Narrating Trouble Experiences

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Narrating Troubling Experiences

LINDAC.GARROUniversity of California at Los Angeles

Abstract This article presents a process-oriented perspective that relates tothe broad question of how self-related experience comes to be endowed withmeaning. The approach highlights the implications of l iving by particularculturally based understandings in specific contexts and centers on how

jointly cultural, social, and cognitive processes offer potentialities for orient-ing the experiential self without determining self-related experiences. Thisprocess-oriented perspective revolves around the interplay between therange of historically contingent cultural resources available for endowingexperience with meaning and the socially and structurally groundedprocesses through which individuals learn about, orient towards and trafficin interpretive plausibilities a socially situated experientially based process.This perspective is informed by, and provides an entree for exploring, vari-abil ity within a cultural setting. The narrative accounts examined are fromindividuals who grew up speaking either Ojibwa or Cree (both Algonkian

languages) in First Nations communities in Manitoba, Canada.

Key words cross-cultural views of the self cultural processes illnessnarratives intracultural variation self-related experience

Much of my work revolves around how troubling experiences with thepotential to be seen as indicating the presence of an illness in need of someform of care or treatment, enter into and are dealt with in everyday life. Inthis article, with reference to accounts of troubling experiences told fromthe perspective of the sufferer, I present a process-oriented perspective that

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relates to the broad question of how self-related experience comes to beendowed with meaning. This perspective centers on how jointly cultural,social and cognitive processes offer potentialities for orienting the

experiential self without determining self-related experiences.1

Thisperspective is informed by, and provides an entree for exploring,variability within a cultural setting.The narrative accounts examined hereare from individuals who grew up speaking either Ojibwa or Cree(both Algonkian languages) in First Nations communities in Manitoba,Canada.

Although self-related, these are all troubling experiences that enter thesocial arena. Whether noticed by the individual alone or by others, theseare instances in which the perceived trouble sets in motion attempts to deal

with the problem.As a breach, as a disruption, these troubling experiences,especially when unanticipated, engage effort after meaning (Bartlett,1932). Trouble has been characterized as the engine of narrative: It is thewhiff of trouble that leads us to search out the relevant or responsibleconstituents in the narrative, in order to convert the raw Trouble into amanageable Problem that can be handled with procedural muscle (Bruner,1996, p.99). Narrative activity, as a distinctive way of ordering experience,of construing reality (Bruner, 1986, p. 11), situates troubling experienceswithin a larger temporal envelope (Carrithers, 1992, p. 82) and links,

however tentatively, present concerns with perceived pasts and/or topossible futures.

Narrative is an active and constructive mode of cognitive engagementthat reflects participation in specific social and moral worlds and dependsupon personal and cultural resources. In the cases examined here, thenotion of cultural resources most commonly refers to culturally availableunderstandings (or cultural knowledge) about illness and misfortune.Hearing about the experiences of others, as recounted through narrative,is a principal means through which relevant cultural understandings are

acquired, confirmed, refined, or modified (e.g. Early, 1982; Garro, 2000c,2001; Price, 1987). These cultural resources may be variably drawn uponto help make sense of ones own or anothers experiences. As resources fornavigating the ambiguity surrounding illness and other troubling experi-ences, cultural understandings can be seen as tools that both enable andconstrain interpretive possibilities.Still,as the examples will show,multiplenarrative possibilities may be entertained for a given set of troublingcircumstances. Narrative framings may emerge through everyday conver-sational interactions which serve as a prosaic social arena for developingframeworks for understanding events (Ochs & Capps,2001,p.2).Whereassome social contexts may structure what is narrated along certain linesand/or preclude the airing of some narrative framings, others may takeform through or as a consequence of social interactions (Garro, 2000a,

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2001; Ochs & Capps, 2001). Reports of life events are shaped for narrativepurposes with a view toward meaning and signification, not toward theend of somehow preserving the facts themselves (Bruner & Feldman,

1996, p. 293; on the impossibility of retaining the concreteness of thepresent, see Kundera, 1995, p. 128; Ochs & Capps, 2001, pp. 288289).As preamble to a discussion that appears in a later section of this article,

the process-oriented perspective put forward here can be contrasted withwhat might be called a content-oriented perspective. The equation ofculture with cultural content is evident in an early and often quoted state-ment by Ward Goodenough (1957, p. 167) that conceptualizes culture aswhatever it is one must know or believe in order to operate in a manneracceptable to its members, and do so in any role that they accept for any

one of themselves. Culture . . . must consist of the end product of learning:knowledge, in a most general, if relative,sense of the term. In a 1981 article,Roy DAndrade referred to culture as a socially transmitted informationpool (p. 180), the shared information the cognitive content (p. 182) with which we do our thinking (p. 193) and upon which the cognitiveprocesses operate (p. 182). Variability among individuals within thiscontent-oriented perspective is most often conceptualized in terms ofsome individuals knowing more than others with regard to specificcultural domains (e.g. Romney,Weller, & Batchelder, 1986). As DAndrade

(1981,p.180) puts the matter: one of the characteristics of human societyis that there is a major division of labor of who knows what. Along thesame lines, Romney (1994, p. 269; italics in original) writes: Intraculturalvariabilityrefers to the variation in cultural knowledge among informants,e.g., females know more about manioc varieties than do men among theAguaruna (Boster, 1985, 1986). While this approach to variability allowscertain types of research questions to be addressed productively (e.g.Garro,1986), not all patterned variability fits easily within this framework(e.g. see Garro, 2000a). Here, rather than attending just to shared cultural

content for example, shared understandings about illness or widelyknown cultural models for illness or adversity a process-orientedperspective broadens to encompass how culturally available interpretiveframeworks (some widely shared and others not) serve as a resource tomeet the demands of everyday life. This process-oriented perspectiverevolves around the interplay between the range of historically contingentcultural resources available for endowing experience with meaning and thesocially and structurally grounded processes through which individualslearn about, orient towards and traffic in interpretive plausibilities asocially situated experientially-based process.

For several reasons, the writings of A. Irving Hallowell (e.g. 1955, 1958,1976) help set the stage for this article. First, his influential essays on selfand personhood can be seen as a starting point for renewed contemporary

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interest in these topics (Csordas, 1994; Fogelson, 1982). The Self in itsBehavioral Environment (the original 1954 article is reprinted in two partsas chapters 4 and 8 in Hallowell,1955) and Ojibwa Ontology,Behavior and

World View (Hallowell, 1960, reprinted in Hallowell, 1976) are particu-larly noteworthy in this regard. Second, Hallowells supportingethnographic material is also relevant to the narratives examined here.During the decade from 1930 to 1940, Hallowell made a number ofsummer field trips to an Ojibwa community in Manitoba, Canada (theOjibwa are also sometimes referred to as Saulteaux by Hallowell and areknown as Chippewa in the US). The Ojibwa Self and Its BehavioralEnvironment is the title Hallowell gave to the second part of his reprintedessay.The narrative accounts examined in the present article are from indi-

viduals who grew up speaking either Ojibwa or Cree (both Algonkianlanguages) in First Nations communities in Manitoba, Canada. Thediscussion of these narratives is framed with reference to Hallowellswritings on self, personhood, and i llness as well as my field research in anAnishinaabe (Ojibwa) reserve community in Manitoba. As Anishinaabe(plural, Anishinaabeg) is how people at my field site refer to themselves,Anishinaabe will be used when discussing my findings and Ojibwa whenreferring to Hallowells work. Third, even though Hallowells examples aresuggestive of considerable homogeneity within a culturally defined group

expressed through a unified cognitive outlook (1960,p. 362) much ofhis general approach is complementary to the process-oriented perspectivedeveloped here. Hallowell urged anthropologists to adopt a behavior-centered approach by attending to the situated nature of experience,sense-making and action (e.g. 1955, p. 88; see also 1976, pp. 236237).

Prior to the narratives, several sections build on the ideas sketched outin this preface. The next section briefly introduces some pertinentanthropological discussions on cross-cultural differences in the self. Afterthat, a selective overview is provided of Hallowells work concerning the

self in its behavioral environment and the interpretation of troublingexperiences. The sections which immediately precede the narrativeaccounts develop the theoretical grounding for cultural and socialprocesses, as well as narrative and self processes.

Cross-Cult ural Differences in t he Sel f?

