National Solid Wastes Management Brief

8/3/2019 National Solid Wastes Management Brief

1/35

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

NATIONAL SOLID WASTES MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION,BLUEBONNET WASTE CONTROL, INC.,IESI TX CORPORATION, REPUBLICWASTE SERVICES OF TEXAS, LTD,ALLIED WASTE SYSTEM, INC.,CAMELOT LANDFILL TX, LP, WASTEMANAGEMENT OF TEXAS, INC., WMRECYCLE AMERICA, LLC, ANDBUSINESSES AGAINST FLOW

CONTROL,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE CITY OF DALLAS, MIKERAWLINGS, PAULINE MEDRANO,TENNELL ATKINS, DWAINECARAWAY, MONICA ALONZO,CAROLYN DAVIS, JERRY ALLEN,

LINDA KOOP, AND ANGELA HUNT,

Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO.

3:11-cv-03200-O

PLAINTIFFSBRIEFINSUPPORTOFTHEIRAPPLICATION

FORAPRELIMINARYINJUNCTION

Case 3:11-cv-03200-O Document 6 Filed 11/28/11 Page 1 of 35 PageID 86


2/35

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities .................................................................................................................... iii

Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 1

Facts................................................................................................................................................ 2

Arguments and Authorities ....................................................................................................... 7

A. There is a substantial likelihood that the plaintiffs will prevail onthe merits of their claims..................................................................................................... 7

1. The Ordinance impairs the plaintiffs franchises in violation ofthe Contracts Clause of the federal constitution. .................................................... 7

2. The Ordinance is an unconstitutional exercise of the police powerbecause it restricts the franchise rights of the plaintiffs to servethe Citys financial interests. ........................................................................................ 11

3. Because the Ordinance has as its primary purpose raising revenue,its enactment was not an exercise of the police power............................................. 13

4. The Ordinance violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act.............................................. 14

a. The Ordinance will allow the City to monopolize the market

for processing recyclable materials in the City. ..................................................... 14

b. The Citys unlawful anti-competitive conduct is not excusedby the state-action exemption................................................................................... 16

5. The definition of solid waste used in the Ordinance is in conflictwith state law and is unenforceable............................................................................ 18

a. With unmistakable clarity, the Texas Legislature has signaled its intent tocomprehensively regulate solid waste and recycling activities. ......................... 18

b. The definition of solid waste used in the Ordinancedirectly conflicts with the SWDA. ........................................................................... 18

6. The Ordinance relies on a critical termrecyclable materialthe meaning ofwhich is improperly left to the complete discretion of a single city employee. ... 20



3/35

ii

7. The Ordinance fails to define a critical termrecyclable materialmaking it unconstitutionally vague. ....................................................................... 21

8. The Ordinance violates the City Charter because it was passed withoutproviding Franchisees notice and a hearing. ............................................................. 22

B. There is a substantial threat of irreparable injury if a preliminaryinjunction is not issued...................................................................................................... 23

C. The threatened injury if the preliminary injunction is not issuedoutweighs any harm that will result if the injunction is granted................................ 24

D. Granting a preliminary injunction will serve the public interest................................ 25

Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 25



4/35

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL CASES

Advocates for Arts-Based Education Corp. v. Orleans ParishSch. Board, No. 09-6607, 2010 WL 375223 (E.D. La. 2010, Jan. 26, 2010).....................8

Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,438 U.S. 234 (1978).............................................................................................................7

America Federation of State, Cnty., & Municipal Emps. v. City of Benton,513 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2008)..............................................................................................8

City of Chicago v. Morales,527 U.S. 41 (1999).............................................................................................................21

City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co.,435 U.S. 389 (1978)...........................................................................................................16

Connally v. General Construction Co.,269 U.S. 385 (1926)...........................................................................................................21

Deerfield Medical Ctr. v. City of Deerfield Beach,661 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1981)............................................................................................23

Doe v. Duncanville Independent Sch. District,994 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1993)............................................................................................23

Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.,422 U.S. 922 (1975)...........................................................................................................24

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Collins Ink Corp.,No. 11-CV-6513L, 2011 WL 5304059 (W.D.N.Y. 2011)...............................................24

Elrod v. Burns,427 U.S. 347 (1976)...........................................................................................................23

Fla. Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. City of Hollywood ,648 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1981)................................................................................23, 24, 25

Kolender v. Lawson,461 U.S. 352 (1983)...........................................................................................................21



5/35

ii

Lipscomb v. Columbus Municipal Separate Sch. District,269 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2001)..............................................................................................8

Roark & Hardee LP v. City of Austin,522 F.3d 533 (5th Cir. 2008)............................................................................................24

Six Kingdoms Enterprises, LLC v. City of El Paso,No. EP-10-CV-485-KC, 2011 WL 65864 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2011) ........................ 9-10

Stearns Airport Equipment Co. v. FMC Corp.,170 F.3d 518 (5th Cir. 1999)............................................................................................15

Surgical Care Ctr. of Hammond, L.C. v. Hospital Serv.District Number 1 of Tangipahoa Parish,171 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 1999)............................................................................................16

Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,471 U.S. 34 (1985).............................................................................................................16

U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey,431 U.S. 1 (1977).......................................................................................................7, 9, 11

United Healthcare Insurance Co. v. Davis,602 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2010)......................................................................................7, 8, 9

United States v. Carlton,512 U.S. 26 (1994)...............................................................................................................9

United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. ,351 U.S. 377 (1956)...........................................................................................................15

United States v. Grinnell Corp.,384 U.S. 563 (1966)...........................................................................................................15

University of Haw. Profl Assembly v. Cayetano,183 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 1999)............................................................................................8

Yick Wo v. Hopkins,118 U.S. 356 (1886)...........................................................................................................21

STATE CASES

Brazosport Sav. & Loan Association v. America Sav. & Loan Association,342 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. 1961)...............................................................................................8



