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Monopoly Monopoly

Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

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Page 1: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

MonopolyMonopoly

Page 2: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

OutlineOutline

• MonopoliesMonopolies

• The monopolist’s problem

h di i i i li• The discriminating monopolist

• Natural monopolies and regulation

• Monopolies and innovation

• Welfare costs and the competitive fringeWelfare costs and the competitive fringe

Page 3: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

So what is a monopoly?

• Firm that has no competitors

h h h ?• Why may that happen?– Property rights

• Sale of salt, gasoline, vodka, oranges

– Economies of scale (natural monopolies)• Costs decline with scale

– Technology• One firm just has much lower cost than anyone and keeps ahead by innovation

– Patents– Patents• Firm keeps ahead by preventing imitation

Page 4: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

Back to competitionBack to competition

• Recall firm takes price as given• Recall firm takes price as given.

• Two decisions. – (1) if it produces how much

–П(q) =pq‐C(q) => p‐C’(q)=0П(q) pq C(q) p C (q) 0

– (2) should it produce at all  

П(q*)>0 prod ce if П(q*)<0 sh t do n–П(q )>0 produce,  if П(q )<0 shut down

• Notice that p does not depend on q

Page 5: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

if only one firmif only one firm• Price must depend on q

– Because we know p(q) falls with q

• So profit function– П(q) =p(q)q‐C(q)– Almost same as before

• So marginal condition

Notice this has extra term relative to competitionp

Page 6: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

Optimal decision by monopolistOptimal decision by monopolist

• Monopoly• CompetitionCompetition

• MR=MC• And the second term is 

i l h t t

• MR=MC• Here MR is simple its 

precisely how output affects price

pjust price

Note1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side and setting price. What does this say about the cost minimization problem under monopoly?p yNote 2 : could ask what happens if the monopolist does not take input prices as given?

Page 7: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

Competition Max П

p

Marginal Cost

Average CostsAverage Costs

Short Run Average Cost

Profits

Short Run Average CostOr

Average Variable Cost

Costs

7

qCosts

Page 8: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

Competitive equilibriumCompetitive equilibriump

Marginal Cost

Average CostsProfits

Costs

8q

Costs

Page 9: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

MonopolyMonopolyp

Marginal Cost

Average CostsProfits

Marginal Revenue

Costs

9q

Costs

Page 10: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

InterpretationInterpretation

• Monopoly P

– MR=MC• Suppose MC=0.

– Optimum is MR=0.  => R i i =1

<1

Revenue is maximum• =>∂R(q)/∂q =0   but R(q)=pq• ∂R/∂q = p+q∂p/∂q=0 

∂ /∂

=1

<=>p=‐q∂p/∂q<=>1= ‐(q/p)(∂p/∂q) 

(but that is elasticity)

>1

MR(q)

Second order conditions => that optimum (with MC>0) always involves elasticity >1

Qd(p)

QQ

Page 11: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

Monopoly Compared to Competitionp

pm

Marginal Costpc

pm

Average CostsProfits

Costs

Marginal Revenue

11q

Costs

qm qc

Page 12: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

Market failureMarket failure

• Recall that the socially efficient allocation isRecall that the socially efficient allocation is the competitive allocation. – marginal cost = marginal willingness to pay– marginal cost = marginal willingness to pay

– Maximize consumer surplus

With l• With monopoly – prices are higher and quantities lower

• Market failure– Equilibrium allocation is inefficient.

Page 13: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

Can the monopolist do better?Can the monopolist do better?

• Well we assumed she had to charge everyoneWell we assumed she had to charge everyone the same price.– But what if she could offer some people (students, p p ( ,the elderly, ) discounts?

– Suppose she could offer quantity discounts?

• Extreme: monopolist knows each person’s valuation for each unit. – Then monopolist can make it take it or leave it offers to each individual.

Page 14: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

MonopolyMonopolyp

Marginal Cost

Average CostsProfits

Marginal Revenue

Costs

14q

Costs

Page 15: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

The discriminating monopolistThe discriminating monopolist

• Produces the competitive quantityProduces the competitive quantity– Extract alls the consumer surplus

• Efficient?• Efficient?– Yes because it maximizes consumer surplus (its just that the monopolist gets it rather thanjust that the monopolist gets it rather than consumers)

• Fair?• Fair?

Page 16: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

Well informed discriminatingWell informed discriminating monopolists are efficient and very profitable

Uninformed monopolies are inefficient but profitable

Argument that price settingArgument that price setting should be avoided. Policy should seek to eliminate Monopoly.

Anti-trust legislation.

Page 17: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

Natural monopolies and regulation

• When Fixed costs are high enough and demand low enough, there may not be a competitive equilibrium.

• Such a situation arises marginal cost be below gaverage cost where marginal cost crosses the demand curve

• Note there may be a possibility to have more than one firm if firms do not behavethan one firm if firms do not behave competitively– Oligopoly– Oligopoly.

Page 18: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

‘natural’ Monopolynatural  Monopolyp

Marginal Cost

Average CostsProfits

Marginal Revenue

Costs

18q

Costs

Page 19: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

Cases where this arises oftenCases where this arises often• Communication Infrastructure

– Roads, railroads..– pipelines– NetNet

• Energy– Electricity y– Hydropower– Natural gas

• Solution regulation (regulated public utility)– Limit owners’ discretion on pricing

Page 20: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

Regulated MonopoliesRegulated Monopolies

• Could just impose a price where the averageCould just impose a price where the average cost curve crosses the demand curve and require the firm to sell to all customers whorequire the firm to sell to all customers who want the service.– Notice firm decides neither p nor q– Notice firm decides neither p nor q 

• At that price firm just breaks even given quantity demandedquantity demanded

• But this requires a lot of data

Page 21: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

Monopoly tamedMonopoly tamedp

Marginal Cost

Average CostsProfits

Marginal Revenue

Costs

21q

Costs

Page 22: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

Rate of return regulationRate of return regulation

• Alternative is to use accounting data so thatAlternative is to use accounting data so that the firm can only make a return of say α% on capital (or sales) and it must serve allcapital (or sales) and it must serve all customers

• Then its profit function becomes• Then its profit function becomes

• П(q)= αC(q) (rev is (1+ α) C(q), cost (c(q))

• Max П(q) is simple max C(q) which is max q– Sbj to constraint (1+ α) C(q)/q=p(q)

Page 23: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

Regulated MonopolyRegulated Monopolyp

Marginal Cost

Average CostsProfitsαC(q)

Costs

Marginal Revenue

23q

Costs

Page 24: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

20000Quantity demanded

16000

18000 Competitive Q Suppliedmarginal revenue

12000

14000Monopoly solution

Average cost

10000

Regulated Price

Regulated solution

6000

8000

2000

4000

0

2000

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000

Page 25: Monopoly - California Institute of Technologypeople.hss.caltech.edu/~jlr/courses/ECON11/JLR-EC11-11 Monopoly.pdfNote1 : the whole difference with monopoly involve the revenue side

Welfare Costs and the competitive ffringe

• Are welfare costs likely to be large in reality (two barriers)• Substitutes to goods produced by Monopoly?• Entry

– Except for natural monopolies single firm businesses have toExcept for natural monopolies, single firm businesses have to worry about entry.

– If they take that into consideration, they will not chose quantities such that MR=MC 

– rather chose a quantity such that any other firm that might think of coming would not make any money.

• Let plant level technology be such that q* is minimum efficient scale (MC=AC) for the industry(MC=AC) for the industry.

• If the monopolist chooses a qm such that qm ≥Qc + q*

• But that is likely to be quite a low price; in particular if economies of scale are limited.