North Carolina A&T State University

Greensboro

Nasser’s Dilemma: Government Repression and the Radicalization of the Muslim Brotherhood,

1928-Present

By

Jonathan Jackson

Course: HIST 250: The Nature, Study & Writing of History

Section: 001

Instructor: Dr. James Woods

Semester: Fall 2014

I. Introduction

British colonialism in Egypt set the stage for the sparks of independence to erupt into a

torrent of flames that would sweep all Egyptians into becoming politically organized. The

rampant government corruption, exploitation of Egyptian citizens under British colonialism, and

Egypt’s humiliating defeat at the hands of Israel in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War pushed many

Egyptian citizens to recognize that new leadership in Egypt was desperately needed to restore the

demoralized and disorganized Egyptian people back to their former glory. Dissatisfaction with

the West was revealed when all Arab States except Lebanon failed to respond to the 1950

Security Council resolution calling for assistance to the Republic of Korea.1 As Egypt advanced

into the 20th century, two different forces: al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn (Muslim Brotherhood, M.B.), as

we know them today, and the nationalist colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser saw this new populist

desire for independence as their opportunity to advance their political causes. Both were hoping

to fundamentally transform Egypt and promote their different visions of what Egypt should

become.

Gamal Abdel Nasser’s legacy has had a profound impact upon Egyptian politics, life, and

history today. He has become one of the most influential Arab leaders of the 20th century. He

believed that the Middle East fell prey to the influences of the West, and that by coming together

under a united front the Arabs could become a formidable force to the Western world. The

consolidation of Nasser’s power over Egypt, as well as his unique charisma that allowed him to

connect with the Egyptian people like no leader before or after him, allowed Nasser to rise to a

1 Don Pertez, “Nonalignment in the Arab World.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 362, (November 1965): p.37. Accessed November 23, 2014. http://www.jstor.org.ncat.idm.oclc.org/stable/pdfplus/1035788.pdf?&acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true

new level of popularity. Being a high level officer in the Egyptian Army and greatly respected by

his subordinates, Nasser was able to assume total control of the Egyptian government because he

had the army on his side. The Egyptian people rallied behind their leader in the effort to resist the

influences of the Western world. Nasser’s hard-lined nationalistic policies and social agenda

made him enemies at home and abroad. His successors would go on to follow his policy of

releasing prisoners and then banning the Muslim Brotherhood after discovering that they could

not be controlled. With the release of the Muslim Brotherhood, the consequences brought about

an Islamic revolution that would spread from country to country affected the global world for

years to come and unleash a wave of violence in the Middle East. The repressive nature of

Egypt’s government, from Gamal Abdel Nasser to his successors, drove the Muslim Brotherhood

to become radicalized and engage in acts of terrorism.

II. Historical Background

Following the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, the seeds of revolt were planted for

many of its citizens to push back against the idea of British rule. The Egyptian nationalist

movement was born in the trenches of these revolts against the British that would later become

one of the two dominant movements for twentieth century Egypt and going forward into the

contemporary period. Egypt saw many clashes with British forces from 1882 to 1914. Max

Guirguis wrote, “In 1922, Britain granted Egypt nominal independence but continued to wield

power behind the scenes by influencing, if not dictating, all the important decisions of the

Egyptian monarchy.”2 This action drove many Egyptians to distrust the ruling monarchy in

Egypt and search for other groups that would represent their interests. At the time this included:

2 Max Guirguis, “Islamic Resurgence and Its Consequences in the Egyptian Experience,” Mediterranean Studies 20, 2 (2012): p. 191. Accessed November 21, 2014. http://0-muse.jhu.edu.sheba.ncat.edu/journals/mediterranean_studies/v020/20.2.guirguis.pdf

nationalism or Islamic Fundamentalism. Nationalism and Islamism are the two most prevalent

ideologies that still have a foothold with the political make-up of Arab countries.3 The

nationalistic movement was largely disorganized and small in nature, due to nationalism not

being very popular in Egypt. Islam was an exceptionally powerful tool for uniting the Egyptian

people because a large percentage of Egyptians practiced Islam and identified themselves as

Muslim first and Egyptian second. Also the idea that the occupation of Egyptian land being

done under the boot of British Christians only angered the Egyptian population even further.

