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Corporate Restructuring and the Consolidation of US IndustryAuthor(s): Julia Porter Liebeskind, Tim C. Opler, Donald E. HatfieldSource: The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Mar., 1996), pp. 53-68Published by: Blackwell PublishingStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2950560 .
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THE JOURNAL OF
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 0022-1821
VOLUME XLIV March 1996
No.
1
CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURING
AND
THE
CONSOLIDATION OF US INDUSTRY*
JULIA
PORTER
LIEBESKIND,
Tim
C.
OPLER,
DONALD E. HATFIELD
This study examines the impact of corporate
restructuring measured
at the
industry
level on
industry
concentration in
695 4-digit US industries
in
the
basic, manufacturing and services
sectors
between
1981
and 1989.
The
results show
a
modest increase
in
median industrial concentration
in
sample
industries between
1981
and 1989.
We find no evidence that selloffs
of
assets
at the
industry
level
through
horizontal
mergers,
acquisitions,
and
inter-firm
asset sales increased US industrial concentration during the 1980s.
I. INTRODUCTION
DURING the 1980s, US industrial asset
ownership changed
at
a rate
not seen since
the turn of the century. Jensen [1993] reports that
35,000 mergers and
acquisitions with a total market value of $2.6 trillion took
place
between 1976
and 1990.
Many
of these transactions resulted
in
extensive
business divestitures
and plant closings in target firms (Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny [1990]). At the
same
time,
numerous
independent
firms also
reconfigured
their
operations by
selling lines
of
business and
closing plants (Bowman
and
Singh [1990];
Comment
and
Jarrell
[1994]).
This boom
in
corporate restructuring activity has provoked an intense debate
about its
consequences
for the
US
economy.
Critics
attribute
the
restructuring
boom to
the Reagan Administration's
relaxed enforcement of the
Cellar-
Kefauver Act and
argue that corporate restructuring has undermined
US
industrial efficiency by increasing industrial concentration
(Adams
and
Brock
[1988]; Shepherd [1990]). Consistent with this argument, the dollar value of
horizontal
mergers
increased from
$25 billion
in
1970-78
to $261 billion
in
1979-87 (Blair,
Lane and Schary [1991]).
In
addition,
Bhagat, Shleifer, and
Vishny [1990]
find
that over two-thirds of the lines of
business sold
off
following
hostile
takeovers during the
1980s
were bought by other
firms
in
the
same
industry. They
conclude
that
a
primary
motivation for these selloffs
was market
consolidation. Others
argue
that
restructuring
has
improved
US industrial
efficiency.
For
example,
Jensen
[1988, 1993]
and
Shleifer and
Vishny [1992]
argue
that
mergers,
selloffs
and
plant
closures
during
the 1980s served
to
discipline managers
in
inefficient
firms,
to eliminate excess
capacity
at both
a
*
We thank Jennifer
Bethel,
Harold
Demsetz, Scott Lee,
Marvin
Liebernan, William Long, John
Lott, David Ravenscraft, Geoff Waring,
Fred Weston and two anonymous referees for
useful
comments. We also
thank
seminarparticipants t the Universityof SouthernCalifornia,Texas
A&M
University, and Southern
Methodist
University. Kishore Gawande, Marion Jones and Carl Voigt
providedvaluable assistance in data
acquisitionand interpretation.
()
Blackwell
Publishers
Ltd.
1996,
108
Cowley Road,
Oxford
OX4
1JF,
UK and
238
Main Street, Cambridge,
MA
02142, USA.
53
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54
JULIA
PORTER
LIEBESKIND
ETAL.
firm
and
an industry
evel, and
to increase
firms'
focus on
the industries
n
which
they
held
a
competitive
advantage.
Consistent
with
this
argument,
Lichtenberg
and Siegel [1987] find thattotal factorproductivity ncreasesaftermergersand
selloffs,
while
Lichtenberg
[1992]
and
Comment
and Jarrell
[1994]
find
that
firms
increased
their
corporate
ocus,
their
productivity,
and their
value
during
the 1980s
by divesting
lines
of
business.
Despite
this vigorous
debate,
there
is
little
evidence documenting
the
overall
pattern
of changes
in US industrial
oncentration
during
the 1980s
or
indicating
whether
corporate
restructuring
was related
to any changes.
To address
these
issues,
this
study
examines
the
relationship
between
selloffs
of lines
of
business,
measured
at
the
industry
level,
and
changes
in industrial
concentration
n
a
sampleof 695 4-digit SIC-codeindustries n all sectorsof the US economy,and
in a variety
of
industry subsamples.
We
also
investigate
the effects
of
establishment
closures,
additions,
and expansion
on
industry
concentration
during
the same period.
This
study
has
two
main
results.
First,we
find
a
modest
increase
in
median
industry
concentration
between
1981 and
1989
in
the full sample
of
695
4-digit
US
industries
and a
larger
ncrease
in
median
concentration
n the subsample
of
390
4-digit
manufacturing
ndustries.
Second,
we
find that
selloffs
of
lines
of
business
measured
at
the industry
evel
are
significantly
and
negatively
associated
with change in industryconcentrationduringthe 1980s in both manufacturing
and
non-manufacturing
ndustries.
This
evidence
is
inconsistent
with
the
argument
hat
mergers
and
selloffs during
he 1980s
led to
increases
n
industrial
concentration
across
broad
samples
of
US
industries.
The plan
of
this
paper
s as follows.
Sections
IIand
III
describe
he measures
of
corporate
restructuring
used
in
this
study,
other
variables,
data,
and
methods.
Section
IV
reports
evidence
on
the extent
of
corporate
restructuring
uring
the
1980s.
