Muslim Personal Law, Uniform Civil Code and Judicial

Activism- A Critical Study

SUMMARY THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF LUCKNOW

FOR THE AWARD OF DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Supervisor : Dr. Mohd. Ahmad Associate Professor Faculty of Law, University of Lucknow, Lucknow

Submitted By : Prabodh Kumar Garg

Research ScholarFaculty of Law,

University of Lucknow, Lucknow

FACULTY OF LAWUNIVERSITY OF LUCKNOW,

LUCKNOW, U.P. (INDIA)

2014

"Muslim Personal Law, Uniform Civil Code & Judicial Activism: A Critical Study"

Uniform Civil Code of India is a term referring to the concept of an overarching Civil Law Code in India. A uniform civil code administers the same set of secular civil laws to govern all people (citizen as well as non-citizen) irrespective of their religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of these. Article 44 of the Constitution legislate a commitment to the gradual establishment of legal uniformity in India, the aim being that the state "shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India." This directive is considered a threat by elements of religious minority communities, who continue to be governed by their own personal laws in family matters, as applied within the superstructure of the India Legal System.

The question of Uniform Civil Code is a very-very sensitive as well as subjective and diversified issue considering the fact that India is a country which has a multifarious race, caste and community. The law is relating to marriage, divorce, maintenance, guardianship and succession governing the Hindus, Muslims and Christians etc., is different and varies from one religion to other. There are different laws like the Hindu Marriage Act; the Hindu Succession Act; the Hindu Minority and Guardian ship Act, the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act governing the personal matters of Hindus. The Shariat Act, The Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act and the Muslim Women (protection of Rights on Divorce) Act etc., which are based on the tenets of Holy Quran, govern the personal matters of Muslims. Similarly the Indian Christians are governed by the Indian Christian Marriage Act, the Indian Divorce Act and the Cochin Christian Succession Act etc. Parsis are governed by a different set of laws Thus it is clear that there is no uniformity in all personal laws as they confer unequal rights depending on the religion and the gender. The common areas covered by a civil code include laws related to acquisitions

and administration of property, marriage, divorce and adoption. This term is used in India where the Constitution of India attempts to set a uniform civil code for its citizens as a Directive Principle, or a goal to be achieved.1

In the early Hindu history, religion came to be closely associated with the growth of law, for the simple reason that men feared God before they gave authority to kings. Divine sanction, rather than kingly edicts was more powerful in enforcing such laws. The laws, the people followed could be called laws of nature being based on custom, ascertained by experience as being the best for community in the long run. In such circumstances it was natural to believe that here existed some supernatural being be it God or a deity at the back of it all. The early Hindu law was at the stage when religion was the governing force and consequently the priest class or the Brahmins enjoyed supremacy and expounded the religion and law. The study of Hindu legal history shows that during Hindu period there was no interference of the State with Hindu law. They enjoyed complete immunity and the whole affairs were regulated by their personal laws.

It is Muslim2jurisprudence which furnishes an examples of complete union of law and religion. "In Islam", says James Bryce, "Law is Religion and Religion is Law, because both have the same source and equal authority being both contained in the same divine revelation."3 Islam claims its jurisdiction over every aspect of a Muslim's life. Its attitude towards non-Muslims or unbelievers was that they must either be converted or subjugated or killed. Arab pagans were given a choice only between conversion and death.4 The Indians, however, could not be given the same treatment. The task of killing or converting the vast multitude of

1 . The Lex Loci Report on October 1840 emphasized the importance and necessity of uniformity in codification of Indian law relating to crimes, evidences, contract etc., but it is recommended that personal law of Hindis and Muslims should be kept outside such codification.

2 Asaf A. A. Fyzee, Outlines of Mohammedan law 1-2 (3rd., 1964). 3 James Bryce, 2 Studies in History and Jurisprudence 237 (1901), Said Ramadau,

Islamic Law. Its Scope and Equity 15-16, 27-30, 42-47 (1961). 4 Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law 130 (1964).