Recently, within anthropology, there has been a resurgence of interest inthe study of the self (e.g.see discussions in de Munck,2000;Fogelson, 1982;Harris, 1989; Hollan, 1992; Holland, 1997; Spiro, 1993). A recurring topicconcerns whether there can be said to be a western self in contrast with anon-western self (e.g. Geertz, 1984; Hollan, 1992; Markus & Kitayama,1991; Shweder & Bourne, 1984; Spiro, 1993). An oft-quoted, somewhat


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notorious, statement by Geertz (1984, p. 126) generated considerablediscussion:

The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or lessintegrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of aware-ness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole andset contrastively both against other such wholes and against its social andnatural background, is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a ratherpeculiar idea within the context of the worlds cultures.

Spiro (1993, p. 108) reads this quote as suggesting that the non-westernconception of the self stands in relative contrast (i.e. not bounded, nota dynamic center of awareness, not contrasted against other selves or

against a social and natural background). Taking as an example theboundedunbounded dichotomy Spiro argues that, despite ambiguities inhow self may be conceptualized, such a strong stance is not empiricallywarranted. Delving further into the broader literature, he provides asuccinct summary of much of the li terature on this topic:

Although these authors are not unanimous in their formulations; neverthe-less, they do seem to agree that whereas the Western self and/or its culturalconception is characterized by self-other differentiation, personal individu-

ation, and autonomy, the non-Western self and/or its cultural conception isnot differentiated, individuated, or autonomous, or not, at any rate, likeanything approaching the same degree. Rather, the key characteristic of thenon-Western self are interdependence, dependence, and fluid boundaries.(Spiro,1993, p. 116)

Spiro finds these bipolar types of self to be widely overdrawn (1993,p. 116; cf. Straus, 1982). In a cogent discussion, Hollan (1992, p. 283)suggests that the sharp contrasts often drawn between Western andnon-Western selves have very likely been exaggerated because researchers

often contrast simplified and idealized cultural conceptions of the selfrather than comparing descriptive accounts of subjective experience.Hollan cautions that world views, cultural conceptions or cultural modelsof the self (which unquestionably may vary significantly from culture toculture) should not be conflated with the experiential self. He presentsevidence, in some contexts, of an independent,autonomous self among thesociocentric Toraja of Indonesia and of an interdependent, relational selfamong egocentric Americans in the United States and submits that therelationship between ideal cultural conceptions and subjective experienceis complex and problematic and requires active investigation (1992,p.294;italics in original). The task ahead, in Hollans view, is to investigate themanner and extent to which these varied cultural conceptions are lived byin specific contexts and thereby ascertain the range of the experiential self


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as well (Hollan, 1992, p. 295). Hallowells focus on the experiencing selfacting in a cultural world appears relevant to this endeavor, as the self so-defined is an experientialdatum that, unlike the Freudian ego, can be

directly described and talked about by actors,not merely deduced or postu-lated from psychological or cultural theory (Hollan, 1992, p.284; italics inoriginal). In this article, the experiential self and cultural conceptions ofpersonhood are explored in relation to narratives about times of trouble.

In light of anthropological debates concerning western and non-western selves, it is interesting to note that ethnographic portrayals of theOjibwa, as well as those of other First Nations peoples living in the NorthAmerican subarctic, often point to their individualism and to the highvalue placed on autonomy (e.g. see Black, 1977a; Goulet, 1998; Hallowell,

1955, p.135; Landes, 1937; Ridington, 1988). Defining autonomy in termsof freedom of being controlled by other human beings, Black (1977a,p. 150) states that the importance of individual autonomy in Ojibwaculture can hardly be overemphasized. In his writings on the Ojibwa,Hallowell repeatedly emphasized that the central goal was life, in the fullestsense li fe in the sense of longevity, health, and freedom from misfortune(e.g. Hallowell, 1963, p. 407).2 Further: the main binding force of Ojibwainstitutions was not so much to link individuals together through commoncooperative aims as it was to permit individuals seeking a common central

value to achieve it without too much human interference from without(Hallowell, 1955,p.361).Although this article does not revolve around theindividuated/relational contrast described earlier, the narrative materialexamined here illuminates how individualism can take a cultural shapedistinctive from that attributed to (mainstream) western selves. At thesame time, my discussion is grounded in an appreciation of the problemsassociated with conceptualizing culture in ways that suggest boundedentities characterized by stability, internal coherence, and homogeneity,with members of a culture recognized by a set of characteristics that are

generationally reproduced.

Hal l owel l on t he Sel f in it s Behavioral Environment

Hallowell framed the self as at once universal and culturally specific.Noting that anthropologists had paid comparatively little attention toaspects of self-awareness, Hallowell aspired to clear the ground for a moreeffective handling of cross-cultural data that seem relevant to a deeperunderstanding of the role of self-awareness in man asculturally constitutedin different societies (1955, p. 79; italics in original). Couching hisdiscussion at what he called a phenomenological level (1955, p. 79),Hallowell characterized self-awareness as the reflexive discrimination ofoneself as an object in a world of objects (1955, p. 75) and viewed it as a


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generic (universal) attribute requisite for human sociality.This capacity forselfother discrimination is grounded in certain basic orientationsprovided by culture self-orientation, object orientation (including other

persons), spatio-temporal orientation, motivational orientation, andnormative orientation which align the experiencing self with the externalworld and structure the psychological field in which the self is prepared toact (1955, p. 110). Although reflexive self-awareness is highlighted,Hallowell also refers to unarticulated concepts that constitute the assump-tions on which basic orientations rest (Hallowell, 1958, p. 65; 1960,pp. 361362; see also Fogelson, 1982, pp. 8485). The basic orientationsimplicitly guide the perception and interpretation of experience, includingwhat one takes to be objective reality, as well as affording a normatively

informed basis for reflection, decision, and action (cf. Hallowell, 1958,p. 79; 1976, p. 391).

The world in which the experiencing self develops is more appropriatelyreferred to as a culturally constituted behavioral environment (1955,p.87); in a later article, Hallowell linked this concept with that of a worldview (Hallowell, 1960). As cultural means and content may vary widely(1955, p. 89), the nature of the self, considered in its conceptual content,is a culturally identifiable variable as the individuals self-image and hisinterpretation of his own experience cannot be divorced from the concept

of the self that is characteristic of his society (1955, p. 76). Becauseconcepts of self are, in part . . . culturally derived (1955, p. 80), Hallow-ell asserted that assuming, as far as possible, the outlook of the self in itsbehavioral environment (1955, p. 89) enables us to approximate moreclosely to an inside view of culture (1955, p. 88) a more direct insightinto the psychological field of the individual as heexperiences it than apurely objective cultural description affords (1955, p. 110; italics inoriginal). Csordas (1994, p. 6) provides a useful synopsis of Hallowellsconcept of self:

Understood in terms of perception and practice, Hallowells concept of selfthus did more than place the individual in culture. It linked behavior to theobjective world, but defined objective in terms of cultural specificity. Itlinked perceptual processes with social constraints and cultural meanings,but added self-awareness and reflexivity.

Csordas (1994, pp. 79) constructively adds that Hallowell left out of hisframework the prominent role that others play in the reflexive awarenessof self.3 Later in this article the narrated accounts illustrate some of theways this occurs.

According to Hallowell (1958, p.63; italics in original), among the mostimportant objects in the behavioral environment of the self are persons.He characterized the Western scientific tradition that conceptually


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identifies person with human being as involving a radical abstractionfrom psychological reality. For, he continued, all human cultures includeclasses ofother-than-humanpersons that are an integral part of the psycho-

logical field of the individual. Rather than imposing an arbitrarydissection of the total phenomenal world of a people, he maintained thatan examination of their cognitive orientation toward all classes of personobjects can reveal how conceptualization, processes of perceiving,remem-bering, imagining, and reasoning in the individual are related to actualbehavior.

Within the Ojibwa behavioral environment, the social relations of theOjibwa self are correlative with their more comprehensive categorizationof persons (Hallowell, 1958, p.64).4 For these social relations, the funda-

mental differentiation of primary concern to the self is how other selvesrank in order ofpower (Hallowell, 1955, p. 181). Human beings do notdiffer from other-than-human persons in kind, but in power (Hallowell,1958,p.76) with other-than-human persons occupying the top rank in thepower hierarchy of animate being (Hallowell, 1958, p.76; 1960, p.377; seealso Black, 1977a, 1977b). An earmark of power is metamorphosis, theability to change external form. Other-than-human persons may movebetween other external forms (such as animals or forces of nature) toassume human form (and thus may be taken for a human being); meta-

morphosis is an inherent capacity of other-than-human persons. Withregard to human beings, while the potentiality for metamorphosis existsand may even be experienced, any outward manifestation is inextricablyassociated with unusual power, for good or evil. And power of this degreecan only be acquired by human beings through the help (blessings) ofother-than-human persons (Hallowell, 1958, p. 76).

