National Identity and Attitudes toward Immigrants in a “Multicreedal” America

polp_301 485..514

National Identity and Attitudes towardImmigrants in a “Multicreedal” America

JENNIFER BYRNEJames Madison University

This study expands the literature by examining how the relationshipbetween ethnic/cultural, civic, and liberal conceptions of Americannational identity shapes attitudes toward immigrants. Using two cross-sectional datasets, an ordinal logit model, and predicted probabilityscenarios, I find that an unequal balance (i.e., strong favoring of one ormore dimensions at the expense of the others) of these three differentdimensions of national identity results in extremely negative or positiveattitudes toward immigrants, while those that hold moderate levels ofthese three elements of identity are likely to express neutral-to-positiveattitudes. I argue that it is the balance between these dimensions that isimportant in shaping individual attitudes toward immigrants, making itessential to determine not just individual support for each dimension ofnational identity but the support of each dimension vis-à-vis each other.

Keywords: National Identity, Immigration, Public Opinion,Americanism, Immigrant Attitudes, Immigration Policy,Ethnonationalism.

Este estudio expande la literatura existente al examinar cómo larelación entre concepciones étnicas/culturales, cívicas y liberales de laidentidad nacional estadounidense determina las actitudes hacia losinmigrantes. Usando dos bases de datos, un modelo de regresiónlogística ordenado y escenarios con probabilidad predicha, encuentro unbalance desigual (es decir, una fuerte inclinación por una o másdimensiones a expensas de otras) en estas tres diferentes dimensiones deidentidad nacional que resulta en actitudes extremadamente positivas onegativas hacia los inmigrantes, mientras que aquellos que poseenniveles moderados de estos tipos de identidad son más propensos aexpresar actitudes neutrales o positivas hacia los inmigrantes. Por lotanto, el balance entre estas dimensiones es importante para dar formaa las actitudes individuales hacia los inmigrantes, haciendo esencial eldeterminar apoyo no sólo para cada dimensión individual de identidadnacional, sino respaldar cada dimensión vis-à-vis las otras.

Politics & Policy, Volume 39, No. 4 (2011): 485-514. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.© The Policy Studies Organization. All rights reserved.

About these Mexican flags flying today . . . If you want to come to America,then you come to America to be an American!

—Pat Caddell (2006) Democratic Strategist and Pollster

In recent years, scholars have been very busy trying to determine what“Americanism” means to the general public. Empirical studies have evolvedfrom a single scale of Americanism (Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990) to adual framework of ethnic versus civic identity (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001)to a multidimensional, multicreedal conception of American national identity(Schildkraut 2005, 2007). In these frameworks, particular dimensions ofnational identity are generally associated with negative or positive attitudestoward immigrants. For example, individuals with ethnic driven conceptionsof national identity have been theoretically and empirically linked to anincreased propensity for xenophobic attitudes. However, most Americansshow support for not just one, but for multiple, yet in many ways theoreticallycompeting, dimensions of national identity. More recently, Schildkraut (2007)has concluded that American identity encompasses a broad range of normsthat are shared across all Americans regardless of ethnic origin or immigrantstatus, which she argues supports the “multiple traditions perspective.” Inlight of such findings, it is important to understand how Americans acceptand balance these traditions, and how this, in turn, shapes public opinion onimmigration. Previous research has shown that different dimensions have adifferent effect on attitudes toward immigrants, but how is this reconciledwhen most individuals identify, at least to some degree, with all of thesedimensions?

This article expands the literature by examining how the relationshipsamong ethnic/cultural, civic, and liberal conceptions of American nationalidentity shape attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy. Using twocross-sectional datasets, and constructing predicted probability scenarios forindividual respondents with varying levels of identification with threedimensions of American national identity, I find that an unequal balance—thatis, strong favoring of one or more dimensions at the expense of the others—ofthese three different dimensions of national identity results in extremelynegative or positive attitudes toward immigrants, while those that holdmoderate levels of these three elements of identity are likely to express neutral-to-positive attitudes to immigrants. Thus, it is the balance between thesedimensions among respondents that is important in shaping individual attitudestoward immigrants, making it essential to determine not just a person’s supportfor each dimension of national identity but the support of each dimensionvis-à-vis each other. The findings of this study showed that the relationshipbetween national identity and immigration attitudes is much more complex thanhas been recognized in the literature and suggests several paths for futureresearch in this area.

486 | POLITICS & POLICY / August 2011

Theoretical Framework

In his classic conception, Benedict Anderson (1983, 6-7) described a nationas an imagined political community, “always conceived as a deep horizontalcomradeship.” People feel connected by the nation through a metaphoricalkinship even though members of the smallest nation will most likely never knoweach other. Shills (1995, 107) refers to national identity as “the shared image ofthe nation and the mutual awareness of its members who participate in itsimage.” This connection denotes membership in a national group, a social bondamong fellow nationals that has implications for an individual’s identity.Nationality helps individuals define who they are, and often this is accomplishedby demarcating who is excluded from membership. In contrast to the nation,and those who define it, there are the “others,” the nonmembers to which thebond of comradeship does not extend. Gellner (1983) and Hjern (1998) indicatethat individuals belong to the same national group because they recognizeeach other as members; the impetus for membership is often a shared culturewithin a specific territory. Thus, as with any form of group membership,national identity denotes similarity to some people and difference to others.Demographic changes brought on through immigration and mounting culturaldiversity may be perceived as a threat to national identity by some groupmembers but not to all (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Brewer and Brown 1998;Quillian 1995; Raijman and Semyonov 2004; Raijman, Semyonov, and Schmidt2003; Sears and Henry 1999).

National identity can be characterized as a subjective phenomenon, andconsequently it is not unreasonable to hypothesize that differing conceptions ofnational identity will diversely affect attitudes of out-group members (Hjern1998, 2004). According to social identity theory, group boundaries help todefine group membership and facilitate the adoption of group identity (Huddy2001). Yet, it is not always the case that all members will recognize and definethe same sets of boundaries for the group. For example, Huddy notes that theterm “African American” carries with it implications for black identity that maynot be recognized or be embraced by all black Americans. Moreover, even ifmembers of a group recognize the same criteria as important for membership,they may not attribute equal emphasis to such criteria. This reasoning holds truefor the images that people have about what it means to be American; there canbe agreements on the indicators of national identity that are prevalent in theUnited States, but people may weight them differently. Thus, it is not allconceptions of national identity, but more emphasis on particular conceptionsof national identity that should be associated with negative attitudes towardimmigrants.

Brubaker (1992, 168-73, 1996) distinguishes the different conceptions ofnational identity by country, building upon the German “Kulturnation” (anation defined by its culture) and the French “Staatsnation,” or civic nation.Recent work has extended this theory and looked at differing conceptions of

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ethnic and civic nationalism within countries (Brubaker 2004; Heath and Tilley2005; Hjern 1998; Jones and Smith 2001a, 2001b; Lewin-Epstein and Levanon2005). According to Brubaker’s (1992, 1996) earlier work, the two concepts aredistinct and one or the other characterizes the nationality of a state. However,as Roshwald (2006, 256) cautions, while using this framework presents apotentially powerful theoretical tool, nuanced insight in the analysis may be lostif nation states are placed into only one category or another. The general pointthat it may be artificial and problematic, to categorize a country as being solelyethnic or civic in its orientation has been recognized in evolving theories aboutconceptions of national identity (see Brubaker 2004, 139, 1998; Reeskens andHooghe 2010). Empirical support for such a move is provided by recent researchsuggesting that members of countries such as the United States, Britain, andSpain hold both ethnic and civic notions of national identity (Heath and Tilley2005; Medrano 2004). As a consequence, scholars have recognized the needto go beyond simple in-group/out-group explanations of attitudes towardimmigrants, and examine how identification with the differing dimensions ofnational identity influences these attitudes (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001;Schildkraut 2005, 2007; Smith 1997).

