My Writ of Mandate

8/6/2019 My Writ of Mandate

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTONIN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SNOHOMISH

Brandia Taamu Writ of Mandate to represent myself Pro Se

(Defendant) Filed in conjunction with1) Motion for Release of Private Property for

Violation of Due Process, ProceduralV Errors & Undue Harship

2) Emergency stay of execution & or transferof pets outside of facility

City of Everett 3) Gag order for Everett Animal Control(Plaintiff) 4) Motion to Dismiss case pending

Comes now Brandia Taamu to plead with a court of higher ruling to grant the relief requested ofjudgements & lack thereof of an inferior court in the County of Snohomish

INDEX:

A) Writ of MadateB) Petition for the release of Property & Gag Order for Everett Animal ControlC) Demand for Release of Property & PetsD) Motion to Dismiss Case Pending

WRIT OF MANDATE TO REPRESENT MYSELF PRO SEI am requesting the right & the priviledge to defend myself in regards to a misdemeanor criminal

matter before the Everett courts. I realize full well the perils of self representation but this matter

is a cause of life or death. One of my animals has already been executed without my knowledgeor consent, 5 more are being held at Everett Animal Control, worse yet, they are in foster care, Ihave no idea who these people are, what their qualifications are or how they are being cared for.This case has the ability to literally destroy my life & my livelihood, I run an animal rescue calledFinally Home Rescue & am licensed to do business in the State of Washington. The publicdefender I have been appointed lacks any trial experience, & is by all standards, not qualified inany means to handle a case like mine which involves, Due Process, Siezure of Property,Maritime, & Federal Laws. A perfect example of her lack of understanding of the law is: I filed anAffidavit of Prejudice against the original Judge who signed the warant, because in effect he hadalready convicted me with his signature without even ascertaining the witness credibility, my PD


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asked the Judge to hear her Motion to Withdraw... He had to explain to her why he couldn't ruleon her Motion. Plus he sent my original return to return my animals to the house of the womanwho was calling on me, not to my address so I had even more harassment from her than before.Furthermore her credentials are lacking at the very best. I am not a lawyer & have had no priortraining but I am the owner of these animals, I am the one who will lose everything if I don't winthis case, this is my life & my understanding was that the 6th Amendment guaranteed me a rightto defend it. My animals are special needs, & senior animals, who would most likely beeuthanized if I were to lose, my standing in the community I work in would be forever destroyedwith a conviction of Animal cruelty, I have waited 40 yrs to do this for a living & I am good at it, notso much at making any money at it but I am making a difference. I am not sure why with thebudget woes Everett claims to have that they have so much time & money to prosecute a womansleeping temporarily in a car with her Animals, with 7 years of vet records that show that my dogs,cats & other furries have always had consistent vet care. I have been to court about 14 times onthis matter & we haven't even made it to pre-trial motions not to mention that they keepscheduling me with the wrong judge when they know full well that I have horrific Agoraphobia &one of the dogs they took was my own personal therapy dog, so just getting out the door ismonumental, almost as if they are having fun just playing with me.

The judge in this matter stated "The Washington State Supreme Court believes you have a rightto represent yourself, we here in Snohomish County don't think so" & then he made a statementthat he wasn't going to let me procede Pro Se because every time he does, they send it back, I

don't know who "they" is & I dont know what it is they send back, that is not my issue, &furthermore the Judge has already stated in a hearing to transfer my dogs out to foster care whenI requested they leave them where they were so I would know where they were, he said in opencourt "well you abused your animals so I think that Everett Animal Control knows what is betterfor them" When I asked if he had already convicted me he refused to answer, but his statementsaid it all. So now I have to trust a lawyer who doesn't understand courtroom procedure, to aprosecutor who has tricked me into presenting my whole criminal case in the Petition hearing, & aJudge who believes he is above the Washington state Supreme court & has already convictedme. Who also sits on the Superior Court according to him. I am trying to learn if I can get aChange of Venue without this taking too long & I have filed complaints with everyone involvedwith the Bar Asociation, the Judicial Commission, the Ethics Commitee & the Dept of Justicebecause there is far more involved than what is relevent to my request to represent myself. It hasbeen well over 116 days since I have seen my Animals, (they were taken January,6th, 2011) for

living in a car. I honestly don't believe I will get a fair trial or anything close to it so it absolutelyimparitive that I represent myself so that I can introduce the evidence I need to in order to have abasis for appeal.

Rspectfully Submitted On May,2nd, 2011Brandia Taamu

PETITION FOR THE RETURN OF PROPERTY & A GAG ORDER FOR EVERETT ANIMALCONTROL

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTONIN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SNOHOMISH


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BRANDIA TAAMU | PETITIONER | COMPLAINT FOR RELEASE OFPETITIONER'S|

| PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR VIOLATION OFDUEV | PROCESS, PROCEDURAL ERRORS.&UNDUE

| HARDSHIP. EMERGENCY INJUNCTION FORCITY OF EVERETT & | STAY OF EXECUTION OR TRANSFEROF PETSCITY OF EVERETT ANIAL CONTROL | & A CEASE & DESIST FOR EVERETT ANANIMAL

RESPONDENTS | CONTROL RELEASING PRIVATE INFO

PETITIONER BRANDIA TAAMU, PRO SE, RESPECTFULLY SUBMIT THIS PETITION, &MOTION IN SUPPORT OF COMPLAINT FOR RELEASE OF PETITIONERS PETS FORVIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS & UNDUE HARDSHIP. ALSO FOR AN EMERGENCYINJUCTION PREVENTING THE EUTHANISIA OF ANY MORE OF PETITIONER'S PETS ORTRANSFER OUT TO ANOTHER FACILITY.

STATEMENT OF FACTS1) ON JANUARY 6 2011 EVERETT ANIMAL COTROL SHOWED UP WITH EVERETT POLICEDEPT WITH A WARRANT TO TAKE DOGS FROM MY VEHICLE. THE ANIMAL CONTROLOFFICER SHOWED ME THE WARRANT NOT THE EVERETT POLICE DEPT. I WAS NEVERREAD MY RIGHTS & THE ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICER DID NOT LEAVE THE WARRANT,THE REPORT, OR ANY INFO THAT WOULD LET ME KNOW WHAT IF ANY LEGALREMEDIES THAT I HAD AVAILABLE TO GET MY DOGS BACK IN VIOLATION OF RCW16.52.085 (3) & I BELIEVE THAT BEFORE THE WARRANT I WAS NEVER CITED NOR GIVENAN OPPORTUNITY TO REMEDY ANY CONDITIONS ANIMAL CONTROL SEEN UNFIT. I WASNOT EVEN A RESIDENT OF THE CITY OF EVERETT & WAS HOMELESS AT THE TIME.

2) EVERETT ANIMAL CONTROL HAS NOT ALLOWED ME TO CALL TO CHECK ON THEHEALTH & WELARE OF MY ANIMALS NOR ALLOWED ME TO VISIT THEM. I DID NOT FIND

OUT THAT MY SENIOR ESKIMO WAS DEAD UNTIL THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY TOLDME THAT. I HAVE NOT SEEN MY DOGS OR CAT IN OVER 41 DAYS.

3) OFFICER'S TRASK & DELGADO HAVE REFUSED TO LET ME SEE A REPORT OR THECOMPLAINT OR EVEN GIVE ME AN IDEA OF WHAT I WAS BEING CHARGED WITH. THEYARE ALSO REFUSING TO GIVE ME MY DEAD DOGS BODY BECAUSE THEY SAY HE IS"EVIDENCE"

4) THE PERSON WHO MADE THE COMPLAINT LIED & DID THIS OUT OF MALICIOUSNESS& HAS POSTED NUMEROUS SLANDEROUS POSTS ABOUT ME ON CRAIGSLIST & SENTOUT MASS EMAILS DISCREDITING ME. SHE IS ALSO CLAIMING THAT ANIMAL CONTROLAGENTS ARE SHOWING HER ON THEIR COMPUTER THAT I HAVE DUMPED NUMEROUSDOGS ON THEM, WHEN IN FACT I USED TO PULL DOGS OUT OF THERE FOR RESCUE.

SHE IS ALSO CLAIMING THEY ARE CALLING HER TO TELL HER MY DOGS HAVE GIARDIA& WORMS. HER HARASSMENT HAS GOTTEN SO BAD THAT I HAD NO CHOICE BUT TOGET AN ANTI HARASSMENT ORDER AGAINST HER AS WELL. IF IN FACT ANIMALCONTROL IS GIVING HER PERSONAL INFORMATIION ABOUT MY ANIMALS I WOULD LIKEA CEASE & DESIST ORDER PUT IN PLACE AS THEY HAVE NO RIGHT TO DISCUSS MYCASE OR ANY OF MY INFORMATION WITH ANYONE EXCPET FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT.SHE HAS GONE SO FAR AS TO CLAIM I DON'T HAVE A BUSINESS LICENSE & THAT I AMNOT A MINISTER

5) ALL OF MY ANIMALS ARE RESCUES & HAVE SEVERE EMOTIONAL & SOME PHYSICAL


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ISSUES & BEING CONFINED IN AN AREA BARELY TWICE AS BIG AS MY CAR WITHOUTLOVE & COMFORT IS DETRIMENTAL TO THEIR HELATH & SAFETY. I REALIZE LIVING IN ACAR WAS NOT AN IDEAL SITUATION FOR ANY OF US BUT I WAS ACTIVELY SEARCHINGFOR A NEW HOME FOR ALL OF US BUT TRYNG TO SAVE ENOUGH MONEY TO DO SO. IHAVE NOW SECURED A RESIDENCE WHERE WE CAN ALL BE TOGTHER INSIDE FROMTHE ELEMENTS.

6) IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE OFFICER TOLD ME SHE WAS TAKING THEANIMALS BECAUSE THEY DID NOT HAVE 24 HOUR A DAY WATER. WHEN THEY CAMETHERE WAS IN FACT A WATER BOTTLE ON THE HOOD OF THE CAR. EVERETTMUNICIPAL CODE 6.04.070 STATES THE DOGS MUST HAVE CONSTANTACCESS TOWATER 24HRS A DAY WHICH IS IN CONFLICT WITH RCW 16.52.310 (D) THAT STATESTHEY MUST HAVEADEQUATEWATER. RCW 35.27.370 (1) & (16) CLEARLY STATE THATANY TOWN IS NOT ALLOWED TO PASS LAWS WHICH ARE IN CONFLICT STATE RCW'S.ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICERS TOOK PICTURES OF THE 5 BAGS OF DOG FOOD I HADFOR THE DOGS AS WELL AS THE CASES OF WET FOOD FOR THE DOGS & THE CAT(S) &I BELIEVE THAT UNDER 16.52.207 (4) I BELIEVE I WILL BE AQUITTED OF ANY CHARGE

7) I AM ALSO REQUESTING THE RETURN OF ALL OF MY DOG'S MEDICATIONS, MYKENNELS, & OTHER DOG SUPPLIES THAT WERE TAKEN FROM MY CAR.

8) Additionally, the practice of seizing the personal property of owners withoutfollowing statutory notice requirements, as occurred in this case, is a denial ofprocedural due process. No proper notice procedures have been followed by the Cityof Everett/animal care and control authorities under animal seizure statutes, orproperty forfeiture statutes, to the owners of the pets setting forth the reason for theseizure and the process whereby the petitioners may reacquire possession of theirproperty in their pets. Petitioners have been denied procedural due process by theCity of Everett and/or (AC) authorities. The pets were seized unlawfully as they wereNOT in a life threatening condition pursuant to RCW 16.52.085. Property owners havethe right to challenge such seizures and, if they substantially prevail, recover theircosts and reaasonable attorney fees. RCW 69.50.505(6). (1) The following are subject toseizure and forfeiture and no property right exists in them (6) In any proceeding to forfeit property

under this title, where the claimant substantially prevails, the claimant is entitled to reasonableattorneys' fees reasonably incurred by the claimant. In addition, in a court hearing between two ormore claimants to the article or articles involved, the prevailing party is entitled to a judgment forcosts and reasonable attorneys' fees. Washington state's civil forfeiture act was adoptedto protect people from having their property wrongfully seized by the government. InGuillen v. Contreras (Sup. Ct. En Banc. No. 82531-9 (9/2010), amicus notes that anowner has the right to resist the taking of any of his property regardless of marketvalue. Amicus Br. At 8, cfGuillen v. Contreras, Sup. Ct. En Banc, No. 82531-9(9/9/2010). A citizen has the right to object to seizure, even if temporary, of hispersonal property no matter the market value. Id. Forfeitures of personal and realproperty are not favored in the law and very specific procedures must be followed.bygovernment officials and its agents when seizing property, including animals. Ifstatutory procedures are not followed, the property was illegally seized and a person

is lawfully entitled to possession thereof. Unless the seized property is needed forevidence, the petitioners are not the rightful owners, the property is contraband, orthe property is subject to forfeiture pursuant to statute, the seized property must bereturned. Id. The petitioners are the rightful owners of their dogs and cats, theirproperty in dogs and cats is not contraband, statutory procedures for seizure ofproperty have not been followed, and the seized property in pets must be returned tothe petitioners. If the state argues that the pets are derivative contraband and thatpetitioners are somehow guilty of a crime, the government must follow propertyforfeiture procedures to divest petitioners of their interest in their property in dogs


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and cats. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvannia, 380 U.S. At 699; Cooper, 904F.2d at 305; Farrell, 606 F. 2d at 1344; David v. Fowler, 504 F. Supp. At 505, cf fromState v. Alaway, 64 Wn. App. 796, 828 P.2d 591, p. 3 (4/2/92). Washington courtsoften look to federal law to determine lawful forfeiture procedures. The State cannotconfiscate property merely because it is derivative contraband. Instead it mustforfeit it using property forfeiture procedures. Washington has a statutory forfeiture

procedure. . . RCW 69.50.505(a)(2). Notice must be given within 15 days of seizure.RCW 69.50.505(c). If the property is personal property, one claming an interest in itthen has 45 days to respond, and if a response is made, a hearing must be held.RCW 69.50.505(d), (e ). Washington State's forfeiture statutes are exclusive. Unlessstatutory procedure are followed, a Washington court cannot order forfeiture andmust release the petitioners' property. A court does not have inherent authority toforfeit property. See, State v. Alaway, 64 Wn. App. 796, 828 P.2d 591, p. 3 (4/2/92).

The government gave no notice, so petitioners are not bound by any time frame toreclaim their property which is still in impound in Everett Wa. In the case of theseizure of an owner's property in pets for feeding and care, as in this matter, theseizure and forfeiture provisions in RCW 16.52.085 appear to track WashingtonState's civil forfeiture statute RCW 69.50 et seq. and federal law notice procedures.RCW 16.52.100 provides that if an animal is confined without necessary food orwater for more than 36 hours, and the officer finds it extremely difficult to providethe animal with food or water, the officer may remove the animals to protectivecustody for that purpose. RCW 16.52.085 sets forth the method whereby an animalmay be seized for protective custody for feeding and care. An animal may be seizedby an officer only with a warrant UNLESS the animal is in an immediate life-threatening condition. If the officer decides that an animal is in an immediate lifethreatening condition to justify summary seizure of the animals,proper notice mustbe given to the owner of the animal by (1) posting at the place of seizure, and (2)

personal service to a person residing at the place of seizure, OR by registered mail tothe owner.The Notice must be written notice to the owner of the circumstances ofthe removal of the animals (without a warrant) and the legal remedies availableunder this chapter to the owner of the animal(s). The proper procedures by statuteare enumerated below. Petitioners received no lawful notice and their due processrights were violated.

IN SUMMARYON 1/6/2011 EVERETT ANIMAL CONTROL TOOK MY DOGS & CAT FROM MY VEHICLEWITHOUT GIVING ME DUE PROCESS TO FIX OR RESPOND TO ANY ISSUES. ON 1/4/2011 IHAD A RUN IN WITH OFFICER TRASK WHO WAS BEING VERY AGRUEMNTATIVE & LEFTTHE PROPERTY, WHEN I REURNED EARLY ON 1/6/2011 SHE SHOWED UP WITH POLICE &AFTER THE FACT THE WOMAN LIVING AT THE RESIDENCE GAVE ME A NOTICE SHE HADLEFT THERE SAYING I HAD TO TAKE THEM TO A VET & CALL HER BUT NO TIME FRAMEWAS GIVEN. THE REPORT WAS A LIE, BUT THEY TOOK THE WOMAN'S WORD BECAUSETHEY BELIEVED THAT SHE WAS THE ONE WHO GAVE ALL THE INFO, VIDEO, &WITNESSES TO THE SNOHOMISH COUNTY PROSECUTOR TO SHUT DOWN THE RENE

ROSKE PUPPY MILL & ONCE I PROVED THAT IT WAS IN FACT ME WHO PROVIDED ALLOF THE EVIDENCE CHARGES WERE FILED AGAINST ME. IT ALSO SAYS IN MY CHARGINGPAPERS THAT I AM GUILTY OF ABOUT 6 DIFFERENT THINGS. WHEN THE OFFICERSARRIVED I WAS ASLEEP IN MY CAR WITH MY ANIMALS WHICH IS WHERE I ALWAYSSLEPT SO I COULD TURN ON THE CAR WHEN WE NEEDED HEAT & SO THEY DIDN'T GETCOLD, THE OFFICERS TOOK PICTURES OF THE BAGS OF FOOD & THE CANNED FOOD, IHAVE WELL OVER 42LBS OF VET PAPERS PERTAINING TO MOST OF THE DOGS YOUHAVE IN CUSTODY TO PROVE THEY WERE GETTIN VET CARE, THAT MY ANIMALS HAVEALWAYS RECIEVED TIMELY VET CARE. MY SENIOR ESKIMO THAT WAS KILED HAS


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LYMPHOMA, IT WAS TERMINAL, THERE WAS NO TREATMENT & IT HAS BEEN THEEXPERIENCE OF THE VETS & MYSELF THAT THE TREATMENT USUALLY KILLS THEMFASTER, SO OUR PLAN WAS TO KEEP HIM WITH ME UNTIL IT SEEMED HE WAS IN PAINOR WAS SUFFERING, HE WAS ACTUALLY IN PRETTY GOOD SHAPE EXCEPT FORCHRONIC CONJUNCTIVITIS, BUT SINCE I HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING HOW BEINGTAKEN FROM ME AFFECTED HIM EMOTIONALLY OR PHYSICALLY I DON'T KNOW WHATHIS TRUE CONDITION WAS WHEN HE WAS MURDERED. NONE OF THE DOGS HAD ANYLIFE THREATENING CONDITIONS NONE WERE MALNOURISHED OR DEHYDRATED,NONE WERE INJURED, ALL WHO HAD PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS HAD MEDICATIONSFOR THEM LIKE LIBBY HAD HOT SPOTS, SHE HAD MEDS, HOKI HAS SEIZURES, HE HASMEDS, SOFFIE HAD CHRONIC BLADDER INFECTIONS WHICH I WAS TOLD BY ONE VET INSHELTON WAS BLADDER CANCER BUT ANOTHER VET IN SEATTLE SAID SHE WAS JUSTFAT, SINCE SHE HAD BEEN BRED 11 TIMES BY THE TIME I GOT HER AT ALMOST 6 YRSOLD, HE SAID IT WAS LIKELY THAT SHE HAD ALOT OF INTERNAL DAMAGE AS WELL,SHE DID HAVE A HERNIA THAT REQUIRED EMERGENCY SURGERY FROM BEINGOVERBRED SOME 4 YRS AGO AS WELL. I KNOW LIVING IN A CAR WAS NOT IDEAL BUTTHEY WERE NEVER UNPROTECTED FROM THE ELEMENTS, & I ONLY FEED MY DOGSQUALITY HIGH END FOODS, WHICH WERE PRESENT IN THE CAR. I NOW HAVE A HOMEFOR THEM TO BE, & STILL HAVE ALL OF THEIR FOOD, TOYS & SUPPLIES. IF YOU WILLNOT ORDER THE RETURN OF MY ANIMALS I WANT AN ORDER ALLOWING ME TO SEE

