Mohammed Azharuddin Judgment

7/29/2019 Mohammed Azharuddin Judgment

1/73

MohammedAzharuddin

..AppellantAndTheBoardofControlforCricketinIndiaThroughitsSecretary,havingitsofficeatBrabourneStatidum,FortArea,Mumbai,MaharashtraAndors

.Respondents.


2/73

1. Mohammed Azharuddin, the appellant herein, was highly reputed

cricketplayer.Itiswellknowntoallthecricketlovingpublicaswellasgeneral

public thatMohammed Azharuddin was an outstanding cricketer (player as

wellasCaptainofIndianTeam)whoheldanexcellentrecordinbothTestand

One-dayInternational(ODI)limitedoversgamecricketmatches.

2. Inandaround2000,therehadbeenmediareportsmakingallegationsof

underperformance,matchfixingbetting,acceptinggiftsetc.,againstseveral

CricketPlayersincludingforeignplayers.Takinginnumerablereportsthathad

come inbothprintandelectronicmediamaking allegationsasstatedsupra

againstseveralCricketplayers,thethenSecretary,MinistryofCulture,Youth

AffairsandSports,GovernmentofIndia,tookcognizanceofthosereportsand

askedtheCentralBureauof Investigation (for short theCBI) tocollectand

evaluatevariousnewsitemsandinformationsopublishedinthatregardand

thereafter,conductanenquiryintothoseallegationswhichwasdone.Onthe

requestoftheMinistryofCultureYouthAffairsandSportsUnionofIndia,the

BCCI (first respondent herein) thereafter initiated preliminary enquiry

appointing the second respondent as its Commissioner in regard thereto.

Ultimately, at the culmination of the enquiry and submitting report, The


3/73

BCCI/first respondent passed its order dated 05.12.2000, imposing

punishmentagainsttheappellant,whichinteraliareadstothefollowingeffect:

ORDER OF THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEEE OF BOARD OF

CONTROLFORCRICKETININIDAPASSEDATTHEMEETINGHELDON5THDECEMBER2000ATCHENNAI:

Mr.Mohd.Azharuddin:

TheCBIhassubmittedaReporttitledReportonCricketMatchFixing&RelatedMalPractices inOctober,2000.TheBoardofControl forCrikcetinIndia(BCCI)hadreferredthemattertoitsCommissioner,Mr.K.Madhavantomakeanappropriateenquiry.DuringMr.MadhavansfurtherenquiryhegaveopportunitiestoMr.Azharuddintogivehisexplanationstohimwhichhedidinthe form of a signed statement. Subsequently Mr.Madhavan submitted hisreport.

Mr.Mohd. Azharuddin was given a notice to appear before theDisciplinary Committee of the Board on 28.11.2000 at Hotel Taj Mahal,Mansingh Road, New Delhi. At the said hearing, on 28.11.2000,Mr.Azharuddinhadedoveraletterdt.28.11.2000addressedtotheChairmanoftheDisciplinaryCommittee.Dr.A.C.Muthaiah,thecontentsofthesaidletterisreproducedbelow:

Kindlyrefertoyourletterdated24.11.2000.IwishtosaythatIfully cooperated with the enquiry conducted by Shri Madhavan,commissioner appointed by the BCCI. He recorded my statement in

minute details. I had specifically denied the allegations about CricketMatchFixingandalliedmattersintheirtotality.Ihadnoconnectionwithanypersonoutsidethecricketfraternity.

Asfarasmyknowledgegoes,nocricketplayerindulgedinmatchfixing.

IamundergreatstrainbecauseinadditiontotheenquirybytheBCCI,separateenquiries/investigationsbytheIncomeTax,DirectorateofEnforcementhavebeenlaunchedagainstmewithoutanybasis.

I have served the BCCI and my country with distinction. I am

confident that having regard to my excellent and outstandingperformanceasacaptainandasaplayer,BCCIwoulddofulljusticetome.

The submissions made by Mr.Azharuddin as above was given dueconsideration. Itwasput toMr.Azharuddinwhether heisawarethat ifheisfound guilty in the proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee then an


4/73

appropriateactioncouldbetakenagainsthimforwhichhehadansweredintheaffirmative.

Thereafter, the proceedings were recorded and signed by all themembersoftheDisciplinaryCommitteeandalsobyMr.Azharuddinandpoint-3 of the proceedings of the Disciplinary Committee Meeting held on 28th

November2000isreproducedbelow:

Clause-3.Onbeingaskedwhetherhehadanythingfurthertoaddbyway ofexplanations regarding theallegations asmentioned in theaforesaidreports.,hestatedthathehadbroughtwithhimaletterdatedNovember 28,2000, addressed to the President, BCCI. He handed itovertotheCommittee.CopythereofisenclosedasAnnexuretotheseproceedings.Hestatedthathehadmentionedinthesaidletterwhathewants tosubmitbefore theCommittee andhas nothing further toaddexcept that he innocent he is hopeful that the Committee and BCCIwoulddofulljusticetohim.

TheDisciplinaryCommitteehascarefullyconsideredthe factsandthefindingsoftheReportoftheCommissionerarrivedatonaconsiderationoftheReport of the CBI as well as the statements/submissions made byMr.AzharuddibeforetheCommissionerandalsothestatements/submissionsmadebyhimatthehearingon28.11.2000beforetheDisciplinaryCommittee.TheCommissionersReporthas correctlydealtwith theseaspects and hasheldthattheexplanationsgivenbyMr.Azharuddinareunacceptabletohimforthereasonsgiveninhisreport.

TheDisciplinary Committee hasconsidered theentirematter and theexplanationsandtheoralsubmissionsmadebyMr.Azharuddinandareunable

to accept the same. After having given anxious consideration to the entirematter and on the basis of the statements/submissions made byMr.Azharuddin before the Disciplinary Committee, Report of theCommissionerwhichalsoconsidered theReport of theCBI, theDisciplinaryCommitteeisalsooftheopinionthatMr.AzharuddinisguiltyasfoundbytheCommissioner.

Afterduedeliberationandkeepinginmind theinterestofthe futureofthe IndianCricket, theMembersoftheDisciplinaryCommitteepresenthaveunanimouslytakenthedecisionasfollows:

i) He had close contacts and nexus with bookies/punters likeM.K.Gupta,AjayGupta,GyanGuptaandAmeeshGuptaetc.,andwasinvolvedinmatchfixing.

ii) Heisguiltyofunbecomingconductandmisconductasanationallevel player in maintaining such frequent contacts withbookies/punters.


5/73

iii) Inhiscase,themisconductisaggravated,ashewastheCaptainof the Indian Team for long and let down the country and thecricketlovingpublicinadespicablemanner.

The Disciplinary Committee is of the considered opinion thatMr.Azharuddinhasconductedhimselfinamannerwhichisprejudicialtothe

interestsofthegameofcricket,moreparticularlyasaCaptainoftheIndianTeam.

IntakingitsdecisiontheDisciplinaryCommitteehasalsokeptinmindthecontributionsmadebyMr.Azharuddintothegameofcricket.

Afterduedeliberationandkeeping inmind the interestof the futureofthe IndianCricket theMembers of theDisciplinaryCommitteepresent haveunanimouslytakenthedecisionasfollows:

Mr.Mohd. Azharuddin be debarred from playing any cricketmatchesconductedorauthorizedbyICC/BCCIoraffiliatedassociations

andalsodebarredfromholdinganypositioninICC/BCCIoranyofitsaffiliatedassociations,forlifecommencingfrom5 thDecember,2000.Hewillalsobenoteligible for anyBenefitMatchesallotted/conductedbythe BCCI or its affiliated members and BCCIs contribution to hisBenevolentFundaccruedasof today,willbeforfeitedwitheffect from5thDecember,2000.

Sd/K.M.RamPrasad Sd/Dr.A.C.Muthaiah

Member-DisciplinaryCommittee Chairman-DisciplinaryCommittee

Dated5thDecember,2000

Chennai.

3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order inflicting the punishment upon him,

MohammedAzharuddin/appellantpreferredO.S.No.10of2001onthe fileof

thelearnedIIAdditionalChiefJudge,CityCivilCourt,Hyderabad.

4. For the sake of convenience, the parties herein are referred to as

arrayedinthesuit.