6/35

iii

City of Beaumont v. Fall,291 S.W. 202 (Tex. 1927) .................................................................................................18

City of Brookside Village v. Comeau,633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1982).............................................................................................20

City of Jacksonville v. General Telegraph Co of the Southwest ,538 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ refd n.r.e.) .....................................8

City of Wichita Falls v. Abell,566 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1978).............................................................................................19

Cnty. of Harris v. Shepperd,291 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. 1956).............................................................................................13

Coffee City v. Thompson,

535 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Civ. App.Tyler 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).................................20

Crossman v. City of Galveston,247 S.W. 810 (Tex. 1923) .................................................................................................20

Dallas Merch.s & Concessionaires Association v. City of Dallas,852 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1993).............................................................................................18

Foster v. City of Waco,255 S.W. 1104 (Tex. 1923) .........................................................................................22, 23

Gates v. City of Dallas,704 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. 1986).............................................................................................14

Hurt v. Cooper,110 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. 1937).............................................................................................13

Lowenberg v. City of Dallas,261 S.W.3d 54 (Tex. 2008)...............................................................................................13

Spann v. City of Dallas,235 S.W. 513 (Tex. 1921) ...........................................................................................20, 21

Tex. Power & Light Co. v. City of Garland,431 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. 1968) ....................................................................................... 11-12

Tex. River Barges v. City of San Antonio,21 S.W.3d 347 (Tex. App.San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) .....................................22



7/35

iv

Willman v. City of Corsicana,213 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1948), affd, 216 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.1949) ..................................................................................................................................22

TEXAS CONSTITUTION

Tex. Const. art. VIII, 3........................................................................................................13

Tex. Const. art. II, 5............................................................................................................14

STATE STATUTES

Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 361.002(a)...................................................................18

Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 361.011(a)-(b).............................................................18

Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 361.022(b)...................................................................18

Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 361.022(b)(2) ..............................................................19

Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 361.421(5).....................................................................6

Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 363.003(9)...................................................................17


Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 363.006(b)...................................................................17


Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 363.227........................................................................17

STATE REGULATIONS

30 Tex. Admin. Code 328.2(3) ............................................................................................6

30 Tex. Admin. Code 328.4(d)............................................................................................6

30 Tex. Admin. Code 328.4(a) ..........................................................................................17

30 Tex. Admin. Code 330.3(122) ........................................................................................6



8/35

PLAINTIFFS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THEIR APPLICATION Page 1 of 35FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION518713 000002 DALLAS 2809700.5

INTRODUCTION

For decades, franchised waste haulers in the City of Dallas (the City) had the

contractually guaranteed freedom to choose among authorized facilities to dispose of

commercial solid waste and recyclable material they collected in the City based on

price, proximity, and quality of service. Haulers built businesses that compete for

customers based on that contractual right. Purporting to eliminate those contractual

rights, the City enacted, on September 28, 2011, by a 9-6 vote a controversial flow

control ordinance (the Ordinance) that criminalizes all but one choice for disposal of

solid waste and effectively outlaws recycling. Now all solid wasteswhich the City

defines to include recyclablesgenerated, found, or located within the City must be

sent to a landfill owned and operated by the City. The Ordinance does not identify, nor

was it intended to address, any current or reasonably foreseeable problem with the

collection, transportation, and disposal of solid wastes or the management of

recyclables generated or found in the City. The sole purpose of the Ordinance is to

divert revenue to the City by creating a monopoly in Dallas for solid waste disposal and

recycling. That monopoly comes at the expense of franchisees who have invested

heavily in reliance on their franchise rights and customers who will be paying more for

solid waste services. The Ordinance violates the United States and Texas Constitutions

as well as federal antitrust laws, and is preempted by state law. Its enforcement should

be enjoined.1

1 Plaintiffs brief eight reasons why the Ordinance is invalid, more than would be typically presented tosupport an application for a preliminary injunction. Here any one of the arguments alone is sufficient to

justify the requested injunction. Only the Citys rush to generate new revenue can explain the enactmentof an ordinance with so many procedural and substantive defects. For example, the three procedural



9/35


FACTS

The facts necessary for consideration of the plaintiffs application for preliminary

injunction are in large part set out in their Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and

Injunctive Relief. Those facts fall into two broad categoriesfacts establishing that the

Ordinance is a money grab and facts demonstrating that the Ordinance improperly

regulates recycling.2

Background

Members of the National Solid Wastes Management Association, all but one of

the named individual plaintiffs, and certain members of Businesses Against Flow

Control (the Franchisees) hold franchises granted by the City to engage in solid waste

collection services. All of the franchises have materially identical terms.3 All of the

franchises were created in March 2007 with 20-year terms. All Franchisee plaintiffs

have invested substantial sums in order to exercise their rights under their franchises.

In exchange for a Franchisee paying to the City 4% of its gross receipts, the

franchise grants the Franchisee the right to use the Citys streets to engage in solid

waste collection services for apartments and businesses.4 The term solid waste

collection services is defined in the Dallas Code of Ordinances to include removing,

transporting, and disposing.5 Franchisees thus have an absolute right to contract with

commercial customers (apartments and businesses) located in the City to collect their

problems discussed are so glaring that only limited explanation is needed to demonstrate the plaintiffslikelihood of prevailing on the merits.2 Plaintiffs intend to submit affidavits, deposition transcripts, and/or live testimony at the hearing toestablish the facts relied upon in this brief and in the Complaint, most of which are beyond dispute.3 See the franchise of one of the plaintiffs at Appendix (App) at 44-81.4 Except for one brief period, the City has always itself directly provided solid waste disposal servicesmeaning collection, transportation, and disposal of wastesto single-family residences in the City.5 The Municipal Solid Wastes Chapter of the Dallas Code of Ordinances can be found at App. at 1-42.



