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MNR TYPE-D EMERGENCY PLAN REVIEW 2012 March. What is the Type D Procedure?. The Type D Procedure is the part of the reactor emergency plan that is implemented when there is felt to be a risk of significant releases from the facility. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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MNR TYPE-D EMERGENCY
PLAN REVIEW
2012 March
What is the Type D Procedure?
The Type D Procedure is the part of the reactor emergency plan that is implemented when there is felt to be a risk of significant releases from the facility. a situation that could lead to an effective dose in excess of 1
mSv (100 mrem) or the introduction of a gamma radiation field greater than
0.25 mSv/hr (25 mrem/hr) at 25 meters from the Reactor Building.
Builds on the plan in place for > 50 years
Other procedures (Type B and C) under the emergency plan address possible incidents confined to the facility. There has never been a need to implement the Type B, C or D
procedures.
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Type DProcedure
CNSCRequirements
Ontario NuclearEmergency PlanPart VIII
McMaster Crisis ManagementPlan
National andInternationalStandards
Hamilton CrisisPlan
3
What the Procedure Addresses Activate the reactor and University emergency
orgs. Notify off-campus emergency organizations Control the area surrounding the reactor
(The Controlled Area) Manage the emergency and control the reactor Assess releases and determine protective
actions Implement Protective Actions in the Controlled Area Communicate Status and actions Terminate the response when the emergency is
over 4
TYPE-D PLAN: Key Features The Emergency Planning Zone for MNR is the
central campus area – NO protective actions expected to be required outside this area. This is based on an ANSI standard for research reactor EP.
The approach is predictive – MNR will activate the plan at the earliest reasonable point if significant fuel damage appears likely. It may be that no releases actually occur.
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Emergency Planning Zone Basis: ANSI/ANS-15.16 Emergency Planning for
Research Reactors – Internationally recognized standard.
“Area for which offsite emergency planning is performed to assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect the public in the event of an accident.”
EPZ set to include areas where there is a possibility of exceeding 10 mSv (1 rem) effective dose and 50 mSv (5 rem) thyroid dose
Defaults “based on highly conservative calculations” For reactors up to 10 MW EPZ is100 meter radius
MNR licensed to 5 MW, normally operates at 2 – 3 MW MNR has a full containment shell – this is not credited
in determining the EPZ (conservative).6
Emergency Planning Zone – Per ANSI Standard
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EPZ and Initial Controlled Area
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EPZ and Initial Controlled Area
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Normal Operations Fuel Damage Release
Recovery
Initiating Event
Symptoms
Containm
ent Failure
Type D Emergency will be declared in this range
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Predictive Approach – Conservative Plan Activation
Initiating events that may lead to Type D Emergency have been identified.
Large Pool Leak Flow Blockage Other unspecified (radiation or contamination outside
facility) Indicators that Type D may occur identified
Aids staff in making early determination that Plan should be activated
The initiating events are so rare that we will start evaluating need for plan activation when they occur – expected to provide early warning, possibly a “false alarm”
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Protective Actions Early Evacuation of Controlled Area
before any release no contamination monitoring of evacuees preferred when possible
Sheltering within Controlled Area stay inside buildings – reduces exposure and contamination
potential Evacuation within Controlled Area
post-release must monitor all evacuees prior to leaving controlled area
Thyroid Blocking for Emergency Workers administer KI tablets will be available if required for emergency workers inside the
controlled area13
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What’s in a mSv? About 1/10th of a
Whole Body CT scan 12 Chest X-Rays About 40 Toronto –
Vancouver airline flights
Moving to Colorado from Boston (annual dose).
Regulatory Dose Limit for a member of the public
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
41 mSv
Average AnnualBackground Dose
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Protective Action Levels
Protective Measure
Effective Dose Thyroid Dose
Lower Level Upper Level Lower Level Upper Level
Sheltering 1 mSv(0.1 rem)
10 mSv(1 rem)
10 mSv(1 rem)
100 mSv(10 rem)
Evacuation 10 mSv(1 rem)
100 mSv(10 rem)
100 mSv(10 rem)
1000 mSv(100 rem)
Thyroid Blocking1
100 mSv(10 rem)
1 Sv(100 rem)
1 KI will be available if required for those working in the Controlled Area
From Province of Ontario Nuclear Emergency Plan Part 1
Emergency Dose Limits For Workers
OBJECTIVE EMERGENCY DOSE LIMIT COMMENT
Urgent actions to prevent capital equipment loss or
damage
50 mSv (5 rem)
Applies to any McMaster University employee and volunteers from outside
agencies.
