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Multi-Hypothesis Structures and Taxonomies for Combat Identification Fusion
Tod M. Schuck, J. Bockett Hunter, Daniel D. WilsonSeptember 2004
Copenhagen DenmarkPaper #141
9th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium
9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -2Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors
Agenda
Presentation Objective
Architecture Definition for Disparate Information
Taxonomy f-refinement
Partition Refinement
Canonical Mapping
Response Mapping
CID Realization of JDL Model
CID Bayesian Network
CID Situational Awareness Fusion Expansion
Conclusions and Future Work
9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -3Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors
Presentation Objective
Address movement of information across multiple hypothesis classes
Relate it to developing the identification of objectsDescribe how it can be combined both within and between JDL levels
Result will be an information architecture that is naturally adaptive to information regardless of quality, level, specificity
We want to answer the question, “How can we establish the relationship between information sets such as
needed for a fusion process????”
9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -4Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors
An Environment of Disparate Information…
9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -5Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors
Solution Requires Good Architecture Definition
Defining architecture requires investigation into detailed taxonomic relationships between information sets and subsequent canonical mappingsSubsequent response mapping can be definedResults can be tied into JDL model
Taxonomy – a classification scheme for objects with mutually exclusive labels (parallels study of ontologies)
CID {Friend, Assumed Friend, Hostile, etc.}Nationality {US, Russia, France, Iraq, etc.}Category {Air, Sea, Land, etc.}Platform {Fighter, Bomber, Civil, etc.}Type {F-14, F/A-18, F-22, etc.}Class {F-14A, F/A-18D, etc.}
9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -6Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors
Taxonomy f-refinement
Taxonomy A is an f-refinement of taxonomy B if:f is a function such that if then
where ϕ = empty set BAf →: 21 bb ≠
ϕ=∩ −− )()( 21
11 bfbf
F/A-18A F/A -18B F/A - 18C F/A -18D F/A –18E F/A –18F
F - 16 F/A-18
A
B
f
F - 16A F - 16B F - 16C F-16D F/A-18A F/A -18B F/A - 18C F/A -18D F/A –18E F/A –18F
F - 16 F/A-18
A
B
f
F - 16A F - 16B F - 16C F-16D
If a taxonomy of A is an f-refinement of taxonomy B and a ∈A, b ∈ B, and f(a) = b, we say that a is an f-refinement of b
Example: F/A-18A in the Class taxonomy is a refinement of F/A-18 in the Type taxonomy
9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -7Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors
Partition Refinement
Given a set S of objects, a taxonomy imposes a partition on the setEach element of the partition is the set of all elements of S for which a single element of the taxonomy is the appropriate nameExample: an element of the partition imposed on aircraft by the Type taxonomy is the set of all F-15s, all 747s, etc.A taxonomy T1 is a refinement of another taxonomy T2 if the partition imposed by T1 is a refinement of the partition imposed by T2
F - 16 F/A-
18 747
Mig-29
A340
F/A-18FF/A -18EF-16A
F - 16B
F-16C F-16D
F/A-18A
F/A-18D
F/A-18B
F/A-18CF - 16
F/A-18 747
Mig-29
A340
F/A-18FF/A -18EF-16A
F - 16B
F-16C F-16D
F/A-18A
F/A-18D
F/A-18B
F/A-18C
9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -8Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors
Canonical Mapping
Canonical mappings provide a way to exploit information about an object from different taxonomies to categorize the object in one of those taxonomies, or in another, completely different, taxonomySet of canonical mappings must be defined between any two related taxonomies
T 1
T 3
T 4
T 2
T 5
T 6
m 1m 2
m 3