10/35


wastes and recyclable materials and send them to an appropriate facility. Relying on

those rights, the Franchisees have built businesses that offer combinations of collection,

transportation, disposal, and recycling services, all in a free and open marketplace. The

freedom to choose among competing disposal sites and recycling facilitiesincluding

their ownhas been integral to the Franchisees ability to offer lower prices to

apartments and businesses than otherwise possible. The Franchisees right to select

among disposal sites and recycling facilities has also shaped the revenue and profit

expectations on which they based their business plans.

Solid waste collection services for apartments and businesses in the City, which

include a significant recycling component, have been provided by private companies in

the manner just described for decades. The City has never before tried to dictate where

to send commercial waste or recyclable material generated or found in the City. The

City had been content to let the free market and state regulations control. No

complaints have been made about those arrangements. In short, at the time the current

franchises were approved, the Franchisees had a reasonable investment-backed

expectation that they would be able to send commercial waste and recyclable material

wherever they chose during the term of the franchise.

Money Grab Facts

So why the change? Immediately before voting on the Ordinance, City Council

members candidly identified capturing money leaving the City as the reason to pass it.6

6 A transcript of these statements can be found in the App. at 82-102.



11/35


Given the last word before calling the vote, Mayor Rawlings dismissed any other

considerations and identified the single purpose at stake:

Mayor Rawlings made it clear: This is a business revenue issue, andcorporations outside of Dallas are making money off of [it]. According

to Mayor Rawlings, the flow control ordinance was about one thing - -who deserves that revenue. Should it be the owners of the landfillsoutside the city, or should it be the taxpayers. Thats the fundamentalissue. Im going to vote for the taxpayers. I believe we - - everybody inthis room that lives in Dallas, if you have a business in Dallas, deservesthat and not a private enterprise.

Other Council Members had sounded the same theme:

Council Member Allen: Trash is value. Its a valuable commodity. Its a

valuable asset to anyone. And its big business.

Council Member Kadane: We need the funds and I think its a good wayto get it. And I think we can get some of our funds through this.

Council Member Caraway: Its [trash] going somewhere if not at thisparticular location, it will go somewhere. Now the somewhere is who willreceive the benefit - - us or someone else? Opportunity come along,sometimes we got to grin and bear it.

This purpose had long been recognized. A November 8, 2010, email between

Department of Sanitation employees Rick White and Ron Smith agreed that the

Ordinance is about revenue:

We can disguise and misdirect the issue all we want, but the reality is the6th bullet. Increase revenue to Sanitation Services. In a city that usedto take pride in being business friendly this might not fly as the primaryreason to implement flow control.

Most recently, Mayor Rawlings had this to say about the Ordinance at a

November 21, 2011, community forum held at Cedar Crest Golf Course as reported in

the Dallas Observer:



12/35


When flow control came up next, Rawlings defended that decision too. Hecalled McCommas Bluff the best landfill in the state of Texas, adding, Itsworld-class. Its a beautiful place. And he wants it to make as muchmoney for the city as possible, he said. Im a Dallas person. I dont likesomebody making money off of us. Ive been accused of caring too muchabout money, but I want that money for Dallas. He promised too that flow

control would act as a checkbook for economic development in [SouthDallas], including those grocery stores. We need money to spur thateconomic growth, he said.

In the Citys view the Ordinance will generate $15,000,000 to $18,000,000

annually in new revenue. By resolution adopted the same day as the Ordinance, the

City has already committed up to $1,000,000 of that total for unspecified economic

development projects in the southern section of the City.

Recycling Facts

The Franchisees currently collect thousands of tons per year of recyclables from

their Dallas customers and deliver the recyclables for processing both within and

outside the City. The Ordinance would criminalize that recycling unless a franchisee

can prove that it is hauling solely recyclable materials. Given that incidental waste is

present in virtually all recyclable loads, the Ordinance will shut down commercial

recycling in the City.

This result flows from two facts. First, the Citys Director of Sanitation has never

defined the term recyclable materials as required under the sanitation section 18-2(39)

of the Dallas Code of Ordinances.7 Without a definition, the Franchisees have no way

of knowing whether or in what circumstances they could ever gain protection under the

solely recyclable materials defense. Even if a definition of recyclable materials

7 Because the City has never previously restricted where recyclable materials can be sent, the absence ofa definition has been unimportant.



13/35


existed, the fact that the defense only applies to wastes that are solely recyclable

materials will effectively eliminate recycling from apartments and businesses in the

City.

Currently, the plaintiffs collection, transportation, and processing of recyclable

material is governed by state law that makes clear that recyclable materials are not a

solid waste.8 Additionally, state law recognizes that virtually no recycling stream will

contain only recyclable materials. Therefore, recyclable materials that contain as much

as 10% non-recyclable materials by volume or weight remain recyclable materials and

are not a solid waste.9 The City has made clear that contrary to state law it intends to

treat any recyclable material that contains even a trace amount of non-recyclable

material as solid waste that must be sent to the Citys landfill. As stated by the Citys

Director of Sanitation at a meeting held on Monday, November 14, 2011, to discuss with

franchisees implementation of the Ordinance:

Any trucks that are picking up loads that have less than solely recyclablematerial on it [which could include one banana peel] should go to thelandfill.

The Director of Sanitation concededat the same meetingthat the effect of that

interpretation will be the elimination of commercial recycling in the City, because as a

practical matter it is impossible to remove all non-recyclable material from recyclable

materials and the City has no recycling operations currently or in the foreseeable future.

8 Under the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act, if a material is recyclable it is not solid waste. Tex. Health &Safety Code 361.421(5) (Recyclable material is not solid waste unless it is a hazardous waste); 30 Tex.Admin. Code 330.3(122) (Recyclable material is not a solid waste)9 30 Tex. Admin. Code 328.2(3), 328.4(d).



14/35


Compliance with the Ordinance will require material that is being delivered to

recycling facilities today to be sent starting January 2, 2012, to the Citys landfill.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

A. There is a substantial likelihood that the plaintiffs will prevail on the meritsof their claims.1. The Ordinance impairs the plaintiffs franchises in violation of the

Contracts Clause of the federal constitution.