Enabling human beings to do things that would otherwise be imposs-ible, the gifts, blessings, knowledge or powers took diverse forms andwere expressed in many different ways. Examples include success in

hunting or warfare, knowledge of specific healing skills or more generalabilities to heal or to covertly harm others, and the ability to communicatewith other-than-human persons to learn things that would otherwise beunknowable (Hallowell, 1955, p. 104). Such gifts were typically bestowedin the context of private sensory experiences, such as dreams or visions.For these dream-conscious people:

. . . self-related experience of the most personal and vital kind includes whatis seen, heard, and felt in dreams. Although there is no lack of discrimin-

ation, nor inherent confusion, between the experiences of the self whenawake and when dreaming, both sets of experiences are equally self-related. . .When we think autobiographically we only include events that happenedto us when awake; the Ojibwa include remembered events that haveoccurred in dreams. And, far from being of subordinate importance, such


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experiences are for them often of more vital importance than the events ofdaily waking li fe . . . it is in dreams that the individual comes into directcommunication with . . . the powerful persons of the other-than-human

class. (Hallowell, 1958, p. 77; 1960, p.378)

Although such dream experiences could occur at any time, they wereactively sought, especially by males, through isolation and fasting at thetime of puberty. The puberty fast was, in Hallowells terms, the oppor-tunity of a li fetime (1976, p. 384). As direct statements about ones giftswere not made, others can only infer what powers have been bestowedupon others. In social relations: no one can tell how much power anotherindividual has,or whether i t enables him to do evil or not (Hallowell,1951,

p. 187).Gifts do not come unencumbered (Hallowell, 1992, p. 92). Bad

conduct, manifested in the failure to fulfill obligations imposed by other-than-human persons or the failure to behave in an appropriate manner wassignaled by trouble,such as a serious,unexpected or puzzling illness and/orother indicators of lack of fortune. Alternatively, such trouble could be theresult of the covert use of power through sorcery (1955, p.173) or witch-craft (1992, p. 96) by a human aggressor. (To refer to such illnesses,Hallowell, 1955, p.282 also uses the term nicinbewpinewhich he trans-

lates as Indian sickness, but which can perhaps be more appropriatelyglossed as Anishinaabe sickness.) From the culturally informed standpointof the Ojibwa self retaliation by this covert means was a stark reality(Hallowell, 1955, p. 141). Building on Hallowells work, Black (1977a,p.149) discusses how bad medicine encompasses harming powers whichinclude the ability to cause anothers death, illness, or misfortune withoutbeing present or in physical contact. Jealousy, envy, anger, laziness, greed,desire for revenge or retaliation, desire to avoid privation, and lust are seento motivate individuals to use bad medicine to affect others. Bad medicine

contrasts with curing medicine and protection medicine (from badmedicine). As bad medicine causes others to perform acts or enter a statethat they wouldnt have if left to their own autonomy, its use contravenesthe high cultural value on an individuals right to self determination: I fbeing in control is good and being out of control is bad, then badmedicine is in essence the power to render another helpless or out ofcontrol, while good medicine is restoring or maintaining anothers stateof control or autonomy (Black, 1977a, p. 150).

A number of the ethnographic examples Hallowell drew on to illustratehis portrayal of the self in the Ojibwa behavioral environment and theOjibwa world-view involved situations of illness and/or misfortune. Intimes of trouble, the self is oriented towards explanations within their webof interpersonal relations, rather than apart from it (Hallowell, 1960,


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he posits the psychological unity of the Ojibwa world (1960,p.381).Selvesare seen to be structured in ways that reproduce and express a unifiedcognitive outlook (1960, p.362); the behavioral environment of the self is

all of a piece (1958, p. 78).5

His view of the post-contact situation is onethat at times assumed a one-way progression involving cultural loss andreplacement, rather than a more complex complementarity or fusion(Brown, 1992, p. 113). And although he expressed confidence in hisrepresentation of the Ojibwa world view (1963,p.266;see also 1955,p.124and Hallowell, 1992, p. 98), he reported that the central institution of thepuberty fast had almost died out at the time of my investigations(Hallowell, 1992, p. 87) and that his reconstruction of the Ojibwa worldview was based on remaining fragments as small, relatively isolated

groups retained living remnants of their old way of li fe and their traditionalworld view (Hallowell, 1992,p.98).But,as Brown (1992,p.112) notes, theOjibwa had more contact with the fur trade than was apparent to Hallow-ell and hence were even less historically isolated than he supposed.Hallowells assurances notwithstanding, the anthropological construal ofthe Ojibwa self is a problematic undertaking.

Social and Cult ural Pro cesses

In the present day, although most Anishinaabe reserve communities arespatially and economically removed from urban areas, there are myriadinterconnections and integrations with the world outside the reserve.Important among these are linkages to broader Canadian society throughgovernmental relations and bi lateral obligations, schools, social services,the health care system, churches, television and radio, and economicactivities pursued both off and on the reserve. The highlighting ofcommonalities with others seen as similar variously designated asAnishinaabe, Aboriginal, Indian, and First Nations provide the foun-

dation for other connections.My field research in an Anishinaabe community was initially centered

primarily around understanding how community members think aboutand deal with illness (fieldwork occurring at various periods from 1984 to1989). The case histories reflected a variety of ways-of-thinking and ways-of-being with the potential to impact on conceptions of persons as well ason the subjectively experienced self. A brief summary of some of the maininterpretive frameworks across this data set can only hint at the diversity.I recorded numerous case histories attributed to Anishinaabe sickness.Although not simply reducible to Hallowells depiction (see Garro, 1990,2000b), overall these cases attest to the continuing relevance of much ofHallowells analysis.But, just as clearly,accounts given in a number of casesreflected exposure to widely shared western explanatory frameworks for


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illness and other misfortune. Other accounts centered on the intersect ofpersonal histories with the collective colonial history of the Anishinaabeand the deleterious changes occurring outside, but affecting those within,

the Anishinaabe community.And, in a small number of cases, the accountsgiven reflected explanations provided by non-Anishinaabe Indian healersfrom outside the community or by non-Indian alternative medicine prac-ti tioners found in urban centers (e.g. acupuncturists, chiropractors,herbalists). My field material also documents significant diversity in theextent to which individuals deem different explanatory frameworks ascredible accounts of illness and misfortune (see Garro, 1990, 1998). Therewere individuals who expressed disbelief in Anishinaabe sickness. Butwhile this is where differences are the most evident, the implications of

diversity within the community are not limited to instances which maypotentially be seen as involving Anishinaabe sickness. For example, vari-ability in understandings about diabetes cannot be accounted for in termsof some individuals knowing more and others knowing less about thiscultural domain, but rather appears to be a matter of thinking differently,of knowing differently, in relation to personal circumstances and patternedin ways that are associated with divergent life experiences (see Garro,2000a). Within the context of this single community, the contemporarysituation is a complex one that does not mesh easily with a content-

oriented perspective on culture and intracultural variability.Despite growing interest in the thesis that culture shapes mind, that it

provides us with the toolkit by which we construct not only our worlds butour very conceptions of our selves and our powers (Bruner, 1996, p. x),what is meant by culture often remains underdeveloped with the potentialdanger of conveying a view of culture as deterministic,homogeneous, andunchanging. As noted earlier, within any socially defined group, muchmore variability exists with much less constancy across time than anydiscrete notion of culture admits. Sapir was one of the first theorists to

grapple seriously with the import of intracultural variation and theproblem this posed for impersonal anthropological description in theconception of a definitely delimited society with a definitely discoverableculture (Sapir, 1985b, p. 570) that catches up the individual and moldshim according to a predetermined form and style (Sapir, 2002, pp.244245). In an article first published in 1932, Sapir (1985a, p.515) wrote:

the true locus . . . of . . . processes which, when abstracted into a totality,constitute culture is not in a theoretical community of human beings known

as society, for the term society is itself a cultural construct which isemployed by individuals who stand in significant relations to each other inorder to help them in the interpretation of certain aspects of their behavior.The true locus of culture is in the interactions of specific individuals and,on the subjective side, in the world of meanings which each one of these


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individuals may unconsciously abstract for himself from his participation inthese interactions.

