Mmda vs Garin, Supra

8/13/2019 Mmda vs Garin, Supra

1/29

II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAWBILL OF RIGHTS

Police Power

01. Define police power. What are the two tests, requisites or limitations for the valid exercise of police

power?

ANSWER: Police power is the power to make, ordain, and establish all manner of

wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, ordinances whether with penalties or

without, not repugnant to the Constitution, the good and welfare of the

commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. (MMDA vs . Garin, GR No. 130230,

April 15, 2005)

The two tests for the valid exercise of police power are: 1) Lawful Subjectthe

interest of the public in general, and not of a particular subject, requires an

interference with private rights, and 2) Lawful Means- the means adopted must be

reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose It must not be unduly

oppressive upon individuals. (City of Manila vs. Laguio, GR No.118127, April 12,

2005)

02. Upon whom is police power lodged? May it be delegated? What are the limitations if the exercise of police

power is merely delegated?

ANSWER: Police power is lodged with the National Legislature which in turn may

delegate it to local government units. Congress has delegated police to the LGUs in

the Local Government Code of 1991. The other limitations if the exercise of police

power is merely delegated are: 1) the delegation is by express provision of law, 2) it

must be exercised within the territorial limits of the delegate, and 3) such exercise isnot contrary to law.

03. Does the MMDA have the power to confiscate, suspend or revoke drivers licences?


2/29

ANSWER: NO. the MMDA does not have the power to confiscate, suspend or revoke

drivers licences without a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature

or those of the local government units to whom legislative powers have been

delegated. Once there is such a law, MMDA is duty-bound to confiscate, suspend or

revoke drivers licences in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic

management. License to operate a motor vehicle is not a property, but a privilegegranted by the state which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of

its police power, in the interest of public safety and welfare, subject to the procedural

requirements of due process. (MMDA vs . Garin, supra.)

04. The Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003 grants to senior citizens 20% discount from all establishments

relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar establishments as well as purchases of

medicines. State the nature or justification of the law.

ANSWER: The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the

power of eminent domain, has the general welfare for its object. When conditions so

demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of

police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to

the general welfare.(Carlos Super Drug Corp. vs. DSWD, GR No. 166494, January

29, 2007)


3/29

Power of Eminent Domain

05. What is the power of eminent domain? What are the constitutional l imitations in the exercise of the power

of eminent domain?

ANSWER: The power of eminent domain is the rightful authority, which exists inevery sovereignty to control and regulate those rights of public nature which pertain to

its citizens in common, and to appropriate and control individual property for the

public benefit, as the public safety, necessity, convenience, or welfare may demand.

The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained by two constitutional

provisions: (1) that private property shall not be taken for public use without just

compensation under Article III, Section 9 on Bill of Rights and (2) the due process

clause which states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without

due process of law also under Article III, Section 1. (Lagcao vs. Labra, GR No.

155746, October 13, 2004)

-1-

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW /P02

06. Distinguish the power of eminent domain from police power.

ANSWER: In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the taking of property isfor public use while in the exercise of police power, the taking is a mere incident to a

valid regulation to promote public interest. In the exercise of eminent domain,

property or right of property is taken from the owner and transferred to a public

agency to be enjoyed by its as its own while in the exercise of police power, the taking

of property or a right therein is accomplished not by transfer of ownership but by

destroying the property or impairing its value.

07. Distinguish the effects of the exercise of police power and the power of imminent domain in relation to the

right to private property.

ANSWER: In the exercise of police power, there is a limitation or restriction ofproperty interests to promote public welfare which involves no compensable taking.

Compensation is necessary only when the states power of eminent domain is

exercised. In eminent domain, property is appropriated and applied to some public

purpose. Property condemned under the exercise of police power, on the other hand, is

noxious or intended for noxious or forbidden purpose, and consequently, is not

compensable. The restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and safety from


4/29


5/29

owner of the fee is not necessarily the only person entitled to compensation. A lessee,

mortgagee, or a vendee in possession under an executory contract of the land has the

right to take part in the expropriation proceeding. If a person claiming an interest in

the land sought to be condemned is not made a party, he is given the right to intervene

and lay claim to the compensation. (Knecht vs. CA, GR No. 108015, May 20 1998)


10. A property was converted into an airport by the Air Transportation Office (ATO) depriving the owners of

the beneficial use and enjoyment of the same as early as 1948 without an expropriation proceeding. It

was contended that there was taking, hence, just compensation should be reckoned from 1948. Is the

contention legally tenable?