The Ordinance strips the Franchisees of their vital contractual right to determine

where to dispose of solid waste and process recyclable materials. Article I, Section 10 of

the United States Constitution prohibits state laws (including municipal ordinances)

that impair the obligation of contracts without sufficient justification. When the State or

city impairs a contract that is between a private party and the governmental entity,

courts must give heightened scrutiny to the asserted public purpose. U.S. Trust Co. of

N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 2526 (1977). The Supreme Court has made it clear, in

other words, that the typical deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and

necessity is not appropriate when the governmental entitys self-interest is at stake. Id.

Plaintiffs Contracts Clause claim has three elements. First, does the Ordinance

substantially impair the rights of the Franchises? Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,

438 U.S. 234, 260 (1978); United Healthcare Ins. Co. v. Davis, 602 F.3d 618, 627-628 (5th Cir.

2010). Second, taking a hard look at the justification advanced by the City, does the

Ordinance serve an asserted significant and legitimate public purpose? United

Healthcare, 602 F.3d at 627-28. Finally, does the Ordinance serve the asserted public

purpose in a manner that is both reasonable and necessary? Id. If impairment exists



15/35


and either condition two or three is not met, the Ordinance is unconstitutional.10

Plaintiffs have the burden on impairment, but the City has the burden to show elements

two and three are met. Id.11

The Ordinance indisputably impairs the plaintiffs rights under their franchises,

which contracts are considered vested rights. Brazosport Sav. & Loan Assn v. Am. Sav. &

Loan Assn, 342 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. 1961); City of Jacksonville v. Gen. Tel. Co of the Sw. ,

538 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Tex. Civ. App.Tyler 1976, writ refd n.r.e.). Unconstitutional

impairment does not require total destruction of contract expectations. United

Healthcare, 602 F.3d at 628. The court must consider how specific terms are affected and

for how long. Lipscomb v. Columbus Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 269 F.3d 494, 504 (5th Cir.

2001). Here, by effectively rescinding a crucial term of the franchisenamely the right

of the franchisee to choose where to send waste or recyclables on the basis of price,

location, and servicethe Ordinance extinguishes a right on which the plaintiffs

justifiably relied in building and operating their businesses. Constrained by a web of

contractual and other obligations to their own customers and employees, the plaintiffs

now face significant harm to their businesses because they can no longer choose where

to send solid waste or recyclable materials. This harm is even more acute for those

Franchisees who operate landfills and recycling facilities, either directly or through

10 Courts have not been reluctant to enjoin statutes and ordinances when such a showing is made. See,

e.g.,Am. Fedn of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps. v. City of Benton, 513 F.3d 874, 882 (8th Cir. 2008) (affirminginjunction against citys attempt to terminate contractually guaranteed health benefits to City employees);Univ. of Haw. Profl Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming injunction oflegislation that would have authorized lags in pay intervals to university employees);Advocates for Arts-Based Educ. Corp. v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. No. 09-6607, 2010 WL 375223, at *4 (E.D. La. 2010, Jan. 26, 2010)(implementation of 2% administrative fee on charter school grant contract was substantial impairment).11 In United Healthcare, the Fifth Circuit affirmed enjoining a statute requiring the state to contract withonly state health maintenance organizations because it impaired existing contracts and did not remedyany social problems.



16/35


affiliates. Moreover, the Ordinance will not have merely a temporary effect. It will

bind Franchisees for a long period if not enjoinedthe remaining 16 years of their

franchises and beyond. The impairment imposed by the Ordinance is unquestionably

substantial.

The Ordinance does not advance a significant and legitimate public purpose.

Justifications for contractual impairments that the Supreme Court has found to be

acceptable have been exercises of the states sovereign authority to protect its citizens

and prevent abuses of its contracts. United Healthcare, 602 F.3dat 631. No such

justification is present here. Rather, as described in the presentation of facts, the

Ordinances only actual goal is to generate revenue for the City. Revenue raising in the

context of the taxing power can certainly be a legitimate legislative purpose. United

States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 40 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). But it can

never be a significant and legitimate reason for a law such as the Ordinance,

purportedly adopted under the police power, which substantially impairs a contract

between the lawmaking governmental unit and a private party. If it were, in the words

of the Supreme Court the Contracts Clause would provide no protection at all. Trust

Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 26.

The Ordinance having no legitimate and significant purpose, the Court need not

reach the final element of the plaintiffs contract-impairment claim. But if the Court

were to take the required hard look at the non-revenue reasons advanced by the City

for the Ordinance, it could only conclude that creating a waste-disposal monopoly is

neither reasonable nor necessary to achieve any of the Citys stated objectives. Six



17/35


Kingdoms Enters., LLC v. City of El Paso, No. EP-10-CV-485-KC, 2011 WL 65864, at *8

(W.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2011) (court found requirements of City ordinance were neither

necessary nor reasonable to achieve the purpose of the ordinanceeliminating animal

euthanizationbased on the evidence presented).

The Ordinances prefatory language identifies five reasons in addition to

revenue-raising for its adoption. Each one is counterfactual and even pretextual. Three

of the reasons(1) insuring safe and proper handling of solid waste; (2) providing

environmentally sound, cost-efficient solid waste management; and (3) deterring illegal

dumping of solid wasteare already addressed by existing state regulations.12 Given

the cradle-to-grave regulatory system governing the collection, transportation, and

disposal of solid wastes generated in the City, requiring that all wastes go to the City

landfill instead of to other landfills subject to the same regulatory requirements cannot

conceivably be justified by reference to regulatory concerns. Indeed, during the

Councils debate on the measure, no member identified any health or safety problems

with the current system for commercial waste disposal. To the contrary, because the

disposal fee charged at the Citys landfill and transfer station is higher than the fee

charged at other nearby legally permitted landfills, the Ordinance will increase the total

costs of disposal, thereby encouraging unsafe and environmentally damaging illegal

dumping.

