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Multi-Hypothesis Structures and Taxonomies for Combat Identification Fusion Tod M. Schuck, J. Bockett Hunter, Daniel D. Wilson September 2004 Copenhagen Denmark Paper #141 9 th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium

Multi-Hypothesis Structures and Taxonomies for Combat ...Multi-Hypothesis Structures and Taxonomies for Combat Identification Fusion Tod M. Schuck, J. Bockett Hunter, Daniel D. Wilson

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  • Multi-Hypothesis Structures and Taxonomies for Combat Identification Fusion

    Tod M. Schuck, J. Bockett Hunter, Daniel D. WilsonSeptember 2004

    Copenhagen DenmarkPaper #141

    9th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium

  • 9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -2Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors

    Agenda

    Presentation Objective

    Architecture Definition for Disparate Information

    Taxonomy f-refinement

    Partition Refinement

    Canonical Mapping

    Response Mapping

    CID Realization of JDL Model

    CID Bayesian Network

    CID Situational Awareness Fusion Expansion

    Conclusions and Future Work

  • 9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -3Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors

    Presentation Objective

    Address movement of information across multiple hypothesis classes

    Relate it to developing the identification of objectsDescribe how it can be combined both within and between JDL levels

    Result will be an information architecture that is naturally adaptive to information regardless of quality, level, specificity

    We want to answer the question, “How can we establish the relationship between information sets such as

    needed for a fusion process????”

  • 9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -4Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors

    An Environment of Disparate Information…

  • 9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -5Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors

    Solution Requires Good Architecture Definition

    Defining architecture requires investigation into detailed taxonomic relationships between information sets and subsequent canonical mappingsSubsequent response mapping can be definedResults can be tied into JDL model

    Taxonomy – a classification scheme for objects with mutually exclusive labels (parallels study of ontologies)

    CID {Friend, Assumed Friend, Hostile, etc.}Nationality {US, Russia, France, Iraq, etc.}Category {Air, Sea, Land, etc.}Platform {Fighter, Bomber, Civil, etc.}Type {F-14, F/A-18, F-22, etc.}Class {F-14A, F/A-18D, etc.}

  • 9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -6Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors

    Taxonomy f-refinement

    Taxonomy A is an f-refinement of taxonomy B if:f is a function such that if then

    where ϕ = empty set BAf →: 21 bb ≠

    ϕ=∩ −− )()( 21

    11 bfbf

    F/A-18A F/A -18B F/A - 18C F/A -18D F/A –18E F/A –18F

    F - 16 F/A-18

    A

    B

    f

    F - 16A F - 16B F - 16C F-16D F/A-18A F/A -18B F/A - 18C F/A -18D F/A –18E F/A –18F

    F - 16 F/A-18

    A

    B

    f

    F - 16A F - 16B F - 16C F-16D

    If a taxonomy of A is an f-refinement of taxonomy B and a ∈A, b ∈ B, and f(a) = b, we say that a is an f-refinement of b

    Example: F/A-18A in the Class taxonomy is a refinement of F/A-18 in the Type taxonomy

  • 9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -7Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors

    Partition Refinement

    Given a set S of objects, a taxonomy imposes a partition on the setEach element of the partition is the set of all elements of S for which a single element of the taxonomy is the appropriate nameExample: an element of the partition imposed on aircraft by the Type taxonomy is the set of all F-15s, all 747s, etc.A taxonomy T1 is a refinement of another taxonomy T2 if the partition imposed by T1 is a refinement of the partition imposed by T2

    F - 16 F/A-

    18 747

    Mig-29

    A340

    F/A-18FF/A -18EF-16A

    F - 16B

    F-16C F-16D

    F/A-18A

    F/A-18D

    F/A-18B

    F/A-18CF - 16

    F/A-18 747

    Mig-29

    A340

    F/A-18FF/A -18EF-16A

    F - 16B

    F-16C F-16D

    F/A-18A

    F/A-18D

    F/A-18B

    F/A-18C

  • 9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -8Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors

    Canonical Mapping

    Canonical mappings provide a way to exploit information about an object from different taxonomies to categorize the object in one of those taxonomies, or in another, completely different, taxonomySet of canonical mappings must be defined between any two related taxonomies

    T 1

    T 3

    T 4

    T 2

    T 5

    T 6

    m 1m 2

    m 3

    In the case of a collection of taxonomies that are successive refinements, the canonical mappings reflect the hierarchical nature of the taxonomies themselvesExample: sets T6 and T3 are related through both the mapping m3 and the composite mapping m2*m1 (so not a true canonical mapping)