The Society of Muslim Brothers, or the Muslim Brotherhood as they are known in today’s

world, was established in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna, an Egyptian school teacher. Max Guirguis

explained, “The Muslim Brotherhood was originally a youth organization intended to teach

young Muslim boys about their history, culture, heritage, and about having self-respect as a

Muslim.”4

The Muslim Brotherhood at the time of its establishment would be considered

something similar to what America has in the Boy Scouts. Max Guirguis wrote “One of the

things the Muslim Brotherhood abhorred was the use of violence to influence change.”5 By the

late 1940s, the Muslim Brotherhood became more politically active organization with over half

a million members. Largely a peaceful political organization but with the Egyptian

government’s movements to repress the grassroots organization; the Muslim Brotherhood like

many other political organizations, would go on to develop their own splinter cells that took the

religious aspects of the group to an unheard of extreme, believing that violence was the only

3 Christoph Schumman, “The “Failure” of Radical Nationalism and the “Silence” of Liberal Thought in the Aab World.” Comparative Studies of South Asian, Africa and the Middle East 28, no.3 (2008): p.409. Accessed October 30, 2014. http://0-muse.jhu.edu.sheba.ncat.edu/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa_and_the_middle_east/v028/28.3.schumann.pdf4 Max Guirguis, “Islamic Resurgence and Its Consequences in the Egyptian Experience,” 192-1935 Max Guirguis, “Islamic Resurgence and Its Consequences in the Egyptian Experience,” 194

way to bring about change in Egypt. Max Guirguis explains, “the Brotherhood sporadically

bombed symbols of British influence, destroyed Jewish institutions and synagogues, and

carried out some high-profile killings of Egyptian officials….”6 Many other social

organizations where usually found throughout Egypt only on a small scale, but the Muslim

Brotherhood continued to expand and became more structured and more organized by the

1940s. It was banned by the Egyptian monarchy after the Islamist wing of the Muslim Brother

assassinated the Prime Minister in 1948 and the government, blaming Al-Banna for the

assassination, had Hassan Al-Banna assassinated in February 1949. Ziad Munson explained

that, “Popularity for the Muslim Brotherhood only increased in Egypt after World War II, and

the Muslim Brotherhood was central in much of the turmoil.7 In 1952, a group of nationalist

military officers in the Egyptian Army, called the Free Officers, led a bloodless coup in Egypt

with the support of the Muslim Brotherhood that would overthrow the Egyptian monarchy due

to several factors, such as dissatisfaction with the corruption in the Egyptian government,

Egypt’s lack of opportunities to modernize, and Egypt’s humiliating defeat at the hands of

Israel in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. With the coup, Egypt finally achieved full independence

from Britain, which would come to be known as the Egyptian Revolution of 1952.

III. Nasser and The Muslim Brotherhood

The ramifications of colonialism and the challenges of governing themselves forced

Egypt to look for a leader, who could project a show a strength and solidarity to the world.

Nasser capitalized on that opportunity and appealing to the nationalistic fervor that was growing

in Egypt. Ziad Munson remarked that, “The agonies of that period were compounded by the