THEM TO CHECK ON THEM DAILY SO THAT I CAN KNOW HOW THEY ARE DOING & TOPREVENT FURTHER EMOTIONAL DAMAGE TO THEM OR MYSELF. I AM OPEN TOCONDITIONS OF RELEASE WHICH WOULD BE FEASIBLE TO MY LIVING & ECONOMICSITUATION, AS THIS IS CAUSING UNDUE HARDSHIP FOR ME EMOTIONALLY &ECONOMICALLY AS WELL. I AM NOT ABLE TO OBTAIN EMPLOYMENT UNTIL THISMATTER IS SETTLED IN CASE I AM NEEDED AT COURT & BECAUSE I AM POOR SO I AMHAVING TO DO ALL OF THE RESEARCH FOR MY OWN CASE. ALMOST EVERY DAY IPARK ACROSS THE RIVER HOPING TO CATCH A GLIMPSE OF MY DOGS & NEVER HAVESEEN THEM SO THEY ARE NOT BEING BROUGHT OUTSIDE FOR EXERSIZE & ARE BEINGKEPT IN A PLACE BARELY TWICE AS BIG AS MY CAR, WITH THEIR KENNELS BEINGHOSED DOWN ONCE A DAY UNTIL WHICH THEY ARE FORCED OT STAND OR SIT INTHEIR OWN WASTE, THEY ARE BEING HOUSED SEPERATELY & HAVE BEEN USED TOBEING TOGETHER, THERE IS ALSO THE ISSUE OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASES WHICH

THEY COULD BE BEING EXPOSED TO ON A DAILY BASIS, WHICH IS ENDANGERINGTHEM DAILY. I KNOW EXACTLY WHERE THEY ARE BEING KEPT & WHAT THE HOLDINGCELLS LOOK LIKE BECAUSE I USED TO RESCUE DOGS FROM EVERETT ANIMALSERVICES WHICH THEY PROBABLY WON'T ADMIT BUT I HAVE THE PAPERWORK & VETRECORDS TO PROVE IT. I AM REQUESTING THE IMMEDIATE RETURN OF MY DOGS, &OTHER PROPERTY. I REALIZE IN A COURT OF LAW THAT ANIMALS ARE PROPERTY, BUTTHEY ARE SENTIENT BEINGS, WITH FEELINGS, THAT FEEL PAIN, DEPRESSIONSADNESS, JOY, ELATION, LOVE, LOYALTY, BETRAYAL, & ANY OTHER HOST OFEMOTIONS THE SAME AS YOU OR I WOULD FEEL, KEEPING THEM AWAY FROM ME &EACHOTHER IS NOTHING SHORT OF CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT FOR A CRIME IHAVE NOT EVEN BEEN CONVICTED OF & DUE IN NO PART TO ANY WRONG DOINGFROM THEM. THEY ARE INNOCENT.

RESPECTFULLYBRANDIA TAAMU(425) 319-3298

[email protected]


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DEMAND FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY & PETS

CITY OF EVERETT ( DEMAND FOR IMMEDIATEV ( RETURN OF MY SEIZEDBRANDIA TAAMU ( ANIMALS & PROPERTY

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

1) I have tried petitions, I have tried motions, & yet the City of Everett, refuses to returnproperty & animals which clearly belongs to me amounting to criminal theft.

2) The court made statements in a criminal court hearing that were absolutely inappropriateduring a hearing to place my dogs outside of the Everett Animal Shelter to the effect of "youabused your dogs so I think that the shelter knows what is better for them" When I asked if thecourt had already indicted me, there was a refusal to answer but it was crystal clear from thestatement that the courts had already done so.

3) In my Motion for dismissal which the courts said "made me look bad" I have also cited

the various laws. At the cost of "looking bad", I have begged the courts, petitioned the courts, nowI am demanding that my animals & property be returned to me including my dead dog's body sohe can have a customary blessing & proper burial. At the cost of "looking bad" I am demandingmy rights as a citizen of the United States of America, & Washington state.

4) My due process & civil rights have been violated & I am citing the laws to you in regardsto this matter in case you are not aware of it

A) I was never given notice of my legal remedies as REQUIRED by state law under RCW16.52.085. Notice requirements after removal of personal property by authorities is provided inparagraph (3). After removal of animals, notice must be provided by posting, personal service orcertified mail and the owner must be provided written notice of the reasons for removal in thisnotice and legal remedies available to the owner.

B) My animals are NOT subject to forfeiture pursuant to RCW 69.50.505 Washington state'scivil forfeiture act was adopted to protect people from having their property wrongfully seized bythe government. In Guillen v. Contreras (Sup. Ct. En Banc. No. 82531-9 (9/2010), amicus notesthat an owner has the right to resist the taking of any of his property regardless of market value.Amicus Br. At 8, cf Guillen v. Contreras, Sup. Ct. En Banc, No. 82531-9 (9/9/2010). A citizen hasthe right to object to seizure, even if temporary, of his personal property no matter the marketvalue. Forfeitures of personal and real property are not favored in the law and very specificprocedures must be followed.by government officials and its agents when seizing property,including animals. If statutory procedures are not followed, the property was illegally seized and aperson is lawfully entitled to possession thereof. Unless the seized property is needed forevidence, the petitioners are not the rightful owners, the property is contraband, or the property issubject to forfeiture pursuant to statute, the seized property must be returned.

C) Everett Animal Control has already gleaned all the "evidence" they needed from bloodwork, lab testing & photographs, my animals are not contraband: derivative, or otherwise & theyare not subject to forfeiture under statute. They have not been used in the commission of afelony, they have not been used in any drug transaction & in case it has been forgotten by thecourts I have not been criminally convicted my court case has not even commenced yet.Furthermore The State cannot confiscate property merely because it is derivative contraband.Instead it must forfeit it using property forfeiture procedures. Washington has a statutory forfeitureprocedure. . . RCW 69.50.505(a)(2). Notice must be given within 15 days of seizure. RCW69.50.505(c). If the property is personal property, one claiming an interest in it then has 45 days


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to respond, and if a response is made, a hearing must be held. RCW 69.50.505(d), (e).Washington State's forfeiture statutes are exclusive. Unless statutory procedure are followed, aWashington court cannot order forfeiture and must release the petitioners' property. A court doesnot have inherent authority to forfeit property. See, State v. Alaway, 64 Wn. App. 796, 828 P.2d591, p. 3 (4/2/92). The government gave no notice, so petitioners are not bound by any timeframe to reclaim their property which is still in impound in Everett Wa. Additionally, the practice ofseizing the personal property of owners without following statutory notice requirements, asoccurred in this case, is a denial of procedural due process. No proper notice procedures havebeen followed by the City of Everett/animal care and control authorities under animal seizurestatutes, or property forfeiture statutes, to the owners of the pets setting forth the reason for theseizure and the process whereby the petitioners may reacquire possession of their property intheir pets. Petitioners have been denied procedural due process by the City of Everett and/or(AC) authorities.

D) The pets were seized unlawfully as they were NOT in a life threatening condition pursuantto RCW 16.52.085. I am the rightful owners of these dogs and cats, my property in dogs and catsis not contraband, statutory procedures for seizure of property have not been followed, and theseized property in pets must be returned to the me. If the state argues that the pets arederivative contraband and that I am are somehow guilty of a crime, the government must followproperty forfeiture procedures to divest petitioners of their interest in their property in dogs and

cats. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. At 699; Cooper, 904 F.2d at 305;Farrell, 606 F. 2d at 1344; David v. Fowler, 504 F. Supp. At 505, cf from State v. Alaway, 64 Wn.App. 796, 828 P.2d 591, p. 3 (4/2/92). Washington courts often look to federal law to determinelawful forfeiture procedures. Washington State's forfeiture statutes are exclusive. Unless statutoryprocedure are followed, a Washington court cannot order forfeiture and must release thepetitioners' property. A court does not have inherent authority to forfeit property. See, State v.Alaway, 64 Wn. App. 796, 828 P.2d 591, p. 3 (4/2/92). The government gave no notice, sopetitioners are not bound by any time frame to reclaim their property which is still in impound inEverett Wa. In the case of the seizure of an owner's property in pets for feeding and care, as inthis matter, the seizure and forfeiture provisions in RCW 16.52.085 appear to track WashingtonState's civil forfeiture statute RCW 69.50 et seq. and federal law notice procedures. The properprocedures by statute are enumerated above. Petitioners received no lawful notice and their dueprocess rights were violated.