Pointing out that cultural patterns may be real and compelling only forspecial individuals or groups of individuals and are as good as non-existentfor the rest of the group (1985a, p. 517), Sapir underscored the problemsof an anthropology organized around what all the individuals of a societyhave in common (1985a, p. 509). In its place, Sapir championed the studyof interpersonal relations involving human beings adjusting to actualsituations, by means of structures of symbols (2002, pp. 204205). Theanthropological task then becomes to determine what are the potentialcontents of the culture that results from these interpersonal relations in

these situations (Sapir, 2002, p. 205). With regard to variability, heexamines an extreme case in which an individuals disagreement with asocial convention, even when unique, may still be viewed as cultural thecomplex resultant of an incredibly elaborate cultural history, in whichmany diverse strands intercross at that point in place and time at which theindividual judgment or preference is expressed . . . and carrying thepotential to impact others (Sapir, 1985b, pp. 572573). Based on thisexample, he continues:

Have we not the right to go on from simple instances of this sort and advanceto the position that any statement, no matter how general, which can bemade about culture needs the supporting testimony of a tangible person orpersons, to whom such a statement is of real value in his system of inter-relationships with other human beings? If this is so,we shall, at last analysis,have to admit that any individual of a group has cultural definitions whichdo not apply to all the members of his group, which even, in specificinstances,apply to him alone. Instead, therefore,of arguing from a supposedobjectivity of culture to the problem of individual variation, we shall, forcertain kinds of analysis, have to proceed in the opposite direction. We shall

have to operate as though we knew nothing about culture but were inter-ested in analyzing as well as we could what a given number of human beingsaccustomed to live with each other actually think and do in their day to dayrelationships. (Sapir, 1985b,p. 574)

In this article, the term cultural processes is used to refer to sociallygrounded ways of learning which contribute to the way an individualthinks, feels, and acts the experiences and forming of understandings(schemas, cultural models) based on those experiences. Social interactionsand the cultural meanings that are abstracted from these interactions bythose present at such encounters (active participants and listeners alike),as the quote from Sapir suggests, are integral to this process-orientedperspective.Although in many situations it would be more accurate to referto processes that are jointly social and cultural (as well as cognitive), for


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ease of reference cultural processes will be used to refer to the amalgam ofcultural and social processes. Separate mention of social processes will beused to draw attention to the socially situated and interactional dimensions

of meaning making.At a broader level, social processes can refer to the roleof pre-existing structural arrangements in facilitating or impeding partici-pation in activities and groups as well as expectations linked to specificinteractional settings. For example, as in the narratives examined here,what is reported to physicians relates only to physical symptoms.

The focus on cultural processes highlights connections betweenexperience, learning, sharing and variability (see Garro, 2000a; Strauss &Quinn, 1997). Through talk and action, individuals are exposed to ways ofthinking about the world (or specific aspects of the world) and ways of

acting in and responding to the world. These experiences may bemediated through cultural products (e.g. books, televisions, computers).Learning through similar life experiences can result in sharing in diverselocations throughout the world (Strauss & Quinn, 1997,p.7).For example,biomedical physicians whether from Japan, the US or somewhere else will share ways of recognizing, labeling, thinking about and dealing withdisease despite the many ways they differ from each other and even thougheach has been trained in medical schools and hospitals within their owncountries. A limited distribution characterizes other ways-of-knowing.

There are, for example, widely known explanatory frameworks for illnesswithin the Anishinaabe community that are essentially unknown (notculturally available) to individuals living in nearby rural communities whoare descendants of European settlers. Within the Anishinaabe communityit is possible to see these cultural resources as a form of collective memory,resources variably relied upon by individuals to help make sense of onesown experience and in relation to unfolding events in the social world.

Individual lives are embedded in a variety of social and culturalprocesses which shape them, although not in a deterministic fashion.Vari-

ability in any given setting is anticipated as individuals participate in andencounter diverse cultural processes. In addition to understandings thatare widely known within a given setting there exist others which are lessshared but no less cultural. These may even appear idiosyncratic,as in thecase of one woman in the Anishinaabe community who linked her highblood pressure to a blood transfusion she had after an accident. She toldof how a television program had alerted her to the possibility for illness tobe transferred in this manner and saw this as most likely in her case as shediscredited a number of other possible explanations that were commonlyoffered by other community members. This way of understanding whathappened to her in the past was seen to have clear implications for dealingwith high blood pressure in the present and future.6 In this article, refer-ence to the framework of possibilities afforded by culture or to culturally


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available knowledge is intended to acknowledge the existence of culturalresources that are not widely known in a given setting. It also recognizesthat cultural resources may be introduced or come to be seen as relevant

through social interactions. The shift in emphasis from culture to culturalprocesses highlights the dynamic nature of lived experience andcultural learning,and allows for individual agency and invention while stillrecognizing culture as the medium of human existence. In the remainderof this article, more attention is given to cultural processes and explana-tory frameworks that are not characteristic of mainstream NorthAmerican cultural settings.

As noted earlier, within a given setting, there may be significant diver-sity in the extent to which individuals deem different explanatory

frameworks as credible accounts of illness and misfortune.Similarities anddifferences in life experiences, for example, those associated with historicalcircumstances as well as participation in different activities and socialgroupings may lead to patterning in the distr ibution of variability. In theAnishinaabe community, for example, a number of adults had spent timeduring their youth in boarding schools where teachers strove to distancestudents from their lives in the Anishinaabe community. One way ofachieving this was by instructing pupils in modern ways of thinking aboutillness and of relating to the world. Often, though by no means always,

these individuals did not credit accounts of Anishinaabe sickness and didnot think that Anishinaabe medicine persons (or healers) had special gifts.There was also a marked tendency for the adult children of these indi-viduals to express similar views. The case histories obtained from theseindividuals about illnesses in their households were typically restricted toexplanatory frameworks more commonly encountered in the broaderNorth American society. (Though it was also learned that in someinstances another household member, such as a spouse or a grandparent,consulted an Anishinaabe medicine person without informing those who

did not take a positive stance towards Anishinaabe healers [Garro, 1998,p. 350]. Thus, clearly divergent accounts of the same illness were at timesobtained from different persons living in the same household.) Variabilitywithin the community is not consistent with some version of accultura-tion. The situation is more complex. Many in this community viewthemselves as Christians and attend church services while also expressingconfidence in the special abilities of Anishinaabe medicine persons.Anishinaabe medicine persons also number among those in the churchcongregation.7 In addition, some of the community members with higherlevels of formal education and income, along with their families, wereamong the most frequent visitors to Anishinaabe medicine persons. Theyhad the economic wherewithal to appropriately acknowledge the Anishi-naabe medicine persons assistance (see Garro, 1998, p. 345) and they


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tended to consult both Anishinaabe medicine persons and physicians(whose fees are covered by universal health insurance in Canada) essen-tially concurrently. Further, although the impact is difficult to assess, there

were a variety of other influences,many in contexts outside the community for example, listening to elders and healers from other communities in avariety of venues, visits to other communities (e.g. pow-wows, hockeygames, family-oriented social events) and interactions with individualsfrom a variety of First Nations communities, involvement in university-based Native Studies Departments, referrals to traditional Native healersby Indian medical interpreters in hospital settings (see ONeil, 1988), andthe impact of Aboriginal Spirituality programs in Canadian federal peni-tentiaries (Waldram, 1993, 1997).8 Overall, in a variety of venues, both

within and outside the community, this was a time of increasing dis-cussions about the role of Aboriginal healing traditions in the present day.This trend has continued since the time of my field research.

Narr at ive and Sel f Pro cesses

Along with the general human potential to learn through social means andthe spontaneous and vital human capacity (Shore, 1996, p. 319) to confer

meaning on experience, the notion of narrative thinking is central to thesocially situated experientially based process-oriented perspectiveadvanced here. As a fundamental human way to understand life in time,through narrative we try to make sense of how things have come to passand how our actions and the actions of others have shaped our history.Writing about the spatio-temporal orientation of the self, Hallowell (1955,p. 94) noted: Human beings maintain awareness of self-continuity andpersonal identity in time through the recall of past experiences that areidentified with the self-image. Bruner (1987, p.12) maintains: We seem to

have no other way of describing lived time save in the form of narrative.Accordingly,we becomethe autobiographical narratives by which we tellabout our lives (p. 15; italics in original) so that a life is not how it wasbut how it is interpreted and reinterpreted, told and retold (p.31). Narra-tive thinking links the remembered past to concerns of the present, withthe potential to make projections into the future. Although by no means atransparent communicator of ones thoughts and feelings, storytelling canbe used to convey what matters to a narrator and in this manner mediatebetween an inner world of thought-feeling and an outer world of observ-able actions and events (Bruner, 1986; Carrithers, 1992; Mattingly, 1998;Mattingly & Garro, 1994).9 Stories of personal experience disclose stancestaken towards other specific persons with the potential to provide insightinto conceptions on the nature of personhood.


