Jack Sheehan,PM Knowledge IntegrationDefense Modeling &Simulation Officejsheehan@dmso.mil,703-998-0660 x448

Dr. Paul Deitz,Technical DirectorArmy Materiel SystemsAnalysis Agencyphd@arl.mil,410-279-6598

Bruce Harris, Dir. Training &Performance AnalysisDynamics Research Corp.bharris@drc.com,978-475-9090 x1878

Britt Bray, PM, SGCOEDynamics Research Corp.bbray@drc.com,913-758-1551

Using M&S to Predict, Describe,Using M&S to Predict, Describe,Design and Execute WeaponsDesign and Execute Weapons

PerformancePerformance

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 22

DOT&E Letter on M&SDOT&E Letter on M&S(Mr. Christie, 4 June 2002)(Mr. Christie, 4 June 2002)

• Test as We Fight:– Real warriors employing real combat systems conducting realistic

missions and tasks in a representative physical environment.

• Core T&E Processes:– Prediction (hypothesis), planning (test design), data collection (test

event), analysis (data verification), reporting (conclusion).

• M&S Supports – but does not Replace – Testing:– Before (sizing, scoping, design), during (stimulation, response), after

(interpretation, significance, assessment).

• Holistic:– Constructive participation and engagement of key stakeholders

through the iterative model, test, simulate, evaluate, cycle

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 33

Operational ChallengesOperational Challenges

Actionable, timely information is power in the battlespace:• Global reach to provide close support in complex terrain drives

up the scope of sensor coverage while simultaneously requiringgreater sensor resolution.

• Increased stand-off ranges and decreased collateral damagedrives munition size down and precision delivery up.

• Each leap in scope, resolution, stand-off, and precision generatesunprecedented need for integration and interoperability bothacross and within echelonsThere is a compelling need for disciplined modeling, testing, simulation,and evaluation of operational concepts, materiel architectures, andmission utility throughout the product life-cycle.

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 44

Systems Engineering ChallengesSystems Engineering Challenges

• Non-information-technology components of materiel solutionsare expensive, slowly evolving, long-lead elements both indevelopment and manufacture.

• The underlying C4ISR technology is changing faster thanoperational capabilities can be conceived and implemented.

• The current state-of-the-practice is to generate voluminousrequirements wish lists which:– Have limited internal consistency and completeness enforcement,– Are alternately too vague to really specify or so detailed as to obscure the real

need, and– No mere mortal could consume in a single lifetime.

• Modeling languages and tools abound:– Need rigorous, enforceable procedures to support semantic integration and

substantive information exchange.

Deciding what to become, what to build, and why is themost difficult (and highest risk) part of anytransformation effort:

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 55

Domain Perceptions of Effectiveness IssuesDomain Perceptions of Effectiveness Issues

– Range and precision drive cost/performance– “a hit is not necessarily a kill”

• Vulnerability, Need– Consistent methods for same weapon type, multiple target types

(to assess applicability of a particular munition to the range oftargets)

– Consistent methods for same target type, multiple weapon types(to assess which of many weapons to pair with a particular target)

– “a kill may not be needed to be effective”

For those that “build munitions for a living”• Lethality

– Stand-off ranges and sensitivity to collateraldamage drives trades to small warheads withprecision targeting

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 66

Domain Perceptions of Survivability IssuesDomain Perceptions of Survivability Issues

For those that “build targets for a living”• Fixed-Wing Aviation Targets

– “a hit is a kill”– Susceptibility reduction is the key to survivability– Av methodology focuses on single bullet/fragment

vulnerability• Ground Warfare Targets

– “hits are inevitable”– Survivability is not feasible without vulnerability reduction features– AJEM* methodology focuses on multiple bullet/fragment vulnerability

• Shipboard Maritime Targets– “an intercept may not be enough”– Damage control is essential for survival– ASAP methodology focuses on collateral damage to redundant systems

*Advanced Joint Effectiveness Model

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 77

Experimentation, Testing ChallengesExperimentation, Testing Challenges

• New and unconventional threats• Substantial increase in operational mission complexity

and required integration• External encroachment on existing testing ranges and

exercise facilities in the face of significant increases ingeographic stand-off between new and emergingoperational systems and targets

• Desire to simultaneously reduce the time-to-field newconcepts/systems and reduce life-cycle systems costs

• Desire to increase experimentation, testing, and trainingrealism while simultaneously reducing costs, and

• Need to integrate modeling and simulation into fieldexperiments and exercises.

