Module 1 Why Join the Arms Trade Treaty? · 2015-09-04 · ATT Implementation Toolkit | Module 1 | Why join the ATT? 2 I. Introduction The landmark Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) – adopted

ATTImplementationToolkit|Module1|WhyjointheATT?

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Arms Trade Treaty Implementation Toolkit

Module 1 Why Join the Arms Trade Treaty?

Available on: www.un.org/disarmament/ATT


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I.Introduction

ThelandmarkArmsTradeTreaty(ATT)–adoptedin2013byanoverwhelmingmajorityintheGeneralAssembly–deliversonthecalltoestablishinternationalnormsfortheconventionalarmstrade.Unregulatedandirresponsiblearmstransfersintensifyandprolongconflict,leadtoregionalinstability,facilitatehumanrightsabusesonamassivescale,andhindersocialandeconomicdevelopment.TheATTisdesignedtostopsuchtransfersandtopromoteresponsibility,transparencyandaccountabilityintheglobalarmstrade.Itwillthereforecontributetoreducingthesufferingofmillionsofcivilianswhoareaffectedbyarmedconflictandviolence.Moreover,theATTwillcreateasaferenvironmentfortheUnitedNationsandotherorganizationstocarryouthumanitarianassistance,peacekeeping,post‐conflictpeacebuilding,andtoattaingloballyagreeddevelopmentgoals.Thisistothebenefitofallcountriesandallpeople,providingpressingreasonsforallStatestojointhisTreaty.TheATTislargelyanormativeTreatythatseekstopromoteappropriategovernmentalregulationofthecross‐bordertradeofconventionalarms.StatesPartiestotheATTwillneedtoensurethattheyhavethenecessaryadministrative,financialandtechnicalresourcesfortheimplementationoftheTreaty.ATTimplementationactionsmayincludeadoptingadequatelegislation,settinguparmsexportcontrolsystems,establishingoversightprocesses,andimprovingthemanagementofstockpiles.Tothiseffect,itisenvisagedthattherewillbeconsiderableassistanceavailable,includingthroughtheUN,tohelpStatesPartiesbuildsuchcapacity.Nationalconditionsvaryfromcountrytocountry.ThespecificsofhowtheATTwillbeimplementedinacountrywilldependonthecountry’snationalinstitutionandlegalframework.TheATTdoesnotestablishasystemofinternationalenforcement,monitoringorverification.SoStatesPartiesarethemselvesinchargeoftheirnationalimplementationefforts.ThistoolkitcanassistStatesPartiesaswellasotherStatesthatwanttoabidebytheATT.ThetoolkitisasetofmodulesbasedongoodpracticesandUNstandardsandguidelines,fromwhichauthoritiescanchoosewhatappliesbesttotheircontext.ThisfirstmoduleexplainsthevalueofjoiningtheATT.


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II.TencompellingreasonsforanycountrytojointheATT

1. Strengtheninginternationallaw

AneffectiveinternationallawregimeisdependentonasmanyStatesaspossiblejoiningkeylegallybindingcommitments.

StateshavefoundedtheUN“tosavesucceedinggenerationsfromthescourgeofwar”,“toreaffirmfaithinfundamentalhumanrights”,“toestablishconditionsunderwhichjusticeandrespectfortheobligationsarisingfromtreatiesandothersourcesofinternationallawcanbemaintained”,and“topromotesocialprogressandbetterstandardsoflifeinlargerfreedom”.

TheATTwasadoptedbytheUNGeneralAssembly,inwhichalltheUNMemberStateshaveanequalvoice–illustratingthateachoneofthemalsohasanequalresponsibilitytocontributetothestrengtheningofinternationallaw.

2. Understandingthatinallregionsweaponscrossbordersandinstabilitycanspread

SomegovernmentofficialsmaintainthattheirStatesdonotexportweapons,and/orthatcrisisandconflictarenotontheirdoorstep–thustheATTis“notreallymeant”fortheircountry.Althoughpoint1.(above)shouldalreadybeseenasenoughofarebuttaltothatargument,thereismoretobesaidtothis:theglobalarmstradedoesaffectallpeopleoftheworld.

Manycountriesexport,atsomepoint,someweaponry–forinstanceto‐be‐replacedpolicerifles,orsurplusammunition.Theseoccasionalexportscanhaveaseriousnegativeimpactwhennotbasedonanexportapprovaldecisioninconformitywithinternationallyagreedstandards.

Sustained,decade‐on‐decadepeaceandstabilityarerarecommoditiesintheworld.In2015,only41countriesreceivedeitherthelabel‘stable’,‘morestable’,‘sustainable’,or‘verysustainable’.1Anareawhichatpresentseemscalmandsafe,mayseeasuddenoutpouringofinstabilityinthefuture,underliningthenecessityofadequateregulationofarmsflowsclosertohomeforallitsneighbours.

Inshort:joiningthelandmarkATT–whichenablesacomprehensiveregulationofthearmstradebenefittingregionalstability–shouldbeintheinterestofeachStateoneverycontinent.

1 Fragile States Index 2015, see: fsi.fundforpeace.org.


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3. ContributingtointernationalsecurityAbidingbytheATTcontributestointernationalandregionalpeace,securityandstability. TheATTacknowledgesthatweaponstransferscandestabiliseacountryorregion.StatesParties

areprohibitedfromexportingconventionalarms,ammunitionorkeypartsandcomponentswhenthereissucharisk.2Forinstance,governmentsshallnotauthorizeatransferofitemsifthiswould:

ViolateaUNSecurityCouncilarmsembargo;

Violaterelevantinternationalobligationsunderinternationalagreementstowhichtheyareaparty;

Beusedingenocide,gravebreachesofthelawofwar(theGenevaConventionsof1949),attacksagainstcivilians,orwarcrimes.

ArigorousapplicationoftheATTprovisions(includingexportprohibitions,3exportassessment,4regulationofimports,5brokering6andtransit/trans‐shipment7aswellaspreventionofdiversionofweapons8)wouldcontributetoreducingflowsofitemsto:

AreasunderSecurityCouncilarmsembargoes;

Conflictzonesandareasofhightensionorvolatility;

Governmentsengaginginsystematichumanrightsabuses;

Terroristsandtransnationalcrimeorganizations.

Reducedconflictandenhancedstabilityimplyfewerhumanitariancrises.Suchcrisesoftentranslateinmassivedisplacementofpeopleandrefugeeflows,withseriousconsequencesformanycountriesinaregion.

Politicalstabilityprovidesabetterenvironmentforsocialandeconomicdevelopment.Italsoimpliesadiminishedneedforgovernmentstodivertscarceresourcestowardsmilitaryspending.

Allcountriesinaregion–andbeyond–willbenefitfromincreasedstability.

2 Article 4 requires States Parties to regulate the exports of parts and components where the exports are in a form that provide the capability to assemble the arms covered by the Treaty. For purposes of these guidelines, conventional arms, ammunition and parts and components (as defined in the Article 4) will be henceforth referred to as “items” or “covered items”. 3 Article 6. 4 Article 7. 5 Article 8. 6 Article 10. 7 Article 9. 8 Article 11.


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4. EnhanceddomesticsecurityImprovedarmsregulationreducestheriskthatweaponsandammunitionwillreachthehandsofcriminalgangsandarmedgroups.Thistranslatesintoanimproveddomesticsecuritysituation,lessopportunityforarmedviolence,andmoresafetyforcivilians. Article8(2)stipulatesthatmeasurestoregulateimportsofitemsshouldbetaken“where

necessary”.Dependingonthespecificcircumstancesoftheimportingcountry,regulationofimportsmaybeneededtoensurebettercontrolandaccountingofweaponscomingintoanyterritoryundertheimportingcountry’sjurisdiction.

Inaddition,theimportingStatePartywillhavetoensurethatithasinplacemechanismstopreventimporteditemsfrombeingdivertedtousesthatwouldcontravenethestipulationsoftheTreaty’sArticle6(prohibitions)and/orArticle7(exportandexportassessment).AStatePartymustensurethatimporteditemsdonotendupinthehandsofindividualsorentitiesengaginginorganizedcrime,terrorism,seriousviolationsofinternationalhumanitarianorhumanrightslaw,andgender‐basedviolence.

AlthoughArticle11on“diversion”makesexplicitreferenceonlytotheconventionalarmscoveredunderArticle2(scope),thisdoesnotpreventStatesPartiesfromadoptingmeasuresaimedatpreventingdiversionofammunitionandkeypartsandcomponents.

5. StrongerinstitutionsInvestmentincapacity‐buildingfortheeffectiveregulationandcontrolofconventionalarmsshouldbeapriorityfornationallegislativebodies–evenincountriesfacingseverehumanandfinancialconstraintsandseizedwithpressingsocialandeconomicdevelopmentchallenges. AState’sparticipationintheATTwouldgivegovernmentofficialsacompellingargumentinefforts

tomobilisenationalsupportforinvestinginarmsregulationandcontrol,asrequiredforcompliancewiththelegalobligationsimposedbytheATT.

Suchcapacity‐buildingmayentail:

Establishingeffectivenationalcontrolsfortheimportandexportofitems,includingkeepingup‐to‐daterecordsandnationalcontrollists,anddevelopingorimprovingrelevantlaws,policiesandprocedures;

Establishingasystemforcontrollingtransitandtrans‐shipment.Thiscouldbepartofthenationalcontrolsystemmentionedabove;

Regulatingarmsbrokering;

Adoptingmeasurestoensuretheauthenticityofdocuments(e.g.,end‐use/usercertificates,licencesandotherdocumentation)andtopreventtheirforgery;

SettinguporimprovingsystemsfordatacollectionandinformationgatheringsoastoenabletheStatePartytorespondtoqueriesfromotherStatesPartiesinatimelymanner;

Developingweaponsmarkingandrecord‐keepingcapacity;

Improvingthemanagementofstockpilesofconventionalarmsandammunition;

Developingadequatemonitoringandenforcementcapacity.


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6. AccesstointernationalassistanceTheATTenvisagesdifferentformsofassistancetohelpStatesPartiesthatlacksufficientresourcesandcapacitytoeffectivelyimplementtheprovisionsoftheTreaty.

TheTreatystipulatesthatStatesPartiesmayseekthefollowing:9

Legalorlegislativeassistance;

Institutionalcapacity‐building;

Technical,materialorfinancialassistance.

Assistancecanbesoughtorrequestedvia:

ThevoluntarytrustfundtobesetuppursuanttoArticle16(3)oftheTreaty;

TheUnitedNationsTrustFacilitySupportingCooperationonArmsRegulation(UNSCAR);10

OthermechanismswithintheUN;

International,regional,subregionalornationalorganizations;

Non‐governmentalorganizations;

Bilateralcooperation.

Article16stipulatesthatStatesPartiesinapositiontodososhallprovideassistance,uponrequest.JoiningtheATTopensthusanopportunityforStatesPartiestosetupaneffectivesystemforconventionalarmsregulationandcontrol.

Tothisend,aStatePartyrequiringassistanceshouldundertakeanin‐depthanalysisofitsneedsanddevelopawell‐craftedplanthatmakeefficientuseofthevariousassistancemechanismstosupporttheimplementationoftheATT.11

7. OpportunitiesforinternationalcooperationInternationalcooperation,includingsharingandexchangeofinformation,isessentialtopreventillicitorirresponsibletransfersofcovereditems.

TheATTencouragesStatesPartiestocooperatewithoneanotherincludingthrough:

Exchangeofinformationandconsultationonmattersofmutualinterest;

9 Article 16. 10 UNSCAR was established in June 2013 as a multi-donor mechanism to fund projects aimed at supporting the implementation of the ATT and the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA). See: www.un.org/disarmament/UNSCAR 11 In this regard, use can be made of available tools such as the ATT baseline assessment project (ATT-BAP), or the ATT model law. See: www.armstrade.info/; /www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/E-Co-Publications/SAS-NZ-Gov-Arms-Trade-Treaty-Model-Law.pdf


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Sharingofinformationregardingillicitactivitiesandactorstopreventanderadicatediversionofarms;

Provisionofthewidestmeasureofassistanceininvestigations,prosecutionsandjudicialproceedingsinrelationtoviolationsofnationalmeasuresestablishedpursuanttotheATT;

Cooperationtopreventarmstransfersfrombecomingsubjecttocorruptpractices;

Exchangeofexperienceandinformationonlessonslearnt.

StatesPartiestotheATTcan,therefore,makeuseoftheinternationalcooperationprovisionssetforthintheTreatyto:

Strengthennationallawsandsystemsfortheregulationandcontrolofconventionalarmsandammunition;

Strengthennationalcapacitytopreventdiversionofarms;

Carryoutinvestigations,prosecutionsandjudicialproceeding;

Preventandcombatcorruption;

GatherintelligenceandaccessinformationandlessonslearnedobtainedbyotherStates.

8. EnhancedtransparencyandconfidenceamongStatesTheATTrequiresitsStatesPartiestosubmittotheATTSecretariatinformationaimedatenhancingtransparencyaswellasensuringthatStatesPartiesaretakingthemeasuresnecessaryfortheimplementationoftheTreaty.

Enhancingtransparencyintheglobalarmstradeisasignificantcontributiontointernationalandregionalpeaceandsecurity,asitwould:

Reducemisunderstanding,miscalculationandscepticismregardingothercountries’intentandcapability;

HelpbuildtrustandconfidenceamongStates;

AllowStatestogetaccurate,up‐to‐dateinformationonweaponscominginandoutoftheirjurisdictions;

Enhanceaccountabilityregardinginternationalarmstransfers.

Requiredtransparencymeasures:

InitialreportonmeasuresundertakentoimplementtheATT,includingnationallaws,nationalcontrollistsandotherregulationsandadministrativemeasures;12

12 Article 13 (1) and Article 5 (4).


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AnnualreportsubmittedbyStatesPartiesonauthorizedoractualexportsandimportsofconventionalarms;13

Informationonmeasurestakentoaddressthediversionofarms.14

9. BetterenvironmentforsocialandeconomicdevelopmentCountriesfacingarmedconflictorhighlevelsofarmedviolenceoftenhavetoinvestsignificantresourcesindefenceandsecurity,indetrimenttosocialandeconomicdevelopmentendeavours.

Preventsomeoftheconsequencesengenderedbyconflictandwidespreadarmedviolence,suchas:

Reducedlevelsofforeigninvestment;

Poorimplementationofprojects;

Destructionofinfrastructure,marketdisruption,capitalflightandbraindrain;

Over‐burdenedhealthservices;

Dysfunctionaleducationsystems;

Illegalexploitationofnaturalresources;

Impunityanddisregardfortheruleoflaw.

Evenintheabsenceofviolence,unregulatedarmstransferscannegativelyimpactnormaleconomicandsocialdevelopmentsby:

Sowingseedsofcorruptionduetothelureoflucrativearmsdeal;

Over‐spendinginthedefenceandsecuritysector.

ThehighcommonstandardsprovidedintheATTareexpectedtocontributesignificantlytothepreventionofconflictsandarmedviolence,leadingthustomoreconduciveenvironmentsforthepursuitofsustainabledevelopmentgoals.

13 Article 13 (3). 14 Article 13 (2).


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10. EnhancedcredibilityintheinternationalcommunityParticipationintheATTcouldinitselfbecomeastandardagainstwhichthecredibilityandresponsibilityofbothimportingandexportingcountrieswouldbemeasured.

AlthoughtheATTaimsneithertofacilitatenortoimpedeinternationaltransfersofarms,thefactthataStateisapartytotheTreatymaybeseenasanindicatorofthedegreeofthatcountry’scommitmenttoconductitsaffairsinatransparent,responsibleandaccountablemanner.

ParticipationintheATTofaStatethatisnotaregulararmsexporterwouldlikelybeseenasanindicationthatthecountryhastakenadequatemeasurestoensurecontroloverweaponswithintheterritoriesunderitsjurisdiction–ortopreventtheirdiversion.

TheexportassessmentcriteriaoftheATTaretobeappliedbytheexportingStatePartyregardlessofwhethertheexportisdestinedforanotherStatePartyoranyotherState.Inpractice,animportingStatebeingapartytotheATTmayinitselfbecomeapositivefactorintheviewofexportingStates’authoritiesconductingexportassessments.

ATTImplementationToolkit|Module2|OverviewofObligations

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Module 2 Overview of Obligations



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I.Introduction

AnycountryjoiningtheArmsTradeTreaty(ATT),commitstoputtinginplaceeffectivemeasurestoimplementtheTreaty.

StateswilldecidewhichmeasurestheyneedtocarryouttheirobligationsundertheATT.Thesemeasuresmayvaryfromcountrytocountry.

Thissecondmodule,OverviewofObligations,willassistgovernmentsbyprovidinganoverviewoftheobligationsundertheATT.

Inparticular,Module2willdiscusswhatitemsarecoveredbytheTreaty.Anditwillclarifythenecessarynationalimplementationactions.Also,thismodulewilladdressopportunitiesforcooperationandhowtofostertransparencyandaccountabilityintheregulationoftheinternationaltradeofconventionalarms.

II.UnderstandingtheTreaty’sscope

ItemscoveredbytheATTareidentifiedinitsArticles2,3and4.

ThescopeoftheATTisdefinedbyArticle2.ItlistseightcategoriesofweaponsthatarecoveredbytheATT1aswellastheactivitiesoftheinternationaltradethatareconsideredtoconstitute“transfers”undertheTreaty.2

ConsequentlyaStatePartytotheATTwillhavetoapply,ataminimum,therelevantprovisionsoftheTreatytotheexport,import,transit,trans‐shipmentandbrokeringtransactionsoractivitiesinvolvingtheconventionalarmslistedinArticle2(1).

Articles3and4oftheATTcoverammunitionandpartsandcomponentsforconventionalarms.

Internationalorcross‐bordermovementsofconventionalarmsbyoronbehalfofaStatePartyforitsownuse(e.g.forexercisesoutsideofitsbordersorpeacekeepingmissions)arenotconsideredtoconstitutetransfersundertheTreatyand,therefore,arenotsubjecttotheprovisionsoftheATT.3

1 Article 2 (1). 2 Article 2 (2). 3 Article 2 (3).


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1.Nationaldefinitions

TheATTrequiresStatesPartiestodevelopanationalcontrollistcontainingnationaldefinitionsoftheeightcategoriesofweaponslistedinitsArticle2.

ForallthecategorieslistedinArticle2(1),exceptforsmallarmsandlightweapons(SALW),nationaldefinitionsshallnotcoverlessthanthedescriptionusedintheUNRegisterofConventionalArms(UNRegister)4atthetimeofentryintoforceoftheATT,524December2014.

ForSALW(Article2(1)(h)),nationaldefinitionsshallnotcoverlessthanthedescriptionsusedinrelevantUNinstruments,namelytheInternationalTracingInstrument(ITI)6andtheFirearmsProtocol.7

1.1 SevencategoriescontainedinUNRegisterofConventionalArms

TheUNRegister’sdefinitionsforitssevencategoriesofweaponsconstituteminimumdefinitionsfortheATT’sfirstsevencategoriesofweapons‐categoriesa)throughg)‐inArticle2(1)[refertotheAnnextothismodulefordefinitions]:

a. Battletanks;

b. Armouredcombatvehicles;

c. Large‐calibreartillerysystems;

d. Combataircraft;

e. Attackhelicopters;

f. Warships;

g. Missilesandmissilelaunchers.

AllStatesPartiesshallapplytheprovisionsoftheATTtothosecategoriesofweapons.

Importantly,theATTencouragesStatesPartiestogobeyondthisrequirementandincludethebroadestrangeofconventionalarmsintheirnationallists.

1.2 SALW

TheFirearmsProtocolandtheITIarethetwoUNinstrumentsthatcontaindefinitionsofsmallarmsand/orlightweapons.8

4 Available at www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/. 5 See Article 5 (3). 6 International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons. The definition contained in the ITI is largely based on the definition of firearms contained in the Firearms Protocol. 7 Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The Protocol defines firearms, a term that is often used interchangeably with small arms. Available at www.unodc.org/unodc/en/firearms-protocol/firearmsprotocol.html.


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ThementionedProtocoldefines“firearm”asfollows:

“’Firearm’shallmeananyportablebarrelledweaponthatexpels,isdesignedtoexpelormaybereadilyconvertedtoexpelashot,bulletorprojectilebytheactionofanexplosive,excludingantiquefirearmsortheirreplicas.Antiquefirearmsandtheirreplicasshallbedefinedinaccordancewithdomesticlaw.Innocase,however,shallantiquefirearmsincludefirearmsmanufacturedafter1899.”

TheITIprovidesadefinitionofSALWthatiscomposedoftwoparts:thefirstpartcontainingageneraldefinition,whichislargelyderivedfromtheabove‐mentionedFirearmsProtocol’sdefinitionoffirearms;thesecondpartspecifyingwhata“smallarm”isandwhata“lightweapon”is,giventhegeneraldefinition.Bothpartsshouldbereadtogether.Thus,forthepurposesoftheITI,SALWare:

“…anyman‐portablelethalweaponthatexpelsorlaunches,isdesignedtoexpelorlaunch,ormaybereadilyconvertedtoexpelorlaunchashot,bulletorprojectilebytheactionofanexplosive,excludingantiquesmallarmsandlightweaponsortheirreplicas.Antiquesmallarmsandlightweaponsandtheirreplicaswillbedefinedinaccordancewithdomesticlaw.Innocasewillantiquesmallarmsandlightweaponsincludethosemanufacturedafter1899:

(a)‘Smallarms’are,broadlyspeaking,weaponsdesignedforindividualuse.Theyinclude,interalia,revolversandself‐loadingpistols,riflesandcarbines,sub‐machineguns,assaultriflesandlightmachineguns;

(b)‘Lightweapons’are,broadlyspeaking,weaponsdesignedforusebytwoorthreepersonsservingasacrew,althoughsomemaybecarriedandusedbyasingleperson.Theyinclude,interalia,heavymachineguns,hand‐heldunder‐barrelandmountedgrenadelaunchers,portableanti‐aircraftguns,portableanti‐tankguns,recoillessrifles,portablelaunchersofanti‐tankmissileandrocketsystems,portablelaunchersofanti‐aircraftmissilesystems,andmortarsofacalibreoflessthan100millimetres.”

1.3 Ammunition/Munitions

InadditiontotheeightcategoriesofconventionalarmscoveredinArticle2,ammunition/munitionsaresubjecttotheprohibitionsandexportassessmentprovisionsthatapplytotheweaponsdescribedinArticle2.Consequently,StatesPartiesarerequiredtoregulatetheexportofammunition/munitionsthatcanbefired,launchedordeliveredbyanyoftheconventionalarmsasdefinedaboveundersection1.1and1.2.

TheATTdoesnotprovideadefinitionofammunition.Also,thereisnointernationallyagreeddefinitionofammunition/munitionsfortheconventionalarmscoveredundertheATT,exceptforfirearmammunition.TheFirearmsProtocolinitsArticle3definesthe[firearm]ammunitionasfollows:

“Ammunition”shallmeanthecompleteroundoritscomponents,includingcartridgecases,primers,propellantpowder,bulletsorprojectiles,thatareusedinafirearm,

8 There are also several regional and subregional instruments dealing with SALW regulations and control. such as the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other Related Materials, the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States, the Andean Plan to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, the SADC Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials.


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providedthatthosecomponentsarethemselvessubjecttoauthorizationintherespectiveStateParty;”

Furthermore,itindicatesthattheabovedefinitionisforthepurposesofthatinstrumentonly.AStatemayadoptthisdefinitionordrawfromit,whenadoptingrelevantnationallawsandpoliciestoimplementtheATT.

AmoregeneraldefinitionofammunitionandmunitionisprovidedbytheInternationalAmmunitionTechnicalGuidelines(IATG):9

“[Ammunition]isacompletedevice,(e.g.missile,shell,mine,demolitionstoreetc.)chargedwithexplosives,propellants,pyrotechnicsorinitiatingcompositionforuseinconnectionwithoffence,ordefence,ortraining,ornon‐operationalpurposes,includingthosepartsofweaponssystemscontainingexplosives.(c.f.munition).

“[Munition]isacompletedevicechargedwithexplosives,propellants,pyrotechnics,initiatingcomposition,ornuclear,biologicalorchemicalmaterialforuseinmilitaryoperations,includingdemolitions.”

ThedefinitioncontainedintheIATGreachesbeyondtheammunition/munitionscontemplatedintheATT,as(i)itmayalsoapplytoweaponsofmassdestruction(e.g.,nuclear,biologicalandchemical)and(ii)itincludesweapons,suchasmines,whicharenotcoveredinthescopeoftheATT.

1.4 Partsandcomponents

UnderArticle4oftheATT,StatesPartiesmustregulatetheexportofpartsandcomponentsthatcanprovidethecapabilitytoassembletheconventionalarmsincludedinthescopeoftheATT.

TheATTdoesnotprovideadefinitionofpartsandcomponents.However,Article3oftheFirearmsProtocoldoes:

“’Partsandcomponents’shallmeananyelementorreplacementelementspecificallydesignedforafirearmandessentialtoitsoperation,includingabarrel,frameorreceiver,slideorcylinder,boltorbreechblock,andanydevicedesignedoradaptedtodiminishthesoundcausedbyfiringafirearm.”

2.ATTcomparedtootherrelevantglobalinstruments10

Thefollowingglobalinstruments–adoptedundertheauspicesoftheUN–addressthetradeinconventionalarms:

9 For the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG), see www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ammunition. 10 There are also regional, sub-regional and other inter-governmental instruments (e.g. the Nairobi Protocol, the ECOWAS Convention, the Wassenaar Arrangement) that deal with arms export regulations.


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a. UNProgrammeofActiontoPrevent,CombatandEradicatetheIllicitTradeinSmallArmsandLightWeaponsinAllItsAspects11(PoA);

b. ITI;

c. FirearmsProtocol;

d. UNRegister.12

SomeATTStatesPartieshaveadoptedregional,sub‐regionalandothergovernmentalinstrumentsthatregulatearmsexports.TheseStatesareencouragedtoconsulttheseinstrumentsandtoidentifyareaswheretheirATTcommitmentswouldoverlapwiththeircommitmentsunderotherrelevantnon‐UNinstrumentsinordertofindsynergiesforaneffectiveimplementationoftheATT.

Figure1and2provideanoverviewofpossibleoverlapsbetweentheATTandtheseotherinternationalinstruments.

Figure1–Exportofconventionalarmsandrelateditems

11 The PoA was adopted by Member States of the UN by consensus in 2001 and all States are politically committed to implementing the measures recommended in it. Available at www.poa-iss.org/poa/poahtml.aspx. 12 www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/.


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Figure2–Import,transitandtranshipment,andbrokeringofconventionalarmsandrelateditems

III.NationalimplementationofATTrequirements

1.Requirementsrelatedtoarmsexports

1.1 Establishandmaintainanationalexportcontrolsystem

TheATTrequiresStatesPartiestoestablishandmaintainanationalexportcontrolsystemthatensureseffectivecompliancewiththeexportprovisionsoftheATT,includingapplicationoftheexportassessmentprovisionsoftheATTandenforcementofrelevantexportprohibitionsandnationallawsandpolicies.13

StatesPartiesmusthaveinplacelaws,regulationsandadministrativeprocedurestocontrolandregulatetheexportofconventionalarmsunderthescopeoftheATT,aswellasrelatedammunition,14partsandcomponents.15

Theselaws,regulationsandproceduresshallenabletheStatePartytoexerciseeffectivecontroloverconventionalarms,ammunitionandpartsandcomponentsleavingaState’sjurisdiction.

Thenationallegislationshouldclearlystate:

13 Article 5 (2). 14 Article 3. 15 Article 4.


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a) Whichweaponsanditemsaresubjecttoexportcontrol(nationalcontrollist);

b) Whichgovernmentministries,departmentsandagenciesareresponsibleforcontrollingconventionalarmsexports(nationalauthorities);

c) Thecriteriaforgrantingorrefusingexportauthorizations(regulatoryprocedures);

d) Thelegaland/oradministrativeactionsthatmustbeappliedincaseofexportoffences(enforcementmeasuresandmechanisms,prosecutionandpunishment).

1.1.1.Nationalcontrollist

Article5(2)oftheATTrequiresStatesPartiestoestablishandmaintainanationalcontrollist.

Thislistshallcontaindefinitionsoftheconventionalarms,ammunitionandmunitions,andpartsandcomponentsthetransferofwhicharetoberegulated.