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Narratives of personal experience rely on interpretive frameworks ofrelevance within culturally constituted behavioral environments. Throughthe narrative process, personal experience is inevitably configured in ways

that reveal what Ochs and Capps (2001,p.55) refer to as a central paradox:

. . . the practice of rendering personal experience in narrative form entailsde-personalization. Though the experiences may be unique, they becomesocially forged. Idiosyncratic experiences become co-narrated according tolocal narrative formats, recognizable types of situations and people, andprevailing moral frameworks,which inevitably constrain representation andinterpretation. It is in this sense that narratives of personal experience are atthe same time narratives of impersonal experience.

The narratives presented here convey how the effort after meaning neednot run along a single path but may admit alternative interpretive possi-bilities. Cultural understandings serve as resources, but there are oftenmultiple interpretive frameworks which are potentially applicable to agiven situation and what is considered interpretively plausible may changethrough time in response to ensuing events. Different ways of framing orlabeling may carry divergent narrative ramifications. The pull towardscoherence and order in narrative theorizing may be accompanied by a pulltowards remaining open to allow for engagement with other conceivable

framings (Good,1994; Ochs & Capps, 2001). When we are in the midst oftroubling experiences, it often isnt clear what actually matters or howthings wil l develop. There is the potential for multiple, even conflicting,interpretive frameworks, to be seen as relevant. Even after the troublesubsides, interpretation may remain ambiguous (see Garro, 1998, 2002).Narrative activity can take the form of a sense-making processrather thanas a finished product in which loose ends are knit together into a singlestoryline (Ochs & Capps, 2001, p. 15; italics in original).

Although each is told from the perspective of a single individual, these

narratives are very much socially embedded. Further, the experiencesrecounted have been deemed worth telling a story about. Mattingly (1998,p. 154; italics removed) states: I f narrative offers a homology to livedexperience, the dominant formal feature which connects the two is notnarrative coherence but narrative drama. Seen as human dramas,the narratives impart how complex interactions with socially positionedagents are seen to contribute to the unfolding understanding of livedexperience through legitimating, challenging, offering alternatives, orpersuading shifts in the construal of life events.

If it is not appropriate in the context of this article to speak of an Ojibwaself (or an Anishinaabe self, or a non-western self, or a western self), thenit becomes critical to establish just what types of selves are being referredto here. Although grounded in a much larger argument than will be


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explored here, Csordas has argued that analytic attention should be givento self processes rather than selves. Other scholars (e.g. de Munck, 1992,2000; Dennett, 1991; Ewing, 1990) contend that the very notion of a self

is a necessary illusion and there is no self (or selves) enthroned somewherein the head (or elsewhere) (de Munck,2000,p.39). Csordas (1994, p.276)notes that if the self is elusive, it is because there is no such thing as theself. There are only self processes, and these are orientational processes.These processes of orientation are the same as those which move experi-ence from indeterminacy to what Hallowell referred to as culturally reifiedobjects (Csordas, 1994, p. 7). Csordas also brings in Bourdieus (1977)concept of habitus, defined as a system of perduring dispositions whichhighlights the lived, acted content of the behavioral environment

(Csordas, 1994, p. 9). Thus, those:

. . . who experience these self processes are not only oriented with respect tocertain cultural domains, as Hallowell (1955) supposed, but their being inthe world is integrated and coordinated within a habitus. Whereas Hallow-ells idea of a behavioral environment presumes the environment to be acondition external to the self, the notion of habitus suggests that self processand habitus are mutually constitutive. (Csordas, 1994, p. 276)

Here, the position taken is that narratives of troubling experience can help

illuminate this mutual constitution of self process and behavioral environ-ment by exploring the role of jointly cultural,social and cognitive processesin relation to our very conceptions of our selves and our powers (Bruner,1996, p. x). The shift from self to self processes complements Hollans(1992) call for studies that investigate the manner and extent to whichvarious interpretive frameworks (cultural models) are lived by in specificcontexts. In place of cultural conceptions or cultural models of the self,attention is directed to the processes through which selves come to frametheir own actions and those of other persons in relation to pre-existing

cultural understandings. The focus here will be on reports of self-relatedexperience in relation to a limited range of interpretive frameworks fortroubling experiences and some of the conceptions of personhood associ-ated with these frameworks.With regard to self processes, my formulationfor this article, of course, does not encompass all that could be considered,but it does highlight aspects of self processes approachable through narra-tives of troubling experience.

Cult ural Pro cesses and Narr at ing Sel f -Rel at edExperiences

The two cases introduced in this section are based on transcripts of inter-views with two individuals from a Nhinaw (Cree) community in


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Manitoba (these cases are more fully discussed in Bruyre & Garro, 1998).In the first interview, a mixture of Nhinaw and English was spoken(following the lead of the interviewee),whereas in the second the Nhinaw

language was used almost exclusively. Both narratives came out of dis-cussions about a condition referred to as-k-pmikwhit awiyak. Inessence, this term translates as one who has been given a twisted mouth bysomeone else through the use of bad medicine (although literally thetranslation alludes to a twisted face the focus is understood to be on themouth, hence the more colloquial twisted mouth which serves as theEnglish gloss for this condition). In the Anishinaabe community, where aclosely related Algonkian language is commonly spoken, a parallel termexists. As in the Anishinaabe community, reference to bad medicine

involves the intentional, malevolent, and covert wielding of power byanother human being. (When speaking in English, bad medicine andcurse may also be used.) Cases comparable with those detailed here wererecorded in the Anishinaabe community during regular household visitsto a sample of families to ask about ongoing illnesses. Because only noteswere taken during the household visits, I do not have a full record of whatwas said in these cases (but see summaries of two parallel cases from theAnishinaabe community in Garro, 1998, p. 348).

The first case concerns a woman in her thirties who will be referred to hereas Mrs Cook.At the time of her illness, Mrs Cook was living in a large urbancenter and studying for a career in biomedicine (a field in which she workstoday). Prior to this illness, Mrs Cook knew of, but gave li ttle credence tobad medicine, an opinion shared by both of her parents. During a visit toher home community during summer vacation, Mrs Cook went to bed earlyone evening after taking an aspirin to deal with a headache and a twitchingeye. The next morning, she awoke to find:

My face was all twisted, my tongue was pulled back to one side. Anyway

I go Aaaaah! I thought I had a stroke or something and I dont feelanything on my face. My mom and dad came running out and they saidWhats the matter? My eye was like this [she pulls her eyelid down] .

Her mother, who for as long as the condition lasted considered it as acommon, non-serious illness, described it as simply a pulled face, usingNhinaw terms that did not implicate bad medicine or the involvement ofothers. Mrs Cooks initial, and indeed her most consistent, interpretationwas to see the condition as linked with a car accident she was in a monthpreviously.However, when a visit to a physician and a prescribed medication

did little to help, she started to actively entertain the possibili ty that badmedicine was involved. She recounted:

I was scared. Some people in our community they sort of accept it, youknow, the traditional way. Someone cursed on you. If they did not like


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the way you did something.My brother said Who did you provoke? Ha,ha. And I said, I dont know, maybe it was unintentional. He said, I tdoes not matter, if they dont like your attitude or something, they might

do something to you. But thats what they used to say. Someone cursedyou for something.Maybe if you wore too much make-up and someonedidnt l ike you, you know?

She went to see an Anishinaabe medicine person who took steps to rid herof the bad medicine and gave her a herbal remedy. Her father expressedskepticism about the validity of the actions performed by this medicineperson. Mrs Cook later speculated that the herbal remedy may have hadanti-inflammatory ingredients and it was this that led to the modestimprovement she experienced. Still concerned, she continued her quest by

consulting an acupuncturist and then went back to her physician. In retro-spect, she is open to the possibil ity that any (or all) of the practitioners sheconsulted contributed to her almost complete recovery. Nevertheless, eventhough she was quite willing to experiment and confer with the Anishinaabemedicine person, Mrs Cook remains quite doubtful about whether badmedicine, if it even exists at all, can permeate bodily boundaries and lead toaffliction. Her distrust of therapeutic efforts aimed at addressing badmedicine has not lessened; the efficacy of the Anishinaabe healers minis-trations have come to be seen as limited to the herbal remedy. Mrs Cookdoes not credit the medicine person as having the gift for communicating

with other-than-human persons; she does not participate in this assumptiveworld.