Urgent actions which will prevent or mitigate a serious radiological
incident
250 mSv (25 rem)
Applies to any Nuclear Energy Worker and
volunteers who are non-NEWs.
Rescue and Lifesaving 1 000 mSv (100 rem)
Any volunteer who has been briefed on potential
consequences of exposure.
Radiation Protection Regulations: During the control of an emergency and the consequent immediate and urgent remedial work, the effective dose and the equivalent dose may exceed the applicable dose limits prescribed by sections 13 and 14, but the effective dose shall not exceed 500 mSv and the equivalent dose received by the skin shall not exceed 5 000 mSv.Does not apply in respect of pregnant NEWsMay be exceeded by a person acting voluntarily to save or protect human life 16
Key Players in Early Emergency Response
MNR Emergency Organization Management of the Controlled Area and the Reactor
McMaster Crisis Management Group Management of Campus Interface to public and organizations / regulators
City of Hamilton Emergency Control Group Coordinate provision of assistance to University Any off-campus protective actions (none expected)
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Hamilton
Campus
ControlledArea
MNR
MNR Emergency Organization
McMaster UniversityCrisis Management Group
City of HamiltonEmergency Control Group
Reactor Operations Team
Hamilton Health Sciences
Media
Emergency Management Ontario
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
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Access Control Point Team
Controlled Area Survey TeamMNR
(Controlled Area)
Plume Assessment Team
Perimeter Teams
Operations
Emergency Control Centre
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McMaster University Crisis Management
Group
Emergency Control Centre
Reactor Management Team
Access Control Point Team
Emergency Director
ScribeProtective
Action Manager
Advisor(s)CMG Advisor
Senior Reactor
Supervisor
Reactor Supervisors
Reactor Operators
Radiation Surveyor
Controlled Area Survey
Team(s)
Perimeter Survey
Team(s)
Plume Assessment
Team(s)
Access Control Point
Manager
Personnel Monitoring
Unit
Emergency Worker Unit
Counting Room Team
Ventillation Control Team
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MNR Emergency Organization
Emergency Control Centre Overall control/coordination Run by MNR Emergency Director Interface to University CMG – Information and
resources Decisions regarding actions inside Controlled Area Advise regarding actions outside of Controlled Area Provide information and status to CMG Nominal Location – NRB G101. Alternates –UCC,
JHE, IAHS
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MNR Emergency Organization – cont.
Reactor Operations Team Manage emergency in facility Provide status/information to ECC Reactor Operations Personnel + Radiation Surveyor
Perimeter Team Post Controlled Area perimeter with radiation hazard tape Patrol perimeter – prevent unauthorized entry/exit Provide continual surveys at perimeter One Security Officer and one Radiological Assessor per
team22
MNR Emergency Organization – cont.
Controlled Area Survey Team(s) Conduct surveys inside Controlled Area Implement protective actions inside Controlled Area (per ECC) Provide data to ECC Two Radiological Assessors per team
Access Control Point Team Control entry to and exit from Controlled Area Contamination monitoring and decon as required on exit Exposure control and registration of emergency workers entering Collection point for resources and personnel Nominal location – McMaster Accelerator Lab Four Radiological Assessors
23
MNR Emergency Organization – cont. Plume Assessment Team
Conduct surveys outside Controlled Area – verify absence of significant effects
Collect and analyze environmental samples Provide data to ECC 1 Radiological Assessor and one Driver per Team
Counting Room Team Sample analysis and Counting, Filter collection Specially trained Radiological Assessor
Ventilation Control Team Shut down ventilation to buildings in the Controlled Area if directed by
Emergency Director Physical Plant UCC Staff
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ResourcesDesignated Emergency Directors 3
Reactor Managers/Supervisors/Operators (+trainees) 9 Health Physics Personnel 6 Iodine Production Staff 5 Neutron Activation Analysis Personnel 3 Accelerator Staff 4 Additional NFCC Members 5
Total 35
- To be trained as Radiological Assessors – able to perform field measurements
Two Security Officers with VehiclesTwo UCC Personnel for Ventilation ControlAlso require
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Staffing Requirements
Minimum Nominal
Emergency Control Centre 3 6Reactor Operations Team 3 6
Perimeter Survey Team (s) 2 4
Controlled Area Survey Team (s) 2 4
Access Control Point Team 4 6
Plume Assessment Team 2 2
Counting Room Team 2 3
Ventilation Control Team 1 2
Total 19 33
McMaster University CMG Overall responsibility for emergency
management for the rest of University Provide logistical support to MNR
organization Decisions for protective actions on-campus
- outside the Controlled Area (none expected)
Interface with City of Hamilton ECG – information, advice on protective actions, support
Interface with Regulatory Agencies Interface with Hamilton Health Sciences Provide information to public/media
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City of Hamilton Emergency Control Group
Per Province of Ontario Nuclear Emergency Plan – Part VIII
Any protective actions required off-campus
Support to McMaster if requested (e.g. fire fighting, police to assist in access control)
Information to public and media Interface with Province
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Province (Emergency Measures
Ontario) Monitor progress of emergency Provide assistance as requested by City Take over management of off-site response if
requested by City (Per Part VIII of Province of Ontario Nuclear Emergency Plan)
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Type D Walkthrough There is NO credible accident scenario that leads to significant
off-site radiological doses.