6 Max Guirguis, “Islamic Resurgence and Its Consequences in the Egyptian Experience,” 1947 Ziad Munson, “Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.” The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Autumn 2001): p. 489

ignominious defeat of the allied Arab forces in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, which weakened but

did not kill secular nationalism.”8 Gamal Abdel Nasser became president of Egypt in 1956 after

disagreements with the first president, Mohammed Naguib, led to Naguib being forcibly

removed from office by Nasser and placed under house arrest for 18 years. He was not released

until it was done by Nasser’s successor, Muhammed Anwar El Sadat, in 1972. Max Guirguis

added that, “The notion of Arab unity continued to be acknowledged in rhetoric… the nationalist

movement was organizationally weak.”9 Nasser became the new leader of the nationalist

movement because of his charisma and the symbolic victories he had won that reignited the

dignity of the Arab community. Nasser’s rise to power changed Egypt as it begun to flex its

might against the Western world and influence other Arab nations into believing that it was

possible to challenge the West. Gamal Abdel Nasser pushed for a domestic agenda that was

socialist in nature. He was able to present himself as the Arab leader who had kicked out the

British.10 The management of the Suez crisis was a major propaganda victory for Nasser and a

litmus test for his belief in a united Arab coalition. The Muslim Brotherhood, which was pivotal

to Nasser’s ascension to power, expected him to share power with them for helping the Free

Officers overthrow the Egyptian Monarchy, but Nasser reneged on sharing power. On October

26, 1954 Muslim Brotherhood member Mohammed Abdel Latif attempted to assassinate Nasser

while he was delivering a speech in Alexandria to celebrate the British military withdrawal. The

speech was broadcast to the Arab world via radio. The gunman was 25 feet away from him and

fired eight shots, but all missed Nasser. Panic broke out in the mass audience, but Nasser

maintained his posture and raised his voice to appeal for calm.

8 Max Guirguis, “Islamic Resurgence and Its Consequences in the Egyptian Experience,” 1989 Max Guirguis, “Islamic Resurgence and Its Consequences in the Egyptian Experience,” 19810 Michael T. Thornhill, “Britain, the United States and the Rise of an Egyptian Leader: The Politics and Diplomacy of Nasser’s Consolidation of Power, 1952-4.” The English Historical Review 119, 483 (September 2004): p.892. http://www.jstor.org.ncat.idm.oclc.org/stable/pdfplus/3490692.pdf?acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true

Barbra Zollner explained that, “The attempt on Nasser's life on October 26, 1954 signaled

the beginning of persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood… In any event, the Muslim

Brotherhood was deemed responsible.”11 Nasser laid the blame for the attempted assassination

largely upon the Muslim Brotherhood. His popularity among the Egyptian people grew and

Nasser’s supporters increased. The incident allowed Nasser to use the assassination attempt to set

the narrative that the Muslim Brotherhood must be banned to protect his power base. Barbra

Zollner also added that, “…the Brothers were rounded up in what appeared to be a well-planned

exercise. Thousands were sent to prison with or without trial, and a number of leading figures

were sentenced to death by military tribunals while others managed to flee the country.”12

Nasser’s crackdown of the Muslim Brotherhood continued upwards into the presidency of his

successor Anwar El-Sadat, where the Muslim Brotherhood was pushed to go underground. The

Banning of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt pushed the already marginalized group to build up

its other splinter groups in other Arab nations, like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria. Hamas, a

well-known militant organization operating in Palestine, was founded in 1987 thanks to the

financial support of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

The Six Days War with Israel was Nasser’s attempt to prove to the Western world that

Egypt and its united coalition of Arab nations was a major military force that could compete by

toppling their closest ally, Israel, in battle. They were in for a rude awakening as Israel launched

a targeted and crushing offensive in the course of six days, effectively destroying the Egyptian

air force on the ground and mobilizing its ground forces to crush the Arab ground troops in

devastating fashion, despite being largely outnumbered. The humiliating defeat once again at the

11 Barbra Zollner, “Prison Talk: The Muslim Brotherhood's Internal Struggle during Gamal Abdel Nasser's Persecution, 1954 to 1971.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 39, 3 (August 2007): p.412-413. Accessed September 18, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3006952812 Barbra Zollner, “Prison Talk: The Muslim Brotherhood's Internal Struggle,” 413

hands of Israel spelled disastrous results for Nasser’s presidency as he formally resigned as