  • 9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -9Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors

    Response Mapping

    Response mapping is a way to interpret a response with elements from one taxonomy in terms of another taxonomyProvides a means of interpreting a response with elements from more than one taxonomy in the various referenced taxonomies

    Example: let R be a response from a source of information composed of a set of attributes, let the canonical mapping from taxonomy Ti to taxonomy Tj be mij- Each taxonomy potentially has elements that are part of the response (R1 and R2 in the figure), as well as elements that are the images, under a canonical mapping, of elements in other taxonomies (m12(R1), m21(R2),m13(R1), m23(R2)

    m12(R1)

    T 1 T2 T3

    R R2R1

    m12m23

    m13

    m12(R1) m13(R1)

    m23(R2)

    m21

    m12(R1)m21(R2)m12(R1)

    T 1 T2 T3

    R R2R1

    m12m23

    m13

    m12(R1) m13(R1)

    m23(R2)

    m21

    m12(R1)m21(R2)m12(R1)m12(R1)

    T 1 T2 T3

    R R2R1

    m12m23

    m13

    m12(R1) m13(R1)

    m23(R2)

    m21

  • 9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -10Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors

    JDL Model and CID Realization

    JDL Model CID Implementation

  • 9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -11Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors

    A priori CID Bayesian Network (Level 1)

    IDF 1 4 AF 1 4 BF 1 4 DF 1 6 AF 1 6 BF 1 6 CF 1 6 DF A 1 8 A CF A 1 8 B DF A 1 8 EF A 1 8 FB o e in g 7 3 7 2 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 3 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 4 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 5 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 7 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 8 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 9 0 0

    8 .7 80 .5 70 .5 72 0 .03 .4 02 9 .51 5 .31 2 .94 .0 00 .4 30 .4 30 .3 20 .5 00 .6 51 .1 40 .5 00 .4 20 .5 6

    T yp eF 1 4F 1 6F A 1 8B o e in g 7 3 7

    9 .9 26 8 .21 7 .84 .1 0

    C a te g o r yA ir 1 0 0

    C la s sF 1 4 AF 1 4 BF 1 4 DF 1 6 AF 1 6 BF 1 6 CF 1 6 DF A 1 8 A CF A 1 8 B DF A 1 8 EF A 1 8 FB o e in g 7 3 7 2 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 3 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 4 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 5 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 7 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 8 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 9 0 0

    8 .7 80 .5 70 .5 72 0 .03 .4 02 9 .51 5 .31 2 .94 .0 00 .4 30 .4 30 .3 20 .5 00 .6 51 .1 40 .5 00 .4 20 .5 6

    N a t io n a lity U S B e lg iu m D e n m a rk E g y p t In d o n e s ia Is ra e l N e th e r la n d s N o rw a y P a k is ta n P o rtu g a l S in g a p o re T a iw a n T h a ila n d V e n e z u e la B a h ra in G re e c e K o re a T u rk e y U n ite d A ra b . . . C a n a d a A u s tra l ia K u w a it F in la n d S w itz e r la n d M a la y s ia I ra n A rg e n t in a C h in a E n g la n d J a p a n P o la n d G e rm a n y P h il lip in e s M o ro c c o S a u d iA ra b ia S w e d e n A fr ic a B ra z il F ra n c e S p a in

    6 7 .6 0 0 0

    0 .2 5 3 0 .9

    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

    1 .2 6

    P la tfo rmF ig h te rC o m m e rc ia l

    9 5 .94 .1 0

    Given a-priori state of universe for F-14, F-16, F/A-18 and Boeing 737 aircraft

    Shaded areas (Nationality and Platform) represent where new info will be inputted

  • 9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -12Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors

    A priori CID Bayesian Network (Level 1)BN after new sensor inputs:

    Fighter (0.85)COM Air (0.15)Israel (0.7)US (0.1)Indonesia (0.1)Spain (0.1)

    ID

    F 1 4 AF 1 4 BF 1 4 DF 1 6 AF 1 6 BF 1 6 CF 1 6 DF A 1 8 A CF A 1 8 B DF A 1 8 EF A 1 8 FB o e in g 7 3 7 2 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 3 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 4 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 5 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 7 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 8 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 9 0 0