Section
V reports
evidence
on
the
relationships
between
corporate
restructuring
nd
changes
in industrial
concentration.
Section
VI
concludes.
II.
DEFINITION
AND
MEASUREMENT
OF
CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURING
We define
seven
measures
of
corporate
restructuring
n this
study.
Each
restructuring
measure
is
estimated
using
establishment-level
data aggregated
o
the
firm
and
industry
evel
in the two-stage
process
as follows:
Stage
1:
Establishments
in each
industry
are
classified
into
restructuring
categories
This procedure
s
illustrated
n Table
I.
First,
the status
of each
establishment
n
any given
industry
s classified according
to
whether
t was:
(a)
continuously
n
operation
n
that
ndustry
between
1981
and
1989, (b)
closed
down between
1981
and 1989,
or
(c)
added
to that
industry
between
1981 and
1989.
Any
establishment
hat
was
continuously
in
operation
between
1981
and
1989
was
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RESTRUCTURINGAND
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55
TABLEI
DEFINITION F
INDUSTRY-LEVEL
ESTRUCTURING
ATEGoRIES5 SED TO
CLASSIFY
NDUSTRY
ESTABLISHMENTS
Change
in the
status
of
industry
ncumbentfirms:
Change
in
the status
of
Firm exits
Firm
remains Firm
enters
industry
establishments:
between
1981
as
incumbent
between 1981
and
1989
1981 and
1989
and 1989
Establishment
urvives and:
(i)
is sold to
another
irm
SELLOFFI
SELLOFFI
between 1981 and
1989 EXIT
STAY
(ii) is not
sold but is
expanded
EXPAND
between 1981 and 1989
Establishments
closed
CLOSE/EXIT
CLOSE/STAY
between 1981
and
1989:
Establishment s
added
to
the
ADD/STAY
ADD/IENTER
industrybetween
1981
and
1989:
REach
estructuring
ariables
definedn terms f
both:
(i)
Change
n
thestatus f the
establishmentetween
981and
1989 i.e.,
establishmenturvived ut
ownership
is changed;stablishment
s
expanded;stablishments
closed;
stablishment
s added).
(ii) Changeornochange)n thestatus f theparentirm egardingtsindustryncumbencyi.e.,parentirm
exists;parent
irm
emains
n
the
ndustry;arent
irm
nters).
Note hat he
variables
redefined
n
terms f
establishmenttatus
ndparenttatusn
1981.Thisallows
definition
of
establishments
hat hange
wnership
n
terms f
being
"sold
ff"
by a parent
irm
ather
han s
being"bought"
by
another
irm.
further
classified
according
to
whether
it
was sold
off
or
expanded
during
this
period.
Second,
the
status of
each
restructured
stablishment's
parent
firm
is
classified
according
to
whether it
remained
as an incumbent
between
1981
and
1989; exited the
industry
between
1981 and
1989;
or
entered he
industry
during
thisperiod. This classificationprocedure esults n sevenrestructuringategories,
illustrated
n
the boxes in
Table I.
Stage
2:
Employee-weighted
ndustry-level
estructuring
ntensity
variables
are
estimated
The
total
volume of each
type
of
restructuring
n
each
industry
s
estimated in
terms of
the
proportion
of
total
industry
employees
in
1981 that
was employed n
establishments
n each of
the
restructuring
ategories defined in
Table
I.
For
the
purposes
of this
study,
the
most
important
of
the seven
restructuring
ntensity
variables s SELLOFF/EXIT,hich capturesall horizontalmergerand inter-firm
asset sales
between 1981
and 1989. Ceteris
paribus,
horizontal
mergers
always
increase
industrialconcentration.
Selloffs
that result
in
industry exit
will
also
increase
industrial
concentration
f the
lines of
business
in
question
are sold to
other
existing incumbent
irms,as
Bhagat,Shleifer,and
Vishny's
[1990]
evidence
suggests occurred
during
the
1980s.
If
lines
of business are
sold to new
firms
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56 JULIA PORTERLIEBESKINDETAL.
instead, nter-firm sset sales will result in decreases n concentration.Selloffs of
establishments by continuing incumbent
firms (measured by the variable
SELLOFFISTAY)ill only increase industryconcentration f small incumbents
sell establishments
to
large firms (Hannah and Kay [1981]); otherwise, such
selloffs will decrease industryconcentration.
Plant closures, additions, and expansions may also have had a significant
impact on industrialconcentrationduring the 1980s (Hannahand Kay [1981]).
Closureof capacity by largefirmsdilutes
industrialconcentration, egardlessof
whether
hese firms exit or not.
Concomitantly,
losure
of
capacityby
small firms
increases concentration.Therefore, both
CLOSE/EXIT nd CLOSEISTAY ay
have a significant mpact
on
industryconcentration, hough the directionof their
effect cannot be predicted.Note, however,thatplant closures by existing firms
reduces the number of incumbent firms
remaining in the industry,which may
facilitate coordinationamong
the
remainingfirns,
even
if
such
closures do not
increase concentrationper
se. If
large incumbent firms add or
expand
more
establishments han small firns,
concentrationwill increase,and vice-versa (Lane
[1993]). Therefore,both ADD/STAYand
EXPANDISTAYay have a significant
effect
on
industryconcentration.Finally,
the
addition of new establishmentsby
entering firms (measuredby
ADDIENTER)
an be
expected
to
reduce
industry
concentrationbecause de novo
entry
is
usually
small
scale
and
always
adds
new
firms.