Events identified in the safety analysis have frequencies well below 10-6 per year. That is, there is less than a one in a million chance of occurrence in a given year.
However the incredible events have been reviewed and the hypothetical consequences determined.
One EXAMPLE scenario from the Safety Analysis has been chosen as a basis for this walk-through. It is a highly unlikely event but is useful as a demonstration of how the plan will function.
Note – even in this event, the dose to the most exposed individual outside the Controlled Area is about 0.5 mSv (50 mrem)
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Scenario During routine operation on the evening shift, an
unspecified accident at a beam port facility causes a large rupture in the beam tube liner.
Reactor cooling water starts to leak through a 40 cm2 hole in the side of the pool
The reactor is staffed by two operators (minimum staffing)
It is 18:00 on a weekday during term – the campus is crowded with evening classes
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Characteristics of Selected Scenario Everything that can go wrong –goes
wrong – at the same time Pool drains over period of time
depending on size of leak, eventually exposing core
Crane failure prevents isolating core in second pool
Exposed fuel partially melts releasing fission products
Containment impaired over first two hours of release by unspecified compressed air in-leakage
Largest releases and doses of examined scenarios
Delay provides time to activate emergency plan and evacuate Controlled Area prior to release
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Scenario - Initiation18:00 Event – Large leak from beam tube initiated
18:00 to 18:15
Several alarms sound in control room (low flow, low pool level etc.)Assume that automatic shut-down fails
18:15 Operators diagnose problem and initiate manual shut-downTYPE B Emergency Declared
18:16 Operators call Security to carry out TYPE B call in of Reactor Supervision and Health Physics
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18:20 Operators attempt to move core and isolate in Pool 2Crane Fails for unspecified reason.
18:20 – 18:55 Unsuccessful attempts by (growing) operations team to plug hole.Reactor personnel reportingHealth Physicist reports
18:55 – 19:05 Senior Reactor Supervisor present and Senior Health Physicist discuss progress of event – Determine that there is a significant risk of fuel failure occurring.
19:05 TYPE D Emergency DeclaredSenior Reactor Supervisor present is Acting Emergency Director
19:05 Call to Security to initiate TYPE D Emergency Plan
Normal Operations Fuel Damage Release
Recovery
Initiating Event
Symptoms
Containm
ent Failure
Type D Emergency will be declared in this range
36
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19:10 ECC Established in NRB.Reactor Operations Team has minimal staffing
19:05 – 19:35 Security Dispatcher executing Call in Lists•Internal resource list•Crisis Management Group•External Agencies (CNSC, Hamilton Fire and Police, Medical Officer of Health (Hamilton ECG), Emergency Measures Ontario, Ontario Ministry of Labour, HHS)
19:10 – 20:00 Additional personnel report for duty and are assigned to teams – teams activated
19:20 Perimeter Survey Team completes first cordon – no detected radiation or contamination (no release yet)
19:30 Early Evacuation of Controlled Area Recommended by Protective Actions Manager and Approved by Emergency Director
Controlled Area Survey Teams
Perimeter Survey Teams
Access Control Point – Personnel Monitoring
Access Control Point – Emergency Worker Unit
Plume Assessment Team
Emergency Control Centre
Crisis Management Group
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Communications Cycle As required and at least every thirty minutes, the Emergency
Director will Receive an update from the Reactor Operations Team
• Progress of emergency, planned releases Receive an update from the Protective Action Manager
• Radiological conditions in controlled area and plume, recommended protective actions
Receive an update from the Access Control Point Manager• Status, contamination level on evacuees
Provide an Update to the Crisis Management Group advisor• Progress of emergency, radiological conditions in CA and
plume, Protective Actions implemented in Controlled Area, Protective Actions recommended outside the CA (for implementation or communication to Hamilton ECG and HHS), request for assistance.