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 88

Crew

Early Warning Sensors(LWR, RWR, MWR)

Secondary Armament

Target Acquisition/Engagement Sights

Ammo Compartment

Millimeter Wave Radar Antenna

Main Armament

Shoot

Commo Equipment

Communicate

Commo Equipment

Engine Compartment

Fuel

Move

Wheels/Track

Example: Platform ConfigurationExample: Platform ConfigurationLevel 2Level 2

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 99

•Tactics•Doctrine•Scenario•etc.(GlobalVariables)

MilitaryOperationsContext

Level 2] l

v2[C1, C2, …, Cc, Cd, …, Cj, Ck, …, Cm, Cn]Crew Ammo Fuel Msn Crit H-

Hour

v2[C1, C2, …, Cc, Cd, …, Cj, Ck, …, Cm, Cn]Crew Ammo Fuel Msn Crit

H + 3

Expending Main Ammo and Fuel

v2[C1, C2, …, Cc, Cd, …, Cj, Ck, …, Cm, Cn]Crew Ammo Fuel Msn Crit

H + 5

Need to Re-Arm and Re-Fuel

ll

v2[C1, C2, …, Cc, Cd, …, Cj, Ck, …, Cm, Cn]Crew Ammo Fuel Msn Crit

H + 7

Re-Armed and Re-Fueled

Abstraction: Platform ConfigurationAbstraction: Platform ConfigurationLevel 2Level 2

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 1010

Mov

eMov

e

Sense

Sense

Engag

e

Engag

e

Replen

ish

Replen

ish

Com

munica

te

Commun

icate

Testing for Platform CapabilitiesTesting for Platform CapabilitiesLevel 3Level 3

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 1111

•Tactics•Doctrine•Scenario•etc.(GlobalVariables)

MilitaryOperationsContext

Level 3] l

v3[Top Speed, Max Range, Rough Terrain Capability, ... Rate of Fire, Time to Acquire Tgt, Hit Dispersion, … Data Rate, Data Latency, ...]

0 .0

0 .2

0 .4

0 .6

0 .8

1.0

H-Hour

0 .0

0 .2

0 .4

0 .6

0 .8

1.0

H + 3

Level 2] l

0 .0

0 .2

0 .4

0 .6

0 .8

1.0

H + 5

l

l

0 .0

0 .2

0 .4

0 .6

0 .8

1.0

H + 7

l

l

O2,3 Operator

Context Data

Abstraction: Platform CapabilitiesAbstraction: Platform CapabilitiesLevel 3Level 3

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 1212

Perform

ance

?

Effecti

vene

ss?

Letha

lity?

Surviva

bility

?

Loss

/Excha

nge

?

Readin

ess

?

Mission Utility from CapabilitiesMission Utility from CapabilitiesLevel 4Level 4

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 1313

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Top Speed

Max Range

Rough Terrain Capability

Rate of Fire

Time to Acquire Target

Hit Dispersion

Data Rate

Data Latency

Minimum RequiredCapability

Level 4] l

•Tactics•Doctrine•Scenario•etc.(GlobalVariables)

MilitaryOperationsContext

O2,3 Operator

l

O3,4 Operator

Msn Cap Reqs

Level 3] l

H + 3 l

l

l

H + 5 l

l

0 .0

0 .2

0 .4

0 .6

0 .8

1.0

H + 7

l

l

l

Context Data

Abstraction: Platform UtilityAbstraction: Platform UtilityLevel 4Level 4

Level 2]

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 1414

Physical Analogues for the O1,2 OperatorPhysical Analogues for the O1,2 Operator

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 1515

•Tactics•Doctrine•Scenario•etc.(GlobalVariables)

MilitaryOperationsContext

O3,4 Operator

O2,3 Operator

Level 4] l

Level 2] l

Level 3] l

ll

l

l

l

l

l

ll

ll

l

ll

l

l

l

lLevel 1] l Risk Factors

O1,2 OperatorContext Data

Context Data

Msn Cap Reqs

Abstraction: Platform Live-Fire Test OperatorAbstraction: Platform Live-Fire Test Operator

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 1616

SituationSituation

• Legitimate, pro-Western Government of Country ofInterest is overthrown by radical elements andforced into exile.

