NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS

REPORT : GUNS

The Untied Stales and Soviet Union flooded Latin America with Kalashnikov rifles, like these AK-lSs. during the Cold War.

Rachel Stohl and

Doug Tuttle are

Senior Analyst and

Research Assistant,

respective!)', a! Ihe

Center Jar Defense

information in

Washington, D.C.

(www.cdi.org).

u

By Racbel Stohl and Doug TuHle |

S MALL ARMS AND GUN VIOLENCE PRESENT THE

most dramatic threat to public safety inLatin America and the Caribbean, After

decades of uncontroUed proliferation, at least45 million to 80 million small arms and lightweapons—that is, weapons operated by an in-dividual or sma]] group, inc]uding handguns,assault rifles, grenades, grenade launchers, andeven man portable surface to air missiles—arecircu]atmg throughout the region,' Gunshotskill between 73.000 and 90,000 people eachyear in Latin America, and guns are the lead-ing cause of death among Latin Americans be-tween the ages of 15 and 44, according to WorldHealth Organization estimates.^

SmaU arms flooded Latin America during theCold War, most significantly during the CentralAmerican civil wars of the 1980s, Although di-verse motivations, channels, and suppliers havehad a hand in their proliferation, the Cold Warand its legacies bear most of the responsibility.Both the United States and the Soviet Unionsupp]ied their Latin American a]]ies with massquantities of weapons through proxy arms dea]-

ers. The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact alliessent weapons to Cuba, which then passed themto the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.-̂

In response, the United States often providedits Centra] American allies, like the counter-revo]utionary Nicaraguan Contras, with Sovietweaponry, most notab]y the AK-47, in orderto maintain officia] "deniabi]ity" of its involve-ment in the conflicts. The U,S. mifitary allegedlymaintained warehouses of Soviet-bloc weaponsthat were distributed throughout the region,"*The United States also used third countries,including Israel, to supp]y the Contras, In ElSalvador, the Farabundo Marti National Libera-tion Front received AK-47s from the Honduranmilitary, which had raided the CIAs Nicaraguansupplies.^ Caches of Cold War-origin weaponsare still being found in Latin America,

Today, most legal weapons in Latin Americacome from the United States, Europe, or thesmall but growing regional arms industry. Be-cause the international sma]l-arms trade lacksfull transparency, and a significant portion ofthe trade is iHicit, it is difficu]t to know the

MARCH/APRIL 2008

REPORT: GUNS

types and estimate the quantities of weapons that LatinAmerican countries import. According to data providedby the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, in2005 Latin America legally imported at least $175 mil-lion worth of smal] arms and ]ight weapons, as we]l asammunition and spare paris. The United States was themain supplier to the region, exporting almost $50 millionworth of these weapons. Other major suppliers to LatinAmerica that year included Be]gium, the Czech Republic.Germany. Israel, Italy, Russia, South Africa, and Spain,

The same 2005 data reveals that the vast majorityof the $29 million worth of U.S. small arms flowing toSouth America went to Colombia, Mexico imported $10million worih, almost as much as all the small arms thatCentral America and the Caribbean imported combined.^Venezuela, meanwhile, spent $10 million on small armsand other weapons and supplies from Belgium, Venezuelaalso made a controversial purchase of 100,000 AK-47sworth about $4 million from Russia that year, in a dealthat included co-production rights.

Traditionally, Latin American countries have not pro-duced enough weapons to meet their domestic militaryneeds and have relied on imports to fill their arsenals.While almost every country in Latin America manufac-tures small arms to some extent, production capabilitiesvary greatly throughout the region,^ In 2005, Brazil, Mex-ico, Argentina, and Chile were the largest regional pro-ducers of small arms, and also the four largest regionalexporters, transferring $15.5 million, $3,6 million, $3,2million, and $657,000 worth of weapons, respectively,to other Latin American countries,^ Still, Latin Ameri-can small-arms production is relatively small in scope.According to the SmaU Arms Survey, only about 4% ofthe smaU-arms-producing companies in the world are lo-cated in South America, on par with sub-Saharan Africaand the Middle East.̂ However, in August, 2007, Russia'sIzhevsk Manufacturing Plant announced it had finalizedthe deal to build two factories in Venezuela to produceAK-103 assault rifles and their 7.62 mm ammunition.Construction on the factories began at the end of 2007and is scheduled to be completed by 2010. The U.S. andColombian governments have complained that the Ven-ezuelan military's stockpiles of 7.62 mm FN FAL rifles,which the new AK-lO3s will replace, might be divertedto Colombian guerrillas.'"