Crisis Management Group provides updates to Contact Organizations and Media.
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19:10 – 20:00 Controlled Area Survey Teams conduct evacuation of Controlled Area buildings
19:45 Crisis Management Group Activated19:50 Access Control Point established
20:15 Reactor Operations Team requests pumper truck for additional make-up water – Emergency Director relays to CMG to Hamilton ECG
20:30 Uncovered core appears inevitable – radiation fields increasing in containment as shielding lost over core
20:30 Communication cycle initiated by conditionsSurvey Teams directed to wear respirators and prepare for release – regular dose checks occurring
20:35 Pumper truck arrives at ACP – Directed to wait based on deteriorating conditions
20:45 MNR building evacuated due to High radiation fieldsContainment isolated
Siren Voice Message Examples NUCLEAR EMERGENCY – EVACUATION
Attention. There is an emergency condition at the nuclear reactor. Please evacuate all buildings in the Controlled Area immediately and proceed to a safe location outside the yellow tape. Follow the directions of Security and Health Physics personnel. There is an emergency condition at the nuclear reactor.
NUCLEAR EMERGENCY – SHELTER IN PLACE Attention. There is an emergency condition at the
nuclear reactor. Remain Inside and shelter in place until you receive further directions from Security or Health Physics Personnel. There is an emergency condition at the nuclear reactor. Shelter in place.
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21:00 Reactor Core uncovered – radioactivity leak to containment
21:05 Detectable radioactivity at perimeter
21:15 Controlled area survey teams report very high radiation fields near reactor building and high levels of detectable airborne activity
21:20 Perimeter teams report high levels of airborne contamination at perimeter and detectable plume shinePlume Assessment team reports measurement of detectable activity
21:30 Communication cycle focused on conditions – no protective action recommendations
21:40 Recognition that containment not holding effectively – Reactor Operations Team investigating
21:45 Initial dose projections available – higher than expected – need to address containment problem clear but public protective actions not urgently required Controlled Area teams withdrawn to safe location
22:00 Communication cycle focused on conditions and containment problem
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22:10 to22:30
Survey teams report in findings – continue to be higher than expectedDose projections show doses on campus will exceed lower Protective Action Level for sheltering in 24 hours if containment not repaired
22:30 Communication cycle based on findings – no protective actions recommended outside Controlled Area (but under consideration)
22:35 Ventilation Control Team directed to turn off ventilation for Controlled Area buildings to the extent possible
23:00 Air in leakage to containment identified and corrected
23:00 Communication Cycle focused on correction of containment problem
23:15 to 23:45
Updated surveys from all teams
00:00 Dose projection available on latest data – no need for protective actions outside Controlled Area
00:00 Communication cycle focused on updated dose projections
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Day 2 Reactor Operations Team developing plan to submerge coreReleases continue to be elevated but well less than those requiring protective actions outside the Controlled AreaSurveys and dose projections continueEnvironmental samples collected and analyzedCommunication Cycles continue (possibly at reduced frequency)
Day 3 Plan Executed to flood reactor building lower levels and re-submerge coreBrief, planned “puff” of activity released due to air displacement by waterSurveys and dose projections continueReleases greatly reduced after core submergedRadiation fields outside reactor greatly reduced
Day 3 later
Type D Emergency declared over by Emergency Director – resumption of normal line management structure for ongoing remediationCommunication cycle regarding Termination of Type D Emergency
Day 3 to Day 30
Remediation and Restoration
Day 30 Unspecified actions terminate ongoing releases from reactor
Consequences Release terminated after 30 days
Highest dose impact for a person standing at boundary of Emergency Planning Zone throughout release about 0.5 mSv
normal background doses are about 3 mSv per year
All doses outside of Controlled Area are less than lower Protective Action Levels
Probable doses to members of MNR workforce at or above occupational dose limits, but less than emergency dose limits
Many non-radiological consequences for University 45
Flow Blockage Limiting estimate – three assemblies blocked
while reactor continues to operate 48 plates severely damaged Limiting Source Term:
14% of short lived noble gases 11% of long lived noble gases 7% of radioiodines
Leakage from containment starts 1.2 hours after isolation – due to assumed pressurized air leakage.
