force. The strategy was based on the use ofregional proxies. There was doubt in the community at the strategy level and growing

frustration. Failure at the political level to do this. Failure at the DoD level to do theplanning and to be forward leaning.

Interaction with other instruments

Capabilities of CIA param ilitary force

Was it treated as a joke?

Risk? Was CIA willing to take risks?

Hidebound bureaucratic organization

How do we sort this our?

Policy makers, did they give you all the authority you needed?

Who were they asking about authority?

Are you satisfied with the legal authority to carry out what you want? Kill him? Write itdown, give us the authority to kill him, if you want him dead?

What is the commander's intent?

What did Clinton mean?

In considering this a catastrophic event like 9/11, any American leader would have acteddecisively, but it was the wrong analysis

The risk was not just putting boots on the ground, the risk was it would take time to dothis through proxies, and might not succeed, we did not have an offensive strategy with

all of our capability

All this had to be weighed and considered

What did you think about the timing and the urgency?

What can you tell us?

We never used certain capabilities. Why?

To do that things need to come together. At the Deputies and above level



"If we are indeed in a war, shouldn't the Generalsbe on the battlefield instead of sitting in a spotremoved from the action while still attempting to

call the shots?"

Colleen Rowley

FBI Special AgentMinneapolis Field Office

Memo to FBI Director Robert Mueller

May 21 , 2002





Special Issues

• John Poindexter: the only person who lost his job as a result of 9/11, and

that's only because he got himself cross-ways on privacy issues. He was in

DARPA.

• DOOMCZAR:

o You mean CIA had to develop its own capability because NSA

wouldn't share information?

o Slow to see that the extreme secrecy of the U.S. government was less

urgent than the exigency of responding to UBL.



What was the threat?

How many aQ in Afghanistan

How many had been trained in the camps

A shadowy network

Intel on WMD

So, needed to be using all instruments

CIA could do its part

It wasn't enough to take this on

Could not be handled through proxies

Problem integra ting it into regional strategy . Pashtun problem

Did no t want to have Northern Alliance take over

Needed offensive punch

At a time when you needed the military fully engaged we did not have it

Problems within CIA, because even though it would not have been enough, still wasn't

getting all the internal support it needed.

People w ithin CTC com ing up with the strategy

Pushing it on the C SG

Support within the CSG

But not above it

They were trying to say there was not a policy o r strategy was insufficient

They come up with the Plan, or The Way Ahead

This is going to beef up proxies

Ask for 35 million but they didn't get it

This was being blocked, but w here?

1



Had to be at the Deputies level, because there was no CSG

There was an army out there taking training to kill Americans

Should have used all instruments of American power

Classic multi-instrument of power problem

What wash the difference between 9-10 and 9-12. The threat hasn't changed really. AQhas no more d ivisions.

What were you trying to do with the Predator?

Clarke grabs this because it's a killing instrument we can use now, in real time. Actually

make something happen. Don't have to wait. Take the fight to them. Not by proxy, not

in the firebox, not NA. but can do this.

What risks are you willing to run? Are you willing to put people into harm's way. Can't

do this with an 8,000 mile screwdriver. Have to be on the ground mixing it up.

We could have done in and seized bases and had our CSAR there.

Look at how we are using SOF in Iraq pre-that war. They were there for months.

Basically, Philip's saying that in March 20 02, based on what had happened in August,early September we would have been pretty well set up to avoid this because of the

strategy that was in play.

But were we w ell set up in spring 2001.

Cofer Black memo. Why did it take a mon th to get a PC after the DC was held, to getstrategy going.

You have to deal with this problem.

Bush did a lot. Did he do enough?

What would killing Usama bin Ladin have done?

Zawahiri? KSM?

CIA had 20% of this. Northern Alliance could get you part way, maybe to 30%. Nofurther. Was this jus t doing things to be doing things?



This was not enough

Needed more direction than CIA

Firm offensive commitment from the military

We still didn 't have the Predator flying

No $ to NA

Read the 86 Finding.

More of a hunting license in September 2001

What had changed on the ground?

Mindset is not good enough. What had changed on the ground? Answer.

Need 1986 Finding, broad authorization, everyone thought they had the authorities, or didthey?