ANSWER: NO. As a general rule, the determination of just compensation in eminent

domain cases is reckoned from the time of taking. (Gabatin vs. LBO, 444 SCRA

176) In this case, however, application of the said rule would lead to grave injustice.

Note that the ATO had been using the property as airport since 1948 without havinginstituted the proper expropriation proceedings. To peg the value of the property at the

time of taking in 1948, despite the exponential increase in its value considering the

lapse of over half a century, would be iniquitous. ATO cannot conveniently invoke

the right of eminent domain to take advantage of the ridiculously low value of the

property at the time of taking that it arbitrarily chooses to the prejudice of the owners.

Justice and fairness dictate that the appropriate reckoning point for the valuation of

the property is when the trial court made its order of expropriation in 2001. (Heirs of

Mateo Pidacan and Romana Eigo vs. ATO, GR No. 162779, June 15, 2007)

Concept of Due Process

11. What is due process? What are its purposes? Who are covered by the due process clause?

ANSWER: There is no controlling and precise definition of due process but its

standard may be described. This standard may be described as responsiveness to the

supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice, and as such, it is a limitation

upon the exercise of police power.

Among the purposes of the guaranty of the right to due process area: 1) to prevent

governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals, and

2) to secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general

law. (City of Manila vs. Laguio, supra.)


6/29

The guarantee serves as protection against arbitrary regulation, and private

corporations and partnerships are persons within the scope of the guaranty insofar as

their property is concerned. (Ibid.)

Due Process and Ri ght to Counsel

12. Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during and administrative

inquiry?

ANSWER: NO. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of

engaging the services of counsel or not. Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in

administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to

determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring

public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of

government service. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless

required by the Constitution or the law. (Lumiqued vs. Exevea, 282 SCRA 125 and

Remolana vs. CSC, 362 SCRA 304)

Due Process and Preliminary Investigation

13. The charge filed against petitioner was modified from violation of Art. 220 (Technical Malversation) of

the Revised Penal Code to violation of Secs. 3(e) and 3(h), RA 3019. Petitioners claim that their right

to due process was denied since they were not given the opportunity to answer and present evidence

on the new charge in a preliminary investigation. Decide.ANSWER: The petition lacks merit. The right to a preliminary investigation is not a

constitutional right but it is merely conferred by statute. The absence of a preliminaryinvestigation does not impair the validity of Information or otherwise render the same defective.

The denial of the motion for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the Information or oust

the court of its jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners were not denied due process because theyhad the opportunity to refute the charges by filing their counter-affidavits. The modification ofthe offense charged was based on the same set of facts and the same allegedly illegal acts.

Furthermore, the right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to

invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea on arraignment. (Budiongan vs. dela Cruz, GR

No. 170288, September 22, 2006)


7/29


14. A respondent claim denial of due process when she was given the opportunity to file her affidavits and

other pleadings and submit evidence before the DOJ during the preliminary investigation of her case andbefore the Information was filed against her. Decide.

ANSWER: There is no denial of due process. Due process is merely an opportunity to

be heard. In addition, preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ is merely

inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the merits. Its sole purpose is to determine

whether a crime has been committed and whether the respondent therein is probably

guilty of the crime. It is not the occasion to the full and exhaustive display of the

parties evidence. Hence, if the investigating prosecutor is already satisfied that he can

reasonably determine the existence of probable cause based on the parties evidencethus presented, he may terminate the proceedings and resolve the case. (Santos vs.

People, GR No. 173176, August 26, 2008)

Concept of Equal Protection

15. What is your understanding of the equal protection clause? Does it take way from the State the power toclassify? What are the requisites of valid classification?

ANSWER: The guaranty to equal protection and uniformity is satisfied 1) when the

laws operate uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances, and 2) all persons

are treated in the same manner in terms of both privileges conferred and liabilities

imposed, the conditions not being different, and that favoritism and preference are not

allowed.

NO. The equal protection clause does not take away from the state the power to

classify in the adoption of police power laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide

scope of discretion in that regards and avoids what is done only when it is without any

reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. (Re: Request for the grant of

Special Distortion Allowance, A.M. No. 03-11-25-SC, October 1, 2004)


8/29

The requisites of valid classification are: 1) there must substantial distinctions which

must make for real differences; 2) the classification must be germane to the issue; 3) it

must apply not only to existing conditions but future conditions as well; and 4) it must

be applicable to all members of the same class. (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil 56)

15. The petitioners assail the validity of Administrative order No. 1, which prohibited motorcycles on limitedaccess highways on the basis of RA 2000 (Limited Access Highway Act). The petitioner seeks redress from the

motorcycle ban under the equal protection clause, because AO 1 singled out motorcycles. Decide.