Thenationalcontrollistmaybeasinglelistcoveringallitemssubjecttoexportcontrol,oracollectionoflistseachcoveringdifferentcategories/typesofitemssubjecttoexportcontrol.

StatesParties,pursuanttotheirnationallaws,mustprovidetheirnationalcontrolliststotheATTSecretariat,whichshallmakethemavailabletootherStatesParties.

StatesPartiesarealsoencouragedtomaketheircontrollistspubliclyavailable.

1.1.2.Nationalauthorities

StatesPartieshavetodesignatecompetentnationalauthoritiestoensuretheeffectiveandtransparentnationalcontrolandregulationovertheexportofitemscoveredundertheATT.16

Thedesignatedauthoritycouldbeanewentityestablishedforthispurposeoranalreadyestablishedentity.

Thedesignatedauthorityshalladministertheregulatoryregimeandimplementcontrolsthroughanarmsexportauthorizationprocess.17

Box1–Designatingnationalauthorities

Althoughspecificapproacheddifferfromcountrytocountry,mostgovernmentsdesignateonestateagencyasthemainentityresponsibleforexaminingexportauthorizationapplicationandgranting(orrefusing)therelatedauthorizations.18Itiscommonforsuchanagencytoconsultwithother

16 Article 5 (5). 17 C.f. Article 5 (5). 18 For the purposes of these guidelines, an export authorization will be often referred to as an “export licence”. However, some countries use other terminology, e.g. “export permit”.


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governmentministriesordepartmentsbeforeadecisionistakenon anauthorizationapplication.Insomecases,theauthorizationauthorityissubjecttoanoversightmechanism(e.g.bythelegislativebodyorparliament).

Taskstobeundertakenbytheauthorizationagencymayinclude:

a. Receiveandreviewexportapplications;

b. Issueexportauthorizations;

c. Ensurethatalldocumentationandapprovalsfortheexportofitemsaredetailedandissuedpriortotheexport;19

d. Keeprecordsofexportauthorizationsforaminimumoftenyears;20

e. MakeavailableappropriateinformationaboutanauthorizationtotheimportingStateandtransitortranshipmentState,ifapplicableandsubjecttoitsnationallaws,policiesandpractices;21

f. Coordinatewithotherministriesanddepartmentinvolvedintheexportauthorizationprocess;

g. Reporttotheoversightbody,whereapplicableandinaccordancewithnationallaws.

Inmanycountriesnationallawsrequirethattheexportofcertainweaponsofstrategicimportancebeapprovedatalevelhigherthannationalauthority,suchashigh‐levelofficials,thecabinetorCouncilofMinistersor,insomecases,thelegislativebody.

1.1.3.Regulatoryproceduresonconventionalarmsexports

Theexportofconventionalarms,relatedammunition/munition,partsandcomponents(or“covereditems”)shallbesubject,onacase‐by‐casebasis,topriorwrittenauthorization(‘exportauthorization’)bythecompetentauthoritiesoftheexportingState.

a.Transferprohibition22

ExportauthorizationsofitemsshallnotbegrantediftheexportwouldcontraveneanyofthecriteriaoutlinedinArticle6oftheATT.

19 Article 7 (5). 20 Article 12 (1). 21 Article 7 (6). 22 Article 6.


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Box2–Prohibitionsoftransfers(Article6)

Atransferofitemsshouldbedeniedif:

a) ItwouldviolatetheStateParty’sobligationsundermeasuresadoptedbytheUNSecurityCouncilactingunderChapterVIIoftheCharter,inparticulararmsembargoes;

b) ItwouldviolateaStateParty’srelevantinternationalobligationsunderinternationalagreements;

c) AStatePartyhasknowledgeatthetimeofauthorizationthatthearmsoritemswouldbeusedinthecommissionof:‐Genocide;‐Crimeagainsthumanity;‐GravebreachesoftheGenevaConventionsof1949;‐Attacksdirectedagainstcivilianobjectsorciviliansprotectedassuch;‐OtherwarcrimesasdefinedbyinternationalagreementstowhichitisaParty.

b.Exportassessment23

StatesPartiesarerequiredtoconductanassessmentofrisksassociatedwiththeexportofitemscoveredundertheATT.

TheassessmentbytheexportingStatePartyshouldbedoneinacoherent,objectiveandnon‐discriminatorymanner,takingintoaccountrelevantfactors,includinginformationprovidedbytheimportingState.ThecriteriafortheexportassessmentareoutlinedinArticle7oftheATT.

IfanexportisnotprohibitedunderArticle6oftheATT,thenationalauthoritiesoftheexportingStatePartyshallassessthepotentialthatanexportofcovereditems:

Wouldcontributetoorunderminepeaceandsecurity;24

Inmakingthisassessment,thenationalauthoritiesmayidentifypositiveandnegativefactorsaffectingdecisionsregardingexportofcovereditems.Ifthoseauthoritiesdeterminethatanexportislikelytocontributetopeaceandsecurity(apositiveoutcome),thentheyshouldaddthisfindingtothelistoffactorsfavouringtheauthorisationoftheexports.Ontheotherhand,ifthenationalauthoritiesfindthatanexportislikelytounderminepeaceandsecurity(anegativeoutcome),thentheyshouldassessthisriskandaddittothelistoffactorsjustifyingtheadoption/negotiationofmitigatingmeasuresoradenialofsuchexport.

Couldbeusedtocommitorfacilitateaseriousviolationofinternationalhumanitarianorinternationalhumanrightslaw;

CouldbeusedtocommitoffensesunderinternationalconventionsorprotocolsrelatingtoterrorismorinternationalorganizedcrimetowhichtheexportingStateisaparty.25

TheexportingStatehastotakeintoaccounttheriskoftheitemsbeingusedtocommitorfacilitateseriousactsofgender‐basedviolenceorseriousactsofviolenceagainstwomenandchildren.26

23 Article 7. 24 Article 7. 25 Article 7 (1). 26 Article 7.4.


11

Box3–Criteriaforexportassessment

Article7(1):IftheexportisnotprohibitedunderArticle6,eachexportingStateParty,priortoauthorisationoftheexportofconventionalarmscoveredunderArticle2(1)orofitemscoveredunderArticle3orArticle4,underitsjurisdictionandpursuanttoitsnationalcontrolsystem,shall,inanobjectiveandnon‐discriminatorymanner,takingintoaccountrelevantfactors,includinginformationprovidedbytheimportingStateinaccordancewithArticle8(1),assessthepotentialthattheconventionalarmsoritems:

a) wouldcontributetoorunderminepeaceandsecurity;

b) couldbeusedto:

(i) commitorfacilitateaseriousviolationofinternationalhumanitarianlaw;

(ii) commitorfacilitateaseriousviolationofinternationalhumanrightslaw;

(iii)commitorfacilitateanactconstitutinganoffenceunderinternationalconventionsorprotocolsrelatingtoterrorismtowhichtheexportingStateisaParty;

(iv)commitorfacilitateanactconstitutinganoffenceunderinternationalconventionsorprotocolsrelatingtotransnationalorganizedcrimetowhichtheexportingStateisaParty.

Article7(4):TheexportingStateParty,inmakingthisassessment,shalltakeintoaccounttheriskofthecovereditemsbeingusedtocommitorfacilitateseriousactsofgender‐basedviolenceorseriousactsofviolenceagainstwomenandchildren.

c.Mitigationmeasures27

Ifthereisariskoftheweaponsanditemsbeingusedtounderminepeaceandsecurityortocommitorfacilitateaseriousviolationofinternationalhumanitarianorhumanrightslaworoffensesunderinternationalconventionsorprotocolsrelatingtoterrorismorinternationalorganizedcrime,exportingStatesPartiesshallconsiderwhethertherearemitigationmeasuresthatcouldbeundertakensuchas:

- Confidence‐buildingmeasures;

- JointlydevelopedandagreedprogrammesbytheexportingandimportingStates.

d.Exportdenials

IftheexportingState–afterhavingconductedtheexportassessmentaswellasconsideredmitigationmeasures–determinesthatthereisanoverridingriskofanyofthenegativeconsequencesinArticle7(1),theexportshallnotbeauthorised.

Consequently,thenationalauthoritiesinvolvedintheexportauthorisationprocessmustconsideriftheprobablenegativeconsequencesofarmsexportswouldoutweighthepositiveaspectsoftheexports(providedtheexportisnottheonethatisalreadyprohibitedunderArticle6).

27 Article 7 (2).


12

e.Assessingtheriskofdiversion28

Duringtheexportassessment,theexportingStatesPartiesshallalsoassess:

Theriskthatsomeoralloftheweaponscouldbedivertedbeforereachingtheauthorizedend‐user;

Theriskthatsomeoralloftheweaponscouldbedivertedafterreachingtheauthorisedend‐user,includingthrough:

Asubsequenttransferbytheauthorizedend‐userinawaythatwouldviolatetheprovisionsoftheATT,contravenetheexportingState’snationalexportpoliciesorwouldotherwiseconstituteadiversion;

Leakagesduetopilferingandotheroccurrencesgenerallyassociatedwithinadequateandinsecurestockpilemanagementorcorruption;

Stockpilescapturedbyarmednon‐stateactors.

f.Reassessmentofauthorizations29

TheexportingStatePartyisencouragedtoreassessanauthorizationofaspecifictransferofconventionalarmsoritemsthathasalreadybeengranted,shouldnewrelevantinformationcomestolight.

Ifpossibleandappropriate,suchareassessmentshouldbeundertakenafterconsultationswiththeimportingState.

1.1.4.Enforcementmeasures

Mechanismstoensurecompliancewithlaws,regulationsandadministrativeproceduresrelatedtoconventionalarmsexportsshallbeinplaceatnationallevel.30

EachStatePartywilldecideontheextentofitsnationalenforcementmeasuresastheATTdoesnotprovideanyguidance.

1.2Maintainnationalrecordsofexportauthorizationsandactualexports

TheexportingStatePartyshallkeeprecordsofallexportauthorizationsissuedoroftheactualexportsofconventionalarmsunderArticle2(1).31

28 Article 11 (2). 29 Article 7 (7). 30 Article 14. 31 Article 12 (1).


13

ItisuptotheStatePartytodecideitspreference:recordsofauthorizationsorofactualexportsorboth.Therecordsshouldbekeptbythecompetentnationalauthorities.

TheATTdoesnotrequireStatesPartiestokeeprecordsofauthorizationsoractualexportsofammunitionorpartsandcomponents,butStatesPartiescankeepsuchrecordsiftheysochoose.

Recordsshallbemaintainedforaminimumoftenyears.32

Box4–Record‐keepingofexports

Statesareencouragedtoincludeintheirrecords:33

1.Quantity;2.Value;3.Model/type/serialnumber;4.Authorizedconventionalarmstobetransferred;5.Conventionalarmsactuallytransferred;6.DetailsofimportingState(s),transitandtrans‐shipmentState(s);7.End‐users.

1.3 RoleofimportingStateinexportauthorizationprocess

TheimportingStateshallensurethatappropriateandrelevantinformationisprovided,uponrequest,toassisttheexportingStateinconductingitsnationalexportassessment.34Suchdocumentsmayinclude:

a.End‐useorend‐userdocumentation;35

b.Importauthorization;

c.DocumentsthatindicatethattheimportingStatehasanadequatesystemandthecapacitytocontroltheimportedweapons.

1.4 Export‐relatedrequirementsundertheATTcomparedwiththoseunderotherrelevantUNinstruments

InadditiontotheATT,thereareotherinternationalinstrumentsthathaveprovisionsorrecommendmeasuresregardingthecontrolofexport,importandtransit/trans‐shipmentofconventionalweapons,suchasthePoAandtheFirearmsProtocol.SomeStatesmayhavealreadytakenimplementationmeasuresundertheseinstruments.Inordertoavoidduplicationofefforts,thefollowingtableliststhedifferentrequirementsrelatedtoexportofconventionalweaponscontainedinthethreeinstruments.

32 Article 12 (4) 33 Article 12 (3). 34 Article 8 (1). 35 ibidem


14

Table1–Overviewofexport‐relatedrequirementsofUNinstruments

ATT Firearms Protocol PoA

Export controls

-Establish and maintain a national control system, including a national control list. See Art. 5 (2). -Establish and maintain national control systems to regulate export of ammunition / munitions and parts and components. See Art. 3 and 4.

-Each State Party shall establish or maintain an effective system of export licensing or authorization. See Art. 10 (1).

-Put in place adequate laws, regulations, and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over export. See Para. II.2 and II.12. -Establish an effective system of export licensing or authorization. See Para. II.11.

Export prohibitions

-Exports shall be prohibited if they violate Security Council and UN Charter obligations, violate obligations under international agreements the exporting State is party to; or be used in the commission of genocide, crime against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, attacks directed against civilians, or other war crimes. See Art. 6.

- No provisions that explicitly prohibit the export of firearms -

- States must take appropriate measures including all legal or administrative means, against any activity that violates a Security Council arms embargo in accordance with the UN Charter. See Para. II.15.

Export assessment

-Assess the potential that weapons would contribute to or undermine peace and security; could be used to violate international humanitarian and human rights law, international conventions, or protocols relating to terrorism or transnational organized crime. See Art. 7 (1).

- No provisions that require States Parties to undertake an export assessment -

-Assess export applications according to strict national regulations and procedures that are consistent with international law and that take into account the risk of diversion. See Para. II.11.

Documentation

- Ensure all authorizations for export are detailed and issued prior to export. See Art. 7 (5).

-Verify that importing States have issued import licences and authorizations; and written notice that transit States do not object. See Art. 10 (2). - Documentation must include: place and date of issuance, date of expiration, country of export, country of import, final recipient, description and quantity of the items, and transit countries (if relevant). See Art. 10 (3). - Ensure (with available means) that the authenticity of documents can be verified or validated. See Art. 10 (5).

- Ensure the use of authenticated end-user certificates and effective legal and enforcement measures. See Para. II.12.


15

2 Requirementsrelatedtoarmsimport

2.1 Regulateimports

Ingeneral,StatesPartiesmustputinplacelaws,regulationsandadministrativeprocedurestoregulatetheimportofconventionalarmsunderthescopeoftheATT.ThisisconsistentwithArticle8(2)andwithArticle5(4),bywhichStatesPartiesareexpectedtohaveinordertohaveaneffectiveandtransparentnationalcontrolsystemregulatingthetransferofconventionalofcovereditems.

Thenationallegislation,regulationsoradministrativeproceduresshouldclearlystate:

Whichitemsaresubjecttoimportcontrol(nationalcontrollist);

Whichgovernmentministriesordepartmentsareresponsibleforregulatingconventionalarmsimports(nationalauthorities);

Thecriteriaforgrantingorrefusingimportauthorizations(regulatoryprocedures),ifapplicable;

Thelegaland/oradministrativeactionsthatwouldbeappliedincaseofimportoffences(enforcementmeasuresandmechanisms,prosecutionandpunishment).

2.1.1.Nationalcontrollist

Thenationalcontrollistisanessentialtoolforregulatingimportsofconventionalarms.StatesPartiesarefreetoestablishasinglenationalcontrollistforbothexportandimportcontrol.


StatesPartieshavetodesignatecompetentnationalauthoritiestoensuretheeffectiveandtransparentnationalregulationovertheimportofconventionalweaponscoveredundertheATT.36

IncasetheStatePartyoptsforanimportcontrolsystem–meaningthateveryimportofconventionalweaponslistedinthenationalcontrollistissubjecttoanimportauthorization–thedesignatedauthoritiesshalladministertheregulatoryregimeandimplementcontrolsthroughanarmsimportauthorizationprocess.

36 Article 5 (5).


16

2.1.3.Regulatoryprocedures

Theregulatoryprocedurestocontrolimportsofconventionalarmsestablishthecriteriaforgrantingorrefusingtheimportofconventionalweaponsincludedinthenationalcontrollist.

IncasetheimportingStatePartyregulatestheimportsthroughalicensingsystem,theregulatoryproceduresshoulddetailhowandunderwhatcircumstancesimportauthorizationscanbeobtained.


StatesPartiesmustputinplacemeasuresandmechanismstoensurecompliancewithlaws,regulationsandadministrativeproceduresrelatedtotransitandtrans‐shipmentofconventionalarms.37

EachStatePartywilldecideonthespecificenforcementmeasurestobeadopted,astheATTdoesnotprovidefurtherdetailsonthismatter.

2.2 Maintainrecordsofimports

TheimportingStateisencouragedtomaintainrecordsofconventionalarmscoveredbytheATTthataretransferredtoitsterritoryasthefinaldestination.38

Box5–Record‐keepingofimports

Therecordsshouldinclude:39

1.Quantity;2.Value;3.Model/type/serialnumber;4.AuthorizedinternationaltransfersofconventionalarmscoveredunderthescopeoftheATT;5.Conventionalarmsactuallytransferred;6.DetailsofexportingState(s),transitandtrans‐shipmentState(s);7.End‐users.

37 Article 14. 38 Article 12 (2). 39 Article 12 (3).


17

2.3 Import‐relatedrequirementsundertheATTcomparedwiththoseunderotherUNinstruments

Thereareotherinternationalinstrumentsthathaverequirementsorrecommendmeasuresrelatedtoimportcontrolofconventionalweapons,suchasthePoAaswellastheFirearmsProtocol.Whiletheyaredifferentinscope,itisimportanttobeawareofthepossibleoverlaps,complementarityorsynergiesbetweenthesethreeinstruments.

Table2–Overviewofimport‐relatedrequirementsofUNinstruments

ATT FirearmsProtocol PoA

Importcontrols

-TheimportingStateshalltakemeasurestoregulate,wherenecessary,importsunderitsjurisdiction,suchasthroughimportsystems.SeeArt.8(2).

-EachStatePartyshallestablishormaintainaneffectivesystemofimportlicensingorauthorization.SeeArt.10(1).

-Putinplaceadequatelaws,regulations,andadministrativeprocedurestoexerciseeffectivecontroloverimport.SeePara.II.2.-Establishaneffectivesystemofimportlicensingorauthorization.SeePara.II.11.

Documentation

‐TheimportingStateshallensurethatrelevantinformation–suchasend‐useorend‐userdocumentation–isprovided,uponrequest,pursuanttoitsnationallaw,toassisttheexportingStateParty.SeeArt.8(1).‐TheimportingStatemayrequestinformationfromtheexportingStateregardingexportauthorizations.SeeArt.8(3).

‐TheimportingStatePartyshall,uponrequest,informtheexportingStatePartyofthereceiptofthedispatchedshipment.SeeArt.10(4).

‐ ThePoAonlyreferstothefactthatimportlicensingorauthorizationisrequired.SeeParaII.11).

3 Requirementsrelatedtotransit/trans‐shipmentStates

3.1 Regulatetransitortrans‐shipment

Bothtransitandtrans‐shipmentconstitutea“transfer”underArticle2(2)oftheATT.Therefore,StatesPartiesarerequiredtocomplywithalltheprohibitionsontransfersofitemsunderArticle6aswellastotakeappropriatemeasurestoenforcetheimplementationoftheTreaty.


18

Inaddition,StatesPartiesshalltakemeasurestoregulatetransitortrans‐shipmentundertheirjurisdiction,wherenecessaryandfeasible.40

Inordertoregulatetransitandtrans‐shipmentofconventionalarms,StatesPartieswillhavetoputinplacelaws,regulationsandadministrativeproceduresinamannerthatisconsistentwithinternationallaw.

Thenationallegislationshouldstate:

Whatconstitutestransitortrans‐shipment(nationaldefinition);

Whichgovernmentministriesordepartmentsareresponsibleforregulatingtransitandtranshipmentofconventionalarms(nationalauthorities);

Thecriteriaforgrantingorrefusingtransit/trans‐shipmentauthorizations(regulatoryprocedures),ifapplicable;

ThecriteriashallincludetheprohibitionsunderArticle6oftheATT.

Thelegaland/oradministrativeactionsthatwouldbeappliedincaseofoffences(enforcementmeasuresandmechanisms,prosecutionandpunishment).


Wherenecessaryandfeasible,StatesPartieswillhavetodesignatenationalauthoritiesregulatingconventionalarmstransitandtrans‐shipment.41

ItisuptoeachStatePartytodecideonhowtoestablishitsnationalauthorities.


EachStatePartyhasdiscretiontoregulatetransitandtrans‐shipmentofitemsbeyonditsobligationunderArticle6.TheStatePartycanestablishhowitwishestoregulatethoseactivities.Therearethreemainapproachestoregulatetransit/trans‐shipment:

Licensingsystem:Underthissystem,anexporterneedstoapplyandobtainatransit/trans‐shipmentauthorizationfromthenationalauthorityinthetransit/trans‐shipmentStatepriortothetransitofweaponsthroughterritoryunderthejurisdictionofthisState.

Priornotification:Notificationproceduresthatrequirethenationalauthorityinthetransit/trans‐shipmentStatetobeprovidedinadvancewithinformationanddocumentationonthemovementofweaponstransiting/trans‐shippingthroughterritoryunderitsjurisdiction.

40 Article 9. 41 Article 5 (5).


19

Transit/trans‐shipmentcontrolonlybycustomsauthorities:Thisrequiresanotificationtocustomsauthoritiesaboutarmsshipmentsatthepointofentry,uponwhichtechnicalanddocumentarycheckscouldbeconducted.


StatesPartiesmustputinplacemeasuresandmechanismstoensurecompliancewithlaws,regulationsandadministrativeproceduresrelatedtotransitandtrans‐shipmentofconventionalarms.42

EachStatePartywilldecidewhichspecificenforcementmeasurestoadopt,astheATTdoesnotprovideguidanceonthismatter.

3.2 Maintainrecords

Transitortrans‐shipmentStatesPartiesareencouragedtomaintainaccuraterecordsofconventionalarmsthatareauthorisedtotransitorbetrans‐shippedinterritoryundertheirjurisdiction.

Theserecordsshouldbekeptforaminimumoftenyears.43

Box6–Record‐keepingoftransitsandtrans‐shipments

Therecordsshouldinclude:44

a. Quantity;

b. Value;

c. Model/type/serialnumber;

d. AuthorizedinternationaltransfersofconventionalarmscoveredunderthescopeoftheATT;

e. Conventionalarmsactuallytransferred;

f. DetailsofexportingState(s),importingState(s),andothertransitandtrans‐shipmentState(s)ifapplicable;

g. End‐user.

42 Article 14. 43 Article 12 (4). 44 Article 12 (3).


20

3.3 Transit/trans‐shipment‐relatedrequirementsundertheATTcomparedwiththoseunderotherUNinstruments

Thereareotherinternationalinstrumentsthathaverequirementsorrecommendmeasuresrelatedtotransit/trans‐shipmentofconventionalweapons,suchasthePoAaswellastheFirearmsProtocol.Whiletheyaredifferentinscope,itisimportanttobeawareofthepossibleoverlaps,complementarityorsynergiesbetweenthesethreeinstruments.

Table6–Overviewoftransit/trans‐shipment‐relatedrequirementsofUNinstruments


Transit/transhipmentcontrols

-—Shallnotauthorise-anytransit/trans‐

shipment-ofcovered-itemsinviolationof-Article6.

—Takeappropriate-measurestoenforce-nationalmeasures-takentoimplement-theATT.SeeArt.14.-Takeappropriatemeasures

toregulate,wherenecessaryandfeasible,thetransitortrans‐shipmentthroughitsterritory.SeeArt.9.

-Establishor-maintaineffective-measureson-internationaltransit-offirearms,theirparts-andcomponentsand-ammunition.SeeArt.-10(1).

-—Putinplace-adequatelaws,-regulations,and-administrative-procedurestoexercise-effectivecontrolover-transitofsmallarms-andlightweapons.See-Para.II.2.-—Establishor-maintainmeasureson-internationaltransitof-smallarmsandlight-weaponswithaview-tocombatingitsillicit

-trade.SeePara.II.11.

Documentation

‐Noreferencetodocumentationinthecontextofregulatingthetransit/trans‐shipmentofconventionalarms‐

‐The informationintheimportlicencemustbeprovidedtothetransitStatesinadvance.SeeArt.10(3).

—Putinplaceadequatelaws,regulations,andadministrativeprocedurestoensureeffectivecontrolovertransitofsmallarmsandlightweapons,includingtheuseofauthenticatedend‐usercertificatesandeffectivelegalandenforcementmeasures.SeePara.II.12.


21

4 Requirementsrelatedtobrokering

4.1 Regulatebrokering

StatesPartiesshalltakemeasurestoregulatearmsbrokeringtakingplaceundertheirjurisdiction.45StateshavediscretiontodeterminehowtodesignsuchregulationprovidedthatitcomplieswiththeirobligationonprohibitionsoftransfersunderArticle6oftheATT.

Thenationallegislation,regulationoradministrativeproceduresregardingbrokeringcouldinclude:

Whatconstitutesbrokering(nationaldefinition);

Whichgovernmentministriesordepartmentsareresponsibleforregulatingconventionalarmsbrokering(nationalauthorities);

Thecriteriaforgrantingorrefusingbrokeringauthorizations(regulatoryprocedures),ifapplicable;

ThecriteriashallincludetheprohibitionsunderArticle6oftheATT.

Thelegaland/oradministrativeactionsthatwouldbeappliedincaseofoffences(enforcementmeasuresandmechanisms,prosecutionandpunishment).

4.1.1.Nationaldefinition

SincetheATTdoesnotdefinethetermbrokering,andgiventhemultitudeofactivitiesthatcouldbeassociatedwithbrokering,itisimportantthatthenationallegislationdelineateswhatconstitutesbrokeringandwhatdoesnot.AccordingtothereportoftheUNGroupofGovernmentalExpertsonBrokeringinSALW46(GGEreport)andtheInternationalSmallArmsControlStandards(ISACS),brokeringmeans:47

GGEreport“8.AbrokerinSALWcanbedescribedasapersonorentityactingasanintermediarythatbringstogetherrelevantpartiesandarrangesorfacilitatesapotentialtransactionofSALWinreturnforsomeformofbenefit,whetherfinancialorotherwise”.

45 See Article 10. 46 A/62/163 of 30 August 2007. 47 Available at www.smallarmsstandards.org.


22

ISACS01.20Broker:“Apersonorentityactingasanintermediarythatbringstogetherrelevantpartiesandarrangesorfacilitatesapotentialtransaction[…]inreturnforsomeformofbenefit,whetherfinancialorotherwise”Brokering:”Activitiescarriedoutbyabrokerinthecontextofarrangingorfacilitatinganinternationaltransferofsmallarmsorlightweapons.Note1.Brokeringactivitiesinclude,butarenotlimitedto:‐servingasafinderofbusinessopportunitiestooneormoreparties;‐puttingrelevantpartiesincontact;‐assistingpartiesinproposing,arrangingorfacilitatingagreementsorpossiblecontractsbetweenthem;‐assistingpartiesinobtainingthenecessarydocumentation;‐assistingpartiesinarrangingthenecessarypayments”.

Note2.Someactivitiescloselyassociatedwithbrokeringinsmallarmsandlightweapons,thatdonotnecessarilyinthemselvesconstitutebrokeringactivities,mightbeundertakenbybrokersaspartoftheprocessofputtingadealtogethertogainbenefit.Theseactivitiesmayinclude,forexample,actingasdealersoragentsinsmallarmsandlightweapons,providingtechnicalassistance,training,transport,freightforwarding,storage,finance,insurance,maintenance,securityandotherservices.

Note3.Brokeringactivitiescantakeplaceinthebroker’scountryofnationality,residenceorregistration;theycanalsotakeplaceinanothercountry.Thesmallarmsandlightweaponsdonotnecessarilypassthroughtheterritoryofthecountrywherethebrokeringactivitytakesplace,nordoesthebrokernecessarilytakeownershipofthesmallarmsandlightweapons”.


StatesPartiesshalldesignatenationalauthoritiestoregulatebrokeringinconventionalarms.48Brokeringconstitutesa“transfer”underArticle2(2)oftheATT.

Ideally,thecompetentnationalauthoritiestoregulatebrokeringofconventionalarmsshouldbeclearlyidentifiedinthenationallegislationandshouldbepartofthenationalimport/exportcontrolsystems.

AlthoughitistheprerogativeofeachStatePartytodecidewhichauthoritiesshouldbeentrustedwiththeresponsibilityofregulatingbrokering,itwouldbeconsistentwithATTimplementationrequirementsandobligations,toconsiderplacingthatresponsibilitywiththesameauthoritiesentrustedwiththeregulationofexports.