In contrast, Mr Peters, a man in his late twenties, accepts bad medicine asthe only reasonable account of what happened to him. His account can beconsidered a more typical case in that the ascribed cause and what is judgedto be effective treatment fit local cultural expectations for this condition.MrPeters described the onset:

It was last year before Christmas. We were home all day. Then, in theevening, it was then I started to feel it. It was hardening on the left side.I looked at myself in the mirror. I was trying to smile and make use ofmy face movements, wondering what was happening to my face. I wentto show it to [my mother-in-law]. She told me that I was getting twistedmouth. She knew. I was really scared, really frightened.

His mother-in-law, renowned as being gifted with some healing powers,advised an emergency visit to a highly regarded medicine person in the nextprovince. Mr Peters sought help from a kinsman who wholeheartedly, andwithout hesitation,supported the decision to consult a medicine person.Mr

Peters explained: Thanks to [name] who made all the arrangements. Aboutthe money that is. We would not have been able to go otherwise. He gave ussome money and said just go! This response indicates that this high levelof concern, as well as the recognized need for obtaining treatment from amedicine person, is shared by others in the community. Despite a snow


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storm that made driving treacherous and substantially lengthened theirjourney, he set off with his family almost immediately. The medicine personadvised them that someone was attempting to get at his mother-in-law

through Mr Peters. The medicine person did not disclose the identity of theperson using bad medicine, but stated he knew who it was. Mr Peters main-tained that recovery began almost immediately after the medicine personstreatment to remove the physical presence of bad medicine from his body.He was told by the medicine person that it would take a month to return tonormal.Despite this improvement,he decided to consult his physician uponreturning home, just in case something else could be done. The account thephysician was provided with dealt only with the physical symptoms. Of thephysician, who diagnosed the problem as Bells palsy,Mr Peters commented:They have a name for it but they dont know what causes it. They only have

a name for it. For Mr Peters this inability to offer an adequate explanationof what had occurred is a deficiency in the biomedical model and strength-ened his conviction about the involvement of bad medicine.

Reflecting on what happened, Mr Peters stated: someone hates you, isjealous of you. I always think all I have is my family. I thought at least theperson who used the bad medicine did not kill me. I still have my children.It is because someone has taken umbrage or is envious, that is what causesit. His ongoing anxiety, especially with regard to his children, is palpablewhen he adds that if the person using the bad medicine cant get the personthey want, they get the weakest link to that person. For Mr Peters it is

through this experience that his pre-existing cultural knowledge of thepossible bodily intrusion of bad medicine has become tempered into thecertitude that some (clandestine but ostensibly affable) persons have thecapability and desire to carry out such acts, even going as far as to ki llanother person, perhaps even a child. It is not surprising that Mr Petersreports being much less trusting of others. In his own words:

I dont know why it happened to me. I dont hate anyone. I dont dislikeanyone. I hate that anyone could do that to a fellow human being.I guessa person has to be really evil to do that. Those people, especially thosewho are called friends, I dont trust them anymore.

While the embodied trouble instigating these two accounts is similar, thereported experience takes quite different form. The privileging of abiomedical interpretation for responding to bodily il ls, underpinned bylabeling the experience as a pulled face, orients Mrs Cook initially to visita physician. Nevertheless, throughout this incident she struggles with thewidely shared proclivity (within her home community) towards interpret-ing what happened to her in terms of bad medicine. Although Mrs Cook

knows about bad medicine, prior to the illness she rejected the construalof reality this alternative perspective entails. Yet, in this case, knowingallows for the possibility that this interpretive framework might be usefulfor negotiating the world. Although there is a pull here towards ordering


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what happened in a manner consistent with biomedical understandings,there is also a pull towards remaining open so that conceivable framingsare not prematurely closed off. In Mrs Cooks narrative account, multiple

perspectives are entertained, suggesting alternative narrative plots aboutthe source and outcome of the illness, which justified continued careseeking and sustained hope for the possibility of a cure.

For Mr Peters it is essentially the converse situation. From almost as soonas he first experienced symptoms,he sees himself and is seen to be suffer-ing the effects of bad medicine, an assessment that sets in motion the needto seek out an appropriate source of care. Still, once the crisis has abated,Mr Peters consulted a physician, to assure himself there was nothingfurther that could be done.

For both cases, social processes exemplified by the reactions of othersenter into how unfolding events are responded to and later reconstructed(see Garro, 2001). Mrs Cooks parents consistently framed the situation asthat of a normal illness. Nevertheless, the teasing, but concerned,comments of Mrs Cooks brother contributed to her decision to see anAnishinaabe medicine person. For the contrasting case of Mr Peters, theshocked and frightened responses of others catapult him and his familyinto an urgent, almost dangerously so, quest for care. Implicit in thesenarratives are self processes, as the protagonists move from culturally

informed experiences to culturally grounded accounts of what happenedand why.For Mr Peters,his manner of being in the world is altered throughhis experiential knowledge that bad medicine is a real threat to his well-being. His outlook is reinforced by the confirmatory reactions of thosearound him, especially those of trusted family members.As a consequenceof this experience, bad medicine and concerns that affability can maskhostility have become more salient aspects of the behavioral environmentwithin which he is prepared to act. For Mrs Cook, bad medicine remainswithin the realm of possibility but is placed at the periphery, with negligi-

ble impact on her experiential reality.

Social and Cult ural Pro cesses in Personal Transfor mat ions

The final, rather extended narrative account, from the Anishinaabe com-munity, starts with a troubling situation and involves a transition fromindeterminacy to a culturally grounded interpretation that motivatesaction and sets in motion a transformation of self. Social processes, in thisinstance advice given by a medicine person, radically alter a womansinterpretation of a singular, emotionally charged, occurrence and lead tonew ways of thinking about her future possibilities. Her husband is seen toundergo a transformation of a different sort, one in which he comes toaccept the reality of Anishinaabe sickness and the behavioral environment


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it entails. To follow this account, some additional background informationabout Anishinaabe sickness in the context of the contemporary com-munity is needed.

Generally speaking, I found that knowledge about Anishinaabe sickness(which encompasses more than bad medicine) was widely shared in thecommunity with numerous case histories across a sample of households.Consistent in broad strokes with what Hallowell reported (see Garro,1990,2000b, 2002 for elaboration), three features recurred across the cases Irecorded: (i) it originates in discrete and identifiable, or potentiallyknowable, actions of human beings, alive or dead; (ii) it involves breachesof certain behavioral tenets which govern social relationships within theAnishinaabe behavioral environment; and (iii) a diagnosis of Anishinaabe

sickness can neither be confirmed nor can an appropriate course of actionbe determined without the guidance of other-than-human persons. Asnoted earlier, since the majority of individuals have not been gifted in waysthat allow for direct interactions with other-than-human persons on arecurring basis, the assistance of an Anishinaabe medicine person is soughtas a way of entering into already established relationships with other-than-human persons. With their gift, Anishinaabe medicine persons arepositioned to act as intermediaries on behalf of those who seek guidanceand knowledge from other-than-human persons. However, in the case of

Anishinaabe sickness, to receive efficacious counsel and care from amedicine person requires more than seeking their help and following theiradvice. It requires conviction in the ontological reali ty of other-than-human persons, acceptance of the cultural rationale for the specificinstance of Anishinaabe sickness,and complete confidence in the medicinepersons gifts. The epistemological stance implicit here is a relational onein which the route for acquiring true knowledge about the etiology andmost appropriate way to deal with troubling experiences is through directinteraction with other-than-human persons.

In addition to bad medicine, the other prominent causal framework isondjine. Ondjinerefers to illness or misfortune that occurs for a reasonand which can be attributed to specific types of transgressions. To partici-pate in the Anishinaabe behavioral environment is to enter into respectfulrelations with other animate beings, and one common explanation ofondjineis causing an animal to suffer unnecessarily. Humans are alsorequired to behave appropriately towards sources of power, which includesfulfilling obligations towards other-than-human persons. When theseobligations are overlooked or disregarded, even unintentionally and/orunknowingly, ondjinemay result.10 Further, ondjineis the inevitable conse-quence of the abuse of power intrinsic to the use of bad medicine.