President of Egypt shortly afterwards and that loss contributed to the collapse of the Arab

nationalist ideology. Once leaving office, Nasser’s successor was a senior member of the Free

Officers who overthrew King Farouk in the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, and a close confidant

of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Muhammad Anwar El-Sadat, attempted to try to hold on to

the power that Nasser amassed and promote his own personal politics. Raymond William baker

wrote that, “Throughout the Muslim world in the 1960s and 1970s secular nationalism and pan

nationalisms suffered from the political disappointments and economic failings….”13

Nasser’s heavy-handed tactics against the Muslim Brotherhood forced the organization to

move its activities underground, or they be discovered and arrested. Nasser saw Islamists and the

Muslim Brotherhood specifically as threats to his regime. He created sophisticated intelligence

groups that infiltrated and reported on the activities of the groups that Nasser deemed as enemies

of the state. Those enemies were then sent to the concentration camps. Mohammed K. Shadid

wrote that, “By the mid-1960s, Brotherhood-organized cells had almost ceased to exist and there

were few if any new adherents to the movement.”14

IV. The Muslim Brotherhood under Anwar El- Sadat

Mohammed Anwar El-Sadat assumed the Presidency of Egypt after Gamal Abdel Nasser

died of heart disease in 1970. He immediately instituted changes to Egypt in hopes of gaining the

support of the people behind him. Distancing himself from Nasser’s socialism, Sadat expelled

the Russian “advisors” and embarked on a wave of economic liberalization by opening up to the

affluent West and inviting noncommunist investment in Egypt. He freed the political prisoners 13 Raymond William Baker, “Afraid of Islam: Egypt’s Muslim Centrists between Pharaohs and Islamic Fundamentalists.” Daedalus, Vol. 120, No. 3 (Summer 1991): p. 47 14 Mohammed K. Shadid, “The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in the West Bank and Gaza.” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2 (April 1988): p.660

and dismantled the vast domestic intelligence apparatus that Nasser had created. One of those

prisoners released from the Egyptian prisons was Ayman Al-Zawahiri, a surgeon in the medical

field and member of the Muslim Brotherhood. He became Osama Bin Laden’s second-in-

command and is currently the leader of Al-Qaeda, he met Osama Bin Laden shortly after he had

been released from prison and fled Egypt to help him start Al-Qaeda. Other famous Brothers

were condemned to the prisons by Nasser and his successors; Max Guirguis wrote, “Ironically, it

was in Nasser’s torture chambers that the Islamists found a new voice and a new inspiration in

the now-famous Sayyid Qutb…. Qutb was an unlikely figure to invigorate a new breed of holy

warriors and ignite a violent global movement.”15 He even invited the Islamist activists in exile

to return and released all the Muslim Brothers from prison and allowed them to function

politically, partly to demonstrate his democratic intentions and partly to neutralize the leftist

forces that were threatening to derail his economic reform program.16 Sadat broke away from his

predecessor’s anti-west policy and allowed Western investment into Egypt, because he wanted to

grow the Egyptian economy. He released political prisoners that were jailed under Nasser,

because he believed that would build him support from those who had opposed Nasser. It would

seem very naïve to allow people who were tortured and imprisoned unjustly by Sadat’s

predecessor to be released believing that they would support the government; that seems very

illogical, if not completely outrageous. To some observers, the shift to the right in the politics of

the Egyptian ruling class under Sadat represents a complete divorce from the political line of his

predecessor, Nasser, whose regime is considered generally to have been pan-Arab, "leftist," and

anti-imperialist.17 This ignores the neutralism and secularism of the Nasserist state and what his

supporters wanted for Egypt. Sadat did not start the shift to the right; he simply accelerated it and

15 Max Guirguis, “Islamic Resurgence and Its Consequences in the Egyptian Experience,” 196-19716 Max Guirguis, “Islamic Resurgence and Its Consequences in the Egyptian Experience,” 19917 Max Guirguis, “Islamic Resurgence and Its Consequences in the Egyptian Experience,” 199

extended it in a way compatible with his personal politics and the needs of the classes that

represent his power base.