6/73

5. The suit was instituted by the plaintiff inter alia seeking the following

reliefs:

a)todeclareaportionofRule38(ii)oftheRulesandRegulationsofthe

BoardofControlforCricketinIndia(forshorttheBoard)afteritseveranceto

theextentwhichprecludesandprohibitstheplaintifffromcallingintoquestion

theactiontakenbytheCommitteeasaresultofaninquiryundertheRule,in

anycourtoflawasbadandillegal;

b)todeclaretheappointmentof thedefendant2and thereportdrawn

up by him as null and void, ultra vires and contrary to the established

procedure;

c) todeclare the proceedings ofdefendant1/Board dated05.12.2000

inflicting thereunder punishment and imposition of life ban on the plaintiff,

which was duly communicated by the Secretary through his letter dated

11.12.2000,asnullandvoidbeingcontraryto theRulesandRegulationsof

theBoardandviolativeoftheprinciplesofnaturaljustice;

d)todeclarethattheplaintiffbepermittedtoplaycricketduringhislife

timefortheIndianNationalTeamandsuchotherteamsandshallbeentitled

toallretirementbenefitsasaninternationalcricketerisentitledtoinIndiaand

to permit him to hold any such position asmaybe available orasmaybe

consideredintheBoardortheICC;and

e) to issue a perpetual and permanent injunction restraining the

defendantsinanywayeitherinterferingorrestrictingthecricketingcareerof

theplaintiffdirectlyorindirectly.


7/73

6.(a) Itisaverredintheplaintthattheplaintiffisalaw-abidingcitizen.Owing

to excellent performance in cricket, he was selected to represent Indian

NationalTeaminCricketTestmatchseriesagainstEnglandintheyear1984-

85.Onhisdebutitself,hecreatedaworldrecordbyscoringthreecenturiesin

arowinthreetests(arecordwhichisstillholdingthefield).Hehadalsoheld

many other records under his cap. It is further averred that considering his

excellentperformance,hewasselectedastheCaptainoftheIndianNational

Team inwhichcapacityhe represented the country inseveral test andone

day international cricketmatches, the detailsofwhich, thoughmentioned in

detail in the plaint, are not really necessary for us to adjudicate the

controversiesinvolvedinthisappeal.

6.(b) At the outset, it is pertinent to notice as to the cause for the

institutionofthesubjectsuitbeforetheCourtbelowwhichwasinviewofthe

innumerable reports that had come in both the print and electronic media

making allegations of under performance, match fixing, betting, accepting

gifts, etc. against several Cricket players, which the Secretary, Ministry of

Culture,YouthAffairs and Sports,Government of India, took cognizance of

leading to takecognizanceandask theCBI tocollect and evaluate various

newsitemsandinformationsopublishedinthatregardandthereafter,conduct

anenquiryintothoseallegations.Ultimately,attheculminationoftheenquiry,

thepunishmentinquestionwasinflictedupontheplaintiff,whichwas interalia

assailedbeforetheCourtbelowunderthesubjectsuit.

6.(c). Itis pleaded that thedefendant1 being the Board is a society

registered at Madras (Chennai) on 28.11.1940 under the provisions of the


8/73

Societies Registration Act, 1860 which is required to be

administered/governed in accordance with its memorandum andRules and

Regulations as last amended at the Special General Meeting held on

15.08.1994atUdaipur.Anyaction on the part of theBoardwhich is not in

consonancewith itsmemorandumandRulesandRegulationsisillegal. Itis

also specifically pleaded that the relationship between the plaintiff and

defendant1/Boardisinthenatureofaservicecontractandthattheprinciples

and procedure laid down by the Supreme Court with regard to initiation,

conduct, conclusion, issuance of show cause notices, charge memos and

imposition of punishment in disciplinary proceedings, etc. also govern and

applytothedisciplinaryproceedingsoftheBoard.

6.(d) Itisfurtherpleadedthatdefendant3fortheBoardappointedthe

defendant2,apracticingAdvocateanditsclient,whoinfactwasnotqualified

toconducttheenquirywasappointedastheCommissioneringrossviolation

of itsRulesandRegulations inasmuchas theydonot stipulate any specific

provision to do so whereby such action on the part of the Board being in

flagrantviolationofitsownRulesandRegulationsisillegal,arbitraryand ex

faciesheerconsequenceofthebiasedattitudeofthedefendant3againstthe

plaintiff.TheBoarddidnotdiscloseitsintentionofappointingaCommissioner

as no resolution was passed to that effect. Apart from that the disciplinary

committee with three members alone was competent to conduct such

proceedingsasclearlyenvisagedunderRule38oftheRulesandRegulations

oftheBoard.Itisclaimedthatthepreliminaryenquiry(forshortPE)initiated


9/73


10/73

Itisallegedthattheenquiryconductedbythedefendant2inanycasewasnot

transparent,fairandindependent,ashedidnotcallorexamineanywitness

whogavestatementagainsthiminhispresence,apartfromwhichattheend

evenbeforetheplaintiffcouldmakehispresencebeforehimonthesummons

sentbyhim,heannouncedthedateofsubmissionofhisreporttotheBoard,

which indicates that theenquirywas ashamandmere formalitywhichwas

done justwith themotive ofseeing that theplaintiff should bepunished. In

additionto that thedefendant2 placed relianceupon thePEreportand the

statementswhichwereinfactnotrecordedbeforehimonlyforthepurposeof

findingorholdingtheplaintiffasguilty,illegallyandinviolationoftheprinciples

of natural justice or established procedure prescribed under law in regard

thereto.On the otherhand, likewisequite illegally only twomembers of the

disciplinarycommitteeoftheBoardsolelyrelieduponthePEreportwhichwas

mechanicallyendorsedbythedefendant2andissuedtheproceedingsdated

5.12.2000debarring theplaintiff from playing cricket matches conductedor

authorised by itself or the ICC or its affiliated associations with effect from

05.12.2000and alsoholdingany post in thoseBodies inposthastewithout

consultingorreferringtothethirdmemberofthedisciplinarycommitteewhich

isborneoutbythefactthathedidnotsigntheproceedings.Thatapartthe

Boardalsoforfeitedthebenevolentfundtobearrangedtotheplaintiff.

6.(g). ItisclaimedthatRule38(ii)oftheRulesandRegulationsofthe

Boardwhich prohibited the plaintiff to initiate legal proceedings against the

Boardquestioningtheactiontakenbyitagainsthimis perseillegalandnot


11/73

bindingontheplaintiffasithasnolegalforceandisopposedtothepublic

policy.

6.(h). Itisfinallypleadedthatnoappealisprovidedagainstthereportof

thedefendant2andorderdated05.12.2000.Unlesstheimpugnedreportand

orderaresetasidedeclaringthemasillegal,nullandvoidandultravires,the

plaintiff will suffer irreparable loss and injury. He claims that he has no

efficaciousalternativeremedythaninstitutingthepresentsuitinordertoseek

justice.

7.(a) TheDefendant1/theBoard,fileditswrittenstatementspecifically

denyingallthematerialavermentsmadewhich interaliareadstothefollowing

effect:

7.(b). It is stated that the suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable

either in lawor on the facts of the case for want of misjoinder and/or non-

joinder of parties. TheCourt below has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain

and try the suit as no part of the cause of action has arisen within its

jurisdiction. It is further pleaded that the entire suit is based on vexatious,

wrongfuland unsustainablecontentionsby reason ofwhich it is liable tobe

rejectedinliminewithexemplarycosts.Itisfurtherclaimedthatthesuitisalso

liable to be dismissed on the ground of improper valuation and improper

paymentofcourtfee.

7.(c). It is claimed further that the Board is an autonomous and

independentbodyregisteredinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofTamilNadu


12/73

Societies Registration Act, 1860 and its actions are guided by its own

constitution. It is claimed that the Board can initiate domestic enquiry in

accordancewith itsRulesandRegulationssubject to thecomplianceof the

principles of natural justice, equity and fair play, but the findings and/or

decisions of the domestic body cannot be superseded by a Court of law

throughajudicialscrutiny.

7.(d). It isspecificallydenied that therelationshipbetween theplaintiff

anddefendant1isinthenatureofaservicecontract.Itisspecificallypleaded

that there isa contractual obligation betweencricket players and theBoard

whereas theplayers by virtueof theprovisions ofRule10 of itsRulesand

Regulations would fall within the jurisdiction of the Board. The Rules and

Regulationsof theBoardarenotviolativeofanypublicpolicyandnotprima

facie illegal. They are exhaustive in nature and provide each and every

modality with regard to initiation, conduct, conclusion, imposition of

punishment, etc., in the matter of disciplinary proceedings initiated by the

Board to which the plaintiff had submitted himself. The plaintiff having

accepted theRulesand Regulationsof the Board isestopped frommaking

anyefforttowriggleoutoftheproceedings.Itisspecificallydeniedthatthough

the defendant 2 got no qualification was appointed as the Commissioner

illegally beyond the ambit of and in flagrant violation of its rules and

regulationsasserting that infacthis appointmentwasproper and legal.It is

also specifically claimed that the enquiry was a sham and mere formality

intendedtoimplicatetheplaintiffandimposepunishmentuponthem.Itisalso


13/73

pleadedthateventhoughtheenquirydoesnotdisclosethecommissionofany

offence under the provisions of IPC or any other statute, still as the facts

clearly disclose thecommission ofmisconductby the plaintiff, the domestic

bodylikethedefendant1isstatutorilyentitledtotakeappropriatedisciplinary

actionwithintheframeworkofitsownRulesandRegulations.