    7 .1 10 .4 10 .4 11 7 .34 .0 72 3 .46 .1 01 2 .24 .0 70 .3 00 .3 02 .0 32 .0 33 .0 59 .1 52 .0 33 .0 53 .0 5

    T yp eF 1 4F 1 6F A 1 8B o e in g 7 3 7

    7 .9 35 0 .81 6 .92 4 .4

    C a te g o r yA ir 1 0 0

    C la s sF 1 4 AF 1 4 BF 1 4 DF 1 6 AF 1 6 BF 1 6 CF 1 6 DF A 1 8 A CF A 1 8 B DF A 1 8 EF A 1 8 FB o e in g 7 3 7 2 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 3 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 4 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 5 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 7 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 8 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 9 0 0

    7 .1 10 .4 10 .4 11 7 .34 .0 72 3 .46 .1 01 2 .24 .0 70 .3 00 .3 02 .0 32 .0 33 .0 59 .1 52 .0 33 .0 53 .0 5

    N a t io n a l it y U S B e lg iu m D e n m a rk E g y p t In d o n e s ia Is ra e l N e th e r la n d s N o rw a y P a k is ta n P o r tu g a l S in g a p o re T a iw a n T h a ila n d V e n e z u e la B a h ra in G re e c e K o re a T u rk e y U n ite d A ra b . . . C a n a d a A u s tra lia K u w a it F in la n d S w itz e r la n d M a la y s ia I ra n A rg e n t in a C h in a E n g la n d J a p a n P o la n d G e rm a n y P h il lip in e s M o ro c c o S a u d iA ra b ia S w e d e n A fr ic a B ra z il F ra n c e S p a in

    6 1 .4 2 .0 9 0 .8 9 2 .6 5 0 .3 3 3 .2 0 3 .2 4 0 .8 9 0 .9 4 0 .2 1 0 .6 8 1 .7 8 0 .7 4 0 .2 5 0 .2 6 1 .8 2 2 .2 6 3 .3 4 1 .0 1 1 .6 3 1 .5 1 0 .4 9 0 .7 0 0 .3 7 0 .6 0 0 .8 4 0 .1 8 0 .4 3 0 .4 3 .0 6 5 0 .2 1 0 .8 3 .0 5 6 0 .3 7 0 .1 6 1 .0 4 0 .1 7 0 .6 2 0 .3 7 0 .9 0

    P la t fo rmF ig h te rC o m m e rc ia l

    7 5 .62 4 .4

  • 9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -13Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors

    CID Situational Awareness (SA) Fusion Expansion

    Level 1 SA: Perception of the environmental elements – The identification of key elements of “events” that, in combination, serve to define the situation

    JDL – numeric processing of tactical componentsSA – symbolic processing of these entities

    Level 2 SA: Comprehension of the current situation – This combines level 1 events into a comprehensive holistic pattern (or tactical situation)

    JDL and SA virtually identicalLevel 3 SA: Projection of future status – Projection of the current situation into the future, so as to predict the course of an evolving tactical situation

    SA more general than JDL, includes projection of ownship/aircraft/etc., and friendly intent

  • 9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -14Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors

    Tactical Elements Employed by Fusion Level

    What?

    Level 1: Object Refinement

    Where?

    Who?

    Level 2: Situation Refinement

    When?

    What if?

    Level 3: Threat Refinement

    Why?Ph

    ysica

    l Obj

    ects

    Even

    ts

    Thre

    at En

    viron

    men

    t, En

    emy

    Tacti

    cs, &

    Thr

    eat B

    ehav

    iors

    Enem

    y doc

    trine

    ,

    objec

    tives

    & ca

    pabil

    ity

    Frien

    dly vu

    lnera

    bilit

    ies

    and m

    ission

    s

    individual

    organizations

    Beha

    viora

    l Obj

    ects

    tactical elements

    local

    global

    local

    global

    specific

    aggregatedoptions

    needs

  • 9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -15Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors

    Proposed Threat Evaluation Tool

    I&WIndicators & Warnings

    Threat Assessmentstate, confidence, rationale, & source

    Intent Determinationstate, confidence, rationale, & source

    “Impact” Assessment (Threat Evaluation)

    “Intent” Determination (Mission, Activity)

    Alert Generation

    “Trigger” ThresholdsCID Mission Planning (IPB)

    HypothesisManager

    Flight plans, FAA updates, ADS-B

    Anticipated scenarios, threats and environments

    Defensive missions, resources, & assets

    Courses of ActionAssessment/

    Comprehension

    Predictive Profiling

    Threat Assess.Assessment/ Comprehension

    Impact Modeling

    Hypothesis Generation/ Refinement

    Hypothesis Generation/ Refinement

    Hypotheses on “Intent” (mission, activity, etc.)