Inquiries into the content of American national identity have validated the“multiple traditions” theory, suggesting that American identity encompasses abroad range of norms that are shared by all Americans, regardless of ethnic originor immigrant status (Schildkraut 2007). This can lead to a state in which there iscompetition and contradiction within the range of identifiable norms thatcomprise the content of American identity. Consequently, a complex set of normsexist in which the affinity to norms associated with one dimension of identity donot exclude an affinity for the norms associated with other dimensions. InAmericans’ conceptions of identity, it may be a routine to hold two contradictorysets of attitudes and that both, together, affect our policy preferences. Numerousstudies have documented the role that ethnocultural conceptions of identity haveplayed in shaping negative attitudes toward immigrants and exclusionarynaturalization policies throughout American history (Smith 1988, 1997). Muchof the responsibility for anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim sentiment, and currentpolicies that arguably restrict the rights of people based on ethnicity and religionhave also been linked to strong ethnocultural identification (Davis and Silver2004; Malkin 2004; Schildkraut 2002, 2009). Yet I contend in this article thatexamining these dimensions of national identity in isolation without viewingthem as interrelated and labeling some dimensions as “good” and others as “bad”(or being exclusively responsible for the presence of negative attitudes) is toosimplistic.

This study provides a more detailed and precise analysis of the role thatnational identity plays in shaping attitudes toward immigration by examiningthe different combinations or syntheses of American national identity.According to Smith (1997), the conceptions of national identity have generallyappeared together in the American consciousness. This underscores the


importance of examining how the theoretically important dimensions ofAmerican national identity work together among individual respondents toproduce empirically observed differences in attitudes among the Americanpublic, depending on where individuals fall on this spectrum of multipleconceptions of identity.

An ethnic conception of national identity emphasizes bloodlines, ancestry,and cultural traits acquired during early socialization. This element of nationalidentity connects country of birth, extended residence, and dominant religiousfaith with being a member of the in-group, a right usually conferred by birth orextended residence (Jones and Smith 2001a, 2001b). In-group members whosubscribe to a strong ethnic national identity will value cultural conformity andnational unity, while holding little tolerance for cultural pluralism andindividual rights (Roshwald 2006). Thus national identity is associated withwhat Roshwald (2006) labels ostensibly fixed cultural markers (i.e., hard-to-change attributes acquired in infancy such as one’s mother tongue andnative accent), and Smith (1997) labels ethnocultural Americanism, at itsextreme, nativism. As this dimension captures both nativist and culturalelements of national identity, it is hereafter referred to the “ethnic/cultural” or“ethnocultural” dimension.

Civic conceptions of national identity, in contrast, are based “in a commonloyalty to a territorially defined state and rooted in a set of political rights, duties,and values shared by citizens of that state, regardless of their ancestry and of thenonpolitical aspects of their cultural heritage” (Roshwald 2006, 254). Proponentsof the civic dimension place more importance on respect for political institutions,acquiring citizenship, and a feeling of attachment to the nation. The civicdimension of identity embodies the idea of being a responsible, active citizen.These characteristics are more open for immigrants to acquire when they migrateto a country (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001; Heath and Tilley 2005; Schildkraut2005). The ethnic/cultural dimension can be viewed as a less consensual set ofcriteria for national membership. An ethnic/cultural identity is expected to beassociated with demands for a unified culture because this model stressescommon cultural and linguistic elements, placing more emphasis on culturalassimilation from out-groups in order to be accepted as Americans. Althoughprevious research has shown that there are a small proportion of people whopossess clear-cut ethnic national identities, it plays a role in increasing the risk ofxenophobic attitudes among people who hold both conceptions of nationalidentity (Hjern 1998). Thus, while people may hold differing—even somewhatcompeting—conceptions of national identity, I argue that it is the importanceplaced on these dimensions by individuals that shapes political attitudes.

Civic conceptions of national identity should be associated with morefavorable attitudes toward immigrants, but this effect can be moderated bysupport for other dimensions. This, I hypothesize, is the reason why a broad,virtually unanimous, support for the civic dimension can exist across manydifferent groups in the United States, but not all Americans fully embrace


immigrants. The criteria for a civic conception of national identity are rooted ina voluntaristic notion of nationality that values a common territory with legalinstitutions and participation in these political institutions. As such, according tothe civic model, civic virtue, institutional ties such as gaining citizenship, andholding strong sentiments toward the country of residence are the key elements tonational identity. Boundaries between nationals and nonnationals are stillpresent in the civic model, but it more readily allows for the integration of socialoutsiders into the nation. Moreover, those who subscribe to the civic conceptionof national identity will be more accepting of immigrants from diverse cultures aslong as they are willing to respect the American law, develop positive sentimentstoward their country, and participate actively in the political process. This iswhere the sense of connectedness and national unity is derived that groupmembers share rather than from an emphasis on shared cultural characteristics.In contrast, ethnic conceptions of national identity represent a more exclusiveperception of national identity compared with civic conceptions of nationalidentity.

Another view of national identity that is considered to be important in theUnited States is liberalism (see Huntington 1983; Smith 1988, 1997). Liberalismstems from the Lockean principles of the individual pursuit of happiness andlimited government interference. Like the civic dimension, a liberal conceptionof national identity does not emphasize common ancestors, language, orreligion as the basis of nationality. Rather, the liberal dimension is defined by acommitment to what has been labeled the “American Creed” (Beaseley 2001;Huntington 1983), which embodies values such as individualism, democracy,tolerance, civil liberties, and egalitarianism. Liberalism is implicitly tied to pridein American history because as the United States moved toward Revolution,“Americans shifted from assertions of legal rights as Englishmen to reliance onthese Lockean notions of consensual government and natural rights” (Smith1988, 229). The liberal conception of national identity has been the “core” ofAmerican national identity since the eighteenth century, and is a collection ofprinciples and ideals about Americanism that were brought by the first settlersand have since remained a forceful, if not dominant, part of American nationalidentity Huntington (1983, 2004).