7.(e) Itisalsospecificallydeniedthattheplaintiffwasnotsuppliedwith

the copiesof thestatements of the witnessesexaminedduring the enquiry

conductedbytheCBIandthatthereportoftheCBIisbaselessandincorrect.

Itisclaimedthatonthespecificrequestoftheplaintiff,hewassuppliedwitha

fullcopyofthereportoftheCBI,thereceiptofwhichwasdulyacknowledged

bytheplaintifffollowingwhichonlytheplaintiffappearedbeforethedefendant

2duringtheenquiryandsubmitted27pagesstatementswhichareonrecord.

It isclaimed that everystatementmadeby the plaintiff was recorded in the

presenceofdefendant2andwassignedbyhim.Itisalsoclaimedthatthough

theplaintiffwasgivenopportunitytoexamineanywitnessorwitnesseswitha

viewtoavoidrecordingofcorroboratingevidenceagainsthim,hewilfullyhad

chosen not to call for any evidence being addressed or any witness being

examined.Itisstatedthattheplaintiffwasinitiallyaskedtoappearbeforethe

defendant 2 at New Delhi but at the behest of the plaintiff and to afford

completeandreasonableopportunity,thedomesticenquirywasconductedat

Hyderabadwhichistheplaceofresidenceoftheplaintiff.

7.(f). Itisalsoclaimedthattheplaintiffexpressedhissatisfactionand

gratitudeforthecourtesyextendedtohimduringthecourseofentireenquiry.


14/73

Itisthereforedeniedthattheenquiryproceedingsarevoidabinitioorillegalor

violative in the eye of law while pleading that it has been sufficiently

established that the plaintiff was guilty of gross misconduct. It is therefore

pleadedthatthewholeandsolemotiveonthepartoftheplaintiffinmaking

falseallegationsintheplaintistomisleadtheCourtsuppressingthematerial

facts.

7.(g). ItisclaimedfurtherthattheCBIreportwasdulyconsideredwith

openmindandindependently.Theultimatedecisionwasarrivedatonlyafter

dueconsiderationofallaspectsthatcametolightwhichsubstantiallyproved

that theplaintiffwasguiltyofgrossmisconduct.It isfurtherclaimedthat the

decision was taken and the punishment was imposed upon the plaintiff in

accordancewith the provisions of the Rules and Regulations of the Board

legallyandvalidly. It isspecifically denied that therewas non-applicationof

mindorthattherewasmechanicalorerroneousconclusionorthattheplaintiff

was subjected toharshpunishment.Whiledenying that the decision of the

defendant3wasmarkedbymalafideintentions,itisclaimedthatitistotally

immaterial whether the third Member of the disciplinary committee was

presentduringthecourseofhearingornot.Itisclaimedthattheplaintiffhas

nocauseofactiontofilethesuit.Accordingtohimitismisconceived,illegal,

wrongfulandbasedonutterfalseandmisleadingpleadingstoentertainit.

7.(h). It is further claimed that the defendant 2 submitted his report

dated05.12.2000tothefirstdefendant/BoardatChennai.Ontheotherhand

CBI reportwasmade and published at New Delhi; Infact except the mere


15/73

hearingaffordedtotheplaintiffatHyderabad,noeventwhatsoeverbearingon

the subjectmatter of the suit took placewithin the jurisdiction of theCourt

below;byreasonofwhichalsothesuitisnotmaintainableonthegroundof

lack of territorial jurisdiction. It is therefore prayedultimately that the suit is

liabletobedismissed.

8. TheDefendant2and3filed separatewrittenstatementswhich confer

with the written statement of the defendant No.1 which need not be

reproducedonceagain.Itissufficetorefertosomeimportantaspectswhich

the defendant No.2 dealt with directly. He claimed that no relief could be

claimedagainsthimashejustconductedtheenquiryandsubmittedthereport

thereonpursuanttohisappointmentastheCommissionerin regard thereto.

HepleadedthatRule38(ii)oftheRulesandRegulationsoftheBoardwere

amendedon29.09.2000inaccordancewithwhich,onlyindeed,heconducted

thedisciplinaryproceedingsthereafter.Withregardstohiseligibilityheclaims

thatatthetimeofhisretirementintheyear1992hewastheJointDirectorof

CBI, he has got vast experience in doing investigation and prosecution of

casesandalsoconductingaswellasmonitoringlargenumberofdepartmental

enquiries/disciplinary proceedings. Therefore he denies that he lacked

experienceinconductingthedisciplinaryproceedings.Itisspecificallyclaimed

byhimthatthestatementsoftheplaintiffwererecordedindetailaffordinghim

proper andnecessary opportunitywhich is reflected in the correspondence

thattookplacebetweentheplaintiffandhimself,viz.Lettersdated08.11.2000,

10.11.2000,13.11.2000,14.11.2000,15.11.2000,17.11.2000etc.Hisclaimis


16/73

that the plaintiff did question during the entire enquiry his appointment or

jurisdictiontoconducttheenquiry;ontheotherhandtheplaintiffhimselfsenta

fax message dated 17.11.2000 on his own volition to him expressing his

gratitude for the courtesy extended to him during the enquiry; It is pleaded

therebythatonlywithaviewtoprejudicetheCourtbelowhehasmadefalse

pleas in the plaint. It is claimed that the CBI which need not record the

statements of the witnesses in the presence of plaintiff supplied those

statementstotheplaintiffintotoasrequiredbylaw.Itisthereforedeniedthat

theplaintiffwasnotgivenfullandcompleteopportunitytomakeuseofthose

statementsforthecrossexaminationofwitnessesatthetimeofenquiry.On

theotherhandthedefendant2isobjectiveinpreparinghisreport.

9. On thebasisof thesepleadings, theCourtbelowframedthefollowing

issuesforadjudication:

1. WhethertheappointmentofseconddefendantasCommissioner

undertheproceedingsdated29.08.2000isvalid?

2. Whether the first defendant had inherent power to appoint

Commissionerforconductingenquiry?

3. Whethertheseconddefendantisincompetentandunqualifiedfor

beingappointedasCommissionerbythefirstdefendant?

4. Whether the enquiry conducted by defendantNo.2 is not legal

andvalidontheseveralgroundsallegedintheplaint?

5. Whether the allegation of match fixing against plaintiff is not

proved?

6. Whether the first defendant had not followed the procedure

prescribed by its bye-laws and the principles of natural justice

and,ifso,itsorderdated05.12.2000isnotvalid?


17/73


18/73

2) Whetherthesuitismaintainable

(a)byvirtueofrule38(1)oftheRulesandregulationsofthe

Boardwhichprohibittofilethesuitand

(b)byvirtueofnonjoinderofnecessaryparties?

3) WhethertheBoardgotpowertoappointthedefendant2as the

Commissioner by the orderdatedon29.08.2000 toconduct the

enquirywithregardstoanyactsofindisciplineandmisconductof

theplaintiffandsubmitreport,inviewofRule38oftheRulesand

RegulationsoftheBoardandhencetheappointmentisvalid?

4) Whether the defendant 2 as theCommissioner was competent

andqualifiedtoconducttheenquiryagainsttheplaintiffeffectively

in the light of the fact that he was advising the Board as anAdvocateonlegalissues?

5) Whether the defendant 2 had followed the rule of principles of

naturaljusticeduringthecourseofentireenquiry?

6) Whetherthedefendant2hadmadeany independentenquiry to

provetheallegationsofmatchfixingbyaffordinganopportunityto

the plaintiff to cross-examine the concerned witnesses whose

statementswere relied uponwhile drawing up his report dated

24.11.2000?

7) Whether the impugned order dated 05.12.2000 of the Board

passedby only twomembers instead of threemembers of the

disciplinaryCommitteeasmandatedbyRule18oftheRulesand

Regulations is legal and valid, more particularly in the light of

letterdated04.12.2000addressedbythethirdMemberofittothe

Boardseekingtofixfreshdateforconveningthemeeting?

8) What are the effects of the report dated 24.11.2000 of the

defendant 2 and the impugned order dated 05.12.2000 of the

Board?

9) WhetherthejudgmentanddecreepassedbytheCourtbeloware

liabletobesetasideconsequently?


