A R o undtable o n C h arl es N. Ede l , Nation Builder:

John Quincy Adams and the Grand Strategy of the Republic

Thomas W Zeiler, Daniel]. Hulsebosch, Andrew Preston, William Inboden, Daniel Walker Howe, and Charles N. Edel

Introductory Essay, Ro und table on Charles N. Edel, Nation Builder: John Quincy Adams and the Grand

Strategy of the Republic Thomas W. Zeiler

I /If y ur ti ns inspiP otlPt'S to dream m re, learn more, do mor and be m nior , you are a lead 'r," John Quincy Adams proclaimed. Th, t ada!?e

ounds like marl et111g f r n ' f the trendy c llfS m lead rshi1 at my univ r ity. But consider ll" in conjun tion with his m s t fam u. qu t , "America does n t go , bro, d in 8 '11' h of monsters to destroy," and ne con tu ion, ur ly in line with the argument il1 this superb bo< k by

Charl s Edel, is that Ad ms thought profoundly, an on casion inspi.rationa_l ly, . abm1t ensuring A11.1erica's place,

safety, , nd potenllol .m lh worl.cl. Deeply thoughtful ru1d well researched, Nn1io11 B11ildet contends tl1at Adams put forth a grand strategic philosophy for the United States that the yow1g ar,id vu In abl nati n grew inlo over time.

TI1e au th r b -Ii v s that Adams wcis a s tat sman pnr excellence. I wou ld go further to label John Quincy Adams a eco.nd,-g n r, ti n F w1d ing Falher. H was~ om lo I t " to

be ne of th riginals, but he was the next b t thing: the s n a Fmmd , wh went n L cru:ve out his own vision for American great:n. ss. Th reviewers Ln this fornm < nd th book's blurbers agree with Edel that Adams was one of the k y sba tegists-ru1d a r:nostly successful on at that- wh built c n thew rk of Jolrn Acfams and th th r half-dozen ound .rs nd helped establish ~n iJ0.d p nd nt, viab~. , and

dynam1 new nal1on. H had his fa i!ur (na111 ly, hu: on -term presidency), and his torian are wont to tr afhim more Lik a Herbert Ho ver (as Wilfint s tatesmru1 who did not do as well in the pol itica 11 imeTight f the nation's high st office ash might hav b en exp cted to. Yet pul aside Liv presidency, and A ams, lik many of the Forn1ders, seemed th perfe t mix for a stat srn.a n: h was a vision, ry who was i.11 h ard-h ad d and pragmati, and a realist wh wa motiva ted to ponder and proiect in sweeping ideol.ogical terms and by and larg succeed din hi s 111 i.ss.ior.t.

Edel focuses on how this F und ing a ther Jr. set out PASSPORT / f1t111rtr _11 ..! 0 I ri

the d trin , that h - b Ueved shmLld guld th c untry. H enmeshes the narrative in the compJexiti s of Ada.ms's thought and in th onLrnv rsies of hifi tim s. u1' f ur reviewers assert thathe do s a magni fi cnt job of explainlng Adams's thought and times, 'ven though e h of them dlsag1ees with 11im anddiv rg~s frorn f !low commentators on occasion when assessing th consequences of Adams's overa.rdilng dip! matic strat gy.

The b k a l l ws that p opl matter, even though su ha focu might n t b ink eping with lilstoriograpl.i lea 1 tr , nds ln urfi'ld. :'..del ntersAda msi ntoth panlh~ nof gr at American leaders despite his poUti al shortcomings. But his treatment of Adams is un_iqu in that h pla e him in the 1 anth n as a t w ring ta t man wh trategic outlool< guid d th " y m1g nati n i r de ad s, if nol e.nttLri"s. lt i ci p sitiv Lreatm nl that al has s berii1g

implications, as the panel of reviewers makes clear. espit his v lumincm s w~itings, Adams, we learn,

n ev .r s t ut thi, grand strat gy in explicit detail. Eel "I does that for us. It is clear that Adams sought nati na l exp nsion, but with utth sortofo e.rext nsi n that would ru rn Lh d m cratic exp ci menl. bus, however grand hi g rand trategy wa, Edel's Adams em."rges cs a r a li t, a auti l nation builder who envisioned th sam goals

of greatness and power for the country as did ide 1listi xpansioni.sts. He JUSt g L th r in a ifferent way. He did

n t s ek mons ters t destr y but rather mged neutrality v is-h-vi the big show in Europe and tLtm inwards ( t I ast toward th ~ N tth Am rican ontinenl) to unit - the nation in the common caLLses of security, prosperity, and democrc cy. That app.roach would resu lt in the ca refu [, step -by-step constmclion of a republican nation. Th 11 cess mini_mized security ri. ks and 1 nabl d the cotmtry to do the right thing 1 rally.

The r viewers were uniformly captivated by Edel's tr alm nt, and, n the whole, i tnpressed as th author by Adams h.imse lf, i nol as aw d . Upbringing counts, as D

Yet Adams was both a man of hjs times and, perhaps most im portant, a man of l"he future. He pr - l'i ted Ameri an gr aln ss and d minan bul a ls fo recasl pr blcin with rc. , gend r, and 0U1er s cia l issui;s.

Andrew Prest n compare Ada 1 1s lo Inter diplomats a nd strategists and likens h im to

comprehensive plans of action, s tage the means efficiently, and make judgmenls informed by the collective wisdom of thinkers from Thucydides lo George Kennan-and includingjohn Quincy Adams.21 lumanc thjnking, in olher words, is a sow1der g u ide for nation-builders than faddish theories from the socia l sciences or im~ulsive reactions in the face of a crisis . Case s tudies from i:he past arc part of the tra ining because they illus trate the d ifference between systernati.c and rash decision-mak ing. There is m uch that is attractive here, especia lly for his torians; at least, grnnd s tategis ts could be new, cager, and influential audience for their scholarship. And Lhcrc is appeal for histoTians in a method that emphasizes eclecllcism, contingency, and learning over time rather Lhan the timeless psychology of ralionar choice or even (lately) timeless irrationality.

The term "strategy," however, possesses an ambiguity that might be usefoT for policymakers but is potentially confusing for historians because it can beg the question of ends. Sbategy often suggests a plan that fils means to ends eHicienfly and well. The task, in this conception, i.s preordained. In the fi.cld of battle, for example, or in a game with piedetermined ru les for winning, strategy is the plan for acI~eving victory. But the goal is

sovereign command, whether into retail legis lative politics or executive discretion. Wisc decision-making ngainst the backdrop of nonpartisa n consensus was for generations an Adams family dream. For several years after the War of 18U il seemed to be a reality. It is probably true that aspirins grand s trategis ts like John Qwncy Adams appreciated iust this combinati.on of open-ended princiJ?le and substantial delegation, and that modern democracies sometimes continue to define ends in empty terms and delegate specification lo high-powered. officials. Into that vact.1mn flow strategist's of a 11 shapes and sizes.