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non-Muslim population of India could not be achieved owing to its impossibility.5 Islamic law interfered with non-Muslims only were they were directly or indirectly involved with Muslims. A good illustration is criminal law where Islamic principles applied alike to Muslims and non-Muslims.6

In a multicultural society like India, Britishers consolidated their position and they completely changed the criminal law. They introduced their own system to deal with the various matters of civil law. They did not want to hurt the religious susceptibilities of the Indians. Interference in religious matters, they considered, was not at all conducive to their friendly trade with Hindus and Muslims or their political stability. Warren Hastings enacted certain schemes for the first time in 1772. Provisions were made that in all suits regarding inheritance, marriage, caste and other religious usage and institution, the laws of the Koran and Shastras were to be applied, in respect of the Muslims and Hindus respectively.7 Warren Hasting's policy of preserving Hindu and Muslim law was supported by the British as a whole.

The legal system of India in the early nineteenth century was one of confusion and chaos. Hindus and Muslims were governed by their own laws, non-Hindus and non-Muslims were governed by the other set of laws. The purpose of codification appears to have been to achieve certainty and uniformity. Lord Macaulay was made the law member and subsequently the Chairman of the First Law Commission of India set up in 1833.

In 1856, the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act legalizing remarriage of Hindu widow was passed at the instance of a reformist section of the Hindus.8Then came the Hindu Women's 5 B.B. Mishra, The Judicial Administration of East India Company in Bengal 1765-

1782, p. 50 (1961) : J. M. Shelat, Secularism – Principles and Application 72 (1972).

6 There were two exception viz., oaths and ordeals. The Muslims had to swear in the name of God and the Hindus had to swear by the cow : Fatwa-a-Alamgiri, Baillie's Digest 748.

7 Tahir Mohammood, An Indian Civil Code and Islamic Law, (1976), p. 53. 8 Krishna Bhagwan Agrawal, "Advisability of Legislating a Uniform Indian

Marriage Code," In Mohammad Iman, ed., Minorities and the Law, (1972). p. 443.

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Right to Property Act, 1937. In 1929 Child Marriage Restraint Act was passed to discourage the practice of existing child marriages.

At this time three Acts which affected Muslim as well are the Caste Disabilities Removal Act, 1850, the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929, and Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 were passed.

The three central statutes were also passed during the British period, they are- The Wakf Act, 1913, the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application, 1937, and the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939. In 1937, the Muslim Personal Law (Shari'at) Application Act was passed with a view to abrogate these customs and bring Muslim communities under the Muslim law.9

In the chapter legislative history of personal laws in India, the discussion has been meticulously arranged into three heads, namely-Hindu Law and the Legislature, Muslim Law and the Legislature and Christian and Parsi Laws and the Legislature. The Central Government however, passed the Hindu Code Bill which is divided into different parts in the form of four different Acts, Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956, and Hindu Succession Act, 1956; Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956; and Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956.

In the realm of Muslim personal law, the legislative activity appears to be extremely limited; and that too on the initiative or demand of the Muslim community. In both pre and post-Independence era, the attitude to the legislature towards the Muslim personal law was of ‘non-interference’. The Shariat Act, 1937, came into operation on 7th October, 1937, and is applicable throughout India. It applies to every Muslim of whatever sect or school. One provision of the Act lists those matters which among Indian Muslims, shall invariably be governed by the Muslim personal law.10 There are; (i) marriage, (ii) dissolution of marriage

9 M.P. Jain, Indian Constitution Law, N.M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd. Bombay (1987). pp. 617-18.

10 Sec-2 of the Act.

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in any form, (iii) guardianship, (iv) dower, (v) maintenance, (vi) gifts, (vii) trusts, (viii) waqf and (ix) intestate succession (excepting that concerning agricultural lands).11

This Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1865, was based on the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, of England and its principal effect was to make Parsi marriage monogamous.

There is also the Special Marriage Act, 1954, which is a secular code of marriage law of a general nature under which any two Indians irrespective of their religion may marry. A couple married under this law comes to be governed by the Indian Succession Act, 1925.12

As far as the issue of personal laws is concerned, it evoked considerable conflict of opinion amongst the members of the constituent Assembly. It is interesting to note that “whilst all the Muslim speakers favoured continuation of the British policy of neutrality, the Hindu speakers emphasized that the guarantee of religious freedom by draft article 19 did not exclude the jurisdiction of the state in matters of personal law”.13 The Muslim speakers argued that neither of the draft articles 19 and 35 empowered the state to legislate on personal laws.14 Accordingly, article 35 of the draft Constitution provided that “The State shall endavour to secure for citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.”

On 26 January 1950 the Constitution was adopted, incorporating a directive to the state to “Secure for the citizen a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India” and specifying under one or the other Legislative Lists matters traditionally regulated by personal laws.

