Narag v. Narag, 291 SCRA 451, June 29, 1998

FACTS:Mrs. Julieta Nunag filed several cases against his husband, Atty. Dominador Nunag, for his alleged affair with Gina Espita who happens to be a former student of the respondent back when Ms. Espita was a first-year college student. Finally, in the most recent case filed by Mrs. Nunag, the complainant had her seven children sign the appeal for disbarment of Atty. Nunag. Mrs. Nunag presented as evidence the pictures of the respondent and Ms. Espita together, love letters, testimony of Mr. Charlie Espita, the brother of Ms. Espita and the source of the mentioned pictures and love letters, and the testimony of the children of Atty. And Mrs Nunag. In the proceedings, Atty. Nunag has been engaged in an affair with Ms. Espita, and being live-in partners, have had two children with the latter. Atty. Nunag denied the allegations by presenting Argumentum ad Misericordia.

ISSUE:Should Atty. Nunag be disbarred even if he denied the allegations against him?

RULING:

Atty. Nunag was not able to invalidate the authenticity of the pieces of evidence presented against him, but instead, presented an argument to pity. He is, by order of the honorable court, being disbarred by virtue of The Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Undoubtedly, the canons of law practice were violated.

OLBES VS. DECIEMBRE

Spouses OLBES VS. Atty. VICTOR V. DECIEMBREAC-5365. April 27, 2005

Facts: Atty. Victor V. Deciembre was given five blank checks by Spouses Olbes for security of a loan. After the loan was paid and a receipt issued, Atty. Deciembre filled up four of the five checks for P50, 000 with different maturity date. All checks were dishonored. Thus, Atty. Deciembre fled a case for estafa against the spouses Olbes. This prompted the spouses Olbes to file a disbarment case against Atty. Deciembre with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. In the report, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 

Issue: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Deciembre was in accord with his fault.

Held: Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character. “A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader.” By taking the lawyer’s oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public’s faith in the legal profession. It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite respondent’s full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain.Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws. Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome. Thus, he is sentenced suspended indefinitely from the practice of law effective immediately.

IN RE: ARGOSINO

In Re: Argosino B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar applicant. Argosino was previously involved with hazing that caused the death of Raul Camaligan but was sentenced with homicide through reckless imprudence after he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced with 2 years imprisonment where he applied for a probation thereafter which was granted by the court with a 2 yr probation. He took the bar exam and passed but was not allowed to take oath. He filed a petition to allow him to take the attorney’s oath of office averring that his probation was already terminated. The court note that he spent only 10 months of the probation period before it was terminated.

ISSUE: WON Argosino may take oath of office.

RULING: The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good morals of all Bar members, keeping in mind that such is of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Hence he was asked by the court to produce evidence that would certify that he has reformed and have become a responsible member of the community through sworn statements of individuals who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to certify he is morally fit to the admission of the law profession. The court also ordered that said a copy of the proceeding be furnished to the family/relatives of Raul Camaligan.

Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997

EN BANC

[BAR MATTER No. 712.  March 19, 1997]

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH

R E S O L U T I O N

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a

scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a.  He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.

b.  He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.

c.  As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.

d.  He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration o f justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inf1icted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

"x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character."[1]

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider  de novo the question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.

Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy and commendable.  It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this cases, to find room for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.

SO ORDERED.

Case Digest: In Re: Argosino B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar applicant. Argosino was previously involved with hazing that caused the death of Raul Camaligan but was sentenced with homicide through reckless imprudence after he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced with 2 years imprisonment where he applied for a probation thereafter which was granted by the court with a 2 yr probation. He took the bar exam and passed but was not allowed to take oath. He filed a petition to allow him to take the attorney’s oath of office averring that his probation was already terminated. The court note that he spent only 10 months of the probation period before it was terminated.

ISSUE: WON Argosino may take oath of office.

RULING: The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good morals of all Bar members, keeping in mind that such is of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Hence he was asked by the court to produce evidence that would certify that he has reformed and have become a responsible member of the community through sworn statements of individuals who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to certify he is morally fit to the admission of the law profession. The court also ordered that said a copy of the proceeding be furnished to the family/relatives of Raul Camaligan.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-19450Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.

Paredes, J.:On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al., L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually engaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.

Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.

WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.

The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant hqXv.

*** The Supreme Court held that the isolate appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists of frequents or customary actions, a succession of facts of the same kind or frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services. The mere appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. It is alsoworth noted that, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

In the Matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo A. Diao vs. Severino G. Martinez

Facts: Telesforo A. Diao took the law examinations in 1953 and was admitted to the Bar.Two years later, Severino Martinez charged Diao of falsifying the information in his application for such Bar Examination. Upon further investigation, it was found that Diao did not finish his high school training, and neither did he obtain his Associate in Arts (AA) degree from Quisumbing College in 1941.Diao practically admits first charge, but claims that he served the US army, and took the General Classification Test which, according to Diao, is equivalent to a High School Diploma, although he failed to submit certification for such claim from any proper school officials.The claim was doubtlful, however, the second charge was clearly meritorious, as Diao did not obtain his AA degree from Quisumbing College. Diao claims that he was erroneously certified, and asserts that he obtained his AA from Arellano University in 1949.This claim was still unacceptable, as records would have shown that Diao graduated from the University in April 1949, but he started his Law studies in October 1948 (second semester, AY 1948-1949) and he would not have been permitted to take the Bar, as it is provided in the Rules, applicants under oath that “Previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (AA) as required by the Department of Private Education”

Issue: Whether Telesforo A Diao should be Disbarred.