The second and related question therefore concerns politics. Adams avoided public politicking, except through the medium of the public address,. Didactic rhetoric-in a public speech, pseudonymous essay, or publicized diplomatic missive-was his preferred tactic for managing the people writ large. Bul in his parlor, assisted by his charn-1ing and smart wHe Louisa, he could wheel and deal with the best of them. I le had to: Andrew Jackson and Henry Clay ate a t his table. So Edel conv.incfogly argues that 1t is wrong Lo characterize Adams as apolitical, fo r he was deeply politico! in hig h and low senses. On the

one hond, he inherited from hi s parents reasonably clear and unconbovers ial. A nation-bui lding strategist, then, might be akin lo a general ordered lo subdue a target, or a general contractor realizing the dcsisns of an archHecl. Another characteristic of grand strategy is Lo appreciate the relationship between ends and to caku'late how the rcsolulion of one problem affects the attainment of anothct, seemingly disconnected one. Weighing the effects of mu I tip le actions on various goa ls requires broad vision across narrow lields of responsibi lity, or departmental lines, something that was probably easier for Adams, whose State Department, Edcl reminds us, functioned as both a Home

A nation-building slralegisl, then, might be akin toa general ordered lo subdue a target, or a general contr

an.d improv ." As lh Napoleonic wars dra.gg -d on, and the waning nations a s rted doubtfol be ll igerent right again to utrals l ike Lh Un itcd tates, sk pticism about th virtue and efficacy of the law f nations grew, >speci fly among Repub.licans.7

T n lhe nation-bui Id ing years on which Ed -l focuses, Adams mixed hi Federalism and Repuhli anism in law as he did elsewber , with fa inating r sults. A good xampl is hi reaction to Andrew Jacks n's invas ion of

Wesl Florida in early 1818. Ordered lo poLlc' Lh bard r and .Pu rsu Na Liv ArncricaJ.1 attackers bad int Spru1 ish Fl nda, though not t engage Spanjsh Lr ops, Jack c n grabbed rnost ofth olony, including som Spanish for ts. A l ng the way, he tri d and hanged two British subj ts in a court marti. ] for tl .e alleged ff nse of inciling [ndians to atta k Am ricans. President Monroe and most members cf h'is cabjnet were horrified, feared war with Spain and/ or Britain, panicked., ru1d re tr ced d the l ' 11ritor r to Spain. , Adams a lon " tayed cool. H advi d the presid nt to

defend Jackson's a t:ions, whi h h d id, authorizing Adams to s nd a, blister ing d -fense lo the American minist r in Madrid. Ede.J prajses Adam for seizing th opportuni,ty to gain :leverc:)ge with th ailing Spanish kingdom in I ng-slan.ding negotiations over Florida and to . h a ll Europe that th Unite State was "the dominant power 011 mainland North Ammi a" (153). That is how Adams saw the incident. Otl1 rs, and not just JacksO'n' p litica l enem ies, interpreted it as il legal and unconstitubcmaJ: 'ilJegaJ b ca1.1se Lhe mi litary incursion into SpaJ1ish terr itory wa not justifi d und r th I, w f nation ; tui onstitutional because, as an act of war, the inva ion of a for ign country r qtJ.ir d congressional approva.1.6

Adams tri.ed to cover bolh those bas -s by claim ing thGJt Jackson had acted tn nati na1 elf-defense: .it was n cessary to r taliate agajnst supp scd.ly Bdtish-ins p'ired lnd ian i.n ursions, wl1i h v: iolated both the Spamsh-Am r i ru1 Treaty of 1795 and th Jaws of n utralily tha l applied to Spain; GJ nd it wa a rospons to an invasion. Th president, as commander in d1ief, could order such a resp n e without ongre sional approvnl H mad hash of the d ctrin of

states vereignty, the crit ria and pr L col for waging war, alld the limits of martia l law, fallin ba k n Lhe simple but powerful docb:ine f sel f-deJense. Il was strategically -an l p litica lly- bri ll iant. However, as Edel n tes, pain had already d cided to cede Florida to th United tates, tind Britain had its own reason. for looking th e other way.9 The primary audi -nee of the diplomatic not' was tb refor domestic. Few cou ld. tti r Adam as an Ang lophilic, anti-expansio11i.st N"w England r after such an aggres iv~ int rpretation of the law of nati n s and executive p wer. Yet in the end the biggest winner was .Ta kson. His Democratic party wou ld eventually build on Aclams's strategi gambits to serve not only territ ri I expan ion but al o 1ndian removal and th spread of s lavery.

Whether Adams's contribution to a, ust ming Americanstor ducti.oni.stan.d self-int rest dint rpretations

f complex bodies of law wa a wise strategy for btLi.ld i.ng a nation, on a longer ti.me h riz n, i th re.fore a difficull question. A ams rni ht very wel l have struggled witb it when the Democrats stormed into Mexico t:-wenty-6ve years later. Viewing thal war cs ab n for Javery, he criti "zed i as b th ill gaJ and ur1: ~>nstill:'tional, and he collaps d on th fl r of Congress w hi le a btll related to it was dPbated. He m.usl hcve died knowing that h had helped build a nation- and an empire. Without compehtors on th continent, it had only.itself to fear.

Notes: 1. James E. Lewis Jr., The American Union and the Problem of Neigh-bor/wad: The United States and the Collapse of the Spanish Empire, 1783-1829 (Chapel Hill, 1998). 2. See, e.g., John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American

xperit11ce C ambridge, MA, 2004); Wa lter Ru. ell M ad, "Ameri-can Grand Strategy tt1 a Wi rid at Risk," Orbis 49 (Autumn 2005): fi89- 98.

. ee "eorg Dang rfieJd, Tiu: Era o_(Cood foelhws (London, 1953). 4. Daniel J. nu I b sch, Co11stit11ti11g Empire: New York nnd t/1e Trn11.fon11ntio11 of Coustitutic111alis111 i11 t)w Atlm1tic World, 1 ,5 1830 ( hapel Hill, 2005). 5. U11iferl Stales v. The /\mis/ad, 40. U.S. 518 (1841). 1. ee Daniel J. Hulsebosch, "The Revolutionary C ortfolio: on-stitutio.n-Maldng and the Wider Wo.rld in the A1n rican R volu-tion," Suffolk U11ivcrsily Law Re11ieu 47 (20'!4): 759- 822; and David M. olo e and Daniel J. HLJls bosch, '"A Civil ized Nation': The Early American Constitution, the Law f Nations, and Lh Pur uit of Interna tional Recognition," New Y01t UniveJ"s!Jy Law Rei1iew 4 ( tober 201 0): 923-1066. 7. ror a uggeslive argument, see Peter nllf and Nicholas nuf, FerltJral U11im1 1 Morler/1 Worlrl: T/1e Law of Nntions in n11 Ag of Ri7.10/11-li

be lo support, and nol to counteract or oppose, the President s administration" (109). When he disagreed with the president, as he did during the internal cfebate that eventually produced the Monroe Doctrine, he did so privately, with candor but a lso the utmost discretion. This was nol merely an expression of personal or partisa n loyall'y to Monroe; it was an expression of utter devotion to the United States, and thus by extension to its chie f executive. As he explained Lo a frustrated supporter in 1824, when he refused lo ca mpajgn for l11e pres idency upon Monroe's retirement, "My business was to serve Lhc public to lhe best of my abilities in the s tatfon assig ned to m e, and nol to intrig ue for further advancement" (193). Thurlow Weed, a f oLitico from New York who despaired at Adams's apolitica tendencies, recalled in his memoirs that Adams "was able, enlig hLened, pabiotic, and honest," yet "d is regarded or overlooked ... political organization a nd persona l popularity" (236). With John Quincy Adan1s, the nation came (irs t; everyone else, himself Lnduded, always came second.