19/73

10) Whethertheplaintiffisentitledtothereliefsprayedforinthesuit?

11) Ifso,towhatrelief?

15. Itisthespecificpleaoftheplaintiffintheplaintthatthecauseofaction

arosewithin the territorial jurisdiction of the Courtbelow inasmuchas the

defendant 2had conductedthe enquiry proceedingsatHyderabad and that

necessarycommunicationswith regards to thesubject enquiry including the

serviceoftheimpugnedorderdated05.12.2000weresenttohisHyderabad

address,wherehewasapermanentresident.Therefore,itisthecontentionof

learnedcounselfortheplaintiffthattheCourtbelowgotterritorialjurisdiction

totrythesuit.

16. ThedefendantswhileclaimingatonestagethattheCourtbelowgotno

territorial jurisdiction have claimed at another stage that the enquiry was

conducted at Hyderabad which is the place of permanent resident of the

plaintiff.Thismakesatcategoricalthatthecauseofactiontofilethesuitarose

atHyderabad.Section20CPCwhichisrelevanthereenjoins.

17. Thus by virtue of this provision the Court below got jurisdiction to

entertainthesuitaswithinitslocaljurisdictiontheplaintiffusedtoresideand

alsotheenquirywasconductedwhichwouldgivenecessarycauseofaction.

18. Rule42of theRulesandRegulationsof theBoardisrelevanthere, it

readstothefollowingeffect:


20/73

42. SuitbyoragainsttheBoard:

TheBoardshallsueorbesuedinthenameoftheSecretary.

ThisRuleappearstobequitecontradictorytotheprohibitionenshrinedinRule

38(ii)whichistotheeffectthattheaction,ifany,takenbytheCommitteeasa

resultofanenquiryshallnotbecalledintoquestioninanycourtoflaw.Here

Section 9 CPC is also relevant as this provision in fact gives right to the

plaintiff to file the suit.This sectionenjoins theCourts shallsubject to the

provisions hereincontained have jurisdiction to try all suitsof a civilnature

excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly

barred.Sobyvirtueofthisprovisioneverybodywillhavearighttofilesuitof

civilnatureforreaddressinghisgrievanceunlessthereisastatutorybartodo

so.

19. Definitely this suit filed to redress the grievances of the plaintiff as

enunciated is purely civil in nature. Rule 38(2) will not have any statutory

enforcementindependently.

20. In ,theSupremeCourt,interalia

whiledealingwith the basicdistinctionbetween the rightofsuitandrightof

appealalsodealtwiththerightofsuitexclusively.Thisdecisioninfactclarifies

categoricallythequestionraisedinthepresentcontext.Wheneverybodywill

haveaninherentrighttofileasuittoredresshisgrievanceagainstanotheror

othersunlessprohibitedbylawanyprovisionmadeagainst thespiritofthat

concept cannot be held to be valid.

OntheotherhandanyprecedentslaidbytheconstitutionalCourtsoperateas


21/73

lawasinterpretedwhichwillhavestatutoryforce.Itisquiteunconstitutionalto

preventapersonfromexercisingsuchrightthoughinfringedquitearbitrarily.

InfacttheApexCourtheld:

15.ItisthusclearthattheappealfiledbyDefendants2and3in

the High Court was directed originally not against any part of the

preliminarydecreebutagainstamerefindingrecordedbythetrialourt

that the partition was not genuine. The main controversy before us

centres roundthequestionwhether thatappealwasmaintainable.On

thisquestionthepositionseemstouswellestablished.Thereisabasic

distinctionbetweentherightofsuitandtherightofappeal.Thereisan

inherentrightineverypersontobringasuitofacivilnatureandunlessthesuitisbarredbystatuteonemay,atonesperil,bringasuitofones

choice. Itisnoanswertoasuit,howsoever frivolous toclaim,thatthe

lawconfersnosuchrighttosue.Asuitforitsmaintainabilityrequiresno

authorityoflawanditisenoughthatnostatutebarsthesuit.Butthe

positionin regard toappeals isquite theopposite.The rightofappeal

inheres innoone and thereforeanappeal for itsmaintainabilitymust

havetheclearauthorityoflaw.Thatexplainswhytherightofappealis

describedasacreatureofstatute.

[Emphasisisours]

Itiscomprehensiblefromthisdecisionthatthereisabasicdistinctionbetween

therightofsuitandtherightofappealandthatasuitismaintainableifthereis

no statutorybar to do so.Significantly in the present case,Rule 42 clearly

positsthattheBoardcanbesuedinthenameofitsSecretarywhichisquite

contradictory to the Rule 38(ii) which enjoins that any action taken by the

Committeeasaresultofanenquiryshallnotbecalledintoquestioninany

Courtoflaw.Whentherearecontradictoryprovisionsonthesubjectwithinthe


22/73

rules that which is in accordance with law laid or interpreted statutorily will

prevailandwillbeenforced.TheembargocontainedinRule38(ii)whichruns

contrary to the other rule, is clearly illegal and arbitrary and hence invalid

thereby.

21. In fact the Supreme Court in

clearly clarified the status of the board for the purpose of

initiatingactionagainsttheboardwhentheboardinvolvedinviolatingtheright

ofacricketplayerwhowasfoundbytherulesandregulationsoftheboard.

Undersimilarquestionsraised,infacttheSupremeCourtobservedandheld:

23.Thefactsestablishedinthiscaseshowthefollowing:

1.TheBoardisnotcreatedbyastatute.

2.NopartofthesharecapitaloftheBoardisheldbythe

Government.

3. Practically no financial assistance is given by the

GovernmenttomeetthewholeorentireexpenditureoftheBoard.

4.TheBoarddoesenjoyamonopolystatusinthefieldof

cricketbutsuchstatusisnotState-conferredorState-protected.

5. There is no existence of a deep and pervasive State

control. The control if any is only regulatory in nature as

applicabletoothersimilarbodies.Thiscontrolisnotspecifically

exercisedunderany special statute applicable to theBoard. All

functionsoftheBoardarenotpublicfunctionsnoraretheyclosely

relatedtogovernmentalfunctions.6.TheBoard is not created by transferof agovernment-

ownedcorporation.Itisanautonomousbody.

31.Bethatasitmay,itcannotbedeniedthattheBoarddoesdischarge

somedutiesliketheselectionofanIndiancricketteam,controllingthe


23/73

activities of the players and others involved in the game of cricket.

TheseactivitiescanbesaidtobeakintopublicdutiesorStatefunctions

andifthereisanyviolationofanyconstitutionalorstatutoryobligationor

rightsofothercitizens,theaggrievedpartymaynothaveareliefbyway

ofapetitionunderArticle32.Butthatdoesnotmeanthattheviolatorof

such rightwould go scot-freemerely because itor he is not aState.

Under the Indian jurisprudence there is always a just remedy for the

violationofarightofacitizen.ThoughtheremedyunderArticle32is

notavailable,anaggrievedpartycanalwaysseekaremedyunderthe

ordinarycourseoflaworbywayofawritpetitionunderArticle226of

theConstitution,whichismuchwiderthanArticle32.

203. It isnot disputedthat theUnionof Indiahas notrecognisedany

othernationalsportsbodyforregulatingthegameofcricketinIndia.Itis

thecategoricalstandoftheUnionofIndiathatonlybysuchrecognition

grantedby the Unionof India, is the team selectedby the Board the

Indian cricket teamwhich it couldnot do in the absence thereof.We

cannotacceptthesubmissionofMrVenugopaltotheeffectthateven

whileplayingabroad,theBoardsendsitsownteam.Itisevident from

therecordswhichfacthasalsobeennoticedbytheDelhiHighCourtin

itsjudgmentinRahulMehra[(2004)114DLT323(DB)]thattheBoard

fields its team as the Indian team and not as Board Eleven, which

withouthavinganyauthorityfromtheUnionofIndia,itwillnotbeableto

do. The stand that the cricket team selected by the Board only

representsitandnotthecountryisincorrect.HavingregardtotheRules

oftheICC,itsownRulesasalsovariousdocumentsplacedbeforethis

CourtbytheUnionofIndia,theconductofboththeBoardandtheUnion

ofIndiaclearlygoestoshowthatsubsilentioboththepartieshadbeen

acting on the premise that the Board is recognised as the only

recognisednationalfederationforthepurposeofregulatingthegameof

cricketinIndia.


