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www.encs.eu Smart Grid Technical Forum 28 th March 2019 Monitoring The Evolving Threat Landscape

Monitoring The Evolving Threat Landscape...2019/04/03  · 4 Emerging Threat Landscape More Active Threat Actors More Interconnectivity More Standards More Automated Attacks/ Artificial

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Page 1: Monitoring The Evolving Threat Landscape...2019/04/03  · 4 Emerging Threat Landscape More Active Threat Actors More Interconnectivity More Standards More Automated Attacks/ Artificial

www.encs.eu

Smart Grid Technical Forum

28th March 2019

Monitoring The Evolving Threat Landscape

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The European Network for Cyber Security (ENCS) is a non-profit organization thatbrings together critical infrastructure stakeholders and security experts to deploysecure European critical energy grids and infrastructure.

European Network for Cyber Security

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Emerging Smart Grids

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Emerging Threat Landscape

More Active Threat Actors

More InterconnectivityMore Standards

More Automated Attacks/ Artificial Intelligence

More Computing Power* and Better Tools

More Targeted Attacks

(Qua

ntum

Com

putin

g*)

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Security Experts at Grid Operators Know the Vulnerabilities

Source: SANS 2016 State of ICS Security Survey

SANS Survey: Control System Components considered risk for compromise?

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Attackers Also Know the Vulnerabilities

ICS-CERT Advisory (ICSA-17-187-03C)

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Exploits Are In Public Domain

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But Who Would Want to Exploit these Vulnerabilities

to Attack the Grid?

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Classes of Attackers

Script kiddies• Stereotype teenage

hacker• Intends no real

damage, but may cause it unintentionally

Researchers / Journalists• Show what’s possible• Like a good story

Hacktivists• Deface websites• Cause bad publicity

Opportunistic Criminals• Target IT, but may hit

OT• Just sending spams• Ransomware

Criminals targeting OT• Extortion• Could work for

terrorists of nation states

Disgruntled Employees• Taking revenge• Selling information on

the black market

Nation State Actors• Strategic assets• Espionage• Sabotage

Terrorists• May be interested in

causing power outage

Untargeted / opportunistic attackers

Targeted / determined attackers

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Cyber Meter Fraud

Bad Architectures Using Bad Protocols

Ukraine Incidents

PLC Malware

Targeted Malware for Energy Sector

Malware now knowsIndustrial Control Systems

ICS Actively Targeted

OT Threat Development

Malware As A Service(MaaS)

Increasing APTs

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Are we keeping up?

• Increasing nation state actor activity• Criminals get business models working• Fast development and distribution of malware

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How To Reduce The Risks

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Countermeasures

Prevention Response

Policies & Procedures

• Implement OT security policies and procedures

• Make employees aware of security risks• Enable information sharing

• Create an ISMS (ISO 27001)• Set up a Security Operations Center (SOC)• Be ready to respond to incidents, and

recover normal operations

SystemArchitecture

• Protect the perimeter of the OT domain• Validate with penetration tests

• Risk assess crown jewels• Risk based use cases

Components • Procure secure devices with good requirements

• Harden operational devices• Validate with lab tests

• Active or passive sensors• Use of honeypots and IDS• Accurate CMDB

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European Regulatory Perspective

• NIS Directive (effective May 2018)• Cybersecurity act

• New permanent mandate ENISA• European cybersecurity certification framework

for ICT products and services

• Network Code Cybersecurity• Harmonized Cybersecurity Baseline across the European Union• Advanced Cybersecurity Implementation for Operator of Essential Services• Supportive Elements for the Network Code on Cybersecurity

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ENCS helps its members solve cyber security challenges in the development and operation of smart grids across Europe

Research

Collaboration projects Testing Training

Information & Knowledge

sharing

Collaborative Approach to Capacity Building

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Threat Monitoring Focus

• What do we need to know/what are we looking for?• Analysis and interpretation of events• SOC development• Intrusion detection technology

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Collaboration and Resource Sharing

• Collaboration focus on• Getting technology in control• Closing the skills gap• Information & knowledge sharing

• Security Community Building• Policy• Architecture• Operations

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Thank you

www.encs.eu

[email protected]