12 The regulations governing municipal solid waste are found in Chapter 330 of Title 30 of the TexasAdministrative Code. Initial collection and transportation is governed by subchapter C, consolidation bysubchapters A and E, landfills by subchapters B, D, F, H, I, J, K, M, and N, providing financial assuranceto deal with the closure of landfills and any environmental problems they create by subchapters L and Rof Chapter 37, reporting obligations by subchapter P, and control of air emissions by subchapter U.



18/35


The City also claims in that prefatory language that the Ordinance will increase

recycling of solid wastes. As plaintiffs demonstrate in their presentation of the facts,

the Ordinance will actually materially decrease recycling because few, if any, loads of

recyclable material contain solely recyclable material.

The final non-revenue reason advanced by the City - facilitating data

development - is just as counterfactual as the others. The City already receives at its

landfill an enormous amount of waste generated or found in the City. No obvious

reason exists why more wastes will generate better, as opposed to simply more, data.

The Citys asserted non-revenue reasons for the Ordinance do not survive a

glancing assessment, much less the hard look the City must overcome when it

attempts to legislate away its own contractual commitments. Nor is there any evidence

that the City considered options short of eviscerating franchise rights to advance its

purported goals. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 30-31. The Ordinance unconstitutionally

impairs the franchises.

2. The Ordinance is an unconstitutional exercise of the police powerbecause it restricts the franchise rights of the plaintiffs to serve theCitys financial interests.

The Ordinance also violates Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution,

commonly known as the due course of law provision, because the City adopted it to

limit competition and for the Citys own financial gain. That is not a reasonable or

legitimate exercise of the police power. Tex. Power & Light Co. v. City of Garland, 431

S.W.2d 511, 517 (Tex. 1968).



19/35


In City of Garland, both the city and Texas Power & Light Company (TP&L)

offered electrical service to city residents. Id. at 513. TP&L operated in the city under a

1915 franchise that did not limit where it could provide service. Id. In 1949, the city

adopted an ordinance that required TP&L to obtain a permit before it could install

infrastructure to expand service and established a number of permitting standards. Id.

In 1965, TP&L sought authorization from the city to expand its infrastructure to supply

electrical power to a 118-unit apartment complex under construction. Id. The city

denied the request because it wanted its own electric utility to serve the area. Id.

The Texas Supreme Court had little difficulty concluding that the 1949 ordinance

was not a reasonable exercise of the police power. The Court found that the terms of

the ordinance were instead aimed directly at the advancement of the Citys economic

and proprietary interests, and have for their purpose the elimination of the Company

as a competitor. Id. at 518. In words that speak directly to the Citys action here, the

court admonished:

Essential franchise rights cannot be taken under a pretense of regulationdesigned to gain a competitive advantage to the City acting in itsproprietary capacity. The City has no right to barter with the policepower. When the City authorized the extension of the franchise, itcontractually submitted itself to economic competition. Conversely, theCompany received rights protected by Article 1, 19 of the TexasConstitution.

Id. at 518-19. Because the 1949 ordinance did not genuinely serve to protect public

health, safety, morals or welfare, the alteration of the franchisees rights was forbidden.

Id. at 518-20.



20/35


The plaintiffs here are threatened with the same harms faced by TP&L in City of

Garland. The Ordinance will eliminate the Franchisees as competitors in the market for

the disposal of solid wastes and the processing of recyclables generated in the City.

And the Citys purpose is, just as it was in City of Garland, to advance its own economic

and proprietary interests, not to further public health, safety, or welfare. The City is

seizing a business opportunitythe right to select and provide disposal and recycling

servicesthat it previously granted the Franchisees, to their detriment and the

detriment of other franchisees and their customers that receive lower-priced disposal

and recycling services today. As discussed above, there is no other factually defensible

reason for the Ordinance. Purporting to exercise the police power for competitive

advantage and pecuniary gain to the detriment of a citys franchisees violates the due

course of law provision of the Texas Constitution.

3. Because the Ordinance has as its primary purpose raising revenue, itsenactment was not an exercise of the police power.

When the primary purpose of a municipal ordinance is raising revenue rather

than regulating conduct for health, safety, and welfare reasons, the city is exercising its

taxing power, not its police power. Lowenberg v. City of Dallas, 261 S.W.3d 54, 57-58

(Tex. 2008); Cnty. of Harris v. Shepperd, 291 S.W.2d 721, 723-24 (Tex. 1956); Hurt v. Cooper,

110 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex. 1937). An ordinance that imposes a tax is lawful only if a

general law authorizes it. See Shepperd, 291 S.W.2d at 723; TEX.CONST. art. VIII, 3.

The Lowenberg case is particularly instructive. There, the City of Dallas, faced in

1995 with difficult economic conditions similar to current circumstances, adopted an

ordinance requiring owners of commercial buildings to pay a fee to generate funds for



21/35


fire-protection services. Id. at 56. The Texas Supreme Court recognized that the

ordinance advanced legitimate health, safety, and welfare concerns by facilitating

collection of fire-safety information for a database used in fire-prevention efforts. Id. at

59. The court was also willing to assume that all money generated would be used only

to enhance fire protection of commercial buildings. Id. at 58. The court nonetheless

readily concluded that because the fee imposed by the ordinance would generate

revenue greatly exceeding any regulatory costs, the ordinance actually was a forbidden

tax:

Though the City is a home rule municipal corporation with broad powersof self-government, Gates v. City of Dallas, 704 S.W.2d 737, 738 (Tex. 1986);TEX. CONST. art. II, 5, it cannot impose regulatory fees that are reallytaxes prohibited by the Constitution.

Id. Here, as already demonstrated, the primary if not the only purpose of the Ordinance

is revenue generation. And it is revenue that will be largely derived from the plaintiffs

who generate solid waste in the City who will pay as a tax in the form of higher fees. It

follows that enactment of the Ordinance was not an exercise of the police power but

instead an attempt to impose taxes prohibited by the Constitution.