E) In regards to the euthanasia of George amounting to permanent deprivation of property &the continued impound of my animals/property my due process rights have been blatantlytrampled on. There is no question that I have a protected property interest in the ownership ofthese animals, and the seizure and impoundment of these dogs triggers due process, Pasco v.Reihl, 635 So.2d 17 (S.Ct. 1994). In the instant case, the petitioner's private property wassubject to, among other things, physical confinement, and muzzling. In the aggregate, theserestrictions are a deprivation of property and before such restrictions are imposed, a propertyowner must be afforded an opportunity to be heard. I have suffered a deprivation of propertywithout benefit of a hearing, and such violation was a violation of my procedural due processrights. Id. at 19. See also, Mansour v. King, 131 Wash. App. 255 (Wash. App.2006) and Philipsv. San Luis Obispo County Dept. of Animal Regulation, 183 Ca. App. 3d 372 (Cal. App. 1986).The deprivation here is unquestionably more severe than Pasco, as this case involves

destruction; a total, complete and final deprivation of my property rights. Where the property wasforfeited without constitutionally adequate notice to the claimant, the courts must provide relief,either by vacating the default judgment, or by allowing a collateral suit. See Seguin v Eide, 720F2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1983), on remand after judgment vacated, 462 U.S.1101,103 S. Ct. 2446(1983); Wiren v Eide, 542 F2d 757 (9th Cir. 1976). Menkarell v. Bureau of Narcotics, 463 F2d 88(3rd Cir. 1972); Jaekel v United States, 304 F Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y 1969); Glup v United States,523 F2d 557, 560 (8th Cir. 1975). (See FED. R. CIV. P. Supplemental Admiralty or MaritimeClaims and Asset Forfeiture Actions Rule A(1)(B) (making rules applicable to forfeiture actions inrem arising from a federal statute) Where a person has been deprived of property in a mannercontrary to the most basic tenets of due process, "it is no answer to say that in his particular case


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due process of law would have led to the same result because he had no adequate defense uponthe merits." Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 35 S. Ct. 625, 629, 59 L. Ed. 1027(1915). As we observed in Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965), only "wip[ing] the slateclean ... would have restored the petitioner to the position he would have occupied had dueprocess of law been accorded to him in the first place." The Due Process Clause demands noless in this case. Peralta, supra, 108 U.S. at 898-99, 900.

F) I have an affirmative defense, which is required as in Federal Forfeiture laws & inWashington state law. Affirmative defenses must be raised in the answer, Fed. R. Civ. P andSup. Ct. R. Civil Rule 8(c), but the answer may be amended even at the time of trial to conformwith the evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P and Sup. Ct. R.-Civil Rule 15(b). Also in Washington state RCW16.52.207 (4) In any prosecution of animal cruelty in the second degree under subsection (1) or(2)(a) of this section, it shall be an affirmative defense, if established by the defendant by apreponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's failure was due to economic distress beyondthe defendant's control.

G) This whole situation seems to be falling into the "Color of Law" In the words of SupremeCourt Judge, Mr. Justice Rutledge He who acts under "color" of law may be a federal officer or astate officer. He may act under "color" of federal law or of state law. The statute does not comeinto play merely because the federal law or the state law under which the officer purports to act is

violated. It is applicable when and only when someone is deprived of a federal right by thataction. The fact that it is also a violation of state law does not make it any the less a federaloffense punishable as such. Nor does its punishment by federal authority encroach on stateauthority or relieve the state from its responsibility for punishing state offenses. Screws v. UnitedStates, 325 US 91, 108 (1945). This section was before us in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.299, 326, where we said: "Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possibleonly because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken `under colorof' state law." Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 109 (1945). For it was abuse of basic civil andpolitical rights, by states and their officials, that the Amendment and the enforcing legislation wereadopted to uproot. The danger was not merely legislative or judicial. Nor was it threatened onlyfrom the state's highest officials. It was abuse by whatever agency the state might invest with itspower capable of inflicting the deprivation. In all its flux, time makes some things axiomatic. Onehas been that state officials who violate their oaths of office and flout 117*117 the fundamental

law are answerable to it when their misconduct brings upon them the penalty it authorizes andCongress has provided. Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 116-7 (1945) Mr. Justice Rutledge,concurring in the result. "It is not open to question that this statute is constitutional. . . [It] dealtwith Federal rights and with all Federal rights, and protected them in the lump . . ." United Statesv. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386, 387. Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 119 (1945) Mr. JusticeRutledge, concurring in the result. Separately, and often together in application, 19 and 20have been woven into our fundamental and statutory law. They have place among our morepermanent legal achievements. They have safeguarded many rights and privileges apart frompolitical ones. Among those buttressed, either by direct application or through the generalconspiracy statute, 37 (18 U.S.C. 88),[24] are the rights to a fair trial, including freedom fromsham trials [including sham Collection Due Process Hearings] ; to be free from arrest anddetention by methods constitutionally forbidden and from extortion of property [by threat of levy,lien, or lockdown letters] by such methods; from extortion of confessions; from mob action incited

or shared by state officers; from failure to furnish police protection on proper occasion anddemand; frominterference with the free exercise of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of speech andassembly;[25] and 127*127 the necessary import of the decisions is that the right to be free fromdeprivation of life itself, without due process of law, that is, through abuse of state power by stateofficials, is as fully protected as other rights so secured. Screws v. United States, 325 US 91,126-7 (1945) Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring in the result. They simply misconceived that thevictim had no federal rights and that what they had done was not a crime within the federal powerto penalize.[30] That kind of error relieves no one from penalty. Screws v. United States, 325 US91, 128 (1945) Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring in the result.


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I am the owner of these animals, I was never given proper notice of my rights & all of myconstitutional rights have been violated, from the the 4th, 5th, 8th & 14th amendments at least.Not to mention I have suffered cruel & unusual punishment, as have my animals more so thanmyself. It has been 108 DAYS since I have seen MY dogs & cat, not yours, not the City ofEverett's, not the Everett Animal Shelter's, but MY dogs & cat. I am not even sure WHY Everett iscontinuing in the case against me, unless they have this much money to waste on a womansleeping in a car, which is absolutely entirely ridiculous & I am sure the people of the city wouldlove to know that their tax dollars are hard at work trying to prosecute MISDEMEANOR casesthat have an affirmative defense. I realize that these statements may be taken as contempt, theyare NOT, they are common sense, which has up til now not prevailed. Because of your bias, lawsays you should step down anyway, it is recorded, these are statements you have made in anopen court that have been recorded & will soon be transcribed. I am completely flabbergastedwith the lack of regard or respect for Washington state law, & Constitutional law, I would submitthat is the courts who are in contempt of me, not I, who are in contempt. In your statement thatthe "Washington State Supreme Court believes I have the right to represent myself, but you inSnohomish County don't think so" further illustrates my point. In every appeal docket I have read,when Snohomish or Everett seizes property the appellate always wins, so this is a pattern in thisdistrict, the arbitrary taking of a persons property is prohibited, but beyond the law, the permanentdeprivation of the last days of life with George, & the past 108 days without my animals are

reprehensible & the courts have made themselves a willing party to this with just the statementsthat have been made. I now ask for the relief sought, or another quick dismissal so that I canmove forward with this action to other administrative agencies as well as the governing courtauthority of the state of Washington. I am not a lawyer, I am sick & tired, & broken-hearted, youhave summarily dismissed my Petition for the return of my animals & property, the Petition torepresent myself Pro Se, my Petition for Dismissal, & my request to leave my animals where theywere so that I would know where they are at. It is absolutely insane that I have to learn the law &cite law to anyone in the courts. I want my animals & property back, I am entitled by law to havethem returned, no matter what the court's "opinion" is of me, the law is the law which you havesworn to uphold.

Respectfully Submitted,Brandia Taamu

April,23rd, 2011

PETITION FOR DISMISSAL OF CHARGES & RETURN OF PROPERTY

Municipal Court of Everett Washington County of Snohomish

In re:

No. CRP-3735


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City of Everett (PetitionforDismissal

V. (of all Charges & Return

Brandia Taamu (of all Seized Property

Brandia Taamu moves the court for an order dismissing this action City of Everett V. BrandiaTaamu for these reasons:

1) It will be shown that my affirmative defense is in fact credible & that my animals did NOT sufferunjustifiable pain. I got evicted, my husband ran off with everything & I was out of work

16.52.207 Animal cruelty in the second degree.

(2) An owner of an animal is guilty of animal cruelty in the second degree if, under circumstancesnot amounting to first degree animal cruelty, the owner knowingly, recklessly, or with criminalnegligence:

(a) Fails to provide the animal with necessary shelter, rest, sanitation, space, or medical attentionand the animal suffers unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain as a result of the failure

(4) In any prosecution of animal cruelty in the second degree under subsection (1) or (2)(a) of thissection, it shall be an affirmative defense, if established by the defendant by a preponderance ofthe evidence, that the defendant's failure was due to economic distress beyond the defendant'scontrol.

2) It will be shown that Officer Weaver & Officer Trask conspired to make false allegationsattirbuting statements to a party who did not make them, taking photos that CLEARLY left out oneside of my vehicle that in particular contained the dog's food & supplies. My vet is supposed tobeconsulting a lawyer as well because of the statements Officer Weaver made that were untrue.It is also amazing to me that Prosecutor Fisher even believed he could file a case that would have

any merit, with all the conflicting evidence. He also let me present my whole case in front of theCommissioner in Superior Court & neither one let me know I had the right to invoke my 5thAmendment rights in order not to incriminate myself or give away my case. If you honestly take alook at my dogs intitial vet exam records you will see all but George (who was terminally ill)were"Bright, Alert, & Responsive" all had clean fecals, except for non-motile bacteria on 2 of them,then the next statement from the same day they were all "dying", had bloodshot eyes, even theirteeth got worse, oh but most precious of all is my GRAY dog supposedly had urine stains on herfur, impossible, & my Tri-Colored dog with BLACK feet also had urine stains supposedly. You willaslo note that Soffie the dog who had a bladder stone removed... They never even called the vetin Shelton to confirm she had been seen there & tested, not did they request her records from ourcurrent vet. Shelton said she had cancer, our new vet said she was just fat (because I thoughtshe was dying so I spoiled her but after a year of her doing well & just getting fat I took her to ournew vet & he didn't catch anything about a bladder stone)

RULE 3.8 SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTORThe prosecutor in a criminal case shall:

(a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probablecause;

(b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and theprocedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;


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(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights, suchas the right to a preliminary hearing;

(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutorthat tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense and, in connection withsentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all mitigating information known to theprosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order ofthe tribunal;

(f) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of theprosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from makingextrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation ofthe accused and exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel,employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case frommaking an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making underRule 3.6 or this Rule.