11 Succession of agricultural lands, being a provincial subject under the Government of India Act, 1935, fell outside the jurisdiction of the central legislature which passed this Act.

12 M.P. Jain, Outlines of Indian Legal History, p. 491. (4th ed. 1981). 13 D.K. Srivastava, Religious Freedom in India, p. 240 (New Delhi, 1982). 14 M.A. Baig Sahib Bahadur’s Speech in the Constituent Assembly, VII Constituent

Assembly Debates p. 543, (1949).

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As far as the legislative powers on the matters relating to personal laws, are concerned, Article 372 of the Constitution is the most important article. The language of article 372 (1) is analogous to section 292 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which also recognized the continued application of “all law in force” then. The Federal Court in United Provinces v. Atiqa,15 had held that the phrase included also non-statutory law including personal laws. Even after the commencement of the Constitution the High Courts of Rajasthan,16 Hyderabad,17 Calcutta,18 Madhya Pradesh,19 and Bombay20 have confirmed the applicability of article 372 to personal laws. It is notable that all the three lists in Schedule VII of the Constitution include even those subjects to which traditionally the personal laws should apply. List III (mentioning subject on which both Parliament and state legislatures can make laws) specifies the following:

(a)Marriage and divorce; infants and minors; adoption; wills, intestacy and succession; joint family and partition; all matters in respect of which parties in judicial proceedings were immediately before the commencement of this Constitution subject toothier personal law.21

(b)Transfer of property other than agricultural land; registration of deeds and documents.22

(c) Charities and charitable institutions, charitable and religious endowments and religious institutions.23

15 AIR 1941 FC 1616 Panch Gujar Kaur v. Amar Singh, AIR 1954 Raj. 100.17 Motibai v. Chanayya, AIR 1954 Hyd. 161. 18 Naresh Bose v. S.N. Deb, AIR 1956 Cal. 222.19 Rao Mote Singh v. Chandrebali, AIR 1956 M.P. 212. 20 Atmaram v. State, AIR 1965 Bom. 9. 21 Entry 5. List – III Schedule VII of the Constitution of India.22 Entry 6. List – III Schedule VII of the Constitution of India.23 Entry 28. List – III Schedule VII of the Constitution of India.

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List II (specifying the subjects on which state legislatures can make law) includes burial and burial grounds,24 “rights in or over land”25 (covering succession to agricultural lands) and administration of justice and organization of courts at the district level.26 In List – I reveal to Muslim law is “pilgrimage to places outside India”27 Under this Provision Parliament can make laws regulating Haj and Ziyarat.

The questions is whether it is permissible under the Constitution that the Muslims, Hindus, Christians, Parsis and Jews of Indian be governed by different sets of religion-based laws relating to marriage and inheritance, etc. Are the personal laws not hit by fundamental rights? The answer to these questions depends on whether the phrase “all laws in force” used in article 13(i) covers personal laws too or not. The history of enactment of the article 13 and some other constitutional provisions (article 19, 25, 44) shows that the Constituent Assembly did not intend to exempt personal laws from the legislative competence the State. The judicial opinion of the two great judges of the time namely late M.C. Chagla and late P.B. Gajendragadkar in Narasu Appa’s case,28 has been dissented from by the eminent scholars like D.D. Basu,29 H.M. Seervai30 and Mohammad Ghause31, who are convinced that all personal laws including their non-statutory parts are hit by article 13(1). The Chagla-Gajendragadkar verdict pronounced in 1952 has, however, been followed, though often silently and without specific reference, by all the higher courts in the country. In its recent decision in Krishan Singh v. Mathura Ahir32, the Supreme Court has categorically ruled that :

24 Entry 10. List – III Schedule VII of the Constitution of India.25 Entry 18. List – III Schedule VII of the Constitution of India.26 Entry 5. List – III Schedule VII of the Constitution of India.27 Entry 20. List – III Schedule VII of the Constitution of India.28 State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali , AIR 1952 Bom. 84.29 Commentary on the Constitution of India, Vol. I, p. 155 (1965). 30 Constitutional Law of India, pp. 254-255 (1968). 31 ‘Personal Law and the Constitution of India’ in T. Mahmood (ed.) Islamic Law

Modern India, pp. 57-58 (1972).32 AIR 1980 SC 707

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“Part III of the Constitution does not touch upon the personal laws.”33

It is interesting to note that recently, the Supreme Court of India in Ahmedabad Women Action Group v. Union of India,34

dismissed three writ petitions which challenged the constitutionally of various provisions of different personal laws on the ground, inter-alia, of being violative of articles 14 and 15. The Court observed that the “questions involved in the case were the issue of State policies with which the court will not ordinarily have any concern.” The same opinion was expressed by the Apex Court in Maharshi Avadhesh v. Union of India.35 The judicial trend, so far, clearly indicates the reluctance of the Courts to determine the constitutionality of various personal laws on the touchstone of articles 14 and 15.