4. The Ordinance violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act.a. The Ordinance will allow the City to monopolize the market for

processing recyclable materials in the City.

Certain plaintiffs operate recycling facilities that process recyclables from the

City. The Ordinance will eliminate this business because it establishes the Citys landfill

as the sole repository for all wastes, including recyclable materials, generated, found, or

located in the City. Those plaintiffs must prove two elements to establish that the



22/35


monopoly created by the Ordinance violates section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2:

(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful

acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development

as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. United

States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 57071 (1966).

If the Ordinance is allowed to take effect, the City will assume complete

monopoly power over the market for processing recyclable materials generated in the

City, which by the terms of the Ordinance is the relevant market. The City has

criminalized the delivery of recyclable materials generated in the City to privately-

owned companies. Monopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude

competition. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).

Under the Ordinance, competition in the relevant market, the City, is not only excluded,

it is illegal. 13

The Citys acquisition of monopoly power is willful and not the product of

successful competition. Illegal exclusionary conduct under section 2 is the creation or

maintenance of monopoly by means other than the competition on the merits. Stearns

Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 522 (5th Cir. 1999). Through the

Ordinance, the City seeks to achieve complete monopoly power over the relevant

market by outlawing competition. Such overt anti-competitive behavior is the essence of

a Section 2 monopolization claim.

13 The Ordinances defense to prosecution for loads composed solely of recyclable materials does notameliorate its anti-competitive effects. As noted previously, even source-separated loads of recyclablematerials contain incidental amounts of solid waste.



23/35


b. The Citys unlawful anti-competitive conduct is not excused bythe state-action exemption.

A municipality is bound by the requirements of the Sherman Act unless it can

demonstrate that its anti-competitive behavior is authorized by the state government

pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public

service. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412 (1978). A

municipality may claim this state action exemption from federal antitrust laws only if

the state policy to displace competition is clearly articulated and affirmatively

expressed, and the municipalitys anticompetitive actions are of a sort

contemplated by the policy. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 44 (1985)

(quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415). While a statute need not explicitly state an intent to

displace competition, id. at 4344, an intent to insulate municipalities from Sherman Act

liability must be fairly signaled. Surgical Care Ctr. of Hammond, L.C. v. Hosp. Serv. Dist.

No. 1 of Tangipahoa Parish, 171 F.3d 231, 233 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc).

Far from clearly and affirmatively authorizing municipalities to monopolize the

processing of recyclable materials generated within their territorial boundaries, the

Texas Legislature has expressly excluded recyclable materials from statutes authorizing

municipalities to regulate the disposal of solid waste. Municipalities have some

statutory authority over solid wastes (subject to constitutional and statutory

constraints). They may adopt rules for regulating solid waste collection, handling,

transportation, storage, processing, and disposal. Tex. Health & Safety Code

363.111(a). And they may choose to operate a solid waste management system. Id.

363.117.



24/35


But the power of municipalities to regulate solid waste disposal does not extend

to recyclable materials. Texas law makes clear that recyclable material is by definition

not a solid waste. See supra note 8. Moreover, the same chapter of the Health and Safety

Code that grants municipalities authority over solid waste expressly excludes recyclable

materials from its coverage. Id. 363.006(b) (Materials that are separated or recovered

from solid waste for reuse or recycling by the generator, by a private person under

contract with the generator, or by a collector of solid waste or recovered materials are

not subject to this chapter.) (emphasis supplied). And no solid waste permit is needed to

process recyclable materials. See 30 Tex. Admin. Code 328.4(a). The Ordinance is thus

unprotected by the state-action exemption.

What is more, Texas law expressly recognizes the valuable role that private

companies play in the States recycling strategy, finding that the government will

benefit from cooperation with private business[es] that have acquired knowledge,

expertise, and technology in the fields of . . . recycling, reuse, reclamation, and collection

of materials. Tex. Health & Safety Code 363.003(9). Thus, the Legislature clarified

that its laws governing municipal solid waste d[o] not prohibit or limit a person from

extracting or using materials that the person generates or legally collects or acquires for

recycling or resale. Id. 363.006(a). Certain plaintiffs regularly collect or acquire

recyclable materials from their customers in the City and thus have the right under state

law to take them where they want for recycling or resale. The City cannot legally

create a monopoly that destroys that right.



25/35


5. The definition of solid waste used in the Ordinance is in conflict withstate law and is unenforceable.

a. With unmistakable clarity, the Texas Legislature has signaled itsintent to comprehensively regulate solid waste and recyclingactivities.

The Solid Waste Disposal Act provides that its purpose is to protect the public

and the environment by controlling the management of solid waste and reducing

solid waste through recycling. Tex. Health & Safety Code 361.002(a), 361.022(b). In

the SWDA, the Texas Legislature vested the Texas Commission on Environmental

Quality (TCEQ) with broad jurisdiction over municipal solid waste: the TCEQ shall

accomplish the purposes of this chapter by controlling all aspects of the management of

municipal solid waste . . . [and] has the powers and duties specifically prescribed by

this chapter relating to municipal solid waste management . . . and all other powers

necessary or convenient to carry out those responsibilities under this chapter. Id.

361.011(a)-(b) (emphasis added). Accordingly, any attempt by the City to regulate

solid waste or recycling activity cannot conflict with the SWDA or with TCEQ

regulations promulgated under authority of the SWDA.

b. The definition of solid waste used in the Ordinance directlyconflicts with the SWDA.

The Ordinance directly conflicts with state law in two ways. It treats all

recyclable materials as solid waste when state law does not. It also treats recyclable

material that contains any amount of non-recyclable material as solid waste when state

law does not. The City is without authority to pass an ordinance that directly conflicts

with state law. Dallas Merch.s & Concessionaires Assn v. City of Dallas, 852 S.W.2d 489,

491 (Tex. 1993) (citing City of Beaumont v. Fall, 291 S.W. 202 (Tex. 1927)). If the state law



26/35


and the local ordinance have the same purpose but impose different requirements, the

conflict is direct. City of Wichita Falls v. Abell, 566 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Tex. 1978).