ANSWER: There is a real and substantial distinction between a motorcycle and other

motor vehicles. Not all motorized vehicles are created equalreal and substantial

differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to

justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. (Mirasol vs.

DPWH, GR No. 158793, June 8, 2006)Does the VAT Law violate the due process and equal protection clauses when it reduced the input

credits to only 70% of output VAT?

ANSWER: NO. Input VAT is not a property or a property right within the

constitutional purview of the due process clause being merely a statutory privilege.

Persons have no vested rights in statutory privileges. The State may change or take

away rights, which were created by laws of the State, although it may not take away

property, which was vested which was vested by virtue of such rights. (Abakada Guro

PartyList vs. Ermita, GR No. 168056, Sept. 1, 2005)17. Does a city ordinance that prohibit motels and inns in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area

violate the equal protection clause?ANSWER: YES. A city ordinance violates the equal protection clause where it prohibits motels

and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments despite

the fact that these establishments are all similarly situated. Furthermore, it prohibits the businessand operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. There is no valid

classification because a noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located

outside the area. (City of Manila vs .Laguio, supra.)


Search and Seizure; Probable Cause


9/29

18. What are the requisites for issuing a search warrant? What are the requisites in the determination of the

existence of probable cause?

ANSWER: A search warrant shall not issue but 1) upon probable clause 2) in

connection with one specific offense a) to be determined personally by the judge b)

after examination under oath or affirmation of i) the complainant ii) the witness hemay produce, and 3) particularly describing a) the place to be searched and b) the

things to be seized i) anywhere in the Philippines.

Under the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the issuance of a search warrant

is justified only upon a finding of probable cause. In determining the existence of

probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge must examine the complainant of his

witness personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination

must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers.InPeoplevs. Mamaril, GR No. 147607, January 22, 2004, the records only show the existence

of an application for search warrant, The affidavits of complainants witnesses and

return of the search warrant. The prosecution failed to prove that the issuing judge put

into writing his examination of the applicant and his witnesses in the form of

searching questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant, rendering the

search warrant invalid and the evidence seized pursuant thereto is inadmissible.

19. May the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures be extended to acts

committed by private individuals?

ANSWER: NO. As held inPeople vs. Marti,193 SCRA 57, the constitutional

protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of ones

person from interference by government and it cannot be extended to acts committed

by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful

intrusion. (People vs. Mendoza, 301 SCRA 66)

20. Can the place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, be amplified or modified by the officers ownpersonal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduce in support of their application for

warrant?

ANSWER: NO. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter

aliathe search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the


10/29

persons or things to be seized. It would concede to the police officers the power of

choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It

would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers

executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely

removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be

searched may properly be done only by the judge, and only in the warrant itself; itcannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search. (People vs.

CA, 291 SCRA 400)

19. What are the instances of valid warrantless searches and seizures?

ANSWER: 1) search incident to a lawful arrest 2) when it involves prohibited articles

in plain view. 3) search of a moving vehicle 4) consented warrantless search 5)

customs searches 6) searches without warrant of automobiles 7) Stop and frisk 8)Exigent and emergency circumstances . (People vs. Nuevas, GR No. 170233, Feb. 22,

2007)

20. What is probable cause in warrantless arrest?

ANSWER: Probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion.

Thus, there is no personal knowledge of facts where the police officers merely

relied on information given to them by others such as a report of the killing,

information from a witness who saw the killing, the physical description given of the

last man who saw the victim fitting the person arrested and information where this

man lived. (People vs. Cubcubin, GR No. 136267,July 10, 2001)

21.What is the plain view doctrine?

ANSWER: Objects falling within the plain view of an officer who has a right to be inthe position to have that view are subject to seizure even without search warrant and

may be introduced in evidence.



11/29

22. What is the Fruit of the Poisoned Tree Doctrine?ANSWER: Evidence obtained from illegal search and seizure shall be inadmissible for any

purpose in any proceedings. [Art. III, Sec. 3(2)]

Privacy of Communication

23. ANDREA and MONICA had confrontation in the latters office. ANDREA secretly taped the

conversation. The conversation between them bordered on humiliating and vexing the personality and dignity

of MONICA for which she filed a civil case for damages. During the hearing ANDREA produced the

recorded tape to prove that MONICA indeed insulted her. MONICA, in a countersuit filed a criminal case

against ANDREA for violation of RA 4200 which prohibits and penalizes wire tapping and other violations of

private communications. ANDREA moved to dismiss the criminal case on the ground that the allegations do

not constitute an offense and that the taping of conversation between the parties is not covered by RA 4200.