48 Article 5 (5).


23


ItisuptoStatesPartiestodecidehowtoregulatebrokeringinconventionalarmstakingplaceunderitsjurisdiction,providedthattheStatePartycomplieswithitsobligationsunderArticle6oftheATT(prohibitionsontransfers).Measurescouldincluderegistrationofbrokersandissuingwrittenauthorizationsbeforeengaginginbrokeringtransactions.


Mechanismsthatensurecompliancewithlaws,regulationsandadministrativeproceduresrelatedtobrokeringofconventionalarmsshallbeinplaceatthenationallevel.49

Stateswillwhichenforcementmeasurestoadopt,astheATTdoesnotprovidefurtherdetails.

4.2 Brokering‐relatedrequirementsundertheATTcomparedwiththoseunderotherUNinstruments

Thereareotherinternationalinstrumentsthathaverequirementsrelatedtobrokeringofconventionalweapons,suchasthePoAaswellastheFirearmsProtocol.Whiletheyaredifferent in scope, it is importanttobeawareofthepossibleoverlaps,complementarityorsynergiesamongthesethreeinstruments.

Table4–Overviewofbrokering‐relatedrequirementsofUNinstruments


Brokeringcontrols

-EachStatePartyshalltakemeasures,pursuanttoitsnationallaws,toregulatebrokeringtakingplacewithinitsjurisdiction,suchasregistrationorbrokeringauthorizations.SeeArt.10.

‐Considerregulatingbrokersbyestablishingasystemthatrequires:registrationofbrokersoperatingwithinStateParty’sterritory;licensingorauthorizationofbrokering;and/ordisclosureofnamesandlocationsofbrokersonimportandexportlicencesandauthorizations.SeeArt.15.

‐Developadequatelegislationandadministrativeproceduresonregulatingtheactivitiesofthosewhoengageinbrokeringofsmallarmsandlightweapons,including:registration,licensingorauthorizationofbrokeringtransactions,andappropriatepenaltiesforillicitbrokeringactivitiesperformedwithinthe

49 Article 14.


24

State’sjurisdictionandcontrol.SeePara.II.14.

5 Requirementsrelatedtothepreventionofdiversionofconventionalarms

5.1 Legalbasis

StatesPartiesinvolvedinthetransferofconventionalarmsshalltakemeasurestopreventtheirdiversion.50

Theresponsibilitytotakemeasurestopreventdiversionneedstobesharedamongallthoseinvolvedintransfers,includingexporting,importingandtransit/trans‐shipmentStates.

Tothateffect,Statespartiesshallcooperateandexchangeinformationinordertomitigatetheriskofdiversionofthetransferofconventionalarms.51

ItisuptoeachStatePartytodefineinitsnationallegislationand/orproceduresthemodalitiesofsuchinformationexchange,includingthescopeandextentofinformationtobeexchangedaswellastheentityresponsibleforinformationexchange.Moreover,StatesPartiesmayconsideradoptingbilateral,multilateralorregionalagreementstoestablishinformationexchangemechanismstothisend.

Exporting,importingandtransit/trans‐shipmentStatesshouldundertakemeasurestopreventdiversionattheirrespectivestagesofatransfer.

5.2 Sharingofinformation

StatesPartiesareencouragedtosharerelevantinformationwithoneanotheroneffectivemeasurestoaddressdiversion.Thisinformationcouldinclude:52

a. Illicitactivities,includingcorruption;

b. Internationaltraffickingroutes;

c. Illicitbrokers;

d. Sourcesofillicitsupply;

e. Methodsofconcealment;



25

f. Commonpointsofdispatch;

g. Destinationsusedbyorganizedgroupsengagedindiversion;

h. Weaponsmarkingpractices.

5.3 RoleofexportingStatesinpreventingdiversion

TheexportingStateshallseektopreventthediversionofconventionalarmsthroughitsnationalcontrolsystemby:

a. Assessingtheriskofdiversionoftheexport;

b. ConsideringtheestablishmentofmitigationmeasuresorjointlydevelopedoragreedprogrammeswiththeimportingState.

TheexportingStatemayalso,whenappropriate:

a. Examinepartiesinvolvedintheexport;

b. Requireadditionaldocumentation,certificates,assurances;

c. Notauthorisetheexport(thisshouldbeusedifitconsidersthatmitigationmeasuresareinsufficient);

d. TakeothermeasuresdeemedappropriatebytheexportingStateParty.

5.4Measurestobetakenifdiversionisdetected

Ifadiversionisdetected,appropriateactionshallbetakenbytheStatePartytoaddresssuchdiversion.

ItisuptoeachStatePartytodeterminewhichmeasurestotake,providedthattheyareinaccordancewithinternationallaw.

TheATTprovidessomeexamplesofpossiblemeasures,suchas:53

a. AlertingpotentiallyaffectedStatesParties;

b. Examiningdivertedshipmentsofconventionalarms;

c. Takingfollow‐upmeasuresthroughinvestigationandlawenforcement.

53 Article 11 (4).


26

IV.Promotecooperation,transparencyandaccountability

1. Promotecooperation

Theinternationalconventionalarmstradeisahighlyglobalizedactivity.ImplementingtheATTeffectivelyrequirescloseandextensiveinternationalcooperation.StatesPartiesareencouragedtofacilitateinternationalcooperation,toconsultonmattersofmutualinterestandtoshareinformation.54

Suchcooperationcouldtakeplaceintheareasof:

a. Preventinganderadicatingdiversionofconventionalarms,includinginformationonillicitactivitiesandactors;55

b. Investigations,prosecutionsandjudicialproceedingsinrelationtoviolationsofnationalmeasuresestablishedpursuanttotheATT;56

c. Preventingthatthetransferofconventionalarmsbecomesubjecttocorruptpractices;

d. Exchangingexperienceandinformationonlessonslearnt.

2. Promotetransparencyandaccountability

StatesPartiesarerequiredtosubmittwotypesofreportsontheimplementationoftheATTtotheSecretariat.

Inaddition,theyareencouragedtoprovideinformationorreportsonmeasurestakentopreventdiversion.

ThesereportsshallbesubmittedtotheSecretariat,whichisinturnentrustedwithmakingthemavailableandwithdistributingthemtoStatesParties.

Mandatoryreports:

a. InitialreportonmeasuresundertakeninordertoimplementtheATT.ThisreportmustbesubmittedbyaStatePartywithinayearoftheentry‐into‐forceforthisStateParty.57Thisinitialreportshouldcontainanationalcontrollist.

Annualreportfortheprecedingyearonauthorizedoractualexportsandimportsmustbesubmittedby31Mayeveryyear.58

54 Article 15. 55 Article 15 (4). 56 Article 15 (5). 57 Article 13 (1). 58 Article 13 (3).


27

Annex:DescriptionsofthesevencategoriesoftheUNRegisterofConventionalArms

Updatedin2013asperrecommendationscontainedinthefinalreportofthe2013GroupofGovernmentalExpertsonthecontinuingoperationandfurtherdevelopmentoftheUNRegisterofConventionalArms(A/68/140),andendorsedbyGeneralAssemblyresolution(A/RES/68/43).

Categoriesofequipmentandtheirdefinitions59

I. Battletanks

Trackedorwheeledself‐propelledarmouredfightingvehicleswithhighcross‐countrymobilityandahigh‐levelofself‐protection,weighingatleast16.5metrictonsunladenweight,withahighmuzzlevelocitydirectfiremaingunofatleast75millimetrescalibre.

II. Armouredcombatvehicles

Tracked,semi‐trackedorwheeledself‐propelledvehicles,witharmouredprotectionandcross‐countrycapability,either:(a)designedandequippedtotransportasquadoffourormoreinfantrymen,or(b)armedwithanintegralororganicweaponofatleast12.5millimetrescalibreoramissilelauncher.

III.Large‐calibreartillerysystems

Guns,howitzers,artillerypieces,combiningthecharacteristicsofagunorahowitzer,mortarsormultiple‐launchrocketsystems,capableofengagingsurfacetargetsbydeliveringprimarilyindirectfire,withacalibreof75millimetresandabove.

IV. Combataircraft

(a)Mannedfixed‐wingorvariable‐geometrywingaircraft,designed,equippedormodifiedtoengagetargetsbyemployingguidedmissiles,unguidedrockets,bombs,guns,cannonsorotherweaponsofdestruction,includingversionsoftheseaircraftwhichperformspecializedelectronicwarfare,suppressionofairdefenceorreconnaissancemissions;

59 Available at www.un-register.org/Background/Index.aspx.


28

(b)Unmannedfixed‐wingorvariable‐geometrywingaircraft,designed,equippedormodifiedtoengagetargetsbyemployingguidedmissiles,unguidedrockets,bombs,guns,cannonsorotherweaponsofdestruction.

Theterm“combataircraft”doesnotincludeprimarytraineraircraft,unlessdesigned,equippedormodifiedasdescribedabove.

V. Attackhelicopters

(a)Mannedrotary‐wingaircraft,designed,equippedormodifiedtoengagetargetsbyemployingguidedorunguidedanti‐armour,air‐to‐surface,air‐to‐subsurface,orair‐to‐airweaponsandequippedwithanintegratedfirecontrolandaimingsystemfortheseweapons,includingversionsoftheseaircraftwhichperformspecializedreconnaissanceorelectronicwarfaremissions;

(b)Unmannedrotary‐wingaircraft,designed,equippedormodifiedtoengagetargetsbyemployingguidedorunguidedanti‐armour,air‐to‐surface,air‐to‐subsurface,orair‐to‐airweaponsandequippedwithanintegratedfirecontrolandaimingsystemfortheseweapons.

VI.Warships

Vesselsorsubmarinesarmedandequippedformilitaryusewithastandarddisplacementof500metrictonsorabove,andthosewithastandarddisplacementoflessthan500metrictons,equippedforlaunchingmissileswitharangeofatleast25kilometresortorpedoeswithsimilarrange.

VII.Missilesandmissilelaunchers

(a)Guidedorunguidedrockets,ballisticorcruisemissilescapableofdeliveringawarheadorweaponofdestructiontoarangeofatleast25kilometres,andmeansdesignedormodifiedspecificallyforlaunchingsuchmissilesorrockets,ifnotcoveredbycategoriesIthroughVI.ForthepurposeoftheRegister,thissub‐categoryincludesremotelypilotedvehicleswiththecharacteristicsformissilesasdefinedabovebutdoesnotincludeground‐to‐airmissiles.

(b)Man‐PortableAir‐DefenceSystems(MANPADS).

ATTImplementationToolkit|Module3|ReportingRequirements

1


Module 3 Reporting Requirements



2

I.Introduction

AnycountryjoiningtheArmsTradeTreaty(ATT)commitstoputtinginplaceeffectivemeasurestoimplementtheTreaty.

StateswilldecidewhichmeasuresarebesttofulfiltheirobligationsundertheATT.Thesemeasuresmayvaryfromcountrytocountry.

AfterreviewingtheobligationsundertheATTinmodule2ofthistoolkit,thisthirdmodule,Reportingrequirements,aimstoassistStatesinunderstandingthereportingobligationsunderthisTreaty.

Module3willdiscussthepreparationofboththeinitialreportandtheannualreportaswellasthesubmissionofinformationoneffectivemeasurestakentoaddressthediversionofcoveredweapons.

II.ReportingundertheATT

OpennessregardingimportsandexportsofconventionalarmsfostersconfidenceandtrustamongStates.SharingnationalreportsalsoenablesStatesParties–andotherrelevantstakeholders,ifthereportsaremadeavailabletothepublic–toassessthelevelofeachStateParty’scompliancewithATTobligations,aswellasthestatusofimplementationoftheTreaty.

1. Typesofreports

TheATTrequiresStatesPartiestoprovidetwotypesofreports1:

AninitialreportonmeasurestakentoimplementtheTreaty;

Annualreportsontransfers.

Inaddition,theATTencouragesStatesPartiestoreporttootherStatesParties,throughtheATTSecretariat,informationonmeasurestakenthatprovetobeeffectiveinaddressingthediversionoftransferredconventionalarmscoveredbytheTreaty.2

1 See comparable table on ATT reports and information on measures taken to address diversion in Annex A to this module. 2 Article 13 (2).


3

1.1 Initialreport

WithinoneyearoftheTreaty’sentryintoforceforaparticularState,thisStatePartymustsubmittotheATTSecretariataninitialreportcontaininginformationonthemeasuresithasundertakentoimplementtheATT.3

Thisreportshall,ataminimum,includeinformationonnationallaws,nationalcontrollistsandotherregulationsandadministrativemeasures.4

TheATTdoesnotpreventStatesPartiestoincludeinformationonothermeasuresthattheyconsidertobeeffectiveATTimplementationpracticesorthatcouldprovideusefullessonslearnedtootherStatesParties.

InordertousethisreportasathresholdofworldwidestatusofATTimplementation,itshouldprovidesuccinctandclearinformationonkeymeasuresundertakenbytheStatePartyincompliancewiththeTreaty.

1.1.1. Informationonnationallaws,regulationsandadministrativemeasurescouldinclude:

MeasurestakentoensurethattheStateParty’slaws,regulationsandadministrativeprocedurescomplywiththerequirementsoftheATTwithregardtothecontrolofarmsexport,import,andbrokering;

Anymeasurestakentoensuretheproperregulationoftransitandtrans‐shipmentactivities;

Otherrelevantenforcementmeasuresand/orpost‐transfercontrols;

Name,title,documentnumber,dateofadoption,dateofentryintoforceandotherrelevantinformationregardingtheabove‐mentionedlaws,regulationsorproceduresaswellasasummaryofthedocumentswhenfeasibleandpertinent;

Additionally,informationonmeasuresaimedatimprovingrecord‐keeping,weaponsmarkingandstockpilemanagementaswellasinformationonguidelines,bestpractices,lessonslearnedandrelevantadministrativeinstructions.

1.1.2 Nationalcontrollist

Thenationalcontrollistsneedtoincludenationaldescriptionsofallitems(weapons,ammunitionandmunitions,partsandcomponents)thataresubjecttotransfercontrolsundertheATT;5

NationaldefinitionsofthefirstsevencategoriesofthescopeoftheATTshallbeataminimumthedescriptionsusedintheUNRegisterofConventionalArms(UNRegister)asof24December2014;6

3 Article 13 (1). 4 Ibidem. 5 For more details on the national control list, refer to Module 5 of this toolkit. 6 Available at www.un-register.org/Reporting/login.aspx.


4

NationaldefinitionsofSALWmustbeataminimumthedescriptionsusedinrelevantUNinstruments;7

StatesPartiesareencouragedtogobeyondthecategorieslistedinArticle2oftheATTandapplytheprovisionsoftheTreatytothebroadestrangeofconventionalarms;

Theinformationcontainedinnationalcontrollistsshouldbepubliclyavailablesoweaponsmanufacturers,tradersandbrokerscanfreelyaccessthelaws,rulesandregulationsaswellastheprocedurestheyneedtocomplywithwhentransferringconventionalarmscoveredunderArticle2(1)aswellasammunitions,partsandcomponents.

Intheirinitialreport,StatescouldalsoincludeinformationonothermeasuresundertakentoimplementtheATT,suchas:

DesignationofNationalPoint(s)ofContactandnationalauthoritiestoregulatearmstransfers;

Measuresundertakentoestablishormaintainarecord‐keepingsystem,andtofacilitateinternationalcooperationandassistance.

Box1–Similarrequirementsinotherinstruments

SynergiescanbedevelopedbetweenreportingundertheATTandreportingunderotherregionalorinternationalinstrumentscontainingoverlaps.Inpreparingtheirinitialreports,StatesPartiescouldrefertootherinstrumentsthathavesimilarreportingrequirements.Similarly,informationprovidedintheATTinitialreportcouldbeusefultoofficialschargedwithreportingunderotherinstruments,thusavoidingduplication.

UNRegisterofConventionalArms(UNRegister)–Statesprovideinformationonweaponstransfersinsevenpre‐definedcategories.

ProgrammeofActiononSALW(PoA)–Biennially,StatescansubmitvoluntaryreportsonthemeasurestakentopreventandcombattheillicittradeinSALW.IntheonlinereportingformprovidedbytheUNOfficeforDisarmamentAffairs(UNODA),Statesareaskedtoprovideinformationonarangeoftopics,includinglegislationandnationalsystemconcerningtransfersofSALW,brokering,stockpilemanagement,capacity‐buildingneeds,internationalcooperationandassistance.AllthereportssubmittedbyStatesareavailableattheProgrammeofAction‐ImplementationSupportSystem(PoA‐ISS).

TheInternationalTracingInstrument(ITI)–Statesmustprovidebiennialreportsonmeasurestoenabletheadequatemarkingandrecord‐keepingofSALW,tofostercooperationintracingillicitSALW,aswellasrelatedcapacity‐buildingneedsandinternationalcooperationand

7 Such as the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (ITI), available at www.poa-iss.org/InternationalTracing/InternationalTracing.aspx; the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Firearms Protocol), available at www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/A-RES%20 55-255/55r255e.pdf.; the Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (A/52/298), available at www.un.org/depts/ddar/Firstcom/SGreport52/a52298.html.


5

assistanceactivities.TheITIreportsaresubmittedaspartofthereportsontheabove‐mentionedProgrammeofAction..

UNGeneralAssemblyresolutionentitled“Nationallegislationontransferofarms,militaryequipmentanddual‐usegoodsandtechnology”‐Statesareannuallycalledupontoprovideinformationonnationallegislationontransferofarms,militaryequipmentanddual‐usegoodsandtechnology.UNODAmaintainsonlineallinformationsubmittedbyStatesinthepastpursuanttotheresolution(http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/NLDU/).

EachStatePartytotheATTisrequiredtosubmititsinitialreportwithinthefirstyearafterentryintoforceofthisTreatyforsaidStateParty.

Aftertheirinitialreports,StatesPartiesshallreporttotheSecretariatonanynewATTimplementationmeasuresundertakenwhenappropriate.8EventuallytheconferenceofStatesPartiesmayprovideguidanceonwhensuchreportingshouldbedeemedappropriate.

StatesPartiesarealsoencouragedtousetheirinitialreportstoidentifyareasinwhichtheymayneedinternationalassistance.

TheuseofavailabletoolssuchastheATTbaselineassessmentsurveycouldprovehelpful.9

Tip:Itmightnotbepracticaltosubmitfullcopiesoflawsandregulations.Rather,StatesPartiescouldincludeintheirreportsbriefnarrativesidentifyingandsummarisingthekeyaspectsoftheirlawsandregulations.Thenarrativescouldalsoincludethetitleofallrelevantdocuments,referencenumbers,websitelinksifavailable,datesofadoption,datesofentryintoforceandanyotherinformationtheStatePartydeemrelevant.

1.2 Annualreport

StatesPartiesmustsubmitannually,by31May,10areport,fortheprecedingcalendaryear,onauthorizedoractualexportsandimportsofweaponsunderthescopeoftheATT.Reportsmayexcludecommerciallysensitiveornationalsecurityinformation.

ThisreportmaycontainthesameinformationsubmittedbytheStatePartytotheUNRegister11ThiswouldavoidduplicationandreducethereportingburdenonATTStatesParties.

StatesPartiescanprovideadditionalinformationtheydeemrelevantintheirannualreports.

Inadditiontoreporting,StatesPartiestotheATTarerequiredtokeepnationalrecords,pursuantwiththeirlawsandregulations,ofexportauthorizationsoractualexportsandareencouragedtokeepnationalrecordsofconventionalarmstransferredtoitsterritoryortransited/trans‐shippedwithinitsterritory.12

8 Article 13 (1). 9 Available at www.armstrade.info/. 10 Article 13 (3). 11 For an overview of reporting themes under relevant UN frameworks, see Annex B of this module. 12 Article 12 (1) and (2).


6

TheATTdoesnotprovidedetailsregardingthespecificcontentsorformatofnationalrecords.Itisrecommendedthatthenationalrecords(andtheannualreports)includeatleast13:

1.Quantity;

2.Value;

3.Model/type/serialnumber;

4.DetailsofexportingState(s),importingState(s),ortransitandtrans‐shipmentState(s);

5.End‐users.

Tip: Ratherthantreatingrecord‐keepingasaseparateactivityfromreporting,StatesPartiesshouldconsiderusingthenationalrecordsasakeysourceofinformationforthepreparationoftheirannualreports.Inotherwords,StatesPartiescouldideallysetuporadapttheirrecord‐keepingsystemsinamannerthatfeedsdirectlyintothenationalreports.

Tip:Untilareportingtemplateiseventuallydevelopedandagreed,StatesPartiescouldfinditusefultousetheagreedUNRegisterreportingtemplateasabasisfortheirannualATTreport.Inthiscase,theyareencouragedtousetheremarkscolumnofthatformtoprovideadditionaldetailssuchasquantity,value,model/type,detailsofStatesinvolvedinthetransactionandend‐users.

13 Article 12 (3).


7

Box2–Sourcesofinformationfortheannualreport

Collectingandcollatinginformationconcerningexportsandimportswouldnormallyrequireinvolvementofseveralentitieswithinagovernment,suchasdefence,foreignaffairsandtradeministries,authorizationagency,customs,manufacturers,etc.

Whilethedetailsconcerningtheprocessesandmethodsforcollectinginformationforannualreportsdifferfromcountrytocountry,thediagrambelowshowsanexampleofpossiblesourcesofinformationandtheirroles.

2.Informationonmeasurestopreventdiversion

TheATTaimsnotonlyatestablishingthehighestcommoninternationalstandardsfortheregulationoftheinternationaltradeinconventionalarms,butalsoatpreventinganderadicatingtheillicittradeinconventionalarmsandatpreventingtheirdiversion.14

14 Article 1.


8

TheATTwouldbeineffectiveifitonlyrequiredStatestoapplyhighstandardstointernationalarmstransfers,whilefailingtorequirethemtotakemeasurestopreventtheirdiversionafterleavingthecountryofexport.

TheATTencouragesStatesPartiestoreporttootherStatesParties,throughtheATTSecretariat,informationonmeasurestakenthathavebeenproveneffectiveinaddressingthediversionoftransferredconventionalarmscoveredinArticle2(1).

Althoughreportingonpreventionofdiversionisnotmandatory,15itisrecommendedthatStatesPartiesmakeaseriousefforttosubmitsuchreports.

2.1.Informationonmeasurestopreventdiversion(fromanexportingStateperspective)

Preventionofdiversionwouldusuallyrequireconcertedactionsonthepartofbothexportersand

importers.Others,suchastransitandtrans‐shipmentStates,mayalsoneedtoundertakeactionstohelppreventdiversion.

FromtheperspectiveofexportingStatesParties,measurestopreventdiversioncouldinclude:

a. Assessingtheriskofdiversionpriortoauthorizingexports;

b. EstablishingmitigationmeasuresorjointlydevelopedoragreedprogrammeswithimportingStatesaimedatpreventingdiversion;

c. Makingacloseexaminationofpartiesinvolvedintheexport;

d. Requiringadditionaldocumentationoradditionalcertificationofdocumentsprovidedbytheimporter;

e. Requiringtheimporter’sassurancesthatthereisnoriskthatexportedweaponswillbediverted;

f. SettingconditionstobeobservedbytheimportingStatesiftheywishtoexporttheweaponstheyhaveimported(re‐export);

g. NotauthorisingexportsiftheauthoritiesoftheexportingStatePartyarenotconfidentthattheweaponswillreachandremainwiththeauthorizedend‐user;

h. Exchanginginformationaboutillicitactivities,includingcorruptionpractices,internationaltraffickingroutes,illicitbrokers,falsificationormisuseofdocumentation,sourcesofillicitsupply,methodsofconcealment,commonpointsofdispatch,ordestinationsusedbyorganizedgroupsengagedindiversion.

2.2.Informationonmeasurestopreventdiversion(fromanimportingStateperspective)

FromtheimportingStates’perspective,measurestopreventthediversioncouldinclude:

15 Article 13 (2).


9

a. Adoptinglegislativemeasurestakentopreventthediversionofweapons,includingthecriminalizationofactivitiesconstituting,aidingorabettingdiversion;

b. Establishingorimprovingweaponsstockpilemanagementandsecuritysystems,includingmeasurestoidentifyandtodisposeofsurplusstocks;

c. Regulatingorenhancingregulationandcontrolofbrokeringactivities;

d. Takingmeasurestoimproveborderandcustomscontrol;

e. Adoptingmeasurestopreventandcombatcorruptpracticesleadingtoorfacilitatingthediversionofweapons,especiallyinthecountry’ssecuritysectorandcustoms;

f. Puttingintoplacemeasurestoenhancethecapacityoflawenforcementofficers(e.g.measurestoenhanceinvestigativeandintelligencegatheringcapacities,studiesundertaken)toidentifysources,routesandmeansofdiversion,includingentitiesinvolvedindiversionactivities;

g. Takingmeasurestoimproveweaponsmarkingandrecord‐keeping,includingprovisionsforthemarkingofweaponsatthetimeofimport;

h. Adoptingmeasurestoavoidtheforgeryofdocumentation,includingend‐use/usercertificates,andtoensuretheirauthenticityandproperuse;

i. Exchanginginformationonillicitactivities,includinginformationoncorruption,internationaltraffickingroutes,illicitbrokers,falsificationormisuseofdocumentation,sourcesofillicitsupply,methodsofconcealment,commonpointsofdispatch,ordestinationsusedbyorganizedgroupsengagedindiversion;

j. Takingmeasurestofacilitatepost‐deliveryverificationandcontrols.

2.3.Informationonmeasurestopreventdiversion(fromatransit/trans‐shipmentStateperspective)

Fromthetransit/trans‐shipmentStates’perspective,measurestopreventdiversioncouldinclude:

a.Exchanginginformationonillicitactivities,includingcorruptionpractices,internationaltraffickingroutes,illicitbrokers,sourcesofillicitsupply,methodsofconcealment,commonpointsofdispatchanddestinationsusedbyorganizedgroupsengagedindiversion;

b.Establishingmechanismstoenabletransit/trans‐shipmentStatesPartiestoacquiretimelyandreliableinformation,includinganyrelevantdocumentation,onshipmentstransitingthroughorbeingtrans‐shippedwithintheirterritories;illicitactivities,includingcorruption.

Formethodologicalreasons,theaboveactionswerebrokendownintodifferentperspectives(i.e.,oftheimporter,theexporter,orthetransit/trans‐shipmentState).Inpractice,aStatePartymaybefacedwiththeneedtotakemeasurespertainingtoallthreeperspectives,asitislikelytobeanimporter,exporterandtransit/trans‐shipmentStateatdifferentmomentsintimeorwithregardtodifferenttransactions.


10

Annexes

A. SummaryofdifferentATTreports

Type Initialreport Annualreport Preventingdiversionreport

Frequency Once.Thereafter,onlywhennewmeasuresaretaken,asappropriate

Annual Asappropriate

Deadline Withinoneyearofentry‐into‐forceoftheTreatyforthatStateParty

31Mayeveryyear Whendeemedappropriate

Maincontents

Nationallaws,nationalcontrollist,otherregulationsandadministrativemeasures,nationalpointsofcontact

InformationonauthorizedoractualexportsandimportsofweaponswithinthescopeoftheATT

Measuresproveneffectiveinaddressingthediversionoftransferredconventionalarms

Submitto ATTSecretariat ATTSecretariat StatesParties(throughATTSecretariat)

DistributionReportshallbemadeavailable,anddistributedtotheStatesPartiesbytheSecretariat.

Reportshallbemadeavailable,anddistributedtotheStatesPartiesbytheSecretariat.

Reportshallbemadeavailable,anddistributedtotheStatesPartiesbytheSecretariat.