In the case of a collection of taxonomies that are successive refinements, the canonical mappings reflect the hierarchical nature of the taxonomies themselvesExample: sets T6 and T3 are related through both the mapping m3 and the composite mapping m2*m1 (so not a true canonical mapping)
9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -9Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors
Response Mapping
Response mapping is a way to interpret a response with elements from one taxonomy in terms of another taxonomyProvides a means of interpreting a response with elements from more than one taxonomy in the various referenced taxonomies
Example: let R be a response from a source of information composed of a set of attributes, let the canonical mapping from taxonomy Ti to taxonomy Tj be mij- Each taxonomy potentially has elements that are part of the response (R1 and R2 in the figure), as well as elements that are the images, under a canonical mapping, of elements in other taxonomies (m12(R1), m21(R2),m13(R1), m23(R2)
m12(R1)
T 1 T2 T3
R R2R1
m12m23
m13
m12(R1) m13(R1)
m23(R2)
m21
m12(R1)m21(R2)m12(R1)
T 1 T2 T3
R R2R1
m12m23
m13
m12(R1) m13(R1)
m23(R2)
m21
m12(R1)m21(R2)m12(R1)m12(R1)
T 1 T2 T3
R R2R1
m12m23
m13
m12(R1) m13(R1)
m23(R2)
m21
9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -10Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors
JDL Model and CID Realization
JDL Model CID Implementation
9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -11Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors
A priori CID Bayesian Network (Level 1)
IDF 1 4 AF 1 4 BF 1 4 DF 1 6 AF 1 6 BF 1 6 CF 1 6 DF A 1 8 A CF A 1 8 B DF A 1 8 EF A 1 8 FB o e in g 7 3 7 2 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 3 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 4 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 5 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 7 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 8 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 9 0 0
8 .7 80 .5 70 .5 72 0 .03 .4 02 9 .51 5 .31 2 .94 .0 00 .4 30 .4 30 .3 20 .5 00 .6 51 .1 40 .5 00 .4 20 .5 6
T yp eF 1 4F 1 6F A 1 8B o e in g 7 3 7
9 .9 26 8 .21 7 .84 .1 0
C a te g o r yA ir 1 0 0
C la s sF 1 4 AF 1 4 BF 1 4 DF 1 6 AF 1 6 BF 1 6 CF 1 6 DF A 1 8 A CF A 1 8 B DF A 1 8 EF A 1 8 FB o e in g 7 3 7 2 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 3 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 4 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 5 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 7 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 8 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 9 0 0
8 .7 80 .5 70 .5 72 0 .03 .4 02 9 .51 5 .31 2 .94 .0 00 .4 30 .4 30 .3 20 .5 00 .6 51 .1 40 .5 00 .4 20 .5 6
N a t io n a lity U S B e lg iu m D e n m a rk E g y p t In d o n e s ia Is ra e l N e th e r la n d s N o rw a y P a k is ta n P o rtu g a l S in g a p o re T a iw a n T h a ila n d V e n e z u e la B a h ra in G re e c e K o re a T u rk e y U n ite d A ra b . . . C a n a d a A u s tra l ia K u w a it F in la n d S w itz e r la n d M a la y s ia I ra n A rg e n t in a C h in a E n g la n d J a p a n P o la n d G e rm a n y P h il lip in e s M o ro c c o S a u d iA ra b ia S w e d e n A fr ic a B ra z il F ra n c e S p a in
6 7 .6 0 0 0
0 .2 5 3 0 .9
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2 6
P la tfo rmF ig h te rC o m m e rc ia l
9 5 .94 .1 0
Given a-priori state of universe for F-14, F-16, F/A-18 and Boeing 737 aircraft
Shaded areas (Nationality and Platform) represent where new info will be inputted
9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -12Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors
A priori CID Bayesian Network (Level 1)BN after new sensor inputs:
Fighter (0.85)COM Air (0.15)Israel (0.7)US (0.1)Indonesia (0.1)Spain (0.1)
ID