On top of these officially approved arms transfers, theillicit small arms trade in Latin America is thriving. Theregion is a smuggler's paradise: A vast coastline, denselyforested mountains, porous borders, clandestine airstrips,widespread government corruption, a lack governmen-

tal resources and political will to confront the trade, andentrenched and powerful narco-traffickers—aU havecontributed to the unregulated flow of weapons, drugs,and people. The tnborder area of Paraguay, Brazil, andArgentina has become a particularly lucrative cross-bordersmuggling region. Smuggled goods in this area, includingweapons and narcotics, are valued between $2 biUion and$3 billion annually" Hezbollah runs much of the area'ssmuggling activities, using profits to suppon activities inthe western hemisphere and the Middle East.'^

But the region's largest and most sophisticated black-market arms-trafficking network serves the ongoingarmed conflict in Colombia, which has fueled an informalarms race between paramilitaries, guerrillas, and privatecitizens. Anecdotal evidence suggests that large quanti-ties of small arms, bound for Colombian guerrillas andparamilitaries alike, arrive in Central America via searoutes and are then routed through Panama, which actsas the largest single transit hub for Colombia's weapons.Researchers have identified 37 trafficking routes fromPanama into Colombia, 26 from Ecuador, 21 from Ven-ezuela, and 14 from Brazil, according to a RAND study.̂ ^

The U,S.-Mexican border is also a central routethrough which illicit small arms enter Latin America.A study released by the Mexican government suggeststhat as many as 2,000 guns are crossing the U.S.-Mexicoborder daily As in Colombia, these guns are fuelling anarms race, in this case between Mexican drug cartels,costing the Uves of 4,000 people m 18 months.'"• Weap-ons, including assault rifles like AK-47s, AR-15s, andM-16s, fetch up to three times their U,S, market value inMexico, assuring a continued southward flow of weap-ons, (See "Guns: The U.S. Threat to Mexican NationalSecurity," page 21,)

In addition to international smuggling, the diversionof domestic production and privately owned stocks con-tributes to illicit ownership in Latin America, Domesticproduction is most important in Brazil; about 80% ofthe illegal guns in Rio de Janeiro are made domestically,according to the Small Arms Survey, and police recordsindicate that between April 1999 and June 2005, 72%of illegal firearms seized by Brazilian police were domesti-cally made,'^ The majority of these firearms were legallyproduced and sold, and then diverted to illicit marketsthrough sale, trade, or theft.

Craft production—crude, small-scale, handmade pro-duction of weapons—has been documented in Chile,Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, and El Salvador, and also fu-els the ilUcit trade. In Chile, for example, craft productionis economically insignificant but used to provide weap-

1S

REPORT: GUNS

NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS

ons for criminal groups. Homemade firearms, known asarmas hechizas, are used by street gangs for local crime.Although not exported, the weapons are used regularlyby groups that have difficulty acquiring weapons becauseof short supplies and strict legal restrictions ongun purchases,'** In pans of Central America,youth gangs assemble makeshift pistols out ofbedsprings and metal tubing. In Santa Ana,El Salvador, informal workshops can produceimitations of .22- and .38-caliber pistols.''More sophisticated and larger-scale craft pro-duction also takes place. Since the 1990s, theRevolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia(FARC) and Colombian drug cartels have beenproducing 9 mm submachine guns that mimicthe U.S,-made Intratec 9, better known as theSaturday Night Special. Similar types of craftproduction have also begun to emerge in Rio de Janeiroand Sao Paulo, Brazil,'"

Small arms have

become both the

currency and com-

modity of the drug

trade. Weapons are

its hallmark at every

stage, from cultiva-

tion to distribution.