capilals, negotiations on the end of the War of 1812 with the Treaty of Ghent, five years as a U.S. senator, eight years as secretary of s tate, four years as president, and sevenlecn years as a member of the House of Reprcsentalives-receives due cons ideration . So do the major political and dipl.omatic issues that anjmated Adarns's career as a public figure, from war and Lerritorial expansion to s lavery, economic development, and the appropriate scope of the federal sovemment's role in managmg the nation's affofrs. But Nat1011 Builrlrr doesn't so much focus 011 the li fe a nd times of John Quincy Ada ms as it illus trates how Adams's life sh aped his times. This is why the analytica l prism of grand s trntegy is so critical lo Edcl's study: by integrating poLitics with economics, and foreign policy with internal development, Edel shows how Adams shaped lhe United Slates in an era when il could very well hitve fragmented into two or indeed several r ival states decades before the Confederacy fu-ed on Fort Sumter.

Adams was by no means flawless. Hi s nationa lism , which amounted to a quasi

Like Kissinger, howeve1~ and very rnud1 LL11l1ke Rusk, Adams was also a brilliant sbategis t, al least in Lerms of foreign policy (Edel concedes that /\dam s was hopeless al d omestic politics). Adams viewed the anarchic rea lm of world politics with remarkable clarity; as a resulL, he advanced America's inleresls and safeguarded its security ab well as, if not better than, onyone before- or since. LLke Kii;singer, Adams was eno.rmously learned,

Adams's grand stra lcgy for prolecl ing the republic nnd c11surin~ its growth consislc

As Edel shows, this rise to power was nol incidental or .c ide1.1ta l. N ither was th subs quent d,epl yrnent or th

n tion'. burgeoning p w r. A the United Stat s expanded, it easily dispensed with a lmost anyone wh 1 stoc din it palh, usually with 111011 >y or diplomacy r th, but by rnilitary force ir necessary. lf there was a source of North American ins t1 rity, it did not ernanat fr m Britain, Russi.a, pain,

r Prance, much I 'SS th ten:itories that came to be called Mexico and Canad ; ins tead, it am Erom Washington and th ons titu nt tates of theAmeri an r -public. Native American tribes with whom the federa l government h ad signed tPaties; Span iards in Pl rida; M i an wh had sove1elgnty over Texru;, a li f rrtia, ai1d ev rything in bctweeni Britons who la.imed the Oregon ounby- wilb th - import, nt pli n f the B.riti h, all w r di pe nsed with summarily and s wiftly.

The Brl.tis h w )r an exception becaus th y a l n " w r powerfu I en ugh t 111 k LiJe dilficult or th United tates, as the sa k of Washington in J.814 demon trated. But aft r: that war 't1ded, Briti. Fi p wer i.n North A me ri a waned as that of th United States urged, and with >ach passing year aft r 1815 th bale nc of power shifted fu t'l h r , nd further away rom L nclon and t war I Washingt< n . The reality o( American security a_nd /\m rican powerhe lps explain whz th British gov rnm ntacqui s ~d to th M nroe D ct rin , ' imperlLn -nl unilatera l deciarati n Ll1al east is ~ast and w st is w st and n ver

new way. Attempting to brins intelle tual coherence to th span 01: Adams's remarkabl life is a daunting c.balJeng , yet

n that Ed l deals with ably. In d l's p sua siv telling, the u.nifying Lhem. s th, L sha d th arc of Adam s's car er am togeLFi ' l' in his "g.ran strategy aim d at reducing

security ri sks tother'ptibH nd vi1~d1 '1ti ngrepublican ism as th 1orm of goverl'lm nt b st stnt d to promote human progress and liberty. Each was "n end unto itself, but those tw g1", l goa ls supp rted each ther" (8). WhDe prot cting the inc.h()at nation'R se urity and def-ending its valL1eS may

und like platitudes--could any Ameri an leader, after a ll, be pp d to Lich thi ngs?-Edcl Ele he thes c ncepts out in considerable detai l and shows the particular p li ies that Adams pu1:s t1ed under th rubric f this SlTategy.

This on fa Founding alh -r is little remembered i 1.1 th p pular mind today, bul Ad ms i ne of the m . t ac ompl ished Americans ev rt hav 'lived and pcrhap th most accomplished member of his own famil y, its lf ne .f America's mos t disting uis hed. ven two enlui:i later, th li s t of pos itions thal Adam he ld is arresting: ambassador to s ve ral strategic ounLTies, nator, congressman, secretary of s ta te, pres1d nL And the sequence f Lh sc positions i equally fascinating: Adams' roles increa cd in power and imp rla11ce until seeming to culminat - in the Whit H usc.But then,aft ron term,Adam wa ign minious ly

Lh twa in ~ha ll m t; it aJso helps exp:lain why Adams felt cortfident enough to dra ft the declaration in the Fir 'l pl, e.

Th gravest Lhr at Lo lh U1Tited Sta tes ga tbered not in Lon.don, Paris, Madrid., or M xico ity, bu.Li 11 plac- s suc.h as Charleston, Atlanta, New Orleans, Hartford, gy rma1ns c nteRled y s holar, lrorn its dcfinilion to its desirabil ity, its feasibility, its u >. s sand fai lures, and ils v ry existence. del will by no m an re Ive these debal 'S, but h non theles, ff r an important con tribution to the

literatur -.

defeated by Andrew ja son, only to 1:eturn to Washing ton to serve in the House of Repres ntatives for seventeen years until his d ath. The job desc.ripti n thal cuts a ross these various r I s i encaps ulated in the book's titl : "nati n bui ldc r."

In Edel's artful portraya l, Adams em rg as an infinitefy c tnplex man of many parad xes: the sl iUed and subtl diplomat who was also a11 inept and ham-handed poUticlan; th man 'On um d by a mbition who was disdainful of the teps n cessary for care r advanc m nt; tI1e leader wilh c li f t im f p r pcTation for th presid n y who was largely a fajJwe

exaggeration of e ternal i.nsecurity sons to en.ab] .Lh fed ral governm .nt t bols ter its ow,n !'Ole in th nation's pol iti a I and economic dcv lopm nt, turn ~d out to be a long-term disaster. Perhaps the n ation buil.der

f the 1 20s paved Ll,1e way f r th nati n desboye:rs f th 18J0 .