In Ratilal Panchand v. State of Bombay,36 the Supreme Court had held that subject to the restriction which Article 25 imposes, every person has a fundamental rights “not merely to entertain such a religious belief as may be approved of by his judgment or conscience but to exhibit his belief and ideas in such overt acts as are enjoined or sanctioned by his religion…” In another case.37

In Mulla Tahir Saifuddian v. State of Bombay,38 the Supreme Court observed that for the application of Article 25(2)(a) it is necessary to classify religious practices into such as are essentially for a religious character and those which are not. In Durgah Committee v. Hussain,39 it said that whether a religious practice is an essential part of a religion is an objective question to be determined by the court and that the view of religious denomination itself is not final.40 It is in the light of these judicial 33 Krishan Singh v. Mathura Ahir , AIR 1980 SC 712.34 (1997) 3 SCC 573.35 1994 Supp. (1) SCC 713.36 (1954) SCR 105537 Comm. H.R.E. v. Lakshmindra, (1954) SCR 1005.38 AIR 1962 SC 85339 AIR 1961 SC 140240 Durgah Committee v. Hussain , AIR 1961 SC 1415

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decisions that we have to examine the place of personal law as an essential part of Islamic religion, a Muslim will ordinarily give an emphatic affirmative answer. In Sri Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir,41 the Supreme Court held the view that personal law is not law for the purpose of Part III of the Constitution. In T. Sareetha v. Venkatasubbaiah,42 the Andhra Pradesh High Court considered Sec. 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act providing for retention of conjugal rights to the spouses living separately without reasonable justification as violative to personal liberty under Art. 21 of the Constitution. The Court viewed that if unwilling spouse is coerced by State power to cohabit with the other spouse there is violation of right privacy. In Harvinder Kaur v. Hermender Singh,43 the Delhi High Court upheld the constitutional validity of Sec. 9 as a reasonable regulation protecting the institution of marriage in accordance with Art. 21. In Saroj Rani,44 case the Supreme Court affirmed the view of Delhi High Court and rejected the view of Chaudhary J. of A.P. High Court. It is to be remembered that the issue of personal law as law did not figure in these cases.

Social justice means the quality of being fair and just in social relations of human beings.45 This noble quality is attained within the family by eschewing exploitation of the vulnerable members like women and children by the dominant members and by forbidding, the operation of irrational notions and religious beliefs of blind nature, the concept of social justice aims to attain a social arrangement wherein the good things of the society, amenities and responsibilities are justly distributed among the members of the society.46

"Social change means", observes Steven Vago, "modifications of the way people work, rear a family, educate 41 AIR 1980 SC 707. 42 AIR 1983 AP 357. 43 AIR 1984 Del. 66. 44 AIR 1984 SC 1562 45 K, Suibba Rao, Social Justice and Law, p. 1 46 R.W.M. Dias, Jurisprudence pp. 81-82; Also see John Rawis, A Theory of

Justice pp., 3-4 (1972).

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their children, govern themselves, and seek ultimate meaning in life. It also refers to a restructuring of the basic ways in which people in a society relate to each other with regards to government, economics, education, religion, family life, recreation, language, and other activities"47 The equation whether law can and should lead, or whether, it should never do more than cautiously follows changes in society, has been and remains controversial. Despite the debate, modern welfare states, make use of law as "instruments that set off, monitor, or otherwise regulate the fact or pace of social change,"48 Law can shape social institutions directly or indirectly. It can not lead the society, in its own way, to the land of social justice provided that factor resisting social change do not counter-balance the effort of the law. Further, to be successful instrument of social change, law should be free from technical defects and loopholes and should be effective.49