The trial court granted said motion which decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. ANDREA elevated

the case to the Supreme Court on certiorari. Is ANDREA liable for violation of RA 4200? Decide.ANSWER: YES. Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocably prohibits any person, not

authorized by all the parties to any private conversation, to secretly tape record any

communication by means of a tape recorder. Congressional records support the view that theintention of the lawmakers in enacting RA 4200 is to make illegal any unauthorized tape

recording of private conversation or communication taken by either of the parties themselves orthird persons. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed

the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under RA

4200. (Ramirez vs. CA, 248 SCRA 590 and Salcedo-Ortanez vs. CA, 235 SCRA 111)

InMamba vs. Judge Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1110, June 25, 2001,the

Supreme Court likewise ruled that the investigating judges reliance on the tape-

recorded conversation is erroneous. The recording of private conversation, without the

consent of the parties, contravenes the provisions of RA 4200, otherwise known as the

Anti-Wire Tapping Law, and renders the same inadmissible in evidence in any

proceeding. The law covers even those recorded by persons privy to the conversation,

as in this case.

24. Can a detention prisoner validly invoke his right to privacy of communication guaranteed under Section 3

of the Bill of Rights?

ANSWER: I qualify. While letters containing confidential communication between

detainees and their lawyers enjoy a limited protection in that prison officials can open

and inspect the mail for contraband but could not read the contents thereof without

violating the inmates right to correspondence, letters folded but not in a sealed


12/29

envelope and are not confidential communication between the detainees and their

lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the

letters are marked confidential communication between detainees and their lawyers,

the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for

inspection in the presence of the detainees. (Alejano vs. Cabuay, 468 SCRA 188)

Right to Privacy and Right Against Self-incrimination25. Does a Senate Committee inquiry violate Philcomsat Holding Corporation and Standard Charter Banks

right to privacy and right against self-incrimination?

ANSWER: NO. Since the inquiry focused on the acts committed in the discharge of

their duties as officers and directors of said corporations, they have no reasonable

expectation of privacy on matters involving their offices in a corporation where thegovernment has interest. Such matters are of public concern and over which the

people have the right to information. This goes to show that the right to privacy is not

absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest.(Sabio vs. Gordon, 504

SCRA 704)Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down inMorfe vs.

Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424, there is no infringement on the individuals right to privacy as

the requirement to disclose information is for valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that

the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately

protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to say that this purpose

constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative

investigation. (Standard Charter Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, GR 167173,December 27, 2007)


The right against self-incrimination may be invoked by the said directors and

officers of the corporations only when the incriminating question is being asked, since

they have no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be

asked of them. That this right may possibly violated or abused is no ground fordenying the Senate Committees their power of inquiry. When this power is abused, it

may be presented before the courts. What is important is that the Senate Committees

have sufficientRules to guide them when the right against self-incrimination is

invoked. (Sabio vs. Gordon, supra.) An accused occupies a different tier of protection

from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the

witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating


13/29

answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and

refuse to answer any questions. In this case, petitioners neither stand as accused in

criminal case nor will they be subjected by the respondent to any penalty by reason of

their testimonies. Hence, they cannot altogether decline appearing before respondent,

although they may invoke the privilege when a question calling for an incriminating

answer is propounded. (Standard Charter Bank vs. Senate Committee, supra)

Freedom of Expression

26. The National Telecommunications Commission issued this press release: NTC GIVES FAIR WARNING

TO RADIO AND TELEVISION OWNERS TO OBSERVE ANTI-WIRETAPPING LAW AND

PERTINENT CIRCULARS ON PROGRAM STANDARDS. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition alleging that

the acts of respondents are violation of the freedom on expression and of the press, and the right of the people

on information on matters of public concern.

ANSWER: It is clear that the challenged acts in the case at bar need to be subjected to

the clear and present danger rule, as they are content-based restrictions. The acts of

the respondents focused solely on but one subjecta specific content- fixed as these

were on the alleged tape conversation between the President and a COMELEC

official. Undoubtedly, these did not merely provide regulations as to the time, place or

manner of the dissemination of speech and expression. The records of the case at bar,

however are confused and confusing, and respondents evidence fall short of

satisfying the clear and present danger test. (Chavez vs. Gonzalez, GR No. 168338,February 15, 2008)

Freedom of Religion/Separation of Church & State

27. Can the courts, in the performance of their judicial functions, exercise control over church authorities in

the performance of their discretionary and official functions?