11

B. ElementsofATTreportingtobeconsideredbyStatesParties

ATT‐initial

ATT‐annual*

ATT‐MeasurestoPreventDiversion

UNRegister PoA/ITI**

Implementationandcooperation Nationaldefinitionsofconventionalarms xNationalControlList xNationalPoint(s)ofContact x x x xInformationexchangemechanism x x xLessonslearned x x

Assistanceininvestigations,prosecutionsandjudicialproceedingsrelatedtoATTviolations x xProvisionofinternationalassistance xRequestforinternationalassistance xRegulationofexports Regulationofexportsofconventionalarms xRegulationofexportsofammunition/munitions xRegulationofexportsofpartsandcomponents xLaws,regulations,administrativeprocedures x xDocumentationrequiredtoauthoriseanexport x x

Nationalauthorities x xRecord‐keeping x xAuthorized/actualexports Transactionsdetailson:

ImportingState x x Model/typeofitem(description) x x Quantity x x Value x Intermediatelocation x x Commentsonthetransfer x Measurestakentomitigaterisk x

Confidence‐buildingmeasuresagreedupon x Enforcementmeasures x xRegulationofimports


12

Laws,regulations,administrativeprocedures x xDocumentationrequiredtoauthoriseanimport x Nationalauthorities x xRecord‐keeping x xAuthorized/actualimports Detailson: ExportingState x x Model/typeofitem(description) x x Quantity x x Value x Intermediatelocation x x End‐useorend‐userdocumentation x Commentsonthetransfer x Stockpilemanagement x xBorder&customcontrol x xMarkingofweapons x xRegulatetransit/trans‐shipment Laws,regulations,administrativeprocedures x Documentationrequiredtoauthorisetransit/trans‐shipment x Nationalauthorities x Record‐keeping x ExportingState x ImportingState x Model/typeofitem(description) x Quantity x Value x Regulationofbrokeringactivities Laws,regulations,administrativeprocedures x xDocumentationrequiredtoauthorisebrokeringactivities x Nationalauthorities x

Record‐keeping x x

Enforcementmeasures x xPreventdiversionofweapons Informationexchange Illicitactivities,includingcorruption x

Internationaltraffickingroutes x

Illicitbrokers x

Sourcesofillicitsupply x

Methodsofconcealment x

Commonpointsofdispatch x


13

Destinationsusedbyorganizedgroupsengagedindiversion x

Investigationandlawenforcementmeasures x

Marking,tracingandstockpilemanagement Measurestoimprovestockpilemanagement x x xMeasurestoensurepropermarkingofweapons x x xMeasurestoenhancecooperationinweaponstracing x x x

*ATTannualreportmayexcludecommerciallysensitiveornationalsecurityinformation.

**TheinformationbelowisbasedonthePoAreportingtemplate.

ATTImplementationToolkit|Module4|Informationexchange,ternationalcooperation&assistance

1


Module 4 Information Exchange, International Cooperation and Assistance


ATTImplementationToolkit|Module4|Informationexchange,Internationalcooperation&assistance

2

I.Introduction

AnycountryjoiningtheArmsTradeTreaty(ATT),commitstoputtinginplaceadequatemeasurestoimplementtheTreaty.StateswilldecidewhichmeasuresarebesttofulfiltheirobligationsundertheATT.Thesemeasuresmayvaryfromcountrytocountry.

AfterreviewingthereportingrequirementsundertheATTinmodule3ofthistoolkit,thisfourthmodule,Informationexchange,internationalcooperationandassistance,aimstoassistStatesinsettingupmechanismstoexchangeinformationandfacilitatinginternationalcooperationandassistancetoimplementtheTreaty.

ThismodulewilldiscusstheroleofthenationalpointsofcontactandtheconferenceofStatesParties.ItwillalsoaddressinternationalcooperationandassistancetoimplementtheTreaty.

II.Channelstoexchangeinformation

StatesPartiesareinchargeoftheirimplementationeffortstocomplywiththeobligationsundertheATT.StatesPartiesmustdesignatenationalpointsofcontacttoexchangeinformationonATTimplementationmatters.1TheconferenceofStatesPartieswillalsoprovidethemwithanopportunitytoexchangeinformationanddiscussmattersrelatedtotheTreaty’simplementation.2ThesechannelsareestablishedbytheATT.Inaddition,StatesPartiesmayengageindirectcontactwithotherStatesanduseanyregionalmechanismsorarrangementsthatmaybesetuptoexchangeinformationonATT‐relatedmatters.

1.Nationalpointofcontact

1.1.Whatisanationalpointofcontact?

Article5(6)stipulatesthatStatesPartiesmustdesignateoneormorenationalpointsofcontact(NPC)toexchangeinformationonmattersrelatedtotheimplementationoftheATT.TheestablishmentofaninternationalnetworkofNPCsisacommonpracticeininternationaltreatiesandagreements(i.e.UNProgrammeofActiononSmallArmsandtheInternationalTracingInstrument).TheATTdoesnotprovideadefinitionforNPC.However,itcouldbeunderstoodas:

1 Article 5 (6). 2 Article 17 (4).


3

Agovernmentunit/institutiondesignatedtoperformfunctionsrelatedtotheATTsuchasliaisingwithofficialsfromotherStates,theATTSecretariat,andrelevantsub‐regional,regionalandinternationalorganizations;liaisingwithothernationalauthoritiesresponsibleforarmstransfercontrols;receivinginformationrequestsrelatedtotheATT;sharingATT‐relatedinformationandlessonslearned;receivingassistancerequests;coordinatingtheprovisionofATTassistancetootherStates.

1.2.ResponsibilitiesoftheNPC

TheNPC’sprimarilyroleshallbetoshareinformationamongStatesParties.InformationtobeexchangedbyorthroughtheNPCcouldinclude:

InformationonmattersofmutualinterestregardingtheimplementationandapplicationoftheTreaty;3

CorrespondencewiththeATTSecretariat,includingonmattersrelatedtonationalreports;

Pendingorapprovedexportauthorizations,whereappropriateandincoordinationwiththerelevantnationalauthoritiesonarmstransferscontrols;

FactsandadviceneededforarrangementstomitigatetheriskofdiversionofthetransferofconventionalarmswithallStatesconcerned(importing,transit,trans‐shipmentandexportingStatesParties);

AssistancerequestsfortheimplementationoftheATT;

ProvisionofassistancetootherStatesonATTimplementationmatters;

EffectiveATTimplementationpracticesandlessonslearnt.

1.3.DesignationoftheNPC

EachStatePartytotheATTwilldesignateitsNPCinaccordancewithitsnationallaws.Typically,theNPCtaskswouldbeassignedtothemostrelevantunitintheministryofforeignaffairs,ministryoftrade,ministryofdefence,ministryofinterior,President’soffice,oralawenforcementagency.AseachStatePartyisrequiredtohavecompetentnationalauthoritiesforaneffectiveandtransparentnationaltransfercontrolsystem,4theseauthoritieswouldoftenbeenseenasbestsuitabletoperformNPCtasks.

ItisrecommendedthattheNPChasauthoritytorequestrelevantinformationfromotherpublicorprivateentitieswithintheStatePartyonmattersrelatedtotheimplementationoftheATT.

Tip:ParticipationoftheNPCinnationaldelegationstotheATTconferencesofStatesPartiesandtheirrelevantmeetingsofsubsidiarybodies,aswellasinrelevantregionalandinternationalmeetingsandeventsrelatedtotheATT,wouldenabletheNPCtobuildnetworksandtokeepabreastofdevelopmentsandlessonslearntintheimplementationoftheTreaty.



4

1.4.CommunicatingthedesignationoftheNPC

TheTreatydoesnotspecifywhatNPC‐relatedinformationshouldbecommunicatedtotheATTSecretariat.5Thefollowinginformationwouldbeuseful:

a.Nameofthedesignatedunit/institution;

b.Address;

c.Contactperson;

d.E‐mailaddress(preferablynotapersonale‐mailaddressbutane‐mailaddressaccessiblebytheunit/institution);

e.Telephoneandfaxnumber.

AnychangesintheinformationrelatedtotheNPCmustbecommunicatedtotheATTSecretariatforthwith.6

1.5.ListofNPCs

TheATTSecretariatisresponsibleformaintainingthelistofNPCsandformakingitavailabletoStatesParties.7TheconferenceofStatesPartiesmaydecidetomakethelistavailabletothepublic.

TheNPCnetworkcanbeanimportanttoolforenhancingcooperationandexchanginginformationamongStatesParties.

1.6.NPCsinotherinstruments

Severalinternationalinstrumentsinthefieldofconventionalarms,includingtransparencyinarmaments,requestStatesPartiestodesignateanNPC,suchas:

FirearmsProtocol;

ProgrammeofActiononSmallArms;

InternationalTracingInstrument;

UNRegisterofConventionalArms;

UNReportonMilitaryExpenditures.

StatesmaydesignatethesameNPCfordifferentinstruments.StatesmayalsochoosetodesignatedifferentNPCsfordifferentinstrumentsandhavethemcooperateclosely(e.g.preparationofreportsunderthePoA/ITIandATT).

5 Article 5 (6). 6 Ibidem. 7 Article 18 (3)b.


5

2.ConferenceofStatesParties8

TheconferenceofStatesParties(CSP)oftheATTprovidesanopportunityforStatestogatherregularlytoexchangeinformationanddiscussmattersofimportance.

2.1.IssuestobediscussedanddecidedatCSPs

a.Atitsfirstmeeting,itsrulesofprocedure;

b.EstablishmentofanysubsidiarybodiesandtheCSPoversightoverthem;

c.Establishmentofavoluntarytrustfund;9

d.FinancialrulesfortheCSPs,theSecretariatandanysubsidiarybodiesitmightestablish;

e.TasksandbudgetsoftheSecretariat;

f.Budgetforthefinancialperioduntilthenextordinarysession;

g.ImplementationandoperationoftheATT,includingthepromotionofitsuniversality;

h.Administrative,logisticalandfinancialprovisionsregardingtheimplementationoftheTreaty;

i.IssuesarisingfromtheinterpretationoftheATT;

j.AmendmenttotheTreatysixyearsafteritsentryintoforceandhenceforth,onlyeverythreeyears;10

k.AnyotherfunctionconsistentwiththeATT.

2.2.ExtraordinarymeetingsoftheconferenceofStatesParties11

ExtraordinarymeetingsoftheconferenceofStatesPartiescouldbeheld:

WhendeemednecessarybytheCSP;

UponwrittenrequestofanyStatePartysupportedbyatleasttwo‐thirdsoftheStatesParties.

Tip:Participationofarmsexport/importcontrolexpertsinnationaldelegationstotheATTconferencesofStatesPartiesandtheirrelevantmeetingsofsubsidiarybodies,aswellasinrelevantregionalandinternationalmeetingsandeventsrelatedtotheATT,wouldenablethoseexpertstobuildnetworksandtokeepabreastofdevelopmentsandlessonslearnedintheimplementationoftheTreaty.

8 Article 17. 9 Article 16 (3). 10 The Treaty entered into force on 24 December 2014 therefore, the conference of States Parties could consider proposed amendments on its meeting in 2020 if any State Party had submitted such proposal to the ATT Secretariat. Henceforth, the conference of States Parties will only consider such proposals every three years. 11 Article 17 (5).


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III.InternationalcooperationandassistancetoimplementtheATT

1.InternationalcooperationRegulatingtheinternationalconventionalarmstradeandtheeffectiveimplementationoftheATTrequiresextensivecooperationamongStatesParties.InternationalcooperationundertheATTcantakevariousforms,including:

a.Exchangeofinformation,experiencesandlessonslearnedontheimplementationoftheATTthroughitsnetworkofnationalpointsofcontacts;

b.ReviewoftheimplementationoftheTreaty,includingdevelopmentsinthefieldofconventionalarmsattheconferenceofStatesParties;

c.CollaborationandexchangeofinformationbetweentheexportingandimportingStatesPartiesonpendingoractualexportauthorizationswheretheimportingStatePartyisthefinaldestinationofsuchtransfer;12

d.Partnershipandexchangeofinformationtopreventdiversion;

e.Mutualassistanceinmatterssuchasinvestigations,prosecutionsandjudicialproceedings;

f.Coordinationtopreventthatarmstransfersbecomesubjecttocorruptpractices;

g.DialogueonATTimplementationmattersatbilateralorregionallevel;

h.ProvisionofassistancetoimplementtheTreaty,includingfundingfromthevoluntarytrustfundtobeestablishedunderArticle16(3)oftheATT,bilateralagreementsorregional,sub‐regionalandinternationalorganizations.

1.1.InformationexchangeamongStatePartiesAdequateinformationexchangeamongcountriesinvolvedinatransfer,oramongallrelevantStatesPartiesforinstanceonlessonslearnedandgoodpractices,isanessentialcomponentforthesuccessfulimplementationoftheATT.

Italsoleadstoincreasedtransparencyandaccountabilityinarmstransfers.

TherearemanywaysinwhichStatesPartiescanengageininformationexchange,includingforexample:

DirectdialoguebetweenNPCs;

CommunicationbetweentheNPCofoneStatePartyandthenationaltransfercontrolauthoritiesofanother;

Meetingsbetweenofficials,atbilateralorregionallevels,orinthemarginsofamultilateralmeeting;

CorrespondencebetweenthenationaltransfercontrolauthoritiesofdifferentStatesParties;

Circulationofinformationthroughappropriatechannelswithintheframeworkofexistingornewbilateral,regionalormultilateralmechanismsforinformation‐sharingandexchange.

12 Article 8 (3).


7

1.1.1.InformationexchangeontheimplementationoftheATT

StatesPartiesshouldshareinformationtoeffectivelysupporttheimplementationoftheATT.Informationtobeexchangedshouldinclude:

a.MattersofmutualinterestregardingtheapplicationoftheATT;13

b.DataregardingillicitactivitiesandactorstopreventanderadicatediversionofconventionalarmsunderArticle2(1);14

c.LessonslearnedonanyaspectoftheATT.15

1.1.2.Cooperationandinformationexchangetoensureaccountabilityandtopreventdiversion

Exporting,importing,transitandtrans‐shipmentStatesPartiesmustcooperateandshareinformation,pursuanttotheirnationallaws,whereappropriateandfeasible,tomitigatetheriskofdiversionofthetransferofcoveredweapons.16

AnyexportingStatePartyshallmakeavailableappropriateinformationaboutanauthorization,uponrequest,totheimportingStatePartyandtothetransitortrans‐shipmentStatesParties,subjecttotheexportingState’snationallaws,regulationsorpolicies;17

StatesPartiesshouldshareinformationregardingillicitactivitiesandactorstopreventanderadicatediversionofconventionalarms.18

1.1.3.InformationexchangethroughtheATTSecretariat

StatesPartiesarerequiredorencouragedtoprovidethefollowinginformationtotheSecretariat,whichinturnismandatedtocommunicateittoallStatesParties:

a.Nationalcontrollists,pursuanttoeachStateParty’snationallaws(required);19

b.NPC(required);20

c.InitialreportonmeasurestakentoimplementtheATT(required);21

d.ReportsonanynewmeasuresundertakeninordertoimplementtheATTwhenappropriate(required);22

e.Annualreport(required);23

f.Informationonmeasuresthathaveproveneffectiveinaddressingthediversionofconventionalarms(encouraged).24

13 Article 15 (2). 14 Article 15 (4). 15 Article 15 (7). 16 Article 11 (3). 17 Article 7 (6). 18 Ibidem. 19 Article 5 (4). 20 Article 5 (6). 21 Article 13 (1). 22 Ibidem. 23 Article 13 (3). 24 Article 13 (2).


8

1.2.Settlementofdisputes25

StatesPartiesshallconsultand,bymutualconsent,cooperatetopursuethesettlementofanydisputethatmayarisebetweenthemregardingissuesconcerningtheinterpretationorapplicationoftheTreaty.StatesPartiesshallseekasolutionby:

a.Negotiations;

b.Mediation;

c.Conciliation;

d.Judicialsettlement;

e.Arbitration;

f.Anyotherpeacefulmeans.

2.Internationalassistance

StatesPartiestotheATTshalltakeappropriateenforcementmeasuresfortheeffectiveregulation

ofinternationaltransfersofconventionalarms,ammunitionandpartsandcomponentsandforpreventingtheirdiversion.26

AnyStatePartyshouldensurethatitcountswithgovernmentalinstitutions,anadequatelegalframework,financialandtechnicalresourcestoimplementtheTreaty.

Tothateffect,manyStatesPartiesmayconsiderrequestingassistance.

InternationalassistanceundertheATThelpsallStatesPartiestoimplementtheTreatyinaneffectivemanner.

InternationalassistancecanbegrantedthroughbilateralagreementsbetweenStatesPartiesaswellasbyregionalandinternationalorganizations.

2.1.Areasofassistance

EachStatePartymayassessthelevel,natureandextentofassistanceitwantstoseek.27Article16(1)indicatesexamplesofareaswhereassistancecouldbesought:

a.Legalorlegislativeassistance;

b.Institutionalcapacity‐building;

c.Technicalassistance;

d.Materialassistance;

e.Financialassistance.

25 Article 19. 26 Article 14. 27 For example, the Arms Trade Treaty Baseline Assessment Project has developed a survey that helps countries to identify areas where they need assistance. See www.armstrade.info .


9

2.1.1.Legalorlegislativeassistance

Legalorlegislativeassistancemayincluderevisingexistinglegislationandregulatoryframeworksordevelopingnewones,suchas:Tradecontrollegislationandregulation,includingadministrativeandcriminalpenalties;

Customslawsandfirearmsregulationandcontrolacts;

Regulatoryprocedures,includingimportandexportcontrolpoliciesandadministrativeprocedures;

Legislation,regulatoryproceduresaimedatpreventingthediversionofconventionalarms;

Nationalcontrollists.

Internationalassistanceprogrammestoprovidelegalorlegislativeassistancecouldtakemanyforms,including:Workshops,seminars,andtrainingprogrammesaimedatassistinginthedraftingorreviewofrelevantlegislation,policiesandprocedures;Round‐tablestoshareinformationoneffectivelegislation,policiesandprocedures;

DevelopmentofmodellegislationbyStatesParties;

Technicalexpertiseprovidedbyconsultants;

Sharingoflessonslearnedandgoodpractices.

2.1.2.Institutionalcapacity‐building

Internationalassistanceprogrammestoenhanceinstitutionalcapabilitiescouldincludethefollowingactivities:

a.Assistanceinestablishingthenationalexport/importcontrolsystem;

b.Supporttointer‐agencyprocessesandnationalcoordinationmechanisms;

c.Trainingforofficialsandpersonnelsuchas:

Nationalpointsofcontact;

Licensing/authorizationofficials;

Lawenforcementofficials,includingcustomsandbordercontrol;

Militaryandsecurityforcesofficialsonweaponsandammunitionstockpilemanagement,intelligencegathering,andweaponsmarkingandtracing;

Parliamentariansandofficialsentrustedwithoversightresponsibilities,whereapplicable.

2.2.Typesofassistance

Assistancecanbeprovidedmainlyinthreeforms:technical,materialandfinancial.

2.2.1.Technicalassistance

Examplesoftechnicalassistanceare:

a.Workshops,seminars,round‐tables,trainingcourses;


10

b.Developmentofinstructionmaterials,booklets,documents,softwareapplications;

c.Sharingoflessonslearnedandgoodpractices;

d.Peer‐to‐peertraining,mentoring;

e.Consultancyservices;

f.Trainingvisits,personnelexchanges;

g.Buildingorrefurbishingstockpilesanddepots.

2.2.2.Materialassistance

EquipmentneededtoimplementtheATTcouldbeprovided,loaned,leased(includingatapreferentialrate)orcontributedin‐kind.

2.2.3.Financialassistance

Sourcesoffinancialsupportcouldbefoundin:

a.Bilateralandmultilateralaid;

b.FundingfromthevoluntarytrustfundtobeestablishedunderArticle16(3)oftheATTorothertrustfundsestablishedforsimilarpurposes,includingtheUnitedNationsTrustFacilitySupportingCooperationonArmsRegulation(UNSCAR).28

2.3.Additionalconsiderations

Inprovidingassistance,StatesPartiescouldconsiderthefollowingcriteria:

a.Applyingflexibilityandaccountingforspecificity:noonesizefitsall;

b.Fosteringnationalownership;

c.Safeguardingsustainability;

d.Ensuringagender‐sensitiveapproach.

2.3.1.Noone‐size‐fits‐all

AssistanceprovidedtoimplementtheATTshouldbetailoredtospecificneedsoftherecipientState.Whendesigningassistanceprogrammes,thefollowingcircumstancescouldbetakenintoconsideration:

a.Countrysize;

b.Geography(e.g.borderlength,borderaccessibility);

c.Infrastructure,majortradingroutes;

d.Historical,cultural,andpoliticalcontexts;

e.Socio‐economicdevelopment;

f.Constitutionalandgovernmentframeworksandadministrativepractices;

28 More information on UNSCAR is available at www.un.org/disarmament/UNSCAR.


11

g.Levelsofregionalcooperation;

h.Volumeandvalueofarmsexportsand/orimports;

i.IftherecipientStatePartyisparticularlyaffectedbyproblemsrelatedtotheproliferationofillicitconventionalarms,includingSALW;

j.IftherecipientStatePartyfacesdiversionproblems;

k.Availablelocalresources;

l.Existingrelevantprogrammes,includingbyregionalorganizationsandbyin‐countryUNpartnerssuchasUNDPorUNODC;

m.Existingassistanceprogrammesprovidedbyotherdonorsinthefieldofdisarmamentandnon‐proliferation;

n.ExistingprojectsrelatedtotheATTbeingimplementedintherecipientStateorintheregion.

2.3.2.Nationalownership

Nationalownershipisakeyfactorinensuringthesuccessofanyassistanceprogramme.RecipientStatesauthoritiesareinthebestpositiontoassesstheirneeds,tosteertheirATTimplementationprocessandtoapplythoseATTlessonslearnedthatwillhelptheirownimplementationefforts.

Inorderforinternationalassistancetobeeffective,recipientStateswillneedtoconductanin‐depthassessmenttoidentifytheassistancetheyrequireinimplementingtheTreaty.

RecipientStatesshouldalsobewillingtobeinvolvedhands‐onthroughouttheATTimplementationprocess(atallstagesoftheassistanceproject‐cycle:assessmentofneeds,designofthetargetedassistanceprogramme,monitoringoftheprogrammeimplementation,evaluationandfollow‐upphaseoftheprogramme,formulationoflessonslearned).

RecipientStatesshouldcontributelocalhumanresourcesand,whenpossible,materialandfinancialresourcestoensureownershipbutalsosustainabilityofeffectiveATTimplementationmeasures.

2.3.3.Sustainability

Atrulyeffectiveassistanceprogrammeisonethathasalong‐lastingandsustainableimpactintherecipientState.Suchprogrammemaycontain:

a.Developmentofguidelines,manuals,instructionsand“how‐to”guides;

b.Inclusionofa‘train‐the‐trainers’component,sothatthetrainingandknowledgeimpartedthroughassistancecouldbereplicatedandmultipliedwithintherecipientState;

c.Adequatetrainingontheuseandmaintenanceofequipmentprovided(ifequipmentisprovidedaspartoftheassistanceprogramme).

2.3.4.Gender‐sensitiveapproach

StatesPartiesmayalsoincorporateagenderperspectiveintheirinternationalassistanceprogrammesthrough,forexample:

a.Consideringthevalueofgender‐sensitiveriskassessmentsandhowthesecanbeundertaken;


12

b.Promotingparticipationofwomenandwomen’sgroupsintherecipientStateinthedecision‐makingprocessaswellasplanningandimplementationoftheprogramme;29

c.IncludingofwomenintherecipientStateasabeneficiary/target/traineeintheassistanceprogramme;

d.Addressingtheconsequencesofarmsdiversionforwomen;

e.Includingwomenintrain‐the‐trainerscomponents.

2.4.Requestingassistance

AnyStatePartymayrequestassistancetoimplementtheATT.Assistancemayberequestedthrough:

a.TheATTSecretariat;

b.OtherStatesParties/Statesatbilateraldialogue;

c.Regionalandsub‐regionalorganizations;

d.InternationalorganizationssuchastheUN;

e.Non‐governmentalorganizations.

2.5.Elementsforanassistancerequest

ThebelowelementsincludekeyinformationthatmightbeusefulinarequestforassistancetoimplementtheATT.

a.Contactdetails(TheStatePartymayconsiderchannellingitsrequestthroughitsNPC)

Institution:

Contactperson:

Position:

PhoneandFaxnumber:

E‐mailaddress:

b.Summaryofassistancerequested

[Provideashortsummaryoftheassistancerequest]

c.Specificationofrequestedassistance

Legalorlegislativeassistance-Modellegislation

-Strategictradecontrollegislation

-Customsandbordercontrollegislation

29 The preamble of the ATT recognizes that civil society can play an active role in raising awareness of the object and purpose of the Treaty, as well as in supporting its implementation.


13

-Implementingregulations

-Nationalcontrollist

Other,specify:Institutionalcapacity‐building

-Settingupanationalcontrolsystem

-Supportinginter‐agencyprocess

-Settinguparecord‐keepingsystem

-Developmentofproceduresforinformationsharing

-Disarmament,demobilizationandreintegration

-Markingofweapons

-Weaponstracing

Training

ATTImplementationToolkit|Module5|ProhibitionsonTransfers

1


Module 5 Prohibitions on Transfers



2

I.Introduction


EachStatewilldecidewhichmeasuresitneedsinordertocarryoutitsobligationsundertheATT.Thesemeasuresmayvaryfromcountrytocountry.

Thisfifthmodule,ProhibitionsonTransfers,aimstoassistStatesinadoptingstandardizedcriteriatotakeintoaccountwhenauthorizingarmstransferstoensurecompliancewithArticle6oftheATT.

II.Whatconstitutesatransfer?

Theactivitiesoftheinternationalarmstrade(export,import,transit,trans‐shipmentandbrokering)aretransfersaccordingtoArticle2(2).1

III.ProhibitionsArticle6establishestheprohibitionsontransfersofconventionalarms,ammunitionandpartsand

components(items)undertheATT.Itspecifieswhatdoesnotconstituteanacceptableandresponsiblearmstransfer.

ObligationsunderArticle6applytoallStatesPartieswithjurisdictionoveratransferofitemscovered

bytheTreaty.

1 See modules 6, 7, 8 and 9 for more information concerning these activities.


3

1.ProhibitionoftransfersinviolationofUNSecurityCouncilarmsembargoesoraStateParty’sobligationsundermeasuresadoptedbytheSecurityCouncilactingunderChapterVIIoftheUNCharter

StatesPartiesshallnotauthorizeanytransferofitemscoveredbytheATT,ifsuchtransferwouldbe

inviolationofaUNSecurityCouncilarmsembargooranyotherStateParty’sobligationsundermeasuresadoptedbytheSecurityCouncilactingunderChapterVIIoftheUNCharter.2

Underthesearmsembargoes,StatesareprohibitedfromtransferringarmstotheembargoedStateor

entity.SecurityCouncilresolutionsfurtherstipulatethatStatesshalltakeallthenecessarymeasurestoimplement,applyandenforcetheembargo.

Tip:ForacurrentlistofSecurityCouncilarmsembargoes:www.un.org/sc/committees

Inadditiontoarmsembargoes,theSecurityCouncil,actingunderChapterVIIoftheUNCharter,hasadoptedothermeasuresthatimposeobligationsonStates.Forinstance,resolution1373establishesthatStatesshalleliminatethesupplyofweaponstoterrorists.3

2.Prohibitionoftransfersinviolationofrelevantinternationalobligationsunderinternationalagreements,inparticularthoserelatingtothetransferof,orillicittraffickingin,conventionalarms

StatesPartiesshallnotauthorizeanytransferofitemscoveredundertheTreatyifsuchatransfer

wouldviolaterelevantinternationalobligationsunderinternationalagreements,inparticularthoserelatingtothetransferof,orillicittraffickingin,conventionalarms.

ItispresumedthatStatesPartiesareawareoftheirlegalobligationsunderinternationalagreements.

ItisimportantthattheofficialsresponsiblefortheauthorizationoftransfersofitemscoveredundertheATTbewellawareofwhichofthoseinternationalobligationsarerelevantforthepurposesofapplyingArticle6(2).

Alistofexamplesofmultilateralandregionalagreementsisattachedasanannextothismodule.

2 Article 6 (1). 3 S/RES/1373 (2001).


4

3.ProhibitionoftransfersiftheStatePartyhasknowledgeatthetimeofauthorizationofthetransferthatthecovereditemswouldbeusedtocommitgenocide,crimesagainsthumanity,gravebreachesoftheGenevaConventionsof1949orotherwarcrimes

WhereaStatePartyhasknowledge,atthetimeoftheauthorization,thattheitemssubjecttoa

transferauthorizationwouldbeusedtocommitgenocide,crimesagainsthumanity,gravebreachesoftheGenevaConventionsof1949,attacksdirectedagainstcivilianobjectsorciviliansprotectedassuch,orotherwarcrimesasdefinedbyinternationalagreementstowhichitisaParty,theStatePartymustprohibitsuchtransfer.

Ifitauthorizesthetransfer,theStatePartywouldnotonlybeinnon‐compliancewiththeATT,butit

couldalsoberesponsibleunderthelawofstateresponsibilityforaidingorassistingintheinternationalwrongfulact.