Regardless, John ui.ncy Ada m 's conhibuti ns to Amerkan s tal c.raflar a Iara. th yareenduring.There was nothing ine.v itab l ' about the United States; it had to be forged, through d iplomati skill nd ome times raw pow r, by individuals like Adam s. Edel' aduevemnl is t e plore Adams tbc individL1< 1, warts and all, and reveal his r I in forging a m, d rn nation-s tate.

Review of Charles Edel, Nation Builder: John Quincy Adams and the Grand Strategy of the

Republic

William lnboden

Iohn Q uincy Adams s t, nds. in one. of the more curious pantheons in Ani. ri an his t ry. Alo~1g wilh Th ma Jefferson, James Madi. on, He.rb rt H over, and perhap e 01.' two othe.rs such as Ulysses S. Grant, h was an American presid -nl wh se term al th Whit H use wa undis tinguished if not an outright failure, but who did g r at good for his countrr, utside his pres id n y. Chru:les Edel's singular new book iUumjnates this Adams in a fresh Pago t4

s omH rni president; a deliberate a1 hite t fin r a ed nationa l power who often misundersto()d or failed to wield

th pow ".I' a l his own di sposal; a proponent of the LLLLiversal valu f the Declarntion oflndepe.ndence wbo counseled again L supp rting Lib rty movem ~nts abroad; an advo aie f r ti humane treatm nt f ative Americans who was a lso the arch -aposll of the American expansionism that ann xed ln lian lands. Whil then? are certain c n istent the mes in Adams' We, the man himself r ple te with

inconsist~n ies. AB are ma ny other gr at people. his I ook is als a wele me add1 ti n t ) th g r yvi ng but

still limited scholarship on grand stra tegy. Jus t about very aspe t of grand s trat gy ~ mains ont steel by scholars, from its ddinili n to its d s irabijjty, its feasibility! its successes and faj.lures, and its very existence. Edel will by no m ans P olv these debate , buL 11e n, n theless ff rs an i mport~nt contrib~1lion to the literatur ( p cia lly in e m . t s tud1 , or Ame n a n gra nd lrategy on ntrat nth lw ti Lh enlu y, whil mo t s h Jarship 11 nin te nth-centu ry grand s trategy f u_ses on familiar Emopean leaders s uch a .. Nap I 11, Metternich, Castle,reagh, a nd Bism ar I). 0 frammg Adams as a grand sLT~~egist, Ed 1 expands th . nm teent,11-c ntury study f the i Id geographically and its tw nli "th-century tudy chron logically.

Edel lays ut hi d fin.ition of grand sbategy as "a ompreh n iv and _i11tegrated pla n f a ti n, J:ia -d n

th calcu lated re!aL1onsfiip of means to ends" (5). He contends that whi 1 othe r leaders of the incipient United States had a ir ady d velop d p ii y traditions-s uch as avoiding the ntangl ment of alliances and the ndless

PASSPORT January 2016

onflicts f Europ r gaining ecurity by xpc nd ing n th N rth An1e.rican c ntin nt-Adams was instrumenta l in developing these tradi tions into a coh rent grand strategy. The distin tiv rn a u r-. that he employed in th is ta k w re a n appreciation fm context, a focus on the proper s quencing f American ac tions, and an a. tute aligrtment of the yoLmg nation's available 'r sou.rces with its sbategic goals. 1 it is possible for an indi vidual leader t0 develop a grand s trategy, E le.I persuasively argues that J .hn Quin y A 'l ams d id just tha t.

N t a LI readers f this book seem to ag r . In n th er r view, a rather qt.te.rulous Andrew B evi h questions whether Adams did in fact possess a grand st1 L tegy. Ba evich vituperativ ly cont nds that "by pastin :rt get.her whal Adams said on thi casion and

not develop the Lhousht ny fu rth r. Fr m my ob ervation, insofar a Adam is rnvoked a t a U in contempmary policy discussion , it is in reference to ne of two wTilten work : th " M nr e Do trine and lhe 1821 Fourth f July speech warnin g thal America "goes not abroad, in search of .monster t d stray." As c n:tested as il conti.nues to e on a n rrnative level, the Mmuoe Doctrine also s em s to stand as , n objec.ti.ve descri pti.on f the fact of Aro rica's hemisJ?.he.cic. stra tegic p s tuxe ov r the past tw cenhuies. It is still relevant because it is stiJl rea 'lity.

Sorn,ewhat m r lu ive in its pote.ntial ap,[JLlcali n Laday is th~ "mon t rs to d sboy" peech. ln Edels te lling, whil Adams did ind d beli ve at th time th .l the Un it >d State could b s t ve i ts own interests just by being an

example to other nations and w hile did on that one, Ed l inf rs th t sbategy. This i.s a bit li k div i11ing th philosophy of Homer by taking hits and pieces from episod s f th Simps ns-a I ve r en ough bick but not to be taken too seriously. The sa me cnn be said of Edel's efforts at d ivinati n .... lt is dilii,cu.lt to avui I the impression that rather than an

Nol al l r adcrs f this b ok ecm to agree. ln another r vi.ew, a rather quern Jou s Andr w Ba vich quesli ns whether Adams did i.n fact posse~s a gran~ slra~"gy. Bacev1ch v1tuperat1vefy

he opposed zealous inte rventions in the int rna l affair f ther nati ns, he should not be crud. ly misappropriated by today's pr p n nts of th foreign policy vari us ly ca lled isolationism, non-int rv ntionisi;n, or restraint. Ralher, Lhe Adams portrayed by Edel i.s a more sophisticated and complex fig ure wh mbined abidi11g onvi lions w ith p Ii y prcfere:nc that shifted according t n cd, ir umstanc , and c ntext. So th ame Adams who coLU1seled his young and vulnerable nation against fo r ' ign nta nglements in 1821 w uld urg mor support just a f w y ar later, in 1826, for tfie spl"ead of r puhlicani.sm and fo r for mal c mm il111 nts to som Suuth American nations through the Pru1ama Co.ngr ss. Adam revised his

xpl.i cation f Adams's thinking, this is a n ex rdse in ven:b:iloquism." 1

Juvenile insuJts and gratuitous snask a.s id , this c.ritic:ism seems to a cuse Ed l of nothing mor tha n ... ngaging in the craft of his torical h larship. After all, what do w hi t rian d but mLn the archives, ass ss the ev idence we find the.re in th light of p.revaili11g events, su ggest m interpr ta t:ions f caus and effec t, in fluence and outcomes, m -aning an i s i~F1ili an e-ln short, try t explai n what 1t a ll means? Bacevich's critique

contends that "by pasting to~elher what Adams sa id . n tlus ccasion and did on that

ne, Edel i11f rs lhnl ~tr, t gy. This is a bil m .. c divining ffie philosophy of Homer by taking bits and p1 s fr m episod s f th Simps ns- a cl ver enough trick bul not i.o be taken t o

eriously."

also seems to hold both John Q uincy A r.n and Charles Edel to a v irtuaJly impossibl tan Lard, si nce ver y few of history's great strategists (at I ast those not named George Ke1U1an) ever w r:ot down a n ntir grand s trategy in a tidy ten-pag mem r For ign Affair article. Rather, U1e grand strategies of m st le d rs are embedded in their words and < ti ns v t th span of their careers. I-laving r ad almost every word that the prolific Adams ever penned, Ed I jud ici us ly a,ttends to th rec rd of Adams's lif a nd thought while mapping it onto the trans rmative yeaTs of-the early nineteenth-century United Stat .