In Abell, the Texas Supreme Court upheld a determination that a municipal

ordinance was unconstitutional and void because the ordinance used a different

measurement than a state statute regulating the same conduct. Id. at 337. The City of

Wichita Falls provided a method for measuring the distance between businesses with

alcohol sales and churches, schools, and hospitals that differed from the method

provided for in the Texas Alcohol and Beverage Code. Id. The court noted that that the

citys alteration of the method of computing the distance made illegal some

establishments legal under state law. Id. at 339. The Supreme Court found that the

conflict between the ordinance and state law rendered the ordinance unconstitutional.

Id.

Both the SWDA and the Ordinance regulate solid wastejust as the Texas

Alcohol and Beverage Code and the Wichita Falls ordinance regulated liquor sales.

And just as the Wichita Falls ordinance made certain establishments legal under state

law illegal under the ordinance, the definition of solid waste in the Ordinance makes

material not a solid waste under state law a solid waste in the City. That conflict is

direct and irreconcilable, and, therefore, the Ordinance is void.

Finally, the Ordinance has the effect of discouraging recycling in favor of

landfilling. That outcome is contrary to the statutory requirement that recycling be

preferred over landfilling and resource recovery. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.

361.022(b)(2). The Ordinance is therefore not acceptable local regulation because it is



27/35


not ancillary to and in harmony with the general scope and purpose of the state

enactment. City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790, 796 (Tex. 1982).

6. The Ordinance relies on a critical termrecyclable materialthemeaning of which is improperly left to the complete discretion of a

single city employee.

According to the Dallas Code of Ordinances, section 18-2(39), recyclable

material is [a]ny material or product designated in writing by the director of

sanitation as being suitable for re-use and/or recycling. That delegation to the

sanitation director is standardless. [B]eing suitable for re-use and/or recycling is

circular as a description of recyclable material. It amounts to no more than I know it

when I see it or it is what it is.

The Texas Supreme Court has been clear that a municipalitys standardless

delegation violates the due course of law provision of the Texas Constitution. Spann v.

City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 517 (Tex. 1921); Crossman v. City of Galveston, 247 S.W. 810,

815 (Tex. 1923). Those two decisions were relied on in Coffee City v. Thompson, 535

S.W.2d 758, 763 (Tex. Civ. App.Tyler 1976, writ refd n.r.e.), to declare a zoning

ordinance invalid because it improperly delegated standardless discretionary authority

to a city official to issue or deny building permits. As the Court noted:

The ordinance does not provide any criteria or guidelines for the citysecretary to follow in granting or refusing building permits; and,therefore, it must be implied that the city secretary has discretionary

authority without restriction in issuing or denying such permits. Anordinance leaving the question of issuing or denying building permits to thearbitrary discretion or determination of the city secretary without any rule orstandard to follow is invalid.

Id. (emphasis supplied).



28/35


The Texas Supreme Court observed in Spann that the need for conditioned

delegation exists because the very essence of American Constitutions is that the

material rights of no man shall be subject to the mere will of another. Spann, 235 S.W.

at 517 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). Here, the existence of a crucial

defense to a criminal ordinance is left entirely to the whim and unbridled discretion of

the Citys Director of Sanitation. The due course of law provision of the Texas

Constitution prohibits that approach.

7. The Ordinance fails to define a critical termrecyclable materialmaking it unconstitutionally vague.

A criminal ordinance is void for vagueness if it fails to provide adequate notice

of what is and is not criminalized and the guidelines by which the ordinance will be

applied. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999). Moreover, the absence of

any definition means there are no guidelines necessary to prevent arbitrary and

discriminatory enforcement of the law. Id. at 6465 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.

352, 357 (1983)). Because the Citys Director of Sanitation has never defined recyclable

material, even though directed to do so, the plaintiffs must necessarily guess at its

meaning. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). That the Citys Director

of Sanitation can change that meaning on a whim and with unbridled discretion allows

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement in violation of the due process clause of the

14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.



29/35


8. The Ordinance violates the City Charter because it was passed withoutproviding Franchisees notice and a hearing.

The City [cannot] perform a governmental function in any manner contrary to

the express provisions of its charter. Willman v. City of Corsicana, 213 S.W.2d 155, 157

(Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1948), affd, 216 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1949). All acts beyond the

scope of the powers granted are void. Foster v. City of Waco, 255 S.W. 1104, 105-06 (Tex.

1923). Indeed, a charters grant of power will be strictly construed, and if any fair,

substantial and reasonable doubt exists as to any power, it is to be resolved against the

corporation and the power denied. Tex. River Barges v. City of San Antonio, 21 S.W.3d

347, 354-55 (Tex. App.San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) (quotations omitted).

Here, the Citys Charter mandates that [t]he city council shall provide for a fair

hearing to any . . . business entity enjoying a public service franchise in the City of

Dallas, prior to the change in the rates, rules, or regulations applicable to such

franchise. City of Dallas Charter, Ch. XIV 7 (emphasis added).14 The Ordinance

imposes a significant new rul[e] or regulatio[n] applicable to such franchise by

requiring all franchisees to send waste, including recyclable materials, to a City-owned

and operated facility, or be subject to a criminal penalty. The City did not provide any

fair hearing as described in the franchises to Franchisees before imposing the new

requirements of the Ordinance.

The Texas Supreme Court has consistently held that a citys action in violation of

the procedures prescribed in its charter is void ab initio. E.g., Willman, 213 S.W.2d at 161

14 The relevant section of the Citys Charter is at App. at 103-109. Pursuant to the Franchise Agreement,this hearing shall afford the Franchisee rudimentary due process in an individualized hearing withrequisite notice. App. at 34, 79.