24/73

[Emphasisisours]

Thus it is held by the Supreme Court that although the Board is an

autonomousbody,itcannotbedeniedthefactthattheBoarddoesdischarge

somedutiesakintopublicdutiesorStatefunctions,namely,theselectionof

an Indian cricket team, controlling the activities of the players and others

involvedinthegameofcricket;ifthereisanyviolationofanyconstitutionalor

statutoryobligationor rights, theaggrievedpartycanalwaysseekaremedy

undertheordinarycourseoflawandtheviolatorofsuchrightwouldnotgo

scot-freemerelybecauseitisnotaState.Thoughtheplaintiffwasboundby

therulesandregulationsoftheBoardthatdoesnotmeanthattheBoardcould

actquitearbitrarilyinfringinghisfundamentalrights.ByvirtueofArticle21of

theConstitution,heisguaranteedlifeandliberty.Thisentitleshimtolivewith

dignityandfightanyinjusticethatmaybedonetohim.Punishinghimwithout

anybasisisdefinitelycurtailmentofhislifeandlibertyguaranteedunderthe

saidArticle and quitearbitrary. Though the Boardgot enormouspowers as

contemplatedby its rulesand regulations thatshould besubject to fair play

andfundamentalrightsoftheplayersselectedby it. Inademocraticcountry

every system in vogue therein should be conducted within the process of

democracy.InthelightofthislawlaiddownbytheSupremeCourt,itcannot

be said that the Board being an autonomous body, its actions cannot be

subjecttochallengebeforeaCourtoflaw.

22. Withregardtothecontentionoflearnedcounselforthedefendantsthat

thesuitisnotmaintainableagainsttheBoardastherelationshipbetweenthe


25/73

plaintiff and theBoard is a contract of service by reasonof which also the

plaintiffisnotentitledtoquestionanyrulesorregulationsframedbytheBoard

and,atbest,theplaintiffcanlayasuitfordamagesinsuchcasesifheisso

advised in the

SupremeCourtheldthus:

12. The regulations contain the terms and conditions which

govern the relationship between the Corporation and its employees.

Thoughmade under the power conferred by the statute, they merely

embody the termsandconditions ofservice intheCorporationbut do

notconstituteastatutoryrestrictionastothekindofcontractswhichthe

Corporationcanmakewithitsservantsorthegroundsonwhich itcan

terminatethem.Thatbeingso,andtheCorporationhavingundoubtedly

thepowertodismissitsemployees,thedismissaloftherespondentwas

withjurisdiction,andalthoughitwaswrongfulinthesenseofitsbeingin

breach of the terms and conditions which governed the relationship

betweentheCorporationandtherespondent,itdidsubsist.Thepresent

case, therefore, did not fall under any of the three well-recognized

exceptions,andtherefore,therespondentwasonlyentitledtodamages

andnottothedeclarationthathisdismissalwasnullandvoid.

[Emphasisisours]

So in this theSupremeCourtunder relevantcircumstances particularlynon

falling of the case under any of the three

well-recognized exceptions, held that the respondent-workman was only

entitledtoseekdamagesinsteadofseekingadeclarationastohisdismissal

asnullandvoid.Onfacts,thisdecisionhasnoapplicationtothepresentcase.

23. Inthepresentcase,nostatutoryprovisionisplacedbeforeuswhereby

asuit isnotmaintainableagainst theBoardexcepta restrictioncontainedin


26/73

Rule38 thattheactionofCommitteeshallnotbeassailedbeforeaCourtof

lawwhich isclearly inconsistentwithRule42which inunmistakable terms

providesthattheBoardcansueandbesued.Insofarasnon-joinderandmis-

joinderof parties to the suit isconcerned, specific reliefsare soughtagainst

theBoardonly, as rightly put it by the learnedcounsel for the plaintiff, and

therefore,thecontentionraisedinthatregardcannotbecountenanced.

24. Thelearnedcounselforthedefendantsalsohasarguedthatthesuitis

not maintainable on the ground of mis-joinder and non-joinder of parties.

Refutingthiscontention,thelearnedcounselfortheplaintiffsubmittedthatthe

reliefs inthesuitareonlysoughtagainsttheBoardandthereforenecessary

andproperpartiesarearraignedinthesuitandtherewasnoneedtoimplead

anyotherpartiesforthepurposeofmaintainingthesuitandthatthesuitas

framedandinstitutedisclearlymaintainable.

25. In the light of the facts and circumstances of cases discussed

hereinabove and keeping inmind the law laid down by the SupremeCourt

referred to supra on the point, we hold that the suit is maintainable. We

accordingly answer thePoint No.2 in favour of the plaintiffand against the

defendants.

26. ItisthecaseoftheplaintiffthatRule38attherelevantpointoftimedid

not ipso facto envisage appointment of a Commissioner by the Board for

conducting an enquiry into the allegations of any act of indiscipline or


27/73


28/73


29/73


30/73

(c)AMemberoranAssociateMemberoroffice-bearerorVice-

President expelled under these rules shall forfeit all rights,

privilegesandbenefits.

(d)AmemberoranAssociateMember expelledunder this rule

mayonapplicationmadetwoyearsafterexpulsionbereadmitted

by the Board provided that a General Meeting 3/4th of the

Members present and voting, vote for readmission of such

member.

[Emphasisisours]

Admittedly, the rule as extracted above was in force as on 29.08.2000

however,itissaidthatthereafterthisruleunderwentamendmentwhichcame

intoforceonandfrom29.09.2000.

30. A bare perusal of the rule makes it plain that if there is any act or

indisciplineormisconductofanyplayer,thePresidentisempoweredtotake

cognizancethereofandshallactinthemannersospecifiedintheruleonly.In

suchanevent,therulethereafterordainsthatthePresidentshalleitherframe

charges against such player in that behalf or direct the Secretary to doso

which shall be communicated to such player by the Secretary.

In such cases, the offending player is called upon to offer his explanation

answering those charges framed against him. After the receipt of the

explanation from the offending player, the President shall constitute a

Committeeconsistingofthreepersonsincludinghimselfbeingoneamongthe

threemembersoftheCommitteeandtheexplanationshallbeplacedbefore

suchCommittee for its decision. If theCommittee is satisfied therewith, no

action is to be proposed against the offending player. However, if the


31/73

Committeeisnotcontentwiththeexplanation,ameetingshallbeconvenedby

theCommitteeandreasonablenoticeofdate,placeandtimeofthemeeting

shall be afforded to the offending player enabling him to attend in person

beforeitbecomingnecessaryevidence, ifany,hemayhavedesiredto lead

and place before it. Thereafter, the offending player shall be heard by the

Committeewhichshallalsoallowhimtoadduceorproducefurtherevidence

beforeit.Indoingso,theCommitteeshallalsoobservetheruleofprinciplesof

naturaljustice.ItisalsoenvisagedthereinthatthedecisionoftheCommittee

shallbefinalandbindingontheoffendingplayeraswellastheBoard.

31. It isclearlycontemplatedthat if theadherenceof theprovisionsofthe

said rule is violated while complying with those by any Member or an

AssociateMember or any office bearer or anyVice-President of the Board,

theyshallbeheldtobeguiltyofsuchconductwhichmaybeconsideredbythe

Boardasislikelytoendangeritsharmonyoraffectitsreputation,stabilityand

interest, thereby such guilty member is liable to expulsion by way of a

resolutiontobetakenataGeneralMeetingoftheBoardby3/4 thofthevotes

ofthememberspresentatthetimeofvoting.However,despitecontemplating

imposition of this stringent punishment upon the guilty expelled member,

underclause(d)ofsub-rule (iii)ofRule38, itisspecificallyprovided thatan

expelledmember,onhisapplication twoyearsaftersuchexpulsion,maybe

re-admittedbytheBoardif3/4thoftheMemberspresentatthetimeofvoting,

votedforthere-admissionofsuchmemberataGeneralMeeting.


32/73


33/73

Defendanton29.08.2000forconductinganenquiryintothevarioussaid

allegations.

[Emphasisisours]

Itishoweverrelevanttonoticetheavermentsofthedefendant2raised

atpara2(iii)inhiswrittenstatementwhichreadsasunder:

iii. .........Theplaintiffwhilequestioningtheappointmentofthis

Defendant and the actions of this Defendant, has challenged the

provisions of the Rule 38(ii) relating to holding of disciplinary

proceedings as before amendment of the said Rules on 29.09.2000.

This Defendant conducted the disciplinary proceedings only after

29.09.2000..........

[Emphasisisours]

The Defendant 2, in fact, in the preface of his report dated 24.11.2000

submittedtotheBoard,onthisaspect,notedthus:

AsIhavebeenappointedasCommissionerbytheBoardofControlfor

CricketinIndia(BCCI)videtheirletterdatedAugust29,2000toconductfollowupenquiriesinsuchcases,BCCImadeavailabletomeacopyof

thereporton2ndNovember,2000.