Unlike Nasser, who feared Islam because it undermined the authority of his new regime,

Sadat was a believer in Islam and many of his speeches contained verses from the Quran. He

relaxed the persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Muslim extremist groups. The

revival of militant religious movements in Egypt, most observers agree, dates back to the

aftermath of the Arab defeat of 1967. The Sadat regime initially took a conciliatory and tolerant

posture towards these groups, to offset what the regime perceived to be a more serious political

threat from the Nasserist and left opposition.18 He would go on to close the concentration camps

in 1971 and release the Islamists held in the camps. He even went as far as to restore their

position as a political party and even issued some policies that seemed to come from Sharia law,

specifically of Salat, or a call of prayer five times a day, and the banning of alcohol except to

foreigners. But despite his identification with Islamists, he also clashed with them over things

like women’s rights and negotiations with Israel. Sadat’s release of the Islamists from the prisons

would prove to be a fatal mistake for him, as on October 6, 1981, as Sadat sat among top

government officials and dignitaries observing an annual victory parade commemorating the

anniversary of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, four assassins in military uniforms approached the

stand and fire in the group of officials hitting Sadat multiple times, Sadat was rushed to the

hospital where he was pronounced dead. The assassins were members of the Egyptian Islamic

Jihad, a radical off-shoot cell of the Muslim Brotherhood that had infiltrated Sadat’s military. It

was the cruelest of ironies that the Muslim Brotherhood, which Sadat had released from prison

18 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Egypt’s Islamic Militants.” MERIP Reports, No. 103 (February 1982): p.5

and looked to as potential allies, formed the main opposition block against his regime and bred

the terrorists who killed him on his day of honor.19

For Nasser, the Muslim Brotherhood came close to being rooted out of Egyptian society

but before it was possible the Arab nationalist movement fell apart. Sadat attempted to appease

the Muslim Brotherhood by releasing them from Nasser’s prisons in hopes that they would help

him defeat the Nasserists and opposition on the left, student groups that were beginning to voice

their own opinions. Policy differences between Sadat and the Brotherhood forced him to

crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood once again in the late 1970s, but he missed a cell that had

infiltrated the military. That mistake would prove to be his downfall as on October 6th, 1981

during a victory parade to commemorate the eighth anniversary of Operation Badr in 1973,

which took place during the Yom Kippur War, Anwar El-Sadat was assassinated by the Egyptian

Islamic Jihad, an Islamic militant off-shoot cell of the Muslim Brotherhood. Sadat had rolled the

dice with the Muslim Brotherhood and lost. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the Camp David

Accords of 1978 destroyed what was left of the collapsing Arab nationalist movement in Egypt.

Hosni Mubarak, who would succeed Sadat, was not going to take any chances at all with the

Muslim Brotherhood. He would put forth his own plan to curb the Muslim Brotherhood and the

radical Islamic behavior that befell his two predecessors.

V. Mubarak’s Strategy

Hosni Mubarak succeeded Anwar El-Sadat as the president of Egypt from 1981 to 2011

after Sadat was assassinated by a Muslim Brotherhood off-shoot cell. He was determined to not

end up like Sadat, and so he went about a systematic approach to protect himself and his

presidency from the reaches of the Islamists. In Judith Tucker and Joe Stork’s report on Hosni

19 Max Guirguis, “Islamic Resurgence and Its Consequences in the Egyptian Experience,” p.202

Mubarak, they wrote, “Egypt's President Husni Mubarak endeavored to set himself apart from

his predecessor Anwar Sadat in matters of style, if not substance.”20 As a first step, Mubarak

began to purge the armed forces of the radical Islamic elements through transfers, early

retirements, and dismissals. He also utilized the media to divert hardline Islamists from their

radical ideology and to educate the rising generation about religion in a more moderate way.21