REGARDLESS OF THE SOURCE. SMALL ARMS IN LATIN

America have led to a variety of crises through-out the region. Ironically, gun violence in many

countries actually increased after formal warfare end-ed. For example, in El Salvador, which experiencedone of Latin America's most brutal civil wars from1980 to 1992, the percentage of homicides causedby firearms increased from 55% in 1990-95 to 75%in 1999,'^ The Inter-American Development Bank(lADB) estimates that almost a quarter of the country'sannual GDP is spent addressing the growing violence.Yet weapons continue to stream into El Salvador andthe rest of Central America, mostly from the UnitedStates, For example, between 1996 and 1999 the U.S.government delivered $376,000 in small arms to Cos-ta Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and Panama, while inthe same period more than $66 million in authorizedprivate sales from the United States flowed to the samecountries,^''

Uncontrolled small arms are responsible for in-creased firearm homicides and increasing gang vio-lence,^' In the favelas of Brazil, the murder rate foryoung men aged 15 to 24 is 113.8 per 100,000, In2001, firearms caused 65% of deaths among youngmen aged 15 to 19,̂ ^ In Ecuador, more than 1,000informal youth groups are involved with organizedarmed violence in the country. Shifting crime patternsand availability of guns in Jamaica left more than 200children between the ages of 10 and 19 hospitalizedfrom gunshot wounds in 2000 alone,"16

Although the majority of conQicts in Latin Americaconcluded soon after the end of the Cold War, somecontinue and others have reignited. Exacerbated bythe ready availability of small arms on international,

regional, and domestic markets, the 40-year civil war in Colombia continues tocost thousands of lives and displaces millions of people. In Haiti, a country pre-cariously perched between war and peactarmed gangs are employed to use violencein an attempt to destroy the fragile peaceprocess, as corrupt officials and drug traf-fickers exploit the instability caused by thecontinual violence.

Furthermore, these weapons threateneconomic development. Gun violenceburdens communities with higher health

care costs, reducing productivity and discouraging in-vestment. Compared to other types of violent trauma,gunshot wounds exact a higher cost m Latin America.A 2003 study by the Small Arms Survey in Rio de Ja-neiro, for example, found that the average medicalcost of a single gunshot wound was $4,500, almostthree times the cost of a stab wound.^'' Gun violenceexacts almost $90 million in health costs in Brazil and$40 million in Colombia, while productivity losses areestimated at $10 billion and $4 billion for the twocountries, respectively,^^

The United Nations Development Program has es-timated the cost of violence in El Salvador at 11.5%of the country's GDP Moreover, a 1999 report by theInter-American Development Bank estimates that vio-lence costs Latin America $16,8 billion, or 14,2% of itsGDP '̂" The lADB also estimates that the per capita GDPin Latin America would be 25% higher if crime rateswere more on par with the rest of the world, ln otherwords, the proliferation and misuse of firearms under-mines growth, threatens human welfare, negativelyimpacts business, threatens investment, and hindersdevelopment throughout the region.'^

SmaU arms have become both the currency and com-modity of the drug trade, A nebulous and mutually re-inforcing relationship between firearms, narcotics, andgangs fuels the trade in both guns and drugs. Guer-rilla movements, street gangs, and organized criminalsyndicates perpetuate the demand for guns throughcompetition, intimidation, and violence. Weapons are ahallmark of the drug trade at every stage, from cultiva-tion to distribution. In Costa Rica, peasants have beenarmed with AK-47s to protect marijuana plantations.

MARCH/APRIL 2008

REPORT: GUNS

Protesting violence against women in Medellin, Colombia, in 2002

and dozens of armed gangs in Guatemala City havestrong ties with international drug dealers.^^

T HE CONSEQUENCES OF SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION

and misuse are multidimensional, and thus con-trol efforts require various, multifaceted solutions.

Because smaU arms have legitimate police, military, andcivilian uses, simply banning them is both unpracticaland unlikely. Therefore, policies and programs must bedeveloped that address smaU-arms proliferation and mis-use both from the top down and the bottom up, takingplace at international, regional, national, and local levels,and implemented simultaneously and cooperatively Ingeneral, smaU-arms policies should control the supply ofweapons, eliminate potentially dangerous stockpiles, endmisuse, and attempt to lessen demand.