ANSWER: NO. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution

or organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and laws and

canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over

church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. In

disputes involving religious institution or organization, there is one area which the

Court should not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary matters. The amendments of the


14/29

constitution, re-statement of articles of religion and abandonment of faith or

abjuration alleged by the appellant, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of

worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the

power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are

unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of civil

courts. (Taruc vs. Cruz, 453 SCRA 123)

28. What do you understand by the Doctrine of BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY or ACCOMMODATION?

ANSWER: The doctrine believes that the wall of separation that divides the church

and the state is meant to protect the church from the state. The principle recognizes

that the state is not hostile to religion because it plays an important role in public life.It believes that the wall of separation does not require the state to be adversary, rather,

the state must be neutral in its relations with groups or religious believers and non-

believers. Under the doctrine, accommodation of religion may be allowed not to

promote the governments favored form ofreligion, but to allow individuals and

groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Thus, the Philippine Constitution

provides for tax exemption of church properties, salary of religious officers in

government institutions, and optional


religious instructions in public schools. The adoption of the benevolent neutrality-

accommodation approach does not mean that the Court ought to grant exemption

every time a free exercise claim comes before it. (Estrada vs. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1)

Liberty of Abode & Travel

28. What are the limitations on liberty of abode? What are the limitations on the right to travel?


15/29

ANSWER: The limitation on the liberty of abode is upon lawful order of the court

while on the right to travel is in the interest of national security, public safety or

public health, as may be provided by law. (Art. III, Sec. 6)

Right to Information

29. Does the COMELEC have the constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the

party-list groups.

ANSWER: YES. The right to information is a public right where the real parties in

interest are the public or the citizens. The right to information is limited to matters of

public concern and is further subject to such limitations as may be provided bylaw.

Also, the policy of public disclosure on Art. II Sec. 28, is confined to transactions

involving public interest and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.

However, no national security is involved in the disclosure of the names of the

nominees of the party-list groups in question. (Bantay RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, GR

No. 177271, May 4, 2007)

30. Are the offers made by the Philippine and Japanese governments during the negotiations of the Japan-

Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) covered by the executive privilege

on diplomatic communications?

ANSWER: YES. InAkbayan Citizens Action Party vs. Aquino, GR No. 170516,July

16, 2008,it was held that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the

understanding that historic confidentialitywould govern the same and that they

continue to be privilege even after the agreement has been published. Disclosing these

offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with

other foreign governments infuture negotiations. A ruling that Philippines offers in

treaty negotiation should now be open to public scrutiny would discourage future

Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations.

The diplomatic negotiation privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative

process and presidential communication privilege.


16/29

Right to Form Associations

31. Does the right the right to strike form a part of the freedom of expression?

ANSWER: NO. The claim that the right to strike is a part of the freedom of

expression and the right to peacefully assemble and petition the government for

redress of grievances, and should thus, be recognized even in the case of government

employees, was rejected by the Supreme Court in GSIS vs. Kapisanan ng Mga

Manggagawa sa GSIS, GR No. 170132, December 6, 2006

Non-impairment Clause

32. What is the non-impairment clause?

ANSWER: The non-impairment clause is a constitutional prohibition for Congress

and Sanggunians to enact a law or ordinance which changes the terms of a legal

contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new

conditions, or dispenses with those expressed or authorizes for its satisfaction

something different from that provided in its term. It impairs the obligation of acontract and is therefore null and void. To constitute impairment, the law must affect a

change in the rights of the parties with reference to its other and not with respect to

non-parties. (PHILRECA vs. The Secretary, DILG, GR No. 143076, June 10, 2003)

33.United BF Homeowners Associations, Inc., questions the constitutionality of a zoning ordinancereclassifying certain portions of BF Homes Paranaque from residential to commercial zone because it impairs

the contracts between the developer and the lot buyers. One of the promises of the developer is that the

property shall be used for residential purposes only. Is the ordinance violative of the non-impairment clause

in the Bill of Rights?



17/29

ANSWER: NO. The Court has upheld in several cases the superiority of police power

over the non-impairment clause. The constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of

contracts is limited by the exercise of police power of the State, in the interest of

public health, safety, morals and general welfare. (United BF Homeowners

Associations, Inc. vs. The City Mayor, Paranaque City) In Ortigas & Co. vs. Feati

Bank and Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533, The Court held that contractual restrictions on theuse of property could not prevail over the reasonable exercise of police power through

zoning regulations.