It is the emphasis on individual rights rather than the public good thatseparates liberalism from the civic dimension of national identity. As Smith(1997, 231) notes, “[i]n contrast to Locke’s focus on liberty as freedom from theinterference of private pursuits, the distinctive element common to diverse strainsof civic republican thought is an emphasis on . . . practices that make collectiveself-governance in pursuit of a common good possible for the community as awhole.” And it is the emphasis on common ideological principles rather than onnative and cultural traits, embodied by a commitment to democratic principlesand civil liberties, which distinguishes the liberal dimension of national identityfrom the ethnic/cultural dimension. The liberal dimension is thought to be themost inclusive because it allows for the recognition that the nation is comprised


of diverse communities and celebrates the American tradition of creating onepeople out of many. Uniformity is achieved only through honoring the“American Creed” and leaves room to honor the heritage and cultures ofdifferent groups. Of all of the three conceptions of national identity, the liberaldimension is expected to be associated with the most positive attitudes towardimmigrants. Figure 1 denotes this relationaship. It is important to note, however,that a tension between liberalism and ethnoculturalism has been documentedthroughout American history, resulting in more negative attitudes towardimmigrants, restrictive immigration policies, and exclusive naturalization laws(Huntington 1983; Smith 1988). This tension between ethnoculturalism andcivic-oriented conceptions of identity has been prominent through Americanhistory, beginning in the aftermath of the Revolution, and the salience of thesedifferent dimensions at different time periods appears to be related to the currentpolitical environment. Major impacts or shocks to the political system, includingwars and acts of terrorism, have been documented as shifting the balance ofidentity among individuals, and shaping attitudes toward a host of policies bothpast and present from the Jim Crow laws to racial profiling (Schildkraut 2005,2009; Smith 1988, 1997).

Figure 1.The Dimensions of National Identity

1996

Ethnic/Cultural

Born in America

Lived in America

Christian religion Feel American

Respect for American laws

2004

Ethnic/Cultural

Born in America

Lived in America

Christian religion

Speak English

Hold American citizenship

Pride in democracy

Pride in American history

Pride in equal treatment of groups

Speak English

Hold American citizenship

Pride in democracy

Pride in equal treatment of groups

Pride in American history Respect American laws

LiberalCivic

Liberal Civic


The Role of Context in Shaping American National Identity

National Identity: Pre- and Post-9/11Throughout its history, the United States has been characterized by

historical periods where there are shifts from an emphasis on more liberal andcivic orientations of national identity to an ethnic/cultural understanding ofnational identity. When the ethnic/cultural character of national identity movesto the forefront of the national consciousness, the term “American” appears tobe reserved for those who can claim birth or long-term residency in the UnitedStates—which is associated with being an Anglo-Saxon protestant—andidentify with a particular religion. For example, in the times leading up to theCivil War, the nativist movement stressed the Protestant character of Americanvalues, but the end of the war signaled an end to racially and culturally baseddefinitions of Americanism, which was arguably necessary to incorporateAfrican Americans into the fabric of American political life (Citrin, Wong, andDuff 2001; Citrin et al. 1994). Identifiable shifts from ethnoculturalism to civic-and liberal-based notions of identity also occurred after both world wars (Fetzer2000; Higham 1963; Spencer 1994). The democratic, inclusive, and ideologicaldefenses that have accompanied America’s engagement in major wars, from theCivil War to the Cold War, have arguably reinforced the efforts of civil rightsworkers and served as vital catalysts for racial progress (Higham 1963; Klinknerand Smith 1999). The ebb and flow between historical periods dominated byethnic versus civic national identity has been attributed to the creation of threeseparate reconstruction periods, where African Americans and other racialgroups fought for equal standing (Higham 1963; Klinkner and Smith 1999).Though American identity has trended toward liberalism since World War II,this path has been less than steady, and there has been a “historic pattern ofrestrictions and exclusions . . . Indeed in some periods liberalism seemedobsolete” (Smith 1988, 226; see also Klinkner and Smith 1999). This suggeststhat the meaning of national identity is susceptible to political shocks in thesystem, which may cause a realignment of the way that the dimensions areemphasized and valued by the general public.

September 11, 2001, changed the political environment in the United States;the effects of its aftermath were felt in all spheres of politics including foreignpolicy, national security, and domestic policy. It also provided a mechanism forpolitical leaders to “promote the strength, values, and vision of America as anation and Americans as a people,” giving elites an important role to play inshifting the emphasis among the tripods in the framework of American nationalidentity (Hutcheson et al. 2004, 27). Hutcheson and others also contend thatafter 9/11, the government and the media were very successful in fostering animage of a collective U.S. identity, which emphasized the unification ofAmericans across ideological and racial lines. Furthermore, Barone (2004)claims that while America has abandoned its emphasis on homogeneity and the“Americanization” approach to the assimilation of immigrants, the events of


9/11 has altered this trend. “We will no longer embrace the notion that it issomehow oppressive to encourage Americanization and assimilation . . . thewar against terrorism will prove to be a unifying event for new Americans”(Barone 2004, 268-9). According to the 2001 Gallup poll,1 people were morelikely to support restrictive measures on immigration policy, and inSchildkraut’s (2002, 511) words, “lingering ascriptive views [were] awakened by9/11.” Consequently, a claim can be made that national identity became moreethnocentric at this time. As an emphasis on a more homogenous and culturalcharacter of American identity begins to take hold, it is expected that theethnic/cultural dimension may have more influence than other conceptions ofidentity on attitudes.

Changing Dimensions of National IdentityThis change in the political environment has implications for the theoretical

framework of American national identity. The shift in the political environmentshould especially affect the indicators of national identity that can be placed inone dimension of national identity or another depending on their meaning ina particular context. As symbols have relatively little importance without areal-world context to provide them with meaning, it is reasonable to expectthe criteria that comprise these dimensions will be susceptible to politicalcircumstances. Therefore, at certain time periods, the importance of speakingEnglish may have a cultural meaning, and at other times a civic meaning. Todate, survey data from only one point in time has been used, which can give asnapshot of that particular period but cannot address the extent to whichconceptions of national identity are dynamic or static. However, Elder andCobb (1983, 82) contend that, “over time a symbol may take on new meaning,and new or different symbols may assume its previous role.” I wouldconsequently expect that the importance of particular indicators that tap“Americanism,” such as the importance of speaking English and gainingAmerican citizenship to be interpreted (or perhaps reinterpreted) with a moreethnocentric tone in 2004 than in 1996.

While the ethnic/cultural and civic conceptions of identity are thought to betheoretically distinct, language is a criterion that can be characterized as both anethnic or a civic conception of identity. Language is often a trait that is acquiredduring early socialization which can be considered as what Hjern (1998, 337)describes as a “partition line for belonging to the folk or not,” which bydefinition fits under the ethnic model of national identity. Language can beviewed as an indicator of everyday cultural competence (Jones and Smith 2001a,2001b). Yet language can also be interpreted as a component of the civic modelwhen it is necessary for being part of, and participating in the political processof, civic society. Research that simply includes the importance of speakingEnglish as a measure of national identity can establish that speaking English

1 For further information, refer to http://www.gallup.com.


matters and influences opinion on immigration but cannot distinguish betweenthese two meanings (see Espenshade and Calhoun 1993). This limitation hasbeen acknowledged in previous research (Schildkraut 2005), but what has notbeen examined is whether or not this meaning can change depending on timeand context. In the few studies that have treated national identity as amultidimensional concept, the importance of speaking English has beenclassified as either a cultural or a civic indicator, but it has nevertheless beentreated as static concept. If the importance of speaking English is classified aspart of the civic dimension, then it is thought to remain in this category (seeCitrin, Wong, and Duff 2001).