Article16oftheArticlesonResponsibilityofStatesforinternationalwrongfulactsprovides:

“AStatewhichaidsorassistsanotherStateinthecommissionofaninternationallywrongfulactbythelatterisinternationallyresponsiblefordoingsoif:(a)ThatStatedoessowithknowledgeofthecircumstancesoftheinternationallywrongfulact;and(b)TheactwouldbeinternationallywrongfulifcommittedbythatState”.4

IV.FactorstobeexaminedbyStatesPartiesbeforeauthorizingordenyingatransferofconventionalarms,ammunitionandpartsandcomponentstoensurecompliancewiththeprovisionsofArticle6

MostStateshavelaws,regulationsandproceduresrelatingtotheexerciseofStatecontrolor

regulationofinternationalarmstransfers.Theselaws,regulationsandproceduresmayneedtoberevisedinordertoensurefullcompliancewithArticle6oftheATT.ThefollowingisalistofsuggestedassessmentfactorsthatStatesPartiescouldutilisetoensurethattheydonotauthorizeatransfer(export,import,transit/trans‐shipmentandbrokeringactivities)thatisnotincompliancewithArticle6.

1.FactorstoconsiderinassessingifatransferwouldviolateArticle6(1)

a.WhethertherecipientissubjecttoaSecurityCouncilarmsembargo;

4 The International Court of Justice in the Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide affirmed that Article 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility reflects a customary rule. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 217, para. 420.


5

b.WhetherthetransferviolatesSecurityCouncilresolution1373onthreatstointernationalpeaceandsecuritycausedbyterroristacts;5

c.Therecipient’spastandcurrentrecordregardingrespectfortheSecurityCouncilarmsembargoes;d.Therecipient’scapacitytoensurethattheitemstransferredwillnotbedivertedinviolationofaSecurityCouncilarmsembargo;e.TherecipientState’sintentionsasexpressedinitsformalcommitments;f.WhethertherecipientStatehasfailedtoinvestigateorcollaborateintheinvestigationsofviolationstoSecurityCouncilarmsembargoes;

g.Inadditiontotheabove,exportingStatesPartiesmaytakeintoconsiderationwhethertherecipientStatehasadoptedlegislationmakingtheviolationofarmsembargoesestablishedbytheSecurityCouncilacriminaloffence.

2.FactorstoconsiderinassessingatransferwouldviolateArticle6(2)

a.WhetherthetransferviolatesobligationsundertheUNCharter;b.WhetherthetransferisinbreachoftheauthorizingStateParty’srelevantinternationalhumanrightsobligations;c.WhetherthetransferisinbreachoftheauthorizingStateParty’sinternationalhumanitarianlawobligations;d.WhetherthetransferisincompliancewiththeauthorizingStateParty’sobligationsunderrelevantinternationalagreements,inparticularthoserelatingtothetransferof,orillicittraffickingin,conventionalarms.

3.FactorstoconsiderininassessingifatransferwouldviolateArticle6(3)

a.Whethertheitemswouldbeusedtocommitgenocide;b.Whethertheitemswouldbeusedtocommitcrimesagainsthumanity;

c.WhethertheitemswouldbeusedtocommitgravebreachesoftheGenevaConventionsof1949;6d.Whethertheitemswouldbeusedtocommitattacksdirectedagainstcivilianobjects;e.Whethertheitemswouldbeusedtocommitattacksagainstciviliansprotectedassuch;

5 unscr.com/en/resolutions/1373. 6 https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions.


6

f.WhethertheitemswouldbeusedtocommitotherwarcrimesasdefinedbyinternationalagreementstowhichtheauthorizingStateisaParty.

V.SourcesofinformationtobeconsideredbyStatesPartieswhenauthorizingtransfers

EachStatePartyisinchargeofitsownimplementationeffortstoensurecompliancewithitsobligationsundertheATT.ThecompetentauthoritieswithintheStatePartymayconsiderconsultingthefollowingsourcesofinformation:

- ThecurrentlistofSecurityCouncilarmsembargoesinforce;7

- ImplementationassistancenoticesissuedbytheSecurityCouncilCommittees;8- RelevantdocumentsfromUNhumanrightsbodiesandinternationaltribunals;9,10

- IntelligenceandotherinformationavailabletotheStatePartythroughbilateralorregionalinformationexchangemechanisms;- InformationexchangedwithotherStatesPartiestotheATT;- Documentsfromregionalandspecialcourtsandtribunals;- Othercrediblesources,suchasregionalhumanrightsorganizationsandcivilsocietyorganizations.

7 www.un.org/sc/committees. 8 www.un.org/sc/committees. 9 E.g. www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx. 10 E.g. www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx


7

Annex

Non‐exhaustivelistofrelevantmultilateralandregionalinstruments

UnitedNationsinstrumentsoUnitedNationsConventiononProhibitionsorRestrictionsontheUseofCertain

ConventionalWeaponsWhichMayBeDeemedtoBeExcessivelyInjuriousortoHaveIndiscriminateEffects(CCW)

oUnitedNationsProgrammeofActiontoPrevent,CombatandEradicatetheIllicitTradeinSmallArmsandLightWeaponsinAllItsAspects(PoA)

oUnitedNationsConventionagainstTransnationalOrganizedCrime(TOC)–ProtocolagainsttheIllicitManufacturingofandTraffickinginFirearms,theirPartsandComponentsandAmmunition(FirearmsProtocol)

InternationalagreementsoConventionontheProhibitionoftheDevelopment,ProductionandStockpilingof

Bacteriological(Biological)andToxinWeaponsandontheirDestruction(BWC)oConventionontheProhibitionoftheDevelopment,Production,StockpilingandUseof

ChemicalWeaponsandonTheirDestruction(CWC)oConventionontheProhibitionoftheUse,Stockpiling,ProductionandTransferofAnti‐

PersonnelMinesandonTheirDestruction(OttawaTreaty)oConventiononClusterMunitions(CCM)oTheHagueCodeofConductagainsttheProliferationofBallisticMissiles(HCOC)

(InternationalCodeofConductagainsttheProliferationofBallisticMissiles)(ICOC)oMissileTechnologyControlRegime(MTCR)oTreatyonNon‐ProliferationofNuclearWeapons(NPT)oWassenaarArrangementonExportControlsforConventionalArmsandDual‐Use

GoodsandTechnologies

RegionalagreementsoAndeanPlantoPrevent,FightandEradicateIllicitTraffickinginSmallArmsinAllits

AspectsoCentralAfricanConventionfortheControlofSmallArmsandLightWeapons,Their

Ammunition,PartsandComponentsthatCanbeUsedforTheirManufacture,RepairorAssembly(KinshasaConvention)

oEconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStates(ECOWAS)ConventiononSmallArmsandLightWeapons,TheirAmmunitionandOtherRelatedMaterials

oEuropeanUnion(EU)CommonPosition2003/468/CFSPontheControlofArmsBrokering

oEuropeanUnion(EU)CommonPosition2008/944/CFSPDefiningCommonRulesGoverningtheControlofExportsofMilitaryTechnologyandEquipment

oInter‐AmericanConventionAgainstIllicitManufacturingofandTraffickinginFirearms,Ammunition,ExplosivesandotherRelatedMaterials(CIFTAConvention)

oNairobiProtocolforthePrevention,ControlandReductionofSmallArmsandLightWeaponsintheGreatLakesRegionandtheHornofAfricaandBorderingStates

oOrganizationforSecurityandCooperationinEurope(OSCE)DocumentonSmallArmsandLightWeapons

oSouthAfricanDevelopmentCommunity(SADC)ProtocolontheControlofFirearms,AmmunitionandOtherRelatedMaterials

ATTImplementationToolkit|Module6|Export

1


Module 6 Export



2

I.Introduction



Thissixthmodule,Exportofconventionalweapons,ammunitions,partsandcomponents,providesStateswithpracticalinformationtoconsiderwhenestablishingandmaintaininganationalexportcontrolsystem.Inparticular,thismodulewilldiscusshowtoconductanexportassessment.

II.Nationalexportcontrolsystem

Anationalexportcontrolsystemcomprisestheinstitutionalarrangementsandmechanisms,laws,regulations,policies,proceduresandprocessesthroughwhichgovernmentexercisescontrolovertheexportofcertainproducts,technologyandservices.Normally,thenationalcontrolsystemregulates,assesses,monitors,authorizesand/ordeniestheexportofthosegoods,technologyorservicesfromterritoryunderthejurisdictionoftheStateinquestion.UndertheATT,StatesPartiesshallestablishandmaintainanationalcontrolsystemtoimplementtheprovisionsoftheTreaty.1StatesPartiesshallauthorizeorprohibittheexportofconventionalarms,ammunition/munitions,partsandcomponentspursuanttotheexportassessmentconductedbytheirnationalcontrolsystem.2

Throughanationalexportcontrolsystem,StatesPartiescaneffectively:

-ComplywiththeirobligationsundertheATT;

-ControltheconditionsunderwhichitemsareexportedfromterritoryunderthejurisdictionoftheauthorizingStatePartytoanothercountry(regardlessiftheimportingcountryisaStatePartytotheATT);

-Preventtheexportofitemsundercertainconditionsandcircumstances;

-Reducetheriskthattheexporteditemswillbedivertedtounauthorizedusers;

-Keeptrackoftransfersoriginatingfromterritoriesundertheirjurisdictions.

1 Article 5 (2). 2 Article 7.


3

1.ElementsofanationalexportcontrolsystemundertheATT1.1.Nationallegislationandnationalcontrollists

Thenationallegislationshouldclearlystate:

a.Whichitemsaresubjecttoexportcontrol(nationalcontrollist);

b.Whichgovernmentministries,departmentsandagenciesareresponsibleforregulatingandcontrollingexportsofitems(nationalauthorities);c.Processesforgrantingorrefusingexportauthorizations(regulatoryprocedures);d.Thelegaland/oradministrativeactionsthatwouldbeappliedincaseofexportoffences(e.g.,enforcementmeasures,mechanisms,prosecutionandpunishment).

StatesPartiesarerequiredtomaintainandestablishanationalcontrollist.3Ataminimum,thenationalcontrollistshallcontainnationaldefinitionsoftheeightcategoriesofweaponslistedinArticle2(1).Thelistcouldalsoincludeammunition/munitions4aswellaspartsandcomponentsthataresubjecttoexportcontrol.5Inaddition,StatesPartiesmaywishtocontrolpartsandequipmentsuchastransporthelicopters,tankeraircraft,trucks,assaultboats,electronics,opticalequipment,radar,andmanyothers.Anationalcontrollistmaybeasinglelistcoveringallitemssubjecttoexportcontrolsoracollectionoflists,eachcoveringdifferentcategories/typesofitemssubjecttoexportcontrol.Anationalcontrollistshouldbeupdatedonaregularbasistoensurethatitcoverstechnicaldevelopmentsandemergingtechnologiesthatshouldbesubjecttoexportcontrol.StatesPartiesshallprovidetheirnationalcontrolliststotheATTSecretariat,whichshallmakethemavailabletootherStatesParties.6StatesPartiesareencouragedtomaketheircontrollistspubliclyavailable.Inparticularthoseinvolvedinthemanufacture,exportorimportofarmsorammunitionorinthearmstrade,includingauthorizedbrokers,shouldbeabletoaccessthelist(s).StatesPartiesmaychoosetoapplya“catch‐all”provision7onitemsthatarenot,inprinciple,subjecttomandatoryexportauthorization.

3 Article 5 (2). 4 Article 3. 5 Article 4. 6 Article 5 (4). 7 Many peripheral items that are not listed on the national control lists may still enhance the weapons’ effectiveness, or contribute to weapons development/enhancement/production programmes. It may be difficult or impractical to attempt to include all those items in the list. Instead, a “catch-all” provision requires government’s authorization to export unlisted items when there is a reason to believe that the item may be intended for undesirable end use and/or end-user.


4

1.2.Nationalauthorities

StatesPartieshavetodesignatecompetentnationalauthoritiestoensuretheeffectiveandtransparentnationalcontrolandregulationovertheexportofitemscoveredundertheATT.8

TherequirementtoestablishanexportcontrolsystemappliestoallStatesParties,includingthosethataremainlyimportersandonlyoccasionallyprocessatransferofitemsfromitsterritorytothatofanotherState.Typically,Stateswithlittleornoarmsexportsmaynotneedanelaboratesystem.Itisanationalprerogativetodecidewhichgovernmententitiesareinvolvedinthelicensingandauthorizationprocess.Considerationsregardingwhichentitiesneedtobeinvolvedincludetheamountoftrade,theexistenceofadomesticdefenceindustry,andthestrategicimportanceoftheitems.Insomecountries,certaingovernmentministries,suchastheministryofforeignaffairs,carryoutpoliticalassessmentsand/orprovideguidancetobeconsideredintheassessmentsundertakenbythenationalexportcontrolauthoritiesattheadministrativelevel.Thedesignatednationalauthoritiesshouldbeabletoconsiderstrategic,militaryandforeign‐policyimplications,includinghumanrightsconsiderations,oftheproposedexports.Again,suchconsiderationsshouldbeguidedbydirectivesorguidelinesemanatingfromhighgovernmentallevels.Thedesignatednationalauthoritiesshouldadministertheregulatoryregimeandimplementcontrolsthroughanexportauthorizationprocess.Insomecountries,thenationalauthorityissubjecttoanoversightmechanism(e.g.bythelegislativebody).

Taskstobeundertakenbytheauthorizationagencymayinclude:

a.Grantingpermission/licencetoengageininternationalarmstrade;b.Receivingandreviewingexportapplications;c.Ensuringcompliancewiththenationallawsandthecountry’sobligationsunderinternationallaw,includingArticle6oftheATT;d.ConductingtheexportassessmentrequiredunderArticle7oftheATT;e.Issuingordenyingexportauthorizationsand,inthecaseofthelatter,ensuringfullcompliancethroughinter‐agencycooperation;f.Ensuringthatalldocumentationandapprovalsfortheexportofconventionalarmsanditemsaredetailedandissuedpriortotheauthorizationg.Keepingrecordsofexportlicences/authorizations;h.Makingavailableappropriateinformationaboutanauthorization,uponrequest,totheimportingStateandtotransitortrans‐shipmentStates,ifapplicableandsubjecttoitsnationallaws,policiesandpractices;i.Coordinatingwithotherministriesanddepartmentsinvolvedintheexportauthorizationprocess;j.Reportingtotheoversightbody,whereapplicableandinaccordancewithnationallaws;

8 Article 5 (5).


5

k.Conductingawareness‐raisingprogrammesandoutreachtoindustry,includingprovidinginformationtofamiliarizeindustrywiththerelevantlawsandprocedures;

l.Assessingtheinternalcompliancesystems/programsofexportingcompanies.

1.3.Regulatoryproceduresforconventionalarmsexports

1.3.1.Sequencingprocedures

Thenationalexportcontrolsystemshouldindicatethesequencingprocedurestobefollowedinexportinganyconventionalweaponsorrelateditemsincludedinthenationalcontrollist.

Typically,thesequencingprocedureswillentail:

Pre‐requisite–PermissionfromtheGovernmentfortheexporterandotheractorsinvolvedinthetransfertoengageininternationalarmstrade(inStateswheresuchpermissionisrequired).

Step1‐Exporterobtainsfromtheimporteranimportauthorization,ifapplicableorfeasible,end‐use/userdocumentationandotherrelevantdocuments.TheexportingStateverifiestheauthenticityofrelevantdocuments.Thebrokerinvolvedinthetransfer,ifany,obtainsbrokeringauthorization.

Step2‐Exporterappliesforexportauthorization.

Step3‐Exportassessmentisconductedbynationalexportcontrolauthorities.

Step4‐Exportauthorizationisgranted/deniedbynationalauthorizationagency.

Step4bis.–IfanexportingStatePartybecomesawareofnewrelevantinformation,exportauthorizationisre‐assessedafterconsultations,ifappropriate,withtheimportingState.

Step5‐Transit/trans‐shipmentauthorizationisobtainedfromtransit/trans‐shipmentState.


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Figure1‐Sequencingprocedure

Operatinglicence(onlyifrequiredbynationallaw)

StatesParties,accordingtotheirnationallaws,mayestablishanexportlicensingsystemwherebyonlytheholdersofavalidoperatinglicencecanapplyforanexportauthorization.Insuchcases,theoperatinglicenceisapre‐requisiteforapplyingforanexportauthorization.Normally,anauthorizationwouldberequiredforeachseparatetransaction.

Applicationforanoperatinglicence(onlyifanoperatinglicenceisrequiredbynationallaws)

Applicantsforoperatinglicencesshouldberequiredtomeetthecriteriasetforthbynationalregulations.Anapplicationforanoperatinglicenceshouldberefusedif:

a.Theapplicantfailstomeetthelicensingcriteriaestablishedbynationalregulations.

b.Thereisevidenceofpastinvolvementbytheapplicantinillicittradeofweapons.

c.Informationsubmittedinsupportoftheapplicationisfalse,inaccurateorincomplete.

d.TheapplicanthasbeenrefusedanoperatinglicenceinanotherStateongroundsthatwouldalsoapplyintheStateconsideringtheapplication.

e.Theapplicanthasacriminalrecord.

Expirationoftheoperatinglicence(onlyifanoperatinglicenceisrequiredbynationallaws)

Whereexportlicencesareissued,thevalidityoflicencesshouldbelimitedintime.Thesedocumentsshouldhaveanexpirationdateafterwhichtheyarenolongervalid.Theexpirationdate


7

shouldbeclearlymarkedonoperatinglicences.Thenationalauthoritycoulddistributetheinformationonexpirationdatestootherauthoritiesinvolvedinexportcontrol,especiallycustoms.

Obtainingandverifyingnecessarydocuments

Whenapplyingforanexportauthorization,theexportershouldberequiredtosubmitrelevantdocumentstoaccompanyitsapplication.ThenationalauthorityoftheexportingStatePartyshouldreviewandverifytheauthenticityofthedocumentssubmittedaswellasthetruthfulnessandaccuracyofinformationcontainedtherein.Examplesofrelevantdocumentsinclude:

a.Importauthorization;

b.End‐use/userdocumentation;

c.Brokeringauthorization.

Step1‐ImportauthorizationIfapplicable,theexportermayobtainanimportauthorizationfromtheimportingStatepriortoapplyingforanexportauthorization.However,notallcountriesissueimportauthorizations.

End‐use/userdocuments

Thenationalexportcontrolauthoritiesmayrequirethesubmissionofend‐use/userdocumentation.End‐use/userdocumentscanhavedifferentnamesdependingonthecountryorwhethertheend‐userisagovernmentalentityorprivateentity(e.g.,end‐usercertificates,end‐usestatements).Anend‐use/usercertificationprocessmayrequirethesubmissionofanend‐usercertificate,end‐use/userstatementorassuranceorotherdocumentsthatproviderelevantinformationabouttheend‐use/user.TheexportingStatemayturntoothersourcesinordertoobtainadditionalinformationthatwouldcorroboratetheveracityorreliabilityofdocumentsprovidedbytheimporterandoftheend‐userandimporterthemselves.Thereisnointernationallyagreedstandardformatforend‐use/userdocuments,includingend‐usercertificates.9Thesedocumentsmostfrequentlycontain:10

a.Dateofissuance;

b.Contractnumber;

c.Detailsoftheexporter(name,address);

9 Some regional or other organizations, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (WA), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU) have produced best practice guidelines that elaborate on the types of information and assurance that should be contained in end-user certificates. 10 Also, exporting States often have specific legal requirements for contents or may provide templates to be utilized or completed by the importers.


8

d.Detailsoftheend‐user(name,address);

e.Detailsoftheconsignees,brokersorotherpartiesinvolvedinthetransfer,ifapplicable(name,address);

f.Countryoffinaldestination;

g.Descriptionofthegoods;

h.Quantity;

i.Value;

j.Statedend‐useofthegoods;

k.Nonre‐exportclause;

l.Fullnameofpersonauthorizedtosignend‐usercertificate,signatureofsaidperson;

m.SealofcompanyorGovernment.Itshouldbenotedthattheshifttowardselectronicapplicationsmaybringaboutnewformsofauthenticationotherthanwatermarksandembossedstampsorseals.However,suchtraditionalmethodscontinuetoservetheirpurposewhereelectronicsystemsarenotinplaceorwherehardcopiesarerequiredinadditiontoelectronicapplications.11

Authenticationofend‐use/userdocuments

Authenticationofend‐use/userdocumentsisalegalformalitybywhichtheauthoritiesofimportingStatescertifytheauthenticityofsignaturesaffixedtothedocuments,thecapacityinwhichthesignatoriesareactingand,ifapplicable,theauthenticityofthesealorstampaffixedtothedocument.Uponrequest,importingStatesshouldassistexportingStatesinend‐use/userverificationprocesses,includinginauthenticatinganddeterminingthevalidityandreliabilityofend‐userdocuments.Thisassistancecouldbeprovidedthroughembassiesorconsularagents,ifpossibleandappropriate.Forexample,thedeliveryofend‐use/userdocumentscouldbecarriedoutthroughdiplomaticchannels.Intheirend‐use/userverificationprocesses,thenationalexportcontrolauthoritiescanuseavarietyofsourcesofinformation,includingchecksagainstopensourceinformationsuchastelephoneandbusinessdirectories,internetsources,nationalcontactpointsandanyothersourcesavailabletotherelevantauthoritiesintheexportingStates.12

11 Some electronic applications systems still require the submission of an original, hard-copy EUC. 12 For more on end-use and end-user control systems: www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/OccasionalPapers/PDF/OP21.pdf


9

Step2‐ApplyingforexportauthorizationsExportauthorizationsshallberequiredforalltransfersofconventionalarms,ammunition/munitionsandpartsandcomponents,regardlessofwhethertheimporterisaStateoranon‐Stateentity.Therefore,exportauthorizationsarerequiredfor:

a.State‐to‐Statetransfers;13

b.State‐to‐privatetransfers;14

c.Private‐to‐Statetransfers;

d.Commercialsales(private‐to‐private).

Contentsofapplicationsforexportauthorizations

EachStatedecidesontheformatandcontentoftheapplicationformforauthorizationsregardingexportsofconventionalarmsandrelateditemsthatareincludedonthenationalcontrollist.Theapplicationformcouldrequestthefollowinginformation:

a. Nameandcontactdetailsoftheapplicantfortheauthorization;

b. Applicant’soperatinglicencenumber,ifapplicable;

c. Detaileddescriptions(type,modelname,modelnumber,quantity,etc.)ofitemsforexport;

d. Detailsofthetransfer(value,dateoftransfer,etc.);

e. Countries/portsoftransitand/ortrans‐shipment,ifapplicableandknownatthetimeofapplication;

f. Namesandcontactdetailsofbrokers,intermediaries,importer,consigneesoranyotherpartiesinvolvedinthetransfer;

g. Detailsofthetransportroute,includingthemeansoftransporttobeusedforeachsegment,ifknownatthetimeofapplication;

h. Countryofimport;

i. Intendeduseoftheitemsbeingexported;

j. Nameandcontactdetailsoftheauthorizedend‐user.

Adulyfilledapplicationformshouldbeaccompaniedbyanyotherrequireddocuments(importauthorization,end‐use/userdocumentation,etc.)andshouldbesubmittedtothenationalauthorizationagencyviaprescribedmethodsdeterminedbythenationallaw.

13 In this particular context, the term “State” refers to government entities, such as armed forces and law enforcement institutions. 14 In this context, the term “private” refers to any non-State entity, including, but not limited to, private individuals and organizations.


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Step3‐UndertakingtheexportassessmentUponreceiptofdulyfilledapplicationsforexportauthorizationandallotherrequireddocuments,theauthorizationauthoritiesshouldassesstheapplications,takingintoaccountthefollowingprinciples:

a.Non‐discriminationExportassessmentsshallbecarriedoutinanon‐discriminatorymanner.

b.ObjectivityEachStatePartyshallimplementtheATTinanobjectivemanner.Inordertoensureobjectivity,exportassessmentsbemadeonthebasisofasetofclearandpre‐definedcriteriainaccordancewithnationallegislationandpolicies.

c.TransparencyProceduresforexportauthorizationshouldbewelldefinedinrelevantlawsorregulations,andbeapplicabletoallexportauthorizationprocesses,unlessotherwisestipulatedbylawsorregulations.Inordertoensuremaximumtransparency,generalinformationonassessmentproceduresshouldbepubliclyavailableandtheresultsofparticularexportassessmentsshouldbeaccessibletothepartiesconcerned.

Figure2‐Conductinganexportassessment15

15 This diagram aims to reflect the order of the relevant articles of the ATT, hence it begins with an assessment of the prohibitions (Article 6), followed by the assessment of the risks listed in Article 7, which is in turn followed by an assessment of the risk of diversion (Article 11). In practice, national authorities may not necessarily follow this sequence and may choose to cover all the steps in a single assessment.


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a. Preliminaryassessment

Theauthorizationagencyshouldpre‐screenapplicationstodetermineif:

-Allnecessarydocumentation(e.g,end‐use/userdocumentation,importauthorizationifapplicable)isdulycompleted;

-Eligibilityconditionsconcerningtheexporter/manufactureraremet(e.g.,doestheexporterhaveanoperatinglicence?Istheexporterotherwisequalifiedtoapplyforanexportauthorization?Istheexporter/manufacturernotbarredduetoapriorviolationorsomeotherreason?).

b. Assessmentonprohibitionsoftransfers16

TheauthorizationagencyhastoassesswhethertheproposedexportisnotprohibitedunderArticle6oftheATT.

Tothatend,theauthorizationauthoritiesshallassess:

IftheproposedexportwouldviolatetheState’sobligationsundermeasuresadoptedbytheSecurityCouncilactingunderChapterVIIoftheUNCharter,inparticulararmsembargoes;

IftheproposedexportwouldviolatetheState’srelevantinternationalobligationsunderinternationalagreementstowhichitisaParty,inparticularthoserelatingtothetransferof,orillicittraffickingin,conventionalarms;

IftheStatehasanyknowledgethatthearmsoritemstobeexportedwouldbeusedinthecommissionofgenocide,crimesagainsthumanity,gravebreachesoftheGenevaConventionsof1949,attacksdirectedagainstcivilianobjectsorciviliansprotectedassuch,orotherwarcrimesasdefinedbyinternationalagreementstowhichitisaParty.

Ifitisfoundthattheexportwouldleadtoanyoftheviolationsmentionedabove,theexportingStateshalldenytheexportauthorization.

Statesmayalsoestablishadditionalcriteriaintheirnationallawstoprohibitexportauthorizationsofconventionalarms,ammunition,partsandcomponents.

Incarryingouttheassessment,theauthorizationagencyshouldseekinformationandinputsfromotherrelevantgovernmententitiesaswellasothersources,includingopensources.

c. Riskassessment

IfitisfoundthattheexportwouldnotviolatetheprohibitionssetforthinArticle6oftheATT,then,theexportingStatePartyshallassessiftheexportwouldcarryanyoftheriskslistedunderArticle7oftheTreaty.

Tothatend,theexportingStateshallassess:

16 For a detailed analysis on Article 6 (Prohibitions) of the ATT, see module 5.


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Thepotentialthattheconventionalweaponsoritemswouldcontributetoorunderminepeaceandsecurity.17Itisnotedthattheuseof“would”inArticle7(1)(a)setsahigherthresholdforcertaintythanthatofArticle7(1)(b),which,instead,usestheword“could”.

Inmakingthisassessment,thenationalauthoritiesshouldidentifyandweighthepositiveandnegativeconsequencesstemmingfromtheexportofitemscoveredbyArticles2(1),3and4.Ifthoseauthoritiesdeterminethatanexportislikelytocontributetopeaceandsecurity(apositiveoutcome),theyshouldaddthisfindingtothelistoffactorsfavouringtheauthorizationoftheexport.Ifthenationalauthoritiesfindthatanexportislikelytounderminepeaceandsecurity(anegativeoutcome),theyshouldaddthisrisktothelistoffactorsthatpointtowardstheneedforconsiderationofmitigatingmeasuresoradenialoftheexport.

Theriskthattheconventionalweaponsoritemscouldbeusedtocommitorfacilitateaseriousviolationofinternationalhumanitarianlaw.18

Whatisaseriousviolationofinternationalhumanitarianlaw?19

Aseriousviolationofinternationalhumanitarianlawisawarcrime.Suchaviolationcantakeplaceininternationalornon‐internationalarmedconflicts.

Aviolationisserious,ifitendangersprotectedpersons(e.g.civilians,prisonersofwar,thewoundedandsick)orobjects(e.g.civilianobjectsorinfrastructure)orifitbreachesimportantvalues.