    Impact Proj.

    Track Fusion

    CID Fusion

    JDL Level 1 Hypotheses

    JDL Level 2 Hypotheses

    Capability & effectiveness of classDesign mission of class

    Source of class

    Source of ID

    Goals of ID

    Knowledge Base

    Initial Hypothesis Generation

    Initial Hypothesis Generation

    “Mission” Recognition

    Object Behaviors “Event”

    Recognition

    “Object” Aggregation

    Domain of Level 3

    Fusion

    I&WIndicators & Warnings

    Threat Assessmentstate, confidence, rationale, & source

    Intent Determinationstate, confidence, rationale, & source

    “Impact” Assessment (Threat Evaluation)

    “Intent” Determination (Mission, Activity)

    Alert Generation

    “Trigger” ThresholdsCID Mission Planning (IPB)

    HypothesisManager

    Flight plans, FAA updates, ADS-B

    Anticipated scenarios, threats and environments

    Defensive missions, resources, & assets

    Courses of ActionAssessment/

    Comprehension

    Predictive Profiling

    Threat Assess.Assessment/ Comprehension

    Impact Modeling

    Hypothesis Generation/ Refinement

    Hypothesis Generation/ Refinement

    Hypotheses on “Intent” (mission, activity, etc.)

    Impact Proj.

    Track Fusion

    CID Fusion

    JDL Level 1 Hypotheses

    JDL Level 2 Hypotheses

    Capability & effectiveness of classDesign mission of class

    Source of class

    Source of ID

    Goals of ID

    Knowledge Base

    Initial Hypothesis Generation

    Initial Hypothesis Generation

    “Mission” Recognition

    Object Behaviors “Event”

    Recognition

    “Object” Aggregation

    Domain of Level 3

    Fusion

  • 9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -16Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors

    Conclusions and Future Work

    Contextual relationship of information is paramountFusion process must incorporate these relationshipsCID information wrt context, time, timeliness, quantity, and quality must be knownFuture work:

    Metrics for information value, completeness, and costs of decisions can be developed and integratedContextual reasoning leading to predictive SA

  • 9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -17Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors

    Author Information

    Tod Schuck is a Lead Member of the Engineering Staff at Lockheed Martin MS2, Moorestown, NJ. He is the recipient of numerous awards for his technical work including the ‘01 Lockheed Martin MS2 Author of the Year, finalist for best paper by OASD C3I at the 7th International Command and Control Research Technology Symposium (ICCRTS) ‘02, best paper (2nd place) IEEE National Aerospace and Electronics Conference (NAECON) ‘00, and a group award winner of Vice President Al Gore’s “Silver Hammer”Award for Extraordinary Effort for Changing the Way That Government Does Business (July ‘97) as the technical lead for the Mk 17 NATOSeaSparrow radar SDP. His areas of expertise are in identification sensor design and development, fusion algorithm development, information architecture design; and requirements generation, and testing. He holds a BSEE from Georgia Tech, an MSEE from Florida Tech, and is pursuing a Ph.D. from Stevens Institute of Technology in Systems Engineering.

    J. Bockett Hunter is a Senior Member of the Engineering Staff at Lockheed-Martin MS2, Moorestown, NJ. He has been on the faculty of Indiana University, worked on Navy operations research problems, and a wide variety of intelligence systems. His areas of expertise include algorithm development, systems engineering for very large systems including system concept definition, requirements development, design, and testing. He holds a BS in mathematics from Caltech and an MA in mathematics from Indiana University.

    Daniel D. Wilson is a Principal Systems Engineer at Lockheed-Martin MS2, Burlington, MA. He has worked on Military Operations Research problems in support of numerous DoD programs. His areas of expertise include C4ISR systems, operations analysis, knowledge fusion, predictive situational awareness, dynamic replanning strategy development, collaborative mission planning, system effectiveness modeling, decision analysis, risk analysis, and cost estimation. He holds a BS in Computational Mathematics from the University of Vermont and an MS in Operations Research from Stanford University.

    [email protected]@lmco.com

    [email protected]