III. OTHER
VARIABLES,
DATA,
AND
METHODS
(i) Dependent
Variables
Change
in
industrial oncentration
s
measuredas
the
change
between 1981 and
1989
in
two standardmeasures
of
industry
concentration:
he
four-firm sales
concentration atio andthe Herfindahl ndexof sales concentration.We use two
measures
of sales concentrationbecause choice of
measure
can
bias results
(Kwoka [1981]).
Both
measures
are
estimated
in
terms
of the
value of final
shipments
of
incumbent
firms in
1981
and
1989.
The
four-firmconcentration
ratiois estimatedas
the
proportion
of the
total value
of
final
industryshipments
that is accounted
for
by
the
four
largest
firms
in
that
industry.
The
Herfindahl
index
is estimated
as
the
sum
of the
squared
marketsharesof
all
incumbent irms
where
market share
is
estimated as
the
ratio
of the
value
of
final
shipments
of
each
firm
to the total
value
of
final
shipments
n the
industry.
(ii)
Control
Variables
The
regressions
include
the
change
in the
estimated minimum efficient scale
(CHMES)
between 1981
and
1989 because a number of
studies
show that
industryplant
size and
industry
concentrationare
highly
correlated
Curry
and
George [1983];
Schmalensee
[1989]).
We
measureCHMESas
percentagechange
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RESTRUCTURING
AND
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INDUSTRY
57
in median
establishment ize
(measured n
terms of
employees).' The
regressions
also control for
industry concentration
n
1981
(INDCONC81) because
prior
levels of industryconcentrationhavebeen shown to be a significantdeterminant
of
change in
concentration.
In
addition, the
regressions control for
industry
regulation
and
growth.
In
industries
such as
utilities and
banking,
horizontal
business
combinations
may
be
prohibited; his is
controlled
for
using
a
dummy
variable
(REGULATE).
Because
industry growth may influence
concentration,
change
in
industry sales is
controlled for
using
the
percentage increase
in
the
value of
total
industryshipmentsbetween
1981 and
1989
measured
n
constant
1981 dollars
(CHSALES).
(iii) Data
The seven
measuresof
industry-level
estructuring nd the
measures
of
industrial
concentration,
MES,
and
industry
sales
were estimated
using
TRINET
Inc.'s
Large Establishment
Database.
An
important
advantage
of
using TRINET
(rather han the US
Census of
Manufactures)
s that it provides
informationon
non-manufacturing
ectors of
the US economy.
TRINET
covers over 80
percent
of
all establishments n the
US and over 95
percentof
establishmentsowned
by
public firns; as
such,
it
is
considered
o
be reliablefor the
purposes
of
analyzing
industry structure
Kwoka
[1978]).2
The
TRINET
data include the
4-digit SIC
code
of
each
establishment's
primary industry,
its number of
employees,
its
current
dollar value of
sales,
its address and
telephone number, and its
parent
company
identificationnumber.3These
data can be
aggregated
to the
industry
level
using
the
4-digit
SIC
code and
to
the
firm
level using the parent
company
identification number.
Further details of the
TRINET
data are
given
in the
Appendix.
If
an establishment
s
redeployedbetween
one
industry
and
another,
TRINET
will
usually
recordthat establishment
as
being
closed in one
industry
and
newly
added to another.Therefore, he estimatesof ADDIENTER,ADDISTAY, LOSEI
EXIT, and
CLOSEISTAYeflect
not
only actual new plant
addition and
actual
plant closure, but
also
the
redeploymentof
establishments
across industries.
In
addition,
TRINETdata
cover
only
establishments
ocated
in
the US
(i.e.
all US-
based facilities of US
and
foreign-owned irms,
but
not
overseas establishments
of
US
firms).
This
permits
us
to
analyze
the
effects
of
restructuring
on
the
concentrationof the
value of
shipments
from
US
establishments,
but not the
effects of
restructuring
on the
concentration of the
value
of
shipments
of
' We also used two othermeasuresof minimumefficient scale in the regressions,with no effect on
results: (i) scale variance,
measured as the inter-quartile
ange of
establishmentemployment
over
median
establishment
mployment,and (ii) the first
quartileof establishment
mployment.
2
See Appendix for details of
Kwoka's
findings and furither etails of the
Large
Establishment
Database.
3TRINET usually lists
multiproduct
establishments as separate
establishments,
with separate
identification
numbers.Employmentand
sales figures are then
attributed o each
industry. n 1989,
about 2.5
percent
of
all establishments
n
TRINET
were
listed
in
more than
one
industry.
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JULIA
PORTER
LIEBESKIND
ETAL.
establishmentsowned by
US firms. Also, not all
marketsare national in scope,
even though
they are treated
as such using the TRINET data.4
TRINET's
coverageof small establishmentshas improvedover time, andin general,datafor
larger establishments
are
more likely to be accurate than
for smaller
establishments. Consequently, we follow
Lieberman and Hatfield [1993] by
restricting our sample to establishments
with 100 or more employees
and to
industrieswith 5 or more establishments
of this size.5This truncating
procedure
reduced
the numberof 4-digit
SIC industries n
the
sample from
745 to 695.6
(iv)
Method
and
Samples
The relationship
between industry-level
restructuringand change
in industry
concentration
s
analyzed using
OLS
regressions
and two measures of absolute
change
in
industrial oncentration
between
1981
and
1989
on seven measuresof
industry-level
restructuring ntensity and four
control variables. Following
Krasker,Kuh, and Welsch [1983]
we conductedregressions with
and without
outliers.Our resultswere substantivelyunchanged
by
the
presence
of outliers;we
therefore reportvariable
estimates and regression
results that include outlying
values. We conduct regressions
on
the
full sample
of 695
4-digit
SIC industries
from the basic, manufacturing,
and service sectors,
and on the subsamples of
manufacturing ndnon-manufacturingndustries,producerand consumergoods
industries,
and industries with low, relatively
high, and high levels
of
concentration
n
1981.