[Emphasisisours]

Eventheavermentofdefendant3inthisregardistothesimilareffect.It

isalsousefultolookatpara8ofhiswrittenstatementinthiscontextwhich

readsasfollows:

8. .........It is submitted that Rue 38 of the Rules and

Regulations ofBCCI,whichwasamended on 29.09.2000specifically

provide for reference of any complaint relating to indiscipline,

misconduct or violation of any of the Rules and Regulations by any


34/73

player,umpire,etc.toaCommissionerformakingapreliminaryenquiry.

.........

[Emphasisisours]

Whereas admittedly the Board appointed the defendant 2 as the

Commissioneron29.08.2000andthattherulewasamended. It is crystal

clearthatbythedateofappointmentofdefendantastheCommissionerbythe

Board on 29.08.2000 the unamended Rule was holding the field which

reflected that the Board exercised its power in making such appointment

purportedly underRule 38 thereof.Fortunately orunfortunately,Rule 38as

stood as on that day did not confer power on the Board to appoint the

Commissioner.PerhapsthatwasoneofthereasonswhytheBoardthoughtit

fit toamendtheRulesandRegulationson29.09.2000 i.e. immediatelyone

monthaftertheappointmentofthedefendant2astheCommissionerunderits

unamendedRulesandRegulations. Itmaybe true that theamendedRules

and Regulations confer power on the Board to do so. This so-called

amendmentwillnotcometotheaidoftheBoardtocontendthattheeffectof

the amendment of its Rules and Regulations would have impact and

applicationontheactsmadeanddonebyitpriorthereto.Suchcontention,in

anyevent,doesnotstandtoreasonandcannotbecountenanced.Itisrather

startling to take note of the fact that for the utter violation committed in

appointing the defendant 2 as the Commissioner quite contrary to its own

Rule, the Board failed to initiate action, namely, expulsion of the

violator/violators of its RulesandRegulations from theofficeas specifically

contemplated under Rule 38(iii)(a) as on 29.08.2000. In the light of this


35/73


36/73


37/73


38/73

39. That apart, it is clearlyurgedbefore us that thedefendant2wasnot

qualifiedandcompetenttobeappointedastheCommissionerinasmuchashe

hadnoexperienceandwasnotwellacquaintedwiththeprocedurelaidand

hencenotadeptandunsustainableforconductingthesubjectenquiriesinas

muchashehadneverbeenaJudgenorhadundergoneanytraininginthat

regard;andthathedidnotknowtherudimentariesorthebasicsofthesportof

cricket.On thesegroundscoupledwiththefactthathisappointmentitself is

invalidbeinginstarkviolationoftheRulesandRegulationsoftheBoard,the

consequentialimpugnedorderdated05.12.2000issummarilyliabletobeset

aside.

40. Apropos the contention that the defendant 2 was not adept and

unsuitable to be appointed as the Commissioner to conduct the subject

enquiry,itissubmittedthatthedefendant2was,indeed,theJointDirectorof

CBI that he had vast experience in conducting investigations and in

prosecuting and monitoring various cases including large number of

departmentalenquiries/disciplinaryproceedings;andthatinviewofthishigh-

profile and professional background, it is illegal and unfair to term the

defendant 2 to be not adept and unsuitable for being appointed as the

Commissioner, which issue was fairly considered and upheld by the Court

belowwhichdoesnotwarrantanyinterferencefromthisCourt.Referenceis

alsomade topara8ofthewrittenstatementfiled bythedefendant2which

reflects thathewaswellacquaintedwith the conductingofenquiries of this

nature.


39/73

41. It is true that in the light of the nature of findings recorded by us

hereinaboveonthePointNos.1to3,itisusuallynotnecessaryforthisCourt

toadjudicateanddecidetheotherpointsandstraightawaytheappealcanbe

disposedof.However,wedealwiththeotherpointsformulatedbyusalsoon

merits keeping in mind the lengthy arguments put forth before us by the

learnedcounseloneithersidewhichtherebyrequiredtobedecidedonmerits.

42. In

theSupremeCourtexplainedastowhatprocedure

shouldnormallybefollowedinadisciplinaryenquiryandheldasunder:

22 The sixty-five page report has been sent to theManaging

Directorof the Nigamagainst the petitioner recording therein that the

chargesagainsthimstandprovedwhatisthebasis?Wastheenquiry

officer justified in coming to such a conclusion on the basis of the

charge-sheetonly?Theanswercannotpossiblybeintheaffirmative;if

therecordshavebeenconsidered,theimmediatenecessitywouldbeto

considerastowhoisthepersonwhohasproducedthesameandthe

nextissuecouldbeasregardsthenatureoftherecordsunfortunately

thereisnotawhisperintheratherlongishreportinthatregard.Where

isthepresentingofficer?Whereisthenoticefixingthedateofhearing?

Where is the list of witnesses? What has happened to the defence

witnesses?All thesequestionsarisebutunfortunatelynoanswer isto

befoundintheratherlongishreport.Butifonedoesnothaveitcanitbetermedtobeinconsonancewiththeconceptofjusticeorthesame

tantamountstoatotalmiscarriageofjustice.TheHighCourtanswersit

as miscarriage of justice and we do lend our concurrence therewith.

[Empahsisisours]


40/73

43. In

the Supreme Court considering its earlier judgments deduced the

following principles as to the procedure to be adopted in the departmental

enquiries:

15. From the above decisions, the following principles would

emerge:

(i)Theenquiriesmustbeconductedbonafideandcaremustbe

takentoseethattheenquiriesdonotbecomeemptyformalities.

(ii) If an officer is awitness toanyofthe incidentswhich is the

subject-matteroftheenquiryoriftheenquirywasinitiatedonareportofanofficer,theninallfairnessheshouldnotbetheenquiryofficer.Ifthe

said position becomes known after the appointment of the enquiry

officer,duringtheenquiry,stepsshouldbetakentoseethatthetaskof

holdinganenquiryisassignedtosomeotherofficer.

(iii)Inanenquiry,theemployer/departmentshouldtakestepsfirst

toleadevidenceagainsttheworkman/delinquentchargedandgivean

opportunitytohimtocross-examinethewitnessesoftheemployer.Only

thereafter,theworkman/delinquentbeaskedwhetherhewantstolead

anyevidenceandaskedtogiveanyexplanationabouttheevidenceled

againsthim.

(iv)Onreceiptoftheenquiryreport,beforeproceedingfurther,it

isincumbentonthepartofthedisciplinary/punishingauthoritytosupply

acopyoftheenquiryreportandallconnectedmaterialsreliedonbythe

enquiryofficertoenablehimtoofferhisviews,ifany.

44. As can be seen from the report dated 24.11.2000 submitted by the

defendant2totheBoard,theabovesaidprincipleslaiddownbytheSupreme

Court had not been succinctly followedbyhimwhiledrawing uphis report,

whichclearlysuggeststhathewasnotwellacquaintedwiththefundamental


41/73


42/73


43/73


44/73


45/73

defendant2.Statingso,thelearnedcounselposedaquestiontohimselfthat

when the CBI failed to gather any concrete evidence during its marathon

preliminaryenquiryandinfactsaidsoinitsreporttotheeffectthattherewas

no evidence against the plaintiff with regard to match fixing, it is

incomprehensibleandinexplicableastohowtheCommittee/theBoardcame

toaconclusionthattheplaintiffisfoundguiltyoftheallegationofmatchfixing

in the light of the fact that defendant 2 did not conduct any independent

enquiry, examine and record any evidence from any other independent

witnesses,saveandexceptthemerestatementoftheplaintiffalone,whichis

only the record available before the Committee for arrivingatanerroneous

conclusions, which are liable to be set aside being recorded based on no

evidenceatall.Thelearnedcounselthussubmittedthatintheabsenceofany

independent enquiry by defendant 2 with regard to the allegation of match

fixing against the plaintiff,his client cannotbe held to be guiltyofsuch an

allegationwithoutanyconcreteevidencebroughtonrecord.

50. Insofarastheviolationofprinciplesofnaturaljusticeisconcerned,itis

seriouslycontendedthattheplaintiffhavingparticipatedintheentireenquiry

proceedings conducted by the defendant 2 did not raise any objection

whatsoeverandthusatthisstageviolationofanyprinciplesofnaturaljustice

orany statutoryprocedureduring theenquiryconductedagainsthimcannot

beraised.

51. ItisalsoputforthbeforethisCourtonbehalfofthedefendantsthatthe

CBIinitsreportdated31.10.2000cametotheconclusionagainsttheplaintiff


46/73


47/73


48/73

156(3)Cr.PC,theCBICourtwhogot jurisdiction can refera complaint filed

before it to the CBI for conducting necessary investigation and report with

regardstoacriminalchargesubjecttoitscompetencytotakecognizanceofit.