• Majority of Country of Interest conventionalmilitary forces are loyal to new government.

• United States and its coalition partners believenational interests and regional stability areR

oad

to

War

Cu

rren

t Situ

atio

nM

issi

on

REPUBLIC OF ANEWAYA

MAJOR HIGHWAYSSECONDARY HIGHWAYSMAJOR RAILWAYSMINOR RAILWAYSOIL PIPELINES

OIL PIPELINE(Under construction)

CAPITAL CITY

CITIES AND TOWNS

AIRPORT C5 CAPABLE

GEOPITA

KHYKYN

LokiAlokizia

Noxiopia

Astociwatta

Port Tothaya

Lowatta

Baadwatta

Sylvah

Gaspain

Sea

Beechheya

SARAN

Evenheyah

Aroia

Wayaemi

Gonforgritz

Homfersuppa

Vanzinshop

ARMCHAYA

Evenheyah

KATABAY

Arwetheyayet

Tofhatogo

Azur

OkraOhnthakost

Ceethewatta

Saltwatta

Niczwatta

Friydokra

Itzinheya Baykdokra

Wayawehedded

Oilzgon

Waytohi

Kumlata

Ovayonda

SumwetaReservoir

0 40 miles

0 40 Kilometers

Cominsunna

Dyzyola

Shunall

Noxiopia

Great Cotton range

Nokatfichen

Summa

Surffabad

Kostofly Nottofha WethayayetHowfhaizit

Imnotheya

Heyatiz

Sumwaya

Alzoran

Rashfrumrun

Ikanrun

Ukanrun

Takarun

Morkanrun

Baadturun

Rivarunz

Hirtztarun

Nautzofaah

Gottarun

Nothienuf

ROSIOPIA

Goinsumwatta

Kloostoheya

Whenttoheya

AIRPORT C17 CAPABLE

Neyaheya

6

x

Dewatta

Dontgothaya

ANEWAYA

BEGAH

Zaltmyn

Nhowaya

Ovathaya

Gontofha

Imgoinheya

Katfichen

Obythawhay

Morsalta

REPUBLIC OF ANEWAYA

MAJOR HIGHWAYSSECONDARY HIGHWAYSMAJOR RAILWAYSMINOR RAILWAYSOIL PIPELINES

OIL PIPELINE(Under construction)

CAPITAL CITY

CITIES AND TOWNS

AIRPORT C5 CAPABLE

GEOPITA

KHYKYN

LokiAlokizia

Noxiopia

Astociwatta

Port Tothaya

Lowatta

Baadwatta

Sylvah

Gaspain

Sea

Beechheya

SARAN

Evenheyah

Aroia

Wayaemi

Gonforgritz

Homfersuppa

Vanzinshop

ARMCHAYA

Evenheyah

KATABAY

Arwetheyayet

Tofhatogo

Azur

OkraOhnthakost

Ceethewatta

Saltwatta

Niczwatta

Friydokra

Itzinheya Baykdokra

Wayawehedded

Oilzgon

Waytohi

Kumlata

Ovayonda

SumwetaReservoir

0 40 miles

0 40 Kilometers

0 40 miles

0 40 Kilometers

Cominsunna

Dyzyola

Shunall

Noxiopia

Great Cotton range

Nokatfichen

Summa

Surffabad

Kostofly Nottofha WethayayetHowfhaizit

Imnotheya

Heyatiz

Sumwaya

Alzoran

Rashfrumrun

Ikanrun

Ukanrun

Takarun

Morkanrun

Baadturun

Rivarunz

Hirtztarun

Nautzofaah

Gottarun

Nothienuf

ROSIOPIA

Goinsumwatta

Kloostoheya

Whenttoheya

AIRPORT C17 CAPABLE

Neyaheya

6

x

Dewatta

Dontgothaya

ANEWAYA

BEGAH

Zaltmyn

Nhowaya

Ovathaya

Gontofha

Imgoinheya

Katfichen

Obythawhay

Morsalta

threatened. They take military action to deter Hostile Country involvement in Country of Interest,to remove radical elements from power, restore legitimate, pro-western government, and tostabilize region and protect US and coalition vital interests.