Citizenship is also a symbol of national identity that can have both a civic anda cultural meaning. It is a form of group identity and helps individuals todiscriminate among each other accordingly. For an out-group member, goingthrough the citizenship process means acquiring relevant legal documents, whichallows for greater access and inclusion in the political institutions of the state,providing a political bond and sense of mutual recognition with in-groupmembers. Nonetheless, though citizenship may be linked to legal status within anation, it can also be a psychological indicator of identity and belonging, wherephysical, ascriptive traits are used to demarcate in-group members fromoutsiders. As Schildkraut (2005, 51) notes, “citizenship, like any other form ofgroup identity, entails distinguishing group members from nonmembers. Thus,for the concept of ‘citizen’ to make sense, people use their racial and ethniccommunities as a proxy for their political communities in determiningboundaries.” Consequently, individuals sometimes fail to distinguish betweenwhat it means to be a member of the political community (a civic conception)from membership in their ethnic/cultural community (ethnic/culturalconception) and in certain contexts, may place more emphasis on ethnic/culturalnotions of citizenship.2 Whether civic or ethnic in nature, having a citizenship isan indicator of identity as the condition of having a citizenship is used todiscriminate among in-group and out-group members. If viewed in civic terms,in-group membership is conditional on the attainment of a particular legal status,while if viewed in ethnocultural terms, identification with the in-group comesfrom sharing a cultural type that is determined by ascriptive characteristics. Theexistence of these competing ideas about citizenship-as-national identity, and therole that political elites have played in encouraging one idea about citizenshipover another is well documented (Brubaker 1996; Hobsbawm 1990; Schmidt2000; Smith 1988; Snyder and Ballentine 1996; Volkan 1994).

Maligned practices and institutions in the United States, including slavery,the internment of Japanese Americans, and the denial of women’s suffrage havebeen linked to the conception of America as a white nation, and an emphasison native-born, white Anglo-Saxon Protestants as true citizens. In times of

2 See Smith (1988) for a discussion of ethnocultural and civic interpretations of citizenshipthroughout American history.


particular shock or change, however, ideas about citizenship sometimes becamemore inclusive. One such example concerns the civil rights advances that occurredin the 1950s and 1960s in the wake of the democratic imperatives of the Cold War(Klinkner and Smith 1999). Therefore, the importance of having citizenship to beconsidered truly “American” is likely to be dependent on the confines of thepolitical environment. Smith (1988, 247) documents “frequent rejections” of civicconceptions of citizenship especially during periods of national stress. Brubaker(1996) finds that political leaders often encourage an ethnic/cultural conceptionof citizenship to promote unity within the nation, and it is well-documented thatpolitical elites encourage competing meanings of citizenship. Given the emphasison a unified national identity since 9/11, it is not unreasonable to expect thatindividual ideas about the meaning of having American citizenship may shiftfrom a civic nature in 1996 to an ethnic nature in 2004.

Data and Methods

The data source for this project comes from the International Social SurveyProgram (ISSP),3 which is a cross-national survey that is comprised of area-specific topical modules. In the United States, the survey modules areadministered as part of the General Social Survey through the National OpinionResearch Center. For this empirical analysis, I will use the data from theNational Identity I and II survey modules, collected in the years 1996 and 2004for two separate, cross-sectional analyses.

The first dependent variable in this analysis is attitudes toward immigrants.More specifically, I am interested in which conceptions of national identity aremost associated with negative attitudes toward immigrants. Negative attitudeswill be captured by responses to a five-point scale that asks whether therespondent agrees or disagrees with the following statement: “Immigrantsimprove American society by bringing new ideas and cultures.” An additionaldependent variable for this analysis is the traditional dependent variable used inthis literature that captures attitudes to immigration policy (Citrin, Wong, andDuff 2001; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Hood, Morris, and Shirkey 1997;Schildkraut 2005). It is theoretically necessary to examine the relationshipbetween national identity and attitudes toward immigration across both of thesedependent variables, as one captures general positive or negative sentimentsabout immigrants, and the other taps views concerning actual policies regardingimmigration in the United States. “Do you think that the number of immigrantscoming to the U.S. should be increased, decreased, or kept the same?” Thisquestion is answered via a five-point Likert scale that ranges from increased a lotto reduced a lot, with kept the same as the middle response option on the scale.

The main independent variable of interest is national identity. Theoperationalization of the dimensions of national identity is based on responsesto the following questions:3 For further information, refer to http://www.issp.org.


“Some people say the following things are important for being trulyAmerican. Others say they are not important. How important do you thinkeach of the following is?”• Being born in America• Having American citizenship• Living in America most of one’s life• Respecting America’s political institutions and laws• Feeling American• Being able to speak English• Being a Christian“How proud are you of the following?”• The way democracy works in America• The fair and equal treatment of groups in America• The history of America

Respondents were asked to rate these items on a five-point Likert scale thatranges from “very important”/“very proud” to “not important at all”/“notproud at all.”

Each indicator represents a component of ethnic/cultural, civic, or liberalnational identity. Previous research has shown that the first seven items loadtogether quite well to reveal two dimensions of national identity thatcorrespond to (1) a clear dimension that represents ethnocultural items and (2)a more ambiguous second dimension with a group of indicators that tapsnoncultural concerns. The items on the list that capture ethnic identity refer tobirthplace, ancestry, and culture-based components of the American identitysuch as being a Christian. In contrast, acquired characteristics that are state-centered such as respect for political institutions, language, and feeling“American” have been shown to load together on a separate dimension, whichcorresponds to the civic conception of national identity (see Citrin, Wong,and Duff 2001; Heath and Tilley 2005; Hjern 1998; Jones and Smith 2001a,2001b; Schildkraut 2005). Three more items were added to the list to capturesupport for a liberal dimension of American national identity, and expectthese indicators to load together on a separate, third dimension as they tapindividual conceptions of pride in liberal ideological principles and theAmerican Creed.

To construct a measure of national identity for the main empirical test, anexploratory factor analysis was conducted to test whether the variables thatload together in theory will load on similar dimensions with the United Statesdata (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001; Schildkraut 2005). I used a principalcomponents analysis with varimax rotation. The results of the factor analysesare presented in Tables 1 and 2.4

4 A factor was retained if it has an Eigenvalue greater than 1.0. An item is thought to load on aparticular dimension if the factor coefficient is .5 or higher. None of the dimensions are correlatedwith each other at a level higher than .3.


Overall, a strong ethnic dimension and a strong liberal dimension arerepresented in both the years, but in 2004, the civic dimension is characterizedonly by the importance of respecting American government and politicalinstitutions. In addition, the role of the importance of speaking English andhaving American citizenship do not fit strongly within any of the dimensions ofnational identity for 1996, but have the highest loading on the civic dimension.There are some changes in the 2004 data that reflect the dynamic and contextualnature of composition of American national identity. The importance ofspeaking English and gaining U.S. citizenship in order to be considered anAmerican clearly load on the ethnic dimension, albeit not quite as strongly as thefactors that capture the importance of being born in America and having lived inAmerica for most of one’s life.5 However, it is clear that they do not fit with the

5 The wording of the General Social Survey question asks whether it is important to “have U.S.citizenship” to truly be considered an American. It does not provide any context as to whethercitizenship is being asked about as an indicator of legal status or as an indicator of ethnic or racialidentity, leaving it up to individual respondents to determine this question in terms of more than

Table 1. 1996 Exploratory Factor Analysis Results

Criteria Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3

To have been born in America .85 .07 -.08To have lived in America .84 .09 -.13To be a Christian .71 .08 -.09To be able to speak English .45 -.01 -.56To have American citizenship .48 .08 -.53To feel American .28 .23 -.61To respect American law/institutions -.02 .16 -.80Pride in democracy -.15 .68 -.25Pride in fair treatment of groups .28 .77 .03Pride in American history .08 .73 -.22

Table 2. 2004 Exploratory Factor Analysis Results

Criteria: Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3

To have been born in America .80 .08 -.11To have lived in America .81 .09 .00To be a Christian .66 -.00 .24To be able to speak English .63 .05 .19To have American citizenship .67 .03 .24To feel American .58 .28 .42To respect American law/institutions .20 .09 .91Pride in democracy -.02 .62 .40Pride in fair treatment of groups .04 .84 .01Pride in American history .03 .69 .18


civic or liberal dimensions of national identity. The importance of feelingAmerican appears to have a somewhat weak loading on the ethnic/culturaldimension, which is also a shift in the structure of the dimensions from 1996.