Many steps have been undertaken at the United Na-tions, but Latin America has a mixed record of participat-ing in them. The UN Firearms Protocol, intended to curbthe iUicit manufacturing and trade in smaU arms throughmore effective policing, has only eight of its 49 ratifica-tions from Latin American countries. And Latin Americancountries have also minimally complied with the volun-tary UN Programme of Action (PoA), a global agreementthat outlines state responsibiUties established at a 2001UN conference called "The lUicit Trade in SmaU Armsand light Weapons in AU Its Aspects," In 2006, only twothirds of Latin American countries had estabUshed a na-tional smaU-arms point of contact—the primary govern-ment functionary on small arms matters—which is the

most basic step that states can take toadhere to the agreement. Most states inthe region have some import laws andprocedures on the books, yet very fewhave any controls over the activities ofarms brokers, the shady middlemenwho coordinate illicit arms deals, andeven fewer conduct regular reviews ofweapons stockpiles, which are attrac-tive targets for theft and diversion.

But the region's governments didshow widespread support for a newUN initiative aimed at establishing aninternational arms-trade treaty thatwould institute standards for import-ing, exporting, and otherwise transfer-ring conventional weapons, includingsmall arms. A December 2006 UN

General Assembly resolution that es-tabUshed a group of governmental

experts (GGE) to assess the feasibility and parametersof such a treaty enjoyed the support of all Latin Ameri-can and Caribbean states, passing by a vote of 153 to1—with only the United States dissenting, Latin Americahas been instrumental in this process; the GGE beganits work m February and is led by an Argentine ambas-sador, while Costa Rica, an original co-sponsor of theUN resolution, has long led the effort for a global codeof conduct on arms transfers. In fact, the idea was firstintroduced as the Nobel Laureate's Code of Conduct onArms Transfers by former Costa Rican president OscarArias in 1997.

At the regional level, Latin America often uses criminalviolence, urban violence, and drug trafficking as lensesthrough which to view small-arms proliferation. As such,the region has built many of its frameworks for small-arms control based on experiences dealing with theseinterconnected issues. Within the region, the most signif-icant accomplishment has been the Inter-American Con-vention Against the IUicit Manufacturing of and Traffick-ing in Firearms. Explosives, and Other Related Materials,or CIFTA by its Spanish acronym, also known as the OASConvention (see "The US, Senate: StaUing HemisphericArms Control," page 18). CIFTA and the subsequentmodel regulations that have been developed on imple-mentation, as well as on substantive issues like markingand tracing, have inspired the subregions themselves toalso address small-arms violence and proliferation.

Central America has been especially active on smallarms. The Central American Integration System (SICA)

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REPORT: GUNS

NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS

universally adopted a politically binding code of conducton smaU arms, ammunition, and explosives transfers inDecember 2005, It prohibits signatories from transfer-nng weapons to governments chat commit human rightsabuses or violate international humanitarian law.

In January 2003 the Andean Community (Bolivia,Colombia, Ecuador. Peru, and Venezuela) adopted Deci-sion 552. approving a plan to crack down on illicit armstrafficking,-'-̂ The MERCOSUR states have also focusedon small arms through explorations of urban violence,drug trafficking, and criminality Although MERCOSURadopted a Joint Firearms Registration Mechanism in

1998, it has not yet become operational. Still, a FirearmsWorking Group has worked to coordinate subregionalimplementation of CIFTA, as well as a cooperative tracingof weapons and harmonization of national laws,̂ '̂

Individual countries within Latin America have alsoadopted national and unilateral small-arms policies, Bra-zil has been extremely active in addressmg small-armsproliferation at the national level and has taken incre-mental steps to achieve great progress. The Brazilian gov-ernment has also worked closely with nongovernmentalorganizations like Viva Rio, which works to prevent urbancrime and conducts large-scale public demonstrations on

The U.S. Senate: Stalling Hemispheric Arms Controln 1997, President Bill Clinton, standing beside Mexican presi-dent Ernesto Zedillo in the Organization of American States'

flag-bedecked Hall of the Americas, declared: "Gun traffick-ing is an issue of national security for our governments, anda matter of neighborhood security for all of us in the Ameri-cas," The presidents had joined together to sign an OAS treatyknown as the Firearms Convention, or by its Spanish initials asCIFTA, designed to end the illicit manufacture and traffickingof guns, ammunition, explosives, and related materials. It re-quires that ratifying nations create laws (ifthey do not alreadyexist) that establish procedures for importing, exporting, andtracing small arms, light weapons, and ammunition, and aswell as mechanisms for enforcement.