IV
INDUSTRY-LEVEL
ESTRUCTURINGACTIVITY
AND
CHANGE
IN US
INDUSTRY
CONCENTRATION,
981-89
The median and mean values
of
the
seven
measures of industry-level
restructuring
ntensity
used
in the
study
are shown
in
Table II. Panel
A
shows
values
for all 695 industries
in the
sample;
Panel
B
shows values
for the
subsample
of
390
manufacturing
ndustries.
The median
level
of
employment
change
due to selloffs
by
exiting
firms
(SELLOFFEXIT)
n both
samples
is
quite
high: 17 percent
n the
full sample,
and 18
percent
n
manufacturing
ndustries.
n
contrast,
the
median
level of
employmentchange
due
to selloffs
by
finns that
remained ncumbents
hrough
1989
(SELLOFFISTAY)
s near zero.
Mean
values
for
both
these variables
are
higher, indicating
skewness
in
the distributionof
selloff
activity
across industries.
4The
problemsof using SIC-defined ndustries o define marketsarewell known. For a discussion,
see Scherer [1980].
5
We also conducted analyses using
minimum establishment
izes
of 50 and 200 employees;
this
had little effect on the
estimate of CHMESor on the regressionresults.
6In
1987
a numberof new SICs
were
created
and severalold SICs were consolidated.To adjust
or
these changes, we consolidatedseveral SICs
in
the dataset,reducing he
total numberof 4-digit SICs
by about 3 percent.
In
addition, we excluded 4-digit industries above
7999
from the
sample
to
eliminate
industriesdominatedby non-profitorganizations.
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TABLEI
INDUSTRY-LEvEL
ESTRUCTURNG crlvrrY
1981-1989a
Variable Median Meanb Std.Dev.
A. For 695 4-digit industries
17.03
22.95 41.01
SELLOFF/EXIT
SELLOFF/STAY
0.00
0.95
2.54
CLOSE/EXIT
41.34 42.03 19.27
CLOSE/STAY
10.84
14.11
14.13
ADD/ENTER
29.38 68.85
154.40
ADD/STAY
7.21 13.08 17.15
EXPAND/STAY
-0.21 -0.73
13.17
Net Additionc -
11.90
25.05 158.07
B. For 390
manufacturing ndustries
SELLOFF/EXIT
18.22
21.14
18.45
SELLOFF/STAY
0.00 1.15
2.46
CLOSE/EXIT
37.70
37.72 15.71
CLOSE/STAY 11.59
13.40
10.20
ADD/ENTER
27.15 21.07
30.87
ADD/STAY
8.06 12.74 14.44
EXPAND/STAY
-
0.84 - 1.76
11.83
Net Addifionc
-
18.26
-
13.00 41.23
aFor definition of measures see Table I
and
the text. All
variables are measured
in
terms
of
percentage
of total
industryemployees in 1981, and each measurethereforehas a potentialvalue of between0 and 100.
bUnweighted
cThis
variable s provided for illustrative
purposes only and is estimated
as:
[(total employeers of plants added or
expanded
between 1981 and
1989)
-
(total employees
of
plants
closed
between 1981 and
1989)1/Total
ndustryemployment
n
1981.
The median level of
employment change
due
to
establishmentclosures
by
exiting finns
(CLOSEIEXI)
is
very
high:
41
percent
in
the
full
sample,
and 38
percent
n
manufacturingndustries.
n
contrast,
he
median level of
employment
change
due
to establishment
losure
by
incumbent irms
(CLOSE/STAY)
s
about
11
percent in
both samples.
(Recall that the measures of
plant closure
and
addition includeredeploymentof establishmentsacross industries,as discussed
in
Section III.) The employment
change due to
plant additionby new entrants
(ADDIENTER)s
also
high:29
percent
n
the median
industry,
and
27
percent
n
the median
manufacturingndustry.
The median rate of
employment
change
due
to
plant additions
by
incumbents
(ADDISTAY)
s
much lower: 7
percent
in
the
median
industry,
and 8
percent
in
the
median
manufacturing ndustry.
Mean
values
are
much
higher
for
both these variables
in
the
full
sample7
The
7
The mean value of
ADD/ENTER n the full sample
(69 percent)appears o be extraordinarily igh.
However, it can be validated by comparing our
estimate of ADD/ENTERfor
the subsample of
manufacturingndustries o
estimatesobtainedby
Dunne, Roberts,and Samuelson
[1988].
They
find
an
unweighted
rate
of
new
plant addition
of
25.3 percent for the five
year period
1977-82 and
for
plants with 250 or more
employees in the manufacturing ector. This rate
is equivalent to an
unweightedrate of 37.9 percent for the eight year
period we analyze.
In
comparison,
our
weighted
estimate
of
ADD/ENTER or
manufacturing
ndustries is
21.07
percent,
even
though
our
sample
includes smaller plants, which
can be expected to
increase reported evels of entry. (See
Dunne,
Roberts,
and
Samuelson[1988] for a discussion of this
issue.)
This
suggests that
our
estimates
are
conservative.
(j
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60 JULIA PORTERLIEBESKINDETAL.
employment change due to plant expansion
(EXPANDISTAY)
s negative (but
very small)
in
both the full sample and the manufacturing
ubsample.
For illustrative purposes, Table II also provides estimates of the total net
change im industryemployment
due to
restructuring ctivity
between 1981 and
1989. For the
full
sample, the median industry experienced
a net reduction in
employment
of
about
12
percent
due to
plant closures,
additions,and expansions;
in
manufacturing,
he net reduction
was about
18
percent.