To create a multidimensional measure of national identity, I constructed aseries of scales that tap the strength of attitudes on each dimension. This isachieved by summing the respondent’s scores on each indicator in a givendimension. For example, in 1996, the cultural dimension takes values thatrange from three to 15 because it is comprised of three indicators; where therespondent falls on this scale is the summation of her responses to howimportant it is to have been born in America, have lived in America most ofone’s life, and to be a Christian in order to be considered truly American. Ifall of the above items are marked as being very important, the respondent isassigned a score of 15. If they are all marked as not important at all to beingan American, the respondent receives a score of three on the ethnic/culturaldimension of national identity. Consequently, lower scores represent a lesserdegree of importance placed on cultural and nativist indicators of nationalidentity. As there are six indicators that comprise the ethnic/culturaldimension in 2004, scores range from six to 30, with 30 representing thehighest score on this dimension. This same method is used to construct thescales that measure the civic dimension in 1996 and the liberalism dimensionin 1996 and 2004. Table 3 presents the reliability of the scales.

The descriptive statistics indicate that there is a high level of support for eachof these dimensions among the American public. The ethnic/cultural dimensiongarners the least overall support of the three dimensions in 1996 with roughly 60percent of respondents scoring in the top third of the scale, indicating strongestlevels of support. For the civic dimension, over 80 percent of respondents score inthe top third of the scale, and roughly 75 percent of respondents score in the topthird of the scale on the liberal dimension. This underscores the need to examinehow these dimensions work in combination. There is almost uniformly highsupport for the civic and liberal dimensions of national identity, yet there are notalways positive attitudes to immigrants among the American public. In 2004,over 70 percent of respondents fall in the top third of the scale on the ethnic/cultural dimension, and almost two-thirds of the sample falls in the top third

one dimension. In the future, qualitative work may be necessary to tease out these distinctions,especially in light of theoretical evidence that suggests that ideas about citizenship can beinterpreted as civic or ethnocultural.

Table 3. Cronbach’s Alpha Scores by Dimension

Ethnic/cultural .77 .77Civic .68 n/aLiberal .60 .61


category on the liberal dimension. Thus, in both years, there is broad support fordifferent dimensions of national identity.6

Finally, I included several categories of control variables that are verycommonly cited in public opinion research. My first set of control variablesconcerns demographic indicators such as sex, race, age, and socioeconomicstatus (college versus no college). I also included a control variable fornativity. To account for preexisting political attitudes, a variable that capturesthe self-reported partisan identification (standard seven-point scale) of eachrespondent and a measure of symbolic racism was included. Finally,immigrants can be viewed as taking jobs away from native workers andresponsible for depressing wages, both of which can interfere with the desiresof native workers to be materially better-off and lead to conflict betweennatives and immigrants. Additionally, standard indicators of socioeconomicstatus, such as employment status and income, are often not significantpredictors of attitudes toward immigrants, suggesting that perceptions of labormarket threat rather than actual personal material status may be responsiblefor driving up negative attitudes toward immigrants (Espenshade andHempstead 1996). I therefore measured labor market threat by using answersto the following five-point Likert scale item, with five representing strongestagreement with this statement: Immigrants take jobs away from nativeworkers.7

Results and Implications

Attitudes toward Immigrants: 1996The dependent variables for this analysis are categorical dependent

variables with five categories that represent a continuum of attitudes from theleast to most restrictive. Thus, for my statistical analysis, I use an ordinal logitmodel. To determine support for all three different dimensions of identity,scenarios are created using predicted probabilities, followed by a discussion ofthe respondents that fit these profiles. The results for attitudes towardimmigrants for 1996 and 2004 are presented in Table 4.

The empirical findings for 1996 provide support for the hypotheses thathigher levels of identification with the ethnic/cultural dimension of nationalidentity is associated with more negative attitudes toward immigrants, whilehigher identification with the civic and liberal dimensions of national identityresult in more favorable attitudes to immigrants. Of the five categories ofattitudes toward immigrants on the scale of the dependent variable, most

6 Full descriptive statistics tables are in the Appendix.7 This variable is not highly correlated with any of the independent or dependent variables used inthe models presented in this article. Moreover, models were run using standard measures ofunemployment and income, and these measures of economic threat were not significant in themodels for either year.


respondents are inclined to agree clear majority (58 percent) are inclined toagree or agree strongly with that immigrants make positive contributions toAmerica, and only roughly 15 percent of the respondents are likely to disagreeor disagree strongly with this statement. Thus Americans appear to be positivelydisposed toward immigrants, but as identification with the ethnic/culturaldimension rises, the probability of expressing positive sentiments markedlydeclines. While the logit coefficients are suggestive of a negative or positiverelationship between the differing conceptions of identity and attitudes towardimmigrants, it is difficult to assess the substantive impact without the use ofpredicted probabilities.

Despite the fact that scholars lament the negative character of the ethnic/cultural dimension of American national identity, it appears to have greatstaying power in the American consciousness. Over 70 percent of respondentsscore above the midpoint of scale of ethnic/cultural identity, and over 50 percentof the sample scores in the top third of the scale. This means that a clearmajority of Americans identify with the ethnic/cultural dimension of Americannational identity, and many identify quite strongly with an ethnic/culturalconception of identity. Thus it is essential to determine not just that there is arelationship between this dimension of identity and attitudes towardimmigrants but how differing levels of ethnic/cultural identity impact uponthese attitudes. For example, a native-born, white, female respondent (the most

Table 4. National Identity and Attitudes toward Immigrants

Immigrant attitudesYear 1996 2004

DimensionsEthnic/cultural .095 (.018) .034 (.015)Civic -.068 (.022) -.072 (.083)Liberal -.051 (.023) -.040 (.028)

Economic threatLabor threat .366 (.062) .574 (.062)

DemographicsNativity -.909 (.206) -.553 (.067)College -.590 (.131) -.649 (.130)Race .120 (.147) .075 (.153)Sex .172 (.106) .066 (.114)Age .002 (.003) -.004 (.003)Partisanship .062 (.028) .089 (.028)Symbolic racism .392 (.065) .571 (.066)

Cut pointsC1 -.640 (.423) .604 (.570)C2 2.23 (.425) 3.72 (.549)C3 3.90 (.434) 5.36 (.532)C4 5.93 (.466) 7.48 (.561)

N 1,367 1,216

Note: Coefficients are reported as log-odds with standard errors in parentheses.