Right to Remain Silent and to Counsel

34. What is custodial investigation? What are the rights of a person under custodial investigation?

ANSWER: Custodial investigation is the stage of police investigation 1) when a

parson is taken into custody and 2) is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the

crime under investigation and 3) the police officers begin to ask questions on a) the

suspects participation therein and b) which tend to elicit an admission. (People vs.

Pavillare, GR No. 129970, April 5, 2000)

The Miranda rights of a person under custodial investigation are the right 1)

to be informed of his right to remain silent, 2) to have competent and independent

counsel preferably of his own choice and the right to be informed of such rights. If theperson cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These

rights, except the right to be informed of such rights, cannot be waived except in

writing and in the presence of counsel. (People vs. Naag, GR No. 123860, January 20,

2000)

The person under custodial investigation must be informed in a language

known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the

warrant of arrest, if any.People vs. Mahinay, GR No. 122485, February 1, 1999.

Exclusionary Rule

35. Does the exclusionary rule under paragraph 2, Section 12 of the Bill of Right apply to admissions made in

an administrative investigation? What about extrajudicial statements made before an employer?


18/29


19/29

Bail may be in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit or

recognizance.


37. When is bail a matter of right?

ANSWER: All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with

sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law of the Rules of

Court 1) before conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,

Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and 2) before

conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. (Sec. 4, Rule 114, ROC)

38. When is bail matter of discretion? In what court can the application for bail be filed?

ANSWER: Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable

by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, admission

to bail is discretionary. xxx Should the court grant the application, the accused may beallowed provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail

subject to the consent of the bondsman. (Sec. 5, Rule 114)

Whenever the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be

released on recognizance, the application can only be filed in the court where the case

is pending, whether on preliminary investigation, trial, or appeal. (Sec. 17, Rule 114)

39. Explain the concept of discretionary bail pending appeal after conviction for non-capital offense.

ANSWER: The discretion to extend bail during the course of the appeal should be

exercised with grave caution and for strong reasons, considering that the accused has

been in fact convicted by the trial court. Reason: Bail should be granted only when it

is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that

uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking be absurd to admit


20/29


21/29

43. When may the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus be suspended? To whom may the suspension be

applied?

ANSWER: In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, the

President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. (Art. III, Sec. 15,

PC)


The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to

persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected

with invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus

arrested or detained shall be judicially released within three days, otherwise he shall

be released. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, 5

th

and 6

th

pars. PC)

Right Against Self-Incrimination

44. What is the scope of the right against self-incrimination? What are the mechanical acts that, without the

use of intelligence, do not fall within the scope of the protection?

ANSWER: The scope of the right includes 1) prohibition against testimonial evidenceand 2) prohibition against act that require use of intelligence, such as providing

handwriting for comparison.

Some acts which are not covered by the right against self-incrimination are: 1)

Fingerprinting, photographing and paraffin testing, physical examination; 2) Physical

examination of a woman accused of adultery to determine if she is pregnant; 3)

Undergoing ultra-violet rays examination to determine presence of fluorescent powder

on the hands; 4) Subpoena directing government officials top produce official

documents or public records in their custody; and 5) Fitting the accused foot over a

foot print, putting on a pair of trousers, shoes, etc.

45. Can an accused invoke the right against self-incrimination? What about ordinary witnesses?


22/29

ANSWER: An accused is exempt from being compelled to be a witness against

himself [Sec 1 (e), Rule 115, ROC], so he could validly refuse to take the witness

stand.

An ordinary witness who is not the accused may be compelled to testify.

However, he could claim the privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to answeronly as each question requiring an incriminatory answer is propounded to

him. (Badiong vs. Gonzales, 94 SCRA 906)

Double Jeopardy

46. What is the concept of double jeopardy?

ANSWER: When an accused 1) has been convicted or acquitted, or 2) the case against

him dismissed or otherwise terminated a)without his consent b) by a court of

competent jurisdiction, c) upon a valid complaint or other formal charge sufficient in

form and substance to sustain a conviction and 3)after the accused had pleaded guilty

to the charge, 4) the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case

shall be a bar to another prosecution a) for the offense charged, or b) for any attempt

to commit the same or frustration thereof, or c) for any offense which necessarily

includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or

information. 1st

par. Sec. 7, Rule 117 ROC)

47. What are the protection afforded by the right against double jeopardy?

ANSWER: 1) Against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal

2) Against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction

3) Against multiple punishments for the same offense

48. What are the requisites for double jeopardy? What are the proofs that the first jeopardy had attached?

ANSWER: Requisites:1) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; 2)

the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; 3) the second jeopardy must be


23/29

a) for the same offense; b) the second offense includes or is necessarily included in

the offense charged in the first information, or is 3) an attempt to commit the same or

is a frustration thereof. (Cudia vs. CA, GR No. 110315, January 16, 1998)

Proofs: 1) court of competent jurisdiction; 2) valid complaint or information 3)

arraignment; 4) valid plea; and 5) the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case

was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the

accused. (Cudia vs. CA, supra.)