Assumes reactor continues to operate Large Servo Error Scram Fails Short Period Scram Fails Fission Product Monitor Scram Fails
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Reference Leakage Containment tested
annually OLC – corresponds to
0.8% of free volume per hour at pressure of 0.5 psi
Safety analysis based on leak rate of 1 % per hour (86.4 m3 per hour) at 0.5 psi
It is assumed that for first 2 hours, containment is pressurized by instrument air – later by unspecified source and gas dewars (1 kg hr-1)
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Scenario 2: Flow Blockage - Initiation18:00 Event – Complete blockage of three high power
assemblies at power18:00 to 19:20
Several trips fail and unusual reactor operation not noted
19:20 Fission product release from blocked fuel
19:20 - 19:25 Multiple High Radiation Alarms in BuildingExhaust Duct Alarm – Building SealedReactor Scrammed by OperatorType C Emergency Declared – Call-ins commence
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19:50 Operators evacuate building due to high radiation
20:00 Supervisory Response – Type D Emergency Declared
20:05 – 20:35 Security Dispatcher executing Call in Lists•Internal resource list•Crisis Management Group•External Agencies (CNSC, Hamilton Fire and Police, Medical Officer of Health (Hamilton ECG), Emergency Measures Ontario, Ontario Ministry of Labour, HHS)
20:15 ECC Established in NRB.Reactor Operations Team has minimal staffing
20:45 Fission Product Leak from Containment Begins
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20:00 – 21:00 Additional personnel report for duty and are assigned to teams – teams activated
21:00 Perimeter Survey Team completes first cordon – low level radioactivity detected and reported
21:00 CMG Activates
21:15 Sheltering in Controlled Area Recommended by Protective Actions Manager and Approved by Emergency Director – voice messages over PA, signs at building exits – ventilation shutdowns
21:15 Communication Cycle
22:00 Source of building pressurization identified and isolated – significant release terminated
22:00 Communication Cycle
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22:00 – 22:30 Surveys and assessments by field teams22:30 Decision to evacuate people via Access Control Point
22:30 Communication Cycle
22:30 – 02:30 Building by building evacuation conducted through access control point – monitoring – possible decontamination.Need for reception centre for evacuees
Day 2 Continuing assessments – building reoccupation plan
~Day 3 Type D Emergency Declared over – resumption of line management organization for remediation phase.
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Flow Blockage Dose Consequences (Limiting Case)
Individual Short Term Prolonged Long TermTotal
Effective Dose (mSv)
A 8.6E-5 3.6E-5 NA 0.00012
B 7.0E-5 1.9E-5 1.4E-6 0.000091
Collective Effective Dose to public = 0.2 person mSv to 60 km
Walkthrough of Emergency Worker Assistance Reactor Management Team Lead identifies need for additional makeup
water – requests assistance from MNR Emergency Director MNR Emergency Director conveys request to McMaster CMG – alerts
Emergency Control Centre (Protective Action Manager and Access Control Point Manager – fan out)
CMG requests assistance from City of Hamilton ECG (Communications) Pumper truck arrives at site – directed by Security/Perimeter team to
Access Control Point ACP Manager consults with Protective Actions Manager – Entry Planned
HFD Personnel registered and issued with dosimetry – PPE/KI as required – dose estimates
Controlled Area Survey Team member assigned to escort HFD Pumper proceeds to reactor building exterior connections and
provides water Returns to ACP for contamination monitoring (as required) and
dosimetry Communications re clearance from Controlled Area Similar process for injured person with ambulance/paramedics No special controls required for response to campus outside of
Controlled Area
Procedures Feedback Please provide comments/corrections and
updates to us Contact information:
Krysia SteinbergNuclear Operations and FacilitiesMcMaster University, NRB G101Hamilton, ON L8S 4K1Phone #: 905-525-9140, ext. 28615Fax#: 905-524-3994e-mail : [email protected]
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