F 1 4 AF 1 4 BF 1 4 DF 1 6 AF 1 6 BF 1 6 CF 1 6 DF A 1 8 A CF A 1 8 B DF A 1 8 EF A 1 8 FB o e in g 7 3 7 2 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 3 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 4 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 5 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 7 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 8 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 9 0 0
7 .1 10 .4 10 .4 11 7 .34 .0 72 3 .46 .1 01 2 .24 .0 70 .3 00 .3 02 .0 32 .0 33 .0 59 .1 52 .0 33 .0 53 .0 5
T yp eF 1 4F 1 6F A 1 8B o e in g 7 3 7
7 .9 35 0 .81 6 .92 4 .4
C a te g o r yA ir 1 0 0
C la s sF 1 4 AF 1 4 BF 1 4 DF 1 6 AF 1 6 BF 1 6 CF 1 6 DF A 1 8 A CF A 1 8 B DF A 1 8 EF A 1 8 FB o e in g 7 3 7 2 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 3 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 4 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 5 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 7 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 8 0 0B o e in g 7 3 7 9 0 0
7 .1 10 .4 10 .4 11 7 .34 .0 72 3 .46 .1 01 2 .24 .0 70 .3 00 .3 02 .0 32 .0 33 .0 59 .1 52 .0 33 .0 53 .0 5
N a t io n a l it y U S B e lg iu m D e n m a rk E g y p t In d o n e s ia Is ra e l N e th e r la n d s N o rw a y P a k is ta n P o r tu g a l S in g a p o re T a iw a n T h a ila n d V e n e z u e la B a h ra in G re e c e K o re a T u rk e y U n ite d A ra b . . . C a n a d a A u s tra lia K u w a it F in la n d S w itz e r la n d M a la y s ia I ra n A rg e n t in a C h in a E n g la n d J a p a n P o la n d G e rm a n y P h il lip in e s M o ro c c o S a u d iA ra b ia S w e d e n A fr ic a B ra z il F ra n c e S p a in
6 1 .4 2 .0 9 0 .8 9 2 .6 5 0 .3 3 3 .2 0 3 .2 4 0 .8 9 0 .9 4 0 .2 1 0 .6 8 1 .7 8 0 .7 4 0 .2 5 0 .2 6 1 .8 2 2 .2 6 3 .3 4 1 .0 1 1 .6 3 1 .5 1 0 .4 9 0 .7 0 0 .3 7 0 .6 0 0 .8 4 0 .1 8 0 .4 3 0 .4 3 .0 6 5 0 .2 1 0 .8 3 .0 5 6 0 .3 7 0 .1 6 1 .0 4 0 .1 7 0 .6 2 0 .3 7 0 .9 0
P la t fo rmF ig h te rC o m m e rc ia l
7 5 .62 4 .4
9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -13Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors
CID Situational Awareness (SA) Fusion Expansion
Level 1 SA: Perception of the environmental elements – The identification of key elements of “events” that, in combination, serve to define the situation
JDL – numeric processing of tactical componentsSA – symbolic processing of these entities
Level 2 SA: Comprehension of the current situation – This combines level 1 events into a comprehensive holistic pattern (or tactical situation)
JDL and SA virtually identicalLevel 3 SA: Projection of future status – Projection of the current situation into the future, so as to predict the course of an evolving tactical situation
SA more general than JDL, includes projection of ownship/aircraft/etc., and friendly intent
9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -14Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors
Tactical Elements Employed by Fusion Level
What?
Level 1: Object Refinement
Where?
Who?
Level 2: Situation Refinement
When?
What if?
Level 3: Threat Refinement
Why?Ph
ysica
l Obj
ects
Even
ts
Thre
at En
viron
men
t, En
emy
Tacti
cs, &
Thr
eat B
ehav
iors
Enem
y doc
trine
,
objec
tives
& ca
pabil
ity
Frien
dly vu
lnera
bilit
ies
and m
ission
s
individual
organizations
Beha
viora
l Obj
ects
tactical elements
local
global
local
global
specific
aggregatedoptions
needs
9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -15Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors
Proposed Threat Evaluation Tool
I&WIndicators & Warnings
Threat Assessmentstate, confidence, rationale, & source
Intent Determinationstate, confidence, rationale, & source
“Impact” Assessment (Threat Evaluation)
“Intent” Determination (Mission, Activity)
Alert Generation
“Trigger” ThresholdsCID Mission Planning (IPB)
HypothesisManager
Flight plans, FAA updates, ADS-B
Anticipated scenarios, threats and environments
Defensive missions, resources, & assets
Courses of ActionAssessment/
Comprehension
Predictive Profiling
Threat Assess.Assessment/ Comprehension
Impact Modeling
Hypothesis Generation/ Refinement
Hypothesis Generation/ Refinement
Hypotheses on “Intent” (mission, activity, etc.)
