24 Feb 2015

Aegis Standard Missile-3

Mission Assurance for Unprecedented Missions

Lt Gen (ret) Trey Obering

USAF

Terminal High

Altitude Area

Defense

Sea-Based X-

Band Radar

Forward-Based Radar

With Adjunct Sensor

US Ground-Based Interceptor

• North Korean Threat

o Long range TD-2 missile capable of reaching US territory in development

o Medium-Intermediate range missile using advanced propellants based on Russian SSN-6 capable of reaching Guam in development

o Demonstrated significantly improved accuracy in their SCUD and No Dong flight tests

o Issued statement suggesting they had assembled nuclear warheads

• Iranian Threat

o Cooperating aggressively with North Korea – sharing technology

o Developing short, medium and intermediate range missiles

o Building a space launch capability

o Showing expertise in developing an indigenous solid propellant capability

The BMD Environment - 2002

• US Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Capability

- No ability to defend against intermediate or long range missile threats

- No sea-based missile defense capability

- Limited land-based capability to defend against short to medium range threats to deployed forces and allies (Patriot)

- US missile defense development severely limited by 1972 ABM Treaty with the Soviet Union until US withdrew in June 2002

• US Ballistic Missile Defense Testing

- Ground-based Midcourse Defense system had achieved 5 of 7 successful intercepts of long range targets (including 4 consecutive) since 1999

- Aegis had achieved 3 of 3 successes against short to medium range targets

• Decision was made to deploy limited defensive capabilities beginning in 2004

- Fielded operational prototypes for GMD (EKV)

- Deployed very limited capabilities for sea-based (SM-3 Block 1)

The BMD Environment - 2002

Command, Control, Battle Management &

Communications

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

Patriot Advanced Capability-3

Terminal Defense

Phase

Boost Defense

Phase Midcourse Defense Phase

Integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System

USSTRATCOM USPACOM USNORTHCOM NMCC USEUCOM USCENTCOM

Defense Support Program

Space Tracking and Surveillance System Sea-Based Radars

Aegis Standard Missile-3

Ground-Based Midcourse

Defense

Forward-Based Radar With Adjunct Sensor

Midcourse X-Band Radar

Early Warning Radar

Sea-Based Terminal

Designated Lead Service: Air Force Navy Army TBD 4

Ascent Descent

Predator Airborne Sensor

Aegis Ashore

• Overall Test Record

- 66 of 82 (~ 80%) hit-to-kill intercept attempts have been successful since the

integrated system began development in 2001

- Includes Aegis BMD w/SM-3, Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD),

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and PATRIOT Advanced

Capability-3

- 45 of 57 (~80%) hit-to-kill intercept attempts have been achieved for THAAD

(11 of 11), Aegis BMD (26 of 32), and GMD (8 of 14) test programs since 2001

• The majority of failure causes were mission assurance related to include:

- Poor workmanship in test silo led to aborted interceptor launch

- Improper configuration prevented launch of sea-based missile

- Unapproved supplier configuration change led to KV failure

- Quality escape in the production line led to KV sensor failure

- Improper grounding scheme between booster and KV

BMDS Mission Assurance

Mission Assurance Philosophy “The Four Aces”

Public Release 07-MDA-2336 (14 March07)

Authority

• Effective mission assurance requires empowerment from the

highest level of organizational authority.

- Mission assurance organization led by SES reporting to

MDA Director – speaks with Director’s authority

- Mission Assurance Provisions (MAP) and Mission

Assurance Implementation Plans (MAIP) plans on contract

- DCMA partnering to increase mission assurance footprint

Authority To Say “Stop!”

Accountability

• Program offices and contractor community are held accountable for practices that impact mission success.

- Accountability to the individual level (missile integrators, process owners)

- Mission assurance reflected in award fee structures (Integrated Flight Tests 13c and 14)

Accountability Drives The Culture

Access

• Effective mission assurance requires access to the highest organizational leadership, programs and supply chain

- Direct access to the contractor executives

- Direct access to program offices and contractors including subs – MDA Assurance Representatives

- Unfettered and unrestricted access to all Government and contractor operations, activities and documentation – Director’s access memo

Direct Line And Unfettered Access

Action

• Effective mission assurance actions influence program execution and behavior in order to achieve mission success.

- Government / Industry Partnerships – Stakeholder initiatives for critical suppliers

- Mission Assurance Audits – Parts, Materials and Processes enhancements

- Lessons Learned Road Shows (Chemical Systems Division, Integrated Flight Tests 13c and 14)

– Direct feedback at the highest industry level

- Award Fee Decisions

Effective mission assurance requires continual attention and resources

Mission Assurance Tools

Mission Assurance

Representatives MDA

Advisories

Supplier Roadmaps

Mission Assurance

and Safety Audits

Government /

Industry

Partnerships

Lessons Learned

MDA Parts,

Materials

And

Processes

Plan

QSMA

Unfettered

Access

MDA CEO

Days

DCMA QA

Letter of

Delegation

Industry

Stakeholder

Initiatives

MDA Assurance

Provisions

Summary

• Accountability, Authority, Access, Action are the four aces of mission assurance

• Focus on process rigor and attention to detail

• Use of independent review teams

Attention To Mission Assurance Pays Off

Contractor Processes

• Standard Processes with Quality Independent insight

• Software CMMI Level 5

• Contractor Independent Review at Major Milestones

STSS Mission Assurance

STSS SPO Project Management

• Daily Project Insight and IPT Participation at all levels by

gov’t and Aerospace members

• Technical Verification of all Requirements

• Participation with MDA/QS and DCMA

Independent Review Teams

• SMC IRT of Space Vehicle

• NASA IRT of Launch Vehicle (with Aerospace

and MDA audits)

• IPA and MDA external review

Mission Certification Process

MDA Director

Mission Approval

SPO Management

of STSS Demo

NASA Delta II

Readiness •NASA Engineering,

•Program Audits

•Independent Reviews

• Daily insight by

gov’t/ Aerospace

• MDA and DCMA

participation

Risk Coordination

and Mitigation

Demo Satellite IRRT • Managed by SMC

w/Aerospace support

• Outbrief directly to

SMC/CC

Independent

Aerospace

and MDA/SS

Audits

(Includes verification of all

requirements, including those

not covered by independent

review)

STSS SPO Insight and Oversight of entire Mission Certification Process

NASA

Booster Certification

SPO

Recommend Aerospace

Recommend

MDA Quality, Test Dir

and other staff

Aerospace

Info

SPO Info

SMC Commander

STSS Readiness

Recommendation