The Implicit Moral Agreement

Whitney Laemmli

In this essay, Whitney Laemmli, a student in Derek Malone-France’s fall2003 seminar, Morality, Diversity, andHuman Rights, cogently argues thecase for an absolutist approach tomoral philosophy. If human beings areto avoid the Hobbesian “war of allagainst all,” then the social contract—including its moral dimensions—mustbind all to all, transnationally and trans-culturally. She says that she became“particularly interested in this specificaspect of James Kellenberger’s bookbecause [Gilbert] Harman’s argument”for a relativistic approach to moralityrelied on “such a relatively small andspecific foundation .. .to explain such awide variety of moral phenomena.” Heraim for this essay was “to account forthe moral absolutism necessary for theaffirmation of universal human rightswithout denying the manifest moraldiversity in the world—something notonly philosophically, but also practical-ly, important.” Indeed, this last obser-vation demonstrates generosity towardthose, like Harman, with whomLaemmli disagrees. This respect for theviewpoint of other scholars is a keydimension in the principles that guidethe Writing 20 curriculum.

Moral diversity, the existence of divergent, culturally, or circumstan-tially determined ethical values, is rapidly becoming less the sole con-cern of philosophers, and increasingly a matter at the heart of manysocial conflicts. Today, the contrasting ethical systems that diverseindividuals and cultures advance are sharply evident. Predictably,

this raises the question of whether morality, at its most primary level, is absolute orrelative in nature. In Moral Relativism, Moral Diversity, and Human Relationships,philosopher James Kellenberger seeks to address this apparent diversity and discuss-es its possible origin in both absolute and relative terms.

By way of framing his own perspective, Kellenberger introduces readers toGilbert Harman’s argument that the foundation for morality lies in the moral agree-ments made between individuals or groups. For Harman, the fact that morality isbased on explicit agreements requires that we adopt a stance of moral relativism,since “different groups of people may have different agreements, and ‘an action maybe wrong in relation to one agreement but not in relation to another.’”1 In logicalstrength, given its narrow parameters,2 Kellenberger finds Harman’s argumentincontrovertible, but he contests its practical import. While Harman sufficientlydefines morality within the context of a specific moral agreement, he fails even tobegin to address broader moral obligations between individuals who have not madean explicit moral agreement—that is, the moral obligations of individuals bound bynothing other than the largely implicit terms of the social contract. My analysis willseek to address this difficulty by more broadly defining ‘moral agreement’ to includethe implicit moral agreements that arise from the social contract. This new definitionof ‘moral agreement’ requires that we accept an absolute standard of morality—one, however, that still recognizes the legitimacy of differing explicit agreementsunder the social contract and the moral diversity concomitant with them.

To clarify why it is essential to consider a specific type of implicit moral agree-ment when seeking a basis for morality, it is first necessary to examine GilbertHarman’s rival conception in greater depth. Harman defines morality as “aris[ing]when . . . people reach implicit agreement or come to a tacit understanding abouttheir relations with one another.”3 While, on its surface, this definition seems toground all morality in implicit agreements, Harman’s explication makes it evidentthat it is possible to make practically significant philosophical distinctions even

12

1 J. Kellenberger, Moral Relativism, Moral Diversity, and Human Relationships (StateCollege: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 2001), 71, quoting in part Gilbert Harman, “MoralRelativism Defended,” in Relativism: Cognitive and Moral, ed. Jack Meiland and MichaelKrausz (Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 190.

2 The specific constraints Harman proposes will be more fully explicated below. 3 Harman, “Relativism Defended,” 189, quoted in Kellenberger, Moral Relativism, 71.

13

within this subcategory of implicit agreement. Hetells the story of “a contented employee of Murder,Incorporated,” who has been “raised as a child tohonor and respect members of the ‘family’ but tohave nothing but contempt for the rest of society.”4

Harman goes on to theorize thatit is not justifiable to condemn asimmoral this man’s commissionof murder outside of the family.Harman supposes that since theman will not violate any of hisexisting, personal moral agree-ments if he commits such a mur-der, no moral wrongdoing willhave occurred. However, even ifwe examine his actions solely inrelation to the agreements he hasentered into, Harman’s theory isvalid only if we assume that themurderer’s implicit obligationsextend no further than his fami-ly. I argue that implicit agree-ments also include the socialcontract that binds all membersof society—indeed, all of hu-manity. Individuals cannot ex-empt themselves from suchagreements; being human entailsan inherent moral obligation toothers by virtue of the socialcontract.