Comment

[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accordedprocedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Precisely howfar the prosecutor is required to go in this direction is a matter of debate and varies in different

jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have adopted the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice Relating tothe Prosecution Function, which in turn are the product of prolonged and careful deliberation bylawyers experienced in both criminal prosecution and defense. Applicable law may require othermeasures by the prosecutor and knowing disregard of those obligations or a systematic abuse ofprosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4.

[2] In some jurisdictions, a defendant may waive a preliminary hearing and thereby lose avaluable opportunity to challenge probable cause. Accordingly, prosecutors should not seek to

obtain waivers of preliminary hearings or other important pretrial rights from unrepresentedaccused persons. Paragraph (c) does not apply, however, to an accused appearing pro se withthe approval of the tribunal. Nor does it forbid the lawful questioning of an uncharged suspectwho has knowingly waived the rights to counsel and silence.

[6] Like other lawyers, prosecutors are subject to Rules 5.1 and 5.3, which relate toresponsibilities regarding lawyers and nonlawyers who work for or are associated with thelawyer's office. Paragraph (f) reminds the prosecutor of the importance of these obligations inconnection with the unique dangers of improper extrajudicial statements in a criminal case. Inaddition, paragraph (f) requires a prosecutor to exercise reasonable care to prevent personsassisting or associated with the prosecutor from making improper extrajudicial statements, evenwhen such persons are not under the direct supervision of the prosecutor. Ordinarily, thereasonable care standard will be satisfied if the prosecutor issues the appropriate cautions to law-

enforcement personnel and other relevant individuals.

[Amended effective September 1, 2006.]

CHAPTER 42.52 RCW ETHICS IN PUBLIC SERVICE.RCW 42.52.010 Definitions. Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the definitions in thissection apply throughout this chapter.(1) "Agency" means any state board, commission, bureau, committee, department, institution,division, or tribunal in the legislative, executive, or judicial branch of state government. "Agency"includes all elective offices, the state legislature, those institutions of higher education created


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and supported by the state government, and those courts that are parts of state government.(2) "Head of agency" means the chief executive officer of an agency. In the case of an agencyheaded by a commission, board, committee, or other body consisting of more than one naturalperson, agency head means the person or board authorized to appoint agency employees andregulate their conduct.(3) "Assist" means to act, or offer or agree to act, in such a way as to help, aid, advise, furnishinformation to, or otherwise provide assistance to another person, believing that the action is ofhelp, aid, advice, or assistance to the person and with intent so to assist such person.(6) "Confidential information" means (a) specific information, rather than generalized knowledge,that is not available to the general public on request or (b) information made confidential by law.(8) "Ethics boards" means the commission on judicial conduct, the legislative ethics board, andthe executive ethics board.(9) "Family" has the same meaning as "immediate family" in RCW 42.17.020.(12) "Official duty" means those duties within the specific scope of employment of the state officeror state employee as defined by the officer's or employee's agency or by statute or the stateConstitution.(13) "Participate" means to participate in state action or a proceeding personally and substantiallyas a state officer or state employee, through approval, disapproval, decision, recommendation,the rendering of advice, investigation, or otherwise but does not include preparation,consideration, or enactment of legislation or the performance of legislative duties.

(14) "Person" means any individual, partnership, association, corporation, firm, institution, orother entity, whether or not operated for profit.(15) "Regulatory agency" means any state board, commission, department, or officer, exceptthose in the legislative or judicial branches, authorized by law to conduct adjudicativeproceedings, issue permits or licenses, or to control or affect interests of identified persons.(16) "Responsibility" in connection with a transaction involving the state, means the directadministrative or operating authority, whether intermediate or final, and either exercisable aloneor through subordinates, effectively to approve, disapprove, or otherwise direct state action inrespect of such transaction.(17) "State action" means any action on the part of an agency, including, but not limited to:(a) A decision, determination, finding, ruling, or order; and (b) A grant, payment, award, license,contract, transaction, sanction, or approval, or the denial thereof, or failure to act with respect to adecision, determination, finding, ruling, or order.

(18) "State officer" means every person holding a position of public trust in or under an executive,legislative, or judicial office of the state. "State officer" includes judges of the superior court,

judges of the court of appeals, justices of the supreme court, members of the legislature togetherwith the secretary of the senate and the chief clerk of the house of representatives, holders ofelective offices in the executive branch of state government, chief executive officers of stateagencies, members of boards, commissions, or committees with authority over one or more stateagencies or institutions, and employees of the state who are engaged in supervisory, policy-making, or policy-enforcing work. For the purposes of this chapter, "state officer" also includesany person exercising or undertaking to exercise the powers or functions of a state officer.(19) "State employee" means an individual who is employed by an agency in any branch of stategovernment. For purposes of this chapter, employees of the superior courts are not state officersor state employees.(21)(a) "Transaction involving the state" means a proceeding, application, submission, request for

a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, case, or other similar matter that the state officer,state employee, or former state officer or state employee in question believes, or has reason tobelieve:(i) Is, or will be, the subject of state action; or (ii) Is one to which the state is or will be aparty; or (iii) Is one in which the state has a direct and substantial proprietary interest.

RCW 42.52.040 Assisting in transactions. (1) Except in the course of official duties or incident toofficial duties, no state officer or state employee may assist another person, directly or indirectly,whether or not for compensation, in a transaction involving the state:(4) This chapter does not prevent a state officer or state employee from assisting, in a transactioninvolving the state:


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RCW 42.52.050 Confidential information--Improperly concealed records. (1) No state officer orstate employee may accept employment or engage in any business or professional activity thatthe officer or employee might reasonably expect would require or induce him or her to make anunauthorized disclosure of confidential information acquired by the official or employee by reasonof the official's or employee's official position.(2) No state officer or state employee may make a disclosure of confidential information gainedby reason of the officer's or employee's official position or otherwise use the information for his orher personal gain or benefit or the gain or benefit of another, unless the disclosure has beenauthorized by statute or by the terms of a contract involving (a) the state officer's or stateemployee's agency and (b) the person or persons who have authority to waive the confidentialityof the information.(3) No state officer or state employee may disclose confidential information to any person notentitled or authorized to receive the information.(4) No state officer or state employee may intentionally conceal a record if the officer or employeeknew the record was required to be released under chapter 42.17 RCW, was under a personalobligation to release the record, and failed to do so. This subsection does not apply where thedecision to withhold the record was made in good faith. [1996 c 213 4; 1994 c 154 105.]RCW 42.52.060 Testimony of state officers and state employees. This chapter does not prevent astate officer or state employee from giving testimony under oath or from making statements

required to be made under penalty of perjury or contempt. [1994 c 154 106.]RCW 42.52.100 Conditions on appearance before state agencies or doing business with thestate-Hearing-Judicial review. (1) The head of an agency, upon finding that any former stateofficer or state employee of such agency or any other person has violated any provision of thischapter or rules adopted under it, may, in addition to any other powers the head of such agencymay have, bar or impose reasonable conditions upon:(a) The appearance before such agency of such former state officer or state employee or otherperson; and(b) The conduct of, or negotiation or competition for, business with such agency by such formerstate officer or state employee or other person, such period of time as may reasonably benecessary or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter.(2) Findings of violations referred to in subsection (1)(b) of this section shall be made on recordafter notice and hearing, conducted in accordance with the Washington Administrative Procedure

Act, chapter 34.05 RCW. Such findings and orders are subject to judicial review.(3) This section does not apply to the legislative or judicial branches of government.[1994 c 154 110; 1969 ex.s. c 234 27. Formerly RCW 42.18.270.]RCW 42.52.160 Use of persons, money, or property for private gain. (1) No state officer or stateemployee may employ or use any person, money, or property under the officer's or employee'sofficial control or direction, or in his or her official custody, for the private benefit or gain of theofficer, employee, or another.(2) This section does not prohibit the use of public resources to benefit others as part of a stateofficer's or state employee's official duties.(3) The appropriate ethics boards may adopt rules providing exceptions to this section foroccasional use of the state officer or state employee, of de minimis cost and value, if the activitydoes not result in interference with the proper performance of public duties.[1996 c 213 7; 1994 c 154 116; 1987 c 426 3. Formerly RCW 42.18.217.]