In pursuance of the policy of rendering social justice and economic security to the dependents, Criminal procedure Code provided for obligation of all persons to maintain his/her spouse, minor, children, unmarried daughter and parents who are unable to maintain themselves. The duty of maintenance avoids the problem to moral and material abandonment in the family life. It is purely a secular measure. In Bai Tahira,50 and Shah Bano,51cases the Supreme Court applied Sec. 125 of Cr.PC. providing for the duty of maintenance and the argument that Sec.125 violated the Muslim Personal law and religious freedom of the community were rejected. According to the Court, payment of Mehr and maintenance during iddat period did not absolve the husband from the duty to maintain. About the argument on the

47 Steven Vago, Law and Society pp. 238-239 (1981); Also see B.S. Sinha, Law and Society Social Change p. 16-23 (1983).

48 Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development, Law and Society Review 4 (1) p. 29 cited by Steven Vago.

49 The importance of technical perfection of the legal instrument and efficient handling of it by administrators of law and justice is pointed out by W. Friedman Legal Theory 177 (5th) Ed. 1967).

50 AIR 1979 SC 362 51 AIR 1985 SC 955

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basis of religious freedom, the court viewed that for purpose of secular and welfarist provision like Sec. 125 of Cr.P.C. application of religious principle was irrelevant. Even if the religion provided for otherwise under Art. 24 of the Constitution the State has power to make legislations for social reform in the semi religious matters. However, the court viewed, after elaborate reference to the Muslim religious writings, that Muslim husband wife beyond the iddat period. The court laid emphasis upon the objective of uniform civil Code under Art. 44.

In 1952, the Madras High Court had to face the similar problem when the Madras Hindu (Bigamy and Divorce) Act, 1949, was challenged in Srinvasa Aiyar v. Sarawathi Ammal,52 In this case Section 4 of the said Act was challenged which provide:53

"Notwithstanding any rule of law, custom or usage to the contrary, any marriage solemnized after the commencement of this Act between a man and a woman either of whom has a spouse living at the time of such solemnization shall be void."

In Ayesha Bibi vs. Suboth Chandra Chakravarty,54the Court after considering the position under Mohammadan law, examined if the Hindu law could be administrated in this case.

In Robaba Khanum vs. K. B. Irani,55,Mr. Justice Blagden rejected the alternative plea. He observed :

“The law of India is not Mohammadan law nay more that it is Hindu law or Christian ecclesiastical law, but the Mohammadan law is by virtue of the general law of India the personal law of the minority of Indians, regulating their relations with one another it differs in degree but not in kind, from (say) by the law of the Willingdon Club.”56

52 AIR 1952 Mad. 193 53 Madras Hindu (Bigamy and Divorce) Act, 1949 54 ILR (1945) 2 Cal. 405. 55 I.I.R, (1948), Bomb. 223. 56 I.I.R, (1948), Bomb. 232.

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In another case of Vilayat Raj vs. Sunila,57 the Delhi High Court held that the marriage sought to be dissolved under the Act has to be a Hindu marriage. It can be dissolved only in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It would, therefore, appear that Section 2 of the Hindu Marriage act, 1955 says that this Act applies to any person who is a Hindu.

In Sarla Mudgal vs. Union of India,58 the apex court has adopted a different attitude of the problem relating to inter-personal conflict between Muslim and Hindu. In this case there were four petitions under Article - 32 of the Constitution of India.

In Lily Thomas vs. Union of India,59 there was a lady Sushmita Ghosh, who was the wife of Shri G.C. Ghosh (Mhod. Karim Ghazi) filed a writ petition stating that she was married of shri G.C. Ghosh in accordance’s with the Hindu rites in 1984 and since then they were happily living at Delhi. In 1992,the husband told he wife that she should in her own interest agreement as he had converted to Islam and therefore he would remarry. In fact the husband had embraced Islam and fixed a date to marry – Miss Vaneeta Gupta.

The court in this case observed that for the past several years it has become very common amongst the Hindu male who cannot get a divorce from their first wife, they convert to Muslim religion solely for the purpose of marriage. This practice is invariably adopted by those erring husband who embrace Islam for the purpose of second marriage but again became reconvert so as to retain their rights in the properties etc. and continue their services and all other business in their old name and religion.