Learning that the military had been infiltrated with Muslim Brotherhood operatives, Mubarak

purged his military of all who were not loyal to him and pushed the Islamists to become

marginalized by the Egyptian population, which in turn protected him from the uniquely

powerful influences that the Islamists have in Egyptian society. He did it to remain in power and

stay alive. Judith Tucker and Joe Stork reported that, “He rejected any move that would

jeopardize Israel's Sinai withdrawal, but simultaneously resisted Israeli ultimatums on

"autonomy" negotiations.”22

The idea of using media to influence the next generation of Egyptians to become more

moderate toward non-Muslims to de-radicalize the youth would seem like a smart and politically

revolutionary reform for Egypt. The Muslim brotherhood was effective in reaching the poor,

disaffected Egyptian youth and that helped the Muslim Brotherhood to become Egypt’s largest

political party. Max Guirguis wrote that, “Mubarak failed to bring the Muslim radicals from the

extreme to the mainstream, to remedy the persistent problem of religious discrimination against

Coptic Christians.”23 Mubarak did not want attacks upon the Coptic Christians to invite

instability into Egypt because the longer that Mubarak was able to keep Egypt stabilized the

longer he could remain in power. While the extremist off-shoot cells continued encouraging

20 Judith Tucker and Joe Stork, “In the Footsteps of Sadat.” MERIP Reports, No.107 (July-August 1982): p.321 Max Guirguis, “Islamic Resurgence and Its Consequences in the Egyptian Experience,” p.20322 Judith Tucker and Joe Stork, “In the Footsteps of Sadat.” 323 Max Guirguis, “Islamic Resurgence and Its Consequences in the Egyptian Experience,” p.204

attacks upon Coptic-Christians, the economic disparity and stagnant chances of upward mobility

in the private sector, enraged many Egyptian youths. The economic disparity that average

Egyptian citizens faced made them: angry, out-of-hope, out-of-jobs, poor, and searching for a

better life. Those different things made average people vulnerable to the temptations that radical

Islamic cells would use to radicalize them into becoming loyal fighters for the cause. Mubarak’s

solution to the Islamic militant movement was similar to Nasser in terms of its very repressive

programs to de-radicalize the people from wanting the engage in acts of terrorism.

The Muslim Brotherhood adopted a more non-violent reformist strategy during the

beginnings of the twenty-first century and more or less became a tool of the Mubarak

government for its domestic policies. Yet they had numerous clashes with Mubarak’s

government. More members of the Brotherhood were arrested and persecuted by the

government, which in turn made it more popular in the eyes of the public as the financially

struggling population suffered under the corrupt government. With people wanting to get

involved in the politics of their country and voice their grievances the only way was to join the

largest political organization in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood. It was under Mubarak that the

Brotherhood saw a revival in membership.

In 2010, thousands of Egyptians took to the streets in Tahrir Square in what would

become known as the Arab Spring, through the use of social media and the Internet, Egyptian

youths were able to spread the word of the revolt against tyranny, corruption, and poverty in

Egypt as well as the call for the end of Mubarak’s thirty-year rule as President of Egypt. The

revolution began as a secular, middle-class uprising, as is evident from the secular signs, slogans,

and chants. The early protesters were neither bearded nor wearing distinctively Islamic garb,

such as turbans or robes. When the Egyptian Army sided with the people, Mubarak was forced to

step down and would later be put on trial for allowing the shooting of protestors during the Arab

Spring. Mubarak responded to those calling for his removal from office by paying government

operatives and thugs to infiltrate the protestors to beat up and attack them. Many members of the

police beat and brutally attacked the captured protestors. The protestors responded by exposing

the agitators and reaffirming their non-violent strategies to hold the moral high ground. The

pressure put upon Mubarak forced him to step down and answer for his actions. The Arab Spring

spread across the Middle East and became something that rocked the very foundation of the

Middle East.