RCW 42.52.360 Authority of executive ethics board. (1) The executive ethics board shall enforcethis chapter and rules adopted under it with respect to state-wide elected officers and all otherofficers and employees in the executive branch, boards and commissions, and institutions ofhigher education.(2) The executive ethics board shall:(a) Develop educational materials and training;(b) Adopt rules and policies governing the conduct of business by the board, and adopt rulesdefining working hours for purposes of RCW 42.52.180 and where otherwise authorized underchapter 154,Laws of 1994;


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(c) Issue advisory opinions;(d) Investigate, hear, and determine complaints by any person or on its own motion;(e) Impose sanctions including reprimands and monetary penalties;(f) Recommend to the appropriate authorities suspension, removal from position, prosecution, orother appropriate remedy; and(g) Establish criteria regarding the levels of civil penalties appropriate for violations of this chapterand rules adopted under it.(3) The board may:(a) Issue subpoenas for the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production ofdocumentary evidence relating to any matter under examination by the board or involved in anyhearing;(b) Administer oaths and affirmations;(c) Examine witnesses; and(d) Receive evidence.(4) The executive ethics board may review and approve agency policies as provided for in thischapter.(5) This section does not apply to state officers and state employees of the judicial branch.[1994 c 154 206.]RCW 42.52.370 Authority of commission on judicial conduct. The commission on judicial conductshall enforce this chapter and rules adopted under it with respect to state officers and employees

of the judicial branch and may do so according to procedures prescribed in Article IV, section 31of the state Constitution. In addition to the sanctions authorized in Article IV, section 31 of thestate Constitution, the commission may impose sanctions authorized by this chapter. [1994 c 154 207.]RCW 42.52.410 Filing complaint. (1) A person may, personally or by his or her attorney, make,sign, and file with the appropriate ethics board a complaint on a form provided by the appropriateethics board. The complaint shall state the name of the person alleged to have violated thischapter or rules adopted under it and the particulars thereof, and contain such other informationas may be required by the appropriate ethics board.(2) If it has reason to believe that any person has been engaged or is engaging in a violation ofthis chapter or rules adopted under it, an ethics board may issue a complaint. [1994 c 154 211.]RCW 42.52.420 Investigation. After the filing of any complaint, except as provided in RCW42.52.450, the staff of the appropriate ethics board shall investigate the complaint. The

investigation shall be limited to the alleged facts contained in the complaint. The results of theinvestigation shall be reduced to writing and a determination shall be made that there is or thatthere is not reasonable cause to believe that a violation of this chapter or rules adopted under ithas been or is being committed. A copy of the written determination shall be provided to thecomplainant and to the person named in such complaint. [1994 c 154 212.]RCW 42.52.430 Public hearing-Findings. (1) If the ethics board determines there is reasonablecause under RCW 42.52.420 that a violation of this chapter or rules adopted under it occurred, apublic hearing on the merits of the complaint shall be held.(2) The ethics board shall designate the location of the hearing. The case in support of thecomplaint shall be presented at the hearing by staff of the ethics board.(3) The respondent shall file a written answer to the complaint and appear at the hearing inperson or otherwise, with or without counsel, and submit testimony and be fully heard. Therespondent has the right to cross-examine witnesses.

(4) Testimony taken at the hearing shall be under oath and recorded.(5) If, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, the ethics board finds that the respondenthas violated this chapter or rules adopted under it, the board shall file an order stating findings offact and enforcement action as authorized under this chapter.(6) If, upon all the evidence, the ethics board finds that the respondent has not engaged in analleged violation of this chapter or rules adopted under it, the ethics board shall state findings offact and shall similarly issue and file an order dismissing the complaint.(7) If the board makes a determination that there is not reasonable cause to believe that aviolation has been or is being committed or has made a finding under subsection (6) of thissection, the attorney general shall represent the officer or employee in any action subsequently


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commenced based on the alleged facts in the complaint. [1994 c 154 213.]RCW 42.52.440 Review of order. Except as otherwise provided by law, reconsideration or judicialreview of an ethics board's order that a violation of this chapter or rules adopted under it hasoccurred shall be governed by the provisions of chapter 34.05 RCW applicable to review ofadjudicative proceedings. [1994 c 154 214.]RCW 42.52.450 Complaint against legislator or state-wide elected official. (1) If a complaintalleges a violation of RCW 42.52.180 by a legislator or state-wide elected official other than theattorney general, the attorney general shall conduct the investigation under RCW 42.52.420 andrecommend action to the appropriate ethics board.(2) If a complaint alleges a violation of RCW 42.52.180 by the attorney general, the state auditorshall conduct the investigation under RCW 42.52.420 and recommend action to the appropriateethics board. [1994 c 154 215.]RCW 42.52.460 Citizen actions. Any person who has notified the appropriate ethics board andthe attorney general in writing that there is reason to believe that RCW 42.52.180 is being or hasbeen violated may, in the name of the state, bring a citizen action for any of the actionsauthorized under this chapter. A citizen action may be brought only if the appropriate ethics boardor the attorney general have failed to commence an action under this chapter within forty-fivedays after notice from the person, the person has thereafter notified the appropriate ethics boardand the attorney general that the person will commence a citizen's action within ten days upontheir failure to commence an action, and the appropriate ethics board and the attorney general

have in fact failed to bring an action within ten days of receipt of the second notice.

If the person who brings the citizen's action prevails, the judgment awarded shall escheat to thestate, but the person shall be entitled to be reimbursed by the state of Washington for costs andattorneys' fees incurred. If a citizen's action that the court finds was brought without reasonablecause is dismissed, the court may order the person commencing the action to pay all costs of trialand reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by the defendant. Upon commencement of a citizenaction under this section, at the request of a state officer or state employee who is a defendant,the office of the attorney general shall represent the defendant if the attorney general finds thatthe defendant's conduct complied with this chapter and was within the scope of employment.[1994 c 154 216.]RCW 42.52.470 Referral for enforcement. As appropriate, an ethics board may refer a complaint:(1) To an agency for initial investigation and proposed resolution which shall be referred back to

the appropriate ethics board for action; or(2) To the attorney general's office or prosecutor for appropriate action. [1994 c 154 217.]RCW 42.52.480 Action by boards. (1) Except as otherwise provided by law, an ethics board mayorder payment of the following amounts if it finds a violation of this chapter or rules adopted underit after a hearing under RCW 42.52.370 or other applicable law:(a) Any damages sustained by the state that are caused by the conduct constituting the violation;(b) From each such person, a civil penalty of up to five thousand dollars per violation or threetimes the economic value of any thing received or sought in violation of this chapter or rulesadopted under it, whichever is greater; and(c) Costs, including reasonable investigative costs, which shall be included as part of the limitunder(b) of this subsection. The costs may not exceed the penalty imposed. The payment owed on thepenalty shall be reduced by the amount of the costs paid.

(2) Damages under this section may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment in a civilcase. [1994 c 154 218.]RCW 42.52.490 Action by attorney general. (1) Upon a written determination by the attorneygeneral that the action of an ethics board was clearly erroneous or if requested by an ethicsboard, the attorney general may bring a civil action in the superior court of the county in which theviolation is alleged to have occurred against a state officer, state employee, former state officer,former state employee, or other person who has violated or knowingly assisted another person inviolating any of the provisions of this chapter or the rules adopted under it. In such action theattorney general may recover the following amounts on behalf of the state of Washington:(a) Any damages sustained by the state that are caused by the conduct constituting the violation;


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(b) From each such person, a civil penalty of up to five thousand dollars per violation or threetimes the economic value of any thing received or sought in violation of this chapter or the rulesadopted under it, whichever is greater; and(c) Costs, including reasonable investigative costs, which shall be included as part of the limitunder(b) of this subsection. The costs may not exceed the penalty imposed. The payment owed on thepenalty shall be reduced by the amount of the costs paid.(2) In any civil action brought by the attorney general upon the basis that the attorney general hasdetermined that the board's action was clearly erroneous, the court shall not proceed with theaction unless the attorney general has first shown, and the court has found, that the action of theboard was clearly erroneous. [1994 c 154 219.]RCW 42.52.520 Disciplinary action. (1) A violation of this chapter or rules adopted under it isgrounds for disciplinary action.(2) The procedures for any such action shall correspond to those applicable for disciplinary actionfor employee misconduct generally; for those state officers and state employees not specificallyexempted in chapter 41.06 RCW, the rules set forth in chapter 41.06 RCW shall apply. Any actionagainst the state officer or state employee shall be subject to judicial review to the extentprovided by law for disciplinary action for misconduct of state officers and state employees of thesame category and grade. [1994 c 154 222; 1969 ex.s. c 234 26. Formerly RCW 42.18.260.]RCW 42.52.530 Additional investigative authority. In addition to other authority under this chapter,

the attorney general may investigate persons not under the jurisdiction of an ethics board whomthe attorney general has reason to believe were involved in transactions in violation of thischapter or rules adopted under it. [1994 c 154 223.]RCW 42.52.540 Limitations period. Any action taken under this chapter must be commencedwithin five years from the date of the violation. However, if it is shown that the violation was notdiscovered because of concealment by the person charged, then the action must be commencedwithin two years from the date the violation was discovered or reasonably should have beendiscovered:(1) By any person with direct or indirect supervisory responsibilities over the person who allegedlycommitted the violation; or (2) if no person has direct or indirect supervisory authority over theperson who committed the violation, by the appropriate ethics board. [1994 c 154 224.]RCW 42.52.900 Legislative declaration. Government derives its powers from the people. Ethics ingovernment are the foundation on which the structure of government rests. State officials and

employees of government hold a public trust that obligates them, in a special way, to honesty andintegrity in fulfilling the responsibilities to which they are elected and appointed. Paramount in thattrust is the principle that public office, whether elected or appointed, may not be used for personalgain or private advantage.The citizens of the state expect all state officials and employees toperform their public responsibilities in accordance with the highest ethical and moral standardsand to conduct the business of the state only in a manner that advances the public's interest.State officials and employees are subject to the sanctions of law and scrutiny of the media;ultimately, however, they are accountable to the people and must consider this publicaccountability as a particular obligation of the public service. Only when affairs of government areconducted, at all levels, with openness as provided by law and an unswerving commitment to thepublic good does government work as it should.

The obligations of government rest equally on the state's citizenry. The effectiveness of

government depends, fundamentally, on the confidence citizens can have in the judgments anddecisions of their elected representatives. Citizens, therefore, should honor and respect theprinciples and the spirit of representative democracy,recognizing that both elected and appointedofficials, together with state employees, seek to carry out their public duties with professional skilland dedication to the public interest. Such service merits public recognition and support. All whohave the privilege of working for the people of Washington state can have but one aim: To givethe highest public service to its citizens. [1994 c 154 1.]

3) It can be clearly shown that Officer Trask made NO attempt to check out the credibility of the


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witnesses, as evidenced by the fact that the Landlord made the complaint thinking they wereRose Adams dogs, & the fact that right in the Washington state court system is a termination ofparental rights for Rose Adams that clearly states she is mentally deficient& has been for quitesome time, the "nieghbor" staking the complaint did so at the request of Rose Adams & it shouldbe noted that she is also living with 2 sexual predators who are currently under supervision &trying to conceive a child with her current boyfriend who repeatedly raped a 3 yr old child &stalked a 13 yr old child as well & who by court order is not even supposed to be around childrenJust a precusory look at Rose Adams criminal record should've been enough to give anyonepause.