Ln describing the early years of hi ubj t,Edel ob erves th.at "reading histmy would stand at the heart of Adams's education. " Hegoesonto xplor them,nywoi:ksofh i.s tory thal shaped th young Adams, esp da lly Thucydides (1 ). With a s tatecraft sh aped by a histori cal sensibility, Adams developed a parti ular app1 ciation for what11e saw s the cons lm1t f buman nature as well as the particular contexts in whi h v n!S pl.ayed . ul and the impo~lphica ll.y prior to the Cons litution and how th I alt r n d d t b int rpr ted through lhe f nnei.

ff hi to'ry shap cl Adams's approach lo s trategy and policy, should the historical insights offered by Adams's a reer i.n turn i.nfonn policym.akers today? Ed It n:tatively

suggests that Lhey sh uld iJ1 his conclusi n, but he does PASSPORT fm111nry 2016

prescrip tion b cau he beli ved lh g loba l c()ntcx t and America's capabilitie

h ad bolh chan.ged. As Ed I write , " o I nger vulnerabJ , and gr wing int its financial and industrial power, the Uniled States, Ada ms beli ved, . .. needed t play mor " ac li v r 1 tewarding he.rn~spheric affairs" (218).

There are, to be s ure, areas in the book where one we uld have liked t have seen Edel develop hi argum nts fw:th r. F r example, h e hints a t bul n v r fu lly xpl r Adams's spiritua llife and theological convicti ns. A dajly reader f the BLbJe, Ada ms a lso serv d as vie pr sident of the American Bible Society; and he brought r eligious conv iction to much of his statecraft, sp cially the fight against slavery tha t on.sum . d much f nis fina l areer in Congress.Additionally, Edel p rhaps s b:etches the meaning f "grand s trategy" rath r t fa r when he describes th

"p rsonal lev I" a nd "m oral le ve l'' (which Edel swmnarizes as "How do 1[ustifya11 f this to God?") f grand strategy in Adam 's Ii~ - , sp ia I ly s i.nce th al angle is s little explored in the book (6).

But such quibbles sh ulcl not d tract from what is in the main a very impr sive a hiev m nt by Edel, especia lly for a first book In 1th. has brought th nismatic John Quincy Adams back to lif for th twenly -frrst- entury United States, and he has reminded us of just how much early twenty-first-centll.ry America owes to its early 11:U1eteentl:i-

ntury nati n bu ilder.

Note: 1. Andrew Bacevich, "In Search of John Quincy Adams," The Na-tional Interest, November-December 2014.

Page 15

Review of Charles N. Edel, Nation Builder: John Quincy Adams and the Grand Strategy of the Republic

Daniel Walker Howe

I n this celJent biogra1 hy r th si Lh pr sident, d1ade. N. Edel traces how John Quincy Adams "conceived of his own and th' nalion's ri se to powe1," studies his successes and his failures in the cont xt of their times, and goes n to min "the contemporary applicabilily of Adam 's tllinking" (5). Here h ~ . hows himself to b a scrupulous lListoricil l biogTapher. His linkage f Adam.s's and the nation's r.ise t power is a particularly a ppr pria,t and insighlful c njunclion; the two were inde d linked, intensely and passionat ly, in Adams's mind and spi_rit.

Edel's .first cha t r (cl 'verly ntitled "The Education ot John Quincy Adams," invoking Adams's grands n's autobioip-aphy, The Educntion of Hem:y Ada1,11 ) do a Cascinatm& j b of. exl?laining the psy h of his ~bj~ t in terms of h.1s upbnngu1g. The lder: Adamses, Ab1gruJ nd John, were relenUessly d m an .ing f their el lest son. Th y insi . ted he be politically successfu l, but at the same tlme they taught hlm to d spi c the arts by which p opl c urt popularity. bigail's larg rol in this dominating style of parenting has not a1ways been fully recogniz d until n w. lt produ ed in th i.r brilUant son a combination of patrfotic ambiti n and gruff, often surly, manners, so tellli1gly dcscrib d her .

A ms' de.a1andl11g personality inflicted b~avy costs on his wife and sons, Edel points out. Louisa Catherine comp.lained e en dLUin.g the'ir utt. hip, when m st peopl wmdd be n thei r b st behavior, that his manners wcr' "so severe, s cold, and s p remptor " lhc t they hurt her (104). nlr ry to L uisa's wish s, Adan repli at >d th, psychologically coercive pare11ting h had received. Of their three sons, the eldesl mmitted SLLicide ru1d the next b came an alcoholic. Only th youngest~ the scholzu:Jl

h. d es 'Francis Adams, who wa l cted to his late fc lher f rme:r congressiona I seat and went on t become Lincoln's ambassadm to Britain, achieved what his father would have considered success in life.

Edel r ogn.i.zes bolh consistenci and chanB"es across Adams's long ca.reer. ln his y uth h was a Fed rali.sl:-, app inted to d.iplomalic posts by "a h f the two Federalist :Rresidents in turn. Washington chose him as rni1Lister to the Netherlands and Portugal; his father John Adams made him m i.nister t Prussi . (The United States did not ca] ils diplomalic envoys ambassad rs until the 1890s.) Returning hom aft r Jefferson be.ca.me president, Adams was elected a F ~dera I is t s nator from Massachusetts.

Again, h w ~v r, foreign affairs int rven d inhis lif . Jn Jun 1807 th British warsFiip HMS Leopal'd atta l< d the USS Chesapeake when her commander refused to a llow the Royal Navy to carch her for deserters. (Th r w re in fa l thr e d , e.rter on board the /1esnpeake, and British au th rities knew this.) The Cllesnpcake was completely Ltnprepared for ombat and eventually surrend red. The British boarded

her and tool four men off. Bxitain and Napoleonic flra_rice were at war al Lbe Lime, and th British wer ~ d sperate for nava l manpow r.