30/35


(holding that [s]ince the city prescribed in its charter the manner in which the power

granted should be performed, such method must be followed, and citys failure to

follow express provisions in passing the ordinance rendered it void); Foster, 255 S.W. at

1105 (Since the charter of the city has specially provided for [how the city may incur

debts and] . . . the notes and contract were not executed in substantial compliance with

[those methods], they are void.). In the absence of a fair hearing, the Ordinance is

void.

B. There is a substantial threat of irreparable injury if a preliminary injunction isnot issued.

Violation of a partys constitutional rights results in irreparable harm as a matter

of law, therefore satisfying the irreparable injury prerequisite for obtaining a

preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 37374, 375 (1976)

(plurality and concurring opinions) (affirming grant of preliminary injunctive relief

based on irreparable injury from threatened constitutional violation); Doe v. Duncanville

Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 1993) (the existence of an irreparable injury

follows from the finding that there is a likely constitutional violation); Deerfield Med.

Ctr. v. City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 338 (5th Cir. 1981) (the loss of First

Amendment rights for even a minimal period of time constitutes irreparable harm);

Fla. Businessmen for Free Enter. v. City of Hollywood, 648 F.2d 956, 958 (5th Cir. 1981)

(same). For that reason alone, a preliminary injunction is proper given the plaintiffs

likelihood of succeeding on the merits of their constitutional claims, as discussed above.

Furthermore, as explained in the complaint and as will be shown at the hearing,

to comply with the Ordinance the plaintiffs must make immediate and significant



31/35


changes in the conduct of their businesses, with criminal penalties and possible loss of

their franchises attached to noncompliance. Those changes will mean higher costs for

their services, only some of which will be passed on to customers, meaning some will be

absorbed, and loss of revenue for affiliated operations. Those impacts likewise establish

a threat of irreparable harm sufficient to warrant a preliminary injunction. Doran v.

Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975); Roark & Hardee LP v. City of Austin, 522 F.3d 533,

545 (5th Cir. 2008); Fla. Businessmen, 648 F.2d at 968 n.2.

C. The threatened injury if the preliminary injunction is not issued outweighsany harm that will result if the injunction is granted.

When a preliminary injunction is directed toward a city ordinance that has not

yet taken effect, the potential harm to the city from delaying enforcement of the

ordinance is at most slight. Fla. Businessmen, 648 F.2d 956, 959 (5th Cir. 1981). In this

case, as explained previously, private companies have disposed of solid waste

generated at the Citys apartments and commercial buildings for decades, without even

a suggestion that this practice causes harm to the public health, safety, or welfare. Nor

could there be such a suggestion, as the same rules apply to collection, transportation,

and disposal regardless of what landfill is used. There can be no potential harm in

continuing current practices while this lawsuit is pending. See Eastman Kodak Co. v.

Collins Ink Corp., No. 11-CV-6513L, 2011 WL 5304059, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (an

injunction that merely preserves the status quo that has existed for many years poses

little risk of harm). Thus, the potential harm to the plaintiffs if an injunction is not

granted far outweighs the harm (if any) to the City or the public if the Ordinance is

preliminary enjoined.



32/35


D. Granting a preliminary injunction will serve the public interest.For the same reasons, the public interest will not be disserved by an injunction.

In fact, enjoining enforcement of the Ordinance will serve the public interest by

preventing the drastic reduction in recycling that is sure to result if the Ordinance

becomes effective. If a substantial likelihood exists that a citys ordinance will be

declared invalid, the public interest also disfavors the city expending public resources

attempting to enforce the ordinance. Fla. Businessmen, 648 F.2d at 959. Granting an

injunction here will serve the public interest.

CONCLUSION

Having decided trash is no longer a nuisance but treasure, the City through the

Ordinance seeks to capture that value by unconstitutionally impairing franchises, using

its police power improperly, acting outside of its police power, and creating an illegal

monopoly. The Ordinance should be enjoined.



33/35


Dated: November __, 2011Respectfully submitted,

THOMPSON & KNIGHT LLP

By: /s/James B. HarrisJames B. HarrisState Bar No. 09065400

Stephen F. FinkState Bar No. 07013500

1722 Routh Street, Suite 1500Dallas, Texas 75201(214) 969-1700 TELEPHONE NO.

(214) 969-1751 FAX NO.Email: [email protected]

ATTORNEYS FOR NATIONAL SOLIDWASTES MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION,BLUEBONNET WASTE CONTROL, INC., IESITX CORPORATION, and BUSINESSESAGAINST FLOW CONTROL



34/35


BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.

By: /s/Ryan Bangert (by permission)Aaron M. StreettState Bar No. 24037561

910 Louisiana StreetHouston, Texas 77002(713) 229-1855 TELEPHONE NO.(713) 229-7855 FAX NO.

Ryan BangertState Bar No. 24045446

2001 Ross AvenueDallas, Texas 75201

(214) 953-6915 TELEPHONE NO.(214) 661-4915 FAX NO.

ATTORNEYS FOR WASTE MANAGEMENTOF TEXAS, INC., and WM RECYCLEAMERICA, LLC

JACKSON WALKER L.L.P.

By: Charles L. Babcock (by permission)

Charles L. Chip BabcockTexas State Bar No. 01479500

Patrick R. CowlishawTexas State Bar No. 04932700

901 Main Street, Suite 6000Dallas, Texas 75202(214) 953-6000 TELEPHONE NO.(214) 953-5822 FAX NO.Email: pcowlishaw @jw.com

ATTORNEYS FOR REPUBLIC WASTESERVICES OF TEXAS, LTD., ALLIEDWASTE SYSTEMS, INC., and CAMELOTLANDFILL TX, LP.



35/35

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on the 28th day of November 2011, I served the foregoing ondefendants by email to Chris Caso, Assistant City Attorney for the City of Dallas, asagreed to by Mr. Caso.

/s/James B. HarrisJames B. Harris


Documents

National Solid Wastes Management Brief