Themajorityofwarcrimesinvolvedeath,injury,destructionorunlawfultakingofproperty.Actscanamounttowarcrimesbecausetheybreachimportantuniversalvalues,evenwithoutphysicallyendangeringpersonsorobjectsdirectly.Theseinclude,forexample,abusingdeadbodiesandrecruitingchildrenwhoareunder15yearsofageintothearmedforces.

Seriousviolationsofinternationalhumanitarianlaware:

•GravebreachesasspecifiedunderthefourGenevaConventionsof1949;20

•GravebreachesasspecifiedunderAdditionalProtocolIof1977;21

•WarcrimesasspecifiedunderArticle8oftheRomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt;

•Otherwarcrimesininternationalandnon‐internationalarmedconflictsincustomaryinternationalhumanitarianlaw.

17 Article 7 (1) (a). 18 Article 7 (1) (b) (i). 19 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Explanatory Note What are “serious violations of international humanitarian law”?, available at www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2012/att-what-are-serious-violations-of-ihl-icrc.pdf. 20 Articles 50, 51, 130, 147 of Conventions I, II, III and IV respectively. 21 Articles 11 and 85.


13

Suggestedindicatorstoassesstheriskthattheexportofcovereditemscouldbeusedinthecommissionofaseriousviolationofinternationalhumanitarianlaw22,23

-Whethertheimporterorend‐userhascommittedseriousviolationsofinternationalhumanitarianlaw;

-Whetherornottheimporterorend‐userhasaidedorabettedseriousviolationsofinternationalhumanitarianlaw;

-WhetherornottheimportingState24hastakenallfeasiblemeasurestopreventviolationsofinternationalhumanitarianlaworcausethemtocease,includingbypunishingthoseresponsible;

-WhetherornottheimportingStatehasmadeaformalcommitmenttoapplyrulesofinternationalhumanitarianlawandtakenappropriatemeasuresfortheirimplementation;

-WhetherornottheimportingStatehasinplacethelegal,judicialandadministrativemeasuresnecessaryfortherepressionofseriousviolationsofinternationalhumanitarianlaw;

-WhetherornottheimportingStatedisseminatesinternationalhumanitarianlaw,inparticulartothearmedforcesandotherarmsbearers,andhasintegratedinternationalhumanitarianlawintoitsmilitarydoctrine,manualsandinstructions;

-WhetherornottheimportingStatehastakenstepstopreventtherecruitmentofchildrenintothearmedforcesorarmedgroupsandtheirparticipationinhostilities;

-WhetherornottheimportingStatehasestablishedaccountableauthoritystructureswiththecapacityandwilltoensurerespectforinternationalhumanitarianlaw;

-Whetherornotthearmsandmilitaryequipmentrequestedarecommensuratewiththeend‐useand/ortheoperationalrequirementsandcapacitiesofthestatedend‐user;

-WhetherornottheimportingStatemaintainsstrictandeffectivecontroloveritsarmsandmilitaryequipmentandtheirfurthertransfers.

Theriskthattheconventionalweaponsoritemscouldbeusedtocommitorfacilitateaseriousviolationofinternationalhumanrightslaw25

Whatisaseriousviolationofinternationalhumanrightslaw?

Whileallhumanrightsviolationsareunacceptable,theATTaddressesonly“serious”violationsofinternationalhumanrightslaw.ThestandardadoptedinArticle7(1)(b)(ii)indicatesthatonlyviolationsofgreatconcerntotheinternationalcommunityshouldpreventtheexportingStatefromauthorizingatransferofcovereditems.Thisstandardunderlinesthehumanrightsconsequencesofarmstransfers.

22 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Arms transfer decisions: Applying international humanitarian law criteria – A practical guide (2007), in particular pages 5-15. Available at www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0916.htm 23 The proposed indicators listed herein are to be understood as a non-exhaustive list of suggestions. Except for the indicators that correspond to the criteria or factors stipulated in the ATT, particularly in Articles 6 and 7, it is up to each State Party to decide which indicators would be most appropriate for use in its export assessments. 24 Transfers to non-State entities that are not under the control or jurisdiction of a State must also be subject to the prohibitions and risk assessments provided in Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT. 25 Article 7 (1) (b) (ii).


14

Thisstandardshouldincorporatetheduediligencestandardinhumanrightslaw.

TheduediligencestandardrequiresthatexportingStatesengageinaneffectiveinquiryinordertomakeareasoneddeterminationastowhethertheproposedexportcarriesasubstantialriskoffacilitatingseriousviolations.

Whilehumanrightscanbeviolatedwithorwithoutweapons,transfersofarmstohumanrightsviolatorscanfacilitateorexacerbateviolations.

Whilethereisnointernationallyagreeddefinitionofwhatconstitutesaseriousviolationofinternationalhumanrightslaw,StatesPartiesmaywishtoconsiderthefollowingfactorsindeterminingwhatconstitutesaseriousviolation:

-Thenatureoftherightviolated;

-Themagnitudeoftheviolation;

-Thetypeofvictim(vulnerability);

-Theimpactoftheviolation.26

Violationsofhumanrightsarealsoseriouswhentheyarepersistent,systematicand/orwidespread.

Examplesofseriousviolationsofinternationalhumanrightslawinclude,butarenotlimitedto:systematicmurder,rape,forceddisplacement,attacksagainstcivilianpopulations,excessiveuseofforce,ill‐treatmentbymilitaryandsecurityforces,disappearances,torture,gender‐basedviolence,andextra‐judicialkillings.

Suggestedindicatorstoassesstheriskthattheexportofcovereditemscouldbeusedinthecommissionofaseriousviolationofinternationalhumanrightslaw

-WhetherornottherecipientStateisapartytointernationalandregionalhumanrightsinstruments;

-Whetherornottheimporterorend‐userhasaidedorabettedaseriousviolationofinternationalhumanrightslaw;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasadoptednationallegislationandregulationtoimplementinternationalandregionalhumanrightsinstruments;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehaslegislationandeffectiveproceduresfortheinvestigationofhumanrightsabusesandviolations,includingthosecommittedbytheStateoritsagents;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasaccountablestructureswiththeauthority,capacityandthewilltoensurerespectforinternationalhumanrightslaw;

26 “What constitutes ‘a serious violations of human rights law’?” Geneva Academy, Academy Briefing No. 6. www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/publications/Briefings%20and%20In%20breifs/Briefing%206%20What%20is%20a%20serious%20violation%20of%20human%20rights%20law_Academy%20Briefing%20No%206.pdf


15

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasacompetent,independent,impartialandfunctioningjudiciarywiththecapacityandwilltoprosecuteserioushumanrightsviolations;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatedisseminatesinternationalhumanrightslaw,inparticulartothesecurityandpoliceforcesandotherarmsbearers,andhasintegratedinternationalhumanrightslawintoitstraining,manualsandinstructions;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasindependentmonitoringbodiesandnationalinstitutionsforthepromotionofinternationalhumanrightslaw;

-WhetherthereisarecordofimpunityforhumanrightsviolatorsintherecipientState;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasmechanismsformonitoringandinvestigatingallegedseriousviolationsofinternationalhumanrightslaw;

-WhetherornotthereisevidencethatthetypeofarmsdescribedintheexportauthorizationapplicationorasimilartypeisorhasbeenusedforseriousviolationsofinternationalhumanrightslawintherecipientState;

-Whetherornotthearmsandmilitaryequipmentrequestedarecommensuratewiththeoperationalrequirementsandcapacitiesofthestatedend‐user;

-Whetherornottheconductofthestatedend‐userinrespectinginternationalhumanrightslawhasbeensubjectofsubstantialconcernbyUNhumanrightsmonitoringbodies,regionalhumanrightsmonitoringbodies,nationalhumanrightscommissions;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatemaintainsstrictandeffectivecontroloveritsarmsandmilitaryequipmentandtheirfurthertransfers.

TheriskthattheconventionalweaponsoritemscouldbeusedtocommitorfacilitateanactconstitutinganoffenceunderinternationalconventionsorprotocolsrelatingtoterrorismtowhichtheexportingStateisaParty.27

Internationalconventionsorprotocolsrelatingtoterrorism-ConventiononOffencesandCertainOtherActsCommittedOnBoardAircraftof1963;-ConventionfortheSuppressionofUnlawfulSeizureofAircraftof1970anditsProtocolthereto

of2010;28-ConventionfortheSuppressionofUnlawfulActsagainsttheSafetyofCivilAviationof1971and

itsProtocoltheretoof1988;29-ConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentofCrimesAgainstInternationallyProtected

Personsof1973;30-InternationalConventionagainsttheTakingofHostagesof1979;31-ConventiononthePhysicalProtectionofNuclearMaterialof1980anditsamendments;32-ConventionfortheSuppressionofUnlawfulActsagainsttheSafetyofMaritimeNavigationof

1988anditsProtocoltheretoof2005anditsProtocoltheretoof1988,anditsProtocoltothe

27 Article 7 (1) (b) (iii). 28 www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/Docs/beijing_protocol_multi.pdf. 29 www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/Lists/Current%20lists%20of%20parties/AllItems.aspx. 30 www.unodc.org/tldb/en/1973_Convention_Internationally%20Protected%20Persons.html. 31 www.unodc.org/tldb/en/1979_Convention_Hostage%20Taking.html. 32 www.iaea.org/publications/documents/conventions/convention-physical-protection-nuclear-material.


16

ProtocolfortheSuppressionofUnlawfulActsagainsttheSafetyofFixedPlatformsLocatedontheContinentalShelfof2005;33

-ConventionontheMarkingofPlasticExplosivesforthePurposeofDetectionof1991;34-InternationalConventionfortheSuppressionofTerroristBombingsof1997;35-InternationalConventionfortheSuppressionoftheFinancingofTerrorismof1999;36-InternationalConventionfortheSuppressionofActsofNuclearTerrorismof2005;37-ConventionontheSuppressionofUnlawfulActsRelatingtoInternationalCivilAviationof

2010.38

Suggestedindicatorstoassesstheriskthattheexportofcovereditemscouldbeusedtocommitorfacilitateterroristacts

-WhetherornottherecipientStateisapartytointernationalconventionsandprotocolsrelatingtoterrorism;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasadoptednationallegislationandregulationstoimplementinternationalconventionsandprotocolsrelatingtoterrorism;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehaslegislationandeffectiveproceduresforinvestigatingoffencesunderinternationalconventionsandprotocolsrelatingtoterrorism;

-WhetherornotaccountabletherecipientStatehasstructureswiththeauthority,capacityandthewilltoensurerespectforinternationalconventionsandprotocolsrelatingtoterrorism;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasacompetent,independent,impartialandfunctioningjudiciarywiththecapacityandthewilltoprosecuteoffencesunderinternationalconventionsandprotocolsrelatingtoterrorism;

-Whetherornottheimporter,end‐userorrecipientStatefinancesorsponsorsterroristgroups;

-Whetherornottheimporterorend‐userhasaidedorabettedviolationsofinternationalconventionsandprotocolsrelatingtoterrorism;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasarecordofprosecutingorextraditingoffendersthatarebroughtintoitscustody;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasassistedotherStatesinconnectionwithcriminalproceedingsbroughtunderanyinternationalconventionorprotocolrelatingtoterrorism;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasarecordofimpunityforperpetratorsofterroristacts;

-WhetherornottherecipientStateexercisesstrictandeffectivecontroloveritsarms,ammunitionandpartsandcomponentswithinitsjurisdiction.

TheriskthattheconventionalweaponsoritemscouldbeusedtocommitorfacilitateanactconstitutinganoffenceunderinternationalconventionsorprotocolsrelatingtotransnationalorganizedcrimetowhichtheexportingStateisaParty39

33 www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/SUA-Treaties.aspx. 34 www.unrol.org/doc.aspx?d=2822. 35www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/Special/1997%20International%20Convention%20for%20the%20Suppression%20of%20Terrorist.pdf. 36www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/Special/1999%20International%20Convention%20for%20the%20Suppression%20of%20the%20Financing%20of%20Terrorism.pdf. 37 www-ns.iaea.org/security/nuclear_terrorism_convention.asp. 38 www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/Docs/beijing_convention_multi.pdf. 39 Article 7 (1) (b) (iv).


17

OffencesunderinternationalconventionsorprotocolsrelatingtotransnationalorganizedcrimeOrganizedcrimeisathreattopeaceandhumansecurity.Itviolateshumanrightsandunderminesthepolitical,socio‐economic,civilandculturaldevelopmentofStates.OffencesundertheUNConventionagainstTransnationalOrganizedCrime(UNTOC)StatespartiestotheConventionshallestablishthecriminaloffencesof:-participatinginanorganizedcrimegroup;-moneylaundering;-corruption;-obstructionofjustice.UnderthethreesupplementaryProtocolsofUNTOC–onTraffickinginPersons,SmugglingofMigrantsandTraffickingofFirearms–StatesPartiestotheProtocolshavetocriminalize:-traffickinginpersons;-attemptstocommitahumantraffickingoffence;-participationasanaccompliceinahumantraffickingoffence;-organizingordirectingotherstocommithumantrafficking;-smugglingofmigrants;-enablingapersontoremaininacountryillegally;-aggravatingcircumstancesthatendangerlivesorsafety,orentailinhumanordegradingtreatmentofmigrants;-illicitmanufacturingofandtraffickinginfirearms.

Suggestedindicatorstoassesstheriskthattheexportofcovereditemscouldbeusedtocommitorfacilitateanactconstitutinganoffenceunderinternationalconventionsorprotocolsrelatingtotransnationalorganizedcrime

-WhetherornottherecipientStateisapartytointernationalconventionsandprotocolsrelatingtotransnationalorganizedcrime;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehaslegislationandeffectiveprocedurestoinvestigateoffencesunderinternationalconventionsandprotocolsrelatingtotransnationalorganizedcrime;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasaccountablestructureswiththeauthority,capacityandthewilltoensurerespectforinternationalconventionsandprotocolsrelatingtotransnationalorganizedcrime;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatefinancesorsponsorstransnationalorganizedcriminalgroups;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasarecordofprosecutingorextraditingoffendersthatarebroughtintoitscustody;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasassistedotherStatesinconnectionwithcriminalproceedingsbroughtunderanyinternationalconventionorprotocolrelatingtotransnationalorganizedcrime;


18

-Whetherornotthereisarecordofimpunityforparticipantsinorganizedcriminalactivities,humantraffickers,smugglersofmigrants,money‐launderers,corruptofficials,firearmstraffickersintherecipientState;

-WhetherornotthereisevidencethatthetypeofarmsdescribedintheexportauthorizationapplicationorasimilartypeisorhasbeenfrequentlyusedfororganizedcrimeintherecipientState;

-Whetherornotthearmsandmilitaryequipmentrequestedarecommensuratewiththeend‐useoroperationalrequirementsandcapacitiesofthestatedend‐user;

-WhetherornottherecipientStateexercisesstrictandeffectivecontroloverarms,ammunitionandpartsandcomponentswithinitsjurisdiction.

Sourcesofinformation

ExportingStatesmayconsultavarietyofinformationsources,astheydeemrelevant,inordertoconductexportassessments.Sourcescouldinclude:a.ThecurrentlistofSecurityCouncilarmsembargoesinforce;

b.ImplementationassistancenoticesissuedbytheSecurityCouncilCommittees;

c.DocumentationfromUNhumanrightsbodiesandinternationaltribunals;

d.IntelligenceandotherinformationavailabletotheStatePartythroughbilateralorregionalinformationexchangesmechanisms;

e.InformationexchangedwithotherStatesPartiestotheATT;

f.Documentationfromotherinternationalandregionalhumanrightsmonitoringbodies;

g.Reportsfromcrediblenationalhumanrightsinstitutions,internationalandnationalNGOsandthemedia.

RoleofimportingStatesintheexportassessment

AnimportingStatesshallprovideappropriateandrelevantinformation,uponrequest,totheexportingStateinaccordancewiththeimportingState’snationallaws.Suchinformationcouldinclude:

a.Declarationofintendeduseofthetransferredweapons;

b.Officialundertaking/assurance/guaranteenottore‐exportinamannerthatwouldruncountertotheprovisionsoftheATTornottouseforunintendedpurposes;c.Informationonthecountry’simportsystem,itsmeasurestoenhanceweaponscontrol,storage,andpreventdiversion.

Mitigationmeasures40

IfitisdeterminedthattheproposedexportcarriesanyoftheriskslistedinArticle7(1)(a)or7(1)(b),theexportingStateshallconsiderwhethertherearemeasuresthatcouldbeundertakentomitigatetherisksidentified.Suchmitigationmeasurescouldinclude:

40 Article 7 (3).


19

-Confidence‐buildingmeasures;

-JointlydevelopedandagreedprogrammesbytheexportingandimportingStates.

Confidence‐buildingmeasures

Confidence‐buildingmeasures(CBMs)enhancethereliabilityofimportingStatesregardingtheobservanceofrelevantinternationallawandtheexerciseofcontrolovertransferredweaponsoritems,soastopreventunauthorizeduseordiversion.WhiletherearemanypossibleformsofCBMs,examplescouldinclude:

UndertakingbytheimportingStatenottore‐exportorre‐transferinamannerthatwouldruncountertotheprovisionsoftheATT;

DeclarationbytheimportingStateofintendeduseofthetransferredweaponsoritems,accompaniedbytheundertaking/assurance/guaranteenottousethemforotherpurposes;

Provisionofinformationonweaponsoritemsstolen,lostorotherwiseunaccountedfor;

DisclosurebytheimportingStateofitsrecordsregardingobservationofrelevantinternationalhumanrightslaw,internationalhumanitarianlaw,internationalconventionsorprotocolsrelatingtoterrorismandtotransnationalorganizedcrime;

Enhancementoftransparencyonmilitarymatters.

Jointlydevelopedandagreedprogramme

InadditiontoCBMs,exportingandimportingStatescouldagreeonjointlydevelopedprogrammestomitigatetherisksofnegativeconsequencesoftheweaponsexport,suchas:

Post‐deliverymonitoring/cooperationprogrammes;

JointprogrammestoenhancetheimplementationbyimportingStateof,andcompliancewith,relevantinternationalhumanrightslaw,internationalhumanitarianlaw,internationalconventionsorprotocolsrelatingtoterrorismandtotransnationalorganizedcrime.

JointprogrammestoenhancethecapacityofimportingStatestocontrolweaponsandpreventtheirdiversion.

Overridingrisk41

Afterconductingtheassessment,theexportingStateshalldecidewhetherornottograntanexportauthorization.TheexportingStateshallalsoconsiderwhethertherearemeasurestomitigateanyoftheriskslistedinArticle7(a)and(b).If,afterconductingtheassessmentandconsideringmitigatingmeasures,theexportingStatePartydeterminesthatthereisanoverridingriskofanyofthenegativeconsequencesidentifiedbytheexportassessment,theexportingStatePartyshalldenytheexportauthorization.

41 Article 7 (3).


20

Whatisanoverridingrisk?

DuringtheATTnegotiationstherewasnoagreementastotheprecisemeaningoftheconceptof

“overridingrisk”orhowtoapplyitinpractice.42

Theword“overriding”presupposesthattherisksaretobeweighedagainstsomething.

OnepossibleinterpretationofArticle7(3)isthattheexportingState,afterconductingitsassessmentandconsideringmitigationmeasures,shouldweightheriskofnegativeconsequencesagainstexpectedpositiveconsequencesoftheexport.Inthisinterpretation,iftheriskofnegativeconsequencesoutweighsthelikelihoodofpositiveconsequences,theexportingStateshouldnotauthorizetheexport.

TheATTdoesprovideguidanceastowhatconstitutepositiveconsequencesofanexport:thetransfercontributingtopeaceandsecurity.43ItisuptoeachauthorizingStatetoweighwhetheratransferismorelikelytocontributetopeaceandsecuritythantoengendernegativeconsequences.

AnotherinterpretationcouldbethattheexportingStateshoulddeterminewhethertheriskofnegativeconsequencesoutweighsthelikelihoodthatthoseconsequenceswouldnotoccur.

Regardlessoftheinterpretationgiventothe“overridingrisk”standard,whenconductingassessmentsanddecidingonwhetherornottoauthorizeexports,StatePartiesareexpectedtoactinamannerthatisfullyconsistentwiththeprovisionsoftheATT.

Thedeterminationofanoverridingriskshouldbeshouldbetheproductofabalancedconsiderationofalltherelevantfacts,basedonanobjectivelyinformedconclusionreachedthroughthesystematicapplicationofcriteriasetbytheATTandusingreliableandcrediblesourcesofinformation.

Riskofdiversion

Seemodule10.

Gender‐basedviolenceTheexportingStateParty,inmakingtheexportassessment,shalltakeintoaccounttheriskoftheconventionalweaponsoritemsbeingusedtocommitorfacilitateseriousactsofgender‐basedviolenceorseriousactsofviolenceagainstchildren.44

42 For comparative purposes, see the “risk” standard (e.g. article 2.5 (b), article 2.7) and “clear risk” standard (e.g. article 2.2 (a), article 2.2 (c), article 2.4) in European Union Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008E0944&from=EN. 43 Article 7 (1)(a). 44 Article 7 (4).


21

Seriousactsofgender‐basedviolenceandseriousactsofviolenceagainstwomenandchildren

Actsofgender‐basedviolenceorseriousactsofviolenceagainstwomenandchildrenconstituteseriousviolationsofinternationalhumanitarianlaworseriousviolationsofinternationalhumanrightslaw.TheymayalsobeoffencesunderinternationalconventionsorprotocolsrelatingtoterrorismortransnationalorganizedcrimetowhichtheexportingStateisaparty.

TheConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationAgainstWomen(CEDAW)establishesthenormsandstandardstopreventandeliminateallformsofdiscriminationagainstwomen,protectandpromotewomen’shumanrightsandensuregenderequality.45

Gender‐basedviolenceimpairsornullifiestheenjoymentbywomenofhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedomsundergeneralinternationallaworunderhumanrightsconventions.Itisviolencethatisdisproportionatelydirectedagainstawomanbecausesheisawomanorthataffectswomendisproportionately.Itincludesactsthatinflictphysical,mentalorsexualharmorsuffering,threatsofsuchacts,coercionandotherdeprivationsofliberty.46

TheConventionontheRightsoftheChild(CRC)providesthelegalstandardstoprotectchildrenfromallformsofviolenceandtopreventviolenceagainstchildren.47

Achildiseveryhumanbeingundertheageof18yearsunless,underthelawapplicabletothechild,majority isattainedearlier.

TheCRChasthreeoptionalprotocols.

Suggestedindicatorstoassesstheriskofconventionalweaponsoritemsbeingusedtocommitorfacilitateseriousactsofgender‐basedviolenceorseriousactsofviolenceagainstwomenandchildren

-WhetherornottherecipientStateimplementsitsobligationsundertheSecurityCouncilresolutions1325and1820;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehaslegislationandeffectiveproceduresinplacetoinvestigateseriousactsofgender‐basedviolenceandseriousactsofviolenceagainstwomenandchildrencommittedbytheStateoritsagents;

45 www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/. 46 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 19 (1992), www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#top. 47 http://www.unicef.org/crc/.


22

-Whetherornotaccountableauthoritystructuresexistwiththecapacityandwilltoensurerespectforinternationalhumanrightslawpertainingtowomenrightsandchildrenrights;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatedisseminatesinternationalhumanrightslawregardingwomenrightsandchildrenrights,inparticularwithinarmedforcesandlawenforcement,andhasintegratedinternationalhumanrightslawonwomen’srightsandchildren’srightsintoitstraining,manualsandinstructions;

-Whetherornotthereisarecordofimpunityforoffenderswhocommittedseriousactsofgender‐basedviolenceand/orseriousactsofviolenceagainstwomenandchildrenintherecipientState;

-Whetherornottherearepatternsofgender‐basedviolenceintherecipientState;

-Whetherornotthereisevidencethatthetypeofarmsdescribedintheexportauthorizationapplicationorasimilartypehasbeenusedrepeatedlyinthecommissionofseriousactsofviolenceagainstwomenorseriousactsofgender‐basedviolence,orthecommissionofseriousactsofviolenceagainstchildren,inparticularrecruitmentofchildsoldiers,intherecipientState.

Step4‐Denialofexportauthorization/issuanceofexportauthorization

Denialofauthorization

Conditionsfordenial

Theexportshallbedeniedwhen:

a. TheapplicationrelatestoanexportthatshouldbeprohibitedinaccordancewithArticle6;

b. Theexportwouldunderminepeaceandsecurity;

c. TheitemscouldbeleadtothenegativeconsequencescontainedinArticle7;

Theexportshouldalsobedeniedwhentheapplicationcontainswronginformationorforgedsupplementingdocuments.

Notificationofdenialofauthorization

Denialofauthorizationshouldbecommunicatedinwrittenformtotheapplicant.Inordertoensureproceduraltransparency,thenotificationshouldincludeinformationaboutthereasonfordenial.Sharinginformationondenialofauthorizationisofparticularuseinpreventingthediversionofitemstoillicitmarkets.ThiswouldbeconsistentwiththeATTprovisionsonthepreventionofdiversion(Article(11)).

Issuanceofexportauthorizations

IftheproposedexportisnotprohibitedunderArticle6andtheexportassessmentdoesnothaveanegativeoutcome,theauthorizationagencycanissuetheexportauthorization.


23

Informationtobecontainedintheauthorization

Exportauthorizationsshouldbedetailedandspecific.48Thesedocumentscouldincludethefollowinginformation:

a.Recordidentifier/exportauthorizationnumber;

b.Dateofissuance;

c.Nameandsealofnationalauthorityissuingtheauthorization;

d.Signature,printednameandpositionofthedesignatedofficialoftheauthorityissuingtheauthorization(someoftheseelementsmaynotapplyinthecaseofelectronicapplications,whichmayrequiredifferentelements);

e.Nameandcontactdetailsoftherecipientoftheauthorization;

f.Detaileddescriptions(type,modelname,modelnumber,quantity,etc.)ofitemsauthorizedforexport;

g.Dateofexpirationofauthorization;

h.Countries/portsoftransitand/ortrans‐shipment,ifapplicable;

i.Namesandcontactdetailsofbrokers,intermediaries,consigneesoranyotherpartiesinvolvedinthetransfer;

j.Detailsofthetransportroute,includingthemeansoftransporttobeusedforeachsegment;

k.Countryofimport;

l.Intendeduseoftheitemsbeingexported;

m.Nameandcontactdetailsoftheauthorizedend‐user.

Notificationofexportauthorizations

Notificationofexportauthorizationsshouldbeprovidedtotheexportingcompanyorindividualandrelevantnationalauthoritiesinvolvedinexportcontrol. AStateParty’sannualnationalreportshallcontaininformationonactualexportsoronauthorizedexport.IfaStatechoosesthelatter,exportauthorizationsshallbecommunicatedtotheATTSecretariatthroughtheannualreport,whichwillbesharedwithotherStatesPartiestotheATT.

Step5‐ReassessmentofauthorizationIfaftertheexportauthorizationisissued,theexportingStatebecomesawareofnewrelevantcircumstances,itisencouragedtoreassesstheauthorization.Whenappropriate,thisreassessmentshouldbeconductedafterconsultationswiththeimportingState.49



24

ReasonsforreassessmentStatesareencouragedtoreassesstheauthorizationsif:a. theybecomeawareofnewrelevantinformationthatmightrequireareviewoftheprevious

assessment,particularlywithregardtotherisksaddressedinArticles6and7oftheATT;

b. informationintheapplicationwasfoundtobeforged,incorrectorobsolete;

c. newcircumstanceshavearisenwithrespecttotheend‐user,importingState,thetransitandtrans‐shipmentStates;

d. thereisachangeinthetransitrouteortransportationarrangement;

e. confidence‐buildingmeasures,jointprogrammesandothermitigationmeasuresagreedbetweenexportingandimportingStateshavenotbeenimplementedorrespected.

Proceduresforreassessment

Thereassessmentmayfollowthesamecomprehensiveproceduresfortheinitialexportassessment,ormayfocusonthenewrelevantinformationthatemergedanditsimplications;

Proceduresforreassessmentshouldbeestablishedbylaw.

Resultofreassessment

Reassessmentmayresultin:

a. Authorization/re‐authorizationunderthesameconditions;

b. Authorizationundermodifiedconditions;

c. Temporaryfreeze/suspensionofauthorization;

d. Revocationofauthorization.

1.3Exportofitems

Oncethenecessaryauthorizationshavebeenobtained,theexportercanproceedwiththeexport.