Anishinaabe sickness may be suspected when a physician is unable tocure an illness, or if there are other clues that suggest that the situation is


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a more complicated one. Ambiguity may exist even when a biomedicalpractitioner is able to effectively treat the surface manifestations of theillness. Appearances are seen as possibly misleading, with the root of the

problem left untouched. If left unaddressed, an Anishinaabe sickness willlead to recurring misfortune, affecting the same individual and/or familymembers.

Still, similar to the two cases from the Nhinaw community, despiteevidence that almost all knew of these explanations,variability exists withregard to how often individuals reported considering such possibilities intimes of trouble. There were some who were considered by others asinclined to act too readily upon fears that bad medicine was implicated andstill others who steadfastly disavowed any belief in Anishinaabe sickness

and further did not credit Anishinaabe medicine persons as being giftedwith any special abilities. The majority can be considered as located some-where between these two extremes.

Thus, to varying degrees, cultural understandings about Anishinaabesickness inform self processes through orienting individuals to the possi-bility that bodily afflictions and other misfortune may be a consequence ofdisordered social relationships. The centrality of interpersonal relation-ships and the normative expectations governing respectful relations amonganimate beings should not be seen as contradicting ethnographic accounts

of individualism and the high value placed on autonomy but it does addanother layer to the portrayal of self processes within the Anishinaabecommunity. For many, the reality of Anishinaabe sickness both alerts indi-viduals to threats to autonomy from other individuals in the communityas well as sets limits to autonomy, predicated on the dependence of humanbeings on the benevolence of other-than-human persons (cf. Black,1977a;Hallowell, 1955, p. 71).

Emily McKay is one of those who is oriented to the possibil ity of Anishi-

naabe sickness. At the time of the events recounted here, Emily was in hermid-thir ties, married with three children. Her family was one that wasvisited every two weeks to ask about ongoing illness cases,but Emily was alsosomeone I knew relatively well. I lodged at the home of one of her closefriends in the community and we visited relatively frequently, dropping inon each other at home and sharing cups of tea and conversation. Emily is afluent speaker of both English and Anishinaabemowin. Our discussionswere in English.During one of the case collection visits,Emily indicated thatshe was quite worried that she might be heading towards a nervous break-down. Despite the fact that she had recently started a new job that she was

quite happy to get, the past few weeks had been rather trying. I knew fromearlier conversations that Emilys marriage had been going through a tumul-tuous period for some time but Emily reported that things had worsenedconsiderably during the past few weeks and Emilys husband had been


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treating her badly. Complicating the situation further, Emilys car keptbreaking down, causing her to be late on a couple of occasions for her newjob. What was even more worrisome, however, were several spells of dizzi-

ness and debilitating headaches. Emily indicated that she was planning tosee her doctor the next day but, in addition to raising concerns about anervous breakdown she speculated that someone could be trying to harmher with bad medicine. Emily expressed specific concern that someone wasjealous of her new job. Like other cases that I had followed in thecommunity, the confluence of cultural and cognitive processes contribute toa state of heightened awareness for detecting additional signs that wereconsistent with a construction of the self being assaulted by bad medicine.In making sense of what was happening,both Emily and I were drawing onother remembered accounts of how cases involving bad medicine typically

unfold. In a later conversation, Emily commented on how suspicions arisethat someone is directing bad medicine towards you:

When things start to go wrong. When you seem to notice a change insomething. Its usually that something will start happening to your car,but then usually its just a coincidence, its just your car has had it. Or,or when one of your kids are .. . theres a change in their attitude or stufflike that. The other thing too is youll dream things.Youll dream of thisperson or youll dream of something and then youll kind of know thatyou know, youll suspect it as if someones trying to do something to

harm you.

As I was getting ready to leave, Emily asked if I could take her to one of thelocal stores to pick up a couple of things. She was still having problems withher car. As we left the store, Emily, visibly shaken, asked me if I had noticedhow another woman had stared at her while we stood at the cash register.She indicated that this woman was one of the unsuccessful applicants for herjob.This is one example of how the orientation of the self towards the threatto autonomy posed by bad medicine impacts on attention and perception.Taken together, a number of Emilys worries the cars breakdowns,

impaired health, the new job, the perception of malice in a distrusted other converge on a prototypical cultural scenario consistent with suspected badmedicine and would have been understood as such (without mentioningbad medicine) by any community member.

When I next saw Emily a couple of weeks later she told me she had seenthe doctor at the local health center complaining of the dizziness andheadaches. The doctor examined her, ran a couple of tests, and in the endsuggested that the most likely explanation was that she was under a lot ofstress. This, of course, did nothing to allay her fears that someone was

attempting to harm her using bad medicine. That evening,after Emily hadgone to bed, something happened that convinced her that she needed to seekthe help of a medicine person. Here is how Emily talked about this event:


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Well, it was just one night. Like I woke up. I didnt know if I wasdreaming or something,but the way it was, I was lying on my stomach.Then it seemed like I woke up. I guess I had seen something. There was

something behind me, like something black. And I kept trying to lookback and I couldnt. I couldnt look back. I could see something out ofthe corner of my eye. But I couldnt its as if something was holdingme, not letting me look back. I just couldnt look back. And then I feltlike the bed was just moving. And then later the next morning, Frank[her husband] asked me if the bed was moving or something,and I toldhim yes, it felt like it was moving. Then I told him, I thought that was adream, did you really feel the bed moving? He said yes. Well, then I gotup and all that night I kept trying to think was this a dream or some-thing, or did it happen. I couldnt sleep. I was scared after that, cause I

thought what if this is the devil or something. Then I told my momabout it and then she told me that I should do something about it. Shetold me, it must mean something.And then I decided to see a medicineman.

Jointly cultural, social and cognitive processes contribute to the narrativemarking of this event as significant and meaningful in flow of time in self-related experience a dramatic nighttime encounter with implications forthe future. As Emily tells us, Franks question about the bed moving steersEmily towards an interpretation that this wasnt just an ordinary dream but

one that heralded other possibil ities, including that someone might betrying to harm her. Unnerved, she seeks advice from her mother. Hermothers judgment that it must mean something fur ther points towardsthis interpretation. In other comments, Emily foreshadowed the likelyinvolvement of bad medicine. At best, it was simply a nightmare, at worst apremonition of impending danger. The decision to confer with a medicineman recognizes the value of his gifts for confirming or dismissing this threat.The person Emily consulted had been widely recognized in the communityas gifted for a period of around thirty years. Emily recounted that she wentto see the medicine man (who, like Emily, considered himself a devoutChristian) with the express purpose of obtaining protection medicine forher and her family. However, when she actually visited him, she only toldhim about the nocturnal episode itself and nothing about her fears. Emilyreported what happened during the visit:

Then he [ the medicine person] started singing. I heard three voices. Iknow I heard a mans voice and two old womens voices, cause I wassitting there and he was singing.And I thought,oh no,what if someonescoming, while hes singing and all this, cause I heard someone. I kept

looking and there was nobody,you know,I was just waiting for someoneto come up the stairs and no one was coming.All through that time likemy legs just felt weak and you know, I dont know how I felt, I just feltlike I wanted to cry right there and then. Then, after he finished singinghe told me that dream that I had was like a warning it was the devil


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it was sort of like he was trying to take my life. The spirits were givingme a warning through my dream for me to try and do something rightaway. The dream was meant for real, that I had to do something right

away.11

At first,unaware that the medicine person was in communication with spiritbeings (other-than-human persons),Emily McKay does not realize the threevoices she hears are not those of other human beings coming to visit butrather her spirit guides/protectors. But through the medicine mansguidance she comes to understand that they were also present at her dream.As well, he presents an alternative scenario, one which still draws onculturally available understandings (i.e. consistent with a culturally appro-priate narrative form) but which rejects the more common and predictable

interpretation of bad medicine. In this alternative scenario, by restrainingher movements, the spirit protectors shielded her from the presence of evil the unseen black shape which, for Emily, is now confirmed as the devil.Emily explained that what transpired is like somebodys trying to help you. . . someones trying to protect you. The headaches and spells of dizzinesscame to be seen as additional warning signs sent by her spirit protectors.

While phenomenally the description of Emilys nighttime encounterremains the same,as a consequence of the social processes set in motion byher consultation with the medicine person her interpretation has been quitedramatically transformed. In essence, Emilys health problems and the

dream were recast as consistent with ondjineand thus indicating that Emilyneeded to make some changes in her life. Emily McKay describes herself assomeone who believes deeply in God and in what she refers to as thetradition. But,due to the number of stressful events in her li fe, she admittedthat she was not living up to her spiritual commitments, she was lettingthings go. In accepting the protection of other-than-human persons andacknowledging her dependence on their benevolence, Emily was incurringan obligation to change her life and behave more respectfully by honoringher commitments to the other-than-human persons.