As Zedillo noted at the signing, the convention is "the first in-ternational legal instrumentof its sort,"Thatthefirstinternationalarms-control agreement was signed in the Americas reflects anumber of crucial dynamics. The region was just emerging froma period of intense conflicts, many of which where perpetuatedby illicit weapons flows across national borders. But unlike oth-er regions emerging from warfare, the Americas include bothmajor suppliers and major importers, making an agreement thatremoves contradictions between national laws necessary. Itusefully includes both supplier and recipient states, has broaddefinitions of firearms and explosives, and is legally binding,

A 2000 State Department fact sheet boasted that "the UnitedStates was a leader in concluding" the treaty. "First proposedby Mexico and negotiated in just seven months," it continued,"this agreement strengthens the ability of the OAS nations toeradicate illicit arms trafficking, while protecting the legal tradein firearms." The United States helped develop the convention,according to a 2002 State Department fact sheet and it was"modeled on U.S. laws, regulations, and practices," The con-vention is "an outstanding example of the contribution that theOAS is making to the security of the hemisphere," asserts thesame statement

On June 9, 1998, the U,S, Senate received the treaty andreferred it to the Foreign Relations Committee "by unanimousconsent" And then . . . nothing, Today, the United States-together with Canada, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Guyana, Suriname, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines—has yetto ratify the treaty. Responsibility for this, at least at first, restedon the shoulders of one man: Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), whofrom 1995 to 2001 served as the chairman of the Senate ForeignRelations Committee, where he earned the nickname SenatorNo. The Firearms Convention and countless other treaties werevictims of Helms' beef with the United Nations and PresidentClinton, and he was not going to allow debate on any treaty untilthe Clinton administration submitted to his will.

A strong ally of the National Rifle Association, Helms had aspecial disdain for arms control, as is evident in his dispatchingof a modest $200,000 USAID-sponsored measure calling for amoratorium on the small-arms trade in West Africa, In a 1999 let-ter to the agency. Helms wrote that the "project proposes usingU,S, taxpayers' money (among other things) to lobby or promotepolicies in foreign countries that may very well be a violationof the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution—if the fed-eral government attempted such activities here at home." Theproposed aid. Helms wrote, was "nothing less than a brazeninternational expansion of the President and Vice President'sdomestic gun control agenda," The measure did not pass.

But Helms no longer bangs the gavel in Foreign Relations,The chairman is Joe Biden (D-DeL), who received an F from theNRA for his pro-gun-control votes. Recently, Biden may havebeen too busy campaigning for the Oval Office to champion theFirearms Convention, but all that is needed is his green light, andthe committee will hold hearings setting the ratification wheelsin motion. The minority leader, Richard Lugar (R-IN), takes armscontrol very seriously, and has his name attached to some ofthe most effective bilateral arms control efforts in existence.But he has not championed the OAS convention either.

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REPORT: GUNS

small arms, including gun destructions. Weapons coUec-tion programs prior to the pubUc destructions have takenliterally tons of weapons off the street. About 100,000guns were publicly destroyed in June 2001, 10,000 inJuly 2002, and 5.000 in 2003,^' For Brazil, which has afirearm death rate more than twice the world average, andwhere more people have been killed by guns during thelast 10 years than in any other country (including coun-tnes at war), the public destructions build confidencethat the government is addressing the problem of gunviolence, raise awareness about the problem, and placespolitical pressure on the Brazilian congress to develop

stronger national gun laws."In 2004, Brazil undertook a National Voluntary Fire-

arms Handover campaign, which led to the recovery ofnearly 250,000 weapons in six months, exceeding theprogram's original target of 80,000. The initial success ofthe initiative prompted the Brazilian president to extendthe program an additional six months. In aU, the year-long collection program removed 450,000 firearms fromthe hands of civilians."*' In October 2005, Brazil voted ona resolution that would ban civilian possession of gunsand ammunition. Although the referendum failed, it wasthe first vote of its kind and served to raise awareness