• Coalition forces have commenced offensive ground operations in Country of Interest to defeatconventional forces loyal to radical government and isolate radical government leadership insideCapital of Country of Interest.

• Conventional forces from Hostile Country to the south, have begun massing on the border withCountry of Interest.

• CJFLCC intends to prevent Hostile Country from reaching Capital of Country of Interest byblocking access to the main north/south road into Capital. He anticipates need to delaymovement of Hostile Country forces north long enough for the Heavy Division to occupydefensive positions astride main north/south road.

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 1717

Task OrganizeTarget / Weapons Parity Mission Thread

Desired Effects

-- Conditions set for return of legitimate GovernmentSN

TopTasks

ID Threats SN2.4.1.1

Provide Direction SN5.4

-- Capital surrounded (BLOCK)TAAggregate

Perform SituationDevelopment

ART 1.3.1

ConductTact. Mvr.ART 2.2

Assess tactSit/OpsART 7.3

Employ FiresTo influence..

ART 3.3

Execute tact.Ops

ART 7.6

Bottom“Atomic” Effects Elements

-- Delayed for six hours (DELAY)TA

Atomic

“Atomic” Task Elements

Conduct UAVFlt Ops

34-5-0041

Conduct Del.Attack

01-2-0211

Execute MLRSFire Msn.06-4-M007

Report Info.01-2-2036.01

-- Territorial integrity securedST

Provide Strategic DirectionTo Theater Forces ST 5.4

Deploy forces to Theater

ST 1

Control Strat.Significant areas ST 1.6

-- Capital isolated (ISOLATE)OP

Provide Indicators& Warnings for JOA

OP 2.4.2.1Prepare Plans and Orders

OP 5.3.9

Contol Opnly Sig.Land Area in JOA

OP 1.5.1

Planning / Inter-theater transportationST

CapabilitiesTop

Strategic Direction / IntelSN

Tactical movement, Fires, C2, IntelTAAggregate

Intra-theater transportation, Fires, IntelOP

“Atomic” Capability Elements

Maneuver, Direct FireTAAtomic

“Atomic” Force Elements

FA Bde

HIMARS

AHBMI Bde

CorpsArty

Corps AVBde

CorpsISRCorps UnitsDivisions

CTF

JFACC JFLCC

Bottom

Combatant Cdr Supporting Cmds

Forces

NSA DOS CIAJCS

Framework IllustrationFramework Illustration

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 1818

Task ExplosionTask Explosion

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 1919

Process Group 1a (MDMP) Corps

PG 1b AvnBde/MSCs

PG 1c AHB/Bns

PG

4 Targeting P

rocess P3 A

2C2

PG

7 SE

AD

PG

8 JAA

T

Time (t)

Activity (at Time t)

PG

2 IPB

P2a Pass. Of Lines

PG 9 Engage Enemy

P2b Pass. Of Lines

PG 10 Recover fromAttack

P1 T

act. Mnvr.

PG 6 Preparefor attack

PG

5 Intelligence/Information gathering

PG

3 C2/B

attle Managem

ent/CO

P

PG 1a MDMP Corps

PG

2 Intelligence Prep of B

attlefield

Deep Attack Process GroupDeep Attack Process Group

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 2020

• Start Process Group 1a first.

• PG 2 and PG 3 are continuous and feed intoPG 1a, b, and c

• PG1b, 4 and 5 begin during PG 1a.

• PG’s 4, and 5 are continuous. PG 1c beginsduring PG 1b.

• PG 6 follows PG 1c.

• P1 and P3 begin when PG6 ends and endwhen PG 10 begins.

• PG 7 begins after P1 begins and before P2abegins and ends when P2b ends.

• P2a and PG 8 begin during PG7.

• PG 9 begins after P2a.

• P2b begins after PG 9.