If the social contract bindshumans together in mutualmoral obligation, then we mustexamine the nature of the socialcontract itself if we wish tounderstand its moral implica-tions. Thomas Hobbes definesthe social contract as a “mutualtransferring of right.”5 Hobbesfounds this concept on the ideathat the ‘natural state’ of humanexistence is a world in whichindividuals exercise absolutefreedom; as a result, they findthemselves constantly in conflictwith one another. To minimize

this conflict and ensure personal security, they recip-rocally cede their absolute freedoms and accept soci-etal obligations. This agreement to surrender un-limited personal freedom is the basis of the socialcontract. David Gauthier defines the “essence of the

social contract” as “found in themutual advantage of restrainingthe pursuit of advantage.”6 It isimportant to note, however, thatthe contracting parties neverexplicitly agree upon the socialcontract. It is enforceable in theabsence of explicit consent be-cause it is what a rational personwould agree to if placed in the‘state of nature’. The actual con-ditions for formation of the so-cial contract need not ever tohave actually existed—its rele-vance as a basis for moral agree-ments lies in its function as an apriori foundation. The needs ofall human beings are such thatthe development of some type of contractual agreement is nec-essary for the propagation of human society. Without such im-plicit agreements between per-sons, chaos would ensue, as eachindividual single-mindedly pur-sued his or her own interestswithout concern for others.

The collective needs of hu-man beings, therefore, provide abasis for moral absolutismgrounded in the implicit agree-ments of the social contract.Because the aspects of humannature that necessitate the for-mation of the social contract areuniversal, transcending national,social, and cultural boundaries,the moral conditions of the so-cial contract must be universalas well.7 The deeper basis forimplicit agreement lies, there-fore, in absolutist thinking about

This new definition of

‘moral agreement’

requires that we accept

an absolute standard of

morality—one, however,

that still recognizes the

legitimacy of differing

explicit agreements

under the social contract

and the moral diversity

concomitant with them.

I argue that implicit

agreements also

include the social

contract that binds all

members of society—

indeed, all of

humanity. Individuals

cannot exempt

themselves from such

agreements; being

human entails an inher-

ent moral obligation to

others by virtue of the

social contract.

4 Ibid., quoted in Kellenberger, Moral Relativism, 72.5 Thomas Hobbes, “The Leviathan,” in The Human Rights Reader: Major Political Essays, Speeches, and

Documents from the Bible to the Present, ed. Micheline R. Ishay (New York: Routledge, 1997), 87.6 David Gauthier, Moral Dealing (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1990), 757 Rousseau asserts that, although the specific conditions of the social contract “may never have been formally pro-

nounced, they are everywhere the same, everywhere tacitly accepted and recognized” (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “On theSocial Contract,” in Classics in Political Philosophy, ed. Jene M. Porter, 3d ed. [Upper Saddle River, N.J.: PearsonEducation, 1989], 410).

14

human nature and the collective need for order. Thisfoundation also leads to the conclusion that onecannot simply choose to remove oneself from civi-lization at will. The social contract trumps individ-ual choice—one cannot escape human nature andthe consequent realities that attend the maintenanceof social order. Harman’s suggestion that one can, ina sense, choose the individuals or groups to whichone’s implicit moral agreements extend is in directopposition to this thinking, contributing additionalsupport to the necessity for a broader view ofimplicit agreements.

Hence, when I use the term ‘implicit agreement’,it is this absolutist type of implicit moral social con-tract to which I refer. It is imperative, again, to dis-tinguish this form of agreement from other, explicitagreements, freely entered into, that are often seenby relativists such as Harman as implicit, such as theagreement within a small group to be truthful withone another in order to facilitate friendship. Wemight regard this latter type of agreement as morenearly explicit than the type of implicit agreements Ipropose. By choosing to enter into a specific groupwith an awareness of its existing implicit agree-ments, the individual makes a conscious, explicitdecision to follow its moral framework and, addi-tionally, retains the ability to abandon that frame-work at will.8 This free decision is entirely unlikethe manner in which the individual enters the socialcontract. Entering into any truly implicit agreement,as I define it, does not involve choice, because suchan agreement must be obligatory and universal—and, thus, one that exists prior to choice. Therefore,the absence of choice and, with it, the consequentabsolute applicability of implicit agreements, is adefining element of the moral social contract.