The American public was outrag d, but New England F d ralists w re rr:?fo tant to prate .t too shongly lest thei.r merchants lo e their profitable LTansatJanti trnde, whicb th Roya'! Navy h d tne power to inte.rd.ict. Senator Adams sided w'th t.he Jeffersonian RepLLblicans in forcefully condemni.ng the Leowzrd's attack as intolerable, and hang d hi. party affiliation. With Adams's c ip ration,

the Jefferson ad.ministration went on to enact the Embargo of 1807, hoping th.ct both th > British gov rnment and

P.igc 16

Napoleon wou Id make concession in order t regain An1eri a n bade. Neithex ltnlry did so, th ugh Ed -I does not dwell on this policy failure. Jefferson's Embargo wip d out the international trnde of coastal N w England, ruining il n my and destroying Adams' popularity with his constituents. At first glan , it w uld seem that Adams had sacrificed his p litical car c~.r to hls judgment f the nation's interests. Time w uld show, however, fhat Adam.s's chang fpartyimpr vedhispoliticalopportunities. Jpf de.ra list

Pru:ty went into terrnmal d dine and never regained the pres1dency.

Ed I f I lows Adam through a series f diplomati positi011s ru1d ba es his consis tent twin commitments to advancing his own care r cJ.1d to rvJng th ~ Lnterests of his weak n w nati n n the fringe of EuropeaJ1 power politics. Thoma8 Jeffeeson:s Democrati -l

S creta.ry of War John C. Calhoun and Speak r f the Hou Clay wer for c urt-mcu:tialing the general, but Seer tary f State Ad ms st d by him.~.e wanted to use Jacksons

d m n trati n ftheweakness fSpanisbauthorilytop s Spain into ceding both East and West 1'lorida to tne United Sta:t s. President Monr took hi advice. Adams went on to negotiate a momentou . transcontinental treaty with Spain that n t only btain d the Fl rides but als d fin ~d lhe bord 'r between the United States and M ico (th n "N w Spain") all the way from the Gulf CoCJst to the PCJci fi e. Spa in tur.ned over its claims in the Oregon Cou ntry-t the United States, which th reby acquir a < n acknowledged West Coast. Adams had pr v d foms 1 a tough negotiator.

Th m st fa m t1 CJ ch iev men1. of Secretmy of State John Quin y Adams was of course the Monroe Doctrine. This unilateral presidential pronouncement was directed against threats of European incursion into Lh . Western Hem isphere. One threat came from Russia, which sou~ht to expa nd its Alaskan pr ence furlh r int N rth Am ' rt a; the other caJt1e from th 1eacti nary Holy A lliance, which, havi.ng restored the Bourb n monarchy in France a11d intervened in Spai n, Portugal, and [taly, was considering h elping Spain recover its lost colonies in Latin Am rica. "British Por ign Mii1i t r o.rge Canning prnposed Lhal Britain and th Unit >d Stat s is uec joints tatementopposing sucll an h1t rv >nti n. Most f Pr s1dent Monro 's adv:isor (in.eluding hi pr d or , ) 'ffe.rs n and Madison) and abinet members counseled him to accept Canning's offer.

But the ecretary of state preferred to have tl1e United States make such an annmmc ment n ils wn. Th lat Ernest R May, diplomatic historian at J:farvmd, sugg sted that Adams's stand in thi s cas was in flu nc by hi car er ambitions: he was I oki.ng forward to runni~g for presic:lent nd wanted to estabhsh a r ord as a fi.im Amencan

nc tionalist. May' int r r -tation fits nicely within Edel' broad thesis that Adams is best und rstood as combining hi,s nationa li m with a c ncern or his personal polilic,il advancement. Once again, President Monroe followed, br adly, Adams's advi e, in orporat.ing it int his annua l mes ag to ongress of t 23. Edel.' explanation ar lu d; and his presentation regarding the Monroe Doctrin e inclu.des informatio n n,ot often provi.d , u h a exa tly how Adams contrived lo addres b th of the Emopean issu.es

a popular hero in the cause of free expr s i n. In '1844 the HOus finalJy xep al d the Gag Rule, wh_ich had bee m an mbc rrassment. So s trongly 1'1ad the slavery iss ue c m to dominat Adams's poli y decisions that it aff t d his suppo,rl for U .. expan ion. He ba ked the a quisition of all of the Oregon Country (including what is now British

oJumbia) but opposed Texa ann alion and th Mexican War.

When Adams died in 1848, his funeral was a national ccasi n. Edel les ribes it bea1.1Ufully. He then proc eds to

an evaluation of his subject's care r and its l ss n f r us today. The pr,inciples Ade m aclvc ale l should remind us that mu nation's power is finit ', and we should carefully define when .n 1 wher to proje .t it I 'st we dis i a te our ,ttenli nan I energy. Adamssbuggfecl to d fiJ1 Lh ext nt to whi h morality shou Id $'uide poli yrnak 'r . H never fu 1 ly te olved th issue, but 1n pra ti h- s, -m t have f IL lhaL moraLi.ty provid d a more compel ling foundation for domestic than for internatio.nal, ffairs. Ed l onclud s that Adan s wasw i ' ra a lat srn nd vising grand trat gi g als than as a poli tician trying to implement th m.

I find Ed l's con lu s'ion ju t, bull W o s sor ry that he did not expand hi focu s to mak mme us of the lessons we ca n take from Adams the ngr s man . ln an age when privat righls and freedom f "Xpression c r under cha II nge from a vari ty f sources, Adam.s's persist nt defens f tne ri hl to ask questions and clialleng th way Lhings reft of visi n, gr.:md s lrat gy becomes merely a list of accomplishnvnts and fail.ure with ut regasd l h w goal were h en, p.ri l"'ifrz d, and s quenced. Without execution, gra nd strntegy merely traces the 'V .llltion lf id as w ith little .r gard t their impact n v nts. Successfo l grand trategy r qufres visi n a11d dexterity, with objectives reevaluated a. circum.stan s ch .nge.

p rhaps the best a1-piction f this balancing act and of the confus ion that tile term gmnd stmtcgy eng nders om.es from Midw 1 Morgan's r view f Jam Wilson's Tlte

Tri11111p/1 of lmprovisnli 11 in thes [ages. Morgan explains Lhat s trategy can b und.ers too as either a om.put r pro ram or, compass. "li strategy i a comput r pro&ram," h writes, "it shou ld tell a leader exactly what to do many g i.ven situation and pr vid an answer for ev ry question. ft 01USt sel every thin~ O'lll ll1 advance and a llow nothing to chance .... If shategy is a c mpass, howev >1~ it nly n d t point in the rig ht dir 3CL~on.'"' the latt r demands d ci'ions of lead r. but attempts to locate the logi of those decisi n in larg r framework.

So now then to pro e d m lhod logicaUy?Ibequestion is especially germane if ne mak s the argum nl, as I do, that Adams' gra nd b:ategy is an implicit one wb e shap emerg~s n t in a ingle docw11ent, but CLLIDulaUvely and comprehensively er ss his entire career. The word implicit i I ey here, be auselt is not a if John Quin y Adam ever sat down a nd recorded his wotldview and grand strategy in a summary fo rm . Rather, it is only in r ad1ng hi immense d cumcntary record that a consistent conception of his objectives emerges ..

