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Mr. Massimo M BeberSenior TutorCollege Lecturer in Economics
Sidney Sussex CollegeCambridge CB2 3HU
[email protected]://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/mb65
International Political Economy
In Historical PerspectiveFINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/mb65/mstir-2011
Institute of Continuing Education - Centre of International Studies
A Generational Perspective
The evolution of economic thinking can be illustrated through the experience of successive generations:
• Current undergraduates - “the return of depression economics” (2007-??)
• Their parents - “the end of history” (1979-2007);
• Their grandparents – “the managed economy” (1945-1973)
Two Hypotheses on finance
• Efficient Markets– Finance “oils the wheels” of the market– It speeds up income convergence at lower cost
in current consumption– Rational expectations ensure stability– Competition empowers rational expectations
• Financial Instability– Expectations intrinsically volatile– Volatility creates real economic damage– This damage can be long-lasting (hysteresis)– Prudential regulation must be strict
“GREED IS GOOD”
“YOU STUPID BOY!”
FROM INTERMEDIATION TO SECURITIZATION
A BRANCH OF NORTHERN ROCK13TH SEPTEMBER 2007
NY-LEHMAN BROTHERS HQ15TH SEPTEMBER 2008
PRUDENTIAL RATIOS IN BANKING
Assets Liabilities
Liquidity Reserves Deposit Liabilities
Government Securities Non-Deposit Liabilities
Loans
Equity (Shareholders’ wealth.
REGULATION: BETWEEN EMH AND FIH
Source: Committee of European Banking Supervisors Annual Report 2004.
Source: Goldman Sachs (2004).
Lt. Gen. Mikhail Kalashnikov with vodka (20th September 2004)
A TOAST TOO EARLY?
THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
• OECD recovery faster than feared– Governments running large deficits– Businesses re-building stocks– Resilience of growth in non-OECD Asia
• Large uncertainty factors remain– Long-term state of government finances– Long-term solvency of financial sector – Inflationary expectations
THE POLICY DEBATE (JULY 2010)
• Fiscal consolidation• Mopping up the emergency money• Re-regulation of the financial system• (Without forgetting) “structural reforms”
(employment legislation, competition policy, public services...)
• And the real question: which is the dog, and which is the tail?
CONCLUSIONS
• The biggest negative shock since the 1930’s• Was initially met by a much bolder
macroeconomic response• Leading to a faster recovery than anticipated• But “the markets”, missing “sound finance”, are
gunning for Greece and other Eurozone members;• Policy-makers may be losing their nerve:• Can Keynes still be the “defunct economist ...
academic scribbler” to enslave them/inspire you/revive public governance?
REFERENCES• Eatwell, John (2004) “International regulation, risk management, and the creation of instability”
(Lecture at the IMF, 1st October 2004)
• Eichengreen, Barry and Kevin O’Rourke (2010) “What do the new data tell us?” (vox.eu posting, accessed July 2010)
• International Monetary Fund (2010) Global Financial Stability Report (April).
• OECD (2010) Economic Outlook no. 87 (May): “General Assessment of the Economic Situation”.
• Rodrik, Dani and Arvind Subramanian (2008) “Why did financial globalisation disappoint?”
• Obstfeld, Maurice and Kenneth Rogoff (2009) “Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Products of Common Causes”
• VOX.EU “The Global Crisis Debate” (various postings by academic economists and professional policy-makers)
OUTPUT VOLATILITY
The business cycle in the industrial world simmered down since the early 1980s (USA), or 1990s (Europe)
Source: Martin and Rowthorn (2004) “Will Stability Last?”, UBS Global Asset Management.
EXCEPTIONALLY “NICE”?
The “Non-Inflationary, Consistently Expansionary” 1990’s were explained in terms of smaller shocks, more flexible markets, and better policies.
LEVERAGE
Source: Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004).
GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
EQUITY PRICES
WORLD EXPORTS
MONETARY POLICY I: INTEREST RATE
and Ben Bernanke. The central bank response has differed globally.Figure 4. Central Bank Discount Rates, Now vs Then (7 country average)
MONETARY POLICY II: QE
Source: OECD (2010a), p. 8.
MARKET CONDITIONS AND PERCEIVED RISKS
FISCAL POLICY
ASSESSING EU SOVEREIGN RISK
Caption: Editor to Charles Dickens: "I wish you would make up your mind Mr. Dickens. Was it the best of times or was it the worst of times? It couldn't possibly have been both."
© 2002 The New Yorker Collection from cartoonbank.com. All Rights Reserved.