representative individual in the sample) with a high level of ethnic/culturalidentity has a 50 percent probability of expressing agreement (.45) or strongagreement (.05) with the idea that immigrants make positive contributions toAmerican society. A respondent with identical characteristics but a lowidentification with the ethnic/cultural dimension has a 76 percent probability ofexpressing positive attitudes. However, it is important to note that while lesspositive attitudes are more likely when a respondent holds a high level ofethnic/cultural identity, there is only a 17 percent chance that a respondent willdisagree or strongly disagree that immigrants are good for society. A respondentis much more likely to hold positive or neutral attitudes toward immigrants thannegative attitudes, which has not been acknowledged in the literature becausethe substantive impact of ethnic/cultural identity has not been explored (Citrin,Wong, and Duff 2001; Schildkraut 2005). It is more accurate to say thatrespondents with high conceptions of ethnic/cultural identity are less likely tohave positive attitudes toward immigrants than those with low-to-moderateconceptions of ethnic/cultural identity, though there is a clear trend towardmore negative attitudes as identification with the ethnic/cultural dimensionincreases among individuals.

While the ethnic/cultural dimension garners much of the attention in theliterature because of its negative relationship to attitudes and is clearlyimportant to many Americans in defining their national identity, mostAmericans consistently subscribe to civic and liberal conceptions of Americanidentity as well. Consequently, the propensity of overtly positive or negativeattitudes may be a result of differing combinations of the three conceptions ofAmerican identity held among individual respondents, which can range fromhigh to low. By calculating predicted probability scenarios, the probability of arespondent moving from a category indicating positive attitudes to a categoryindicating negative attitudes can be estimated based on particular combinationsof identification with the three dimensions of American national identity.Table 5, shows the predicted probability of a respondent expressing positive or

Table 5. Attitudes toward Immigrants: 1996

1996PositiveAttitudes

NegativeAttitudes Difference

High ethnic identity;Moderate civic identity;Moderate liberal identity: 50% 17% 32%High civic identity;High liberal identity;Low ethnic identity: 77% 5% 72%High ethnic identity;Low civic identity;Low liberal identity: 20% 41% 21%


negative attitudes toward immigrants, depending on the level of identificationwith each dimension of American national identity.

A respondent with a high level of ethnic/cultural identity has a 50 percentprobability of expressing agreement (.45) or strong agreement (.05) with the ideathat immigrants make positive contributions to American society. This is truewhen levels of civic and liberal national identity are kept at their means.8

However, if this same respondent holds a high conception of ethnic/culturalnational identity and low levels of civic and liberal national identity, the chanceof expressing more favorable views toward immigrants decreases to 20 percentwith a 40 percent chance of disagreement. When this scenario is reversed to oneof a low ethnic/cultural identity and high levels of civic and liberal identity, thereis an overwhelming 77 percent probability that a respondent will expressfavorable attitudes toward immigrants, while the chance of responding in oneof the “decrease” categories is reduced to less than 5 percent. Finally, it isimportant to note that a respondent who holds a high regard for both theethnic/cultural and civic dimensions—the liberal dimension kept at its mean—isstill about 35 percent less likely to hold positive attitudes toward immigrantsthan a respondent with a high civic conception of national identity and a lowethnic/cultural conception of national identity. Consequently, there appears tobe a substantial difference in attitudes between respondents at the high and lowends of the ethnic/cultural scale. While a high score on the civic dimensionappears to balance out many of the negative effects of the ethnic/culturaldimension, favorable attitudes are substantially more likely when the ethnic/cultural dimension is at low to moderate levels, which characterizesapproximately 30 percent of the sample.

A recurring puzzle in the literature is that while the hostile effects of theethnic/cultural dimension are often lamented for increasing negative attitudes,strong civic identifiers are expected to have the most positive attitudes towardimmigrants. Upon examination of the data, most respondents identify highlywith the civic dimension of identity; less than 3 percent of respondents scorebelow the midpoint of the scale. While negative attitudes are likely to emergeamong those that are high ethnic/cultural identifiers and low civic identifiers,this combination of national identity characterizes a small proportion of thepopulation overall. There is nevertheless a wide range of support among civicidentifiers for the ethnic/cultural dimension ranging from very low (12 percent)to extremely high (36 percent), and here there are real changes in attitudes. Itis therefore a balance between the different dimensions that appears to shapeattitudes rather than support for the civic dimension or ethnic/culturaldimension alone, suggesting that the relationship between national identity andattitudes toward immigrants may be much more complex than has to date beenacknowledged in the literature. By calculating the predicted probabilities amongrespondents with different conceptions of national identity, this study shows not

8 The means for civic identity and for liberal identity are fairly high on the scales (see Appendix).


only that there is a large substantive effect of national identity on attitudes, butthat this affect may be dependent on how Americans balance these conceptionsof national identity.

Changes in 2004In 2004, the impact of the cultural dimension is still significant. The pattern

is the same: A weaker association with the cultural dimension is associated withless negative attitudes toward immigrants. When levels of identification with theethnic/cultural dimension are low, a respondent has roughly a 50 percent chanceof expressing positive attitudes toward immigrants, but when levels ofidentification with the ethnic/cultural dimension are high, the probability ofholding negative attitudes increases to roughly 72 percent. Thus, while mostAmericans are inclined to think positively about immigrants and theircontributions to American society, there is a considerable movement towardnegative attitudes as a respondent progresses from the lowest to the highest levelof identification with the ethnic/cultural dimension. However, consistent withthe hypothesis that national identity will take on a more exclusive, nativist tonein the aftermath of 9/11 and the War in Iraq, the effects of the civic and liberaldimensions are not significant in this model.

While combinations of differing conceptions of national identity appear tohave a strong impact on attitudes toward immigrants in 1996, symbolic racismand labor market threat appear to be the driving forces behind more negativeviews toward immigrants in 2004. For example, when high levels of labormarket threat and symbolic racism are present and conceptions of nationalidentity are held at their means, a respondent has a 60 percent probability ofexpressing negative attitudes, and only a 13 percent chance of expressingpositive attitudes. Given this same scenario in 1996, a respondent is only about34 percent likely to express negative attitudes. Those who respond in a highercategory on the symbolic racism scale are almost twice as likely to respond in ahigher category on the attitudes scale (indicative of more negative attitudes) in2004.

Despite the fact that the impact of the ethnic/cultural dimension of nationalidentity on attitudes does not change between 1996 and 2004, its symbolicmeaning does change. The ethnic/cultural dimension is stronger in 2004 than itwas in 1996, and consequently results in a weakened civic dimension of nationalidentity in 2004. This is an effect that has not been captured in previous modelsexploring the link between national identity and attitudes toward immigrants.This also underscores the need for future work to examine the relationshipbetween national identity and attitudes to immigrants longitudinally as thecross-sectional data provided here can only offer a snapshot of this relationshipat a particular point in time. Such a discussion is nevertheless beyond the scopeof this study. Indeed, there is no year of data beyond 2004 in the ISSP thatwould allow for an empirical test to determine if the results in 2004 were atemporary response to the political environment, or—if the United States


underwent major changes after 9/11—that would suggest a more long-standingtrend toward a heightened subscription to ethnic/cultural identity and lesssignificance of the civic and liberal dimensions of identity.9

Attitudes toward Immigration Policy: 1996Table 6 present the results from the model that assesses the effects of the

differing dimensions of increasing or decreasing the number of immigrants thatare legally allowed to resettle to the United States each year.