Statesareencouragedtoexchangeinformationamongrelevantgovernmentaldepartmentsandagencies,on:

a. Issuanceofexportauthorization;

b. Departureoftheitemsfromitsterritory/custom;

c. Achangeinthetransferroute,dateortransportationarrangement.


25

1.3.1.Recordkeepingofexportedweapons

EachStatePartyshallmaintainnationalrecordsofitsexportauthorizationsoritsactualexportsoftheconventionalarmscoveredinArticle2(1).50Therecordsshouldbeasdetailed,accurateandcomprehensiveaspossibleandpreferablyenteredinapre‐determinedformat/template.Recordsshallbekeptforaminimumoftenyears.51Statesareencouragedtorequiremanufacturers–throughlegislation–tomaintainrecordsofactualexportsandreportperiodicallytotheGovernmentonactualexports.TheATTdoesnotrequireStatesPartiestokeeprecordsoftheirexportsofammunitionorpartandcomponents.EachStatePartyisfreetoadoptnationalrecord‐keepingrequirementsthatwouldalsocovertheseitems.

ContentsofrecordslistedintheATT

StatesPartiesareencouragedtoincludeintheirrecords:52

a. Quantity;

b. Value;

c. Model/type/serialnumber;

d. Export/import/transitauthorizationnumber/date;

e. DetailsofexportingState(s);

f. DetailsofimportingState(s);

g. Detailsoftransitandtrans‐shipmentState(s);

h. Informationaboutend‐users.

Additionalcontentsthatcouldbeincluded

a. Uniqueauthorizationidentifier(e.g.,licencenumber);

b. Issuingagency;

c. Issuedateandexpirydate;

d. Nameandcontactdetailsofrecipient;

e. Yearofmanufacture;

f. Informationonimportand/orexportmarkingifavailable;



26

g. Copyorscannedcopyofauthorizationdocuments,end‐use/userdocumentationandotherrelevantdocuments;

h. Informationonbroker/intermediary(ifapplicable);

i. Conditionsonexport/import(ifapplicable)(e.g.prohibitiononre‐transfer);

j. Otherinformation,suchasintendeduse.

Maintenanceofrecords

Thechoiceofmethodsforrecordkeepingisanationalprerogative.Agoodrecord‐keepingsystemshouldbeup‐to‐date,easilysearchable,andaccessibleonlytoauthorizedofficials.

Traditionalpaper‐basedrecord‐keepingsystemsareinprincipleasusefulaselectronicsystems.

Use,applicationandsharingofrecords

GoodrecordkeepingisacriticalmeasureforaneffectiveandtransparentsystemforregulatingthetransferofconventionalarmsanditemscoveredunderArticle3and4,inlinewithArticle5(5).Therecordscouldbeusedto:

a. Informexportassessmentsandexportauthorization;

b. Provideinformationneededforinvestigationsofcasesofbreachesofexportcontrollawsandregulations;

c. PreparereportsrequiredbytheATT,theUNRegisteronConventionalArms,andrelevantregionalcommitments;

d. Preparereportstooversightbodies,suchasparliament,ifrequiredbyrelevantnationallawsandregulations;

e. SharewithimportingState,transit/trans‐shipmentStatesandotherStatesParties,inaccordancewithnationallaws.

1.4.Enforcementmeasures

StatesPartiesshallputinplacemechanismstoenforcelawsandregulationsrelatedtoexport

controls.53Enforcementmechanismsmayentail:

- Identifyingcompetentenforcementagenciesandbestowingthemwithpowerstoenforceexportcontrollegislation;

- Establishingpenalties;

- Inter‐departmentalcooperationbycustomsofficials,policeforces,judiciary;

- Compliancewithexportcontrollawsbyindustry.

53 Article 14.


27

1.4.1.Establishmentofpenalties

Penaltiesshouldbeestablishedtodissuadeandpunishviolationsofnationalexportcontrollawsandregulations.Suchpenaltiescouldinclude:

- Fines;

- Administrativesanctions(suspensionorrevocationoflicencesand/orauthorizations;barringviolatorsfromapplyingforlicencesorauthorizationsforcertainlengthsoftime;placingadditionalburdensorimposingrestrictiveconditionsforsubsequentapplicationoflicencesorauthorizations);

- Imprisonment.

1.4.2.Inter‐agencycooperationtoenforcenationalexportcontrollawsandregulations

Effectiveenforcementoflawsandregulationsrequirestheinvolvementofmultiplegovernmentagenciesorservices.WhiledifferentStatesprovidedifferentdutiesforagencies/services,typicallythefollowingcouldbeinvolved:

- Authorizationagency;

- Othernationalauthoritiesinvolvedinlicensing/authorizationprocess;

- Customsandbordercontrol;

- Policeandotherrelevantlawenforcementagencies;

- Intelligenceagencies;

- Judiciary.

Closeinter‐agencycooperationisessentialtoensuretheeffectiveenforcementofnationalexportcontrols.

Customsandbordercontrol

Customandborderpoliceplayanimportantroleinenforcinglawsandregulationsonarmstransfers.Atthebordercheckpoint,customsofficialsshoulddeterminethat:

a.Theshipmentofweapons,ammunitionand/orpartsandcomponentsisaccompaniedbyallrequiredauthorizationsanddocumentation,suchasexport/import/transitauthorizations;

b.Therequireddocumentationisauthenticandaccurate;

c.Thecontentoftheshipmentmatchesthedescriptionintheauthorizations.

Policeandotherlawenforcementagencies

Policeandotherlawenforcementagencies,whereapplicable,shouldbeprovidedwiththenecessaryauthority,investigativeskillsandcapacitytodealwithenforcementofnationalexportcontrollawsandregulations.


28

Judiciary

Statesmaydevelopacadreofprosecutorsandjudgesspecializedinnationalexportcontrol,tofacilitateexpeditiousprocessingofrelevantcases.

1.4.3.Industry

Statesareencouragedtoplaceobligationsoncompaniesandindividualsinvolvedinthemanufactureandexportofweapons,inparticularregardingrecord‐keeping,reportingofexportsofitemscoveredbytheATT,andcooperationwithenforcementagencies.Companiesandindividualsinvolvedinthemanufactureandexportofweaponsshouldfamiliarisethemselveswithexportcontrollaws,regulationsandproceduressoastofacilitatecompliance.Industrymayestablishnationallyaconsultativebodyorforumtohelpenhanceindustrycompliancetonationalexportcontrollawsandregulation.

III.Internationalcooperationandassistance

1.Internationalcooperationonsharingofinformation

StatesPartiesshallcooperatewitheachother,consistentwiththeirrespectivesecurityinterestsandnationallaws,toeffectivelyimplementtheATT.54StatesPartiesshouldcooperate,inaccordancewiththeirnationallaw,toassistnationalimplementationoftheTreaty,includingthroughsharinginformationonillicitactivitiesoractors.55Informationprovidedcouldbelimitedbynationallawsonprotectionofpersonaldata,commercialconfidentialityandStates’securityconsiderations.StatesPartiesareencouragedtocooperateinthevalidationofrelevantdocumentsforscreeningthelegitimacyofallpartiesinvolvedinaproposedtransferofitems.StatesPartiesshouldconsidercooperatinginlawenforcementeffortstoinvestigateillicittransferactivities.StatesPartiesshouldengageinbilateralormultilateralcooperationpertainingtotheinvestigationandprosecutionofanyindividualorlegalentityallegedlyinvolvedinillicittransferactivities.StatesPartiescouldconcludebilateralandmultilateralarrangementsormakeuseofexistingarrangementsforsharinginformationonillicittransferactivities.ContactbetweennationalpointsofcontactontheATTisanobviousfirststeptoestablishbilateralcooperationonsharinginformation.56

54 Article 15 (1). 55 Article 15 (4). 56 See Article 5 (6), and module 4 of this toolkit.


29


StatesPartiesmayseekassistance(technical,legal,financialandothersupport)toregulatearmsexportactivities.StatesPartiesinapositiontoofferassistanceareencouragedtodosowhenarequesthasbeenmade.StatesPartiesshouldexplorepossibilitiesofstrengtheningcapacity‐buildinginpreventingandcombatingillicitbrokeringactivities,including(e.g.throughtheWorldCustomsOrganization(WCO)SAFEframework).57WCO’sColumbusProgrammeaimsatfullimplementationoftheSAFEFrameworkofStandardsandotherWCOconventionsandinstruments.58Whererelevant,StatesPartiesshouldworkwithINTERPOLonoperationalizingaccesstoandefficientuseofINTERPOLdatabases,including:

‐theINTERPOLFirearmsReferenceTable(IFRT)59‐theINTERPOLBallisticInformationNetwork(IBIN)60‐theINTERPOLIllicitArmsRecordsandtracingManagementSystem(iARMS)61‐theINTERPOLStolenAdministrativeDocuments(SAD)database‐theINTERPOLStolenandLostTravelDocumentsdatabase(SLTD)62‐theINTERPOLCounterfeitDocumentsdatabase63‐theINTERPOLComparisonofGenuineandFakeDocumentsdatabase64‐theINTERPOLMaritimePiracydatabase.65

NotethatallrelevantINTERPOLdatabasesareaccessiblereal‐timethroughtheI‐24/7networkwhichconnectsallINTERPOLNationalCentralBureaus(NCBs).66INTERPOLencouragesNCBstoextendI‐24/7accesstoadditionalauthorizedlawenforcemententities,suchasbordercontrolunitsandcustomsofficials.INTERPOLcontinuestoprovidetechnicalassistanceandsupporttofurtherextendingitsI‐24/7systemtoadditionalauthorizedlaw‐enforcementorganizations.INTERPOL’sIntegratedBorderManagementTaskForceisthecentralpointofcontactandcoordinationforinternationalborder‐securityactivitiesatINTERPOL.TheTaskForcesupportslawenforcementofficersworkingatthefrontlineofbordersecuritybyprovidingthemwithaccesstoINTERPOLtoolsandservices,deliveringcapacitybuildingandtrainingcourses,andcoordinatingoperationalactivities.67

57 www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/instrument-and-tools/tools/safe_package.aspx. 58www.wcoomd.org/en/about-us/wco-secretariat/the-directorates/~/link.aspx?_id=D581386AEDDA4B328142E78D89F76536&_z=z 59 www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Firearms/INTERPOL-Firearms-Reference-Table-IFRT. 60 www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Firearms/INTERPOL-Ballistic-Information-Network-IBIN. 61 www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Firearms/INTERPOL-Illicit-Arms-Records-and-tracing-Management-System-iARMS. 62 www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Border-management/SLTD-Database. 63 www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Databases. 64 www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Databases. 65 www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Databases. 66 www.INTERPOL.int/Public/Region/Default.asp 67 www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Border-management.

ATTImplementationToolkit|Module7|Import

1


Module 7 Import



2

I.Introduction


EachStatewilldecidewhichmeasuresitneedstoputinplaceinordertocarryoutitsobligationsundertheATT.Thesemeasuresmayvaryfromcountrytocountry.

Article8oftheATTexplicitlyrequiresStatesPartiestotakemeasurestoallowthemtoregulate,wherenecessary,theimportoftheconventionalarmscoveredinArticle2(1),butareencouragedtoapplytheprovisionsoftheTreatytothebroadestrangeofconventionalarms.1

Thisseventhmodule,Importofconventionalweapons,providesStateswithpracticalinformationtoconsiderwhenestablishingandmaintainingcontroloverimports.

II.Nationalcontrolsystem

StatesPartiesarerequiredtoestablishandmaintainanationalcontrolsystem,includinganationalcontrollist.2StatesPartieshavetodesignatecompetentnationalauthoritiestoensuretheeffectiveandtransparentnationalcontrolandregulationovertheimportofitemscoveredundertheATT.3

III.StatesParties’obligationsregardingimportsofconventionalarmsStatesPartiesshalladoptmeasurestoregulate,wherenecessary,importsofconventionalarmscoveredinArticle2(1)intotheirjurisdiction.4(TheTreatyalsoprovidesthatsuchmeasuresmayincludeimportsystems,butitdoesnotprovidefurtherguidanceonsuchsystems.)StatesPartiescanalsoadoptmeasurestoregulatetheimportofammunitionandpartsandcomponents,althoughtheATTdoesnotexplicitlyrequirethemtodosounderArticle8.SuchmeasureswouldbeconsistentwithArticle5(5),bywhichStatesPartiesarerequiredtotakethemeasures

1 Article 5 (3). 2 Article 5 (2). 3 Article 5 (5). 4 Article 8 (2).


3

necessarytoimplementtheprovisionsoftheATTandtodesignatenationalauthoritiesinordertohaveaneffectiveandtransparentnationalcontrolsystemregulatingthetransferofconventionalarms,ammunitionandpartsandcomponents.StatesPartiesshallprohibittheimportationofconventionalarmsammunition,partsandcomponentsifsuchimportationwouldviolateArticle6oftheTreaty.

IV.RegulationofimportAtaminimum,aStatePartyneedsasystemthatcanensuretheprohibitionofimportofitemslistedinArticle2(1),3and4ifitviolatetheprovisionscontainedinArticle6oftheATT.ImportregulationenablesaStatePartytoauthorizeordenyapplicationsforimportsandtoensurethatactualshipmentsintoitsterritoryareconsistentwithauthorizationsandthenationalcontrollists.Moreover,InlinewithArticle7(1)and8(1),theimportingStatePartyhastohaveinplacemeasurestoenableittoprovideappropriateandrelevantinformationtoassistexportingStatesintheconductofexportassessments,whensuchinformationisrequestedandisconsistentwiththeimportingState’snationallaw.Byexercisingimportregulation,theimportingStateislikelytohaveamechanismforobtainingpriornotificationthatenablesthecompetentauthoritiestodeterminewhetherthegoodsshouldbeallowedtoentertheimportingState’sterritoryandwhethertheyshouldbesubjecttoinspectionuponarrival(includingthepossibilityofseizure).Effectiveimportregulationcanhelptopreventdiversionofweapons,ammunition,partsandcomponents.Properimportregulationscaninformdecision‐makingprocesses–includingexportassessments–ofthenationalauthoritiesintheexportingState.ImportingStatescanthushelpensurethereliabilityofinformationcontainedinend‐use/userdocumentation,andtheauthenticationofsuchdocumentation.ImportregulationcanalsocontributetobuildconfidencewithotherStates.HavinganeffectiveandtransparentsysteminplaceforregulatingimportscanenhancetheimportingState’scredibilityasadestinationforweapons.Consequently,importingStatesPartiesmayhaveanincentivetoreviewtheirimportlaws,policies,practicesandproceduresinordertoensuretheeffectivenessandtransparencyoftheirsystemsforregulatingtheimportofweapons.

1.Elementsofimportsregulation

Thebasicelementsneededtoeffectivelyregulateimportedconventionalweaponsare:

a. Nationallegislation,includinganationalcontrollist;

b. Nationalauthorities;

c. Regulatoryprocedures,includingrecord‐keeping;

d. Enforcementmechanisms.


4

2.Nationallegislation,includinganationalcontrollist

Thenationallegislationshouldstate:

a.Whichitemsaresubjecttoimportregulation(nationalcontrollist);

b.Whichgovernmentministries,departmentsandagenciesareresponsibleforregulatingconventionalarmsimports(nationalauthorities);

c.Criteriaforgrantingorrefusingimportauthorizations(regulatoryprocedures);

d.Record‐keepingbyapplicantsandnationalauthorities;

e.Thelegaland/oradministrativeactionsthatwouldbeappliedincaseofimportoffences(e.g.,enforcementmeasuresandmechanisms,prosecutionandpunishment).

StatesPartiesarerequiredtomaintainandestablishanationalcontrollist.5

Seemodule6fordetailsonnationalcontrollists.

3.Nationalauthorities

StatesPartieshavetodesignatecompetentnationalauthoritiestoensurethattheyhaveaneffectiveandtransparentnationalcontrolsystemforregulatingtransfersofitemscoveredundertheATT.6Thedesignatednationalauthoritiesshouldconsultwithotherrelevantgovernmentministriesordepartmentsbeforedecidingonanyauthorizationapplication.Taskstobeundertakenbytheauthorizationagencymayinclude:

a.Receivingandreviewingimportapplications,includingverifyingandassessingend‐use/userdocumentation,ifapplicable,feasibleandpractical;

b.Issuingimportauthorizations;

c.Keepingrecordsofimportlicences/authorizationsaswellasactualimports,ifapplicable;

d.ReportingtotheoversightbodyandprovidingdataforthenationalreportstobesubmittedtotheATTSecretariat,whereapplicableandinaccordancewithnationallaws;

e.Requesting,whereapplicable,informationfromtheexportingStateonanypendingoractualexportauthorizationswheretheimportingStateisthecountryoffinaldestinationoftheexport;

f.CooperatingwiththeexportingStateinitsexportassessment,asappropriate;

g.Establishingorundertakingmitigationmeasures,suchasconfidence‐buildingmeasuresorjointlydevelopedandagreedprogrammeswiththeexportingStates,ifrequired.

6 Article 5 (5).


5

4.Regulatoryproceduresfortheimportofconventionalarms

Procedurestoregulateimportsofconventionalarmsestablishtheconditionsunderwhichimportlicencesorimportauthorizationsmaybegranted.

Therearedifferentapproachesforregulatingimportsofconventionalarms:

a. Licensingsystem:Importingentities(companies,associationsetc)arerequiredtoobtainimportlicences,permitsorauthorizationspriortothetransferoftheweapons,aswellasthetransferofammunitionandpartsandcomponents,wheresuchitemsarealsosubjecttoalicensingsystem.SpecificrequirementsvaryfromStatetoState,suchas:

- Provisionsrequiringthatanyimportofweapons(andammunitionandpartsandcomponents,whenapplicable)needpriorauthorization;

- Limitedprovisionsrequiringthattheimportsofcertainweapons(andammunitionandpartsandcomponents,whenapplicable)aresubjecttoanimportauthorization;

- Limitedprovisionsrequiringthatcertainentitiescanimportonlyafterreceivinganimportauthorization;

- Provisionsstatingthatcertaintypesofweaponsareprohibited.

b. Importregulationbycustomsauthorities:Statesusetheircustomsasaprimarymeanstoinspect,

regulate,andcontrolimportsofitems.

Inbothcases,customauthoritiesshouldcontrolimportsofitems,includingverifyingallnecessarydocumentation.Specificmeasuresaimedtoregulateorcontrolimportsofweaponsdonotsupersedethebroaderprerogativesandresponsibilitiesofcustomsauthorities.

Importprocedures

Whentheitemstobeimportedfallunderthenationalcontrollist,theimportershouldapplyforimportauthorizationtothenationalauthorityintheimportingState.

Thetypicalsequencingoftheimportproceduresis:

a.Applicationforimportauthorization

b.Reviewofapplicationbynationalauthorities

c.Issuance/denialofimportauthorization


6

Prerequisiteoperatinglicence(onlyifrequiredbynationallaws)

StatesParties,accordingtotheirnationallaws,may(butarenotrequiredto)establishanimportlicensingsystemwherebyonlytheholdersofavalidoperatinglicencecanapplyforimportauthorizationforeachtransaction.

Insuchcases,theoperatinglicenceisapre‐requisiteforapplyingforanimportauthorization.

Applicationforoperatinglicence

Applicantsforoperatinglicencesshouldberequiredtomeetthecriteriasetforthbynationalregulations.

Anapplicationforanoperatinglicenceshouldberefusedif:

a.Theapplicanthasfailedtomeetthelicensingcriteriaestablishedbynationalregulations;

b.Thereisevidenceofpastinvolvementbytheapplicantinillicittradeofweapons;

c.Informationsubmittedinsupportoftheapplicationisfalse,inaccurateorincomplete;

d.TheapplicanthasbeenrefusedanoperatinglicenceinanotherStateongroundsthatwouldalsoapplyintheStateconsideringtheapplication.

Expirationoftheoperatinglicence

Whereimportlicencesareissued,thevalidityoflicencesshouldbelimitedintime.Thesedocumentsshouldhaveanexpirationdate.Theexpirationdateshouldbeindicatedclearlyonoperatinglicences.


7

Step1–Applicationforimportauthorization

Applicationsforimportauthorizationshouldbedetailed,andpreferablycontainthefollowinginformation:

a.Nameandcontactdetailsoftheapplicant(theimporter);

b.Nameandcontactdetailsoftheend‐user;

c.Countryofexport;

d.Nameandcontactdetailsoftheexporter;

e.Countryoftransitandtrans‐shipment,ifpracticalandknownatthetimeofapplication;

f.Nameandcontactdetailsofbrokersandotherintermediaries,ifapplicableandpractical;

g.Value/quantityoftheimport;

h.Intendeduseoftheitemstobeimported;

i.Detaileddescriptionsoftheitemstobeimported.

Step2–Reviewofapplicationbynationalauthorities

Thecompetentnationalauthoritiesshouldassesseachapplicationforimportauthorizationinaccordancewithclearlydefinedcriteria.

Article6provisionsonprohibitionsoftransfersmustbeappliedtotheimportassessment.7Inotherwords,importsshallnotbeauthorizediftheywouldviolateArticle6oftheATT.

Thecompetentauthoritiescouldalsoconsiderwhetherthequantityandthenatureoftheimporteditemsarecommensuratewiththeneedsoftheimporter.

Applicantsandend‐usersshouldbecheckedandscrutinizedduringtheassessment.Specifically,theassessmentshouldverifythattheapplicantandtheend‐user:

a. Arelegallyregisteredcompaniesorindividuals;

b. Areingoodlegalstandingand,whenapplicable,ingoodfinancialstanding;

c. Arenotincludedonablacklist;

d. Havenotpreviouslymisrepresented/falsifieddocumentsandinformationsubmitted;

e. Havenotbeendeniedanapplicationforimportauthorization;

f. HavenotbeeninvolvedintransfersthatconstitutedaviolationoftheprohibitionsstipulatedinArticle6;

g. HavenotbeeninvolvedintransfersthatunderminedpeaceandsecurityorwereusedtocommitorfacilitateanyoftheviolationsoractslistedunderArticle7(b).

7 For a detailed discussion of States Parties’ obligations under Article 6, see module 5.


8

Step3–Denialofimportauthorization

Suggestedgroundsfordenial

Importauthorizationsshouldnotbegrantedif:

a.Theapplicationisincomplete,containswronginformation,oriswilfullymisrepresented;

b.TheproposedimportisprohibitedunderArticle6;

c.Thereisariskthatsomeoralloftheitemscouldbedivertedbeforeorafterreachingtheauthorizedend‐user;

d.Theintendedrecipientisnotlegallyentitledtobeinpossessionoftheitemsinthecountryofimport;

e.Theimporterdoesnothavethestoragefacilitiestosecurelystoretheimporteditemsorcannotguaranteethattheitemswillbesafelyandsecurelystored.

Denialofauthorizationshouldbecommunicatedinwrittenformtotheapplicant.

Informationondenialofauthorizationisofparticularuseinpreventingdiversionandillicittradeofweapons.ThusStatesareencouragedtosharethedetailswithotherStates,inaccordancewithnationallaws.

Step4–Authorizationofimport

Importauthorizationsshouldbedetailedandspecific.Withoutprejudicetorelevantnationallawandregulation,theimportauthorizationcouldinclude:

a. Importauthorizationnumber/recordidentifier;

b. Dateofissuance;

c. Nameofnationalauthorityissuingtheauthorization;

d. Signature,printednameandpositionofthedesignatedofficialoftheauthorityissuingtheauthorization;

e. Nameandcontactdetailsoftherecipientoftheauthorization;

f. Detaileddescription(e.g.,type,modelname,modelnumber,calibreandquantity)ofitemsauthorizedforimport;

g. Dateofexpirationofauthorization;

h. Countries/portsoftransitand/ortranshipment,ifapplicable,practicalandknownatthetimeofauthorization);

i. Namesandcontactdetailsofbrokers,intermediariesoranyotherpartiesinvolvedinthetransfer,ifapplicableandpractical;

j. Detailsofthetransportroute,includingthemeansoftransporttobeusedforeachsegment,ifpracticalandknownatthetimeofauthorization;

k. Countryofexport;


9

l. Intendeduseoftheitemsbeingimported;

m. Nameandcontactdetailsoftheauthorizedenduser;

n. Detaileddescriptionsoftheitemstobeimported,includingtheirvalue;

o. Sealofnationalauthorityissuingtheauthorization.Itshouldbenotedthattheshifttowardselectronicapplicationsmaybringaboutnewformsofauthenticationotherthanwatermarksandembossedstampsorseals.However,suchtraditionalmethodscontinuetoservetheirpurposewhereelectronicsystemsarenotinplaceorwherehardcopiesarerequiredinadditiontoelectronicapplications.

p. Anyotherconditionsattachedtotheimport.

5. Enforcementmechanisms

5.1. Fines,penalties

Lawsandregulationsrelatedtoweaponsimportsshouldhavesufficientlyseverepenaltiesfortheirviolations.Penaltiesforimportoffencescouldinclude:

a. Fines;

b. Administrativesanctions

‐suspensionorrevocationoflicencesand/orauthorizations;

‐barringviolatorsfromapplyingforlicencesorauthorizationsforcertainlengthsoftime;

‐placingadditionalburdensorimposingrestrictiveconditionsforsubsequentapplicationoflicencesorauthorizations;

c. Imprisonment.

5.2.Controlbycustomsofficials

Atthepointofentry,customsofficialsshoulddeterminethat:

a. Theshipmentoftheimporteditemsisaccompaniedbyallrequiredauthorizationsanddocumentation;

b. Actualcontentoftheshipmentisconsistentwiththedescriptionscontainedintheauthorizations.


10

5.3. Deliveryverification

ItisdesirablethattheimportingStateinformstheexportingStatethattheshipmentoftheimporteditemshasentereditsterritory.Whenpossible,theimportingStateshouldalsoverifythattheimporteditemsreachedtheauthorizedenduser.

Thiscanbedonethroughdifferentmeans,suchas:

a. Provisionofadeliverycertificate;

b. Provisionofotherdeliverydocumentationornotification;

c. Post‐deliverycontrolandon‐siteverifications.

5.3.1.Deliveryverificationcertificate

AdeliveryverificationcertificateisadocumentcertifiedbythecustomsorothercompetentauthorityoftheimportingState,confirmingthatimporteditemshavebeenreceivedbytheauthorizedend‐user.

AcommitmentbytheimportertoprovidetheexportingStatewithadeliveryverificationcertificatecouldbeincludedfromtheoutsetintheend‐use/usercertificateorstatementorsalecontract.

NationalauthoritiesoftheexportingStateshouldverifytheauthenticityofdocumentssubmittedbytheimporter.

5.4. Non‐re‐exportclause

AnexportingStatemayrequiretheinclusionofanon‐re‐exportclauseinasalescontract.Ingeneral,suchclausescouldstipulatethattheend‐usercannotre‐exportthearmsatallorthattheend‐usermustaskforpriorwrittenapprovalfromtheoriginalexportingState.

6. Recordkeeping

EachStatePartyshouldmaintainrecordsofconventionalarmsthataretransferredtoitsterritoryasthefinaldestination.8TheATTdoesnotexplicitlyrequireimportingStatestokeepsuchrecords.However,underArticle13(3),eachStatePartyisrequiredtosubmitanannualreportconcerningauthorizedoractualexportsandimportsofconventionalarms.

Fordetailsonrecordkeeping,seemodule6.

8 Article 12 (2).


11

V.InternationalcooperationandassistanceSeemodule6fordetails.

ATTImplementationToolkit|Module8|TransitandTrans‐shipment

1

ArmsTradeTreatyImplementationToolkit

Module 8 Transit and Trans-shipment



2

I.Introduction

AnycountriesjoiningtheArmsTradeTreaty(ATT)arerequiredtoputinplaceeffectivemeasurestoimplementtheTreaty.

EachStatePartywilldecidewhichmeasuresitneedstoadoptinordertocarryoutitsobligationsundertheATT.Thesemeasuresmayvaryfromcountrytocountry.

Thiseighthmodule,Transitandtrans‐shipment,aimstoassistStatesinregulatingarmstransitandtrans‐shipmenttakingplaceundertheirjurisdiction,wherenecessaryandfeasible.