SNOHOMISHAdams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-south Div 165176 02-16-1993Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Snohomish Superior 93-2-04928-3 08-31-1993Adams, Rose M Respondent Snohomish Superior 95-2-05009-1 07-05-1995Adams, Rose M. Petitioner Sno Co-south Div A95-00268 09-28-1995Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-south Div A96-00260 10-16-1996Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-south Div A96-00258 10-16-1996Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-south Div A96-00261 10-16-1996Adams, Rose Respondent Sno Co-everett Div 97-311AH 08-26-1997Adams, Rose Respondent Sno Co-everett Div 97-171AH 05-22-1997

Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-everett Div 97-207AH 06-16-1997Adams, Rose Defendant Snohomish Superior 98-2-09032-2 12-02-1998Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-south Div A99-00063 03-31-1999Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-south Div C00036999 12-29-1999Adams, Rose Defendant Snohomish Superior 00-2-09388-6 12-06-2000Adams, Rose M Judgment Debtor Snohomish Superior 00-9-03737-0 06-15-2000Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-south Div C00039284 11-07-2000Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Snohomish Superior 01-2-00338-9 03-12-2001Adams, Rose Defendant Snohomish Superior 01-2-01649-9 01-08-2001Adams, Rose Judgment Debtor Snohomish Superior 01-9-01682-6 03-14-2001Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Snohomish Superior 01-2-00337-1 03-12-2001Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Snohomish Superior 01-2-00339-7 03-12-2001Adams, Rose T H/w Defendant Snohomish Superior 02-2-08098-5 07-12-2002

Adams, Rose T H/w Judgment Debtor Snohomish Superior 02-9-05607-9 07-15-2002Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-south Div D03-00170 10-24-2003Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-everett Div PC04-2218 08-25-2004Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-south Div C00011544 09-27-2004Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-south Div C00011543 09-27-2004Adams, Rose Marie Respondent Sno Co-everett Div U04-00671 04-22-2004Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Snohomish Superior 04-2-00445-2 04-20-2004Adams, Rose Defendant Snohomish Superior 05-2-10520-6 08-02-2005Adams, Rose Judgment Debtor Snohomish Superior 05-9-09830-2 08-02-2005Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Snohomish Superior 05-1-01959-4 07-29-2005Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-south Div C00087109 07-25-2005Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-south Div C00087110 07-25-2005Adams, Rose Judgment Debtor Snohomish Superior 07-9-08916-4 09-07-2007

Adams, Rose H/w Defendant Snohomish Superior 07-2-07272-0 09-04-2007Adams, Rose H/w Judgment Debtor Snohomish Superior 07-9-08913-0 09-07-2007Adams, Rose Defendant Snohomish Superior 07-2-07370-0 09-07-2007Adams, Rose M Petitioner Sno Co-south Div C07-00782 03-09-2007Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-south Div I05420944 12-13-2007Adams, Rose T And John Doe Defendant Sno Co-south Div C08-01858 06-27-2008Adams, Rose Defendant Snohomish Superior 09-2-11839-4 12-18-2009Adams, Rose M Petitioner Sno Co-south Div U09-00053 03-18-2009Adams, Rose M Petitioner Sno Co-south Div U09-00054 03-19-2009Adams, Rose Defendant Snohomish Superior 10-2-02911-5 02-24-2010


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Adams, Rose Judgment Debtor Snohomish Superior 10-9-08050-7 04-14-2010Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-evergreen Div XY0026677 02-01-2010Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Snohomish Superior 10-2-00835-5 06-07-2010Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-everett Div 1095A10FE 05-07-2010Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-south Div U10-00012 01-19-2010Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-south Div U10-00011 01-19-2010EVERETTAdams, Rose Marie Defendant Everett Municipal CR0081455 /04-02-2008Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Everett Municipal IN0128726 /12-01-2010THURSTONAdams, Rose Marie Respondent Thurston Superior 07-2-30559-6 08-09-2007Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Thurston Superior 08-2-30308-7 05-09-2008Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Thurston Superior 08-2-30307-9 05-09-2008Adams, Rose Judgment Debtor Thurston Superior 08-9-00725-4 06-03-2008Adams, Rose Marie Respondent Thurston Superior 08-2-30502-1 07-29-2008Adams, Rose Plaintiff Thurston County Dist 27974 07-29-2008Adams, Rose Defendant Thurston Superior 08-2-01621-5 07-08-2008Adams, Rose Judgment Creditor Thurston Superior 08-9-01041-7 08-01-2008Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Thurston Superior 08-2-30590-0 08-29-2008Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Thurston Superior 08-2-30627-2 09-12-2008

Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Thurston Superior 08-2-30628-1 09-12-2008Adams, Rose Marie Judgment Debtor Thurston Superior 08-9-01282-7 10-01-2008Adams, Rose Judgment Debtor Thurston Superior 08-9-01567-2 12-05-2008KING COUNTYAdams, Rose Marie Defendant Kcdc-east Div (sho) J00046326 12-12-1989Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Kcdc-east Div (sho) J00041398 12-12-1989Adams, Rose M Petitioner King Co Superior Ct 89-2-13774-7 07-17-1989Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Kcdc-east Div (sho) J00009876 02-16-1990Adams, Rose M Petitioner King Co Superior Ct 90-2-02137-8 01-29-1990Adams, Rose M Petitioner King Co Superior Ct 90-2-13305-2 07-03-1990Adams, Rose M Petitioner King Co Superior Ct 91-2-19788-1 09-10-1991Adams, Rose M Petitioner Kcdc-east Div (sho) 91-009057 09-06-1991Adams, Rose Petitioner Kcdc-east Div (sho) 95-000843 07-05-1995

Adams, Rose M Petitioner King Co Superior Ct 95-2-18323-9 07-26-1995Adams, Rose M Petitioner Kcdc-east Div (sho) 95-000749 06-12-1995Adams, Rose M Petitioner Kcdc-east Div (sho) 95-001200 09-13-1995Adams, Rose Petitioner King Co Superior Ct 95-2-17127-3 07-07-1995Adams, Rose Petitioner Kcdc-east Div (sho) 95-000841 07-05-1995Adams, Rose Petitioner Kcdc-east Div (sho) 95-000842 07-05-1995Adams, Rose M Plaintiff King Co Superior Ct 97-2-16445-1 06-30-1997Adams, Rose Marie Defendant King County District IT0038177 09-06-2007Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Kirkland Municipal XY0073502 01-19-2010LYNNWOODAdams, Rose Marie Defendant Lynnwood Municipal I00168820 01-08-2009SEATTLEAdams, Rose M Defendant Seattle Municipal Ct 65919 06-06-1991

Adams, Rose M Defendant Seattle Municipal Ct 201656 06-22-1991Adams, Rose M Defendant Seattle Municipal Ct 201656 06-22-1994APPELANTAdams, Rose Appellant Coa, Division I 506374 06-19-2002Adams, Rose Appellant Coa, Division I 506366 06-19-2002PIERCE COUNTYAdams, Rose M Petitioner Pierce Co Superior 93-3-01866-4 04-19-1993


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Court of Appeals Division I State of Washington Opinion Information Sheet DocketNumber: 50636-6-I Title of Case:In RE the Dependency Of: J.A.B. (dob 8/20/92)v.Rose Adams and George Beutler, App. V. Dshs, Resp.File Date: 03/03/2003 SOURCE OF APPEALAppeal from Superior Court of Snohomish County Docket No: 017006963Judgment or order under review Date filed: 06/06/2002Judge signing: Hon. Richard J. ThorpeIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTONIN RE THE DEPENDENCY OF: No. 50636-6-IJ.A.B., consol. with Cause Nos. DOB: 08/20/92, 50637-4-I, 50739-7-IC.A., DOB: 05/31/86, DIVISION ONEMinor Children.

ROSE ADAMS and GEORGE BEUTLER,Appellants,v.STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES,Respondent. FILED

Per Curiam. In this consolidated appeal, Rose Adams and George Beutler challenge the orderterminating their parental rights in their son, J.B. Adams also challenges the termination of herparental rights in C.A., J.B.'s half-sister. Because the State has satisfied its burden of proving thestatutory elements set forth in RCW 13.34.180 and RCW 13.34.190, we affirm.FactsAdams and Beutler are the biological parents of J.B., who was born on August 20, 1992. Adamsis also the biological mother of C.A., who was born on May 31, 1986. Both C.A. and J.B. wereremoved from the home following the filing of a dependency petition in February 2000. Thedependency petition recited a lengthy history of referrals and concerns about neglect, angermanagement, domestic violence, parenting skills, and mental health issues. In particular, thepetition alleged that Adams had physically and verbally assaulted both children and expressedconcerns about Beutler's ability to protect the children.Adams and Beutler acknowledged that there had been "extreme family conflict" in the home,

including "inappropriate discipline" of the children. The parents also acknowledged that there hadbeen indications of substance abuse, including the fact that Beutler had tested positive inFebruary 2000 for amphetamine/methamphetamine and THC. Dr. Jolynn-Marie Wagner, alicensed psychologist, completed the court-ordered psychological assessments of both parents inlate 2000. The assessments were delayed for several months while Dr. Wagner waited for Adamsand Beutler to return questionnaires. Dr. Wagner never received the questionnaires and issuedher report in January 2001. As part of the evaluation, Dr. Wagner interviewed Adams and Beutlerseparately and together and observed Beutler interacting with J.B. and Adams interactingwithJ.B. and C.A. Dr. Wagner diagnosed Adams with antisocial personality disorder, finding her to behostile and with little insight into the events involving her children. Adams also displayed featuresof narcissistic personality disorder and borderline personality disorder. Adams generally blamed"the system" for her children's behavior and emotional difficulties. According to Dr. Wagner, it isdifficult to treat individualswith a similar profile because they tend to blame others. Dr. Wagner

observed little evidence of bonding between Adams and C.A. or Adams and J.B. and concludedthat an attempt at reunification with their mother was not in the children's best interest Dr. Wagnerdiagnosed Beutler with dependent personality disorder, noting his difficulty in expressingdisagreement with others, his excessive need for others to assume responsibility for most majorareas in his life, and his difficulty in making everyday decisions without advice and reassurance.Dr. Wagner found Beutler's dependency reflected in his commitment to the relationship withAdams, which was generally controlled by Adams and in which Beutler was demoralized andverbally abused. Dr. Wagner observed a relatively strong bond between Beutler and J.B. Basedon Dr. Wagner's evaluation, the court eventually ordered both Adams and Beutler to participate inpsychotherapy and parenting training. Beutler moved out of Adams' house shortly after the