Note that the mean
value
for this
variable
in
the
full sample
is 25
percent,
indicating that
some
(mainly non-manufacturing)
ndustries
grew very rapidly
between 1981 and
1989.
Table
III
shows the changes
in
the two measures
of industryconcentration sed
in the study between 1981 and 1989.8 For all industries,median concentration
increasedslightly: the median change
in
four-firm atio
representsan increase of
3.4 percent between 1981 and 1989, while the median change
in
Herfindahl
indexrepresentsan increaseof 6.4 percent.Therefore,concentration ncreased
n
more than half
of
all
US industries
during
he 1980s.
In
manufacturingndustries
concentrationncreased
more: the
medianchange
in
four-firm atio represents
an
increaseof 14.0 percent,while
the
median change
in
Herfindahl ndex represents
an increase
of
20.3
percent.
V
THE
DETERMINANTS
OF
CHANGE
IN
US INDUSTRYCONCENTRATION,
981-89
We use OLS
regressions
to
explain
the
change
in
industry-level
concentration
with seven measures of
industry-levelrestructuring
and a number
of
control
variables. Lacking
a structural
model
appropriate
or
describing change
in
the
many
different
ndustries
n
our
sample,
we wish to
interpret
our
regressions
as
under-identified educed forms
of
some largerbut unknown structural ystem
(Schmalensee [1989]).
TableIV reportsregressionsusing the full sampleof 694 4-digit industriesand
the
subsample
of
390
4-digit manufacturing
ndustries.
The
most
important
esult
of these
regressions
s
that
selloffs of
establishmentsby exiting
firms
(SELLOFFI
EXI)
are shown to be significantlyand negatively associated with changes
in
concentration
n
three of the
four
regressions.
Selloffs of
establishments
by
surviving
ncumbent irms
(SELLOFFISTAY)
re
also
significantly
and
negatively
associated
with
changes
in
industry
concentration
n
the
full
sample, suggesting
that large
incumbentfirms sold off assets
to
smaller
firms
during
the
1980s.
The
regressions
show that other
types
of
corporate
restructuring
are also
significantdeterminants f changesin industryconcentration.First, he closureof
establishments
by exiting
firms
(CLOSEIEXI)
is
significantly
and
positively
associated
with
changes
in
industry
concentration
in
the
subsample
of
manufacturing
ndustries. This
suggests
that establishments
were closed
by
8The Herfindahl
ndex of industry
concentrations scaled between
0
and
1, where an industrywith
an index of 1 has all its employees
in one firm.
Herfindahl
ndices are
frequently
rescaled from
0 to
10,000
as
in the
Department
of
Justice's
Merger
Guidelines.
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TABLEIII
INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION
AND
CHANGE IN INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION
1981 TO 1989
Variable Median Meana Std. Dev.
A.
All
industries:
(n= 695)
Four Firm concentration atio:
1981
0.4508 0.4874 0.2324
1989
0.4515 0.4837 0.2071
Change
in Four Firm
concentration atio between 0.0157 -0.0037 0.1664
1981 and 1989b
Hirschmann-Herfindahlndex of concentration:
1981
0.0781 0.1201 0.1238
1989 0.0792 0.1146 0.1085
Change
in
Hirschmann-Herfindahlndex of 0.0050 -0.0055 0.1174
concentrationbetween 1981 and 1989b
B.
Manufacturingndustries:
(n
=
390)
Four Firmconcentration atio:
1981
0.3862 0.4170 0.1919
1989 0.4412 0.4769 0.1967
Change
in
Four
Firm
concentration atio between
0.0541
0.0599
0.1205
1981 and 18989b
Hirschmann-Herfindahlndex
of
concentration:
1981 0.0607 0.0823 0.0694
1989 0.0772 0.1060 0.0915
Change
in
Hirschmann-Herfindahlndex of 0.0123 0.0237 0.0700
concentrationbetween 1981
and
1989b
'Each ndustrys equallyweighted.
bChange
between 981and 1989 s the
dependent
ariable
sed n the
regressionseported
n
Table
V
and
V
smaller,rather
han
larger,manufacturingirns, consistentwith the argument hat
restructuring hrough plant
closures
during
the
1980s
served
to consolidate
manufacturing apacity (Jensen [1993]).
As
expected,
the addition of
establish-
ments
by entering
firms
(ADDIENTER)
s
significantlyandnegatively associated
with
changes
in
industry
concentration
n
all four
regressions.
In
contrast,
in
addition
of
capacity by
incumbent
inns
(ADDISTAY)
s
significantlyassociated
with
increases
in
concentration
n
three
out
of four
regressions, suggesting
that
large incumbent
firms
expanded
their
marketshareduringthe 1980s by adding
new
capacity.
Neither
closures
of
capacity by
incumbent firms
(CLOSEISTAY)
nor
expansions
of
capacity
(EXPANDISTAY)
ave
any consistently significant
association
with
changes
in
industry
concentration.
With
regard
o
the
control
variables,
concentration
n
1981
(INDCONC81) s
significantly
and
negatively
associated
with
industry
concentration
n
all four
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Ltd. 1996
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62
JULIA
PORTERLIEBESKIND
ETAL.
TABLE
IV
EFFECTS
OF
CORPORAT
RESTRUCTU
ON
INDUSTRY
CONCENTR
1981-1989.
(Ordinary
least
Squares
Regressions,
t-statistics
in
parentheses.