Upholding the decision in Saral Mudgal Court Case, the Supreme Court has held that the second marriage of a Hindu husband after conversion to Islam without having his first

57 AIR 1983, Delhi 51 58 (1995) 3 SCC 63559 AIR 2000 SC 1650

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marriage dissolved under law would be invalid, the second marriage would be void in the terms of provisions of Section 494 IPC and the apostate husband would be guilty 7 of the offence under Sec 494 IPC doses not lay down any new law. It cannot be said that the second marriage by a convert male Muslim has been made offence only by judicial pronouncement. The court has only intercepted the existing law which was in force. It is settled principal that of a provision of law vela’s back to the date of law itself and cannot be prospective from the date of the judgment because concededly the court does not legislate but only five an interpretation to an existing law. It cannot therefore be said the decision in Sarla Mudgal case,60 has to be given prospective operation and that the decision cannot be applied to persons who have solemnized marriages violation of the mandate of law prior to the date of judgement.

India is a country of million customs and communities. Everyone thinks that his/her faith and customs are the best. No one wants to consider reforming own system yet wants to worry about others system. UCC is used more often than not as a tool for minority bashing rather than genuine social reforms. Such minority bashing will only make the members of those communities more possessive about their alleged identity and customs thereby further reducing any scope of nurturing UCC in its embryonic stage.

The unfortunate interference and mixing of religions with politics has further complicated the social atmosphere. The political stakes will ensure that no one can enforce a UCC over the multicultural society of India. Instead, interested politicians will only keep the issue of UCC burning to bash their opponents and please their vote banks.

The supporters of Uniform Civil Code and abrogation of the personal laws put forth an argument that such an abrogation of personal laws and imposition of the said code would promote the cause of national integrity. Would they like to explain how the 60 1995 AIR SCW 2326

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different sets of personals laws have obstructed the process of national integration? Hindu code is existing in the form of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Hindu Adoptions and Marriage Act 1956 and is applicable to all Hindus including Sikhs, Jains, Budhists, Lingayats, Aryasmaj is etc, but we find this code has not unified Hindus and the case of national integration could not be promoted to a desired extent during last Sixty seven years.

The idea of a uniform Civil Code for India advocated in Article 44 of the Constitution has assumed the colour of a nightmare in the eyes of a vast majority of Muslims citizens. Answerable for this situation are two distinct anthropogenic forces in the society. Firstly, there are the super-traditionalists who would leave no stone unturned to enshrine the Islamic personal law as applicable in the country, inclusive of its each and every principle, as "revealed" or "inspired" laws not liable to any reconsideration by man. And secondly, there are those pseudo-secularist members of the majority community whose cherish and propagate the belief that the proposed civil code will be stuffed with the concepts of ancient Indian jurisprudence only and have in its provisions nothing derived from Islamic legal doctrines. The combined activity of these two forces in the society, though both are sadly mistaken, have gradually indulged the Muslim community into a massive revolt against the proposed civil code. The result is that it has become a fashion among the Muslims of India in general vituperate against anybody who talks either of the reform of Muslim personal law or of a uniform civil code. In order to mitigate the influences of these forces it is expedient to concretize provisions of the proposed civil code, to concretize provisions of the proposed civil code, not abstract, and analyze the extent to which those provisions would be opposed to or in conformity with, the Islamic jurisprudence.

In my opinion, there is no urgent need to force any UCC on unwilling population. Most people be it Hindu, Christian, Muslim or any other community are not ready to adopt truly secular laws separated from religious customs. Also, it is not right to force the

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customs of one group, however dominant it may be, upon other groups. So we can try to solve thousands of other less contentious problems that our society is facing and are more public in nature than personal laws.

A family law board should be set up in the Union Law Ministry on the pattern of the Company Law Board working under the Ministry of Industrial Affairs. It should be a statutory body having an all-India network of regional branches. It duties should include :

(i) to produce periodical and other literature pointing out the drawbacks in the existing family laws, highlighting the complications resulting from the plurality of personal laws, and explaining the need for the features oft he uniform civil code:

(ii) to set up committees of experts in family law and sociologists to study the working of the existing legislation and report thereon;

(iii) to arrange periodical opinion polls on the issue of reform of family law and uniform civil code;

(iv) to secure co-operation of trusted leaders of various communities – theologians, politicians and others – and of various institution of learning, politicians and others – and of various institution of learning, in order to prepare the people to appreciate the changes in social conditions and the changes in family law which they have necessitated;

(v) to educate the people on the need for family law reform and unification through the use of audio-visual aids and other media of mass communication;

(vi) to encourage empirical research of a socio –legal nature in the problems of family law in various parts of the country; and

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(vii) to prepare and submit to the government periodical reports on its activities.

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