This absolutism separates theories based onexplicit moral agreement from their implicit-based

counterparts, and makes the concept of overarchingimplicit agreements valuable in practical moral deci-sion-making. Harman’s “agreement between per-sons” model opens the way to radical moralrelativism and creates several practical problemsthat can only be resolved through a broader view ofagreements. First, while the explicit-agreementsmodel accounts for the moral diversity that existswithin and among groups, and explains why certainactions may be morally wrong in some situationsbut not in others, it fails to explain the universalityof many moral values. If all moral agreements weresimply matters of preference, it is unlikely that sucha wide consensus would exist regarding the imper-missibility of some acts, such as gratuitous killing ortorture. Such moral proscriptions derive from uni-versal, absolute, and implicit agreements that thoseactions are detrimental to the whole of society.While this position might also come under attackfrom pragmatists, who argue that such morals areonly universal because they are functional for thespecific people involved in the agreement, it is myposition that the moral social contract underlies thisidea and is inviolable for all of humanity. The condi-tions that lead to the creation of the social contractand its implicit moral agreements are the sameacross cultures and, thus, universal and bindingupon all cultures.

Furthermore, the general principle of implicitmoral agreements does not render impossible themoral diversity that arises from the profusion ofexplicit agreements that people form under theimplicit social contract; it merely places limits onthis diversity. Within the framework of preexistingmoral contracts, the individual is still free to makeother, varying moral agreements. It is still true thatan action may be moral relative to one agreementand immoral relative to another—so long, I wouldargue, as the implicit agreements imbedded in thesocial contract are not violated. In a sense, the dis-tinction between explicit and implicit agreementsparallels that between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’moral values in conventional relativism.9 For in-stance, different societies could reach differentexplicit agreements pertaining to the distribution ofwealth, while still upholding the requisite implicitagreement to respect human dignity and needs. Aslong as the implicit agreement is honored, different

The general principle of implicit moral

agreements does not render impossible the

moral diversity that arises from the profu-

sion of explicit agreements that people

form under the implicit social contract; it

merely places limits on this diversity.

8 It is important to note that, even if an individual is coerced into joining a group or does not personally accept thegroup’s moral standards, and may not possess the practical means to renounce the affiliation, it is philosophically possi-ble to do so, as it is not with the moral social contract. Furthermore, although individuals often do enter into complexsocial arrangements not fully aware of the implicit agreements these relationships entail, these agreements are by nomeans part of the social contract, but particular to the individuals involved. Yet again, these agreements involve an ele-ment of choice, while the implicit agreements of the social contract are binding upon all humankind, facilitating socialorder among strangers as well as friends, enemies as well as allies.

9 Kellenberger, Moral Relativism, 97.

10 For Harman, an “agreement in intentions”signifies that neither party was coerced into theagreement; it was made of completely free will(Kellenberger, Moral Relativism, 73, citing Harman,“Relativism Defended,” 199).

explicit agreements remain valid. In this way,we may account for both the moral diversityand the moral universality that we observe.

An additional problem with confining mor-ality to explicit agreements is the possibilitythat one could make an agreement to be im-moral. If the only qualification for making anagreement morally binding were that bothparties have an “agreement in intentions”10

to do something, they could consciously agreeto be immoral, and a violation of such anagreement would, then, itself, be immoral byHarman’s definition. We may exclude thispossibility by considering it within the frame-work of existing implicit agreements. Withinthat framework, such agreements contradictthe overarching obligations of the social con-tract; violating them does not. In this way,implicit agreements halt the slide down theslippery slope to radical relativism, and pro-vide a basis for universal human rights. Thelack of an overarching moral code wouldentail a return to the original state of nature,in which unmitigated self-interest and chaoswould reign. With implicit agreements as amoral foundation, however, while individualmoral choice is possible in many cases, thereis a limit to acceptable moral decisions; justifi-

cation based on the relative nature of agree-ments can only be taken so far.

In his philosophical analysis, Harman at-tempts to use an agreement-based ethical codeto support the case for a relativistic morality.We have seen, however, that this justificationis only possible when agreements, as such, aredefined in exceptionally narrow terms to ex-clude true implicit agreement as it exists in themoral social contract. Indeed, if morality werebased solely upon the type of explicit agree-ments that Harman proposes, radical rela-tivism would be the logical conclusion, andsuch an arbitrary morality would lose itsimport. Including consideration of implicitagreements in a theory of agreement-basedmorality, however, resolves this dilemma.Moral judgments remain possible, and themorals that form the basis of the social con-tract remain intact. We may justify the asser-tion of certain absolutes by pointing to themoral agreements implicit in the social con-tract as a matter of human nature. Thus, theimplicit-agreement basis for morality allowsfor both moral diversity and moral judgment,both of which permit moral tolerance, andensure that choosing when to be moral can-not always be a choice. �

15