49. Is there double jeopardy if acquittal violates due process?

ANSWER: NONE. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when

the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction due to a violation of due process, ie, that the prosecution was denied the

opportunity to


present its case, in which case certiorari may be resorted to cure an abusive denial. In

that extraordinary proceeding it must be clearly demonstrated that the trial court

blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to

dispense justice. (People vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 140633, February, 2002)

50. Is there double jeopardy upon a conviction for violation of Anti-Graft Law and a subsequent charge for

falsification of public documents?

ANSWER: NONE. One of the elements of double jeopardy that is missing is that the

second jeopardy (falsification of public documents) must be for the same offense as

that in the first (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices). The crime of falsification of public

documents is not necessarily included in Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices. They have

different elements. The guilt or innocence of the accused in the anti-graft case does


24/29

not hinge on the validity or falsity of the documents which is the subject of the

falsification. Furthermore, it is clear that the Sandiganbayan did not rule on the

validity or falsity of the public documents. (Suero vs. People, GR No. 156408,

Januray 31, 2005)

51. When it became manifest before the judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper

offense against A, the first charge was dismissed to pave the way for the filing of the proper offense.

Does the filing of the proper offense constitute double jeopardy?

ANSWER: No. The dismissal of the first case will not give rise to double jeopardy

inasmuch as the proper offense was not the one charged against A in such case. The

filing of the proper offense, therefore, does not constitute double jeopardy. (Gonzales

vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 667)52. What is the so-called Finality-of-Acquittal Doctrine?

ANSWER: The doctrine is a safeguard against double jeopardy where verdicts of

acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable. In the Absence of a

finding of mistrial, i.e., the criminal trial was a sham, a judgment of acquittal is final

and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial

court level or at the Court of Appeals. InPeople vs. CA, GR No. 142051, February 24,

2004, the special civil action of certiorari seeking a review and reversal of decision

acquitting an accused on ground of grave abuse of discretion is not proper. If the

petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of thefindings of the court a quo, without demonstrating that the lower court blatantly

abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense

justice, the constitutional right against double jeopardy would be violated. Such

recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary

to the express injunction of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing

jurisprudence on double jeopardy. (Ibid.)

Overbreath Doctrine and Void for Vagueness Doctrine

53. Define/explain briefly the following doctrines:

(1) Overbreath Doctrine

(2) Void for Vagueness Doctrine


25/29

(1) The Overbreath Doctrine states that a governmental purpose may not be achieved

by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of

protected freedoms. InDavid vs. Ermita,the Supreme Court prevented the

government, pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 1017 and General Order No.5, from hunting down terrorists since acts of terrorism had not been defined

and made punishable by Congress.

(2) The Void for Vagueness Doctrine which renders a law invalid if men of common

intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its

application. Thus, a statute may be rendered void if its terms are uncertain or

not sufficiently definite rendering it incomprehensible to ordinary people and

thereby making the enforcement of the law arbitrary and subject to abuse. Such

a vague or ambiguous piece of legislation violates due process of law. It

provides a rule to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense mustdefine the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary

intelligence can understand what conduct is condemned.


54. R challenges the validity of Section 5 of RA 3019, a penal statute on the ground that the act constitutingthe offense is allegedly vague and impermissibly broad and thus violated due process right of

individual to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. Will his suit prosper?

ANSWER: NO. overbreadth and vagueness doctrine have special application only to

free speech cases. They are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.

When the allegation in the information is vague or indefinite, the remedy of the

accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars. (Romualdez vs.

Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371)

A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the

constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities

constitutionally subject to State regulation may not be achieved by means that sweep


26/29

unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. (Chavez vs.

COMELEC, 437 SCRA 415)

55. What is the effect of an on its face invalidation of criminal statutes? Whatis the test in determiningwhether a criminal statute is void?

ANSWER: The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty

is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed

conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. The vagueness

doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld

not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.

Facial invalidation or an on its face invalidation of criminalstatutes is not

appropriate because it would result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not

have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the

usual requirement of actual case and controversy and permit decisions to be made in

a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness.The test in determining

whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a

sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common

understanding and practice. The vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable

degree of certainty for the statute to be upheldnot absolute precision or

mathematical exactitude.

(Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, supra.)

No ExPost Facto Law

56. What is ex post facto law? What are the characteristics of ex-post facto law?

ANSWER: Ex post facto law which penalizes a person for having committed an act

which was not punishable at the time of its commission. Such retroactive application

violates a persons right to due process.

An ex post facto law is one that 1) Makes an act done before the passage of the law

and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; 2) Aggravates a crime,


27/29

or makes it greater that it was, when committed; 3) Changes the punishment and

inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; 4)

Alters the legal rules of evidence, authorizes conviction upon less or different

testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; 5)

Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or

deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and 6) Deprives aperson accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled,

such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of

amnesty.

The prohibition against ex post facto law applies only to penal laws which are

given retroactive effect. Penal law is one that prescribes a criminal penalty imposable

in a criminal trial. A law is also penal if it prescribes a burden equivalent to a criminal

penalty (eg. disqualification from the practice of a profession) even if such burden is

imposed in an administrative proceeding (Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners,

28 SCRA 344)

Academic Freedom

57. Does the Civil Service Commission have the power to terminate employment of a UP professor or other

academic personnel?

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW /P14ANSWER: NO. The Civil Service Commission has no authority to dictate to UP the outrightdismissal of its personnel. On its own, the CSC does not have the power to terminate

employment or to drop workers from the rolls. Academic freedom encompasses the autonomy tochoose who should teach and, concomitant therewith, who should be retained in its rolls of

professors and other academic personnel. The UP by opting to retain a professor and even

promoting him despite his absence without leave, exercised its freedom to choose who may teachor, more precisely, who may continue to teach within its faculty. (UP vs. CSC, 356 SCRA 57)57. Does academic freedom encompass a universitys discretion to determine who shall be conferred academic

honors?ANSWER: YES. Academic freedom accords an institution of higher learning the right to decide

for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. Academic freedom extends to theright to confer academic honors. Thus, the exercise of academic freedomgrants the University the exclusive discretion to determine to whom among its graduates it shall

confer academic recognition based on its established standards. And the courts may not interfere

unless there is a clear showing that the University has arbitrarily and capriciously exercised itsjudgments. (Morales vs. UP Board of Regents, 446 SCRA 227)

58. May a university validly revoke a degree or honor it has conferred to a student after the graduation of the

latter after finding that such degree or honor was obtained through fraud?


28/29

ANSWER: YES. Academic freedom of institution of higher learning is a freedom

granted to institutions of higher learning which is thus given a wide sphere of

authority certainly extending to the choice of students. If such institution of higher

learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can alsodetermine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.

Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through

fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has

thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon the graduation

of a student, for it is precisely the graduation of such a student that it is in

question. (UP Board of Regents vs. CA and Celine, GR No. 134625, August 31, 1999)

59. The Board of Regents of the Benguet State University approved a resolution granting rice subsidy andhealth care allowance to BSUs employees. The grant of this rice subsidy and health care allowance

in the amount of P4.35M was disallowed in audit by the Commission on Audit stating that RA 9282,

the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997, does not provide for the grant of said allowance to

employees and officials to the university. BSU argued that the authority given to the Governing

Board is plenary and absolute invoking the academic freedom clause of the Constitution. Is the

contention of BSU legally tenable?

ANSWER: NO. BSU cannot find solace in the academic freedom clause of the

Constitution. Academic freedom as adverted to in the Constitution and in RA 9282

only encompasses the freedom of the institution of higher learning to determine for

itself, on academic grounds, who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be

taught and who may be admitted to study. The guaranteed academic freedom does not

grant the institution of higher learning unbridled authority to disburse its funds and

grant additional benefits sans statutory basis that would justify the grant of these

additional benefits to its employees. (BSU vs. COA, 524 SCRA 437)

60. Does the assumption by the Civil Service Commission of jurisdiction over a president of a state university

violate academic freedom?

ANSWER: NO. A complaint against a state university official may be filed eitherwith the universitys Board of Regents or directly with the Civil Service Commission

which has concurrent jurisdiction. Contrary to the matters traditionally held to be

justified to be within the bounds of academic freedom, the administrative complaints

filed against a state university president involves violations of the civil service rules.

The guaranteed academic freedom does not give an institution the unbridled authority

to perform acts without any statutory basis. For that reason, a school official, who is a


29/29

member of the civil service, may not be permitted to commit violations of civil

service rules under the justification that he was free to do so under the principle of

academic freedom. (Civil Service Commission vs. Sojor, GR 168766, May 22, 2008)

--oo0oo--

Documents

Mmda vs Garin, Supra