II.Regulatingtransitandtrans‐shipmentunderArticle9oftheATT Bothtransitandtrans‐shipmentconstitutea“transfer”underArticle2(2)oftheATT.StatesPartiesshalltakemeasures,wherenecessaryandfeasible,toregulatetransitortrans‐shipmentundertheirjurisdictionofconventionalarmscoveredunderArticle2(1)throughitsterritoryinaccordancewithinternationallaw.1

StatesPartieshavetheprerogativetoadoptmeasurestoregulatethetransitortrans‐shipmentofammunitionandpartsandcomponents,eventhoughtheATTdoesnotexplicitlyrequirethemtodosounderArticle9.

Measurestoregulatetransitandtrans‐shipmentshallbetakeninaccordancewithrelevantinternationallaw.Forinstance,anytransitandtrans‐shipmentregulationshouldbeconsistentwiththerightsandobligationsundertheUNConventionontheLawoftheSea(UNCLOS),2theConventiononInternationalCivilAviation,3theInternationalConventionconcerningtheCarriageofGoodsbyRail(CIM)4andtheConventiononTransitTradeofLand‐lockedStates.5

Regulatingtransitandtrans‐shipmentposeschallenges,particularlyincountrieswithlongbordersorlargeterritorialwatersandlimitedcapacity(humanandtechnical)toexercisecontrolovergoodstransiting.

1 Article 9. 2 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1833, p. 3. 3 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 15, p. 295. 4 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1101, p. 226. 5 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 597, p. 3.


3

Countriesthatprocesslargevolumesoftrans‐shipmentoperationscanalsofinditdifficulttoeffectivelyregulatetrans‐shipment.Moreover,therearedifferentapproachestoregulationofair,landandseatransport.Consequently,aone‐size‐fits‐allapproachisnotfeasible.

III.Whatconstitutestransitandtrans‐shipment?TheATTdoesnotprovideadefinitionfortransitand/ortrans‐shipment.

AccordingtotheInternationalSmallArmsControlStandards(ISACS),6transitandtrans‐shipmentare:

ISACS01.20

Transit:“MmovementofgoodsacrosstheterritoryofaStateaspartofatransferbetweentwootherStates,includingthetrans‐loadingofthegoodsatthepointsofentryintoandexitfromthetransitState”.

Trans‐shipment:“TransportofgoodstoanintermediatelocationoutsidetheexportingandimportingStates,wheretheyareloadedtoadifferenttransportvesselandtransportedtotheirfinaldestination(oradditionalpointoftrans‐shipment)withoutcrossingtheterritoryoftheStateinwhichthetrans‐loadingtakesplace.

Note.Trans‐shipmentusuallytakesplaceintransporthubsatportsandoftentakesplacewithindesignatedcustomsareas,whicharenotsubjecttocustomschecksorduties”.

StatesPartiesmaywishtoadoptthesedefinitionsordrawfromthem,whenadoptingrelevantnationallawsandpoliciestoimplementtheATT.

IV.MeasurestobeconsideredbyStatesPartieswhenregulatingtransitandtrans‐shipment

StatesPartiesareinchargeoftheirimplementationeffortstocomplywiththeirobligationsundertheATT.Tothiseffect,theymayconsideradoptinganyofthefollowingmeasures:

a.Adoptinglaws,regulationsandproceduresstating:

- Nationaldefinitionoftransitand/ortrans‐shipment;

- Nationalauthorities(whichministriesoragenciesareresponsibleforregulatingtransitandtrans‐shipment);

6 Available at www.smallarmsstandards.org.


4

- Criteriaforgrantingorrefusingtransit/trans‐shipmentauthorizations(regulatoryprocedures),ifapplicable.Theseshouldincludetherequirementthatauthorizationbedeniedwhenthetransitortrans‐shipmentwouldviolateorcontributetoviolateArticle6oftheATT;

- Recordkeepingofconventionalarmsauthorizedtotransitorbetrans‐shipped;

- Legaland/oradministrativeactionsthatwouldbeappliedincaseofoffences(enforcementmeasuresandmechanisms,prosecutionandpunishment).

b.Establishingregulatoryprocedures,7suchas:

- Licensingsystem.Underthissystem,anexporterneedstoapplyandobtainatransit/trans‐shipmentauthorizationfromthenationalauthorityinthetransit/trans‐shipmentStatepriortothetransit/trans‐shipmentofweaponsthroughtheterritoryunderthejurisdictionofsaidState.- Priornotification.8Notificationproceduresrequiringthenationalauthorityinthetransit/trans‐shipmentStatetobeprovidedwithinformationanddocumentationonthemovementofweaponstransiting/beingtrans‐shippedthroughterritoryunderitsjurisdiction,inadvanceoftheweapons’arrivalinitsterritory.- Transit/trans‐shipmentcontrolbycustomsauthorities.Customsauthoritiesofthetransit/trans‐shipmentStatehavetobenotifiedofthearmsshipmentsatthepointofentry.Atechnicalanddocumentarycheckcouldbeconducted.

c.Puttinginplaceenforcementmeasuresandmechanismstoensurecompliancewithlaws,regulationsandadministrativeproceduresrelatedtotransitandtrans‐shipmentofconventionalarms.d.Stateswithlimitedresourcesmaywishtolimittransit/trans‐shipmenttocertainentrypoints/ports.e.Maintainingrecordsofconventionalarmsauthorizedtotransitorbetrans‐shippedintheterritoryundertheStateParty’sjurisdiction.9

V.InternationalcooperationandassistanceSeemodule6fordetails.

7 For example, States Parties to the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials have to establish and maintain an effective system of international transit licences or authorizations for transfers of firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials under Article IX. 8 For example, see Article 10.2 (b) of the Firearms Protocol. 9 Article 12 (2).

ATTImplementationToolkit|Module9|Brokering

1


Module 9 Brokering



2

I.Introduction

AnycountriesjoiningtheArmsTradeTreaty(ATT)arerequiredtoputinplaceeffectivemeasurestoimplementtheTreaty.

StateswilldecidewhichmeasurestheyneedtocarryouttheirobligationsundertheATT.Thesemeasuresmayvaryfromcountrytocountry.

Thisninthmodule,Brokering,aimstoassistStatesinregulatingarmsbrokeringtakingplaceundertheirjurisdiction.Inparticular,thismodulewilldiscussmeasurestobeconsideredbyStatesPartiesinadoptingnationalbrokeringcontrols.

II.RegulatingbrokeringunderArticle10oftheATT

Brokeringconstitutesa“transfer”underArticle2(2)oftheATT.InaccordancewithArticle10,StatesParties,pursuanttotheirnationallaws,shallregulatebrokeringforconventionalarmscoveredunderArticle2(1)takingplaceunderitsjurisdiction.Suchmeasuresmayincluderequiringbrokerstoregisterorobtainwrittenauthorizationbeforeengaginginbrokering.1EachStatePartyhasdiscretionindetermininghowtodesignsuchregulationprovidedthatitcomplieswithitsobligationonprohibitionsoftransfersunderArticle6oftheATT,andmoregenerallywithitsobligationnottounderminetheobjectandpurposeoftheTreaty.AlthoughArticle10oftheATTdoesnotexplicitlyrequireStatesPartiestoregulatebrokeringinammunitionorpartsandcomponents,eachStatePartyhastheprerogativetoadoptmeasurestoregulatebrokeringinthoseitemstakingplacewithinitsjurisdiction.ThiswouldbeconsistentwiththeaimsoftheATTandtheprovisionsofArticle5(5).

1 Article 10.


3

III.Whatconstitutesarmsbrokering?2Brokeringreferstoactivitiesperformedbyabroker,whichmightinclude:- servingasafinderofbusinessopportunitiestooneormoreparties;

- puttingrelevantpartiesincontact;

- assistingpartiesinproposing,arrangingorfacilitatingagreementsorpossiblecontractsbetweenthem;

- aidingpartiesinobtainingthenecessarydocumentation;

- assistingpartiesinarrangingthenecessarypayments.

Abrokercanbedescribedasapersonorentityactingasanintermediarythatbringstogetherrelevantpartiesandarrangesorfacilitatesapotentialtransactioninreturnforsomeformofbenefit,whetherfinancialorotherwise.

Aspartoftheprocessofputtingadealtogethertogainbenefit,abrokermightperformotheractivitiescloselyassociatedwithbrokeringwhichmightnotconstitutebrokeringactivitiesinthemselves.Inthiscontext,thebrokermight:

- actasadealeroragent;

- providetechnicalassistanceand/ortraining;

- supplytransportand/orfreightforward;

- setupstorage;

- providefinanceservices;

- obtaininsurancepolicies;

- givemaintenance;

- providesecurityandotherservices.

IV.Thetrans‐boundarynatureofbrokeringactivities

Brokeringactivitiescantakeplaceinthebroker’scountryofnationality,residenceorregistration.Theycanalsotakeplaceinanothercountry.TheitemsbeingbrokereddonotnecessarilypassthroughthejurisdictionoftheStatewherethebrokeringactivitytakesplaceandthebrokermightnevertakeownershipofthoseitems.

2 See the Report of the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/81 to consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons (A/62/163). For more information on brokering, also refer to the International Small Control Standards (ISACS) 01.20


4

Giventhetrans‐boundarynatureofbrokeringactivities,nationalcontrolscouldbeexercisedbydifferentStateswithjurisdictionoverthesameactivity.BrokeringactivitiescantakeplaceunderthejurisdictionoftheexportingState,theimportingState,thetransit/trans‐shipmentStateoranyothercountry(thirdcountry).IfthebrokeringtakesplaceintheexportingState,theimportingStateorthetransit/trans‐shipmentState,thentheitemswillactuallypassthroughtheterritoryoftheStateswherethebrokeroperates.Figure1illustratesthedifferentregulatorycriteriaofbrokeringactivitiestakingplaceunderthejurisdictionoftheexporting,importingortransit/trans‐shipmentStates.

Figure1–Brokeringinexport/import/transitStates


5

Whenbrokeringactivitiestakeplaceinathirdcountry(differentfromtheexporting,importing,transit/trans‐shipmentStates),theitemsmayneverenterthecountryfromwherethebrokeroperates.Thisiscalled“thirdcountry”brokering.UnderArticle10,StatesPartieshaveanobligationtoregulatebrokeringactivitiestakingplaceundertheirjurisdiction.Therefore,“thirdcountry”brokeringwillalsoneedtoberegulatedifthe“thirdcountry”isapartytotheATT.Insum,brokeringactivitiestakingplaceinaterritoryunderthejurisdictionofanyStatePartytotheATTmustberegulated.

Figure2–Third‐party/third‐countrybrokering

Insomecases,thebrokermighttraveloutsideofhis/herhomecountry(countryofnationalityorlegalpermanentresidence)andcarryoutbrokeringactivitiesinanothercountry.Thisisknownas“extraterritorialbrokering”.Toregulate“extraterritorialbrokering,”StatesPartiestotheATTshouldconsiderincludingextraterritorialclausesintheirnationallegislationtoexercisecontroloverbrokeringactivitiescarriedoutoutsidetheirterritoriesbybrokersoftheirnationality,brokerswhoareresidentsorareestablishedintheirterritories.Figure3illustrates“extraterritorialbrokering”.

Figure3–Extraterritorialbrokering

Theregulationof“extraterritorialbrokering”isconsistentwiththerightsofStatesPartiesundertheATT.Exercisingcontrolover“extraterritorialbrokering”wouldcontributetotheestablishmentofthe


6

highestpossiblecommoninternationalstandardsintheregulationoftheinternationaltradeinconventionalarms.3Moreover,exercisingcontrolover“extraterritorialbrokering”wouldfacilitatemutuallegalassistanceandextraditionsbetweenStatesconcerned,consistentwithArticle15(5),whichobligesStatestoaffordoneanotherthewidestmeasureofassistanceininvestigations,prosecutionsandjudicialproceedingsinrelationtoviolationsofnationalmeasuresestablishedpursuanttothisTreaty.Enforcingbrokeringregulationsextraterritoriallymayrequireextraditionofbrokersindictedforviolations.

V.MeasurestobeconsideredbyStatesPartiesintheregulationofbrokering

EachStatePartyisinchargeofitsowneffortstocomplywithitsobligationsundertheATT.StatesPartiesmayconsideradoptinganyofthefollowingmeasures:

1.Designationofcompetentnationalauthoritiesthatexercisebrokeringcontrols

Thecompetentnationalauthoritiestaskedwithregulatingbrokeringofconventionalarmsshouldbeclearlyidentifiedinthenationallegislation.AlthoughitisaprerogativeofeachStatePartytodecidewhichauthoritiesshouldbeentrustedwiththeresponsibilityofregulatingbrokering,itwouldbeconsistentwithATTimplementationobligationstoconsiderplacingthatresponsibilitywiththesameauthoritiesentrustedwiththeregulationofexports.

2.Nationalimplementationoflegislationandadministrativeprocedures

ItisuptoeachStatePartytodecidehowtoregulatebrokeringactivitiesinconventionalarmstakingplaceunderitsjurisdiction,providedthattheStatePartycomplieswithitsobligationsunderArticle6oftheATT.

Asanexample,themeasureslistedbelowcouldbeanintegralpartoftheregulatoryprocess.

- Adoptionofanationaldefinitionofbrokerandbrokeringactivities;

- Registrationandlicensingprocedures;

- Record‐keepingbygovernment;

3 Article 1.


7

- Penaltiesandfines;

- CriminalizationofbrokeringactivitiesthatviolateSecurityCouncilarmsembargoes.4

Registrationandscreeningofprospectivebrokersmayberequiredbythenationalauthorities.Tothisend,prospectivebrokerscouldbeaskedtoprovidethefollowinginformation:

Broker’scountryofnationalityandresidence;

Broker’sownershipofanyentityorinvolvementinanyrelevantbusinessesusedtofacilitatebrokeringactivities;

Rangeofconventionalweaponsthatthebrokermaywishtobeinvolvedinbrokering.

Inscreeningpotentialbrokers,theStatePartymayassessiftheapplicant:

a.Isingoodlegalstandingand,whenapplicable,ingoodfinancialstanding;

b.Isnotincludedinablacklist;

c.Hasnotpreviouslymisrepresented/falsifieddocumentsandinformationsubmitted;

d.Hasnotbeendeniedanapplicationforbrokeringauthorization;

e.HasnotbeeninvolvedintransfersthatconstitutedaviolationoftheprohibitionsstipulatedinArticle6;

f.HasnotbeeninvolvedintransfersthatunderminedpeaceandsecurityorwereusedtocommitorfacilitateanyoftheviolationsoractslistedunderArticle7(b).

TheStatePartymayalsoconductotherchecksontheinformationprovidedbythepotentialbroker.

3.ApproachestoregulationofbrokeringStatesPartiesmayregulatebrokeringactivitiesbyissuinglicences,authorizationsorpermits.StatesPartiesmayadoptaone‐stepapproach,wherebybrokersareonlyrequiredtoobtainanoperatinglicenceoranauthorizationbeforeengaginginbrokeringactivities,oratwo‐stepapproachwherebybrokersarerequiredbothtoobtainalicenceandtoapplyforanauthorizationforeachbrokeringactivity.

Figure4showsdifferentapproachesStatesPartiesmayadopttoregulatebrokeringactivities.

4 S/RES/1196 (1998).


8

Figure4–Approachestoregulatebrokeringactivities

Onestepapproach(a):Brokersneedtoapplyonlyforauthorizationforeachbrokeringactivity

Onestepapproach(b):Brokersneedtoonlyobtainanoperatinglicencebeforeengaginginbrokering

Twostepapproach:Brokersneedtoobtainanoperatinglicenceandapplyforauthorizationforeachbrokeringactivity

Thesamecriteriaforgrantingarmsexportlicencesmaybeappliedtotheauthorizationofbrokeringactivities.TheprohibitionsprovidedunderArticle6aswellastheassessmentcriterialistedunderArticle7shouldbeappliedindecisionsregardingtheauthorizationofbrokeringactivities.

VI.Internationalcooperationandassistance

1.Internationalcooperationonsharingofinformation

StatesPartiesshouldseekandprovideinformation,inaccordancewiththeirnationallaw,onbrokeringactivitiesandbrokersaswellasthoseinvolvedinillicitorsuspiciousactivitiesandrelatedentitiesorassetsusedintransfers(aircrafts,vessels,etc).Informationprovidedcouldbelimitedbynationallawsonprotectionofpersonaldata,commercialconfidentialityandStates’securityconsiderations.StatesPartiescouldconcludebilateralandmultilateralarrangementsforpromotingcooperationwithregardtothecontrolofbrokeringactivities.5

5 Examples of such multilateral instruments include: Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons (2005). OAS “Model Regulations for the Control of Brokers of Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition”, document CICAD/doc1271/03, 13 November 2003.


9

Formoredetailsoninternationalcooperation,seeModule6.


Fordetailsoninternationalassistance,seeModule6.

Council of the European Union, Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP of 23 June 2003 on the Control of Arms Brokering, EU document 2003/468/CFSP, 23 June 2003. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Best Practice Guide on National Control of Brokering Activities, document FSC.GAL/63/03/Rev.2, 19 September 2003. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Principles on the Control of Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons, document FSC.DEC/8/04, 24 November 2004. Wassenaar Arrangement, Elements for Effective Legislation on Arms Brokering (2003).

ATTImplementationToolkit|Module10|PreventingDiversion

1


Module 10 Preventing Diversion



1

I.Introduction



Thistenthmodule,Preventingweaponsdiversion,aimstoassistStatesintakingappropriatemeasurestothatend.

II.Theobligationtopreventdiversion

1.Whatisdiversion?

TheATTdoesnotprovideadefinitionofdiversion.

Ingeneralterms,diversionisthetransferofitemsfromanauthorizedowner/usertoanunauthorizeduser.

oDiversioncantakeplacewhenitemsareintendedforexporttooneend‐user,butinsteadtheyaredeliveredtoanother,unauthorized,end‐user.

oDiversionofweaponsisakeymethodbywhichStatesunderarmsembargo,warlords,humanrightabusers,terroristsandorganizedcriminalgroupsobtainweapons.

Diversioncouldtakeplaceatanytimeduringthelife‐cycleofweapons,fromproductiontodistribution,fromtransfertostoragetodestruction.Weaponsareparticularlyvulnerabletodiversionduringtransfers.

2.Causesofdiversion

Diversionofarmscanoccurasaresultof:

a. Inadequatelegislation,policiesandprocedures;


2

b. Absenceofappropriatecontrolsovertransfers;

c. Limitedcapabilitiesforenforcement(e.g.borderpatrolsandcontrols,especiallywhenbordersareextensiveorlocatedonhard‐to‐accessareas);

d. Falsificationofdocuments;

e. Unauthorisedre‐transfers;

f. Theftandleakagesfrompoorlymanagedstockpiles;

g. Hand‐outsorsaletoarmedgroups;

h. Captureofgovernmentforcesstockpiles;

i. Corruption.

3.DiversionundertheATT

ThepreventionofdiversionisoneofthecornerstonesoftheATT.Thegoalofpreventingweaponsfromreachingillicithandsorthosewhosystematicallymisusethemcouldnotbeachievedwithtraderegulationalone,withoutaseriousefforttopreventandcombatdiversion.

EachStatePartyinvolvedinatransferofconventionalarms(exporting,transit/trans‐shipmentandimportingStates)shalladoptmeasurestopreventdiversion.1

WhiletheATTdoesnotrequireStatesPartiestotakemeasurestopreventdiversionofammunitionorpartsandcomponents,eachStatePartyisfreetoadoptsuchmeasures.

TheexportingStateshallassesstheriskofdiversionoftheproposedexportofconventionalarmsthroughitsnationalexportcontrolsystembyconductinganexportassessment.2

Exporting,transit/trans‐shipmentandimportingStatesPartiesshallcooperateandshareinformation,pursuanttotheirnationallaws,tomitigatetheriskofdiversionofarmstransfers.3

WhenaStatePartydetectsdiversionoftransferredweapons,theStatePartyisrequiredtotakeappropriatemeasurestoaddresssuchdiversioninaccordancewithbothnationalandinternationallaw.4

WhenaStatePartydetectsdiversionoftransferredweaponsitshouldalsoalertpotentiallyaffectedStatesParties.

StatesPartiesshouldshareinformationontheirexperiencesinaddressingdiversion.5

StatesPartiesshouldalsoreporttootherStatesParties,throughtheATTSecretariat,oneffectivemeasurestakentoaddressdiversion.6

1 Article 11 (1). 2 Article 11 (2). For a discussion on how to conduct an export assessment, refer to module 6 of this toolkit. 3 Article 11 (3). 4 Article 11 (4). 5 Article 11 (5). 6 Article 11 (6).


3

4.Preventativemeasures

Allpartiesinvolvedinaparticulartransferofconventionalweaponsshalltakemeasurestopreventtheirdiversion.

4.1.MeasuresbytheexportingState

4.1.1.Includetheriskofdiversionintheexportassessment7

TheexportingStateshould:

a.Examineallrelevantinformationandparties;

b.Payparticularattentiontodocumentsthat:

-aremissingessentialinformation(e.g.importerisnotidentified,lackofaddressorcontactnumber);

-canbeeasilyforgedorre‐used(e.g.documentlacksministerialorgovernmentseal,thespaceusedtoprovidethedocumentwithanindividualcertificationnumberhasbeenleftblank);

-containinconsistentinformation.

c.Requestadditionaldocumentationandinformationifneeded;

d.Contacttheimportingand/ortransitandtrans‐shipmentStates,asappropriate,regardingtheproposedexport;

e.Consultanydatabases(ifavailable)orothersourcesofinformationonpreviouscasesofdiversion,illicittransfersandillicitbrokers;

f.Consultembassiesandotherdiplomaticofficials.

IftheexportingStatePartydeterminesthatthereisariskofdiversionitshouldnotauthorizetheexport.

Suggestedindicatorstoassesstheriskofdiversion-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasthecapacitytoensurethattheexportedarmsarenotdivertedortransferredtootherentitiesordestinations.ThismayincludeadeterminationofwhetherornottherecipientStateorend‐userhasadequatesystemsforthemanagementofstockpiles;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasanationalcontrolsystem,includinganationalcontrollist;

7 See module 6.


4

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasadoptednationallegislationandregulationstopreventandcombatdiversionofconventionalarms;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehaslegislationandeffectiveproceduresforinvestigatingoffencesrelatedtodiversionofconventionalarms;

-WhetherornottherecipientStatehasacompetent,independent,impartialandfunctioningjudiciarywiththecapacityandthewilltoprosecuteoffencesrelatedtodiversionofconventionalarms;

-WhethertherecipientStateexerciseseffectivecontroloverconventionalarmsimportedintoitsterritory;

-Whetherornottheend‐useroranyotheractorinvolved(e.g.,broker)hasarecordofdivertingconventionalarms;

-Whetherend‐useassurancesprovidedbytheend‐userarecredible;

-Whetherthetypes,qualityandquantityofitemsrequestedarecompatiblewiththelegitimatesecurityneedsoftheend‐user;

-Whetherthecarrierstobeusedinthetransportofthearmstobetransferredarewell‐establishedandreputable;

-Whetherthemeansoftransport/transportroutehavebeenusedinpreviouscasesofdiversion.

Itisrecommendedthattheaboveindicatorsalsobeusedtoassesstheriskofdiversionofammunitionandpartsandcomponents.

4.1.2.Mitigationmeasures

IftheexportingStatesPartiesdeterminesthatthereisariskoftheexportedweaponsbeingdivertedtounauthorizedend‐usersand/orend‐use,itmayconsiderwhethertherearemeasurestomitigatetheriskidentified.Suchmitigationmeasurescouldinclude:

Confidence‐buildingmeasures;

JointlydevelopedandagreedprogrammesbytheexportingandimportingStates;

Examiningpartiesinvolvedintheexport;

Requiringadditionaldocumentation,certificatesandassurances;

Post‐deliveringmonitoringprogramme;

Requestingdeliveryverificationcertification;

Conducton‐sitevisits;

Otherappropriatemeasures.


5

4.2.Measuresbythetransit/trans‐shipmentState

Establishandmaintainasystemforregulatingtransit/trans‐shipment;

Issueatransit/trans‐shipmentauthorization;

CollaboratewiththeexportingState,uponrequest,intheexportassessment.

4.3.MeasuresbytheimportingState

Committonore‐exportingortoeffectivelycontrolre‐exports;

Improveandstrengthenweaponsstockpilemanagementandsecurity;

Putinplaceeffectiveproceduresforimportauthorization.

Ensurethatalldocumentsissuedtoimportersbythecompetentauthoritiesareauthentic,reliableandtrustworthy.ThemorecrediblethedocumentsissuedbytheimportingStatetheeasieritisfortheauthoritiesoftheexportingandtransit/trans‐shipmentStatestoprocesstheirrespectiveauthorizationsanddetectdiversionrisks.

4.4.Otherpreventativemeasuresasrequiredineachspecificsituation.

4.4.1.Transportationcontrol

Weaponscanbedivertedduringtransportation(e.g.enroutetotransit/trans‐shipmentStateorimportingState,byre‐routingthevessel,aircraftorothermeansoftransportationtoadestinationthatisdifferentfromtheoneinexport/import/transit/transhipmentauthorization).

SpecificmeasuresaStatecouldadopttocontroltransportationofarmsare:8

a. Requiringdetailedinformationontransportandtransportserviceprovidersinapplicationsforimportandexportlicencesorauthorizations;

b. Requiringtransportserviceproviderstomaintaincomprehensiveandverifiabledocumentation,includingmanifests,billsofladingandinvoicesforpossibleinspectionbyStateauthorities.

c. Makeitmandatoryforthetransporterand/orthepartiesinvolvedinthetransfertonotifytheexportingandtheimportingStatewheneverthereisachangeinthetransportationplan(route,carrier,date,etc.).

8 For more information on this matter, refer to “Elements for Controlling Transportation of Conventional Arms Between Third Countries”, agreed at the 2011 Plenary Meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement.


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4.4.2.Weaponsmarking

ImportingStatesareencouragedtomarkimportedweapons,particularlysmallarmsandlightweapons(SALW),atthetimeofimport,andtokeepadequaterecords.

TheInternationalTracingInstrumentadoptedbytheUNGeneralAssemblyin2005recommendsandprovidesstandardsformarkingSALWatthetimeofmanufacture.ThatinstrumentalsoencouragesStatestorequirethemarkingofSALWatthetimeofimport.

TheFirearmsProtocolrequiresitsStatesPartiestoensurethatSALWaremarkedatthetimeofmanufactureandofimport.

4.4.3.Tracing

Statesareencouragedtodevelopnationalcapacitiestotraceillicitordivertedweapons,particularlySALW.

Weaponstracingcanhelplawenforcementofficialstouncovertraffickingroutes,toidentifypartiesengagedintheillicittradeandthemethodsusedbythem.9Thistypeofinformationiscriticaltoeffortstopreventdiversion.

4.4.4.Stockpilemanagement

Takingregularandcomprehensiveinventoryofweapons,ammunition,andpartsandcomponentsisessentialtoensurethatweaponsarenotdiverted.Statesshouldendeavourtostrengthenthephysicalsecurityofstocksandimprovetheirmanagementsystem.

5. Informationexchange

Inpreventingdiversion,StatesPartiesshouldcooperatewithoneanotherandexchangeinformationon:

a. Exportlicence/authorization;

b. Importlicence/authorization;

c. Transit/trans‐shipmentlicence/authorization;

d. Brokerlicence/authorizationandbrokeringactivitiesauthorization;

e. End‐usercertificatesdatatohelpverifythetruthfulnessofend‐useclaims;

f. Informationonweaponstransportationproviders;

g. Casesofpreviousdiversion;

h. Denialsofexportandimportlicences;

i. Knowninternationaltraffickingroutes,methods,illicitbrokers,intermediariesandtransportagency/carriersinvolvedindiversion;

9 For more information on tracing, refer to International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons.


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j. Anyotherrelevantinformation,pursuanttonationallaws.

6. Actionstobetakenincaseofdiversion

UnderArticle11(4),whenStatesPartiesdetectadiversionofconventionalarms,theyshalltakeappropriatemeasurespromptly.Thesemayinclude:

a. AlertingpotentiallyaffectedStates(Exporting,importing,transitandtrans‐shipmentStates,neighbouringStatesandStateswithcurrentconflictsortensionintheregion.);

b. Examiningdivertedshipments.Re‐examineallrelevantdocumentstoidentifytheweaponsbeingdivertedandthepossiblepointandmethodofdiversion;

c. Tracingweaponsthathavebeendiverted.CooperateandexchangeinformationwithallStatesconcerned.UseavailabletoolssuchastheINTERPOLiARMSdatabase,whereappropriate;

d. Initiating/cooperatingincriminalinvestigationsofcasesofdiversion.