Thereby itappears thatthereferenceofthemattertotheCBIforconducting

necessary preliminary enquiry or investigation in the matter is without any

authority.EvenotherwisethepreliminaryenquiryreportoftheCBIcannotbea

basistotakeactionagainsttheplaintiffasthenomenclatureofit(preliminary

enquiry)itselfindicatesthatitissubjecttothefinalenquirytobeconductedon

showingsufficientmaterialtodoso.ThereforethereportoftheCBIcouldnot

be a basis for the defendant 2 to give his report to the Board against the

plaintiff.UtmosthecouldhavetakenintoconsiderationtheCBIrecordasaid

to go on with the final enquiry proceedings before him. He ought to have

examined the witnesses concerned and recorded their statements giving

opportunitytotheplaintifftocrossexaminehimsubjecttohisauthoritytodo

so.Ifonthatbasishecametotheconclusionthatthechargesleveledagainst

theplaintiffwereprovedhecouldhavesenthisreporttotheBoardagainstthe

plaintiff accordingly. These basic and fundamental procedures were not

followedbythedefendant2whileplacingrelianceonthestatementsrecorded

by CBI. This failure on the part of defendant 2 is fatal to the case of the

defendants.Thereforetheconsequentialreportdated24.11.2000isanullityin

theeyesoflawandcannotbecountenancedandactedupon.


49/73


50/73

therein.Suchapreliminaryenquirymayevenbeheldexparte,foritis

merelyforthesatisfactionofgovernment,thoughusuallyforthesakeof

fairness,explanationistakenfromtheservantconcernedevenassuch

anenquiry.Butatthatstagehehasnorighttobeheardfortheenquiry

ismerelyforthesatisfactionofthegovernmentanditisonlywhenthe

government decides to hold a regular departmental enquiry for the

purpose of inflicting one of the three major punishments that the

governmentservantgetstheprotectionofArticle311andalltherights

that that protection implies as already indicated above. There must

thereforebenoconfusionbetweenthetwoenquiriesanditisonlywhen

the government proceeds to hold a departmental enquiry for the

purposeofinflictingon thegovernmentservantoneofthethreemajorpunishments indicated in Article 311 that the government servant is

entitledtotheprotectionofthatArticle.

55. Aslongbackasintheyear1964itselftheSupremeCourthadoccasion

todistinguishbetweenpreliminaryenquiryandregulardepartmentalenquiry

and stated the stark differences in between the two enquiries. A careful

reading of the judgment makes it abundantly obvious that generally a

preliminary enquiry is initiated only for the purpose of collection of facts in

respectofaparticularaspect/issueandsuchpreliminaryenquirymayevenbe

held ex parte as no punishment is inflicted on the ultimate result of such

enquiry. On the other hand, a regular departmental enquiry is usually

proposed tobeheldwithaview to imposepunishmentupon thedelinquent

personsiftheallegationslevelledagainstthemareprovedultimatelyinsuch

an enquiry. Therefore, in conducting regular departmental enquiry, the

constitutionalprotectionsshallbeaffordedtothedelinquentpersons.


51/73

56. The learned counsel for the plaintiff seeks to place reliance on a

Judgment of the Supreme Court in

wherein

the ConstitutionBenchdealingwith theprinciples of natural justice held as

under:

10. Theonlygeneralstatementthatcanbesafelymadein

thisconnectionisthatthedepartmentalenquiriesshouldobserverules

ofnaturaljustice,andthatiftheyarefairlyandproperlyconductedthe

decisionsreachedbytheenquiryofficersonthemeritsarenotopento

be challenged on the ground that the procedure followed was not

exactlyinaccordancewiththatwhichisobservedincourtsoflaw.As

VenkataramaAiyar,J.hasobservedinUnionofIndiav.T.R.Varma[AIR

1957 SC 882] stating it broadly and without intending it to be

exhaustiveitmaybeobservedthatrulesofnaturaljusticerequirethata

partyshouldhavetheopportunityofadducingallrelevantevidenceon

whichherelies,thattheevidenceoftheopponentshouldbetakeninhis

presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-

examiningthewitnessesexaminedbythatparty,andthatnomaterials

shouldbereliedonagainsthimwithouthisbeinggivenanopportunityof

explaining them.It ishardly necessary toemphasise that the right to

cross-examine thewitnesseswhogiveevidenceagainsthim isa very

valuableright,and ifitappears thateffectiveexerciseof thisrighthas

beenpreventedbytheenquiryofficerbynotgivingtotheofficerrelevant

documents to which he is entitled, that inevitably would be that the

enquiryhad notbeenheld inaccordancewith rulesofnatural justice.That is the view taken by the High Court, and in the present appeal

which has been brought to this Court under Article 136 we see no

justificationfor interferingwithit.Inthisconnection itwouldberelevant

torefertothedecisionofthisCourtinKhemChandv.UnionofIndia

[AIR1958SC300]wherethisCourthasemphasisedtheimportanceof


52/73


53/73

accusationbutalsothetestimonybywhichtheaccusationissupported.

Hemustbegivenafairchancetoheartheevidenceinsupportofthe

chargeandtoputsuchrelevantquestionsbywayofcross-examination

ashedesires.Thenhemustbegivenachancetorebuttheevidence

led against him. This is the barest requirement of an enquiry of this

characterandthisrequirementmustbesubstantiallyfulfilledbeforethe

resultoftheenquirycanbeaccepted.Adeparturefromthisrequirement

ineffectthrowstheburdenuponthepersonchargedtorepelthecharge

withoutfirstmakingitoutagainsthim. Inthepresentcaseneitherwas

any witness examined nor was any statement made by any witness

tenderedinevidence.Theenquiry,suchasitwas,madebyMr.Marshall

orMr.Nicholswhowerenotonly in theposition of judges butalso ofprosecutors and witnesses. Therewas no opportunity to thepersons

charged tocross-examine themandindeed theydrewupon theirown

knowledge of the incident and instead cross-examined the persons

charged.

[Emphasisisours]

58. The learned counsel for the plaintiff also invited our attention to a


whereintheSupremeCourtheldasunder:

14. Therulesofnaturaljusticeinthecircumstancesofthe

case, required that the respondent should be given a reasonable

opportunity to deny his guilt, to defend himself and to establish his

innocencewhichmeansandincludesanopportunitytocross-examine

the witnesses relied upon by the appellant Corporation and an

opportunitytoleadevidenceindefenceofthechargeasalsoashow-

cause notice for the proposed punishment. Such an opportunity was

deniedtotherespondentintheinstantcase.Admittedly,therespondent


54/73

was not allowed to lead evidence in defence. Further, he was not

allowed tocross-examinecertain personswhosestatementswerenot

recordedbytheEnquiryOfficer(oppositeparty1)inthepresenceofthe

respondent.Therewascontroversyonthispoint.Butitwascleartothe

HighCourt from the report ofenquiryby theoppositeparty 1 thathe

relied upon the reports ofsomepersons and the statementsofsome

otherpersonswhowerenotexaminedbyhim.Aregulardepartmental

enquirytakesplaceonlyafterthecharge-sheetisdrawnupandserved

upon the delinquent and the latters explanation is obtained. In the

presentcase,nosuchenquirywasheldandtheorderofdismissalwas

passed summarily after perusing the respondents explanation. The

rulesofnaturaljusticeinthiscase,werehonouredintotalbreach.Theimpugnedorderofdismissalwasthusbadin lawandhadbeenrightly

setasidebytheHighCourt.

[Emphasisisours]

SomemoredecisionsoftheSupremeCourtaswellastheHighCourtsinthe

country were also brought toournoticeon this aspect holding to thesame

effect and therefore they need not be referred to here as there can be no

disputeastothelawlaiddownbytheSupremeCourt.Wethereforefeelthatit

isnotnecessarytodilatefurtheronthisissue.

59. Thelearnedcounselforthedefendants,on theotherhandhasdrawn

theattentionofthisCourttoaJudgmentoftheSupremeCourtin

andreiteratedhis

arguments that the need for compliance of the principles of natural justice

woulddependupon thefactsand circumstancesofeachcase.Therein, the

SupremeCourtheldthus:


55/73


56/73


57/73

,weare

therefore of the firm view that no independent enquiry was made by the

defendant 2 to find out as to whether the plaintiff was really guilty of the

charges of match fixing and that no opportunity of cross-examining the

witnesseswhosestatementswererelieduponbyhimwasaffordedtohimand

thereby the rule of principles of natural justice was violated throughout the

enquiry proceedings conducted by defendant 2 as a Commissioner while

conductingthesubjectenquiry.WeaccordinglyanswerthePointNos.5and6

infavouroftheplaintiffandagainstthedefendants.