Dependent
variable
=
Change
in:
Four
Firm
Concentration
Ratio:
Herfindahl
Index:
Four
Firm
Concentration
Ratio:
Herfindahl
Index:
Full
Sample
Full
Sample
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
Intercept
0.1950
0.0766
0.1024
0.0105
(9.10)***
(5.85)***
(3.14)**
(0.58)
SELLOFF/EXIT
-0.0005
-0.0003
-0.0009
-0.0004
(-3.87)***
(-3.34)***
(-2.17)**
(-1.60)
SELLOFF/STAY
-0.0041
-0.0032
-0.0039
-0.0016
(-1.96)
(-2.29)**
(-1.74)*
(-1.20)
EXPAND/STAY
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003
0.0002
(0.80)
(1.08)
(0.53)
(0.68)
CLOSE/EXIT
-0.00008
-0.0001
0.0018
0.0012
(-0.23)
(-0.48)
(3.86)***
(4.37)***
CLOSE/STAY
-0.0006
-0.0004
-0.0013
-0.0003
(-1.37)
(-1.24)
(-1.83)*
(-0.62)
ADD/ENTER
-0.0003
-0.0001
-0.0014
-0.0010
(-7.50)***
(-3.01)***
(-4.76)***
(-5.39)***
ADD/STAY
0.0010
0.0005
0.0016
0.0008
(3.06)***
(2.32)**
(3.05)***
(1.61)
CHMES
0.0008
0.0003
0.0003
-0.00006
(3.87)***
(1.95)*
(0.99)
-(0.35)
lNDCONC81
-0.3403
-0.5730
-0.1468
-0.1126
(-14.98)***
(-19.62)***
(-4.68)***
(2.12)**
REGULATEa
0.0149
0.0001
(-0.83)
(-0.02)
CHSALES
0.0001
0.0001
0.0004
0.0004
(4.17)***
(4.85)***
(3.71)***
(5.54)***
Adjusted
R2
0.344
0.396
0.216
0.165
F
Value
34.13***
42.32***
11.72***
8.68***
N
(industries)
695
695
390
390
*(**)(***)
denotes
significance
at
the
10%
(5%)
(1%)
level.
'There
are
no
regulated
manufacuring
industries.
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RESTRUCTURING
AND
CONSOLIDATIONOF
US
INDUSTRY
63
regressions,
indicating
that
increases
in
concentration
duringthe
1980s mainly
took
place
in
those
industries
hatwere
the least
concentrated n
1981.
Industry
growth (CHSALES) s significantlyand positively associated with changes in
concentration,while
change
in
median
plant
scale
(CHMES) and
regulation
(REGULATE) ave
no
significant
effect.
Table V
presents
summary
results for
regressions
in the
subsamples of
producer
and
consumer
goods
industries,
non-manufacturing
ndustries,
and
industries
with
low,
relatively
high
and high
levels of
concentration n
1981.
Consistent
with the
regression
results
in
TableIV,
TableV
shows that
SELLOFFI
EXIT
s
significantly
and
negatively
associated with
change
in
concentration n
producer
and
non-manufacturing
ndustries.
SELLOFF/EXITs
also
significantly
and negatively associated with changes in concentration n industrieswith low
concentration n
1981.
Also
consistent
with the
results of the
main
regressions,
SELLOFFISTAY
s
significantly
and
negatively associated with
changes
in
concentration
only
in
non-manufacturing
ndustries,
while
CLOSE/EXIT s
significantlyand
positively
associated
with
changes
in
concentration n both
subsamples of
manufacturing
industries, and
also
in
industries
with
low
concentration n
1981.
ADDISTAYs
shown to
be
significantly
and
positively
associated with
changes
in
concentration n
consumer
goods
industries,
while
EXPANDISTAYs
shown to be
significantly
and
positively
associated with
changesin concentration n non-manufacturingndustries,even thoughit is not a
significant
determinant f
changes
in
concentration
n
the
main
regressions.
The
most
important
esult of
these
regression
analyses, given
the
purpose of
this
study,
s
the
consistentlysignificantand
negative
associationwe
find between
selloffs
measured
at
the
industrylevel
and
changes
in
industrial
concentration
during
the
1980s.
Recall that
our
measures
of
selloffs
capture
all
horizontal
mergers and inter-firm
asset
sales
in
sample
industries
between 1981
and 1989.
Therefore,this
finding
is
inconsistent with
the
argument hat
relaxed
antitrust
enforcement
during
the
1980s
resulted
n
mergers and inter-firm
asset
sales that
increased industrialconcentration
across
broad
samples
of US
industries.
In
addition,
he
significantand
economicallyimportant
negative
association
we find
between
prior levels of
industry concentration
INDCONC91)
and
changes
in
concentration
s
consistent
with a
claim of
continued
antitrust
vigilance.
Some
caution is
warranted
n
arriving
at this
interpretation,
however,
because we
consider
only
broad
samples
of
4-digit
industries
n
this
study.
Therefore,
our
results
cannot be
interpretedas
ruling out the
possibility
that
some
horizontal
mergers
and inter-firm
sset
sales
did result
n
increases n
concentration n
some
US
industries
during
the
1980s.
The
regressionsdo
show that
additions
of
capacity
by large
incumbentfirms
between
1981 and
1989
increased
ndustry
concentration.
However,
this
finding
indicates that
the
large
finns that
increasedtheir market
share
during
the 1980s
did so
by
internal
expansion,
rather
han
by
acquiring
rival
firms.
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1996
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64
JULIA
PORTER
LIEBESKIND
ETAL.