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hearing and obtained a separate residence. But he went to Adams' house on December 16,2001, in violation of a restraining order. After January 2002, Beutler had no further contact withTheresa Espana, his social worker. No visitation occurred between Adams and C.A. during thetwo-year dependency. Visitation would have been permitted at C.A.'s request, but she neverexpressed a desire to see her mother. Adams' visitation with J.B. was suspended in February2001, because she was not in compliance with services and was not making progress. Visitationwas never restored.DecisionStandard of Review An order of permanent termination of the parent-child relationship may beentered when the statutory elements set forth in RCW 13.34.180 Rose Adams Adams firstcontends that the trial court erroneously considered the children's hearsay allegations assubstantive evidence of physical abuse. Prior to trial, Adams moved to exclude statements thatC.A. and J.B. had made to various persons alleging that she had physically abused them, Adamsflatly denied ever abusing J.B. or C.A. Beutler denied that he ever saw Adams abusing thechildren, but acknowledged that he suspected physical abuse when he heard yelling andsomething that sounded like slapping.The trial court then entered the following findings of fact: 1.28 J.B. and C.A. consistently reported

ongoing emotional and physical abuse by the biological mother to the evaluators in this case, thetherapists, school personal {sic}, social worker, and guardian ad litem. Any hearsay statementswere not proof of abuse but the fact that J.B. and C.A. made consistent repeated statements is

evidence of abuse. 1.29 The totality of the trial evidence confirms, and this court finds that thechildren were physically abused by the mother. The trial court also found that Beutler's testimonydenying knowledge of abuse was not credible. Adams argues that by considering the hearsaystatements cumulatively, the trial court effectively reversed the ruling that it would not considerthe statements as substantive evidence of abuse. The findings themselves do not identify thespecific nature of the "physical abuse." Under the circumstances, we decline the State's invitationto review the record in order to find an alternative basis upon which to sustain the trial court'sfinding of physical abuse. But even without the finding of physical abuse, the record supports thetrial court's termination of Adams' parental rights. Adams does not challenge the trial court'sfinding that she has been offered all necessary and reasonable services, and the recorddemonstrates that Adams has participated in numerous services, including parenting classes,anger management classes, domestic violence classes, counseling, and in-home therapyservices. But the State's witnesses clearly established that Adams had made no significant

progress in her ability to parent J.B. or C.A. Dr. Wagner, who diagnosed Adams with an antisocialpersonality disorder, noted that during the psychological evaluation, Adams frequently becameangry and raised her voice, cursing and going off on tangential topics. Adams dominated theconversation whenever Beutler was present and frequently abused him verbally. Despite heracknowledgement at the time of the agreed dependency order that there had been extremefamily conflict and inappropriate discipline, Adams blamed C.A., Beutler, and "the system" for thefamily's difficulties, and characterized C.A. as manipulative and dishonest. The record was alsoundisputed that J.B. and C.A. suffer from severe emotional or behavioral problems. J.B. had gonethrough extensive counseling, with the recognition that he needed continued social and emotionaldevelopment in a structured and safe environment. C.A. told Dr. Wagner that her greatest fearwas that her mother was correct and that she was a bad child. No evidence indicated that Adamshad any insight into the severity of the children's problems, whatever their source, or that shecould acquire any meaningful ability to respond to the children's needs in the foreseeable future.

Dr. Wagner also observed little evidence of a psychological bond in the interaction betweenAdams and J.B. and C.A. J.B. remained unresponsive to Adams' attempts at affection, andAdams exhibited little eye contact, smiling, or verbal give and take in her interaction with bothchildren. Adams did not respond to C.A.'s rudeness and the two maintained a wide distancebetween one another. Based on her evaluation, Adams' inability to control her anger, lack ofinsight, poor prognosis for treatment, and failure to benefit from many years of services, C.A.'sstrong desire to remain in her father's home, and J.B.'s expressed fear of Adams, Dr. Wagnerconcluded that reunification with their mother was not in the children's best interest. Other Statewitnesses reached similar conclusions. Ellis Amdur, a child mental health specialist, interviewedAdams in conjunction with an assessment of C.A.'s placement with her father. During the


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interview, Adams asserted that all of C.A.'s allegations were false and blamed C.A. for many ofthe things that had happened during the dependency. Adams denied any personal responsibility.Dr. Bramhall diagnosed Adams with a bipolar II disorder, "characterized by alternating cycles ofhypomania and depression and recently mixed states." During the interview, Adams insisted thatprior CPS referrals had all been based on deliberate lies. Dr. Bramhall concluded that Adams'inability to control her anger prevented her from forming significant attachments with her childrenand setting appropriate limits. Leila Copeland testified that she provided in-home parentingservices for Adams for approximately 18 months. Copeland felt that Adams wanted to makechanges in her behavior patterns, that she was resourceful in seeking out assistance in thecommunity, and that there was improvement in Adams' ability to control her anger as to the childthat remained in her home. But Copeland also observed that Adams frequently reverted to oldhabits. Copeland characterized Adams' overall progress with parenting, anger management, andcommunication skills as "minimal." At the end of the intervention, Copeland concluded thatAdams had "minimal" insight into the effect of her actions on others. Clear, cogent, andconvincing evidence supports the trial court's findings that all necessary and reasonably availableservices capable of correcting parental deficiencies have been offered or provided, that noamount of services will be capable of correcting Adams' parental deficiencies, and that there islittle likelihood that conditions will be remedied within the foreseeable future. Continuation of theparent-child relationship clearlydiminishes C.A.'s and J.B.'s prospects for integration into a stableandpermanent home.8 Substantial evidence also established that termination of Adams' parental

rights is in the best interests of C.A. and J.B. Even without the finding of physical abuse, the Statesatisfied its burden under RCW 13.34.180 and RCW 13.34.190; substantial evidence supportsthe trial court's termination order as to Adams.

George BeutlerBeutler conceded that his relationship with Adams was hostile, violent, abusive, and extremely

harmful to J.B. and that separation was necessary to insure J.B.'s safety. Beutler did not establisha separate residence until the court ordered him to do so in November 2001. Less than onemonth later, he violated a court order by going to Adams' residence. Several witnesses testifiedthat Adams and Beutler were continuing to see one another shortly before the terminationhearing. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that there is little likelihoodBeutler's deficiencies will be remedied so that J.B. can be returned in the near future.Continuation of Beutler's parental relationship clearly diminished J.B.'s prospects for early

integration into a stable and permanent home.

Affirmed.For the court: (e) That there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child canbe returned to the parent in the near future. (f) That continuation of the parent and childrelationship clearly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable andpermanent home.

Spinelli v.United States 393 U.S. 410 (1969)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE: Spinelli (D) argued that the evidence gathered was inadmissiblehaving been obtained pursuant to a search warrant improperly issued on the basis of a

confidential informant's tip, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The warrant lacked probablecause.

PROCEDURE BELOW: The D was convicted of traveling in interstate commerce with theintention of conducting illegal gambling activities. The District Court refused to suppress evidenceobtained through a search of an apartment. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Courtreversed and remanded the case.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS: The D was convicted for traveling to Missouri from Illinois with theintention of gambling. D appealed, challenging the search warrant obtained by the FBI to obtain


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evidence. The application on which the warrant was based included four main parts: 1. The FBIhad tracked D for five days, during four of which he traveled from Illinois to a certain apartmenthouse in Missouri, and on one day he was further tracked to a specific apartment in the building;2. Two phone numbers are associated with the specific apartment; 3. The government officialsstated that this person was a known bookie; and 4. A reliable informant told the FBI that D was abookie and used the two phone numbers associated with the apartment in Missouri.

LEGAL ISSUE: Does an informant's tip provide probable cause for the issuance of a searchwarrant if the tip does not state reasons why the informant is reliable and does not includespecifics regarding the facts known by the informant?

HOLDING: An informant's tip does not provide probable cause for the issuance of a searchwarrant if the tip does not state reasons why the informant is reliable and does not includespecifics regarding the facts known by the informant.

OVERVIEW: Defendant challenged the constitutionality of the warrant that authorized the FederalBureau of Investigation (FBI) search, which uncovered the evidence necessary for his conviction.The warrant was granted by a magistrate judge upon an affidavit stating that the FBI hadobserved defendant's travels to and from an apartment and that a confidential reliable informanthad informed the authorities that defendant was operating a gambling operation. On certiorari, the

court found that the application for the warrant was inadequate because it failed to set forth theunderlying circumstances necessary to enable the magistrate to independently judge the validityof the informant's information. Also the affiant-officers failed to support their claim that theirinformant was "credible" or his information "reliable." The bald assertion that defendant was"known" as a gambler was entitled to no weight in appraising the magistrate's decision and theCourt rejected as imprecise the "totality of circumstances" approach embraced by the court ofappeals. Thus, the affidavit fell short

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