63. Thelearnedcounselfortheplaintiffpointedoutthattheimpugnedorder

dated 05.12.2000 is also in utter violation of Rule 38 of the Rules and

RegulationsinasmuchasitwaspassedbyaCommitteeoftwoMembersbut

notbyaCommitteeofthreeMembersasspecificallyenvisagedtherein.The

learnedcounselfor theplaintiff furtherdrewtheattentionof thisCourtto the

letter dated04.12.2000 addressedby the thirdMember, namely,Sri Kamal

Morarka,tothePresidentoftheBoard,whoisoneoftheMembersoftheso-

called Committee, whereby he sought some more time to go through the

reportoftheCBIaswellasthereportofdefendant2.Thelearnedcounselfor

the plaintiff thereforehas contendedthat notwithstanding the said letter, the

othertwoMemberswentaheadinconductingtheMeetingon05.12.2000and

passed the impugned order on that day itself in the absence of the third

Memberforthereasonsbestknowntoitwhicharenotexfacieapparentinthe


58/73


59/73

the evidence he may lead or produce and thereafter take such

action as the Committee may in its discretion deem ft.

In conducting the enquiry against the offending player, the

CommitteeshallfollowtherulesofNaturalJustice.

[Emphasisisours]

AcarefulreadingofthispartoftheRulemanifestlyreflectsthatthroughoutthe

phrasetheCommitteeisused.ObviouslytheCommitteeconsistedofthree

Membersincluding thePresident of theBoard. Thatbeing thepurport of its

ownRulesandRegulations,theCommitteecouldnotbepermittedtoconvene

ameeting in theabsenceofanyof itsMembers. If forany reason, such a

meetingwasconvenedincontraventionoftheRule,theresultofsuchmeeting

beingnotin consonancewith thatRuleshouldnotbepermittedtobeacted

uponbeingillegalandanullityintheeyesoflaw.TheCourtbelowfailedto

considerthe controversyonthispoint inthe rightperspective.It istherefore

clear that the impugnedorder dated 05.12.2000 given based on the illegal

report dated 24.11.2000 of the defendant 2 having been passed by the

CommitteeconsistingonlytwoMembersisillegal,invalid,arbitraryandnullity

intheeyesoflaw.

66. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has further placed reliance on a


insupportof the

saidcontention.Therein,theSupremeCourtheld:

20.Counselfortheappellantarguedthattheexpresspowerof

theVice-Chancellortoregulatetheworkandconductofofficersofthe


60/73


61/73


62/73


63/73


64/73

and thesameare liable tobesetaside.The learnedcounsel for theplaintiff

alsohascontendedthat the impugnedorderdated05.12.2000,havingbeen

passedmerelyplacingrelianceontheillegalenquiryreportdated24.11.2000,

isalsoinutterviolationoftheRule38inasmuchasitwaspassedbythe

CommitteeconsistingoftwopersonsbutnotbyaCommitteeofthreepersons

as specifically envisaged therein. The learned counsel for the plaintiff thus

asserted that the enquiry report dated 24.11.2000 of defendant 2 and the

impugned order dated 05.12.2000 passed by the incompetent Committee

consistingoftwoMembersareillegal,arbitrary,invalidandnullityintheeyes

of lawand the cannot beacteduponandtherebynoadverseconsequence

would flow therefrom against the plaintiff. The learned counsel has also

attacked theimpugnedorderdated05.12.2000 imposingthe punishmentas

detailedthereinonthegroundthattherewasnovalidandlegalbasisfordoing

sointhelightoftheothersubmissionsandthatthesameisliabletobeset

asideonthisscorealso.

71. The learnedcounsel for thedefendants haspointed out that after the

receipt of the report dated 24.11.2000, the Committee consisting of three

Members,infact,convenedameetingon28.11.2000andaffordedafulland

complete opportunity to the plaintiff to put forth his case before it and

thereafter only, the Committee consisting of two Members passed the

impugned order dated 05.12.2000 which again is in accordance with the

amendedRulesandRegulationsoftheBoardandthereforenoviolationofany

prescribed procedure canbecomplained of; and that both the reportdated


65/73

24.11.2000 and the impugned order dated 05.12.2000 are legal and valid,

whichaspectwasconsideredandupheldbytheCourtbelowandthereforethe

samefindingdoesnotwarrantinterferencefromthisCourtinthisappeal.

72. At the cost of repetition, we may state here that we have already

recordedfindings supraonPointNos.2to7 infavouroftheplaintiffinteralia

holding that the Board got no power to appoint defendant 2 as the

Commissioner to conduct the subject enquiry against the plaintiff under its

unamendedRulesandRegulationswhichwere in forceon29.08.2000; that

theappointmentofdefendantastheCommissionerisillegal,invalidandultra

viresoftheRulesandRegulationsoftheBoard;thatthedefendant2asthe

Commissionerwasnotadeptandunsuitabletoconductthesubjectenquiryon

the ground that he was an Advocate who was advising the Board at the

relevantpointof time that he lacked experience inconducting the kindand

natureofsubjectenquiry;thatthedefendant2violatedtheprinciplesofnatural

justiceduringthecourseofenquiry;thatthedefendanthadnotconductedany

independent enquiry to prove the allegation of match fixing against the

plaintiff;andthattheimpugnedorderdated05.12.2000isillegal,invalidand

arbitraryhavingbeenpassedbyanincompetentCommitteeconsistingoftwo

MembersinsteadofthreeMembers.

73. In the lightof thesefindingsrecordedbyushereinabovewhichare in

favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants, the effect of the enquiry

reportdated24.11.2000submittedbythedefendant2andtheimpugnedorder

dated05.12.2000passedbytheCommitteeconsistingoftwoMemberscan,


66/73

undertheabovecircumstances,besaidtobethattheyhavenolegalforcein

theeyesoflawbeingnullity,illegalandinvalid.

74. Inthiscontext,referencemaybemadetoaJudgmentoftheSupreme

Courtin .Therein,

theSupremeCourtilluminatinglyexplainedtheeffectoftheproceedingswhich

arenullityintheeyesoflaw,itreadsasfollows:

6. It is a fundamental principle well established that a

decree passed by a courtwithout jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its

invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be

enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in

collateral proceedings.

Adefectofjurisdiction,whetheritispecuniaryorterritorial,orwhetherit

is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very

authorityofthecourttopassanydecree,andsuchadefectcannotbe

cured even by consent of parties. If the question now under

consideration fell tobedetermined only on the application of general

principlesgoverningthematter,therecanbenodoubtthattheDistrict

Court of Monghyr was coram non judice, and that its judgment and

decreewouldbenullities.Thequestioniswhat istheeffectofSection

11oftheSuitsValuationActonthisposition.

[Emphasisisours]

A perusal of this Judgment inter alia clearly demonstrates that the

proceedingswhicharenullityintheeyesoflawcannotbecuredevenbythe

consent of parties. In the present case, the reportdated 24.11.2000 of the

defendant 2 and the impugned order dated 05.12.2000 being nullity in the


67/73


68/73


69/73

78. Inviewoftheforegoingdiscussionandplacingrelianceonthecaselaw

referredtohereinaboveonthispoint,weareoftheconsideredviewthatboth

theenquiryreportdated24.11.2000ofdefendant2and the impugnedorder

dated 05.12.2000 of the Committee consisting of twoMembers are, illegal,

invalidandnullandvoidintheeyesoflawandcannot,underanystretchof

imagination, be countenanced and acted upon. We answer Point No.8

accordinglyinfavouroftheplaintiffandagainstthedefendants.

79. The learned counsel for theplaintiff has submitted that theplaintiff is

entitledtoseekthereliefsasspecificallyprayedforinthesuitinthelightofthe

submissionsmadehereinaboveontheothercontentiouspointsandtherefore

prayed that the appeal is liable to be allowed by duly setting aside the

impugned judgement and decree dated 27.08.2003 passed by the Court

below.

80. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the defendants has volubly

contendedthatasthesuititselfisnotmaintainable,theplaintiffisnotlegally

entitledtoseekanyrelieffromthisCourtastheCourtbelowconsideredallthe

aspectsofthematterminutelyandultimatelydismissedthesuit.Thelearned

counsel for the defendants has therefore urged this Court to dismiss the

appealaffirmingtheJudgmentanddecreepassedbytheCourtbelow.

81. Inthelightoftheaboveprayerssoughtforbytheplaintiffandinviewof

the contentions of the respective parties, we have given our anxious


70/73


71/73


72/73


73/73

Documents

Mohammed Azharuddin Judgment