In addition, Emily now considers herself blessed by the visitation,especially as the medicine man intimated that the visit bears the promise offuture gifts. He also instructed her in a number of rules she should followto give thanks to those who are watching over her. Although only crypticalallusions were made at the time by Emily, she has come to see the import ofthe medicine persons intimations as a sign that she herself is gifted with theabil ity to interact with other-than-human persons in a way that will obligateher to take on the mantle of a medicine person in the future. The dream istaken as a portal onto true knowledge which, similar to what Hallowellreports for the dreams and visions experienced during the puberty fast of

the Anishinaabe past, is a self-related experience of the same order ofphenomenological reality as that experienced in waking life. For Emily, thedream has become a major transition point in her li fe.

Emily stopped being concerned that one of the unsuccessful jobapplicants was jealous and attempting to get back at her.Her headaches and


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dizzy spells abated to a large extent. Suspicions about bad medicine soonresurfaced, however, as Frank, Emilys husband, continued to behave in-appropriately and uncharacteristically. They would seem to be getting along

and then, suddenly, things would explode. Speaking of this time, Emily saidshe didnt know what to believe. While it was possible that bad medicinewas causing Franks bad behavior, it was also possible that it was just Frankbeing mean. At the same time, Emily noted:

Because there were just certain times of the day when Frank was beingsuch an idiot . . . and I always wondered why is it only at these times.Cause it started at evenings, and during the day was just OK, andevenings, like, he says, I want to go here, I want to go here, like hecouldnt stay at home. It was like he was acting, like a sixteen year old, I

guess. And, he was so mean at times.What especially gave Emily pause, however, were some times immediatelyafter he had mistreated her when:

. . . he would say, I dont know why I do that. Like you know he wouldbreak down and cry and he would never do that before. And he said itseems like, lets see how would I say this in English, but anyway what hesaid was I dont know, I dont know why Im doing this, I try hard notto, but, I stil l do it.

Emily, however, was reluctant to even share her concerns with Frank as hehad many times in the past expressed amazement that anyone could believein Anishinaabe sickness and in the powers of medicine persons. Over thecourse of their marriage, Emily had consulted with medicine persons onnumerous occasions, for herself and for her children, but she had never oncetold Frank about any of these visits. One time, soon after their marriage,Frank became extremely i ll and cure was elusive despite being under medicalcare. Emily went to see a medicine man who told her that an old girlfriendof Franks, someone with whom he had been involved before he married

Emily,was the source of his illness and, if left unaddressed, that Frank wouldeventually die. The medicine man said that he would take care of it andFrank recovered soon after.After a while,Emily told him that somebody putmedicine on him, like he didnt believe me at that time. I finally told himabout that, and he didnt believe me. He said it just wasnt true and all that.

One evening, when Emilys sister was visiting. Frank started treatingEmily badly. Emily described what happens next:

I was going to leave right there and then, I was standing at the door andI told Frank, Im going to leave. Im never going to come back.Then you

know,we were just arguing and all this.And then just right there in frontof me and my sister he just stood there and he broke down and criedand he said, I dont know why this is happening. And, and then rightthere and then like I kind of knew, like I kind of believed it. Like Ibelieved it but its so hard to say I believed it and then again I couldnt


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believe it, like cause its happened so many times that I didnt want tobelieve him, I guess. And then, but anyway at that time, cause he reallykeeps to himself.He wont tell anybody anything and that t ime I couldnt

believe he would break down and cry right in front of my sister, causehe always tries to make himself look good in front of everybody. I wassurprised that he did that in front of my sister and then I kind of, I kindof thought, you know, there really is something wrong.

Emily left but the next day she went to see the same medicine man that shehad previously consulted. The medicine man told her that it was the samewoman again, this time trying to break Emily and Frank up as a couplethrough the use of bad medicine to alter Franks behavior. Again, themedicine man said he would take care of it. After a few days at her sisters

home, Emily decided to give Frank one more chance. What happened nextwas truly surprising to Emily:

Suddenly, a few days after I came back, Frank wanted to go see amedicine man and I wondered.And then he said all that time I was gone,he had seen something or he imagined this, this woman or something.He said that he had seen her in his dream and all that, and then he knewId take it seriously. I didnt say anything to him and he was the one thatwanted to go and see a medicine man. Then we were told that someonewas trying to put medicine on him again or something and then he was

told to take some [protection] stuff and he was supposed to get some ofthat stuff youre supposed to carry with you all the time.

Emily reports that since these events transpired, they have had only thenormal ups and downs of a married couple.From Emilys perspective,Frankhas undergone a transformation through which he accepts as reality theconceptions of self and behavioral environment within which Anishinaabesickness is embedded. He even initiated a family journey to a medicineperson living in another province to seek spiritual guidance for living in amanner consistent with the tradition.

Conclusion

Through narratives of troubling experiences this article has explored howcultural, social and cognitive processes enter into the perception andinterpretation of self-related experience as well as the mutual constitutionof self and behavioral environment. Steering clear of the pitfalls encoun-tered when hypothesizing particular kinds of cultural selves (e.g. anAnishinaabe self, a Japanese self), the approach taken here draws attention

to self-processes as orientational processes the self-related implicationsof living by particular culturally based understandings.Seen as a kind of collective memory in the Anishinaabe community,

cultural understandings associated with Anishinaabe sickness serve asresources variably relied upon by individuals to help make sense of ones


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own experience in relation to unfolding events in the social world.Drawingon Martin Heideggers phenomenological concept of temporality,Mattingly (1998) and Ochs and Capps (2001) discuss the narrative struc-

turing of experience. Lived experience our life in time . . . is a time whichis always situated between a past and a future (Mattingly,1998, p. 64). Weare always in the process of becoming and that future saturates eachpresent moment with meaning (Mattingly, 1998, p. 93; cf. Ochs & Capps,2001, p. 157). In the face of uncertain future, desire plays a centralstructuring role. We hope for certain endings; others we dread. We act inorder to bring certain endings about, to realize certain futures,and to avoidothers (Mattingly,1998,p.93). In narratives of personal experience,occur-rence of a troubling event sets in motion theprobabilitythat a subsequent

state or action will occur (Ochs & Capps, 2001, p. 172; italics in original).These potentialities (affordances) infuse narrated events with a sense ofanticipation (Ochs & Capps,2001, p.172).Cultural understandings affordplausible narrative frames that are oriented to the present in a way thatanticipates future possibilities while organizing the past. As important asit is to address a concern of the present, an implicit aim of those seekingthe assistance of an Anishinaabe medicine person is to avoid future trouble,which is sure to recur if Anishinaabe sickness is indeed at the base. Assketched below, a myriad of orientations and anticipations are associated

with bad medicine and Anishinaabe sickness more generally.To be oriented to Anishinaabe sickness as a possible cause of present

troubling experiences is to entertain the possibility that the root ofmisfortune may be in ones own inappropriate actions or in the covert illwill of another. To allow for illness and misfortune occurring as aconsequence of not living up to ones obligations to other-than-humanpersons entails an acceptance of the ontological reality of such beings aswell as seeing oneself as dependent on the continuing benevolence of suchbeings and of the necessity to live in a manner that recognizes this depen-

dence. To be attentive to clues that someone who seems outwardly affablemay have secretly taken steps to cause misfortune or affliction in anothercontributes to a cautionary stance in interactions with all but ones mosttrusted allies. To realize that bad medicine exists is to conceive thatsubstances can permeate bodily boundaries unnoticed by the victim. Toexpect that bad medicine may lead an afflicted person to behave in anunusual fashion is to allow for an interpretation of anothers or ones ownmisbehavior in a manner that is free of individual blame.To anticipate thatbad medicine boomerangs and that misfortune is the inevitable conse-quence of covert actions that interfere with the autonomy of fellow humanbeings,opens onto possibilities for interpreting the afflictions of others. Toaccept that other-than-human persons may bestow gifts that enablehumans to establish ongoing relations with them is to conceive that some


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individuals may have acquired such powers. To accept that other-than-human persons can communicate through dreams and visions is to beopen to the possibility that private sensory experiences may represent true

knowledge of the world as it currently is or as it may become.Taken together, these orientations to reality do not correspond wit

Documents

Narrating Trouble Experiences