Yet in the State Department's 2002 letter to the Senate For-eign Relations Committee outlining the administration's treatypriorities, the convention was the first on the list of treaties thatshould be given very high priority, right below "urgent" priori-ties. In more recent editions ofthat annual letter, the conventionhas sunk lower down that list

There has been a little movement on the Convention, but notfrom the Senate leadership. Senator DIanne Feinstein (D-CA) in-sists that ratifying the convention "will help create a regime forthe control of illicit trade in small arms which serves the stra-tegic, economic, and political interests of the United States."In 2004, she and three other senators sponsored the Securityand Fair Enforcement in Arms Trafficking Act which (amongother things) sought to urge the Congress that the "Secretaryof State should encourage those countries that have not doneso to sign and ratify" the Firearms Convention. That the UnitedStates should be one of the nations so urged is strongly implied.This bill was also referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Com-mittee, and that was the end of that

Part of the reason for the lack of movement could be an un-willingness to aggravate the "sleeping lion" of the NRA, Thepro-gun group's influence is visible in repeated exhortationsthat nothing in the OAS treaty limit constitutionally protectedgun ownership in the United States. Perhaps knowing it hasthe Senate committee's ear, the NRA has not made defeat-ing the Firearms Convention a central plank in its internationalwork; certainly it has not reached the same apoplexy overthe OAS treaty as it did over UN work on small arms, which itcalled a "global gun grab." Meanwhile, with only a slim major-ity in the midst of a defining political moment the Democratsmight be timid about pushing a treaty that could serve to unifytheir opposition.

From the administration's perspective, it is possible thatratification is not a priority because the United States wieldsconsiderable power throughout the OAS despite its lack of

by Frida Berrigan

support for the convention. Technically, all 35 independentnations in the western hemisphere are members of the OAS,although Cuba is barred from participating under its currentgovernment. While all nations contribute to the group's annualbudget of about $77 million, the United States' share accountsfor almost 60%. Washington also contributes well over $1 mil-lion annually to specific projects it deems important includingde-mining, development assistance, and a fund dedicated to"strengthening democracy." These contributions "give theUnited States significant leverage over the types of projectsundertaken by the OAS," according to the Congressional Re-search Service,

The OAS convention^a sensible security tool—is just oneof the many casualties of the Bush administration's disdainfor international and multilateral treaties: the Kyoto Protocol,the International Criminal Court, the list goes on. There aremore than two dozen treaties awaiting congressional action.Some, like the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofDiscrimination Against Women, have been languishing fordecades despite an absence of opposition, Mexico City andWashington's close collaboration on the treaty is ironic, giventhat the flow of guns from the United States to Mexico remainsan enormous problem and a source of growing tension.

The Senate's inaction on this and similar treaties furtherindicates the deep antipathy toward internationally bindingagreements that permeates Washington politics. Senator JohnKyi (R-AZ) sums up the administration's anti-treaty philosophyas "peace through strength, not peace through paper," Underthe Bush administration, the United States struck out on itsown, ignoring, undermining, and in some cases toppling keyinternational agreements negotiated by earlier administra-tions in the interest of peace and security.

Frida Berrigan is a senior program associate m//? (/le New AmericaFoundation's Arms and Security Initiative.

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NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS

about smaU-arms issues throughout Latin America. InJune 2007 Aigentlna launched its own gun buyback andamnesty program; in the first six months, thegovernment destroyed 70,000 weapons andcollected 50.000 rounds of ammunition. ̂ ''

Other Latin American countries have im-plemented national destruction programs.The United States has worked for several yearswith the Nicaraguan government to destroythe country's many shoulder-fired SAM-7missiles received from the Soviet Union dur-ing the 1980s, These weapons are ideal forlerronsts, who could use them to shoot downcommercial aircraft. In 2005, Nicaragua de-stroyed 1,000 of them, though it is believed tohave another 1,000 in Us arsenal. The Nicara-guan government has said it intends to keep400 for its national defense force,"

U.S. arms policies,

including loopholes

in existing laws and

opposition to creat-

ing strong interna-

tional agreements,

have allowed U.S.

arms to flow to Latin

America with contin-

ued devastating

consequences.