Ruling: Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the Bar Exams, but did by falsifying information. Admission under false pretenses thus give grounds for revoking his admission in the Bar, as passing the Bar Exam is not the only requirement to become an attorney at law.Thus, the name Telesforo A. Diao is deleted from the roll of attorneys and he is required to return his law diploma within thirty days.

IN RE APPLICATION OF ADRIANO M. HERNANDEZ

Non-graduates of Philippine law schools have also been allowed to take the Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of the Supreme Court En

Banc dated July 27, 1993 (Re: Application of Adriano M. Hernandez to take the 1993 Bar Examinations), the Court allowed the applicant,

a Filipino citizen who obtained a Juris Doctor from Columbia University, New York and who has taken fourth year review courses and

other bar subjects at the Ateneo Law School, to take the 1993 Bar Examinations, considering the fact that in the past, it had allowed

Filipinos “who have studied law in foreign law schools from the strict requirements of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138 and allowed them to

take the bar examinations…”, but with the caveat that:“beginning next year, the Court WILL NOT ALLOW GRADUATES OF FOREIGN LAW SCHOOLS TO TAKE THE BAR EXAMINATIONS. An applicant who desires to take the bar examinations must not only have studied law in a local law school but has to present the certifications required under Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138 in order to take the bar examination. Since graduates of foreign law schools cannot submit said certifications, they shall henceforth not be allowed to take the bar examinations” (emphasis supplied).

Was Adriano M. Hernandez the last Filipino to graduate from a foreign law school who was allowed to take the Bar

Examinations?

No.

In Bar Matter No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in the Bar Examinations through Amendments to

Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, March 9, 2010) the Supreme Court once again allowed Filipino graduates of foreign law schools to take the

Philippine Bar, subject to certain conditions, and amended Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Section 5 of the Rule now provides that before being admitted to the examination, all applicants for admission to the bar shall

satisfactorily show that they have successfully completed all the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent

degree in a law school or university officially recognized by the Philippine Government or by the proper authority in the foreign

jurisdiction where the degree has been granted.

Section 5 now also provides that a Filipino citizen “who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the bar examination

only upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing: (a) completion of all courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of

Laws or its equivalent degree; (b) recognition or accreditation of the law school by the proper authority; and (c) completion of all fourth

year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law school duly recognized by the Philippine Government.”

A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her degree in Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent in a foreign law school must also

present proof of completion of a separate bachelor’s degree.

Since the law course is designed to acquaint the law student with (hopefully) the whole spectrum of Philippine law, those who obtain

their law degrees from non-Philippine law schools have to work doubly hard in preparing for the Bar Examinations, since they studied a

different set of laws in law school. But if they are up to the challenge, the Supreme Court, pursuant to Bar Matter No. 1153, is very much

willing to accommodate them.

And so what happened to Adriano M. Hernandez?

He passed the 1993 Bar Examinations and was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1994, butpassed away in 2011 at the young age of 44.

Republic of the PhilSupreme Court

Manila

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 9, 2010.

“Bar Matter No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in the Bar Examinations Through

Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). – The Court Resolved to APPROVE the proposed amendments to Sections 5 and

6 of Rule 138, to wit:

SEC. 5. Additional requirement for other applicants. – All applicants for admission other than those referred to in the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have successfully completed all the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree, in a law school or university officially recognized by the Philippine Government or by the proper authority in the foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been granted.

No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in this jurisdiction shall be admitted to the bar examination unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the following course in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.

A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the bar examination only upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing: (a) completion of all courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree; (b) recognition or accreditation of the law school by the proper authority; and (c) completion of all the fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law school duly recognized by the Philippine Government.

SEC. 6. Pre-Law. – An applicant for admission to the bar examination shall present a certificate issued by the proper government agency that, before commencing the study of law, he or she had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor’s degree in arts or sciences.

A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her Bachelor of Laws degree or its equivalent in a foreign law school must present proof of having completed a separate bachelor’s degree course.

The Clerk of Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, is hereby directed to CIRCULARIZE this resolution among all law

schools in the country."

Very truly yours,

(signed)MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA

Clerk of Court

PEOPLE VS VILLANUEVA

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19450             May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.

PAREDES, J.:

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al., L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:

The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.

Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.

WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.

The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1äwphï1.ñët

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98

N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.

Case Digest:

14 SCRA 109 – Legal Ethics – Practice of Law – Isolated Appearance

In 1959, Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in the municipality of Alaminos in Laguna. In said case, the private offended

party asked his lawyer friend, Ariston Fule to prosecute said case. Apparently, Fule was the fiscal in San Pablo, Laguna. Villanueva the

opposed the appearance of Fule as counsel for the offended party as he said that according to the Rules of Court when an attorney had

been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage

in private law practice.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice.

HELD: No. Private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal

profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in

consideration of his said services. In the case at bar, Fule is not being compensated but rather he’s doing it for free for his friend who

happened to be the offended party. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a

succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Further, the fact that the Secretary of Justice approved

Fule’s appearance for his friend should be given credence.