2000 Blue Sky Memos

Was there a strategy to destroy a Qaeda's infrastructure? To do what the military does,rampage around the world

Were we using CA in the right way? Were we using it in a way that was inefficientStrategies

CapabilitiesAuthorities

Was the process inherently insufficient?

Were we using CA to do things we should have had the military doing?

Taking out camps? Thousands of jihadists. This was beyone the capability of CIAwithout enormous help from the m ilitary.

Where does this die, the question of the military? Where does it die? Tenet? Berger?Shelton? Coehn?

Did we want him dead bad enough to do real things to him?

Actionable intelligence, did they have it? Did they have a means to get it?



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Did we use all methods to fight new threat

Strategy for stasis, for containment? Or a roll back strategy? What were we trying to do?

AQ terrorism goin g up, governm ent response not going up fast enough

Minimal offensive strategy, but that is hardest o sell. W ithout public support you can'tget it. How do you sell and offensive strategy. Strong political leadership

CIA's offensive capabilities had been diminished.

CA - use of proxies m eans time, reliability, they have their ownprimary concerns,consistency with our law

Fighting with only some of our weapons

By mak ing choices it means you can absorb these hits, they are coming

We accepted certain things

We can absorb

State, DoD, hard en, take anti-terrorism measures, it means we are impervious, but youhave a big problem because it means go after softer targets: Hotels, corporations

Defense is only a mechanism or a responsibility to carry out an offense

Damage our will and our psyche is the goal

CIA used offensively is only a part of our capability, but CIA was a limited response, this

was damage limitation rather than an offensive strategy

What was the info that was in our hands at the time?

What did we do with it?

What collection activities?

Team 1 timeline

Team 2 what was produced?

Team 3 what was the impact it had on decision makers

What impact did this have on the top policy makers? How did it feed back into intelactions?



Intel/policy nexus: What information did we have? When did we have it? What did wedo with it?

What did we learn from this?

How did we communicate it? Who did we communicate it to?

What finished intel was done at these points?

How did we fight this battle?

What worked?

What didn't work?

How do we correct this if that's what we missed?

What could we have been doing at that time?

How are we going to suggest intelligence problems? What do we need to do that wasn'tdone?

Can't look at 9/11. Look at what we knew.

Why wasn't this pulled together intel wise?

Was 1998 a watershed?

Was the Cole a watershed?

Were these critical mom ents? Windows? How were they regarded? How did werespond?

TLAM is not a stategy: needed a larger, and broader strategy, entire array of elements of

national power

12 TLAM missiles in the box within 48 hours

assets with 48 hrs sailing range

B-2 fixed wing options

TLAM strategy, no strategy, killing UBL not a strategy

Needed forward operating bases



No real time response until we had armed Predator, that did not exist until summer of2001

Direct action forces, basic JSOC readiness

Special Technical m eans

Conventional forces for Afghanistan, no conops for a general invations

Shelton tasked late in Clinton administration

Shelton, no detailed plans for execution of any of these optionsPresident let him off the hook

Don Kerrick was briefed on slide presentation

Newbold: Too reliant on technical m eans, criticisms for unimaginative planning and

reluctance probably valid.

Need an agile ability to use C T force s, deploy forces, apply force

Force posture

Make it m ore agile

Hadley sent a memo to deputies to resolve funding issues, and indemnification. How didhe follow through on this? How did Rice and Hadley follow through on this?

Look at out statute: The Commission's. What are we supposed to do.

Integration of FBI and CIA.

How did the Small Group address the threat?

Was there institutional change?

How do you get it?

The standard is not who was less engaged, it is whether either President was

appropriately engaged?

Level of the threat, what was it?

Where was the policy direction in this fight

Needed to use national instruments



Problem: not law enforcement, not military, not CIA (intelligence); it fell in between allof these. Nobod y wanted it. Military certainly didn't want it. CIA took it on but it wasnot enough.

Not all fighting up to their capacities.

Not a sufficient recognition that this would require a greater comm itment. Recognitionwas lacking at the Principals' level

What did they do differently after these threats? What did they do differently? Or was itjust a slow-roll?

Documents

Miscellaneous 9/11 Commission Staff Notes about Drafting the Final Report