The outcome of the Arab Spring was most beneficial to the Muslim Brotherhood as

Mubarak resigned and the ban on the Muslim Brotherhood was removed, allowing them to

publically gather and operate without fear of government persecution. That also in turn freed

militant Islamist groups to come out of the underground to try to co-opt the Arab Spring to

spread radical ideology into Egypt. Yet the protesters, largely secular in nature, recognized and

pushed out those groups. Mohammed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate for the

presidency of Egypt, won the first democratic election in 2011. Under Morsi, the Muslim

Brotherhood now had the position of power that they had yearned for since its establishment by

Hassan Al-Banna in 1928, approximately 83 years prior. It marked a huge milestone for the

Muslim Brotherhood as they had the power to make their goals of a united Islamic state in Egypt.

The public at first supported them but when the policies that the Muslim Brotherhood instituted

failed to address the problems that the public wanted solved. Many of the officials still in office

at the time Morsi was elected had been appointed by Mubarak, so gridlock in the legal system

became evident. The referendum to draft a new constitution also contributed to the downfall of

the Mohammed Morsi as well as anti-Semitic comments he made about the Jews, which soured

his public image in the eyes of some in the Egyptian community and largely the International

community.

Unfortunately, the Muslim Brotherhood was soon forced back underground as the

mounting dissatisfaction with the progress of democracy in Egypt and the bleak economic

conditions that many faced. Mohammed Morsi was overthrown by the Egyptian military, under

the command of General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, on July 3rd, 2013 under the pretense that the

Muslim Brotherhood failed to live up to the demands the Egyptian people hoped for when they

elected them to office. El-Sisi, like Nasser, cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood, arresting

many prominent leaders of the organization and designated it as a terrorist group. Hundreds of

Muslim Brotherhood members and anybody associated with them were arrested. Mohammed

Morsi, himself, was placed on house arrest expecting to await trial like many of his brothers.

VI. Conclusion

After the attempt on his life, Gamal Abdel Nasser drove the already contentious Muslim

Brotherhood underground, where they would embrace activities that would drive them towards

becoming a terrorist group. Egypt has come a long way since its occupation by the British in

1882; it has been forged in the fires of revolution, protest, regime change, and repressive

government. The power struggle between Nasser and the Muslim Brotherhood started a

precedent that future Egyptian presidents would take against the Muslim Brotherhood. Pan-

Arabism and Islamism have been the two major ideological-political forces that have dominated

political life in the Middle East for over a century. These movements promised social and

political renewal and power through national awakening or religious revival. Looking back on

the actions of the 20th century Egyptian Presidents, Nasser started the repression of the Muslim

Brotherhood and his successors re-enacted the measures he had taken to ban and destroy the

Brotherhood. The consequences of Nasser’s tactics against the Muslim Brotherhood would only

be felt by his successors and by the wider world. The creation of groups such as Hamas, Al-

Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra, and ISIS all could not have been possible had they not drawn their

influences from the Islamic militant cells that broke off from the Muslim Brotherhood during the

strict repression they faced because of the tactics and policy failures of Nasser and his

successors.

Did the attempt on the life of Gamal Abdel Nasser drive the already contentious Society

of Muslim Brothers underground, where they would embrace activities that would drive them

towards becoming a terrorist group? The answer is yes and no. Yes, in the sense that anytime a

government repressed an organization to hold on to their political power over the country, they

will usually react violently. The Muslim Brotherhood did engage in violent retaliation in the past.

The Muslim Brotherhood was forced underground in Egypt and they fought to hold a presence in

the country where they were established. No, in the sense that much of the Muslim Brotherhood

was purely a political organization operating in Egypt, like many organizations around the world,

they would eventually develop their own fringe group that operated in terroristic activities. The

Muslim Brotherhood would eventually become designated as a terrorist organization by Russia,

Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and even Qatar has expelled

Brotherhood leaders just this past September. This says that the Muslim brotherhood is an

organization that has a complicated past, a troubled present, an unknown future, yet it has

allowed the Egyptian people to voice their grievances with the Egyptian government like so

many other political organizations around the world.

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