• PG 10 begins after P2b

• Deep Attack Process Group ends when PG10 is complete

MoE: Country of Interest conventional military forcesdelayed long enough for Heavy Division to establishdefensive position blocking progress north to Capital.

PG 10

PG 6

P2b

PG 9

P2a

PG 8

PG 7

P1 P3

PG 4 PG 5

PG 1a

PG 1b

PG 1c

PG 2 PG 3

Deep Attack Process GroupDeep Attack Process Group

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 2121

Relating Mops to MoEsRelating Mops to MoEs

Desired Conditions Not Desired Conditions

Strategic MoE:Rogue government maintains powerRogue government plays up “unprovoked” West attack and gains support for their government through successful world media campaign

Operational MoEs:Hostile country conventional capabilities intactCapitol still under rogue government control

Tactical MoEs:Hostile country conventional forces remain operationalHostile force link-up with rogue government in capitol successful

Deep Attack Results:Hostile country forces not delayed sufficientlyForce XXI Division arrives too late

Strategic MoE:Legitimate government restored to power (Phase III)Territorial security of country of interest ensuredHostile country aggression and involvement in country of interest deterred

Operational MoEs:Hostile country conventional capabilities defeatedCapitol isolated

Tactical MoEs:Hostile country conventional forces defeatedCapitol surrounded

Deep Attack MoE:Hostile country conventional military forces delayedForce XXI Division able to establish defensive position prior to arrival

SuccessfulU

nsuc

cess

ful

Deep Attack

Starting ConditionsStarting Conditions

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 2222

Stating the Problem “the same old Physical Capabilities way”Stating the Problem “the same old Physical Capabilities way”

Mission:• Main Battle Tank closes with and destroys enemy

Stating the Problem “the emerging Mission Capabilities way” Stating the Problem “the emerging Mission Capabilities way”

Key Performance Parameter:• 90% probability of kill at 5000 meters.

Will inevitably constrain the range of solutions to “ the same old… “Monolithic Single-Platform, Mechanically-Integrated Physical Hunter-Killer

Mission:• FCS halts OPFOR advance by drawing the enemy into the open for destruction by anaffordable combination of direct and indirect fires.

Key Performance Parameter:• Prevent OPFOR firing platform closure to lethal firing positions on manned FCSplatforms using awareness, stealth, mobility, and fire.

Will open the range of solutions to consider “ the emerging… “Distributed Multi-Platform, Digitally-Integrated Virtual Hunter-Killer”

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 2323

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 2424

Definition of MeasureDefinition of Measure

• Measures distinguish among varying levels of taskperformance. More than one measure may be specified forany single task.

Task:• OP 2.2.1 Collect Information on Operational SituationMeasures:

SCALESCALE MEASUREMEASURE

Time To retask collection asset

Time Since most current intel. info. was collected

Percent Of collection requirements filled

Percent Of collection reqmts filled by multiple sources

Percent Of targets accurately located

Percent Of targets accurately identified

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 2525

MISSION-BASED TASK STANDARDSMISSION-BASED TASK STANDARDS

Criterion Scale Measure

km x km sector search areaminute sector search timepercent probability of detecting threatpercent false alarm rate

*e.g.; Collect Information on Operational Situation (OP2.2.1)

1005

901

Standards express the degree to which (how well)a military organization or force must perform a task* under a specified set

of conditions.

A criterion defines acceptable levels of performance for a measure and isoften expressed as a minimum acceptable level of performance.

Standard:

03/14/200303/14/2003Page Page 2626

C4ISR Architecture FrameworkC4ISR Architecture Framework::Operational ArchitectureOperational Architecture captures mission requirements captures mission requirements

• Operational Concept Graphic• Node Connectivity Description• Operational Info Exchange Matrix

• Operational Concept Graphic• Node Connectivity Description• Operational Info Exchange Matrix

Essential Content

Source: C4ISR Architecture Framework, Version 2.0, 18 Dec ‘97

The operational architecture view is a description of the tasks and activities, operational elements, andinformation flows required to accomplish or support a military operation.

The operational architecture view is a description of the tasks and activities, operational elements, andinformation flows required to accomplish or support a military operation.