In 1996, the results indicate that a higher identification with both the ethnic/cultural and the civic dimensions are associated with support for decreasing thenumber of immigrants that come to the United States annually, while the liberaldimension of identity is associated with support for increasing the number ofimmigrants allowed to settle permanently each year. While at first glance, thefact that the civic conception of national identity has the same effect on attitudes

9 To address concerns over measurement driving the change in results in 2004, I have also runstatistical models in 2004, using the same construction of the variables in 1996, and have notfound any dramatic differences in the overall direction and significance of the coefficients. In thesealternate models that keep the measurement of the dimensions of national identity constant,ethnoculturalism has a negative relationship with attitudes toward immigrants and immigrationpolicy, while the civic and liberal national identity variables are not significant.

Table 6. Ordinal Logit Results: National Identity and Attitudes toward Policy

Attitudes: Immigration policyYear 1996 2004

DimensionsEthnic/cultural .035 (.019) .029 (.015)Civic .053 (.027) -.032 (.089)Liberal -.050 (.025) -.028 (.029)

Economic threatLabor threat .528 (.064) .609 (.064)

DemographicsNativity -.487 (.221) -.820 (.214)College -.300 (.135) -.380 (.129)Race -.620 (.175) -.493 (.161)Sex .256 (.116) .011 (.117)Age .006 (.004) .009 (.004)

OtherPartisanship .050 (.030) .074 (.029)Symbolic racism .423 (.067) .359 (.065)

Cut pointsC1 -5.69 (.554) -6.07 (.604)C2 -4.51 (.535) -4.85 (.589)C3 -2.36 (.522) -2.59 (.578)C4 -.775 (.517) -.884 (.571)

N 1,367 1,216

Note: Coefficients are reported as log-odds with standard errors in parentheses.


to immigration policy as the theoretically more restrictive ethnic/culturaldimension appears odd, there are several plausible explanations for this finding.First, Smith (1997, 231) argues that despite the inclusive theoretical nature ofthe civic dimension of American identity, “republican notions are capable, atleast, of supporting nonliberal conceptions of citizenship and civic life.” Second,Wilcox (2004) asserts that despite the theoretical tolerance of holding a civicidentity, civic identifiers are capable and willing to privilege members of thenation over nonmembers and cites legislation barring nonresidents fromreceiving social welfare as an example of the disconnect between the theoreticalvirtues of a fully developed civic national identity and the empirical reality in theUnited States. Finally, while civic identifiers may be positively disposed towardimmigrants overall, there may be biases toward particular groups of immigrantsor misperceptions that cannot be picked up with the data used in this survey.For example, while civic identifiers may be favorably disposed to immigrants ingeneral, views on policy may be more restrictive if there is doubt that particulargroups of immigrants or new waves of immigrants will be able or willing tointegrate politically and make the transition to being Americans.

Once again, a look at the predicted probabilities clearly illustrates thenecessity to look at where a respondent falls on the scale for each dimension ofnational identity to get a complete picture of attitudes. Table 7 below lists thepredicted probabilities for attitudes toward immigration policy based ondiffering combinations of American national identity.

A respondent with high levels of ethnic/cultural and civic national identityand high levels of liberal identity has a 67 percent chance of being in one of thedecreased categories (30 percent in decreased a lot). The same respondent withlow levels of liberal identity is increased to a 77 percent chance (with 40 percentin the decreased a lot) of wanting the number of immigrants that come to theUnited States each year to fall. When identification with the liberal dimension ishigh and identification with the ethnic/cultural dimension is low, the probabilityof being in the decreased categories is reduced to 53 percent. It is important to

Table 7. Attitudes toward Immigration Policy: 1996

Number of immigrants coming to the United States

1996 Decreased Increased Kept the same

High ethnic identity;High civic identity;High liberal identity: 67% 3% 30%High ethnic identity;High civic identity;Low liberal identity: 77% 1% 32%Low ethnic identity;High civic identity;High liberal identity: 53% 5% 42%


note, though, that the chance of being in one of the increased categories is verysmall among any of these respondents and that only 10 percent of the samplefalls in these two categories of the dependent variable. Thus only a very smallproportion of the sample would actually support an increase in the number ofimmigrants that come to the United States annually. Clearly there are stilldifferences in the predicted probabilities among respondents that range fromlow to high identification with the differing dimensions of American nationalidentity, but the substantive effects appear to have less impact than in themodels that examine attitudes toward immigrants. National identity andcombinations of national identity may consequently have a greater substantiveimpact on immigrant attitudes than immigration policy, and future researchmay be necessary to further disentangle this relationship.

Changes in 2004In 2004, the ethnic/cultural dimension is linked to favoring more restrictions

on the number of immigrants coming to the United States, but while the civicand liberal dimensions move in the expected direction, neither of the variablesachieves significance. This is consistent with the findings for general attitudestoward immigrants; the civic and liberal dimensions play a critical role inexplaining attitudes in 1996 but fail to be a driving force in 2004. The findingshere appear to be consistent with some of Smith’s (1988) observations about thetension between the ethnic/cultural and liberal dimensions of national identitythroughout American history. While the country was founded on liberal ideals,its very first naturalization laws excluded minority groups and women fromcitizenship and the rights that came with it, including but not limited to themany forms of political participation that come with naturalization. As Smith(1988, 247) notes, “the nation’s frequent rejections of liberal conceptions ofcitizenship, particularly in times of stress, must cause us to doubt whetherliberalism can provide a sense of identity that will prove politically satisfying ormorally feasible.” In this way, the findings in 2004 are consistent with the theorythat states that throughout history, the liberal dimension has waxed and wanedin terms of its prominence, especially in relation to the ethnic/culturaldimension. The year of 2004 can therefore be characterized as a period of highstress, still in the aftermath of the events of 9/11, and it is reasonable to assertthat in 2004, the civic and liberal dimensions faded from the nationalconsciousness, taking a backseat to the ethnic/cultural dimension.

In 2004, national identity overall fails to be a less significant indicator ofattitudes toward immigration policy, but the role that the ethnic/culturaldimension plays in fostering these attitudes is still prominent. For instance, theprobability of a respondent being in one of the “decreased” categories dropsfrom 55 percent to 40 percent as one moves from high to low on the ethnic/cultural scale among individuals that believe immigrants negatively impact theprospects for native workers. The ethnic/cultural dimension is also useful fordetermining attitudes to immigration policy among those that are neutral when


it comes to labor market threat and symbolic racism, which characterizes 30percent of the respondents in the sample. The probability of being in thedecreased categories rises from 49 to 64 percent as identification with the ethnic/cultural dimension shifts from low to high.

Discussion and Conclusion

The primary goal of this project is to shed some light on how differingconceptions of national identity influence attitudes toward immigrants in theUnited States. This study builds on the theoretical and empirical knowledge inseveral crucial ways.