A LTHOUGH SEVERAL TREATIES, INTERNATIONAL AGREE-

ments, regional and subregional initiatives, andnational policies on small arms exist, Latin Amer-

ican countries would benefit from additional assistancefor implementing treaties and agreements and undertak-ing programmatic initiatives to disarm (through coUectmgand destroying weapons and improving stockpile manage-ment), demobilize armed groups, and reintegrate formercombatants into society Such assistance would bolsterstrategies and programs and allow Latin America to takemeaningful steps to stop the small-arms scourge.

The United States is uniquely positioned to lead suchefforts in Latin America, highlighting its complicated, of-ten contradictory, arms relationship with the region. Thecountry has long been the regions chief arms exporter, pro-viding miUions of dollars' worth of weapons, while at thesame time providing substantial assistance on small-armscontrol. Since 2001, for example, the United States helpedfour Latin American countries destroy thousands of sur-plus small arms and shoulder-fiired rockets, and to improvestockpile security In Fl Salvador, the United Stales helpeddestroy 30,000 smaU arms in 2003, in Honduras, 13.680small arms and 5,772 unstable aviation bombs were de-stroyed in 2006-07, in Nicaragua, 1,011 shoulder-firedrockets were destroyed in 2004-06, and in Suriname, 3million ,50-cal rounds, 20.000 WWIl-vimage rounds, and20,000 small-arms munitions (including grenades) weredestroyed in 2006-07,'^

Similarly, the United States has used its own nationallaws to prevent diversion and encourage improved nationalstockpile security practices by Latin Amencan countries. In20

the mid-1990s the United States applied its export con-trol laws to suspend arms sales to Paraguay because of

their likely diversion to Brazil, Brazilian policeregularly seized U,S, guns from crime scenes,guns that had not been legally supplied toBrazil. The U.S, Bureau for Alcohol, Tobacco,Firearms, and Explosives (BATF), with the as-sistance of the State Department and the thenOffice of Defense Trade Controls, worked withthe Brazilian police to trace the weapons' ori-gins. They discovered that the seized weaponshad been legally transferred from the UnitedStates to Paraguay, but illegally divened toBrazil. The United States requested that Para-guay enact tighter controls over its weaponsimports, but Paraguay neglected to do so. In1996, after several warnings, the United Statessuspended small-arms exports to Paraguay,lifting them only when arms policy improve-

ments were implemented,^^

Nonetheless, the United States has frequently been onthe opposite side of its hemispheric neighbors by opposinginternational controls on the small-arms trade. As notedabove, the United States was the lone dissenter on estab-lishing a treaty to control the arms trade, has consistentlystalled and weakened efforts to develop other interna-tional measures, and has been ineffective in stopping thecross-border trade with Mexico, U,S, arms policies, includ-ing loopholes in existing laws and opposition to creatingstrong international agreements, clash with U.S. program-matic initiatives and have aUowed U.S. arms to flow toLatin America with continued devastating consequences.

Millions of small arms and lights weapons continueto circulate throughout Latin America, leaving a path otdestruction, cnme, and conflict. Whether these weap-ons were provided to fight the Cold War or to fuel drugand gang wars, through legal or illicit channels, theirpresence is responsible, in part, for the crime and vio-lence that has retarded development throughout LatinAmerica. These weapons last longer than their intendedpurposes require, perpetuating cycles of violence andunderdevelopment that affect the entire region. LatinAmerica is progressively taking steps to break this cycle,but significant work remains. Levels of crime and vio-lence are still unacceptably high in much of the region,especially among young people. If Latin America is toprosper in the coming generations, continued resources,efforts, and initiatives are needed to address the effectsof gun proliferation and violence that threaten LatinAmerica's future, Q