Moving beyo nd th v isi.on, whi , i aft r Li only the firs t s tep for a strategist, 1 then exam ine how Adams excn1t d the vision: how h id ntified threats to Lhos inler sts and formulat cl responses in IJght of those threats. Exe uting a visi n m ans n l only doing what on w uld want, bul a lso h

developed and his ability-and, at times, inabili ty- to trru1slate that v ision into policy.

Adams is of course we]] known for his role in devising the Monroe Doctrine. I was particularly g ratifi.ed Lhat Daniel Walker Howe hig hlights my efforts to explain that this famous policy s tatemen;t was not simply a un.ilateral public pronouncement. Rather, it was part of Adams's efforts to respond simultaneously to several concerns: Rltssia's detel'm ination to suppress republican regi mes, possible plans for a milita ry intervention in South America bX the Holy A IJjan.ce, and Bi:itisb offers to declare a bilatera l secu_r ity agreement with America in the Western Hemisphere. Adams's fr.i:vate diplomatic response to the l~W.sla ns was issue1: in conjunction with Lhe public presidential address that has come to be

guided by the same principles as private .morality, or if fhe d ictates of the national interest n~quired a separate set o.f rules, ceaselessly tro.ubled Adams. YVhile he preferred that the nation act in a mora l fashion, he adm itted that the principles of p rivate morality did not always serve the national interest be&t. Additionally, Adams often though t that mora l behavior mea nl one thing inside the law-tlased realm o.f the Ol1ited States, but another in the anarchic in ternationa l world. For the realist, this view appea rs to provide evidence that Adams was co!d-eyed and dispassionate about the counb:y's interest. But Adams is a muc.h more complex figwe than that particu la r view suggests. For it was also his belief that it was the unique duly of the American statesman to guide the nation te

power while keepin&: it on a course remembered as the Mon roe Doctrine; together the two wen~ meant to be, in Aaams's words, "parts o f a combined

syste~\l of po.lky and adapted to each o ther.1''' ln fact, it wa.s his p.ri vate response to the Russians that he considered "the most i~mportant paper that ever went from my h ands."

The letter to the Russians laid out several poi:nts, but most interesting, in my view, was Adams's suggestio.n th,al tl1e United Slales COLdcl Work w ilh authoritarian s tates but would also seek to conta in the g rowth of authorita rian regimes within tF1e Western Hemisphere.

Adams's movement on these issues is best understood as a product of circumstance and sequencing. He had a clear sense of Lhe stages of development a rising power must go th rough-securing Lhe nation against foreign attacks; strengthening its ability Lo defend iLseH; developing its rec;ources ru1d capacities; and gradually aligning its ideals to its actions.

towards justice. fhroughout his caiee.r, Adams argued that changed. circun1stances-ana particularly- a change in capabil'iti,es- altered what was possible. As American resources grew and the nation became mare capab1e of influencing the res! o.f the world, the limits of ftis vision become harder to discern, but Lhey ce1;tainJy seem less a product of restraint thru1 of an:ibilion.

On this point, Inboden .raises two par tkulady insightful questio;ns. ri rst, drnwing on his experience as both a scholar and a pol i.cymaker, he ponders

As 1 suggest, the Monroe Doctri ne and the letter to the Russians should be read i.n tandem; the latter as a fuller exposilion of the broad principles espoused in the .former. The Monroe Doctrine is usually seen as a unilatera l pronouneemenl of American power, but what tbe cabinet meetings and official state correspondence reveal is something quite different. Under Adams'.s g uidance the Monroe Doctrine was less a projection of power and moxe a statement of principles, an announcement about expectations of future growth, and perhaps mostimportant, a declaration about simultaneously limitmg activity abroad and expanding American interests.

Howe also noles that l show Adams focusi.ng inilially on efforts Lo protect American interests and, as f1is cal'eer progr,essed, shifting towa rd promoting the nationa l interest 111 positive ways. This is true 111 terms of both his foreign and domestic poHcies, although I wou ld add that botl1 of these irnpu lses were presen t from the s tart for Adams. Adams's grand strate&y was a.im~d a.t both red~cin~ security d sks to the republic and vind 1catrng republtcamsm as the fotm of government best suited to promoting human progress and liberty. He believed that each objective was an end unto i.f:self but that these two g reat goals supported eac.h other. Without secW"ity, the nascent republican principles and institutions would t,1ot survive in a world dominated by m ilitarized e mpires. Without a moral component, America could not offer the world anything better tban the monarchies of the old wo.cld could.

Adams's movemenl on these issues is best underslood as a p roduct of circumstance and sequenc:ing. He had a clear sense of the stages of development a ris ing power must go through- securing the nation against foreign attacks; she.ngthening its ability to defena itself; developing its resources and capacities; and gradually aligning its ideals (o its actions. But he also recognized that certain events de111anded immedlate responses, wl1ile o lhers couJd be put on the back bmner. Distinguishing among these allowed Adams not only to prioritize but also to act on events in Lhe proper order.

Finally, Howe underscores that Adams struggled to define the extent to wh ich moralily should guide policymakers. The question of whether nations should be PASSF>ORT /m111nry 2011>

H1e contempotary relevance of Adams's career and asks if historical insights

from that crueer could inform policymaking today. He focuses on Adams's most famous phrase-"America goes not abroad in search oi monsters to destrny" -and suggests that Ad.ams should "not be audely misappropriated by today's proponents of the foreign policy variously called isolation.ism, non-intervention ism, or restra int." T am in complete agreement with him here. Adams h imself would be the first to concur that chan~.ng circumstances and cotitexts must mean changing policies. Jn mll lti ple instances, he dedared that precedent should not become a policy straightjacket; the nation needed to keep in 1nind the c.hang.ll1g natlLl'e of American power and the shJ ftin:g .inter.national environment. What rnade sense when the nation was a small power on the edge of the world might not make as much sense to the nation's ambitions whe:n it became larger and more secure.

lnboden a lso suggests that I could have undertaken a ful ler explora tion of i\.dams's spiJ:itual We and theological convictions. While I do discuss JohJ1 and Abigail's belief that their child1en's education should revofve al'Ound his tory, Ch ristian etb.ics, and civ ic virtues, and l examhi.e the gene.ra l Adams creed that the personaJ morality of Christianity and the public virtues of civic duty were meant to be mutually reinforcing, more 011 this subject would have been a worthy add ition to the book.

r do devote some time to analyzing fhe 11elig ious aspects of Adam.s's views on slavery. During his p0st-presidential

caree1~ Adams held that abolishing sTave1y was a Cb.ris tian d uty that would bring the country closer to f:ulfilling .its religious mission. He saw a reflection of Christianity's most basi,c and important beliefs in the principles set out in the Dedaral ion of In.dependence, and he believed that what was uniqu e about America was that it had, for the first time in human history, ins t.itutionalized the gospel truth of the equaLity of man as a government's first princip.le. America was founded, he thought, on an appeal to certain urriversal bu.man r,ights that superseded aJJ human law, and its morality came not from its actions, but from its realization of Chris tianity's humane and just principles. What gave the Amedcan sense of mission such moral weig ht was its conversion of these w1i11ersnl rights to political principles.