TABLE
V
THE
EFFECTS
OF
CORPORATE
REsTRucTuRING
ON
INDUSTRY
CONCENTRATION,
1981-1989
IN
SELECTED
SUBSAMPLES
OF
INDUSTRIES
(T-STATISTICS,
R2,
AND
VALUES
REPORTED
FROM
OLS
REGRESSIONS:
SEE
TABLE
IV
FOR
FULL
MODEL)
SELLOFFI
SELLOFF
EPAND
CLOSE
CLOSE
ADD
ADD
R2
F-Value
N
STAY
STAY
STAY
EXIT
STAY
ENTER
STAY
Industry
Subsamples:
Manufacturing:
Producer.
Four
firm:
-2.14**
-1.32
0.20
2.84**
-1.79**
-4.85***
1.68*
0.23
9.09***
297
Herfindahl:
-
1.90*
-0.85
0.49
2.93**
-0.50
-5.07***
0.11
0.20
8.30***
2947
Consumer:
Four
firm:
-1.72*
0.03
0.92
1.52
-0.57
0.54
3.74***
0.21
3.38***
93
Herfindahl:
-1.35
-0.81
1.82*
3.10***
-0.28
-1.35*
5.39***
0.42
7.79***
93
Non-manufacturing:
Four-firm:
-2.68***
-1.75
1.79*
1.44
1.00
-4.92***
1.32
0.36
18.16***
305
Herfindahl
-2.19**
-
1.83*
1.79*
0.57
0.30
-1.60
0.79
0.48
29.49***
305
Concentration
in
1981:a
Low:
Four-firm:
-4.08***
-0.18
0.51
2.14**
-
1.70*
-6.32***
3.00***
0.22
12.86***
411
Herfindahl
-3.48***
-0.77
0.66
3.24***
-0.72
-5.16***
1.83*
0.15
8.29***
411
Relatively
high:
Four-firm:
-0.42
-0.14
-0.08
-
1.81*
0.25
-4.52***
0.88
0.17
3.90***
138
Herfindahl:
-1.42
-0.06
-0.30
1.18
0.19
-3.83***
0.05
0.07
2.17***
139
High:
Four-firm:
-1.30
-2.49*
1.12
-1.72*
-0.83
-2.41***
1.11
0.19
4.47***
145
Herfindahl:
-2.17*
-1.57
0.91
-0.46
0.17
0.02
0.43
0.50
15.63***
145
*
(*)
(***)
denotes
significance
at
the
10%
(5%)
(1%)
level.
aIndusty
concentration
categories
are
defined
for
each
4-digit
SIC
industry
following
Department
of
Justice
guidelines
as
follows:
High
Concentration:
Herfindahi
Index
>
0.18;
Relatively
High
Concentration:
0.10
<
Herfindahi
Index
<
0.18;
Low
Concentration:
Herfindahl
Index
<
0.10.
?
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1996
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RESTRUCTURING
AND CONSOLIDATION
OF
US INDUSTRY
65
VI. SUMMARY
AND CONCLUDING
REMARKS
The purpose
of this study
has been
to document the
changes
in US industrial
concentrationduring he 1980s andto investigatewhethercorporate estructuring
was
a
determinant
of any changes in concentration.Although
there has been
extensive debate
regarding he effects
of corporaterestructuring
n US industry,
we are
not
aware
of any other study
that has examined
this issue
in
detail.
This
study
has
sought
to
fill
this gap
in
our knowledge
about
the
aggregate
effects
of
corporaterestructuring
and to inform the
on-going
policy debate about
the
regulation
of corporate
control transactions
n the US. Based on
a broadsample
of 695 4-digit
US industries,and
a number of industry sub-samples,
this study
finds
no evidence that
horizontalmergersor
inter-firm sset sales
wereassociated
with increasing ndustryconcentrationduringthe 1980s.
JULIAN
PORTER
LIEBESKIND,
ACCEPTED
MAY
1995
School of
Business
Administration,
Universityof
Southern California,
Los Angeles,
California
90089-1421,
USA
TIM C. OPLER,
Department
of
Finance,
Max
M
Fisher
College
of Business,
Ohio State
University,
1775
College Road,
Columbus,
OH
43210,
USA
and
DONALD E.
HATFIELD,
Departmentof Management,
R. B.
Pamplin College of
Business,
VirginiaPolytechnic
Instituteand State University,
Blacksburg,
VA.24061-0233,
USA
APPENDIX: DETAILS OF
TRINET INC.'S
LARGE ESTABLISHMENT
DATABASE
TRINET, Inc.'s Large
Establishment
Database was originally
developed by
Economic
Information Systems, Inc.,
(EIS) for
sale to companies
involved
in
direct industrial
marketing. The database contains a variety of information on manufacturing and non-
manufacturing
establishments
with more
than 20 employees
in
the US
only.
The data
are
derived from a
variety
of
sources,
including
state and
county
industrial directories,
corporate
reports,
trade
association and Chamber
of Commerce directories,
the trade
press,
telephone
directories,
and mailing lists. Data
are cross-checked with
the Census Bureau's
County
Business
Patterns,
and
by telephone
calls.
All
of the data
are
subject
to continuous
update
and
review;
this is
essential,
because the database
is sold for
marketing purposes.
(C
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Publishers
Ltd. 1996
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66
JULIA PORTERLIEBESKIND
ETAL.
The Large
Establishment
Database was first
established
in
1968.
In the late 1970s, the
database was sold
by
EIS
to
TRINET,
Inc.
In
this
study,
we refer to this database as the
"TRINET data." New versions
of the database
were issued commercially by
TRINET each
year during the 1980s. Data
were released
for research purposes only on
tape in 1981,
1983, 1985, 1987 and 1989.