First, identification with dimensions of national identity have a substantiveimpact on attitudes toward immigrants; there are major shifts in attitudes asrespondents move from low to high levels of ethnic/cultural, civic, and liberalnational identity. Moreover, while it is established that people can supportmultiple and even competing notions of national identity, I have shown that itis the importance attributed to these dimensions by individuals that determinespolitical attitudes toward immigrants. The ethnic/cultural dimension isconsistently linked to less positive sentiments in both 1996 and 2004 across twodifferent measures of attitudes. However, the ethnic/cultural dimension alonedoes not cause extremely negative attitudes to immigrants, as has been mostoften suggested in the literature. The two combinations that result in the mostnegative attitudes toward immigrants are high levels of ethnic/cultural identitythat is not balanced with moderate-to-high levels of civic and liberal identity, orhigh-to-moderate levels of ethnic/cultural national identity where high levels oflabor market threat and symbolic racism are also present. Positive attitudes aremost likely when the ethnic/cultural dimension is low in relation to the civic andliberal dimensions and when labor threat and symbolic racism are not present.As most Americans identify at some level with all three of these dimensions, itis important to examine how differing combinations produce differing results. Ihave shown that the emphasis placed on these dimensions matters when it comesto gauging public opinion about immigrants in the United States, enabling theemergence of a more nuanced, and arguably more complete, picture of how therelationship between national identity and immigrant attitudes works. Thesefindings suggest that ethnoculturalism may affect respondents differentlydepending on whether they have high or low levels of identification with thecivic and liberal dimensions of identity, underscoring the need to examine theconditional relationship between differing dimensions of national identity andattitudes toward immigrants in future research.

Second, the ethnic/cultural dimension is still widely accepted among theAmerican public, but when identification is at moderate levels and held incombination with moderate-to-high levels of the civic and liberal dimensions ofnational identity, attitudes toward immigrants tend to be positive or neutral.This suggests that the ethnic/cultural dimension may not be as “bad” as


previously thought, and this is good news, given that it appears to be asubstantial part of the American national consciousness. Also, the civicdimension may not be as “good” as previously suggested, particularly when itcomes to attitudes to immigration policy. The findings support Brubaker’s(2004) assertion that simplistic forms of these dimensions, where ethnic identityis bad and civic identity is good, are both theoretically and analyticallyproblematic. This underscores the need to heed cautions from political theoristswho link support for the civic dimension to discriminatory policies (Smith 1991;Wilcox 2004) and further highlights the merits of examining the synergisticrelationship between these dimensions to render a more complete picture of hownational identity affects attitudes. This is particularly salient in the currentpolitical climate, as comprehensive immigration reform once again moves to thetop of the congressional agenda.

A third finding is that there is a distinction between general sentimentstoward immigrants and actual stances on immigration policy. The work ofHuntington (1983) suggests Americans’ theoretical acceptance of immigrantsdiffers from how immigrants are treated in practice, particularly when itcomes to the civic and liberal ideals of American identity, a phenomenon thathe labels the “ideas versus institutions gap.” While identification with the civicdimension plays a crucial role in mitigating the negative effects of high ethnic/cultural identification when it comes to general acceptance and positivedisposition toward immigrants, the civic dimension is associated with morerestrictive policy preferences in 1996. A final caveat is that the strongrelationship that emerged among synergistic conceptions of national identityin 1996 is more tenuous in 2004, suggesting the need to study the frameworkof national identity over time, and how this framework of national identityaffects attitudes toward immigrants at multiple points in time. These resultsindicate that Smith (1997) is right when he argues that context is important,perhaps even more so than deeper underlying attitudes about identity. Futurestudies might use qualitative tools to delve deeper into the meaning of theindicators of American national identity, their meanings, and the role thatcontext plays in observed shifts in these meanings. Finally, future studies mayincorporate a test of synergistic interactions among the attitudes towardimmigrants and national identity.


Appendix

Description of Variables

Dependent Variables Immigrants improve American society by bringing new ideas and culturesRanges from strongly agree to strongly disagreeThe number of immigrants coming to the United States each to settlepermanently should be:Ranges from increased a lot to decreased a lot

Main Independent Variable Conceptions of National IdentityRanges from not important at all to very important1996Ethnic Conceptions of National Identity:• To have been born in America• To have lived in America for most of one’s life• To be a ChristianCivic Conceptions of National Identity:• To feel American• To respect America’s political institutions• To speak English• To gain American citizenshipLiberal Conceptions of National Identity:• Pride in the way U.S. democracy works• Pride in the way groups are treated equally in the United States• Pride in American history2004Ethnic Conceptions of National Identity:• To have been born in America• To have lived in America for most of one’s life• To be a Christian• To have American citizenship• To speak English• To feel AmericanCivic Conceptions:• To respect America’s political institutionsLiberal Conceptions of National Identity:• Pride in the way U.S. democracy works• Pride in the way groups are treated equally in the United States• Pride in the history of the United States

Socioeconomic Status DEGREE—highest degree respondent holds0 = no college, 1 = college degree (BA and above)

Labor Market Threat “Immigrants take jobs away from natives”5-point Likert scaleRanges from disagree strongly to agree strongly

Nativity BORN—respondent born in the United States?0 = Yes, 1 = No

Demographics SEX, AGE, RACE, IDEOLOGYSEX, 0 = female, 1 = maleAGE, number of years oldRACE, 0 = white, 1 = nonwhite[Note: The ISSP only provides the followingoptions as a response: white, black, other]IDEOLOGY, 1 = strong liberal—7 = strong conservativePARTY ID, 1 = strong—Democrat = 7 strong Republican

Symbolic Racism “Immigrants increase crime rates”Ranges from strongly disagree to strongly agree

Continued.


Appendix (Continued)

Descriptive Statistics: 1996

Mean Standard Deviation

Ethnic/Cultural DimensionTo have been born in America 3.64 1.45To have lived in America 3.81 1.33To be a Christian 3.20 1.65Civic DimensionTo be able to speak English 4.52 .90To have American citizenship 4.55 .93To feel American 4.28 1.11To respect American law/institutions 4.44 .90Liberal DimensionPride in democracy 3.87 1.03Pride in fair treatment of groups 3.20 1.31Pride in history of America 4.14 1.08Main Independent Variables:Ethnic/cultural national identity 10.7 3.69Civic national identity 17.7 2.75Liberal national identity 11.2 2.57Dependent VariableAttitudes toward immigrants 2.49 .932

Descriptive Statistics: 2004

Mean Standard Deviation

Ethnic/Cultural DimensionTo have been born in America 4.03 1.33To have lived in America 4.17 1.19To be a Christian 3.63 1.58To be able to speak English 4.76 .65To have American citizenship 4.73 .71To feel American 4.80 .91Civic DimensionTo respect American law/institutions 4.62 .73Liberal DimensionPride in democracy 3.96 1.05Pride in fair treatment of groups 3.66 1.19Main Independent VariablesEthnic/cultural national identity 25.8 4.57Civic national identity 4.62 0.73Liberal national identity 12.1 2.29Dependent VariableAttitudes toward immigrants 2.55 .965


About the Author

Jennifer Byrne is an assistant professor at James Madison University.Jennifer’s research focuses on political behavior, in particular, the relationshipbetween identity politics and political attitudes. Her current projects focus onhow differing conceptions of American national identity among attitudestoward immigrants and how conceptions of national identity among refugeesin protracted situations shape attitudes toward possible durable solutions.

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Documents

National Identity and Attitudes toward Immigrants in a “Multicreedal” America