Impact Proj.
Track Fusion
CID Fusion
JDL Level 1 Hypotheses
JDL Level 2 Hypotheses
Capability & effectiveness of classDesign mission of class
Source of class
Source of ID
Goals of ID
Knowledge Base
Initial Hypothesis Generation
Initial Hypothesis Generation
“Mission” Recognition
Object Behaviors “Event”
Recognition
“Object” Aggregation
Domain of Level 3
Fusion
I&WIndicators & Warnings
Threat Assessmentstate, confidence, rationale, & source
Intent Determinationstate, confidence, rationale, & source
“Impact” Assessment (Threat Evaluation)
“Intent” Determination (Mission, Activity)
Alert Generation
“Trigger” ThresholdsCID Mission Planning (IPB)
HypothesisManager
Flight plans, FAA updates, ADS-B
Anticipated scenarios, threats and environments
Defensive missions, resources, & assets
Courses of ActionAssessment/
Comprehension
Predictive Profiling
Threat Assess.Assessment/ Comprehension
Impact Modeling
Hypothesis Generation/ Refinement
Hypothesis Generation/ Refinement
Hypotheses on “Intent” (mission, activity, etc.)
Impact Proj.
Track Fusion
CID Fusion
JDL Level 1 Hypotheses
JDL Level 2 Hypotheses
Capability & effectiveness of classDesign mission of class
Source of class
Source of ID
Goals of ID
Knowledge Base
Initial Hypothesis Generation
Initial Hypothesis Generation
“Mission” Recognition
Object Behaviors “Event”
Recognition
“Object” Aggregation
Domain of Level 3
Fusion
9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -16Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors
Conclusions and Future Work
Contextual relationship of information is paramountFusion process must incorporate these relationshipsCID information wrt context, time, timeliness, quantity, and quality must be knownFuture work:
Metrics for information value, completeness, and costs of decisions can be developed and integratedContextual reasoning leading to predictive SA
9th ICCRTS Sept 2004 paper #141 -17Copyright Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors
Author Information
Tod Schuck is a Lead Member of the Engineering Staff at Lockheed Martin MS2, Moorestown, NJ. He is the recipient of numerous awards for his technical work including the ‘01 Lockheed Martin MS2 Author of the Year, finalist for best paper by OASD C3I at the 7th International Command and Control Research Technology Symposium (ICCRTS) ‘02, best paper (2nd place) IEEE National Aerospace and Electronics Conference (NAECON) ‘00, and a group award winner of Vice President Al Gore’s “Silver Hammer”Award for Extraordinary Effort for Changing the Way That Government Does Business (July ‘97) as the technical lead for the Mk 17 NATOSeaSparrow radar SDP. His areas of expertise are in identification sensor design and development, fusion algorithm development, information architecture design; and requirements generation, and testing. He holds a BSEE from Georgia Tech, an MSEE from Florida Tech, and is pursuing a Ph.D. from Stevens Institute of Technology in Systems Engineering.
J. Bockett Hunter is a Senior Member of the Engineering Staff at Lockheed-Martin MS2, Moorestown, NJ. He has been on the faculty of Indiana University, worked on Navy operations research problems, and a wide variety of intelligence systems. His areas of expertise include algorithm development, systems engineering for very large systems including system concept definition, requirements development, design, and testing. He holds a BS in mathematics from Caltech and an MA in mathematics from Indiana University.
Daniel D. Wilson is a Principal Systems Engineer at Lockheed-Martin MS2, Burlington, MA. He has worked on Military Operations Research problems in support of numerous DoD programs. His areas of expertise include C4ISR systems, operations analysis, knowledge fusion, predictive situational awareness, dynamic replanning strategy development, collaborative mission planning, system effectiveness modeling, decision analysis, risk analysis, and cost estimation. He holds a BS in Computational Mathematics from the University of Vermont and an MS in Operations Research from Stanford University.
[email protected]@lmco.com