Data for earlier
years were obtained by some researchers
from
EIS. (See, for example, Montgomery
and
Wemerfelt, 1988, who use EIS data
from 1976.)
A detailed
discussion of the reliability of
the Large Establishment Database
is given by
Kwoka, "Economic Information
Systems,
Inc. (EIS)
Market
Share
Data: Nature,
Reliability, and Uses," American
Bar Association Antitrust Journal, 47, pp.
1089-1098.
Kwoka considers the Large
Establishment
Database
to be
generally
reliable:
"The sheer volume of
these data make total
accuracy impossible, of course,
but by and
large,
the data are judged
to have substantial reliability."
(Kwoka, 1978, page 1093.)
Comparing the TRINET data and Census market share data for 314 manufacturing
industries
in
1972,
Kwoka found a cross-sectional
correlation of 0.922 for
the
four-firm
concentration
ratio
(CR4).
However,
he noted that deviations between
the
Census data
and
the TRINET data are not completely random,
as
follows:
(i) The
diferences
in concentration between
Census data
and TRfINETdata are larger
for
small industries
than
for large
industries.
In this
study,
we correct for
this
possible
source of bias
by
eliminating very small
industries
from our sample. (See page
5 of the text for details.)
(ii) The
differences
in concentration
between Census data
and
TRINET
data
are smaller
in
more
concentrated
industries.
This bias will not result in failure to measure industries where concentration
increased
between
1981 and 1989,
which
are
of interest
in
this study.
(iii) There
is some systematic
over-estimation of concentration
in the TRINET
data.
The
most
likely
source for this bias,
in
our
view,
is that
TRINET
includes only
establishments
employing
20 or more
persons. Consequently,
concentration will be
over-estimated
for industries
with
many
small establishments
operated
by many
small
firms.
In
addition,
this
bias
can
be
expected
to
create
larger
differences
between the
Census
data and the
TRINET data in
measuring
the
Herfindahl
index,
than
in
measuring
the four-finn ratio.
We
compared
the concentration
ratios in the Census
of Manufactures
with
those
estimated in this study for the manufacturing sector. Unfortunately, we were unable to
compare these for identical
years,
as did Kowka, because
the Census
of
Manufactures
was
conducted
in
1982 and 1987
only,
whereas we use
TRINET data
from
1981 and 1989.
In
addition,
the
classification
of
4-digit
SIC codes
in
the Census was
changed
between 1982
and
1987.
Nonetheless,
we
find a cross-sectional correlation
in
the four-firm ratio
of
0.665
(p
<
0.001)
between
TRINET
1981
and Census
of Manufactures
1982
data,
and 0.761
(p
<
0.001)
between
TRINET 1989 and Census
1987 data.
The
cross-sectional
correlations for
the Herfindahl index are
lower: 0.559
(p
<
0.001)
and 0.478
(p
<
0.001)
respectively.
This
lower
correlation is most probably
due to
systematic
biases
in the
TRINET and Census data
which differentially
affect measurement of
this ratio.
First,
establishments with less than
20
employees
are not
reported
in TRINET
but are included
in
the Census estimates
of concentration.
Second,
the
Herfindahl
ratios
in
the
Census are
estimated
for
only
the
top
50
finns,
whereas we
estimate
them for all
firms
in
a
given
industry.
In
our
sample,
73% of
manufacturing
industries
in
1981 had more than
50
firms,
and 81% had more
than 50 firms
in
1989.
Because data on
large
establishments,
and the
establishments
of
larger
finns,
is more
likely
to
be
reliable
than data on
smaller
establishments,
and
the establishments of
smaller
finns
(biases
that also apply
to the Census
data,
as discussed
by Dunne,
Roberts and
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RESTRUCTURINGAND CONSOLIDATIONOF
US INDUSTRY
67
TABLE
A.I
ESTABLISHMENTSDDED BY SIZE
CLASS BETWEEN 981 AND 1989 ACCORDiNGTO
CoUNTRY
BuSINESS
PArrERNS
Yearand Source
Size Class:
20-49
50-99 100-249 250-499 500-999
1000
<
A. All industries:
1981:
379,303 130,880
71.453 20,209 7,986
4,700
1989: 495,678
172,323 95,291
23,898 9,437 5,489
Change:
+30.7%
+31.7% +33.4%
+
18.2%
+
18.2%
+
16.8%
B.
Manufacturingndustriesonly:
1981: 56,179 28,370 23,121 8.902 3,923 2.354
1989:
59,965 30,832
24,327 8,799 3,679
1,986
Change:
+6.7% +8.7% +5.2% - 1.1 -
6.3%
-
16.5%
Samuelson
[1988]),
and because TRINET has increased the
accuracy
of
its
reporting
of
small establishments
over
time,
we restrict our
sample
in this
study to establishments with
100 or
more employees. However, this raises
the question
of
whether such a truncation
procedure differentially eliminates smaller
establishments
added between 1981 and 1989,
resulting
in
biases of concentration ratios and
MES. As
shown in
Table A.I
below,
according
to
Country
Business
Patterns,
the
highest
rates
of overall establishment addition
between 1981 and 1989 took place among establishments with 100-249 employees. Rates
of addition were
lower
in
both
larger
and
smaller establishments.
In
contrast,
in
the
manufacturing
sector,
rates
of establishment addition
were higher
among
smaller
establishments, and
the
number
of
large
establishments decreased. To
examine
possible
bias of
our results from
using
the 100
employee
cutoff
level,
we conducted
additional
regressions
that
included smaller
establishments. We found
that
our regression results
were
not highly sensitive to the elimination
of smaller establishments
in
either the full
sample of
695
industries,
or
in
the
subsample
of 390
manufacturing
industries.
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