P.agc 19

Except, f cou rse, when il didn't. From the out t, many b IJeve Lbat slav ry w Luci eventually wit!Pr, if n t disapp ar, as th counlTy gr w. And if 1t did not disappear,manythoughtitwoulcLtl astb ge>graphi al ly ircums ribed. Bul with the adv nt f th tton g in nd

the w sLward expansion of th" country, the instituti n of slav ry, instead of withering, became rnud1 m r d . ly i ntcrwoven into the nati n's fabric. For Adams, th ' United States of the 1840s, with its agg.ressive pu rs u.! t of new territory an con omitanl xpansion or Javery, wa a perver ion of the nati n whose mission w .s s 1pposed to b th xpansion of th ~ .realm of liberty. Th transform1::d, d:.baud1ed c untry was n w a "colonizing, s lave-ta.inted me narchy . .. [that'] extingu.ishe fr: ed m."7 It was tor -medy this ut.rag LJ1c t Adams Lu1n don slavery with increasing fer city d ming 11 i cong.ressiona.1 car r.

Their ny lier , as Preston point ou l, is ll1at Adams did mo.re than most to create the cond itions Lhat a ll owed for slav 'ry's. expansion. It is trag ic Lh t Adam.s's early clfort to ensure Am rica's heg >m ny otl the N rlh Ameri an continent also ensured fhe extension of slavery into new lands. Prest n finds iL surpris ing that, as ad pt a grand

tTateg isl a. Adams was, be collld notind a better solution lo the di lemma pm;ed by slaV' ry d1d e, pansion than civil war. A ams hims If ckn.owl dged that he was un ble to solve th probl m as early as the Missouri Cri is of 1819-20, when 11e. wrote the l h believ d tJiat Lh abolition f lav 1y wasp ible but that il' w uld come only through

"a re rganizabon of the Union" that wou ld foUow th c untry's dissolutJon.8 !tis< fair ritigue of th portrayal of Adams as a grand ' trategist that it ""ras on ly when Adams saw that expansJon of federal territory nd power m >anl tJ1e growth sat11er than th dHution f the outh's political cloul Lhat he reassessed hi s and th ' untry's priorlti.es. Lncreasingly, th most important d1al l -ng >the nation faced wash w to rid itself of s laverr. now th tit was suffici.e.ntly powerful to avoid b ing anrnbal.iz d by uts id powers.

n tbis final p int, Preston suggest. that- Adams's cxagge.rati n of an externaJ se u rity thr at may bav been to blame for th debad Lhat fol1owed. "Perhap th natL 11 bu i Ider of th - 1820 ," he wd tes, "paved the way for th nation des tTOyers f tJie '1860s." While I thir k thaL Preston ~~nderrat s th mu ltiP.le ide. logi al, m_ilita ry, and comm rcial th re ts posed to i:he Urn t>c:f States m the post-Gbent years by I. oking retro('lpe Liv Jy al Lh domi.nant positi 11 the UnHed Ste tes ~rpied in the Western Hemisph re, he correctly bserv s LliatAdams b Heved that the cOLuiLry- if il rn i play d it. hand, i i.l ov rl:!xtended its ap< citi , if it dissipated its energy with un11e essary wars

of choice, or if its own internal probl rns 1 d to fra ture-pos d a real a threat t its futur a any foreign power did.

!_n his p >r eptiv r view, HuJsebos h raises two r lated poinls about the dangr the nation p . ed to its lf. First, he probes the r Jationshlp etween national p litics c n 1 grand strategy. 1 a I o qu -'stion s t what exten t law might hav a r le i.n grand stra tegy and whether or nol Adams's bjghhancl ~d us of it in the 1 '20s t the nation

n a dang 'r LI course in th 1 40 . n the form.er point, HuJsebosch sui;;!?ests that "unl ss grand strategy can apture th political, the history f grand strat gy might

nol b' able tor veal the des.igns in which nation btdlder labor." l whole.h art dJy ag ree. Adam.s's ev l.ving poLiti s

r a entraJ them of my bo k, a a.re the larger debates on foreign poli y, political economy, slavery, and expansion.

Grandsbategydoesi.nd d inv lvelh n ~ptualization r ends as well as the tactical cmploym nt of means. But

because grand strategy requires constant rebalan ing acl betw 11 m ans and nds, th ref rmulation, r ass sment, and r onceptuaUzation of those ends is a necessary part of iL J Im Quincy Adam re~11/nrly r asse.ssed th hategic ~iwirnnmenl or the r>p ub1i c, judging which objectives

n10. t ritically r qu.ir d action al any given moment and which means were best suit d for tl1.ose 11ds . On need only l k at his anti- lav ry sta tements of th 1830s and 1840s to unders tand just how much h had rccal.ibrat d the country's m st pr ssing n, ds.

But lUal ly important here is the ability tot ll wJ1ich meanst mpJoyandwhe.n. Hu.l s b schas,k .. wh th th.er is a place in gra nd trat gy f r law. ~dams' car~er su.ggc~s that th re is. 1 [c' spent mud1 of l1J S post-p~es1dentiaT life developing va rious legal l'gumenL attack111g lavery. In this eH rt, he wi, Id .. d th I.aw as a weapon to adv nee a particular objective, much as he had d611 in d fending j ckson's i.nvasfon o.f Florida. F rom ur vantage point, using th - law L attack s lavery seems m re l'ighteous than using it to justify dubiou land grab . But i 11 both ca s, th law becam' a useful and e(fe tive tool to promot a particular poJi y.

Hulsd h sugg ts LhaL Lh v ry l J!al arguments Lliat Adams used in defense of Ame:ri.ca s exp. nsi nist extension .int Florida were on he w uld later oppose when the Onited States incit d a war with M xico for si milar purposes. Ii. re he is n firm gr und1 a Adam him. elf bcm aned the roli i 3 S of President Polk and must hav found iL particularly ga lling that Polk cl.aim d he was simply acting in Jin w ilh the M mo D ctrin .

As Preston underscore in his corn.men ts, grand shategy d e n l need to be worked ut in advance r executed flawl ss.ly. Such standard is neith r realisti nor useful. rgui11g Lhal Adams c n 'i tently pursued a grand strat gy

for himself and for the nation do n l m an LJ1al h had a ll the issu s .fuJJy worked ol1.t from the start. Nor does it m an that his ideas remained static. Nord s it even mean that he h ad to be wholly successful (surely h - was notjn his lifetime) for his s l rat gy t b ju